3 Civil Law

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U.P. LAW BOC CIVIL LAW PRE-WEEK REVIEWER
PRELIMINARY TITLE
Q1: WHEN DO LAWS TAKE EFFECT?
A1: Generally, laws take effect 15 days following the completion of its publication either in the Official Gazette, or
in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided (Art. 2, CC).
Q2: Explain the Nationality Theory/Lex Nationali.

A2: Lex nationali is enshrined in Art. 15 of the New CC. Such provision states that Laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad. The foregoing rule will also apply to aliens living in the Philippines.
Q3.1: A, a Japanese national died in Quezon City. He was survived by Y, his spouse, and B and C, his children.
If A left properties in the Philippines, what law will be applied in the disposition of said properties?
A3.1: Japanese Law. Art. 16, par. 2 provides that in intestate and testamentary succession, it is the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration that shall be applied, regardless of the nature and location of
the property.
Q3.2: In relation to said properties, what then will be governed by Japanese law?
A3.2: The order of succession, amount of successional rights, intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, and
capacity to succeed. [Art. 16, par. 2; Art. 1039, CC]
Q4.1: A was hit by a bus driven by B. A instituted a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries against B. Without making a reservation, A subsequently filed an action for damages based
on quasi-delict against B. B contends that A waived his right to file said action when he did not reserve such
right in the criminal action, and thus moved for its dismissal. Is B correct?
A4.1: No. Art. 31 of the New CC provides that when a civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter. In this case, the second action filed by A is patently based on a quasi-
delict. Pursuant to Art. 1157, such is a separate and distinct source of obligations, B’s contention then cannot be
upheld.
Q4.2: Does this mean then that A can recover damages both in the criminal action and in the civil action?
A4.2: No. Under Art. 2177, one cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission complained of the
defendant.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Q5: WHEN A COURT IS CONFRONTED WITH A CONFLICTS PROBLEM, WHAT ARE ITS OPTIONS?
A5: The court may either,
(a) Dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction or on the ground of forum non conveniens; or
(b) Assume jurisdiction and apply, either (1) forum law; or (2) foreign law. [Coquia and Aguiking-
Pangalangan]
Q6: WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?

A6: This doctrine of forum non conveniens (which literally means “the forum is inconvenient”) requires the courts
to dismiss the case with a conflicts problem on the ground that the controversy may be more suitably tried
elsewhere.
Q7: Cruz, a businessman based in the Philippines, failed to pay Beto, Inc., a Seattle-based partnership, its
obligation for a contract of purchase of paper. Beto, Inc. filed an action in the Philippines against Cruz, but
Cruz submits that the court should have dismissed the case on the ground of forum non conveniens. Is Cruz
correct?
A7: No. Forum non conveniens is inapplicable. Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff’s choice of forum should be rarely disturbed, and furthermore, the consideration of inadequacy to enforce
the judgment, which is one of the important factors to be considered in the application of said principle, would
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precisely constitute a problem to the plaintiff if the local courts decline to assume JD on the basis of said principle,
considering that defendant is a resident of the Philippines. [Wing On Company v. Syyap, 64 O.G. 8311 (1967)]
Q8: WHEN SHOULD COURTS APPLY FORUM LAW?

A8: Courts should apply forum law in the following circumstances:
1) When a specific law of the forum decrees that forum law should apply (e.g. Art. 16, CC);
2) When the applicable foreign law was not pleaded and proved; and
3) When the case falls under any of the exceptions to the application of foreign law:
a) The foreign law is contrary to an important public policy of the forum
b) The foreign law is penal in nature
c) The foreign law is procedural in nature
d) The foreign law purely fiscal or administrative in nature
e) The application of the foreign law will work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the forum
f) The case involves real or personal property situated in the forum
g) The application of the foreign law might endanger the vital interest of the state
h) The foreign law is contrary to good morals [Coquia and Aguiking-Pangalangan]
Q9: X, the special administrator of Y’s estate, moved for the reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of the
probate of Y’s will on the ground that it does not comply with Philippine law. X contends that since Y was a
resident of West Virginia and the will was executed therein, the laws of West Virginia should apply. To support
his claim, X, presented an extract from a book containing a compilation of West Virginia laws. A, an
illegitimate child of Y, opposed X’s motion contending that X failed to plead and prove said laws in accordance
with the country’s rules on evidence. If you were the judge, how would you decide such case?
A9: X’s motion should be dismissed. The courts of the Philippines are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of
law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published
under the authority of the state of West Virginia. as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure; nor was the extract
from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original. [Fleumer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
(1930)]
Q10: EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT OF RENVOI.

A10: Renvoi is a procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred by the conflict of laws rules of the forum
to a foreign state, the conflict of laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter to the law of the forum (remission) or
a third state (transmission). [Coquia and Aguiling-Pangalangan]
Q11: The will of M, a domiciliary of the Philippines, was admitted to probate, and a project of partition was
proposed. M’s illegitimate child opposed the project of partition on the ground that the distribution of the
estate should be governed by Philippine law. The lower court found that M was a US citizen, particularly, a
resident of California; hence the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the will should be governed by
California. Was the trial court correct in this case?
A11: Not necessarily. Art. 16 of the New CC provide that the national law of the decedent governs the validity of his
testamentary dispositions. Such national law includes the conflicts rules of said State. In this case, if the conflicts
rules of the California Code authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile.
Then Philippine law would apply since M was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the time of his death. However, if
said national law provides otherwise, then Californian law would apply in this case. [See Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No.
L-16749 (1963)]
Q12: Define domicile. And discuss its kinds, if there are any.
A12: Under Art. 50 of the New CC, domicile refers to the place where one (natural person) habitually resides, or
the place determined by the law creating or recognizing it; and in its absence shall be understood as the place
where their legal representation or place of business is (for juridical persons). Additionally, Justice Story defines it
as the place of true, fixed permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he
has the intention of returning. [Coquia and Aguiling-Pangalangan]
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There are three kinds of domicile: (1) domicile of origin, which refers to a person’s domicile at birth; (2) domicile of
choice, also called voluntary domicile, is the place freely chosen by a person sui juris; there must be concurrence
of physical presence in the new place and unqualified intention to make that place one’s home; and (3)
constructive domicile, pertaining to the domicile assigned to persons incapable of choosing their own domicile by
operation of law. [Coquia and Aguiling-Pangalangan]
Q13: M, an American national, but a Philippine domiciliary, enlisted the legal services of N, in her suit against
her husband, O, also an American, for support in contemplation of a divorce suit. The spouses eventually
entered into a compromise agreement, and included in said agreement was a provision negating N’s claim
for attorney’s fees. This prompted N to file a case in court against M. M moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the contract was void because divorce is not sanctioned by Philippine law. Is M correct?
A13: No. N should be paid for the legal services which he rendered M. M and O are American citizens. Following
Art. 15 of the New CC, their status and its dissolution shall be governed by their national law. In this case, since
divorce is permitted in America, M’s contention will not hold water, and thus, the contract herein should not and
cannot be declared contrary to public policy. [See Recto v. Harden, G.R. No. L-6897 (1956)].
Q14: B, a Filipino, and C, an Australian, entered into a contract of lease of a parcel of land, owned by B,
situated in the Philippines, in Greece. B and C stipulated that US law will govern their contract. For C’s failure
to pay rent, B instituted a case against C in the Philippines. In deciding the case, what law or laws will be
considered?
A14: Following the principle of lex loci celebrationis enshrined in Art. 17, the laws of Greece will govern the
contract’s extrinsic validity. For the contract’s intrinsic validity, Philippine law should apply. Although generally,
paramount consideration is given to the parties’ choice of law, such can be disregarded in light of the well-
established policies of the forum. In this case, Philippine law provides that real and personal properties shall be
governed by the laws of the country where they are situated. Thus, in this case, since the object of the contract,
the parcel of land, is located in the Philippines, Philippine law will apply.
Q15: A, a citizen of Pennsylvania, died in the Philippines while on vacation. Upon the death of A, her father H
sought to be proclaimed as the sole compulsory heir of A, his wife having died years prior. On the other hand,
O and P, children of S and T, A’s late siblings, sought the probate of A’s will executed in the US. When the
court allowed probate of the will in the Philippines, H raised in issue that doing so would divest him of his
legitime. Is H correct?
A15: No. Pursuant to Art. 16, par. 2, the governing law with respect to the amount of successional rights is the
national law of the decedent. In this case, the decedent was a citizen of Pennsylvania, thus, Pensylvania law should
apply. And since such law does not have a system of legitimes, H is therefore not preterited. [Cayetano v. Leonidas,
G.R. No. L-54919 (1984)]
PERSONS AND FAMILY LAW

Q16: DISTINGUISH JURIDICAL CAPACITY FROM CAPACITY TO ACT.
A16:
Juridical Capacity Capacity to Act
Fitness of a person to be the subject of legal
Power to do acts with legal effect
relations
Passive Active
Aptitude for the Holding and Enjoyment of rights Aptitude for the Exercise of rights
Inherent in natural persons Must be acquired
Lost upon death Lost through death and other causes
Can exist without capacity to act Must exist with juridical capacity
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Cannot be limited or restricted May be restricted or limited
Q17: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE?

A17: There are two types of requisites: essential and formal requisites. Essential requisites include the: 1) Legal
capacity of the contracting parties, which must be a man and a woman; and 2) Consent freely given in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. Formal requisites include the 1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; 2) A valid marriage
license, except in cases provided in Chapter Two of this Title; and 3) A marriage ceremony. [Arts. 2 and 3, FC]
Q18: HOW DO ESSENTIAL AND FORMAL REQUISITES DIFFER?

A18: While both the absence of essential and formal requisites entail that the subject marriage is null, it differs in
the effect of a flaw in the requisite. If there is a defect in an essential requisite, then the marriage is voidable and
thus may be annulled. In contrast, a defect in a formal requisite will not affect the validity of the marriage and,
instead, makes the party responsible criminally, civilly, or administratively liable. [Art. 4, FC]
Q19: IS A FALSE AFFIDAVIT OF COHABITATION CONSIDERED AN IRREGULARITY OR AN ABSENCE OF THE

REQUISITE? [DE CASTRO V ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO]
A19: Such marriage shall be rendered null and void, given that a falsified requisite does not count as a requisite
and thus is considered absent.
Q20: IS FORCED CONSENT A GROUND FOR NULLITY?

A20: No. It is only a ground for annulment. The lack of consent refers to the absence of a bona fide intent to marry.
Q21: WHY IS BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG?

A21: Marriage is based on the consent voluntarily given by the parties. This entails that every person has the
capacity and the right to change her or his mind. Such breach can only be an actionable wrong in circumstances
where the right to recover money or property is advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise [Wassmer
v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089 (1965)].
Q22: WHEN MAY A MARRIAGE BE SOLEMNIZED WITHOUT A MARRIAGE LICENSE?

A22: A marriage may be solemnized without the necessity of a marriage license in the following situations:
1. Where either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, even if the ailing party survives
[Art. 27, FC]
2. Where the residence of either party is so remote that there is NO MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar [Art. 28, FC]
3. Marriages among Muslims or among members of ethnic cultural communities, provided that they are
solemnized in accordance with their customs/rites/practices [Art. 33, CC]
4. Where the parties have lived together as husband and wife for AT LEAST FIVE YEARS and WITHOUT ANY
LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY EACH OTHER [Art. 34, FC]
Q23: WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGES?

A23: Article 7, FC enumerates the persons who have the authority to solemnize a marriage. It includes
1. Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the Court’s jurisdiction
2. Any member of a religious clergy authorized by his church and registered in the civil registrar
3. Any ship captain or airplane chief only in articulo mortis (Art. 31, FC)
4. Any military commander during military operations in articulo mortis (Art. 32, FC)
5. Any consul-general, consul, or vice consul, as provided in Artl 10, FC
Q24: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE MARRIAGE LICENSE IS OBTAINED FROM A PLACE THAT IS NEITHER
PARTY'S RESIDENCE?
A24: Such marriage shall only constitute an irregularity to the formal requisite of marriage. In the case of Alcantara
v Alcantara [G.R. No. 167746 (2007)], even if neither party resided in Carmona, Cavite at any point of their lives,
their marriage remained valid.
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Q25: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A MISSING MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE? A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE THAT WAS
NOT DELIVERED TO THE REGISTRY?
A25: Since a marriage certificate is neither an essential or formal requisite of marriage, its non-submission shall
not affect the validity of the said marriage [Madridejo v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-32473 (1930)]. It is, however,
considered as an admissible proof of marriage and thus, shall be preferred over secondary evidence of marriage.
Q26: WHY IS AN ACTION/DEFENSE FOR NULLITY IMPRESCRIPTABLE?

A26: Void marriages are void from the beginning. In other words, there is nothing to ratify and a lapse of time
would not, in any way, correct the deficiencies at the time of marriage.
Q27: WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT? AND, HOW DO SUCH GROUNDS DIFFER FROM ONE
ANOTHER?
A27:
Who may file an action When may they
Ground Who may ratify
for annulment file such action
Party who did not

Party who did not Within five years
receive parental
receive parental upon reaching 21
Lack of parental consent
consent, by freely
consent for parties
cohabiting with the
aged 18-21 Parents or guardians
spouse upon reaching Until party reached
of the party aged 18-
21 21
21
Insanity The sane spouse

During the lifetime
Party suffering from The relative,
of the insane
unsound mind, upon guardian, or person
spouse
coming to reason, having legal charge
freely cohabits with the of the insane
spouse
During a lucid
The insane spouse
interval
Injured party, upon

Within five years
Consent obtained freely cohabiting with
Injured party from discovery of
through fraud the spouse after
fraud
discovery of fraud
Injured party, upon

Within five years
Consent obtained freely cohabiting with
from
through force, the spouse after
Injured party disappearance of
intimidation, and disappearance of force,
force, intimidation,
undue influence intimidation, or undue
or undue influence
influence
Within five years

Impotence Injured party from celebration of
marriage
Within five years

Cannot be ratified
STD Injured party from celebration of
marriage
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Q28: IS A CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR BIGAMY NECESSARY FOR AN ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION?
DOES A CIVIL ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION GROUNDED ON CONCUBINAGE HAVE TO BE SUSPENDED
TO AWAIT CONVICTION IN THE RELATED CRIMINAL CASE?
A28: No. While related, the causes of action for these two are distinct [Gandionco v Penaranda, G.R. No.
79284(1987)]. Quantum of evidence for civil and criminal cases are also different (preponderance of evidence v.
guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
Q29: WHAT PROPERTIES ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY?

A29: The following properties are deemed as separate properties of the spouses:
1. Property acquired DURING the marriage by GRATUITOUS title by either spouse, including its fruits and
income;
2. Property for PERSONAL AND EXCLUSIVE use of either spouse, except jewelry;
3. Property acquired BEFORE the marriage by either spouse who has LEGITIMATE DESCENDANTS BY A
FORMER MARRIAGE and the fruits and income thereof [Art. 92, FC]; and
4. Property excluded by the marriage settlements. [Art. 91, FC]
Q30: D and E are to be married. A month before their wedding, they entered into a verbal antenuptial
agreement providing that their property regime will be conjugal partnership of gains. D and E got married.
Unfortunately, during the reception, D’s father, F, because of too much excitement, died of a heart attack. F
left a will where he bequeathed a parcel of land to D.
a) What is the property regime of D and E?
b) Is the parcel of land separate property? Is community/conjugal property? Explain.
Q30:
a) Absolute community of property. D and E’s antenuptial agreement was void for it was not in writing. The
law provides that marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the
parties, and executed before the celebration of marriage. In this case, D and E’s marriage settlement was
verbal, thus, such was void. The default property regime of absolute community of property will therefore
govern D and E’s property relations.
b) The parcel of land is exclusively owned by D. The Code provides that the absolute community of property
between the spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. In this case,
when F died during the reception, D and E were already married. Under the law property acquired
DURING the marriage by GRATUITOUS title by either spouse, including its fruits and income shall be
excluded from the absolute community. Such rule is applicable to the property in the case at bar, for D
acquired it through succession, which is a gratuitous mode of acquiring ownership. The parcel of land is
therefore does not form part of D and E’s community property.
Q31: COMPARE AND CONTRAST ART. 147 AND ART. 148.

A31:
Art. 147, FC Art. 148, FC
Man and woman living together as
husband and wife, with capacity to marry
(Art.5, without any legal impediment) Man and woman living together as husband
-at least 18 years old and wife, NOT capacitated to marry
-not violative of Art. 37 (incestuous void a. Under 18 years old
marriage) b. Adulterous relationship
Applicability
-not violative of Art. 38 (void marriage by c. Bigamous/polygamous marriage
reason of public policy) d. Incestuous marriages under Art. 37
-not bigamous e. Void marriages by reason of public policy
under Art. 38
Other void marriages due to absence of
formal requisite
Salaries and wages Owned in equal shares Separately owned by parties
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Properties
acquired through Remains exclusive, provided there is proof Remains exclusive
exclusive funds
Properties
acquired by both Owned in common in proportion to respective
Governed by rules on co-ownership
through work and contribution
industry
Owned in equal shares since it is
presumed to have been acquired through
joint efforts
If one party did not participate in

acquisition, presumed to have contributed
No presumption of joint acquisition. When
Properties jointly, if the former’s effort consisted in
there is evidence of joint acquisition but none
acquired while the care and maintenance of family and
as to the extent of actual contribution, there is
living together household
a presumption of equal sharing.
N.B. Neither party can encumber or
dispose by acts inter vivos his share in co-
owned property without the consent of the
other party until cohabitation is
terminated.
If one party is validly married to another his/her
Where only one party to a void marriage is
share in the co-owned properties will accrue to
in good faith, share of party in bad faith is
the ACP/CPG of his/her existing valid
forfeited:
marriage.
-In favor of their common children
-In case of default of or waiver by any or all
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
Forfeiture of the common children or their
married to another, his/her share shall be
descendants, each vacant share shall
forfeited in the same manner as that provided
belong to the respective surviving
in Art 147.
descendants
-In the absence of such descendants, such
The same rules on forfeiture shall apply if both
share belongs to the innocent party
parties are in bad faith.
Q32: A and B’s marriage was annulled on the ground of fraud. Even after securing said decree of annulment,
B still continued to use A’s surname not wanting to have a different surname from her children. Can A compel
B to revert back to her maiden name?
A32: It depends. If B is the guilty party, then it is imperative and incumbent upon her to resume her maiden name
pursuant to CC 371. However, if B is the innocent spouse, she may choose to continue to use A’s surname, UNLESS:
(a) The court decrees otherwise; or
(b) She or A is married again to another person. [Art. 371, CC]
Q33.1: X and Y, had an affair; such illicit relationship resulted in C. Two years after C’s birth, X’s wife died of a
car crash, while Y obtained an annulment from V, her husband. Thereafter, X and Y got married. Three years
later, Y gave birth to D. What is the status of both children? Who exercises parental authority over them?
A33.1: C is an illegitimate child. While D is a legitimate child. The Code provides that children conceived AND born
outside of a valid marriage are considered illegitimate, while those conceived OR born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. In this case, C was conceived and born during the time when his parents were both married
to other people, thus he is illegitimate, even if his parents were eventually married years after his birth. D, on the
other hand, having been born during the marriage of X and Y, legitimate.
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Q33.2: If C, although conceived during the affair, was born during the marriage of X and Y, will the answer in
the first question change?
A33.2: No. C can never be legitimated. Under the Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below 18 years of age, may be legitimated. In this
case, when C was conceived, both of his parents were disqualified to marry each for they were married to other
people, thus, the requirement of the law that the child be conceived or born to parents, although not married, were
nevertheless qualified to enter marital union, was wanting in this case.
Q34: WHEN DOES EMANCIPATION TAKE PLACE? WHAT ARE ITS EFFECTS?
A34: Emancipation takes place by the attainment of the age of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of 18 years old [Art. 234, FC as amended by RA 6809].
Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
However, contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of 21; and parents and guardians
remain liable for damages caused by their children and wards below 21 years of age who live in their company. [Art
236, FC as amended by RA 6809]
Q35: WHAT ARE THE BASES OF THE AMOUNT OF LEGAL SUPPORT?

A35: The amount of legal support shall be in proportion to:
1. The resources or means of the giver; and
2. The necessities of the recipient. [Art. 201, FC]
Q36: DISTINGUISH LEGITIMATION FROM ADOPTION.

A36:
LEGITIMATION ADOPTION
The law merely makes legal what exists by The law creates by fiction a relation which
Legal effect
nature did not in fact exist
Persons affected Natural children Strangers (generally)
Procedure Extrajudicial acts of parents Always by judicial decree
Both parents
Except when:
• One spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other
• One spouse seeks to adopt his own
Who should apply Both parents
illegitimate child, provided that the
other spouse has signified their consent
thereto
• Spouses are legally separated from
each other
Same status and rights with that of a
Creates a relationship only between the
Effect on parent- legitimate child not only in relation to the
child and the adopting parents [Sayson v.
child relationship legitimizing parents but also to other
CA (1992)]
relatives
PROPERTY
Q37: John owns a parcel of land by the West Philippine Sea. Due to the current of the sea, the area of his property
increased by 500 square meters. When john discovered this, he extended his fence around said area. Does said
increase inure to the benefit of john? Explain.
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A37: NO. Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to
acquisition by adverse possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared
by either the executive or legislative branch of the government. [De Buyser v. Dir. of Lands, G.R. No. L-22763 (1983)]
Q38: HOW MANY YEARS IS REQUIRED TO PASS BEFORE CONTINUOUS AND NON-APPARENT EASEMENTS
MAY BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION?
A38: None, as continuous and non-apparent easements cannot be acquired by prescription. Art. 620 of the CC speaks
of continuous and apparent easements, and how they can be applied by prescription, i.e. by continuous and apparent
use of the easement, such easement must have been used for at least 10 years, and there is no requirement for good
faith or title.
Q39: DISTINGUISH EASEMENT FROM USUFRUCT.

A39: As to constitution, easements may be constituted only on immovables, while usufructs may be constituted
on movable or immovables. As to extinguishment, easements are not extinguished by the death of dominant
owner, while usufructs are extinguished by the death of usufructuary. As to possessory right, easements don’t
involve possessory rights over an immovable, while usufructs do. As to subject matter, easements are limited to
particular or specific use of the servient estate, while usufructs include all the uses and the fruits of the property.
Q40: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE?

A40: An action to quiet title has three (3) requisites: (1) There is a cloud on title to real property or any interest to
real property; (2) The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property; and (3) Plaintiff
must return the benefits received from the defendant.
Q41: Tito Boy entered into a Land Purchase Agreement with Tita Girl of NorthSouth Realty Corporation. By
virtue of the agreement, Tito Boy will purchase a 400 sqm parcel of land. After the Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed, he was issued a new TCT, under his name, after the old one was cancelled. However, he was never
able to physically possess the property because of his assignments as a member of the Philippine Air Force.
When he was about to retire, he visited his property only to discover that it was occupied by Caloy Aquino and
his family. Tito Boy sent them a letter to vacate, but Carlito, son-in-law of Caloy Aquino, replied that they were
claiming ownership over the said property. Tito Boy filed a complaint against the Aquinos for violating PD 772
(Anti-Squatting Law) but was eventually dismissed as the issue on ownership needed to be resolved in a civil
action.
Tito Boy then commissioned an engineer to do a survey of the property where they confirmed that the property
occupied is the same as the one reflected in Tito Boy’s TCT. Tito Boy then filed a complaint for recovery against
Petitioners. Taking into consideration Art. 434 of the CC, will Tito Boy be entitled to possession? If yes, how
will he prove such possession? If no, why will he not be entitled?
A41: Yes. Article 434 of the CC provides that “[i]n an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.” In other words,
in order to recover possession, a person must prove two things: (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title.
In this case, Tito Boy will be able to prove the identity of the property and his title. To prove his title to the property,
he may present in evidence the following documents: (1) Land Purchase Agreement; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale; (3)
and a TCT registered under his name, which also proves the title requirement of Art. 434.
To better prove the identity of the property, he may also get and offer the testimony of the one who conducted the
relocation survey, as well as any resulting survey plans or copies of the survey [Jakosalem v. Barangan, G.R. No.
175025 (2012)].
Q42: UNDER THE NEW CIVIL CODE, WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR THE ACTION TO
ABATE A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE NUISANCE?
A42: Under CC 1143(2), the action to abate a public or private nuisance CANNOT be extinguished by prescription.
Such action is imprescriptible, as long as the said nuisance continues to meet the requirements to be classified as
such.
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Q43: Juan and Jose are brothers. They inherited a banana plantation from their grandfather. Jose however
migrated to Japan and lived there for 30 years, while Juan stayed and managed said plantation. When Jose
returned, he asked that he and Juan partition the property. Juan refused contending that he had already
acquired the entire property through prescription, this prompted Jose to file an action for partition in court.
Will Jose’s action prosper?
A43: Yes. Under Article 494 of the New CC, “no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.” In this case, there was
no showing that Juan renounced the co-ownership, thus he cannot invoke prescription against Jose’s claim. Thus,
Jose may properly ask for the partition of said plantation as the law provides that each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. [Art. 494, par. 1, CC]
Q44: Z donated a parcel of land to A, B, and C. A, B, and C agreed that they will not partition the land, and
therefore, continue to be co-owners, for 15 years. During the 11th year, C filed an action for partition. A and B
opposed this action invoking their agreement. Will C’s case prosper?
A44: Yes, C’s action will prosper. CC 494 provides that an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain
period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. In this case, A, B, and C’s agreement was only valid to the
extent of ten years. C therefore has the right to ask for partition during the 11th year.
The answer in this case would have been different if it were Z who imposed the subject prohibition for Art. 494,
par. 3 states that a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed 20 years.
Q45: DISTINGUISH CO-OWNERSHIP WITH PARTNERSHIP.

A45:
CO-OWNERSHIP PARTNERSHIP
As to creation
Can be created without formalities of a contract Can be created only by contract, express or implied
As to Juridical Personality
Has no juridical or legal personality Has juridical personality distinct from partners
As to Purpose
Purpose is collective enjoyment of the thing Purpose is to obtain profits
As to Disposition of Shares
Consent of other co-owners not needed; transferee Partner needs to be authorized; he cannot substitute
automatically becomes co-owner another as a partner in his place
As to Existence of Mutual Agency
There is no mutual representation A partner can generally bind the partnership
As to Effect of Death or Incapacity
Does not result in dissolution Results in dissolution
As to Formal Requisites
No public instrument is needed even if the object of the May be made in any form except when real property is
co-ownership is a real property contributed
As to Agreement on the Period
An agreement to keep the thing undivided for a period There may be agreement as to a definite term without
of more than 10 years is void limit set by law
Q46: DISTINGUISH OCCUPATION FROM POSSESSION.

A46:
Occupation Possession
Mode of acquiring ownership Raises the presumption of ownership
Only of corporeal personal property Over any kind of property
Object must be without an owner (res nullius) Property may be owned by somebody
Requires an intent to acquire ownership May be had in the concept of a mere holder
May not take place without some form of
May exist without occupation
possession
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Short duration Generally of longer duration

Cannot lead to another mode of acquisition May lead to another mode which is prescription
SUCCESSION
Q47: Define what is a will. What is the form of a notarial will? Of a holographic will?
A47: A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain
degree the disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death. (Art. 783, CC)
Every will must be in writing and signed by the testator. (Art. 804, CC)
For NOTARIAL WILLS

• Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
• The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
• The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
• If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (Art. 805,
CC)
• Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (Art. 806,
CC)
• If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall
designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents
thereof. (Art. 807, CC)
• If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again,
by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. (Art. 808, CC)
For HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS: A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Art. 810, CC)
Q48: Who are capacitated to make a will?

A48: All persons who are not expressly prohibited by law may make a will. A person may either be male or female,
and must be over 18 years of age. He must also be of sound mind at the time of execution of the will. (Art. 796-
798, CC.)
A person of sound mind should be able at the time of making the will, to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. (Art. 799, CC)
Q49: When does the right to succession accrue? What are the objects transmissible by succession, and to what
extent?
A49: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. If inheritance is
accepted, he possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption. (Art. 777,
533, CC)
The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death. (Art. 76, CC) The inheritance includes a party's contractual rights and obligations because by legal fiction,
the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that
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the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. However, they
are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. [Alvarez v. IAC, G.R. No. L-68053 (1990)]
Q50: A died leaving a notarial will in english, consisting of 8 pages, all signed on the upper left margin and
correlatively numbered. It was attested to by her cousin, a friend, and her uncle who notarized the will. It is
undisputed that she was an illiterate who does not know how to read and write. Being uneducated, she was
not able to learn how to speak in english. The will was written and signed by her uncle and notarizing attorney
in her presence and by her express direction. The same was read to her twice, by her cousin in Filipino, and by
her uncle and notarizing attorney, in english. Is the will valid?
A50: NO. Art. 805, CC requires that the will must be attested and subscribed to by three or more credible
witnesses. However, a notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. If the third witness
were the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of
himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the
other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. [Cruz v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-32213 (1973)]
Q51: A died leaving a notarial will on a single sheet of paper with the provisions crammed together. The
probate was opposed by some of her relatives on the ground that A could not have read the will because of
her poor eyesight. The doctor who operated on her cataracts was presented as an expert witness in court. He
said that A had eyesight so bad that she can only see forms but not read them even with prescribed glasses
on. Probate court admitted the will. Was the probate court correct? Why?
A51: NO. The will should not have been admitted to probate. A could not have read the will. For all intents and
purposes of the rules on probate, A, is not unlike a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have
required observance of the provisions of Art. 808 of the CC. The ratio of the law being to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim
of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the
handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will
should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act
within the range of his (the testator’s) other senses. [Garcia v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-26615 (1970)]
Q52: A died leaving a notarial will. It consists of 2 pages: the first one contained the entire testamentary
disposition; the second page contains the attestation clause. The attestation clause did not state the number
of pages the will has. Should the will be probated?
A52: YES. Formal requisites are liberally construed. Unsubstantial departures may be ignored as long as
possibility of bad faith and fraud are obviated. While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable,
unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is
not assailed. [Taboada v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-36033 (1982)]
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will,
must be disregarded. [Abangan v. Abangan, G.R. No. L-13431 (1919)]
Q53: A executed a holographic will. It contained 2 substantial provisions: (1) that A is bequeathing her entire
estate to B, and (2) that her shares in ABC Corporation shall be given to C. During her lifetime, she altered the
first provision, erasing B’s name and substituting it with C’s name. She failed to authenticate the same. The
will was submitted to probate. Decide on the validity of the will and its provisions.
A53: The will invalidated insofar as the first provision is concerned. Art. 814 of the CC provides that an insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will must be authenticated by the testator. However, the same
does not affect the validity of the will itself, only the disposition. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections,
and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, x x x the
Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
12
interlined. [Kalaw v. Relova, G.R. No. L-40207 (1984)] Here, the only disposition under the first provision is
invalidated.
Q54: A executed a holographic will. It was lost during World War II. On probate, the proponents of the will
sought to prove its dispositions by oral evidence. Should the will be probated?
A54: NO. Holographic wills may not be proven by oral testimony. Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be
proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the
only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or
instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only
medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. [Gan v. Yap,
G.R. No. L-12190 (1958)]
Q55: How may a will be revoked?

A55: No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
1. By implication of law; or
2. By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or
3. By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator
himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn,
cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will
may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due
execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established
according to the Rules of Court. (Art. 830, CC)
Q56: Differentiate between disinheritance and preterition.

A56: Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law (Art. 918, CC), while preterition is the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. (Art. 854, CC)
The effect of preterition annuls the institution of heir in toto, unless in the will there are testamentary dispositions
in the form of devises or legacies, while the effect of illegal disinheritance annuls the institution of heirs, but the
nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. (Nuguid
vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966)
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Q57: A, B, C and D are solidary debtors of X for P40,000. X released D from the payment of his share of
P10,000. When the obligation became due and demandable, C turned out to be insolvent. Should the share
of insolvent debtor C be divided only between the two other remaining debtors, A and B?
A57: NO, as the release of the share of one debtor would then increase the burden of the other debtors w/o their
consent. When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor
paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each (Art. 1217,
CC). Additionally, D was released only from his share of P10,000, not from the solidary tie that binds him to A, B
and C.
Q58: Gary is a tobacco trader and also a lending investor. He sold tobacco leaves to Homer for delivery w/in
a month, although the period for delivery was not guaranteed. Despite Gary’s effort to deliver on time,
transportation problems and government red tape hindered his efforts and he could only deliver after 30 days.
Homer refused to accept the late delivery and to pay on the ground that the agreed term had not been
complied w/. As a lending investor, Gary granted a P1,000,000 loan to Isaac to be paid w/in two years from
execution of the contract. As security for the loan, Isaac promised to deliver to Gary his Toyota Innova w/in
seven (7) days, but Isaac failed to do so. Gary was thus compelled to demand payment for the loan before the
end of the agreed two-year term. Was Homer justified in refusing to accept the tobacco leaves?
A58: Homer was not justified in refusing to accept the tobacco leaves. He consented to the terms and conditions
of sale and must abide by it. Obligation arising from contract have the force of law between the contracting parties.
13
It is clear under the facts that the period of delivery of the tobacco leaves was not guaranteed. Gary anticipated
other factors w/c may prevent him from making the delivery w/in a month. True enough transportation problems
and government red tape did. Such slight delay was, thus, excusable. Obligations arising from contract have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied w/ in good faith.
Q59: A, B, C, D and E made themselves solidarily indebted to X for the amount of P50,000. When X demanded
payment from A, the latter refused to pay on the following grounds:
(a) B is only 16 years old

(b) C has already been condoned by X
(c) D is insolvent
(d) E was given by X an extension of 6 months w/o the consent of the other four co-debtors.
State the effect of each of the above defenses put up by A on his obligation to pay X, if such defenses are found
to be true.
A59:
(a) A may avail the minority of B as a defense, but only for B’s share of P10,000. A solidary debtor may avail
himself of any defense w/c personally belongs to a solidary co-debtor, but only as to the share of that co-
debtors.
(b) A may avail of the condonation by X of C’s share of P10,000. A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the
creditor, avail himself of all defenses w/c are derived from the nature of the obligation and of those w/c
are personal to him or pertain to his own share. With respect to those w/c personally belongs to others,
he may avail himself thereof only as regards that part of the debt for w/c the latter are responsible.
[Art.1222]
(c) A may not interpose the defense of insolvency of D as a defense. Applying the principle of mutual guaranty
among solidary debtors, A guaranteed the payment of D’s share and of all the other co-debtors. Hence,
A cannot avail of the defense of D’s insolvency.
(d) The extension of six (6) months given by X to E may be availed of by A as a partial defense but only for the
share of E. There is no novation of the obligation but only an act of liberality granted to E alone.
Q60: Four foreign medical students rented the apartment of Thelma for a period of one year. After one
semester, three of them returned to their home country and fourth transferred to a boarding house. Thelma
discovered that they left unpaid telephone bills in the total amount of P80,000. The lease contract provided
that the lessees shall pay for the telephone services in the lease premises. Thelma demanded that the fourth
student pay the entire amount of the unpaid telephone bills, but the latter is willing to pay only one fourth of
it. Who is correct? Why?
A60: The fourth student is correct. His liability is only joint, hence, pro rata. There is solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states or when the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity (Art. 1207). The
contract of lease in the problem does not, I any way, stipulate solidarity.
Q61: Joey, Joy and Jojo are solidary debtors under a loan obligation of P30,000 w/c has fallen due. The
creditor has, however, condoned Jojo’s entire share in the debt. Since Joy has become insolvent, the creditor
makes a demand on Joey to pay the debt. How much, if any, may Joey be compelled to pay?
A61: Joey can be compelled to pay only the remaining balance of P200,000, in view of Jojo’s remission of Jojo’s
share by the creditor. (Art. 1219)
Q62: Enumerate the difference/s between civil obligation and natural obligation?
A62:
1. Civil obligation is based on positive law while natural obligation is based is based on equity and natural
law.
2. Civil obligation gives the creditor the legal right to compel by bringing action in court. In a natural
obligation, there is no legal right to compel performance but if the debtor voluntarily pays, he cannot
recover what he has paid.
Q63: When is demand not necessary in order that delay may exist?
14
A63: (1) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform; OR (2)
When from the nature and the circumstances if the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the
thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the
contract (time is of the essence); (3) When the law or the obligation expressly so declare. [Art. 1169 par. 2]
Q64: What are the requisites of accion pauliana?

A64: (1)
There is a credit in favor of the plaintiff prior to the alienation by the debtor
(2) The debtor has performed a subsequent contract conveying patrimonial benefit to third person/s.
(3) The debtor’s acts are fraudulent to the prejudice of the creditor.
(4) The creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim.
(5) The third person who received the property is an accomplice to the fraud. [Cheng v. CA, G.R. No. 144169
(2001)]
Q65: Distinguish rescission from termination?

A65: Rescission may be effected by both parties by mutual agreement, or unilaterally by one of them declaring a
rescission without the consent of the other if a legally sufficient ground exists or if a decree of rescission is applied
for before the courts. It requires mutual restitution to restore the parties to their original situation. Termination on
the other hand may be effected by mutual agreement or by one party exercising one of its remedies as a
consequence of the default of the other. The parties are not restored to their original situation; prior to termination,
parties are obliged to comply with their contractual obligations. [Pryce Corp v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 157480 (2005)]
Q66: A promised to pay 1000 pesos to B subject to the condition that A can secure a contract of sale with C. A
was able to fulfill this condition. B then demanded payment, but A refused. A argues that the condition
depended on his sole will as the debtor, and as such, the obligation is void. Is A correct?
A66: No. While article 1182 does state that if a condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the obligation
is void, it is not applicable in this case. The condition depends not only upon the will of A, the debtor, but also the
will of C, a third person to A and B’s contract. This is a mixed condition, and since it does not depend solely on the
debtor’s will, the obligation is valid.
Q67: A made a contract with B subject to a couple of conditions. B would pay A 1000 pesos if UP’s men
basketball team wins in the current season and B would pay another A another 1000 pesos if A successfully
kills B’s archenemy, D. Is A’s contract with B completely void?
A67: No. Under article 1183, those obligations subject to impossible conditions shall annul the obligations that
depend on them but if the obligation is divisible, the one without an impossible condition shall remain valid. In
this case, the obligation is divisible. The first half of the obligation is subject to a condition which is not impossible
(winning the current season) and is such valid. The second half involves a condition contrary to good customs and
public policy and as such the obligation is void.
Q68: A promised to give B a horse upon the condition that C would paint his car black. A, not wanting to lose
his horse, destroys C’s only car. Is A’s obligation to B extinguished?
A68: No. According to Article 1186, the obligation shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents
its fulfillment. This is the case in this scenario and as such A’s obligation to B is now demandable.
Q69: A promised to give B his car, his horse or his pocket watch. Due to A’s negligence in leaving his electric
fan running while he was out for work, a fire consumed A’s house, killing his horse and burning his house. Can
B be indemnified for the value of the lost objects?
A69: No. According to article 1204, the creditor shall have a right to indemnity when all the things that are
alternatively the object of obligation have been lost or have become impossible. Since the pocket watch was not
consumed by the fire, not all things are lost, and B is unable to be indemnified with the value of the horse or the
car.
Q70: A promised to give his car to B, but upon the former’s election, he could give his horse instead. A abused
his horse because it kept making noises, disturbing him from his sleep, and as a result, the horse died. Is A
liable to B for the horse?
15
A70: No. In a facultative obligation under article 1206, loss of the thing intended as a substitute does not render
the debtor liable.
Q71: A promised to pay B 1000 pesos whenever his financial situation allows him to do so. A contends that the
condition depends solely on his will and as such the obligation is void. Can B still collect from A?
A71: Yes. According to article 1180, when the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, this
obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period. It is not subject to a potestative condition and is such perfectly
valid.
Q72.1: Michelle owned a Toyota Vios which she used for ride-sharing. When Uber left the Philippines, she
decided to sell the said car. She offered it to her very good friend, Naomi for P250,000, with P50,000
downpayment to be paid up front, and the remaining P200,000 to be paid in monthly installments for 24
months. Naomi asked Michelle if she could take a month to decide whether or not to buy the car, to which
Michelle replied in the affirmative. Michelle told Naomi to just inform her by email should she decide to buy
the car. Five days later, Naomi was able to get P50,000 which she deposited to Michelle. The following day,
Naomi found out that Michelle sold the car to Mimi for P300,000. Naomi is now claiming that Michelle
violated their option contract.
Was there an option contract between Naomi and Michelle?

A72.1: There was no option contract violated by Michelle. According to Art. 1479. In this case, there was no separate
consideration for the option granted to Naomi. Even assuming that the P50,000 given by Naomi to Michelle was
given as the downpayment for the car, the same is not considered option money distinct from the price of the item.
The option granted to Naomi was therefore not founded upon a consideration. As such, the general rule in Art.
1324 should apply, and the offer of Michelle could be withdrawn at any time before acceptance.
Q72.2: Can Naomi’s tender of the downpayment be considered an acceptance of Michelle’s offer?
A72.2: No. In Malbarosa v. CA [G.R. No. 125761 (2003)] the Court ruled that when the offeror prescribes a form by
which the acceptance is to be made, an acceptance not made in such a manner is not effective. In this case,
Michelle said that the acceptance must be made by email. Naomi’s tender of the downpayment cannot therefore
be deemed an acceptance of Michelle’s offer.
Q73: Rich, the daughter of one of the wealthiest couples in the country, fell in love with Lito, the son of their
driver. Rich’s parents consented to their marriage on the condition that their marriage be under the regime of
a complete separation of property. Rich bregudgingly agreed. After they got married, Rich would sell
properties for a very cheap price to her husband Lito every three years, when Lito had enough. Are these sales
valid?
A73: Yes. The case falls under the exception in Art. 1490 of the CC which renders void any sale between spouses.
It provides that such sales are valid when a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements.
Q74: Caleb, a 15-year-old, really wanted a Nintendo Switch. He signed up for an account in an online trading
site and changed the year of his birthday so as to make it appear that he was already 18 years old—the age
requirement to be able to avail of the site’s services. He found a seller, and thereafter bought a Nintendo
Switch, transferring the payment via bank deposit, and having the device shipped to his house. When his
mother found out about his purchase, she got mad and told him to return it. Caleb contacted the seller and
told him that he was a minor and that their contract was voidable. Is Caleb correct?
A74: No. In Mercado v. Espiritu [G.R. No. L-11872 (1917)], the court held that minors who enter into contracts
through active misrepresentation are in estoppel and cannot raise their minority to avoid the contract.
Q75. The local news had been studded with headlines about the Mitsubishi Montero’s issues of sudden
unintended acceleration. Despite this, Raul still decided to purchase a unit for himself. A week after getting
his Montero, Raul was driving home from work and saw a dog crossing the street. Instead of slowing down by
pressing the brakes, the car sped up. Raul was able to swerve, but missed the dog only by a few inches. Due
to this trauma, he went back to Mitsubishi and asked to avoid their contract of sale, stating that he was
mistaken in thinking that the Montero he bought was a good and safe car. Is Raul entitled to avoid the contract
on the ground of mistake of fact?
16
A75: No. According to Art. 1333, there is no mistake if the party alleging it knew the doubt, contingency or risk
affecting the object of the contract. In this case, Raul knew of the risk affecting the Monteros released around the
time he purchased his. He could therefore not be said to have entered the contract upon a mistake of fact that
vitiated his consent.
Q76. Jose took out a loan with AsiaBank, with an interest of 12% per annum. The contract of loan included an
escalation clause that provided that the bank has the authority to increase the interest without notice to Jose.
Is such a stipulation valid?
A76: No. This stipulation violates the mutuality of contracts. According to Article 1308, the contract must bind
both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. Moreover, in Philippine
Savings Bank v. Sps. Castillo [G.R. No. 193178 (2011)], the Court held that any change to the contract must likewise
be mutually agreed upon; otherwise, it produces no binding effect.
Q77: Marlene, a motion picture actress, sued Hollywood Far East Productions for the balance allegedly due
to her for the services she rendered based on an oral contract to act for motion pictures produced by the
company. The lower court ordered the complaint dismissed because the claim was not evidenced by a written
document, either public or private. Is the lower court correct?
A77: No. In general, contracts are valid and binding from their perfection regardless of form, whether they be oral
or written [Art. 1356]. Once the essential requisites of a contract – namely (1) consent (2) proper subject matter,
and (3) consideration or causa [Article 1318] – exist, the contract is generally valid and obligatory, regardless of
the form, oral or written, in which they are couched.
Article 1356 provides two exceptions to this rule, wherein the form becomes indispensable:
1. Contracts for which the law itself requires that they be in some particular form in order to make them valid
and enforceable (the so-called solemn contracts) [Art. 1356, par. 2]
2. Contracts that the law requires to be proved by some writing (memorandum) of its terms, as in those
covered by the old Statute of Frauds [Article 1403(2)]
The contract for compensation for services sued upon by Marlene does not come under either exception. It is true
that it may fall under Article 1358, when the law requires a contract to be in some form for convenience. But
nowhere does it provide that the absence of written form in this case will make the agreement invalid or
unenforceable. On the contrary, Article 1357 clearly indicates that contracts covered by Article 1358 are binding
and enforceable by action or suit despite the absence of writing. [Dauden-Hernaez v. Delos Angeles, G.R. No. L-
27010 (1969)]
Q78: What are the exceptions to the rule that contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present?
A78: A certain form may be prescribed by law for any of the following purposes: (1) for validity [Art. 1356], (2)
enforceability [Arts. 1356 and 1403 (2)], or (3) greater efficacy of the contract [Arts. 1357 and 1358]. When the form
required is for validity, its non-observance renders the contract void and of no effect. When the required form is for
enforceability, non-compliance therewith will not permit, upon the objection of a party, the contract, although
otherwise valid, to be proved or enforced by action. Formalities intended for greater efficacy or convenience or to
bind third persons, if not done, would not adversely affect the validity or enforceability of the contract between the
contracting parties themselves. [Cenido v. Apacionado, G.R. No. 132474, November 19, 1999]. Article 1358 of the
CC which requires the embodiment of certain contracts in a public instrument, is only for convenience, and
registration of the instrument only adversely affects third parties [Fule v. CA, G.R. No. 112212 (1998)]
Q79: What are the contracts or agreements covered by the Statute of Frauds?
A79: Under Art. 1403, the following are covered by the Statute of Frauds, and hence, are unenforceable by action,
unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by
his agent:
1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
3. An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
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4. An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not lower that 500 Pesos,
unless the buyer accepts and receives part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them,
of such things in action, or pay at the time some part of the entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales
book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the
purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum
5. An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an
interest therein;
6. A representation to the credit of a third person [Art. 1403, CC]
Q80: What is the reformation of an instrument and when is it proper?

A80: Reformation is a remedy in equity, whereby a written instrument is made or construed so as to express or
conform to the real intention of the parties, where some error or mistake has been committed. It is predicated on
the equitable maxim that equity treats as done that which ought to be done. The rationale of the doctrine is that it
would be unjust and unequitable to allow the enforcement of a written instrument which does not reflect or
disclose the real meeting of the minds of the parties [Rosello-Bentir v. Leanda, G.R. No. 128991 (2000]. In granting
reformation, the remedy in equity is not making a new contract for the parties, but establishing and perpetuating
the real contract between the parties which, under the technical rules of law, could not be enforced but for such
reformation [Multi-Ventures Capital and Management Corporation v. Stalwart Management Corporation, G.R.
No. 157439 (2007)].
In order that an action for reformation of instrument may prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true
intention of the parties; and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to
mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident [Art. 1359, CC].
Q81: What are the kinds of estoppel?

A81: There are three kinds of estoppel: (1) estoppel in pais; (2) estoppel by deed; and (3) estoppel by
laches. Estoppel in pais occurs if by a person’s conduct, representations, admissions or silence, he causes another
to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, as a consequence of which
he would be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. Estoppel by deed, on the
other hand, occurs when a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from denying any material fact stated in
the said deed as against the other party and his privies. Estoppel by laches is considered an equitable estoppel
wherein a person who failed or neglected to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time is
presumed to have abandoned or otherwise declined to assert such right and cannot later on seek to enforce the
same, to the prejudice of the other party, who has no notice or knowledge that the former would assert such rights
and whose condition has so changed that the latter cannot, without injury or prejudice, be restored to his former
state. [Co Chien v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc., G.R. No. 162090 (2007)]
Q82: What is estoppel by laches?

A82: Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting
a right or claim to be enforced or asserted [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, April 15, 1968]. The elements of
laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the
situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a
suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in
which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held barred [Estate of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon, G.R. No.
148777 (2007)]
Q83: What are the defective contracts?

A83:
Rescissible contracts- contract that has caused a particular damage to one of the parties or to a third person and
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which for equitable reasons may be set aside even if valid
Voidable or annullable contracts (contrato nulo)

- Contract in which consent of one of the parties is defective either because of:
1. Want of capacity
2. Vitiated consent, by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud
- But which contract is valid until judicially set aside
Unenforceable contracts – contract that for some reason cannot be enforced, unless ratified in the manner
provided by law:
1. Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
2. Those that do not comply with the statute of frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or
memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents:
a. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
b. A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
c. An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
d. An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five
hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the
evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of the purchase
money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book,
at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of
the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
e. An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or
of an interest therein;
f. A representation as to the credit of a third person.
3. Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
Void or inexistent contracts (contrato inexistente)- contract which is an absolute nullity and produces no effect, as
if it had never been executed or entered into
Q84.1: On Ross Gellar’s 16th birthday, he sold his car to his younger sister, Monica, for php 500,000, putting
it in a private document. A year later, Monica was enforcing the sale, as only then was she able to come up
with the purchase price. Ross refused to part with his car, saying the contract is void, as he was a minor when
he executed the contract. Moreover, the contract is in a private document, hence it cannot be enforced. Is ross
correct in saying the contract is void?
A84.1: Contract is valid but unenforceable because both parties are incapable of giving consent, being both
minors. Consent of one of the parties after attaining capacity, or their parents, converts it into a voidable contract
(Art. 1407). Moreover, the document need not be notarized. For a note or memo to satisfy the statute of frauds, it
must be complete, indicating the price and mode of payment.
Q84.2: If Monica’s parents, Sps Gellar, give consent to the sale, what will happen to the status of the contract?
A84.2: The contract will be enforceable. Ratification may cure the defect if it is done by the party against whom
the contract is being enforced, or his privies, parents or guardians. Ratification by one party converts the contract
into a voidable one. The consent of Sps Gellar cures both the incapacity of Ross and Monica since they are siblings.
Q84.3: If their contract was notarized, can Monica validly enforce the sale?
A84.3: No. The issue is not that the document was in a public or private document, but the incapacity of both the
parties to enter into a contract, which makes it unenforceable.
Q85: Rachel conveyed a parcel of land to her minor daughter Emma through the execution of a quitclaim, in
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consideration of one peso and other valuable considerations. Phoebe, Rachel’s creditor, assailed the
execution, saying she conveyed it to her prejudice. Will Phoebe’s claim hold?
A85: Yes. A conveyance leaving no property for other creditors to attach is an evidence of fraud. The consideration
was fictitious and inadequate, and is equivalent to a donation in favor of her daughter.
Badges of fraud (1387):
1) consideration is fictitious or inadequate;
2) transfer was made while suit had begun or pending;
3) sale was upon credit by insolvent debtor;
4) there was large indebtedness or complete insolvency;
5) transfer consisted of all or nearly all property especially when insolvent or greatly embarrassed financially;
6) the transfer was made between father and son when other above circumstances present
7) there was failure of vendee to take exclusive possession of all property.
8) it was known to the vendee that the vendor had no properties other than that sold to him
Q86: Chandler and Joey entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land owned by Joey, a minor. Chandler
started making payments at first but ceased. Representatives of Joey filed for specific performance. He said
the contract is voidable can he institute the action for annullment?
A86: General rule: No. Action for annulment may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily. Persons capable of giving consent and guilty parties who have caused the vitiation of consent cannot
allege the incapacity or want of consent of those they contracted with. This rule is sustained by the principle that
he who comes to court must come with clean hands [Art. 1397].
Q87: Distinguish between civil and natural obligations.

A87: According to Article 1423, civil obligations give a right of action to compel their performance. Natural
obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce
their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been
delivered or rendered by reason thereof.
Q88: A borrowed P20,000 from B and orally promised to pay it within 2 months. When A tried to pay B on the
4th month, B demanded payment of interest of 12% per annum because of A’s delay. A paid her debt and the
interest claimed by B. After reconsidering, A demanded from B the amount she had paid as interest. B claims
she has no obligation to return the interest paid by A because it was a natural obligation which A voluntarily
performed and can no longer recover. Is B correct?
A88: No, B is not correct. The payment of interest by A is not a natural obligation because in the first place, A had
no such obligation to pay the interest. For a creditor to be entitled to compensatory interest, there must be delay.
According to Article 1169, for delay to exist, demand must have been made. In this case, there was no demand
made upon the expiration of the 2-month period. Thus, A could not be considered in delay, and is not liable to pay
compensatory interest. There being no obligation to pay interest, in accordance with Article 2154, B must return
the interest mistakenly paid since he was not entitled thereto, and delivery was made merely through mistake.
Q89: A sued B for the payment of B’s debts even though the action for such had already prescribed.
Nevertheless, B paid A money in payment of his debts. Realizing that the action had already prescribed, B
demanded the return of the money he had paid from A. Should A return the money?
A89: No, A should not return the money. According to Article 1424, when a right to sue upon a civil obligation has
lapsed by extinctive prescription, the obligor who voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what he has
delivered or the value of the service he has rendered.
Q90: In 2000, A and B entered into an agreement wherein the former was to register a parcel of land in the
name of B under the explicit covenant to reconvey the land to C, daughter of A, upon her graduation from
college. In 2001, the land was registered in the name of B. In 2002, A died. In 2003, C graduated from college.
In 2012, C accidentally found a copy of the agreement between A and B. In 2014, C filed a case against B for
the reconveyance of the land to her. B, in her answer, averred that the action already prescribed. How should
the matter be decided?
A90: The matter should be decided in favor of C. The case at bar involves an express trust which does not prescribe
as long as they have not been repudiated by the trustee [Diaz v. Gorricho, G.R. No. L-11229].
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Q91: A and his brother B inherited from their father 2 parcels of land with exactly the same areas. For
convenience, the TCT covering both lots were placed in A’s name alone. A sold to an innocent purchaser one
parcel in its entirety without the knowledge and consent of B, and wrongfully kept for himself the entire price
paid. What right/s of action, if any, does B has/have?
A91: When, for convenience, the TCT to the two parcels of land were placed in A’s name alone, an implied trust (a
resulting trust) is created for the benefit of B with A as trustee of one-half undivided or ideal portion of each of the
two lots. Therefore, B can file an action for damages against B for having fraudulently sold one of the two parcels
which he partly held in trust for B’s benefit.
Q92: Explain the concept of trust de son tort (constructive trust).

A92: A constructive trust is a trust not created by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a
direct intention to create a trust, but one that arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not come
about by agreement or intention but in main by operation of law construed against one who, by fraud, duress or
abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience,
to hold (Heirs of Lorenzo Yap vs. CA). An example of this is Article 1456 which states that “If property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes.”
SALES
Q93: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A CONTRACT OF SALE AND A CONTRACT TO SELL.
A93: In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. In a
contract to sell, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the seller and is not to pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price. In the contract of sale, the buyer’s non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory
condition; in a contract to sell, the buyer’s full payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition to the coming
into effect of the agreement. In a contract of sale, the seller has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the
property unless he takes action to set aside the contract of sale. In the second case, the title simply remains in the
seller if the buyer does not comply with the condition precedent of making payment at the time specified in the
contract. [Heirs of Atienza v. Espidol, G.R. No. 180665 (2010)]
Q94: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A CONDITIONAL SALE AND AN ABSOLUTE SALE.

A94: A conditional sale is one where the vendor is granted the right to unilaterally rescind the contract predicated
on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the prescribed condition. An absolute sale is one
where the title to the property is not reserved to the vendor or if the vendor is not granted the right to rescind the
contract based on the fulfillment or non- fulfillment, as the case may be, of the prescribed condition. [Sps. Ramos
v. Sps Heruela, G.R. No. 145330 (2005)]
Q95: WHAT IS AN OPTION CONTRACT?

A95: An option contract is a privilege existing in one person, for which he had paid a consideration, which gives
him the right to buy, for example, certain merchandise of certain specified property, from another person, if he
chooses, at any time within the agreed period, at a fixed price. The contract of option is a separate and distinct
contract from the contract which the parties may enter into upon the consummation of the option. A consideration
for an optional contract is just as important as the consideration for any other kind of contract. If there was no
consideration for the contract of option, then it cannot be entered any more than any other contract where no
consideration exists. A contract of option is a contract by virtue of the terms of which the parties thereto promise
and obligate themselves to enter into contract at a future time, upon the happening of certain events, or the
fulfilment of certain conditions. [Enriquez de la Cavada v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-11668 (1918)]
Q96: IS EARNEST MONEY PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE?

A96: Yes. Whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and as
proof of the perfection of the contract. [Art. 1482]
Q97: ON JANUARY 12, BEFORE BIANCA LEFT FOR CANADA, SHE SOLD TO SHARON A RELATIVELY NEW
FERRARI. ON JANUARY 25, SHARON TOOK POSSESSION OF SAID FERRARI. ON NOVEMBER 6, RAJA WENT
21
TO SHARON TO RETRIEVE THE CAR SAYING THAT SHE BOUGHT THE SAME CAR FROM BIANCA ON MARCH
9. WHO BETWEEN SHARON AND RAJA HAS ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR?
A97: Sharon. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. [Art. 1544]
Q98: FROM THE FACTS ABOVE, IF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED WAS A REGISTERED/TITLED PARCEL OF
LAND IN MANDALUYONG, AND VIOLET HAD THE SALE TO HER REGISTERED ON MARCH 10 AFTER
LEARNING THAT THE LOT WAS SOLD TO SHARON, WILL THE ANSWER STILL BE THE SAME?
A98: Yes. The rule on double sales of registered land states that ownership is deemed acquired by the person who
first registers the property in his name in good faith. In this case, Violet registered it in bad faith. In order for the
second buyer to displace the first buyer the second buyer must show that she acted in good faith (i.e., in ignorance
of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) from the time of acquisition until title is transferred to him by
registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession. [Cheng v. Genato, G.R. No. 129760 (1998)]
Q99: WHAT IS THE MACEDA LAW?

A99: The Maceda Law (R.A. 655) is applicable to sales of immovable property on installments. The most important
features are:
(1) After having paid installments for at least two years, the buyer is entitled to a mandatory grace period
of one month for every year of installment payments made, to pay the unpaid installments without
interest.
If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value equivalent to fifty
percent (50%) of the total payments made, and after five years of installments, an additional five percent
(5%) every year but not to exceed ninety percent (90%) of the total payments made.
(2) In case the installments paid were less than 2 years, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of
not less than 60 days. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period,
the seller may cancel the contract after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or
demand for rescission by notarial act. [Rillo v. CA, G.R. No. 125347 (1997)]
Q100: WHAT IS THE RECTO LAW?

A100: The Recto Law (Art. 1484) refers to sale of movables payable in installments and limiting the right of seller,
in case of default by the buyer, to one of three remedies:
(1) Exact fulfillment;
(2) Cancel the sale if two or more installments have not been paid; and
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the things sold, also in case of default of two or more installments,
with no further action against the purchaser. [PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging,
G.R. No. 142618 (2007)]
Q101: JASMIN SOLD A PARCEL OF LAND TO PATRICK ON JANUARY 1, 2002, PAYMENT AND DELIVERY TO
BE MADE ON FEBRUARY 1, 2002. IT WAS STIPULATED THAT IF PAYMENT WERE NOT TO BE MADE BY
PATRICK ON FEBRUARY 1, 2002, THE SALE BETWEEN PARTIES WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE RESCINDED.
PATRICK FAILED TO PAY ON THE SAID DATE, BUT OFFERED TO PAY THREE DAYS LATER, WHICH
PAYMENT JASMIN REFUSED TO ACCEPT, CLAIMING THAT THEIR CONTRACT OF SALE HAD ALREADY BEEN
RESCINDED. IS JASMIN’S CONTENTION CORRECT?
A101: No, X is not correct. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated, as in this
case, that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take
place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the
contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. Since no demand for rescission was made
on Y, either judicially or by a notarial act, X cannot refuse to accept the payment offered by Y three (3) days after
the expiration of the period. [Art. 1592]
Q102: WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF AN APPARENT VENDOR WHEN THE INSTRUMENT IS FOUND TO BE AN
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE?
A102: Reformation of the instrument. [Art. 1605]
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Q103: RAMON OWNS A UNIT IN A GREENBELT MANSIONS CONDOMINIUM. TOGETHER WITH OTHER
OWNERS OF THE SEPARATE UNITS IN THE CONDOMINIUM, HE IS DEEMED A CO-OWNER OF THE STUDENT
LOUNGE WHICH IS A COMMON AREA. HE WANTS TO SELL HIS UNIT TO TRISH, AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. IS
THIS ALLOWED UNDER RA 4726 OR THE CONDOMINIUM ACT?
A103: No. Where the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of separate units as co-
owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino
citizens, or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in
cases of hereditary succession. [Sec. 5, RA 4726]
Q104: IS THE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, BY ITSELF, ALLOWED TO SELL, EXCHANGE, LEASE OR

DISPOSE OF THE COMMON AREAS HELD BY IT?
A104: No. A condominium corporation shall not, during its existence, sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose
of the common areas owned or held by it in the condominium project unless authorized by the affirmative vote of
ALL the stockholders or members. [Sec. 16, RA 4726]
Q105: NOT EVERY PURCHASER OF A CONDOMINIUM UNIT IS A SHAREHOLDER OF A CONDOMINIUM

CORPORATION. TRUE OR FALSE?
A105: True. The Condominium Act leaves to the Master Deed the determination of when the shareholding will be
transferred to the buyer of the unit. But ownership of a unit is an indispensable requisite to being a shareholder in
the corporation. [Sunset View Condominium Corporation v. Campos, G.R. No. L-52361 (1981)]
Q106: IN THE DELIVERY OF A THING SOLD, WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS OF A BUYER IF THE QUANTITY OF
THE MOVABLES DELIVERED IS LESS THAN EXPECTED?
A106: The option of the buyer are the following: 1. Buyer may reject all 2. Buyer may accept a. If buyer accepts with
knowledge of seller’s inability to deliver the rest – buyer pays contract rate b. If Buyer has used or disposed of the
goods delivered prior to knowing seller’s inability to deliver the rest, or if buyer does not know of seller’s inability
to deliver the rest – buyer pays fair value [Art. 1522]
Q107: ON JULY 14, 2004, TAMARA EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF CHRISTIAN A DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OVER
A PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 6245. IT APPEARS IN THE DEED OF SALE THAT TAMARA
RECEIVED FROM JUAN P120,000.00 AS PURCHASE PRICE. HOWEVER, TAMARA RETAINED THE OWNER’S
DUPLICATE OF SAID TITLE. THEREAFTER, CHRISTIAN, AS LESSOR, AND TAMARA, AS LESSEE, EXECUTED
A CONTRACT OF LEASE OVER THE PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF ONE (1) YEAR WITH A MONTHLY RENTAL
OF P5,000.00. TAMARA, AS LESSEE, WAS ALSO OBLIGATED TO PAY THE REALTY TAXES ON THE
PROPERTY DURING THE PERIOD OF LEASE. SUSEQUENTLY, TAMARA FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST
CHRISTIAN FOR THE REFORMATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, ALLEGING THAT THE
TRANSACTION COVERED BY THE DEED WAS AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. IN HIS VERIFIED ANSWER TO
THE COMPLAINT, CHRISTIAN ALLEGED THAT THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD TO HIM UNDER THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE, AND INTERPOSED COUNTERCLAIMS TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
AND TO COMPEL TAMARA TO TURN OVER TO HIM THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE OF TITLE. RESOLVE THE
CASE.
A107: The complaint of Tamara against Christian should be dismissed. The instances when a contract —
regardless of its nomenclature — may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage are enumerated in Article 1602
of the CC. Moreover, Article 1604 states that “the provisions of article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting
to be an absolute sale.” For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur: 1) the parties entered into
a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and 2) their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of
mortgage. In the given case, although Tamara retained possession of the property as lessee after the execution of
the Deed of Sale, there is no showing that the intention of the parties was to secure an existing debt by way of
mortgage. Hence, the complaint of Tamara against Christian should be dismissed. [Heirs of Balite v. Lim, G.R. No.
152168 (2004]
Q108: ON OCTOBER 20, 1993, EDITH AND IAN ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT WHEREBY EDITH SOLD TO IAN
A PARCEL OF LAND FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF P10,000.00, EDITH RESERVING TO HERSELF THE
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RIGHT TO REPURCHASE THE SAME. BECAUSE THEY WERE FRIENDS, NO PERIOD WAS AGREED UPON FOR
THE REPURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY.
UNTIL WHEN MUST EDITH EXERCISE HER RIGHT OF REPURCHASE?
IF EDITH FAILS TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY WITHIN THE ALLOWABLE PERIOD, WHAT WOULD YOU ADVISE
IAN TO DO FOR HIS PROTECTION?
A108: First, Edith can exercise her right of repurchase within four (4) years from the date of the contract. [Art.
1606]
Second, I would advise B to file an action for consolidation of title and obtain a judicial order of consolidation which
must be recorded in the Registry of Property. [Art. 1607]
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP

Q109: What are the elements of agency?
A109: The following are the essential elements of agency:
a) There is consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship of agency
b) The object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person
c) The agent acts as a representative and not for himself; and
d) The agent acts within the scope of his authority [Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Sons, G.R. No. L-24332
(1978)]
Q110: Richard sold a large parcel of land in Cebu to Leo for P100 million payable in annual installments over
a period of ten years, but title will remain with Richard until the purchase price is fully paid. To enable Leo to
pay the price, Richard gave him a power-of-attorney authorizing him to subdivide the land, sell the individual
lots, and deliver the proceeds to Richard, to be applied to the purchase price. Five years later, Richard revoked
the power of attorney and took over the sale of the subdivision lots himself. Is the revocation valid or not?
Why?
A110: The revocation is not valid. The power of attorney given to the buyer is irrevocable because it is coupled with
an interest: the agency is the means of fulfilling the obligation of the buyer to pay the price of the land. [Article
1927, CC] In other words, a bilateral contract (contract to buy and sell the land) is dependent on the agency.
Q111: As an agent, AL was given a guarantee commission, in addition to his regular commission, after he sold
20 units of refrigerators to a customer, HT Hotel. The customer, however, failed to pay for the units sold. AL’s
principal, DRBI, demanded from AL payment for the customer’s accountability. AL objected, on the ground
that his job was only to sell and not to collect payment for units bought by the customer.
Is AL’s objection valid? Can DRBI collect from him or not? Reason.
A112: No, AL’s objection is not valid and DRBI can collect from AL. Since AL accepted a guarantee commission, in
addition to his regular commission, he agreed to bear the risk of collection and to pay the principal the proceeds
of the sale on the same terms agreed upon with the purchaser. [Article 1907, CC]
Q112: X appoints Y as his agent to sell his products in Cebu City. Can Y appoint a sub-agent, and if he does,
what are the effects of such appointment?
A112: Yes, the agent may appoint a substitute or sub-agent if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so,
but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:
a) when he was not given the power to appoint one;
b) when he was given such power, but without designating the person, and the person appointed was
notoriously incompetent or insolvent. [Article 1892, CC]
Q113: X was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Cabanatuan City. As she was abroad, she advised
her sister Y via overseas call to sell the land and sign a contract of sale on her behalf.
Y thus sold the land to B1 on March 31, 2001 and executed a deed of absolute sale on behalf of X. B1 paid the
purchase price.
24
B2, unaware of the sale of the land to B1, signified to Y his interest to buy it but asked Y for her authority from
X. Without informing X that she had sold the land to B1, Y sought X for a written authority to sell. X e-mailed
Y an authority to sell the land. Y thereafter sold the land on May 1, 2001 to B2 on monthly installment basis
for two years, the first installment to be paid at the end of May 2001.
Who between B1 and B2 has a better right over the land?

A113: B2 has a better title. This is not a case of double sale, since the first sale was void. The law provides that
when a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in
writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void. [Article 1874, CC] The property was sold by Y to B1 without any written
authority from the owner X. Hence, the sale to B1 was void.
Q114: Explain the doctrine of delectus personarum.

A114: Delectus personarum literally means ‘choice of the person’. It is because of this delectus personarum that the
law gives such wide authority to one partner, to bind another by contract or otherwise. Partnership is a relation in
which delectus personae is an important element. It is based on trust and confidence between the partners. Hence,
no one may be introduced into the partnership without the unanimous consent of the other partners. This element
of delectus personae, however, is true only in the case of a general partner, but not as regards a limited partner.
[Article 1866, CC]
Q115: A, B, and C were partners, the first one being an industrial partner. During the first year of operation,
the firm made a profit of P3 million. During the second year, a loss of P1.5 million was sustained. Thus, the
net profit for the two years of operation was only P1.5 million. In the articles of partnership, it was stipulated
that A, the industrial partner, would get 1/3 of the profits, but would not participate in the losses. Is the
stipulation valid?
A115: Yes, the stipulation is valid. Even the law itself exempts the industrial partner from losses. In the absence of
stipulation, the share of each partner in the profits and losses shall be in proportion to what they may have
contributed, but the industrial partner shall not be liable for the losses. [Article 1797, CC]
Q116: Will the dissolution of the partnership discharge a partner from liability?
A116: No. The dissolution of partnership does not itself discharge the existing liability of any partner. A partner is
discharged from any existing liability upon dissolution of the partnership by an agreement to that effect between
himself, the partnership creditor, and the person or partnership continuing the business, and such agreement may
be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person
or the partnership continuing the business.
The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for all obligations of the partnership incurred while
he was a partner, but subject to prior payment of his separate debts. [Article 1835, CC]
Q117: What is the doctrine of apparent authority?

A117: One who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such cannot
be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent to the prejudice of third persons dealing with
such person in good faith and in honest belief that he is what he appears to be. [Cuison v. CA, G.R. No. 88539
(1993)]
Q118: When may an act of an agent be binding upon the principal even if he acted beyond the scope of his
authority?
A118: An agent’s act even if done
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Q119: IN A COMMODATUM, WHAT ARE THE RULES ON THE RIGHT OF THE BAILOR TO DEMAND THE
RETURN OF THE THING LOANED?
A119: The general rule is that a bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until (a) after the expiration
of the period stipulated, or (b) after the accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum has been
constituted [Art. 1946]. However, the bailor may demand the return of the thing if (a) he has urgent need of the
25
thing or its temporary use [Art. 1946], (b) if the commodatum is a precarium [Art. 1947], or (c) if the bailee commits
any acts of ingratitude under Article 765 [Art. 1948].
Q120: CAN A BAILEE MAKE USE OF THE FRUITS OF THE THING LOANED IN A COMMODATUM?
A120: Yes, provided that the parties have stipulated that the bailee may make use of the fruits. The general rule is
that a bailee in commodatum is entitled only to the use of the thing loaned but not to its fruits [Art. 1935]. However,
a stipulation that the bailee may make use of the fruits of the thing loaned is considered valid [Art. 1940].
Q121: HOW MUST PAYMENT BE MADE IN A MUTUUM?

A121: If the object of the mutuum is money, payment must be made in the currency stipulated if it is possible to
deliver such currency. Otherwise, it is payable in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines [Art. 1249].
And in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the basis of payment shall be the value of the currency at the
time of the creation of the obligation. [Art. 1250]. If the object of the mutuum is a fungible thing other than money,
the borrower must pay the lender another thing of the same kind, quality, and quantity. If it is impossible to do so,
the borrower shall pay its value at the time of the perfection of the loan [Art. 1955].
Q122: WHAT ARE THE RULES FOR AWARD OF INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT OF ACTUAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES?
A122: (1) When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore,
the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Art. 1169 of the CC.
(2) When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount
of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty,
the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially [Art. 1169], but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed
to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be
on the amount finally adjudged.
(3) When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. [Nacar
v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 18987 (2013), modifying Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA, G.R. No. 97412 (1994), in light of
BSP-MB Circular No. 799]
Q123: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF BANK DEPOSITS?

A123: Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the
provisions concerning simple loan. [Art. 1980] Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits; they are really
loans because they earn interest. The relationship then between a depositor and a bank is one of creditor and
debtor. [Serrano v. Central Bank of the Phil., G.R. No. L-30511, February 14, 1980]
The general rule is that a bank can compensate or set off the deposit in its hands for the payment of the
indebtedness to it on the part of the depositor. [Gullas v. PNB, G.R. No. L-43191 (1935)]
Q124: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF A CONTRACT FOR THE RENT OF A SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX WITH A BANK?
A124: It is a special kind of deposit. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease because the full
and absolute possession and control of the safety deposit box was not given to the renters. The guard key of the
box remained with the bank; without this key, the renters could not open the box. On the other hand, the bank
could not likewise open the box without the renter's key. [CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp. v. CA, G.R. No.
90027 (1993)]
26
Q125: DISTINGUISH THE RIGHT OF A DEPOSITARY UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND THAT OF A
WAREHOUSEMAN UNDER THE WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS LAW (ACT NO. 2137) AS REGARDS THE
COMMINGLING OF GOODS.
A125: Under Art. 1976 of the CC, as a general rule, a depositary may commingle grain or other articles of the same
kind and quality, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. As for a warehouseman, under Sec. 22 of the
Warehouse Receipts Law, a warehouseman shall keep the goods so far separate from goods of other depositors
and from other goods of the same depositor for which a separate receipt has been issued, as to permit at all times
the identification and redelivery of the goods deposited. The exception, found in Sec. 23, is, if authorized by
agreement or by custom, the warehouseman may mingle fungible goods with other goods of the same kind and
grade.
Q126: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF PLEDGE?

A126: (1) Constituted to secure a principal obligation; (2) pledgor must be the absolute owner; (3) pledgor must
have free disposal of the thing pledged; (4) when the principal obligations becomes due, the thing pledged may
be alienated to satisfy payment of such obligation; (5) the subject matter of the contract must be a movable
property; and (6) the thing pledged must be placed in the possession of the pledgee.
Q127: WHAT ARE THE QUALIFICATIONS OF A GUARANTOR?

A127: One who is obliged to furnish a guarantor should present a person who possesses (1) integrity (2) capacity
to bind himself (3) sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees. [Art. 2056]
Q128: WHAT IS THE BENEFIT OF EXCUSSION AND HOW IS IT EXERCISED?

A128: Under the benefit of excussion, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has:
(1) exhausted all of the property of the debtor; and (2) resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor. [Art.
2058]
In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must: (a) set it up against the creditor
upon the latter’s demand for payment from him; and (b) point out to the creditor available property of the debtor
within the Philippine territory and sufficient to cover the amount of the debt. [Art. 2060]
Q129: MAY THE GUARANTOR BE REPLACED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE CREDITOR?

A129: Yes. The creditor may demand another who has all the qualifications in Art. 2056 if the guarantor (1) has
been convicted in first instance of a crime involving dishonesty (2) should become insolvent.
Exception: creditor has required and stipulated that a specified person should be the guarantor. [Art. 2057]
Q130: WHAT IS THE FORM OF A CONTRACT OF GUARANTY?

A130: A contract of guaranty falls under the Statute of Frauds under Art. 1403 (2)(b) of the New CC as it is a special
promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another. As such, it is unenforceable unless it is in writing
and subscribed by the part charged or his agent.
Q131: WHEN IS THE MANAGEMENT EXTINGUISHED IN A CASE OF NEGOTIORUM GESTIO?

A131: It is extinguished:
(1) When the owner repudiates or puts an end thereto
(2) When the gestor withdraws from the management, subject to Art. 2144
(3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the owner or the gestor. [Art. 2153]
Q132: IN CASES OF SOLUTIO INDEBITI, WHAT IS THE LIABILITY OF A PAYEE IN BAD FAITH?
A132: One is liable for:
(1) For legal interest if a sum of money is involved, or
(2) For the fruits received or which should have been received if the thing produces fruits, and
(3) For any loss or impairment of the thing for any cause, and
(4) For damages to the person who delivered the thing, until it is recovered. [Art. 2159]
Q133: WHAT IS AN ANTICHRESIS? WHAT ARE THE OBLIGATIONS OF AN ANTICHRETIC CREDITOR?
27
A133: By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his
debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal
of his credit [Art. 2132]. Under a contract of antichresis, the creditor is obliged, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary, to pay the taxes and charges upon the estate [Art. 2135]. He is also bound to bear the expenses necessary
for the preservation and repair of the property [Article 2135].
Q134: DISCUSS THE RELIANCE ON SECURITY TEST IN RELATION TO A DRAGNET CLAUSE IN A REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE CONTRACT.
A134: When parties conform to a dragnet clause, it is reasonable to conclude that they also agree to an implied
understanding that subsequent loans need not be secured by other securities, as the subsequent loans will be
secured by the first mortgage. However, there is no prohibition against contractually requiring other securities for
the subsequent loans. Hence, when the mortgagor takes another loan for which another security was given, it
cannot be inferred that such loan was made in reliance solely on the original security with the dragnet clause, but
rather, on the new security given [Prudential Bank v. Alviar, G.R. No. 150197 (2005)].
Q135: WHEN IS A CONTRACT PRESUMED TO BE THAT OF AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE?

A135: A contract is presumed to be an equitable mortgage when (1) When the price of a sale with right to
repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) When
upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is executed; (4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5)
When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; or (6) In any other case where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the
performance of any other obligation. [Art. 1602].
Q136: C BOUGHT CERTAIN SHARES OF STOCK FROM PF CORP. THE SHARES OF STOCK WERE DELIVERED
TO CUSTODIAN BANKS WHO HELD SUCH ON C’S BEHALF. WHEN PF CORP. WAS PLACED UNDER
RECEIVERSHIP BY THE SEC, THE RECEIVER WITHDREW THE SHARES FROM THE CUSTODIAN BANKS AND
WERE SOLD WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE AND WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM THE SEC. THE PROCEEDS
WERE COMMINGLED WITH PF CORP.’S OTHER ASSETS. UPON LEARNING OF THIS, HE FILED A CLAIM FOR
PAYMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE STOCKS IN THE RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS. A 15% RATE OF
RECOVERY WAS APPROVED FOR PF CORP.’S CREDITORS AND INVESTORS. C CLAIMS THAT HE IS
ENTITLED TO THE ENTIRE MONETARY VALUE OF THE SHARES OF STOCK, ARGUING THAT HE IS A
PREFERRED CREDITOR UNDER ART. 2241 (2) OF THE CIVIL CODE SINCE HIS CLAIM FOR THE MONETARY
VALUE OF THE SHARES AROSE FROM THE UNAUTHORIZED SALE OF HIS STOCKS. IS C CORRECT?
EXPLAIN.
A136: No. Under Art. 2241 (2), claims arising from misappropriation, breach of trust, or malfeasance by public
officials committed in the performance of their duties, on the movables, money or securities obtained by them, are
preferred with reference to specific movable property of the debtor. While C’s shares were specific movable
property, the money raised from them after their sale is a generic thing. C’s claim is for the payment of the
monetary value of the shares, thus it does not fall under Art. 2241(2).
At most, C is deemed an ordinary creditor whose credit, along with other ordinary credits, shall be paid pro rata
[Art. 2251(2)]. [Cordova v. Reyes Daway Lim Bernardo Lindo Rosales Law Offices, G.R. No. 146555 (2007)].
Q137: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORTGAGE CREDITS AND UNPAID VENDOR’S LIENS WITH
RESPECT TO PREFERRED CREDITS WITH REFERENCE TO THE DEBTOR’S SPECIFIC IMMOVABLE
PROPERTY AND REAL RIGHTS?
A137: While Art. 2242 specifically requires mortgage credits to be recorded in the Registry of Property in order to
be given preference, no such requirement is made with respect to the vendor's lien for the unpaid price of real
property sold. The law does not make any distinction between a registered and unregistered vendor's lien. Any
lien of that kind enjoys the preferred credit status. [De Barretto v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-14938 (1961)]
Q138: EXPLAIN THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE AND CONCURRENCE OF CREDITS PROVIDED IN THE CIVIL
CODE.
A138: The CC establishes a two-tier order of preference among the enumerated special preferred credits: taxes
come first, and all other claims come after. Only taxes, duties, and fees due on the movable or immovable
28
properties enjoy preference among the special preferred credits in Arts. 2241 and 2242. All other claims in the said
articles are not preferred over any other, as there is only a concurrence of credits among them.
TORTS AND DAMAGES

Q139: Explain the concept of negotiorum gestio.
A139: Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another,
without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its
incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so. [Art. 2144,
CC]
Q140: When is negotiorum gestio inapplicable? [Art. 2144, CC]

A140:
(1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned – law on unauthorized contracts applies
(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner – law on agency applies
Q141: What are the requisites for quasi-delict?

A141: (1) There must be an act or omission;
(2) Such act or omission causeds damage to another;
(3) The act or omission is caused by fault or negligence (culpa aquiliana)
(4) There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
Note: The existence of a contract between the parties does not necessarily bar the commission of a tort by one
against the other, and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
“The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.” [Air France. Vs. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438 (1966)]
Q142: What are the instances of vicarious liability?

A142:
Imputed to On behalf of
Father, or mother if father is dead or Minor children who live in their company
incapacitated
Guardians Minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company
Owners and managers of an establishment or Employees, in the service of the branches in which they are
enterprise employed or on occasion of their functions
Employers, even if not engaged in any business Employees and household helpers acting within the scope
or industry of their assigned tasks
State Special agents
Note: But not to an official to whom the task done properly
pertains
Note: Special agent – one who receives a definite/fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official [Meritt vs. Government]
Teachers and heads of establishments of arts Pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
and trades in their custody
The responsibility of the persons who may be held vicariously liable shall cease when they prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. [Art. 2180, CC]
Under Article 2180 of the New CC, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption
instantly arises that the employer was remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the negligent employee. To
avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this
29
presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. [R Transport v. Yu, G.R. No. 174161 (2015)]
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias.
The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. [Caedo
v. Yu Khe Thai, G.R. No. L-20392 (1968)]
Q143: What is the presumption of negligence in motor vehicle mishaps?

A143: The owner is solidarily liable with his driver in motor vehicle mishaps if:
(1) he was in the vehicle, and
(2) he could have prevented the misfortune by the use of due diligence.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, Art. 2180 is applicable. [Art. 2184, CC]
Disputably presumed that the driver was negligent if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. [Art. 2184, CC]
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum
level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be
entirely safe and commonplace to another. [Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, supra]
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the CC is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners
are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. What would be a
negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly
equipped. [Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, supra]
Q144: What are the elements of the defense of res ipsa loquitur?
A144:
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
(2) It is cause by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant/s; and
(3) The possibility of contributing conduct, which would make the plaintiff responsible, is eliminated.
Q145: When are moral damages recoverable?

A145:
(1) Criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander, or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309 (disrespect to the dead, wrongful interference with a funeral);
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35;
(11) Willful injury to property if the court finds such damage justly due; and
(12) Breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Q146: What are the requisites for the award of moral damages?
A146:
(1) There must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
(2) There must be a culpable act or omission;
30
(3) Such act or omission is the proximate cause of the injury; and
(4) The damage is predicated on the cases cited in Article 2219.
Note: On award of moral damages to corporations—

General Rule: A corporation may not be awarded moral damages, it being a juridical person. Thus, it cannot suffer
from wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish, or moral shock. [Manila Electric Co. v. T.E.A.M.
Corporation, G.R. No. 131723 (2007)]
Exception: Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; but there must be evidence to prove the same [Filipinas
Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Agro Medical and Educational Center, G.R. No. 141994 (2005)]
Q147: When are attorney’s fees recoverable?

A147: Under Art. 2208, in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid,
just, and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers, and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
Q148: Who may be sued under the State?

A148:
(1) A special agent
(2) Instrumentalities discharging proprietary functions
(3) Those that consent to be sued
Q149: Distinguish between injury, damage, and damages.

Q149:
(1) Injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right.
(2) Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm, resulting from the injury.
(3) Damages is the recompense or compensation awarded.
Q150: Distinguish culpa contractual from culpa aquiliana.

A150: According to Cangco v. Manila Railroad [G.R. No. L-12191 (1918)], they differ in that:
CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA CONTRACTUAL
Basis of liability Fault or negligence or omission (first of the EE, which Breach of contract
is then attributed to the ER)
Vinculum juris Fault or negligence of omission itself Contract
Nature of liability Vicarious liability Principal – direct and immediate
or obligation of
ER
How rebutted ER needs to show that he exercised the diligence of Common carrier exercised
a good father of a family in the selection and extraordinary diligence to prevent
supervision of EEs breach
Burden of proof Plaintiff should prove that the damages were caused Plaintiff should only prove that the
by the negligent conduct of the defendant contract exists and that the
31
defendant has breached it – it is not

necessary for the plaintiff to prove
negligence
Statutory basis 2176; 2180 (CC) 1170; 1172; 1174 (CC)
Q151: After ten years as a couple, A proposed to B, who was ecstatic and immediately accepted the proposal.
After two years of planning during which all the necessary arrangements and corresponding payments were
made by B’s family, A disappeared and never showed himself to B or her family again. B sued a under Article
21 for breach of promise to marry. In his defense, A alleged that breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong, and he cannot be held liable for damages under Article 21. May A be held liable for damages?
A151: Yes. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, but when it is done contrary to morals,
good customs, and public policy and with intent to injure, such breach is actionable. The case of Wassmer v. Velez,
supra is applicable. In that case, the bride had already set a wedding and went through all necessary preparations
and publicity, only to walk out when the marriage was about to be solemnized. It was palpably contrary to morals,
good customs, and public policy. In this case, the same set of circumstances was present.
Q152: Ben was driving along Commonwealth Avenue when he received a startling text message from his wife,
causing him to hit the brakes abruptly. Manong, who was then driving a passenger jeep carrying Jane, crashed
into Ben’s car from behind. Jane suffered an abrasion on her face as a result of the crash and sued Domeng
(the owner of the jeep) for damages. Domeng alleged in his defense that since Ben’s negligence in abruptly
braking was the proximate cause of the accident, Domeng cannot be held liable for damages to jane. Is
Domeng correct?
A152: No. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving
breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
the parties; but where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between them, it is the parties themselves that
create the obligation. The action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. [Calalas
v. CA, G.R. No. 122039 (2000)].
Q153: Mark was a bagger at SM Hypermart. One busy Sunday morning, the security guard reported to the
manager that he saw Mark placing a Kitkat bar in his bag without paying for it. The manager immediately
went to the bagger’s station, pulled Mark by his collar and screamed, “Magnanakaw! Tanggal ka na sa
trabaho!” Upon inspection, no Kitkat bar was found in Mark’s bag. The manager whispered an apology and
said that Mark was not really fired. Mark filed a complaint for damages against the manager on the basis of
Articles 19 and 21 of the CC. The manager disclaimed liability on the ground that he acted in good faith upon
a well-founded belief in dismissing the employee and was only looking out for the interests of the employer.
Is the manager liable for damages?
A153: Yes. While the employer, represented by the manager, has a right to dismiss the employee for misconduct,
the manner of this right was exercised constituted a violation of Article 19, as such was based on unfounded
accusations of dishonesty [Globe v. CA, G.R. No. 81262 (1989)].
Q154: Valmonte was hired as a wedding coordinator. On the day of the wedding, she left the bridal suite to
run a few errands. Upon her return, she was accosted by the bride’s Aunt Carpio in front of the entire entourage
and accused of stealing the bride’s jewelry that had gone missing. Can Valmonte recover damages from
Carpio under Article 19 of the CC?
A154: Yes. To find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19, the following elements must be present: (1)
there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring
another. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry
in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, Carpio virtually
branded Valmonte as the thief. True, Carpio had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
Valmonte without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any
standard or principle of law is impermissible. Carpio had willfully caused injury to Valmonte in a manner which is
contrary to morals and good customs [Carpio v. Valmonte, supra]
LAND, TITLES, AND DEEDS
32
Q155: WHO MAY FILE AN APPLICATION FOR THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LAND UNDER PD 1529?
A155: Sec. 14 of PD 1529 provides that the following may file an application for registration of title to land with
the proper Regional Trial Court, personally or through their authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original
registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of
the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be
substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless
prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
Q156: X FILED AN APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF A PARCEL OF LAND IN 1980. NO ONE CONTESTED
X’S APPLICATION. X PRESENTED PROOF THAT HE HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF SAID LAND IN THE
CONCEPT OF AN OWNER FOR 38 YEARS. THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED SAID APPLICATION ON THE
GROUND THAT ALTHOUGH THE LAND WAS ALREADY ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AT THE TIME OF X’S
APPLICATION, SUCH WAS NOT WHEN X STARTED TO POSSESS IT. WAS THE DISMISSAL PROPER IN THIS
CASE?
A156: NO. The Court in Malabanan v. Republic [G.R. No. 179987 (2009)] opined that the land subject of an
application for registration needed to be classified as alienable and disposable at the time of application. Thus,
the trial court erred in dismissing X’s application in this case.
Q157: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR FILING A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER SEC. 32 OF 1529?
A157: A decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the
concurrence of five essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right; (b) that he
has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the
decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value. [Walstrom v.
Mapa, G.R. No. L-38387 (1990)]
Q158: WHO IS CONSIDERED AS AN INNOCENT PURCHASE FOR VALUE?

A158: An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before
receiving any notice of another person’s claim. [Rosales v. Burgos, G.R. No. 143573 (2009)]
Q159: A’s title to a parcel of land was confirmed by the judge of CFI Pampanga in 1958. Months later, a petition
for review was filed by B in the same proceeding alleging that the same was registered in A’s name through
actual fraud, deceit, and intentional omission of facts. Also, B raised an allegation that a Simulated Deed of
Sale was executed in favor of C, who was also impleaded as a respondent in this case. Does the cadastral
court have the power to entertain B’s petition?
A159: YES. In a petition for the review of a decree filed within the one-year period on the ground of actual fraud,
the cadastral court acting as such could likewise inquire into an allegation that the lot subject of the decree was
transferred in a simulated sale intended to avoid such a review […] The adjudication of land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final
decree and as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has
not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it, which court,
33
after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. [Cayanan v. Delos
Santos, G.R. No. L-21150 (1967)]
Q160: WHEN IS TITLE TO LAND DEEMED REGISTERED?

A160: Title to land is deemed registered at the time of its transcription in the Registry Book, not at the time of its
issuance. [Agcaoili; citing Manotok Realty v. CLT Realty, G.R. No. 123346 (2007)]]
Q161: WHEN WILL A WRIT OF POSSESSION NOT BE ISSUED?

A161: A writ of possession will not be issued in the following circumstances:
(a) When it has already been issued at the instance of the applicant or his successors, who hold transfer
certificates of title;
(b) When the persons against whom it is sought to be issued have occupied the premises after the final decree
was issued, and have not taken direct part as opponents in the registration proceedings where said final
decree was issued; and
(c) When the case is for reconstitution of title [Agcaoili]
Q162: THE COURT RULED IN FAVOR OF B IN THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS WHICH HE FILED.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOW BEING OCCUPIED BY C, D, AND E, WHO STARTED
OCCUPYING THE PREMISES AFTER THE FINAL DECREE WAS ISSUED, AND WHO HAVE NOT TAKEN DIRECT
PART AS OPPONENTS IN THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS WHERE SAID FINAL DECREE WAS ISSUED.
WHAT THEREFORE IS B’S REMEDY IN THIS CASE?
A162: B may file an action for unlawful detainer or a reivindicatory action. In Bernas v. Nuevo [G.R. No. L-58438
(1984)], the Supreme Court held that the rule is "when other persons have subsequently entered the property,
claiming the right of possession, the owner of the registered property or his successors in interest cannot
dispossess such persons by merely asking for a writ of possession. The remedy is to resort to the courts of justice
and institute a separate action for unlawful entry or detainer or for reinvidicatory action, as the case may be.
Q163: WHAT MUST ACCOMPANY AN APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION?

A163: An application for original registration must be accompanied by:
(a) CENRO or PENRO Certification that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable; and
(b) A copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian thereof. [Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corp., G.R. No. 162322 (2012)]
Q164: DISTINGUISH VOLUNTARY DEALINGS FROM INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS:

A164:
Voluntary Dealings Involuntary Dealings
Presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate of
Entry in the day book of ROD is sufficient notice to all
title is required to notify; mere entry in the day book
persons
of the Register of Deeds (ROD) is insufficient
An innocent purchaser for value of registered land
becomes the registered owner the moment he
presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed Lenin v. Bass, (1952): Entry thereof in the day book of
of sale and the same is entered in the day book of the ROD is sufficient notice to all persons even if the
the ROD and at the same time he surrenders or owner’s duplicate certificate of title is not presented to
presents the owner’s duplicate certificate of title the ROD.
covering the land sold and pays the registration
fees.
Villasor v. Camon, R-C.A. No. 8551(1951): It is
Dir. Of Lands v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27594 (1976): Entry in
necessary to register the deed or instrument in the
the day book of the ROD is sufficient notice to all
entry book of the ROD and a memorandum thereof
persons of an adverse claim without the same being
shall also be made in the owner’s duplicate
annotated at the back of the certificate of title
certificate and its original
34
Spouses Labayen v. Leonardo Serafica, G.R. No.

AFP Mutual Benefit Association v. Santiago, G.R. No.
178443 (2008): At the time of the filing of the
147559 (2008): Entry of the attachment in the books is
petition for cancellation of encumbrance, the lease
sufficient notice to all persons. Hence, the fact that the
contract already lost its efficacy. Thus, there is no
deed of sale was already annotated is of no moment
basis to save its annotation on defendant’s title.
with regard to third persons. The preference created
The fact that the cancellation of the lease contract
by the levy on attachment is not diminished by the
was forged is of no moment, for there was no
subsequent registration of the deed of sale.
violation of a right.
35

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1

U.P. LAW BOC CIVIL LAW PRE-WEEK REVIEWER

Q2: Explain the Nationality Theory/Lex Nationali.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Q6: WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?

Q8: WHEN SHOULD COURTS APPLY FORUM LAW?

Q10: EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT OF RENVOI.

PERSONS AND FAMILY LAW

Cannot be limited or restricted May be restricted or limited

Q17: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE?

Q18: HOW DO ESSENTIAL AND FORMAL REQUISITES DIFFER?

Q19: IS A FALSE AFFIDAVIT OF COHABITATION CONSIDERED AN IRREGULARITY OR AN ABSENCE OF THE

Q20: IS FORCED CONSENT A GROUND FOR NULLITY?

Q21: WHY IS BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG?

Q22: WHEN MAY A MARRIAGE BE SOLEMNIZED WITHOUT A MARRIAGE LICENSE?

Q23: WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGES?

Q26: WHY IS AN ACTION/DEFENSE FOR NULLITY IMPRESCRIPTABLE?

Party who did not

Insanity The sane spouse

Injured party, upon

Injured party, upon

Within five years

Within five years

Q29: WHAT PROPERTIES ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY?

Q31: COMPARE AND CONTRAST ART. 147 AND ART. 148.

If one party did not participate in

Q35: WHAT ARE THE BASES OF THE AMOUNT OF LEGAL SUPPORT?

Q36: DISTINGUISH LEGITIMATION FROM ADOPTION.

Q39: DISTINGUISH EASEMENT FROM USUFRUCT.

Q40: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE?

Q45: DISTINGUISH CO-OWNERSHIP WITH PARTNERSHIP.

Q46: DISTINGUISH OCCUPATION FROM POSSESSION.

Short duration Generally of longer duration

For NOTARIAL WILLS

Q48: Who are capacitated to make a will?

Q55: How may a will be revoked?

Q56: Differentiate between disinheritance and preterition.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

(a) B is only 16 years old

Q64: What are the requisites of accion pauliana?

Q65: Distinguish rescission from termination?

Was there an option contract between Naomi and Michelle?

Q80: What is the reformation of an instrument and when is it proper?

Q81: What are the kinds of estoppel?

Q82: What is estoppel by laches?

Q83: What are the defective contracts?

which for equitable reasons may be set aside even if valid

Voidable or annullable contracts (contrato nulo)

3. Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

Q87: Distinguish between civil and natural obligations.

Q92: Explain the concept of trust de son tort (constructive trust).

Q94: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A CONDITIONAL SALE AND AN ABSOLUTE SALE.

Q95: WHAT IS AN OPTION CONTRACT?

Q96: IS EARNEST MONEY PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE?

Q99: WHAT IS THE MACEDA LAW?

Q100: WHAT IS THE RECTO LAW?

Q104: IS THE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, BY ITSELF, ALLOWED TO SELL, EXCHANGE, LEASE OR

Q105: NOT EVERY PURCHASER OF A CONDOMINIUM UNIT IS A SHAREHOLDER OF A CONDOMINIUM

UNTIL WHEN MUST EDITH EXERCISE HER RIGHT OF REPURCHASE?

AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP

Who between B1 and B2 has a better right over the land?

Q114: Explain the doctrine of delectus personarum.

Q117: What is the doctrine of apparent authority?