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Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla (G.R. No.

157206, June 27, 2008)

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and
the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is
not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full and ample.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 146587, 02 July 2002)

The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in
the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as
between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited
with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time
when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking
of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner
in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking

Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 150640, March
22, 2007)

Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the
property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, just
compensation has been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator, and that the gauge for computation is not the takers gain but the owners
loss. In order for the payment to be just, it must be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must
the payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine
Export Processing Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a reasonable time from
the taking of the property. It succinctly explained that without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered just inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences
of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just compensation is
finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v.
National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the
final compensation until paid. Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the
imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court
enunciated the rule that where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
Manansan vs. Republic (G.R. No. 140091, 10 August 2006)

The rule is that the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of
the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. In this case,
the complaint was filed on April 17, 1979, and the trial court issued the writ of possession
on January 10, 1981. The City Treasurer, City Assessor and the AACI based their assessment reports
as of 1995 and not as of 1979 or a difference of 16 years. Indeed, the fair market value of the
property in 1979 cannot be fixed by the mere expedient of cutting in half the assessment made by
the City Treasurer and City Assessor or AACI for that matter as of 1997. Such a process is arbitrary
and a grave abuse of the trial courts discretion.

It bears stressing that just compensation means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements
and capabilities should be considered.

We agree with the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the trial court was not
bound by the assessment report of the commissioners and that it had the discretion to reject the
same and substitute its own judgment on its value as gathered from the record. The court may
accept the report/recommendation of the commissioners in toto and base its judgment thereon.
However, the decision of the court must be based on all established rules, upon correct legal
principles and competent evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on
speculations or surmises. While tax values can serve as guide, the same cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation. Just compensation is the just and complete equivalent of the loss
that the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The court
should thus insist that the owner of private property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses; it is not intended that the compensation shall extend beyond the loss or injury.

Since the commissioners failed to base their assessment of the property as of 1979 and relied solely
on data as of 1995 instead of 1979, it behooved the trial court to direct them to revise their assessment,
or to discharge them and appoint new ones, or to require the parties to adduce competent evidence
to prove the fair market value of the property as of 1979. The trial court failed to do so. Worse, the
CA condoned the lapse of the trial court. Considering all the foregoing, the Court has no other
recourse but to remand the case to the trial court.

National Power Corporation, vs. Luis Samar (G.R. No. 197329, September 08, 2014)

Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken
from the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes
possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should befixed as
of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at
the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value
when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the
commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition of the order of expropriation,
the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken.’ However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appealsthat Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing
of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such
complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and
hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for
damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just
compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners
is dispensable x x x.