BAIL

Q: After Alma had started serving her sentence for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), she filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, citing Vaca v. CA where the sentence of imprisonment of a party found guilty of violation of BP 22
was reduced to a fine equal to double the amount of the check involved. She prayed that her sentence be similarly
modified and that she be immediately released from detention. In the alternative, she prayed that pending determination
on whether the Vaca ruling applies to her, she be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102, Sec.14, which provides that if
a person is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not punishable by death, he may
be admitted to bail in the discretion of the court. Accordingly, the trial court allowed Alma to post bail and then ordered her
release. In your opinion, is the order of the trial court correct?

a. Under Rule 102?

A: No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court (Habeas Courpus) does not authorize a court to discharge by writ of
habeas corpus a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.

b. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure? (2008 Bar)

A: No. The trial court’s order releasing Alma on bail even after judgment against her has become final and in fact she has
started serving sentence, is a brazen disregard of the mandate in Section 24, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that:
“In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence” (People v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No.
149723, October 27, 2006).

Q: When is bail a matter of right and when is it a matter of discretion? (1999, 2006 Bar)

A: Bail is a matter of right: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court; (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment (Sec. 4, Rule 114); and (c) if the charge involves a capital
offense and the evidence of guilt is not strong (Sec. 7, Rule 114).

Bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment (Sec. 5, Rule 114).

Q: When the accused is entitled as a matter of right to bail, may the court refuse to grant him bail on the ground that there
exists a high degree of probability the he will abscond or escape? Explain. (1999 Bar)

A: If bail is a matter of right, it cannot be denied on the ground that there exists a high degree of probability that the
accused will abscond or escape. What the court can do is to increase the amount of the bail. One of the guidelines that
the judge may use in fixing a reasonable amount of bail is the probability of the accused appearing in trial (Sec 9[g], Rule
114, as amended by Circular No. 12-94.)

Q: At the Public Attorney's Office station in Taguig where you are assigned, your work requires you to act as public
defender at the local Regional Trial Court and to handle cases involving indigents. In one other case, an indigent mother
seeks assistance for her 14-year old son who has been arrested and detained for malicious mischief. Would an
application for bail be the appropriate remedy or is there another remedy available? Justify your chosen remedy and
outline the appropriate steps to take. (2013 Bar)

A: Yes. An application for bail is an appropriate remedy to secure provisional remedy of the 14-year old boy. Under the
Rules, bail is a matter of right before or even after conviction before the MTC which has jurisdiction over the crime of
malicious mischief (Sec. 4, Rule 114). Consequently, bail can be posted as a matter of right.

Q: A was charged with murder in the lower court. His Petition for Bail was denied after a summary hearing on the ground
that the prosecution had established a strong evidence of guilt. No Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the denial of
the Petition for Bail. During the reception of the evidence of the accused, the accused reiterated his petition for bail on the
ground that the witnesses so far presented by the accused had shown that no qualifying aggravating circumstance
attended the killing. The court denied the petition on the grounds

that it had already ruled that: (i) the evidence of guilt is strong; (ii) the resolution for the Petition for Bail is solely based on
the evidence presented by the prosecution; and (iii) no Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the denial of the Petition
for Bail.

a. If you are the Judge, how will you resolve the incident?

A: If I were the Judge, I would grant the second Petition for Bail. Under Section 7, Rule 114, Rules of Court, no person
charge with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. In this case, the evidence of guilt
for the crime of murder is not strong, as shown by the prosecution’s failure to prove the circumstance that will qualify the
crime to, and consequently convict the accused of, murder. Accordingly, the accused should be allowed to post bail
because the evidence of his guilt is no strong (Sec. 13, Art. III, 1987 Constitution). Besides, it is settled that an Order
granting bail is merely interlocutory which cannot attain finality (Pobre v. People, G. R. No. 141805, July 8, 2015).

b. Suppose the accused is convicted of the crime of homicide and the accused filed a Notice of Appeal, is he entitled to
bail? (2014 Bar)

A: Yes. The accused is entitled to bail subject to the discretion of the Court. Under Section 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court,
the appellate Court may allow him to post bail because the Trial Court in convicting him, changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable. Be that as it may, the denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion
since after conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right
to bail ends. (Jose Antonio Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010).

Hearing application for bail in capital offenses

Q: D was charged with murder, a capital offense. After arraignment, he applied for bail. The trial court ordered the
prosecution to present its evidence in full on the ground that only on the basis of such presentation could it determine
whether the evidence of D’s guilt was strong for purposes of bail. Is the ruling correct? Why? (2002 Bar)

A: No, the prosecution is only required to present as much evidence as is necessary to determine whether the evidence
of D’s guilt is strong for purposes of bail (Sec. 8, Rule 114). Q: In an information charging them of Murder, policemen A, B
and C were convicted of Homicide. A appealed from the decision but was denied. Finally, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision acquitting A on the ground that the evidence pointed to the NPA as the killers of the victim.

a. Was the Court of Appeal’s denial of A’s application for bail proper?

A: YES, the Court of Appeals properly denied A’s application for bail. The court had the discretion to do so. Although A
was convicted of homicide only, since he was charged with a capital offense, on appeal he could be convicted of the
capital offense (Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, January 16, 1997).

b. Can B and C be benefited by the decision of the Court of Appeals? (1998 Bar)

A: B, who did not appeal, can be benefited by the decision of the Court of appeals which is favourable and applicable to
him (Sec. 11[a], Rule 122). The benefit will also apply to C even if his appeal is dismissed because of his escape.

Q: If an information was filed in the RTC-Manila charging D with homicide and he was arrested in Quezon City, in what
court or courts may he apply for bail? Explain. (2002 Bar)

A: D may apply for bail in the RTC-Manila where the information was filed or in the RTC-Quezon City where he was
arrested, or if no judge, thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein (Sec. 17, Rule 114).

Q: In what forms may bail be given? (1999 Bar)

A: Bail may be given by a corporate surety, or through a property bond, cash deposit or recognizance (Sec. 1, Rule 114).

Q: RP and State XX have a subsisting Extradition Treaty. Pursuant thereto RP’s Secretary of Justice (SOJ) filed a Petition
for Extradition before the MM RTC alleging that Juan Kwan is the subject of an arrest warrant duly issued by the proper
criminal court of State XX in connection with a criminal case for tax evasion and fraud before his return to RP as a
balikbayan. Petitioner prays that Juan be extradited and delivered to the proper authorities of State XX for trial, and that to
prevent Juan’s flight in the interim, a warrant for his immediate arrest be issued. Before the RTC could act on the petition
for extradition, Juan filed before it an urgent motion, in sum praying (1) that SoJ’s application for an arrest warrant be set
for hearing and (2) that Juan be allowed to post bail in the event the court would issue an arrest warrant. Should the court
grant or deny Juan’s prayer? Reason. (2004 Bar)

A: In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, G.R. No.
153675, April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being
available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

1. The growing importance of the individual person in public international; 2. The higher value now being given to human
rights; 3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations;
and 4. The duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law
on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the
sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to
post bail (Gov’t of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007).

Q: May the Court require a witness to post bail? Explain your answer. (1999 Bar)
A: Yes. The court may require a witness to post bail if he is a material witness and bail is needed to secure his
appearance. The rules provide that when the court is satisfied, upon proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify
when required, it may, upon motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper.
Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony
is taken (Sec. 6, Rule 119).

Q: A was charged with a non-bailable offense. At the time when the warrant of arrest was issued, he was confined in the
hospital and could not obtain a valid clearance to leave the hospital. He filed a petition for bail saying therein that he be
considered as having placed himself under the jurisdiction of the court. May the court entertain his petition? Why or why
not? (2012 Bar)

A: Yes, a person is deemed to be under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. The accused who is confined in a hospital may be deemed to be in the custody of
the law if he clearly communicates his submission to the court while he is confined in a hospital (Paderanga v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, August 28, 1995).

Q: Paz was awakened by a commotion coming from a condo unit next to hers. Alarmed, she called up the nearby police
station. PO1 Remus and P02 Romulus proceeded to the condo unit identified by Paz. PO 1 Remus knocked at the door
and when a man opened the door, PO1 Remus and his companions introduced themselves as police officers. The man
readily identified himself as Oasis Jung and gestured to them to come in. Inside, the police officers saw a young lady with
her nose bleeding and face swollen. Asked by P02 Romulus what happened, the lady responded that she was beaten up
by Oasis Jung. The police officers arrested Oasis Jung and brought him and the young lady back to the police station.
PO1 Remus took the young lady's statement who identified herself as AA. She narrated that she is a sixteen-year-old high
school student; that previous to the incident, she had sexual intercourse with Oasis Jung at least five times on different
occasions and she was paid P5,000.00 each time and it was the first time that Oasis Jung physically hurt her. P02
Romulus detained Oasis Jung at the station's jail. After the inquest proceeding, the public prosecutor filed an information
for Violation of R.A. No. 9262 (The VAWC Law) for physical violence and five separate informations for violation of R.A.
No. 7610 (The Child Abuse Law). Oasis Jung's lawyer filed a motion to be admitted to bail but the court issued an order
that approval of his bail bond shall be made only after his arraignment.

a. Did the court properly impose that bail condition?

A: No. The court did not properly impose that bail condition. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require the
arraignment of the accused as prerequisite to the conduct of hearings in the bail petition. A person is allowed to file a
petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not
wait for his arraignment before filing the bail petition (Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149116, January 2, 2003).

Moreover, the condition that the approval of bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment would place the accused in
a position where he has to choose between: (1) filing a motion to quash (the Information) and thus delay his released on
bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held; and (2) foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash (the Information) so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail (Lavides v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000). b. After his release from detention on bail, can Oasis Jung still
question the validity of his arrest? (2015 Bar)

A: Yes. Oasis Jung can still question the validity of his arrest even after his release from detention on bail. Under Section
26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of a charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Q: Under Republic Act No. 8353, one may be charged with and found guilty of qualified rape if he knew on or before the
commission of the crime that he is afflicted with Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim. Under
Section 17(a) of Republic Act No. 8504 the court may compel the accused to submit himself to a blood test where blood
samples would be extracted from his veins to determine whether he has HIV. (2005, 2010 Bar)

a. Are the rights of the accused to be presumed innocent of the crime charged, to privacy, and against self-incrimination
violated by such compulsory testing? Explain.

A: No. The court may compel the accused to submit himself to a blood test to determine whether he has HIV under Sec.
17(a) of R.A. No. 8054. His rights to be presumed innocent of the crime charged, to privacy and against self-incrimination
are not violated by such compulsory testing. In an action in which the physical condition of a party is in controversy, the
court may order the accused to submit to a physical examination (Sec. 1, Rule 28; Look for citation of latest cases, in
2004).
 b. If the result of such test shows that he is HIV positive, and the prosecution offers such result in evidence to prove the
qualifying circumstance under the Information for qualified rape, should the court reject such result on the ground that it is
the fruit of a poisonous tree? Explain.

A: Since the rights of the accused are not violated because the compulsory testing is authorized by the law, the result of
the testing cannot be considered to be the fruit of a poisonous tree and can be offered in evidence to prove the qualifying
circumstance under the information for qualified rape under R.A. No. 8353. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine refers
to that rule of evidence that excludes any evidence which may have been derived or acquired from a tainted or polluted
source. Such evidence is inadmissible for having emanated from spurious origins. The doctrine, however, does not apply
to the results obtained pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 28, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as it does not contemplate a search
within the meaning of the law (People v. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998).

Q: X was arrested for the alleged murder of a 6-year old lad. He was read his Miranda rights immediately upon being
apprehended. In the course of his detention, X was subjected to three hours of non-stop interrogation. He remained quiet
until, on the 3rd hour, he answered "yes"

to the question of whether "he prayed for forgiveness for shooting down the boy." The trial court, interpreting X’s answer
as an admission of guilt, convicted him. On appeal, X’s counsel faulted the trial court in its interpretation of his client’s
answer, arguing that X invoked his Miranda rights when he remained quiet for the first two hours of questioning. Rule on
the assignment of error. (2002, 2010 Bar)

A: The assignment of error invoked by X’s counsel is impressed with merit since there has been no express waiver of X’s
Miranda rights. In order to have a valid waiver of the Miranda rights, the same must be in writing and made in the
presence of his counsel. The uncounselled extrajudicial confession of X being without a valid waiver of his Miranda rights,
is inadmissible, as well as any information derived therefrom.

Q: Pedro, the principal witness in a criminal case, testified and completed his testimony on direct examination in 2015.
Due to several postponements by the accused, grounded on his recurring illness, which were all granted by the judge, the
cross-examination of Pedro was finally set on October 15, 2016. Before the said date, Pedro died. The accused moved to
expunge Pedro’s testimony on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation and the right to cross-examine the
witness. The prosecution opposed the motion and asked Pedro’s testimony on direct examination be admitted as
evidence. Is the motion meritorious? (2016 Bar)

A: The motion is meritorious. The cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the party
against whom he is called. With regard to the accused, it is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due
process. Article III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution specifically mandates that “the accused shall enjoy the right to
meet the witnesses face to face,” and Ruel 115, Sec. 1(f) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial.
Accordingly, the testimony of a witness given on direct examination should be stricken off the record where there was not
adequate opportunity for cross-examination. (People v. Fernando Monjey Rosario, G.R. No. 146689, September 27,
2002)

In People v. Manchetti, G.R. No. L-48883, Aug. 6, 1980, the Supreme Court also held that if a party is deprived of the
opportunity of cross examination without fault on his part, as in case of the illness and death of a withness after direct
examination, he is entitled to have the direct testimony stricken from the records. Since the accused was deprived of his
opportunity to cross examine the witness without fauly on his part, the motion to expunge is meritorious.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The motion is not meritorious. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation is a personal one which may be waived, expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross examination. Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination
of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. The conduct of a party which may be construed as an
implied waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. The common basic principle underlying the
application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an
opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. (People v. Abatayao, G.R. No.
139456, July 7, 2004)

Under the Doctrine of Incomplete Testimony, the direct testimony of a witness who dies before conclusion of the cross
examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination, (Curtice v. West, 2 NYS 507, 50 Hun
47, affirmed 24 N.E. 1099, 121 N.Y. 696) and that a referee has no power to strike the examination of a witness on his
failure to appear for cross-examination where a good excuse is given. (People v. Hon. Alberto V. Seneris, G.R. No.
L48883, August 6, 1980)

At any rate, the accused may be deemed to have waived his right to confront and cross-examine the witness when he
asked the postponements of the hearing for several times; therefore, the direct testimony of a witness who dies before the
conclusion of the cross-examination should not be expunged from the records.