WEEK 3

APRIL ILAGAN
Section 11. Personal Dignity and Human Rights

Section 12. Family Life, Mother and Unborn

The State recognizes the sanctity of Family Life and shall protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973)
FACT: Under the Texas law, it is a crime to commit an abortion except when it is to be done for the purposes
of saving mother’s life during risky pregnancy. Appellant Jane Roe seeks a declaratory judgment that the
statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District
Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was
unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal
abortion. The appellant contends that the statues have curtailed her right to personal privacy in which abortion
decision is included. Hence, she prays to the US Supreme Court on behalf of others with the similar situation as
to her that the Texas statutes, be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy
embodied in the concept of personal liberty?

RULING:. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is qualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation. They held that abortion laws belongs to the previous
era of men, in the 19th century, abortion before the first recognized movement of the fetus inside the mother’s
womb was not an indictable offense,

Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the
laws are the product of a old social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been
taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is
hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques
have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third
reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that
the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
In light of the foregoing, the findings of the lower court which declares the abortion statutes were
unconstitutional was affirmed by this court.
MEYER VS. NEBRASKA
Facts: Robert Meyer taught at the Lutheran Zion Parochial School in Hamilton County, Nebraska. Where a
statute was passed where it prohibits an instructor from using a foreign language or teaching a foreign language
to students in grades one through eight. Appellant was caught teaching ten year olds how to read in German
using a collection of Bible stories written in German. He was caught and charged on May 25 1920 and
subsequently convicted. He appealed citing that the statute violates his right to teach which is protected under
the Due Process Doctrine stated in the 14th Amendment

Issue: Whether or not the Statute passed violates the right under the 14th amendment
Ruling: It is decided that the statute passed in Nebraska is in violation of a protected right under the 14th
amendment and the ruling of the court of first instance and the Nebraska Supreme Court was overturned.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

268 U.S. 510 (1925)

FACTS: The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation, organized in 1880, with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Hill Military Academy, was a private organization conducting an
elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders
prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and
guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The enactment of the Act alleges conflicts
with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious
training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right of schools and teachers
therein to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Act unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of their children?
RULING: Yes. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and
has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state. While the state has the right to
insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a
liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are educated.
Wisconsin v. Yoder
40 LW 4476, May 15, 1972

Facts: Three Amish students stopped attending school after eight grade due to religious beliefs. Wisconsin’s
compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until
they reach 16. All three families represented by Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy..
The New Glarus school district took them to court. The first ruling made by the Green County Court was in
favor of the school district and fined each family five dollars. The families appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether or not the application of the compulsory attendance law regarding children under 16 years of
age is in conflict with the free exercise of the Amish community?

Ruling: Yes, States cannot force children to attend school when it conflicts with their right to practice their
religion. Not all religious beliefs meet the demands of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. There
must be objective evidence of religious practice. In this case, the evidence existed. Though the state argued that
two more years of schooling was necessary to participate in America’s political system, The SC stated that the
state did not provide evidence of this. Furthermore, they held that the Amish community was a successful part
of American society, since it is made up of law-abiding citizensd that pay their taxes and do not use welfare.

Ginsberg vs. New York, 390 US 629 (1968)

Facts: Under New York Law it was illegal to willfully sell to a minor under 17 any picture which depicts
nudity, is harmful to minors and any magazine which taken as a whole is harmful to minors. Sam Ginsberg and
his wife operated Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette in Bellemore, Long Island. In it they sold magazines
including those deemed to be "girlie". He was prosecuted from two informants in which he personally sold two
16-year-old boys the "girlie" magazines. He was tried in Nassau County District Court and found guilty. The
court had found that the pictures were harmful to minors under the law. The Conviction was upheld by the
Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York and was denied an appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals. Ginsberg argued before the court that the State of New York did not have the power to classify two
different sets of the population in regards to obscene material and that it was an unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty.

Issue: Can the Government prohibit the sale to minors of certain kinds of sexually explicit materials, even if the
material is not considered obscene or illegal for adults.

Ruling: Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the court. The court rejected Ginsberg’s argument that New
York had deprived minors of their liberty. The court found that it was well within the state’s power to protect
minors and that just because the material is not classified as obscene to adults it may still be regulated with
minors.

Orceo v. COMELEC
GR 190779 (2010)

Facts: The Resolution No. 8714 is entitled Rules and Regulations on the: (1) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting
of Firearms or other Deadly Weapons; and (2) Employment, Availment or Engagement of the Services of
Security Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election Period for the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. The Resolution was promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on December 16,
2009, and took effect on December 25, 2009. The COMELEC’s intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the
term "firearm" and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational
guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. Meanwhile a ordinary citizen may not be
able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. They further contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not
in accordance with the State policies in the constitutional provisions Art. II, Sec. 12 "The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the term "firearm" in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
Ruling: No. The Court excludes the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns from the term "firearm"
under Resolution No. 8714, because they are not subject to any regulation, unlike airsoft guns. The Court holds
that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft guns and airguns in the term
"firearm" in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period, with the apparent
objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credible elections

Sec 13. The Vital Role of the Youth

The Role of the Youth in Nation Building

The role of the youths towards the nation building

First of all we have that the youths are the period between childhood and adulthood. Secondly, the nation is a
country considered as a group of people living in a certain territory under one Government. Thirdly, we also
have to know “Building” here means not masonry constructed, instead the development of the nation, the future
of our country. The vision of our country lies in the hands of our youths. They are filled with tremendous and
towering ambitions. It will be a great wastage of human resources if these youths are not given an opportunity
to exercise their talent. This beautiful land needs these youths in order for our soil to become a brighter one.
The primary role of young people is to get a good education in order to become better citizens of tomorrow.
They need to learn skills to do the job that their country’s economy needs. They also need to know how to read,
write, think, understand, analyse, and discuss the issues their country faces. The entire success of the nation
depends on the youths. However, in order for continuous success to take place; it is the Government’s
responsibility to provide the youth with proper facilities for, getting equipped with the knowledge of the modern
era.
Youth is the spring of life. It is the age of discovery and dreams. They have the power to transform the
nation into a better place. They also have the ability to lead their fellow citizens into the right direction. Youths
are fighters. They fight for an identity in society, equality, the homeless, bullying, unemployment, exploitation,
poverty and other problems which the world faces today. All of them hopes for a world full of opportunities, so
great minds can conquer them and become better individuals. They need good morals and values to handle
conflicts in a positive way. We have aspiring doctors, entrepreneurs, scientists, and who knows; maybe the next
president. Illiteracy is a major around the world. About ninety percent of the people who reside in villages are
illiterate. The reason is their utter ignorance and lack of initiative to lead them in the right direction. Someone
has to pull them up. Here also, the young people can be of immense help.
The role of the youth is the most important in today’s time. They have underplayed themselves in the field of
the politics. Youth are strong forces in social movements. Youths are problem solvers. Our nations need them to
resolve most of our problems. The nation is facing a lot of problems, and I believe that the youths are capable of
solving them. They just need to be given a chance to prove themselves. Youths have the power to unite
individuals in the six ethnic groups. Racism is an ongoing issue around the world. Individuals are fighting
against each other because of the complexion of their skin and the texture of their hair. Religion is another
issue, the youths can convince their fellow man to live in peace and love. All of us are one and we should not
allow these little differences to push us away from each other.
There also a lot of crime taking place. Women are being killed by their abusive husbands. Person’s homes,
businesses, are being broken into. All of this crime and violence needs to stop. The youth once more has the
ability to bring about a change in their country. Youths seems to have the ability to face any challenges and
problems. They have a positive influence on their fellow young people. They are able to teach them the positive
things in life. The ones whom are destroying their future, they tend to listen to their fellow youths. They will
make them understand the importance of a good education.
The wise youths that we have out there should be taken into consideration. Some of them, though educated are
unemployed. They should be given an opportunity to expose their intelligence to the world and make
themselves into someone. Some organisations and other firm should assist the youths; so they can make our
land a great and educated one. They will make a huge difference in society and the entire world. The youths are
our life and nation. They will make our country proud. The country will be recognized. The youths just need the
support from their fellow citizens and they will perform their duties.
In conclusion, the role of the youth in the nation building is crucial. They are problem solvers, have a positive
influence on other young people and the nation, and are extremely ambitious. They have the ability to create an
identity for themselves and move the nation forward. However, they will not be able to do this without the
support of their Government and fellow youths. So the youths can make their beautiful land flourish and shine
in success.

Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649)

Facts: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter --
PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes a waiver
of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s
right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded
into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

Ruling:1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it.
Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by
the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.” The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create
and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power
of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and
vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to
issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos.
The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from
local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always
subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the
1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the
state.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
Boys Scouts of the Philippines v. COA
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011

FACTS: COA issued Resolution No. 99-0115 on August 19, 1999 with the subject "Defining the Commissions
policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines." In its whereas clauses, the COA
Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation under CA No. 111, as amended by PD No.
460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. NLRC, the Supreme Court ruled that
the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a "government-controlled corporation within the meaning of
Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution"; and that "the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government
instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code." The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate
under Section 2(1), Article IX (D).

COA General Counsel, Director Sunico wrote BSP that latter have to comply with COA Resolution No. 99-011,
among which is to conduct an annual financial audit therein. Upon the BSPs request, the audit was deferred for
thirty (30) days. The BSP then filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order before the COA. This was denied by the COA in its questioned Decision, which
held that the BSP is under its audit jurisdiction. The BSP moved for reconsideration but this was likewise
denied under its questioned Resolution. This led to the filing by the BSP of this petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the COA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BSP falls under the COAs audit jurisdiction.

RULING: Yes. After considering the legislative history of the amended charter and the applicable laws and the
arguments of both parties, the Court found that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the
COA’s audit jurisdiction.
The BSP charter created the BSP as a “public corporation” to serve the following public interest or purpose: to
promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for
themselves and others, to train them in scout craft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and
responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the methods which
are in common use by boy scouts.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement a State
policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special
law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of “public
corporations” defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it,
pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code. The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private
corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to
ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or
groups special privileges denied to other citizens.

The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with judicial personality, which
does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to
its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered
private corporations as there exist another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are
otherwise known as “public corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the test of ownership or control and economic
viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.

Since BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality, the
Court concludes that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent
with the provisions of the BSP charter.

Section 14. Role of Women and Equality of Men and Women

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.

The provision is so worded as not to automatically dislocate the Civil Code and the civil law
jurisprudence on the subject. What it does is to give impetus to the removal, through statutes, of existing
inequalities. The general idea is for the law to ignore sex where sex is not a relevant factor in determining rights
and duties. Nor is the provision meant to ignore customs and traditions.

In Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. NLRC, 1997, the Supreme Court held that thepetitioner’s
policy of not accepting or consideringas disqualified from work any woman worker whocontracts marriage ,
runs afoul of the test of, andthe right against discrimination, which isguaranteed all women workers under
theConstitution. While a requirement that a womanemployee must remain unmarried may be justifiedas a “bona
fide qualification” where the particularrequirements of the job would demand the same,discrimination against
married women cannot beadopted by the employer as a general principle.

SECTION15. The State shall protect and promote the rightto health of the people and instillhealth
consciousness among them. Health • is the state physical, social and mental well-being rather than merely
than merely the absence of physical diseases These constitution gives the right to the people to health
The human right to health means that everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health, which includes access to all medical services, sanitation, adequate food, decent housing, healthy
working conditions, and a clean environment.
The human right to health guarantees a system of health protection for all.
Everyone has the right to the health care they need, and to living conditions that enable us to be healthy, such as
adequate food, housing, and a healthy environment.
Health care must be provided as a public good for all, financed publicly and equitably.The human right to health
care means that hospitals, clinics, medicines, and doctors’ services must be accessible, available, acceptable,
and of good quality for everyone, on an equitable basis, where and when needed.

SEC. 16 . THE STATE SHALL PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO A
BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY IN ACCORD WITH THE RHYTHM AND HARMONY
OF NATURE. 1. Right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The 1987 Constitution was drafted at a time when
there was a growing concern about the preservation of a healthy environment. The discussions manifested a
clear desire to make environmental protection and ecological balance conscious objects of police power. 1 3 9

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation
and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against FulgencioFactoran Jr., Secretary of DENR.
They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to:
 1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and
granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a
clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parenspatriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut
and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative
or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

RULING: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
LLDA v CA

FACTS: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It
was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or
activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like. Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE: Whether or not LLDA has the right to exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned.

RULING: Yes, LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It
is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the
absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting
and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to
municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of
1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. No. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

FACTS: The concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC Imus. They alleged that the
water quality have fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily
liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for
swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of P.D. 1152 under the headings,
Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;

(2) Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

RULINGS: (1) Sec. 17 of P.D. 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water
quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are
of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila
Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) Yes. As the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus,”
the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, et al.

FACTS: On March 12, 2009, The Governor of Aklan sent a letter to respondent Philippine Reclamation
Authority (PRA) expressing the interest of respondent Province to reclaim about 2.64 hectares of land along the
foreshores of Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan, pursuant to Resolution No. 13, s.
2008 issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan. And on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
respondent Province issued Resolution No. 2009110, which authorized Governor Marquez to file an application
to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan with respondent PRA.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay expressed its strong opposition to the
intended foreshore lease application, through Resolution No. 044, approved on July 22, 2009, manifesting
therein that respondent Provinces foreshore lease application was for business enterprise purposes for its
benefit, at the expense of the local government of Malay.
On August 2009, the Geohazard Assessment was completed then the Governor submitted an Environmental
Performance Report and Monitoring Program (EPRMP) to DENR-EMB RVI, which he had attached to his
letter dated September 19, 2009, as an initial step for securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On April 27, 2010 PRA approved the reclamation.
Petitioner alleges that despite the Malay Municipality’s denial of respondent Provinces request for a favorable
endorsement, as well as the strong opposition manifested both by Barangay Caticlan and petitioner as an NGO,
respondent Province still continued with the implementation of the Reclamation Project.

On June 1, 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of
Continuing Mandamus. On June 7, 2011, this Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic;
[2] Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing this case;
[3] Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and regulations based
on the scope and classification of the project;
[4] Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and
regulations; and
[5] Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project

RULINGS:

A close reading of the two LGUs respective resolutions would reveal that they are not sufficient to render the
petition moot and academic, as there are explicit conditions imposed that must be complied with by respondent
Province. In Resolution No. 003, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan it is stated that any
vertical structures to be constructed shall be subject for barangay endorsement. Clearly, what the barangay
endorsed was the reclamation only and not the entire project that includes the construction of a commercial
building and wellness center, and other tourism-related facilities. Petitioners objections, as may be recalled,
pertain not only to the reclamation per se, but also to the building to be constructed and the entire projects
perceived ill effects to the surrounding environment.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Malay obviously imposed explicit conditions for respondent Province to comply
with on pain of revocation of its endorsement of the project, including the need to conduct a comprehensive
study on the environmental impact of the reclamation project, which is the heart of the petition before us.
Therefore, the contents of the two resolutions submitted by respondent Province do not support its conclusion
that the subsequent favorable endorsement of the LGUs had already addressed all the issues raised and rendered
the instant petition moot and academic.

We do not agree with respondents appreciation of the applicability of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies in this case. We are reminded of our ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals, which summarized our
earlier decisions on the procedural requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit:

***

The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable: (1)
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department
secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.

Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, when
there is no due process observed, or where the protestant has no other recourse.

Although petitioner was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to issue an ECC was rendered, it
stands to be aggrieved by the decision, because it claims that the reclamation of land on the Caticlan side would
unavoidably adversely affect the Boracay side, where petitioners members own establishments engaged in the
tourism trade. As noted earlier, petitioner contends that the declared objective of the reclamation project is to
exploit Boracays tourism trade because the project is intended to enhance support services thereto; however,
this objective would not be achieved since the white-sand beaches for which Boracay is famous might be
negatively affected by the project. Petitioners conclusion is that respondent Province, aided and abetted by
respondents PRA and DENR-EMB RVI, ignored the spirit and letter of our environmental laws, and should thus
be compelled to perform their duties under said laws.

***

The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner
under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be availed of to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO as an
auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself. The Rationale of the said Rules explains the writ in this
wise:

Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of regulation by Congress to the
implementation of regulatory programs by the appropriate government agencies.

Thus, a government agency’s inaction, if any, has serious implications on the future of environmental law
enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will
have to rely on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial component.
Accordingly, questions regarding the propriety of an agency’s action or inaction will need to be analyzed.

This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of mandamus, which allows for the
enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty.

The writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision and, in order to do this, the court
may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of
other means to monitor compliance with its decision.

Petitioner had three options where to file this case under the rule: the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or this
Court.

Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine the
questions of unique national and local importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for environmental
protection, thus it was justified in coming to this Court.

3) Being the administrator of the EIS System, respondent DENR-EMB RVIs submissions bear great weight in
this case. However, the following are the issues that put in question the wisdom of respondent DENR-EMB
RVI in issuing the ECC:

[1] Its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a mere expansion of the existing jetty
port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new project;
[2] Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;
[3] The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government agencies; and
[4] The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the reclamation project to the environment.

As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by respondent Province above, a
significant portion of the reclaimed area would be devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the
area to be utilized for the expansion of the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m). To be true
to its definition, the EIA report submitted by respondent Province should at the very least predict the impact that
the construction of the new buildings on the reclaimed land would have on the surrounding environment. These
new constructions and their environmental effects were not covered by the old studies that respondent Province
previously submitted for the construction of the original jetty port in 1999, and which it re-submitted in its
application for ECC in this alleged expansion, instead of conducting updated and more comprehensive studies.

Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and Boracay are separated only by a
narrow strait. This becomes more imperative because of the significant contributions of Boracays white-sand
beach to the country’s tourism trade, which requires respondent Province to proceed with utmost caution in
implementing projects within its vicinity.

***

The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of
ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units
for the projects described therein.

In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the project proponent is the local
government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the
government to undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go
through respondent PRA and to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRAs authority to reclaim was delegated
to respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national
government institution which is tasked with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by
environmental laws such as the one at bar.

This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities, and is covered by the requirements found in the Local Government Code provisions.

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects
the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the
affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of
these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required by law to have been
conducted and secured by the respondent Province. Accordingly, the information dissemination conducted
months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with this requirement under the Local
Government Code. Had they been conducted properly, the prior public consultation should have considered the
ecological or environmental concerns of the stakeholders and studied measures alternative to the project, to
avoid or minimize adverse environmental impact or damage. In fact, respondent Province once tried to obtain
the favorable endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied by the latter.

Moreover, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides:

5.3. Public Hearing / Consultation Requirements

For projects under Category A-1, the conduct of public hearing as part of the EIS review is mandatory unless
otherwise determined by EMB. For all other undertakings, a public hearing is not mandatory unless specifically
required by EMB.

Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns
of stakeholders are taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan. All
public consultations and public hearings conducted during the EIA process are to be documented. The public
hearing/consultation Process report shall be validated by the EMB/EMB RD and shall constitute part of the
records of the EIA process.

In essence, the above-quoted rule shows that in cases requiring public consultations, the same should be
initiated early so that concerns of stakeholders could be taken into consideration in the EIA study. In this case,
respondent Province had already filed its ECC application before it met with the local government units of
Malay and Caticlan.

The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the
reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Malay on February 28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging
and insistence of respondent Province. As we have established above, the respective resolutions issued by the
LGUs concerned did not render this petition moot and academic.

It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the promotion of tourism in Boracay and
the protection of the environment, lest they kill the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of
this decision, we mentioned that there are common goals of national significance that are very apparent from
both the petitioners and the respondents respective pleadings and memoranda.

As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and smooth resolution of these issues
would benefit all the parties. Thus, respondent Provinces cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the
Court-mandated review of the proper classification and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of
utmost importance.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The TEPO issued by this
Court is hereby converted into a writ of continuing mandamus specifically as follows:

1. Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau

Regional Office VI shall revisit and review the following matters:

a. its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;

b. its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a mere expansion of the existing jetty port
in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new project; and
c. the impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on new, updated, and comprehensive studies,
which should forthwith be ordered by respondent DENR-EMB RVI.

2. Respondent Province of Aklan shall perform the following:

a. fully cooperate with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the reclamation project proposal and
submit to the latter the appropriate report and study; and
b. secure approvals from local government units and hold proper consultations with non-governmental
organizations and other stakeholders and sectors concerned as required by Section 27 in relation to Section 26
of the Local Government Code.
Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority shall closely monitor the submission by respondent Province of
the requirements to be issued by respondent DENR-EMB RVI in connection to the environmental concerns
raised by petitioner, and shall coordinate with respondent Province in modifying the MOA, if necessary, based
on the findings of respondent DENR-EMB RVI.

The petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. and the respondents The Province of Aklan, represented by Governor
Carlito S. Marquez, The Philippine Reclamation Authority, and The DENR-EMB (Region VI) are mandated to
submit their respective reports to this Court regarding their compliance with the requirements set forth in this
Decision no lafter than three (3) months from the date of promulgation of this Decision.

In the meantime, the respondents, their concerned contractor/s, and/or their agents, representatives or persons
acting in their place or stead, shall immediately cease and desist from continuing the implementation of the
project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders from this Court. For this purpose, the
respondents shall report within five (5) days to this Court the status of the project as of their receipt of this
Decision, copy furnished the petitioner.

Section 17. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports. The State shall give priority to
education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate
social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

Section 18. Labor Protection. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Philippine National Bank v. Dan Padao

G.R. No 180849 November 2011
FACTS: On August 21, 1981, Padao was hired by PNB as a clerk at its Dipolog City Branch. He was later
designated as a credit investigator in an acting capacity on November 9, 1993. He was ultimately promoted to
the position of Loan and Credit Officer IV.

In 1994, PNB became embroiled in a scandal involving "behest loans" as anomalous loans were being granted
by its officers. In line with this, Padao was administratively charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The case against Padao was grounded on his having allegedly presented a
deceptively positive status of the business, credit standing/rating and financial capability of 13 loan applicants.
After due investigation, PNB found Padao guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him
dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the banks Board of Directors. Velasco, Padaos colleague, was also
held guilty of the offenses charged, and was similarly meted the penalty of dismissal. Her motion for
reconsideration, however, was later granted by the bank, and she was reinstated.

ISSUES: Whether or not the position of a credit investigator is one imbued with the trust and confidence of the
employer and the act of falsifying the credit and appraisal reports and that of affixing ones signature in a false
report by another is one and the same degree of misconduct which warrants the same penalty

RULING: While it is an employer’s basic right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a measure
of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest, the law sets the valid grounds for termination as well as the
proper procedure to be followed when terminating the services of an employee.

Thus, in cases of regular employment, the employer is prohibited from terminating the services of an employee
except for a just or authorized cause. Such just causes for which an employer may terminate an employee are
enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate family member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. Further, due process requires that employers follow the
procedure set by the Labor Code. Under Art. 277, workers may be dismissed only for a just cause and enjoy the
right of due process which includes notice and the ample opportunity to be heard and to defend his or her side.

In this case, Padao was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the
Labor Code. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties, while habitual neglect
implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending on the circumstances. Padao was
accused of having presented a fraudulently positive evaluation of the business, credit standing/rating and
financial capability 13 loan applicants.

The role that a credit investigator plays in the conduct of a bank’s business cannot be overestimated. The
amount of loans to be extended by a bank depends upon the report of the credit investigator on the collateral
being offered. If a loan is not fairly secured, the bank is at the mercy of the borrower who may just opt to have
the collateral foreclosed. If the scheme is repeated a hundredfold, it may lead to the collapse of the bank.

Padao's repeated failure to discharge his duties as a credit investigator of the bank amounted to gross and
habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. He not only failed to perform what he was
employed to do, but also did so repetitively and habitually, causing millions of pesos in damage to PNB. Thus,
PNB acted within the bounds of the law by meting out the penalty of dismissal, which it deemed appropriate
given the circumstances.

The CA was correct in stating that when the violation of company policy or breach of company rules and
regulations is tolerated by management, it cannot serve as a basis for termination. Such ruling, however, does
not apply here. The principle only applies when the breach or violation is one which neither amounts to nor
involves fraud or illegal activities. In such a case, one cannot evade liability or culpability based on obedience
to the corporate chain of command.

Padao, in affixing his signature on the fraudulent reports, attested to the falsehoods contained therein.
Moreover, by doing so, he repeatedly failed to perform his duties as a credit investigator.
Section 19. Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Garcia v. BOI
FACTS: The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation, applied for
registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed
investment but later submitted an amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change
of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original
and amended application documents. The BoI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had
declined to give their consent to the release of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus
Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these documents absent consent to disclose. The BoI
subsequently approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the
amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes of the investor,
national interest notwithstanding.

RULING: The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcia’s Constitutional right to have access to information on
matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants
of Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and
vital because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe” The Court also ruled that
BPC’s amended application was in fact a second application that required a new public notice to be filed and a
new hearing to be held.

Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that “all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the
consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the orders of a court
of competent jurisdiction”. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application,
amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with certain exceptions.

The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, “the Constitution does not open every
door to any and all information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny”. Thus it excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial information of the
applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security” from its order. The Court did not provide a test for what
information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public information, nor did it specify the
kinds of information that BPC could withhold under its ruling.

Tanada v. Angara

Facts: Petitioner sought to have the agreement to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that: “(1) that the WTO requires the Philippines .to place nationals and products
of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products. and (2) that the WTO .intrudes, limits
and/or impairs. the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before
this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to .develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods..”

Issues: Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art II and Secs. 10 and 12, Art.
XII, of the Philippine Constitution.

HELD: The Court held that there was no contravention of the Constitution since Art. II or the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies is not self-executory. Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, on the other hand, the Court said:

Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:

Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and
agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. . . .

FAJAYJAY
Section 20. Role of Private Sector. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines v. Reyes

 Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan

Facts: Boracay Island (Boracay), a tropical paradise located in the Western Visayas region of the Philippines
and one of the countrys most popular tourist destinations, was declared a tourist zone and marine reserve in
1973 under Presidential Proclamation No. 1801. The island comprises the barangays of Manoc-manoc, Balabag,
and Yapak, all within the municipality of Malay, Aklan.
Sometime in April 2009, respondent Province entered into an agreement with the Financial Advisor/Consultant
that won in the bidding process held a month before, to conduct the necessary feasibility study of the proposed
project for the Renovation/Rehabilitation of the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Building and Jetty Port,
Enhancement and Recovery of Old Caticlan Coastline.Subsequently, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of respondent Province issued Resolution, which authorized to file an application to reclaim the
2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan with respondent PRA.Meanwhile, the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Malay expressed its strong opposition to the intended foreshore lease application,
through Resolution No. 044, approved on July 22, 2009, manifesting therein that respondent Provinces
foreshore lease application was for business enterprise purposes for its benefit, at the expense of the local
government of Malay, which by statutory provisions was the rightful entity to develop, utilize and reap benefits
from the natural resources within its jurisdiction.

Respondent PRA approved the reclamation project on April 20, 2010 in its Resolution No. 4094and
authorized its General Manager/Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to enter into a MOA with respondent Province
for the implementation of the reclamation project.
Petitioner alleges that despite the Malay Municipalitys denial of respondent Provinces request for
afavorableendorsement, as well as the strong opposition manifested both by Barangay Caticlan and petitioner as
an NGO, respondent Province still continued with the implementation of the Reclamation Project.On June 1,
2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition.
After receiving a copy of the TEPO on June 9, 2011, respondent Province immediately issued an order to the
Provincial Engineering Office and the concerned contractor to cease and desist from conducting any
construction activities until further orders from this Court.

Issues: Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and regulations
based on the scope and classification of the project

Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and regulations

Ruling: No. It is not applicable (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3)
where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, when
there is no due process observed, or where the protestant has no other recourse.

As petitioner correctly pointed out, the appeal provided for under Section 6 of DENR DAO 2003-30 is only
applicable, based on the first sentence thereof, if the person or entity charged with the duty to exhaust the
administrative remedy of appeal to the appropriate government agency has been a party or has been made a
party in the proceedings wherein the decision to be appealed was rendered. It has been established by the facts
that petitioner was never made a party to the proceedings before respondent DENR-EMB RVI. Petitioner was
only informed that the project had already been approved after the ECC was already granted. Not being a party
to the said proceedings, it does not appear that petitioner was officially furnished a copy of the decision, from
which the 15-day period to appeal should be reckoned, and which would warrant the application of Section 6,
Article II of DENR DAO 2003-30.
 Yes. The Court notes such manifestation of respondent Province. Assuming, however, that the area involved
in the subject reclamation project has been limited to 2.64 hectares, this case has not become moot and
academic, as alleged by respondents, because the Court still has to check whether respondents had complied
with all applicable environmental laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the actual reclamation project.
Being the administrator of the EIS System, respondent DENR-EMB RVIs submissions bear great weight in
this case. However, the following are the issues that put in question the wisdom of respondent DENR-EMB
RVI in issuing the ECC:
1. Its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a mere expansion of the existing jetty
port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new project;
2. Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;
3. The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government agencies; and
4. The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the reclamation project to the environment.
The above issues as raised put in question the sufficiency of the evaluation of the project by respondent DENR-
EMB RVI.

Section 21. Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy

Gamboa v. Teves
G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011

Facts: In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation, an American company and major PLDT
stockholder, sold 26% of PLDTs equity to the Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation
(PTIC).Subsequently, PTIC assigned 46% of its equity or 111,415 shares of stock to Prime Holdings, Inc. In
1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered these shares. Eventually, the Court
declared these as properties of the Republic of the Philippines. In 1999, First Pacific, a Hongkong-based
investment firm, acquired the remaining 54% of PTICs equity in PLDT.In 2006, the governments Inter-agency
Privatization Council offered to auction the 46% PTIC equity in PLDT that the Court adjudged to the
Republic. Parallax Venture Fund XXVII won with a bid of P25.2 billion.In 2007, First Pacific, through its
subsidiary, Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc.,entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement with
the national government involving the 46% PTIC equity for P25.2 billion.

Petitioner Wilson P. Gamboa, a PLDT stockholder, seeks to annul the sale of the 46% PTIC equity or 111,415
shares of stock to Metro Pacific on the ground that it violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which limits foreign ownership of a public utility company to 40% of its capital. Gamboa claims that since
PTIC is a PLDT stockholder, the sale of the 46% of its equity would increase the common shareholdings of
foreigners in PLDT to about 64.27%.

Issue: Whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common
shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred
shares) of PLDT, a public utility.

Ruling: The Constitution simply states that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted to a
corporation organized under Philippine laws unless at least sixty per centum of its capital is owned by Filipino
citizens.The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.Wherefore, the court partly
grant the petition and rule that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares,
and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent
Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is directed to apply this definition of the term capital
in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate
sanctions under the law.

SECTION 22 . THE STATE RECOGNIZES AND PROMOTES THE RIGHTS

OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
NATIONAL UNITY AND DEVELOPMENT.
The welfare of indigenous cultural communities. The implementation of this policy is found principally
in the pro-visions on cultural communities found in Article X, on local governments, Article XII, on the
economy, Article XIV, on arts and culture, and Section 12, Article XVI, on a consultative body to advise the
President. It is also worth noting that, in the initial discussions of this provision, the proposal had among its
objectives the "banning and rectifying of erroneous allusions to ethnic minorities in books, museums, other
institutions and records of government." The final text does not reflect this objective the pursuit of which can
involve the weighing of considerations of freedom of experience.

SECTION 23 Community-Based Private Organizations. Article 2, Section 23 of the 1987 Constitution states
that the "State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, sectoral organizations that promote the
welfare of the nation." This is further asserted in Article XIII, Sections 15 and 16 that the State shall respect the
role and rights of independent people's organizations in the pursuit of their collective interests and aspirations
and ensure their effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-
making. This participation was institutionalized so that socio-economic and political structures may be moved
by the efforts of people together with the government. And through people's organizations those who have no
wealth or political influence can empower themselves. By far, the most concrete expression of people's
participation in governance is the role played by the non-government organizations (NGOs) and people's
organizations (POs) in the so-called local special bodies, such as the local development council (LDC), which
according to the Local Government Code, should be constituted from the barangay level up to the regional
level. The LOC has a crucial role: it formulates plans that would determine what development projects should
be pursued and how these would be financed, among others.
Section 24. Vital Role of Communications. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation-building.

Case 190 SCRA 717

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. [PLDT], petitioner,
vs.
The National Telecommunications Commission [NTC[ and CellCom, Inc, (Express Telecommunications
Co., Inc. [ETCI]), respondents.
October 18, 1990
Facts: PLDT filed an opposition with a motion to Dismiss the Orders (of 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 in
NTC Case No. 87-39) of NTC i.e. to grant ETCI provisional authority to install, operate and maintain a Cellular
Mobile Telephone System in Metro-Manila (Phase A) in accordance with specified conditions.
This on grounds that (1) ETCI is not qualified under its legislative franchise to operate a systemwide
telephone service (2) ETCI lacks facilities to operate successfully; (3) PLDT itself has appending application
with NTC to install and operate Cellular Mobile Telephone Sustem; (4) the provisional authority, if granted will
result in needless, uneconomical and harmful duplication among others; thus an abuse of its power of discretion
within its jurisdiction.

Issue/s: Whether NTC has abused its powers as the regulatory agency of the national government with
jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities, allowing ETCI provisional authority to install, operate CMT
System in Metro Manila; and violated due process by commissioning PLDT to enter into an interconnection
agreement for the provision of adequate facilities…”

Held: No. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction,
on the part of the National Telecommunications Commission in issuing its challenged Orders of 12 December
1988 and 8 May 1989 in NTC Case No. 87-39, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary
Restraining Order heretofore issued is LIFTED. The bond issued as a condition for the issuance of said
restraining Order is declared forfeited in favor of private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc.
That NTC acted within its powers to provide better communication and information facilities towards
nation building – the Orders issued was for the public welfare. More people will gain access to such
communication throughout the archipelago.

ILAGAN

Section 25. Local Economy. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Ermita, et al.

Section 26. Equal Access to Political Opportunities and Political Dynasties

The opportunities to occupy some important positions in the government shall be equal to every
competent and promising candidates, but it is undeniably correct that we have some government officials who
ascend to the power by virtue of their birth that results to political dynasties
The establishment of political dynasties is an effective way of monopolizing and perpetuating power.
Hence, the state is commanded to prohibit such political dynasties.
Pamatong v. COMELEC, 427 SCRA 96 (2004)
FACTS: The petitioner Rev.Elly Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 Presidential
Election. The respondent Commission on Election refused to give due course to the petitioner’s COC in its
resolution. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but on a similar motion, filing for a candidacy for
presidential Election was still denied on the guidance of the Omnibus Election Code which states that ‘Nuisance
candidates’ who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not
supported by a registered political party with a national constituency shall be limited. The petitioner seeks for a
review on certiorari on the contention that the respondent violates the provision of Section 26 of the Article II of
the Philippine Constitution which connotes to the ‘equal access to political opportunities’.
ISSUE: whether or not the denial of the certificate for candidacy violates the Section 26 of Article II of the
1987 Philippine Constitution.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in
the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No.
645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to
give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity
stands and has to be accorded due weight.

Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the
petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed
resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that
petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would
necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE

G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and
services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China.
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal and its implications on national security and government-to-government
contracts. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner Neri, the head of NEDA, was summoned to appear and
he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered
him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed
him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. For failing to appear in the other days
that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the invocation of executive privilege violates Sec. 28, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING: No. The petitioner appeared in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly
manifested his willingness to answer questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by
his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like
any other right, is subject to limitations. These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as
highly confidential, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Moreover, the communications elicited by the three questions are
covered by the executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to
provide “the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately.” Also, the claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating
the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the country’s diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Republic of China.
Garcia v. Teves
GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12
million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific.
Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47% without public disclosure.
Issue: Whether or not the PLDT’s Aticles of Incorporation violates the Article II Section 28 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution of full public disclosure.

Held: Yes. Holders of PLDT shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of directors.
PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation expressly state that “the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled
to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for the election of directors or for any other purpose or otherwise
participate in any action taken by the corporation or its stockholders, or to receive notice of any meeting of
stockholders.” On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the
election of directors. PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation state that “each holder of Common Capital Stock shall
have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders,
and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and
for all other purposes.”

Pollo vs. David

GR No. 181881

Facts: Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an
anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo
directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the MamamayanMuna (PALD) and Legal
divisions.”In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of
“fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.He was charged of
violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He
assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer)
assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the
authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.The CSC denied the omnibus motion
and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his
counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal
investigation which then proceeded ex parte.The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to
the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal
search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling: The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did
not violate his constitutional right.In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the
issue raised by the petitioner.The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard
drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope. The case at bar involves the computer from
which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government
property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.

Philippine Savings Bank and Pascual Garcia III v. Senate Impeachment Court, GR 200238, (2012)
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullity and set aside the resolution 1
of the respondent Senate of the Philippines, sitting as an Impeachment Court, requesting for PSBankto testify
and produce documents relative to the foreign currency accounts that were allegedly to belong to then
Supreme Court Justice Renato C. Corona. Either violating Republic Act No. 6426 or being held in contempt of
court for refusing to disclose the details of the subject foreign currency deposits.
Issue: Whether or not the Impeachment Court acted arbitrarily.
Held: No. The policy of full public disclosure guarantees the right of the people to demand information. It
pertains to honesty and integrity of public service that must be moot and academic.
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and employees
as witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the Impeachment
Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012.
[SC Resolution dated February 14, 2012)

FACTS: During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the list of proposed witnesses
included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of
which are, internal to the Court. Letters were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records, and the
issuance of certified true copies of the Rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations of various cases
decided by the SC for purposes of the Impeachment Complaint. Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum
and Subpoena Ad Testificandum were also issued against Clerks of Court of the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the letters and subpoenas issued by Prosecution Impeachment Panel shouldbe favored.

RULING: IT DEPENDS. The right to information, by its very nature and by the
Constitution’s own terms, is not absolute. Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court grants access to court
records to any person, subject to payment of fees and compliance with rules; it is not necessary that the request
be made by a party to the case. This is limited by the need to preserve and protect the integrity of main
adjudicative function of the Court and the Judiciary.Based on the INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME
COURT (IRSC) which is applicable to judges and justices and court officials and employees:

Article VI: The Legislative Power

The Legislative Power

Defined: The power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.
It is vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor
signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof [Sec. 32, Art. VI],

Who may exercise legislative power?

1. Congress. Legislative power is vested in Congress except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. The legislative power of Congress is plenary (may legislate on any
subject matter).Legislativepoweristhe power to propose, enact, amend and repeallaws.
(a) Express Powers.Bill of Rights (Art III),On Appropriations (Secs. 25 and 29 [1] & [2], Art. VI),On
Taxation (Secs. 28 and 29 (3), Art. VI; Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV), On Constitutional appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court (Sec. 30, Art. VI), No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be passed (Sec.
31, Art VI)

2. Regional/Local legislative power.Power of a local legislative body to make rules in the form of ordinances
and resolutions of local application that have the force and effect of law. Local legislation is a participatory
process. It acquires legitimacy and social acceptability though the involvement of stakeholders in the LGU.
The 1991 Local GovernmentGovernment Code vests legislative power to the sanggunian at different
levels of local government: provinces, municipalities, Cities and Barangays. In the autonomous regions of the
country, legislation is made by the regional legislative assemblies, e.g. Regional Legislative Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

3. People’s initiative on statutes

 a) Initiative and referendum
Section 32.The Congress shall as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom…
Petition. A petition must be signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof. Thepetition must then be
registered. RA 6735. The current implementing law is RA 6735, an Act Providing for System of Initiative and
Referendum.
Initiative.The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation.
Three systems of Initiative:
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation.
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
Referendum. Power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose.
Two Classes of Referendum
1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress;
2. Referendum on local laws which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. (Sec. 2(c) RA 6735)
Prohibited Measures.The following cannot be subject of an initiative or referendum:
1. Petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate.
2. Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested in Congress by the
Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety(90) days after their effectivity. (Sec. 10 RA 6735)

4. The President under a martial law rule or in a revolutionary government

Delegation of emergency powers
Section 23 (2). In times of war or other nationalemergency, the Congress may by lawauthorize the President,
for a limitedperiod and subject to such restrictionsas it may prescribe, to exercisepowers necessary and proper
to carryout a declared national policy. Unlesssooner withdrawn by resolution of theCongress, such power shall
ceaseupon the next adjournment thereof.
1. Requisites for the delegation:
(1) There must be a war or other national emergency
(2) Law authorizing the president for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe
(3) Power to be exercised must be necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
2. Duration of the delegation:
(1) Until withdrawn by resolution of Congress
(2) Until the next adjournment of Congress
3. Powers that may be delegated
Congress may authorize the President, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy Note that the nature of delegable power is not specified. It is submittedthat the President may be given
emergency legislative powersif Congress so desires.
4. Withdrawal of powers
Congress may do it by a mere resolution.And such resolution does not need presidential approval.

General Rule: Non-Delegation of Power

The Congress cannot further delegate the power delegated to it by the people. This is in keeping with the
principle of non-delegation of powers which is applicable to all the three branches of the government. The rule
states that what has been delegated cannot further be delegated – potestasdelegata non delegaripotest. A
delegated power must be discharged directly by the delegate and not through the delegate’s agent. It is basically
an ethical principle which requires direct performance by the delegate of an entrusted power. Further delegation
therefore constitutes violation of the trust reposed by the delegator on the delegate. The people, through the
Constitution, delegated lawmaking powers to the Congress, and as such, it cannot as a rule delegate further the
same to another.
Exceptions:
In order to address the numerous and complex demands of legislative function, the Constitution provides
exceptions to the rule. Further delegation is permitted in the following cases:
(a) Delegation to the people at large. The Congress further delegates its legislative power by allowing direct
legislation by the people in cases of initiative and referendum;
(b) Delegation of emergency powers to the President. Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution states that
“in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy.” Emergency powers are delegated to the President by the Congress to effectively
solve the problems caused by war or other crisis which the Congress could not otherwise solve with more
dispatch than the President;
(c) Delegation of tariff powers to the President. Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution states that “the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.” Tariff powers are
delegated to the President by the Congress to efficiently and speedily solve economic problems posed by
foreign trade which the Congress could not otherwise address with more dispatch than the President;
(d) Delegation to administrative bodies. The Congress delegates the so called “power of subordinate legislation”
to administrative bodies. Due to the growing complexity of modern society, it has become necessary to allow
specialized administrative bodies to promulgate supplementary rules, so that they can deal with technical
problems with more expertise and dispatch than the Congress or the courts. Regulations or supplementary rules
passed by the administrative bodies are intended to fill-in the gaps and provide details to what is otherwise a
broad statute passed by Congress. For the rules and regulations to be valid and binding, they must be in
accordance with the statute on which they are based, complete in themselves, and fix sufficient standards. If any
of the requirements is not satisfied, the regulation will not be allowed to affect private rights; and
(e) Delegation to the local governments. This delegation is based on the principle that the local government is in
better position than the national government to act on purely local concerns. Legislative power is therefore
given to them for effective local legislation.
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

FACTS: Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for
purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to
be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in
prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made
on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this
case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not
the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
RULINGS:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or
not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law
as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may
make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said,
refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation
to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can
adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor
class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.”

Antipolo Realty Corp v. NHA

FACTS: Jose Fernando executed a Contract to sell with petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation over a lot at
Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo Rizal. He transferred his rights over the lot to private respondent
Virgilio Yuson. Thereafter, Yuson assumed the obligations of the vendee under the original contract, including
payment of Fernando’s installments in arrears. However, due to the failure of ARC to develop the subdivision
project as stipulated under Clause 17 of the contract, Yuson paid only the arrears for the month of August 1972
and stopped paying thereafter.

Despite the notice sent by ARC and its citing of an NHA decision both claiming that it had complied with its
obligation to complete the improvements, Yuson refused to pay the Sept 1972-Oct 1976 monthly installments,
but agreed as to the post Oct 1976 installments. ARC reacted by rescinding the contract, and claiming the
forfeiture of all installment payments made by Yuson.

Aggrieved, Yuson brought the matter to the NHA. The latter ordered the reinstatement of the contract. Motion
for reconsideration was denied. On certiorari before the SC, petitioner cries lack of jurisdiction on the part of
NHA and likewise, notice as to the schedule of the hearing. A minute resolution was issued, affirming NHA,
but without prejudice to pursuing an administrative remedy. ARC then appealed the case to the Office of the
President. Again, the contract was upheld. Back to the SC, ARC now claims that the NHA had not only acted
on matter outside its competence/jurisdiction, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions which it wasn’t authorized to perform.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA has quasi-judicial functions.

RULING: YES, it has. As a matter of fact, Sec3 of PD No. 957, or “The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyer’s Decree” vests the NHA with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate real estate trade and business. In its 2nd
and 3rd preambular paragraphs, the statute discussed the need and scope for NHA’s regulatory authority, that is,
the rise of cases where subdivision owners/developers/sellers renege on their obligations to lot buyers, and other
fraudulent means employed by the former to the detriment of the latter. Most importantly, PD No. 1344
provides that the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: (a) unsound
real estate business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesma, and (c) Cases
involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

PITC v. ANGALES

FACTS: PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for
importation from the People’s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export
program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from China on
the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter
they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld
and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and
approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already
been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of
the said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is
invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states
that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published as condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.

Atitiw V. Zamora G.R. No. 143374

Facts: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article
X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino she promulgated E.O
220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organic act for the cordillera
autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. The court declared that E.O 220 to
be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended. Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada
signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which includes the assailed special provisions, then
issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by
virtue of E.O 328.The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA
870 (GAA2000) directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the
separation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees.

Issues:

1.Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional.

2.Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO 220.

3.Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO.220

Rulings: In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an appropriations bill
covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary bill. The
title of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a title that
embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of theRA8760 does not
constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations bill must relate specifically to
some particular appropriations. On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O
220 is rejected, there is no such thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the Congress from
amending or repealing the E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law. The last issue, the court ruled
that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual respect. Therefore, the implementation of E.O.
220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds is within the powers of the legislature. In the
absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannot correct the acts of either the Executive or the
Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR.

GUINTO

SEC. v. Interport 567 SCRA 329

EXCEPTIONS:
1. Delegation of legislative power to local government units;
2. Instances when the Constitution itself allows for such delegation

Section 23 (2)
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Section 28 (2)
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

VILLANUEVA
AGUSTIN v. EDU, 88 SCRA 1

FACTS: Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction
No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of
“reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh,
cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is
already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of
reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners
whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of
motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among
the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a
motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other
hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will
not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is
it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the
mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
Free Telephone Workers v. Min. of Labor, 108 SCRA 757
FACTS: In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union)
and the Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction
over the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it
averred that it is an undue delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by
granting discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to
the National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law
on free collective bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take
on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that
the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state
should afford protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law,
that is yet to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor
dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The
law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest.”
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,
vs.HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, HON.
ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.

Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,while the appropriations for the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of
Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.There can be no question that petitioners
as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines may bring this suit where a constitutional issue is raised. Indeed,
even a taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D.
No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant
to said decrees.

Issue: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.

Held: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the
facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of
P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a
clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion
of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the
Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

Salvador Araneta v. Magno Gatmaitan

GR Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, Apr 30, 1957
Felix, J.

Facts: Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to Bicol region for
the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance
fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there
arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls
in San Miguel Bay. League of Municipal Mayors prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of
San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein.

In response to these pleas, the President issued Executive Order No. 22 on April 5, 1954, prohibiting the use of
trawls in San Miguel Bay, which was amended by Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23, 1954,
apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of
trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 was
issued reviving Executive Order No. 23, to take effect after December 31, 1954.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

Ruling: The court ruled in the affirmative. Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines
prescribes that the President shall have, control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. For the foregoing reasons the Court declared that Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80,
series of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law. When the President, in response to the
clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting
fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an
anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal-province and dispose of issues of general
concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

Marcos v. CA
278 SCRA 696

FACTS: Bongbong Marcos sought for the reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals to grant CIR's petition
to levy the properties of the late Pres. Marcos to cover the payment of his tax delinquencies during the period of
his exile in the US. The Marcos family was assessed by the BIR, and notices were constructively served to the
Marcoses, however the assessment were not protested administratively by Mrs. Marcos and the heirs of the late
president so that they became final and unappealable after the period for filing of opposition has prescribed.
Marcos contends that the properties could not be levied to cover the tax dues because they are still pending
probate with the court, and settlement of tax deficiencies could not be had, unless there is an order by the
probate court or until the probate proceedings are terminated.

ISSUE: Is the contention of Bongbong Marcos correct?

RULING: No. The deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment are already final and
unappealable -and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy resorted to by the government,
sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct
and separate from the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not
affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by the government.
The approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory
requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau erred in
proceeding with the levying and sale of the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that
it was required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the pertinent
remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim
for estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected. On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC,
it is the probate or settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the
decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a
Certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision
disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which approves the assessment and collection of
the estate tax.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD VS PHILIPPINE DRUG

ENFORCEMENTAGENCY
FACTS: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. According to Aquilino
Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, said mandatory drug
testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by the Constitution. No
provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are
constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also violates the equal protection
clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached. In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J.
Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the
right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
Issue: Whether or not Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional
Ruling: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not constitutional. Section 36 (c) and (d)
as to students and employees of private and public offices. Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of the
constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying the following reasonable deductions: schools and their administrators
stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult,
and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as
may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicion less drug testing of students are constitutional.
Pacific Steam v. LLDA

Facts: After investigation of a complaint of black smoke emission, the Laguna Lake and Development
Authority (LLDA) –tasked byDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), found of untreated
wastewater discharged by Pacific Steam Laundry Inc. (PSLI) – a Laundry services business. Also, PSLI was
operating without LLDA’s clearance, Discharge Permit, and AS/PO-ESI. Thus PSLI was fined for such
violations P1,000.00 per day of discharging polluted wastewater, and a fine of P5,000.00 per year for operating
without the necessary clearance/permits from the Authority i.e. LDDA.
The fine totaled to P172, 000.00, accumulated from 5 September 2001 to 17 May 2002 (172 days, weekends
and legal holidays excluded).
Issue/s: Whether LLDA has the authority to impose or sanction fines for the violations made by PSLI.

Held: Yes. The petition raised by PSLI was DENIED. Under Pres. Marcos’ E.O. 927, granting LLDA
additional powers and functions, viz.: LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively perform
its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement. Also under PD 884, the
capacity to impose fines. Thereby, the court AFFIRMS the decision dated 30 June 2004 and the Resolution
dated 8 September 2004 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 75238

PD 984

Wherefore, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 30 June 2004 and the Resolution dated 8
September 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75238.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Fixes a Satndard

People of the Philippnes v. Rosenthal

FACTS: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company.
Later, Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible
assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5
of Act No. 2581.

Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the
Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with
the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of
twenty-pesos.

Section 5, on the other hand, provides that “whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied,
either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation
is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he
shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such
person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such
person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in
said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his
judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision
of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.”

Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can
guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making
his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly
delegated to the Insular Treasurer.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to
follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or
permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying
therefor “has complied with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other
provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the
provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular
Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in
the public interest.”

In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the public against “speculative schemes
which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns,
visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, — the SC held that “public
interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.

Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is
uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to
public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it
imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . . ”

Eastern Shipping Line v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988
FACTS: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow (private respondent herein) sued for damages under Executive Order
No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the
position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180, 000.00 as death
benefits and P12, 000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

ISSUE: whether or not the issuance of Executive Order No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

RULING:the Supreme Court held that the principle of non-delegation of powers was not violated. The
authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, which
states that, ‘The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA)’.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is
especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in'
the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has
been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA
(and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a
sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the
executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order
dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: Petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988 without
taking or failing the required test of NMAT required by the Board of Medical Education. They assailed that RA
2382 and MECS Order 52 series of 1985 which gives the standard test of NMAT in order to go to Medicine is
an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement and as such the petitioners sought for issuance of
preliminary injunction against the administering of the NMAT.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NMAT test is Constitutionally sound to have it as a requirement before getting into
Medical Schools

RULING: The Court affirmed that the taking of NMAT is a valid exercise of Police Power of the State to
secure and regulate the practice of medicine for the protection of the health and physical safety and wellbeing of
the population which is also considered as public Order. The Court denied the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction

CONFERENCE v. POEA
G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995
FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed
Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino
seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner principals, urge to annul Resolution No.01,
series of 1994 of the Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05 which increases
the compensation and benefits of the seafarers. In which, the death benefits shall now be equivalent to
$50,000.00 and an addition of $7,000.00 for each child below 21 years old, but not exceeding four children.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting the
compensation of Filipino seamen and only the Congress can.

ISSUE: Whether or not the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power?

RULING: Yes. The POEA can promulgate rules by the virtue of delegation of legislative power. To many of
the problems of the present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
specific solutions for each. Thus, these solutions may be expected from its delegates who are supposed experts
in the particular fields they are assigned. While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains
exclusively to Congress, the latter may however constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it
impracticable to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that
the regulation should be relevant to the objects and purposes of the law and that it shall not be of contradiction
but of conformity with the standards prescribed by law.

Osmeñavs. Orbos
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

Facts: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO 137,
empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional
amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)
established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner
avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power
to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the
taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised
primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of
the taxation power of the State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

RULING: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special
treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law
refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the
COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special
fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to
protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes
the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
Viola vs. Alunan 277 SCRA 409

Facts: Cesar G. Viola, filed petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, §§1-2 of
the RevisedImplementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the LigangmgaBarangay Officers in sofar as they
provide for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for auditors for theNational Ligangmga
Barangay and its chapters.

Issue: Whether or not Section 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid?

Held: Supreme Court’s decisions have upheld the validity of reorganization statutesauthorizing the President of the
Philippines to create, abolish or mergeoffices in the executivedepartment.

Abakada v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1

Facts: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods,
and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned
provisions contain a uniformproviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have
been satisfied. That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:(a) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or(b) National government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).Petitioners argue that the
law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of
taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Issue:Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution such Article VI,
Section 24, andArticle VI, Section 26(2).
Ruling: No. As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of value-added
tax (VAT), as the confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a fallacious notion of its nature.
The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods or
properties and services. Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of goods or services may pass on the
amount of tax paid to the buyer, with the seller acting merely as a tax collector.The burden of VAT is intended
to fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-consumers.
In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business it engages
in, without transferring the burden to someone else. Examples are individual and corporate income taxes,
transfer taxes, and residence taxes.In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in
existence, albeit in a different mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax computed under the "cost
deduction method" and was payable only by the original sellers. The single-stage system was subsequently
modified, and a mixture of the "cost deduction method" and "tax credit method" was used to determine the
value-added tax payable.Under the "tax credit method," an entity can credit against or subtract from the VAT
charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports.
Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168 (2005)
Facts: Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood
Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public
respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged
with the enforcement and implementation of RA 7719 or the National Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719
provides phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said provision on
the ground, among others, that such represents undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power
of the state.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power

Held: Petitions dismissed. The court upholds the validity of RA 7719.

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and
preserve public health and safety.

Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means employedare reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Thus, persons may be subject to certain kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to its fundamental aim of government, the rights
of the individual may be subordinated.
Bayan v. Ermita 488 SCRA 226
Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed.
26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas
Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola
bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing
injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which
KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding
further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and
others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to
the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which
the expression is sought.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the
right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the
CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P.
No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to
this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and
convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to
apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action
even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy.
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it
causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public
inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral
regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the
Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place
and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all
rallies.
Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Ruling: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right
of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute
ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It
refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
“peaceable” and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and
is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the
content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck
down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to
justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared
null and void.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of
at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days
from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to
exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that
has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMAet. Al
G.R. No. 166715; August 14, 2008
FACTS: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic
Act (RA) 9335(Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board).It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at
least six months of service, regardless of employment status.The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR
and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC).Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the system of rewards and
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and
employees to serve the people.Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. In their comment, respondents question the petition for being
premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 9335 is unconstitutional?

Yes. The Republic Act 9335 is unconstitutional

HELD:
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for
their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.
Legislative power is vested in Congresswhich consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers.Thus, assuming the
validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative
veto are invalid.Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the
absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law.From the moment the
law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law.Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute
a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through
the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA")
while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the
Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were
so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A..Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta,
Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994.
Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated 23 August 1994, the Court required public
respondents to file a Comment on the Petition. On 21 September 1994, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders from the
Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in
San Fernando, Pampanga and praying that public respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office Orders.
The Court, in a Resolution dated 27 September 1994, granted this Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining
Order prayed for by petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to
the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and
Development Office

Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure.
HELD:The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by
that individual for the benefit of the public.5 We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any
public office as that term is used in the law of public officers.6 It is essential to note that none of the "changes in
organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of
the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it
very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different
"Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the
internal organization of the commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization
regardless of the ever-changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority
had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," as the need [for such
changes] arises."
The appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but rather
appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or
Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records
Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV,
without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons
holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
Chiongbian vs. Orbos
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.

FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later on known as the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of
RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino
issued E.O No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in
Mindanao. Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional
because it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of
the power delegated and that the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.aw They also
challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only
to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly
not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President’s
discretion.

HELD: No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative determination
the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress
merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative
regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into
regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of
executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are
not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar
to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature.” (Pelaez v.
Auditor General)Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or
redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services

Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor Conrado Rodrigo, entered into an agreement
with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San
Nicolas, for the sum of P486,386.18. On September 2, 1992, Reynaldo Mejica, the
Planningand Development Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared an AccomplishmentReport stating that the Cab
oloan Power Generation project was 97.5% accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by Mayor
Rodrigo andconfirmed by Larry Lu. On the basis of said report, payment of P452, 825.53was effected by the
Municipal Treasurer, petitioner Alejandro Facundo, to Philwood Construction. On 14 August 1993, petitioners
received a Notice of Disallowancedated 21 June 1993 from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty.
AgustinChan, Jr., who found that as per COA (Commission on Audit) evaluation of
theelectrification project, only 60.0171% of the project (equivalent toP291,915.07) was actually accomplished.
The Ombudsman approved thefiling of an information against Rodrigo et. al. for
violation of “AntiGraft Law” before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbay
an. They contend that Mayor Rodrigooccupies a position of Grade 24 and is, therefore, beyond the original
andexclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Rodrigo et. al.
HELD: Yes, Although RA 7975 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those government
officialhaving Salary Grade 27 or higher, municipalmayors were re-classified from Salary Grade24 to Salary
Grade 27 by virtueof RA 6758 which took effect on July 1, 1989. Rodrigo however, claim that at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime on or about September 2 1992, Mayor Rodrigo the highest
public ranking public officialimpleaded in this case, was receiving monthly salary of P10,441.00.Such amount
6758 is supposedly equivalent to a fourth step incrementin Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule prescribed in
Section 7 of R.A.
No.6758. Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 forclassifying positions with comparable res
ponsibilities andqualifications for the purpose of according such positions similarsalaries. This scheme is
known as the "Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985 asincluding all classes of positions which, although
different with respectto kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and
responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of
positions within one range of basic compensation. Rodrigo’s position having been classified as Grade 27 in
accordance with RA No. 6758, and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, is subject
to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
TONDO MEDICAL v. CA
527 SCRA 746 2007)

Facts: On November 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals was denying a petition for nullification of the Health
Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive
Order No. 1102, Redirectiong the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health which was issued by
then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on May 24, 1999. Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to
Section 17 of the Local Government Code (republic Act no. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the
local government units of basic services and facilities as well as specific health-related functions and
responsibilities.
Issue: Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO.102 was unconstitutional.
Held: No. The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioner’s bare allegations that it violates the general
principles expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a
cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process
and the limitations of judicial power. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was
empowered to issue Executive Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. It also declared that the DOH did not implement EO No. 102 in bad faith or with grave abuse of
discretion. In view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court AFFIRMED the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both HSRA and Executive
Order No. 102 as valid and constitutional.
Pichay v. Exec Sec
G.R. 196425 July 24, 2012

Facts: On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA
Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel
Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred
Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring
him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and
docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized under any
existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-
judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office,
appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon
the powers of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due process
requirement and equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that
the President went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292 for him to reorganize the executive department
since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the abolition of an office but the creation of one as well. He
argues that nowhere in the legal definition laid down by the Court in several cases does a reorganization include
the act of creating an office
Issue: W/N the president’s act of transferring the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and transferring
it into the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its
newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD) is beyond the powers granted to him under
EO 292.
Held: No. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created
within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292 However, the President's power to
reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his
power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring
functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited
to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and
vice versa. The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office. The
abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and
functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an
existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere
alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division – the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it
has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that – Reorganization
takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including
the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. The
Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith. A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through
legitimate authority but must also be pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good
faith if it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency.13It appears in this case that the streamlining of
functions within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.
Arroyo v. DOJ 681 SCRA 181
FACTS: On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases.

In its Initial Report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed
perpetrated.The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.
(Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the
election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary
investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to
further investigation.The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.

Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint Affidavit for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others, and
several John Does and Jane Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011. Thereafter,
petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint
Panel.

The Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the Comelec. The Comelec en
banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec
resolved, among others, that an information for electoral sabotage be filed against GMA and Abalos, while the
charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The RTC issued a Warrant for GMAs arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned and she entered a
plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty when
her motion for bail was granted. At present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in
another criminal case.

The Court denied the petitions and supplemental petitions of herein petitioners. Hence, this motion for
reconsideration. Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in
nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct
preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Finally,
as has been repeatedly pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the
proceedings involving the electoral sabotage case were rushed because of pressures from the executive branch
of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Joint Panel is valid

HELD: Yes.

Political Law- Power of the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute cases

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec has the exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections, the constitutionality of
Section 43of RA 9369 had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While
recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881
or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such
intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA
9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the
DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No. 3467 dated
January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation
cases. However, GMA seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were promulgated by the Comelec.

It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code
was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 8733and
9057mentioned in the assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during the
effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government the
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses. This amendment paved the way for the
discrepancy.

In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing deputation of prosecutors and the
Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force
pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise
changed the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms
of the government now exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the Office
of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and prosecutory
functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force.

Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.

People of the Philippines v. Jose O. Vera

G.R. No. L-45685
November 16, 1937
Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation
alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the
appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera
has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute
discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation
law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in
effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issues:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Rulings:

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no
set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violating of the constitution and
the doctrine of the non-delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in
every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer,
while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in
operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within
the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another
person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary
funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality
would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by
the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
US v. Barrias
FACTS: In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the
business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos
(small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to implement Act
No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred
dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually powered
by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam
powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information against Barrias, it
was alleged that the imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of
the court – this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not
less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the penal
provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-
dollar exchange was more or less equal).
ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.
HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that specified by
Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to
legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign
power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter
of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector cannot exercise a power
exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed
by Act No. 1136. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is $25.00.
U.S. v. Panlilo, G.R. L-9876
FACTS:In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having been exposed to the
dangerousand contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-
authorizedagent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat,
Pampanga;that, on said place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and
whilethe quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to betaken
from the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another;that by virtue of
said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from thesaid corral and drove them
from one place to another for the purpose of working them.The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760
relating to the quarantining of animals sufferingfrom dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 withsubsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs
of trial. The accused contendsthat the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a
violation of Act No. 1760.
ISSUE:Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?
RULING:NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or
madeunlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No.1760
provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, bepunished.
However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawfulare Sections 3, 4 and
5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of theBureau of Agriculture, as
authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. Theorders of the Bureau of Agriculture,
while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, arestatutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a
violation of such orders is not a penal offenseunless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof
unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere inAct No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
made a penal offense, nor is suchviolation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art.
581, par 2 of the PenalCode which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to
epidemicdisease among animals.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN

FACTS:The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 whichpenalizes electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Lawand the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed
the complaint andheld that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicialdepartments cannot
consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, thisappeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

RULING:NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheriesexceeded their authority
in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does notexpressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned
under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless
to penalize it.Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect couldhave been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to anexecutive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize theissuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for
in the law itself. Where thelegislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgaterules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards,which
have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do notrepresent a valid precise of the rule-making
power.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL
and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.

Facts: Private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school
officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555
thereof for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the
accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion to quash was subsequently reduced to in writing, the
municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. On September 2, 1975, private respondents filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with
the further allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional. In an undated order received by the counsel for private
respondents on October 20,1975, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from
proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of
Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an amended petition alleged the additional
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said
law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of
imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court
as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.

Issue: Whether or not RA No. 4670 is unconstitutional

Held: Yes. RA No. 4670 is unconstitutional. It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on
the ground that the imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment, in defiance of the express mandate of the Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and
should be rejected.

We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that —

 The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or
unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to
the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community. Based on the principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled
contentions of the defense that the punishment of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute
involved is cruel and unusual.

The language of our Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided after the last world war is
appropriate here

The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted. The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or
character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments
which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance there
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and
the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.

CEBU OXYGEN v. SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

GR No. 82849, Aug 02, 1989
GANCAYCO, J.

Facts: Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen Acetylene and
Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
covering the years 1986 to 1988 in which the company agrees that for three years effectivity of the agreement ,
it will grant to all regular covered employees salary increases. The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent rules
implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640. Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the
employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against
such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.

Petitioner contended that inasmuch as it had credited the first year increase negotiated under the CBA, it
was liable only for a salary differential of P62.00 and a 13th month pay differential of P31.00. Petitioner argued
that the payment of the differentials constitutes full compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The thrust of the
argument of petitioner is that Section 8 of the rules implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640
particularly the provision excluding anniversary wage increases from being credited to the wage increase
provided by said law is null and void on the ground that the same unduly expands the provisions of the said law.

Issue: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide
for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.

Ruling: The Court ruled in the negative. As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing
Republic Act No. 6640, which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided
in collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from
the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640,do not prohibit the
crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The
implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law
itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

FACTS: Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said
order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In
the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also
see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were
confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon
his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation
of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from
ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity.
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right
to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD: YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests
of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has
ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method
chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban
of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit
adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their
improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second
requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial
transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming
there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright
confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and
the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the
government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with,
such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated
meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by
which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers
since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited
discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the
distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes
the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Health Secretary Duque III (DOH)

Facts: Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O.
51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional
and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the
Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to
give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue: Whether or not the DOH acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

Held: No. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are
customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as
obligatory to comply with such rules. The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states,
were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature
enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for
breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The
Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified
as soft law stated non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part
of international law.

Abakada v. Purisima
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation. They contend that the limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There
is no valid basis for classification of distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies. Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system
will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice
to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the
BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies
and instrumentalities.
ISSUE: Whether or Not there is a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD: Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified
based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or persons are
different in fact or circumstance, they maybe treated in law differently.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed. The equal protection clause
recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and
not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have
the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being
the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.

ILAGAN: Philippine Coconut v. Republic, GR 178193, January 24, 2012

Executive Misapplication
The local level principle of separation of powers does not apply strictly between the -executive and the
law-making body. A law making-agency may be given executive functions. When what is given to a local
legislative body is executive power, the rules applicable to the empowerment of administrative agencies also
becomes applicable to the local law making body.
Tatad v. Secretary of DOE,
281 SCRA 330 (1997) and MR 282 SCRA 337 (1997)

FACTS:on 1996, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8180, this law allows that “any person or entity may
import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his
own requirement,” subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. The petitioner Francisco Tatad,
assailing the section 15 of R.A. No. 8180, which aver that the Implementation of Full Deregulation. — Pursuant
to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall
time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Hence, the petitioners questions the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180.
ISSUE: whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power and
Whether or not Republic Act 8180 is unconstitutional
RULING:the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative
power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will
be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March
1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and
the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the
President — he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Furthermore. The Supreme Court held that RA 8180 is unconstitutional, on the ground that this law violated the
Section 19 of the National Economy and Patrimony (Article 12) of the Philippine Constitution which aver that
‘the state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.’ It violated that provision
because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition in the oil industry in the country.

Dagan v. PRC, 578 SCRA 585 (2009)

FACTS: Dagan’s horses were banned from racing and were kicked out of the stables due to the non-
compliance to the order of MJCI and PRCI in their rules to have blood test done on all the horses. He is
questioning the delegation of PHILRACOM of its rule making power to PRCI and MJCI in issuing the directive
for them to come up with club rules

ISSUE: Whether or not PHILRACOM delegated their rule making power to MJCI and PRCI.

RULING: PHILRACOM did not delegate its rule making power to MJCI and PRCI. It’s merely instructive and
within the scope of power of PHILRACOM
Section 2. Senate Composition. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected
at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

Section 3. Qualifications of a Senator. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day
of the election.

Section 4. Senator: Term of Office; Voluntary Renunciation. The term of office of the Senators shall be six
years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
of which he was elected.

Section 5. COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE

1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.

4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC

GR. No 147589

Facts: BagongBayani and Akbayan Citizens Party filed the COMELEC a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No 3785 issued by the COMELEC. This resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented.

Issue: Whether or not Political Parties may participate in the party list elections and whether or not the party-list
system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Held: The Resolution of this court directed the COMELEC to refrain proclaiming any winner during the last
party-list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC have complied and reported its compliance.
 Yes, Political Parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections, private respondent
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
No, the provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. Hence, R.A. 7941 was enacted.
Veterance Federation Party v. COMELEC, GR 136781
Facts:To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are the twenty percent allocation, the two
percent threshold, the three-seat limit, and proportional representation. Because the Comelec violated these
legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to
contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the
acts of Congress.
Issue:Whether or not:
a. the Twenty Percent constitutional allocation is mandatory,
b. a need for statutory requirement and limitation, and
c. method of allocating additional seats
Held: Yes.The Supreme Court reversed the Comelec ruling that the 38 respondent parties, coalitions and
organizations were entitled to a party-list seat despite their failure to obtain at least 2% each of the national
vote in the 1998 party-list election. The Court said that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least four
inviolable parameters. With that,
a. the 20% allocation is the combined number of all party-list congressmen that shall not exceed 20% of
the total membership of the House of Representatives;
b. the 2% threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid vote cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House, and
c. the three seat limit- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; the additional seats which
a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in “proportion to their total number of votes”.
Aklat v. Comelec
Facts: The Resolution No. 6320 issued by the COMELEC declaring September 30, 2003 as the deadline for
filing petitions for registration under the party-list system violates the sec.5 of RA7941 which states that the 90-
day period refers to the prohibitive period beyond which petitionsfor registration by parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system should no longer be filed nor entertained, was tainted with grave
discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC violates the section 5 of RA 7941
Held: The ruling of the court was that the COMELEC did not commit any grave discretion because it has the
power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to enforce and administer election laws, including
determination, Within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment
of certain pre-election acts. The findings of fact by the COMELEC with regard to the lack of representation and
uplifting of marginalized groups are binding on the Supreme Court thereby the petition was denied
Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC
487 SCRA 623 – Political Law – Control Power of the President

FACTS: In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the
country’s id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin the
Director-General from implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it
infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power by the
president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.

RULING: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a unified multi-purpose ID
system.” Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required
to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.
Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The President may by
executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the “President
shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” The same Section also mandates the
President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” Certainly, under this constitutional power of control
the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public.
The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation. Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and
does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not
apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID
cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to
establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government

Citizens v. COMELEC, 521 SCRA 524

Facts: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in
1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological
parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in
her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates
Held: No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and
deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them. In contrast,
the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election
contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President,
only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the
Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates
before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to
assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would
be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace
as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Bantay vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007

Facts: There were two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain
issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No.
177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-
LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents BiyahengPinoy et al., to
participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether
or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or
the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent.
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
BantayKatarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying
their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited
participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales’ previous letter-request While both petitions
commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-
list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private
respondents named therein be “declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the
Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.
Issues: 1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the COMELEC to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified?
2. Whether respondent COMELEC, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various partylist
groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution;
and 3. Whether respondent COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.
Ruling: 1.The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation
of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a
factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for
certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be
decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the
evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. ) 2. COMELEC’s basis of its
refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last
sentence reads: “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list” is certainly not
a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941
that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the “Certified List”
of the names. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the
right to information enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz: Sec.7. The
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another
constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the
basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on
their choice While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a
vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The
Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election. 3.COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right
where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not
absolute. The people’s right to know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of
the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose
or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to
immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary General

George “FGBF George” Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

FACTS: Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional
or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the
latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motuproprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling
of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the
excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative
intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore
simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was given an
opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process,
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is
the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement
is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that]
under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare
decisis et non quietamovere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case
override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is
justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the]
ruling case law.

BANAT v COMELEC
FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners
and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come
from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3
seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party
vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for
the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat,
must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further,
the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-
lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD”
portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional
HELD: No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2%
are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

Albayon v. Comelec
G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2011
FACTS: Respondents Perfecto Lucaban, Jr. et al. filed a petition for quo warranto with respondentHouse of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal HRET against AangatTayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo wasnot eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives since it did not represent themarginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Further, they pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list
nominee since she did not belong to themarginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent
congressional districtrepresentative.Petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for
quowarranto since the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization was a matter that fell withinthe jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee.
All questions involving her eligibility asfirst nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.On July 16, 2009
respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo butupholding its jurisdiction over the
qualifications of petitioner Abayon. She moved for reconsiderationbut the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,
prompting Abayon to file the present petitionfor special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitionerAbayon as nominee of
Aangat Tayo party-list organization.

.RULING: Yes. As stated in Republic Act No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to
determine which parties ororganizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives duringthe
elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as theysought the disqualifications of
Aangat Tayo. Since petitioner Abayon was not elected into office butwas chosen by its organization under its internal rules, the
HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into andadjudicate her qualifications as nominee.Although it is the party-list organization that is
voted for in the elections, it is not the organizationthat sits and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article
VI of theConstitution clearly shows the Constitution’s point of viewthat it is the party-list representatives whoare "elected" into
office, not their parties or organizations.But where anallegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee tobecome its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes withthe
position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. Section 17, Article VI of theConstitution provides that the HRET shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among otherthings, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed outabove, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than thedistrict
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

GR 190582

Facts: Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It
filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral
grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and
quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,
they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article
201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the ROC. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also
argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence
contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issues: WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Ruling: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that
only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors
is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted
that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies
for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on
purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool
to further any substantial public interest

Guinto: Layug v. COMELEC 666 SCRA 321

MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190793 June 19, 2012
FACTS: MAGDALO filed its Petition for Registration with the respondent COMELEC as a regional political
party based in the NCR for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its
Chairperson, Senator Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Acedillo.
Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that
MAGDALO’s purpose was to employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals. MAGDALO
contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition for Registration
not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration
not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures.
HELD: No. The Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper
subject of judicial notice. Public knowledge of facts pertaining to employment of violence and unlawful means
to achieve one’s goals is within the determination of the COMELEC, and such fact is sufficient to deny a party
registration and accreditation.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualification is
reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to
evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
Furthermore, under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration.

Atong Paglaum et. Al., GR 203766, April 12, 2013

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and

ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

Facts: The municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9,
1994.Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A.
No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII,
Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Republic Act No. 7675 is un constitutional for a reason that:

1. it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution;
2. It violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1); and
3. It preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts

Held: 1. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is
not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural
and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so
as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the
constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than
a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
2. No. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
3. No. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
4.
Mariano v. COMELEC
GR No. 118577, Mar 07, 1995
Puno, J.

Facts: Petitioners assail certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." As
unconstitutional. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854

Issue: Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment
cannot be made by a special law.

Ruling: The Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand(250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least
one congressional representative. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.The said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot
be any clearer, section 2 stated that the city's land area shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality.Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of
fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.

SEMA v. COMELEC 558 SCRA 700

Rules on Apportionment
In accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the habitants of a uniform and
progressive ratio
Definition. The requirement that direct taxes be apportioned among states according to their populations.
Apportionment and Uniformity Efforts. When a business operates in more than one state, there is a need to
determine how much of its income should be subject to tax in each state in which it is doing business. A
separate accounting system can be used to measure the income and expenses attributable to activity in each
state. Alternatively, total business income can be apportioned among the states in which the entity does
business. Because of inherent inaccuracies and challenges of separate accounting, apportionment is the
preferred approach.
 Montejo v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of
Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the
principle of equity of representation. Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District of the province.

ISSUES: Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

RULING: The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution,
which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment
herein made.

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the
transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive
one. Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition
praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the
province of Leyte is denied.

ILAGAN

Herrera v. COMELEC

Contiguous, Compact and Adjacent Territories

This rule is a prohibition of ‘Gerrymandering’ which means the creation of representative districts out of
territory in order to favor a candidate. This was also prohibited under the 1935 Constitution. It should be noted,
however, that the requirement that representative districts should consist of “contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory’’ is qualified by the phrase ‘as far as practicable’.
Population Size
Each City with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative. It should be noted for a city to merit one representative it should be have a population of two
hundred fifty thousand. If the city is smaller than the minimum size required, it will simply be represented as a
part of one of the districts within a province. A province, however, is entitled to one representative no matter
what is the population size. This, in effect, is an exception to the rule on proportional representation because a
number of provinces, such as Batanes, have a population size much smaller than required for district or for a
city.

LUNA: Samson v. Aguire

HERRERA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 131499. November 17, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS: In Resolution No. 68 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras, they requested to have their
province subdivided into two provincial districts from the COMELEC. To act upon the said request, the
Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal
officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested
parties. A consensus was reached in favor of the division. The PES then issued a memo recommending the
division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1
issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance. The COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista
and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats. The petitioners
questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and
adjacent area, that the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province, that
the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable and that there is disparity in the ratio of the number of
voters that a Board Member represents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?

RULING: No. COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. There were two consultative meetings held by
the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor where all interested parties were duly notified and represented.
Moreover, the municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and
adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along
boundaries often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities
grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members. Also,
under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of
electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province
and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts. Under
Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the number of
inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters. Petition was DISMISSED.

Aldaba vs Comelec
GR No. 188078, January 25,2010

Facts: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591),
creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law,
amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of
Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no
dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030
by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.”
Issue: Whether or not the RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987Constitution
Ruling: Yes. We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constituton The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district,
the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”

AQUINO V. COMELEC
G.R. No.189793

FACTS: Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment."
Said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Art VI,Sec 5 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.
Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the constitution

ISSUES:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to
meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI,
Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5
paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution

RULINGS:
Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
The use of the word "or", which is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

Navarro v. Ermita, GR 180050 (2011)

Facts:On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An
Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the
Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of
office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected
their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. On November 10, 2006, petitioners
Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed
before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed
another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that
the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and
would unjustly deprive the people of Surigaodel Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed,
Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply
with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts.

Issue: Whether or not the Republic Act No. 9355 is unconstitutional.

 Held: No.Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is
declared as valid and constitutional, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials thereof are declared valid. With three (3) members each from both the Senate and
the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local
Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the
land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was
intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was
echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just
arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight
Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society
and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was
formulated.33 Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and
respect from this Court,34 but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of
representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of
the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress
understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the
LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province,
enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the
creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its
plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat.

Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both
Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative
intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the
creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR.
Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.

What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of ₱82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of ₱20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather
than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from
the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.

Rogelio Bagabuyo vs Commission on Elections

573 SCRA 290

Facts: Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino
Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence
two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections.
Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required
by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
Held: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration
of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What
happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. Before, Cagayan de
Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately
500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means
better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000.

Section 6: Qualifications of Representatives

The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per cent (20%) of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list.

A Member of the House of Representatives should be:

a) a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election,
b) at least twenty-five (25) years of age,
c) able to read and write, and, except the party list representatives,
d) a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and;
e) a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately proceeding the day of the election.

The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years, and shall serve for
no more than three consecutive terms.

Bengzon v. Cruz, GR 142840

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement
that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.” Cruz
was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63. In
1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner
Bengson who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since
he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

HELD: Yes. Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen by naturalization, repatriation, and direct act of Congress. Repatriation may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship and Cruz' service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
any other time is applied. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality which means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. As provided in R.A. No. 2630 Sec. 1, Cruz had thus
taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.

Domicile and Residence

AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)

Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representativefor the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was
aresident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended
theentry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission
on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino
won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an
order suspendingthe proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack
of constitutional qualification of residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as
mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.
Ruling: The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that towhich the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The purpose is toexclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in
a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San
Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second
District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to
establish apermanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
The short-length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and
his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not toacquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of
the Second Districtof Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS, defendant

248 SCRA 300

Facts: March 23,1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with
the COMELEC alleging that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing the entry “seven” months
to “since childhood”. The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration declaring her not
qualified to run for the position of the member of the House of Representatives for the First District of Leyte. In
a supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the election.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period
of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Ruling: Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake

the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. In
the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince
the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot
be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Having determined that Marcos possess the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board
of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Domino v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone
legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks
to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a
resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the
COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency
requirement and likewise ordered thecancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter’s
Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding
the May 11, 1998 elections
HELD: The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing thequalifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends
to return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of
representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he
had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the
Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts whichcorrespond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it
does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere
absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it
does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in
Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
strengthened by his act ofregistering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it
does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his
former barangay.

PEREZ v. COMELEC and AGUINALDO

G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999
FACTS: On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the
Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a
voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate
on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day
of the elections as required by Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,dismissed the petition
for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third
District of Cagayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and eventually
pass upon private respondent’s eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan?

RULING: No. Republic Act No. 6646, section 6 cannot be applied since there was already a decision made by
COMELEC based on substantial evidence, dismissing the petition for disqualification, finding private
respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.Accordingly he was
proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office. It thereforebarred further consideration of
petitioner’s action.
In the case of Lonzanida where this court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The
outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved
after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may
encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been
proclaimed.

Fernandez v. HRET
FACTS: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a
petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo
was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she
being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat
in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a
seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist
rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner
Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay,
not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he
was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal
concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.
HELD: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that
sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, identifies who the “members” of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

GUINTO: Maquera v. Bora

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

Facts: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36 1 of RA 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. According to Aquilino
Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, said mandatory drug
testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by the Constitution. No
provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a
student or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached. In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and
taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
Issue: Whether or not Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional
Held: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not. Section 36 (c) and (d)–as to students
and employees of private and public offices. Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of the
constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying the following reasonable deductions: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parent is with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer
rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
 Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicion less drug testing
of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the
right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. Just as in the case of
secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.

Section 7. Term of Representatives. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term
of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
DIMAPORO V. MITRA
G.R. No. 96859. October 15, 1991
FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during
the1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of
ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR
under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to
resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not
able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman
because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to
the members of Congress. Grounds may be termed to be shortened:1.Holding any officer or employment in the
government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof.2.Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a
disorderly behavior3.Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election
contest4.Voluntary renunciation of office
ISSUE: Whether or not Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
another government position
HELD: NO. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the
1935Constitution, it was stated that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest
degree of responsibility and integrity. If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to
serve for six (6) years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then it clearly shows that he did
not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him thus he should be considered ipso
facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an obvious act or abandoning or relinquishing
his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he
could be of better service.

Farinas v. Executive Secretary

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed
rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials
who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING: No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough
to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the
said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not
violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in
the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law
of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was
amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members
of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes.
Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

QUINTO v. COMELEC
Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend
that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting
provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they
are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the
law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a
two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—if it is
not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The
obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public.
The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to
their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be
germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the
Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed
to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing,
social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both
head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the
elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say,
for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to
support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive
office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy
would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of
the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Section 8. Regular Elections

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative
district of, one Josephine de la Cruz, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for
Disqualification against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered, in violation of Section
68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned
by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga
and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and reception of
evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII. [8] On May 11, 2001,
the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed
against him. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district representative and was
voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate. Codilla’s votes being considered
stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office.
Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of
Locsin’s proclamation.
Issue: Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid for a reason that the petitioner is guilty of
indirect solicitation of votes and ordered for the disqualification by the COMELEC 2nd Division
Ruling: No. The proclamation is not valid for the grounds that the court specified as follows:
a. Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of
summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy
of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private
respondent never rebutted petitioners repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his
disqualification because he never received summons.[71] Petitioner claims that he was never summoned nor
furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition by
personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001.
b. The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce
evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in gross
violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to continue with the trial
or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest. This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402
requiring the Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within ten (10)
days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the
five (5) days from completion of the hearing and the reception of evidence.
c. the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on
substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial
evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the
COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said
Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly observed:
Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based mainly on the
allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided evidence at hand, the result was
predictable. The Commission (Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified.[81]
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the
petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged.
d. Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was
done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the
proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same.
In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said
Resolution excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the highest
number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15, 2001 [98] when everything was
already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness,
any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Section 9. Special Elections.
Arturo M. Tolentino v. COMELEC
GR No. 148334, Jan 21, 2004
CARPIO, J.

Facts: On January 2001, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.was nominated as Vice-President, and took his oath
as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. On 8 February 2001, the Senate passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to
the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a
special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a
6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election.Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial
candidate garnering the 13 highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.On June 5, 2001, after COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Petitioners contend that
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of
the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645; (2) it
failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election
under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under
the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act
No. 6646.

Issue: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.

Ruling: The Court ruled in the negative. A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14
May 2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or
substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its
resolutions or even in its press releases did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single
three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give
formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of
votes in the special election.In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time
thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election
failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any
call for the election by someauthority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of
the election.COMELEC's failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election,
much less invalidate it.

SEC. 10 THE SALARIES OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW. NO INCREASE IN SAID COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT
UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE FULL TERM OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROVING SUCH INCREASE.

Salary of Senators and Representatives.

The annual salary of the members of Congress has been initiallyfixed by Article XVIII, Section 17 at
two hundred four thousand pesos,and that of President of the Senate and of the Speaker at two hundred forty
thousand pesos. These are subject to change by law. However, "No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase." This limitation is a carryover from the 1935 Constitution as well as
from the 1973 Constitution. Its purpose is to place a "legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural
temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with
the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such
measure unless the need for it is clearly felt."

It should be noted that an increase in salary does not take effect "until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase." Although
the term of Representatives is only three years, the term of Senators is six years. It is only after the expiration of
the six-year term of Senators who approved the increase that the increase in salary becomes effective.
Moreover, the retirement benefits of a legislator must be based on the salary in effect during his term and not on
the increased salary of the subsequent term.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay

18 SCRA 300; 10/4/1966

FACTS: The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and
organized under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has filed in
this Court a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the
Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking to
permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased
salaries authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of the
House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor General,
was substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.

The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No.
4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by
Republic Act 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.

The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14(now Section 10),
of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took
part in the approval of Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the
members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic Act 4134 violates the Article VI, Section 14(now Section 10) of the
Constitution.

HELD:
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation
for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation
between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of
the full term" of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not
the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives
thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of
one single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase
"all the members of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14,
the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the
measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can
become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact that
the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not
apportionable between the two chambers.

The Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation
may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation
Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the
Constitution and must be held null and void.

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to authorize the
disbursement of the increased compensation to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even
prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14(now Section 10), of the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the
Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit any disbursements
of the increased compensation authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No costs.

Section 11, Privilege from Arrest; Parliamentary Freedom of Speech. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. NoMember shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Privilege from Arrest
1. Entitled to immunity from arrest while the Congress is in session
2. Whether attending the session or not
a. Regular
i. Three regular sessions
b. Special
i. Takes place when the president calls for session during recess to consider legislations the
president may designate
ii. Executive Session
3. As long as the session is not yet adjourned or in recess
4. If ever can be arrested
a. imprisonment should not be more than 6 years
5. Except for offenses punishable with a minimum of 6 years imprisonment
a. Reclusion Perpetua
b. Life Imprisonment
i. Theft
1. 2 years – Life imprisonment
Limitations to Immunity from Arrest
a. If Congress is no longer in session
b. If the offense committed is punishable with more than 6 years of imprisonment
c. If the representative waives this right
Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
a. Entitled to immunity from being questioned and be held liable to what they say
b. Condition
a. As long as the speech is relevant to the performance of his legislative duties
6. Limitations to Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
a. If the person is not acting as a member of the Congress
i. No longer a representative
ii. Actions are not in relation to the performance of his legislative duties
b. Etiquette or behavior is being questioned in the Congress itself

CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
March 16, 1995
242 SCRA 415

Facts: With the premise using Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of COMELEC, i.e. redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte, 1st district of Leyte representative Cirilo Roy G. Montejo seeks transfer of the
municipality of Tolosa from his district to the 2nd District of the province. This following the notion of a
resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte five
districts – after 3rd district of Leyte Biliran was made to a sub-province, COMELEC made redistrictions
transferring the municipalities of Capoocan of 2nd district and Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of
Leyte.

Issue/s: Whether it is within the power of the COMELEC to transfer municipalities from one legislative district
to another district, as such expressed in Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736. If yes, that the petition of C. Montejo
to transfer the municipality of Tolosa of 1st district to the 2nd district of Leyte be granted.

Held: No. From the amendments made in the Constitution, the Ordinance promulgated that “the COMELEC
only has authority to make minor adjustments- i.e. adjust the number of members (not municipalities)
“apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created”. Thereby, Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2736 of COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE. The Court also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

ILAGAN: Trillanes v. Pimentel

Parliamentary Freedom of Speech

Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases, except, treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966)
FACTS: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under
serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such
strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a
coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under
their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an
end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case
against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is
libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower
house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said
letter is not even libelous. This petition having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present
appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of the open letter to the President of the Philippines is a privilege
communication.
RULING: The Supreme Court said No, the publication of the letter in question to some newspapers of general
circulation in the country is not covered by the provision of Section 15, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution, because it was made while the Congress was no longer in its regular session and the defendant-
appellee was not performing his official function. Hence, the publication of the letter in question was not at
privilege communication and he is not entitled to enjoy the Parliamentary Freedom of Speech.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

LUNA: Antonio v. Valencia

POBRE v. DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO

A.C. NO. 7399, August 25, 2009

FACTS: JBC through public invitation publish the soon to be vacant position of the Chief of Justice. Santiago
was one of the applicants of the said position but JBC later informed that only an incumbent associate justice
would qualify for the position. During her privilege speech on the Congress, Santiago said the following:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to
be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in
the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
Complainant, Pobre in his sworn letter invites the attention of the court and asks that disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not a disbarment proceeding and other disciplinary actions should be taken against Senator
Defensor-Santiago?

RULING: No. A disbarment proceeding and other disciplinary actions cannot be imposed against Senator
Defensor-Santiago because the delivery of her speech was done while the Congress was in session and therefore
she is covered with the state immunity provided in Art. VI, Sec.11 of the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, her
privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. Therefore,
the case was DISMISSED.

Section 12 Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests

1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as compensation to
the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families
Section 13 Prohibitions on Members of Congress
No Senator or Members of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to
any office which may have been created the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.
Liban vs. Gordon
GR no. 175352

Facts: Petitioner Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of Quezon City Red Cross Charter
filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to declare Richard J. Gordon as forfeited his seat in
the Senate” against Respondent Gordon, who was elected chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator. Petitioners alleged that by accepting the
chairmanship of PNRC Board Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate to Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Was it correct for the court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the
PNRC charter?

Ruling: No, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the Constitutional because it was not the very
lismota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature, it is neither strictly a Government nor private
corporation. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross cannot “be classified as an
instrumentality of the state, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly
as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of
the state. Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirely. Supreme Court declare that the
office of the chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not Government Office or an office of a
Government-Owned of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of 1987 Constitution.

Section 14. Prohibitions Related to the Practice of Profession

No senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court
of justice or before the electoral tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31
Facts:It is dealt with an assemblyman who bought a nominal amount of shares in a corporation which was
party to a suit before the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and then proceeded to appear “in
intervention” purportedly to protect his own interest.
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent
Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747. His indirectly appearance could
theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI) -Private Corporation, in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the
protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel. On a
certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He
had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares.
He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14,
1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979.
Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case.
Ruling: No. The "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest"
of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be
done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited. In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747
falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 15. Regular Session; Special Session

There are two main types of legislative sessions—regular and special (sometimes known as extraordinary). A
regular session is the annual or biennial gathering of legislators, the starting date (and often, the length) of
which is set by constitution or statute.

Unlike regular sessions, there is no specific timing for special (or extraordinary) sessions. They occur
intermittently to deal with the specific issues or topics. Usually, the scope of a special session—that is, the
topics that may be taken up—is limited to the issues specified in the notice calling for the special session.

There are no limits on the number of special session that may be called. Many factors can influence the number
of special legislative sessions that occur in any year, including court decisions; federal government actions;
length of or scope limits on regular legislative sessions; length or scope limits on special sessions; natural or
other disasters; party control of the legislature and governor's office; political culture of the state; redistricting;
or state economy.

A special or extraordinary session is called either by the governor or the legislature. Who has the ability varies
among the states.

In 15 states, only the governor may call a special session.

Section 16. (1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority
vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from
day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request
of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more
than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
PUEBLA
Section 16. Officers of congress; Quorum; Discipline; Journal/Records
A quorum is the minimum number of members of a group or committee required to be in attendance in order
for that group to be able to take official action. Groups that often have quorum requirements include legislative
bodies, corporate boards of directors, and corporate shareholder meetings.
Avelino vs. Cuenco
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him
the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s
request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved.
With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and
prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to
adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left
continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was
recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the
court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in
view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of
the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended
senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because
the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose
their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of
the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the
Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the
Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco
and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the
rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the
majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any
time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place
them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS
G.R. NOS. 132875-76 FEBRUARY 3, 2000

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE: Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate
of the sovereign will”.
RULING: NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot
validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines

FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

HELD: YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution does not
expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges,
read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May
1992 and for all the following elections. In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections,
should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

INTERNAL RULES AND DISCIPLINE

Inherent in any legislative body is its power of internal regulation and discipline. As Justice Story said “If the power did not
exist” it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and
order. The humblest assembly of men is understood to possess this power; and it would be absurd to deprive the councils of the
nation of a like authority.

Article VI, Section 10 (3)of the 1935 Constitution stated that “Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the consent of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a member.” The 1973
counterpart modified rule by prescribing the number of votes needed to impose a suspension and limiting suspension to sixty days.
The 1987 provision follows that of 1973. In other respects, the 1935 provision has been preserved; hence, jurisprudence prior to
1973, mutatis mutandis, still applies.
 It is thus clear that on matters affecting only the internal operation of the legislature, the legislature’s formulation and
implementation of its rules is beyond the reach of the courts. In these matters, what is referred to as the “expanded jurisdiction” of the
Supreme Court found in the second sentence of Article VIII, Section 1 does not apply. When, however, the legislative rule affects
private rights, the courts cannot altogether be excluded.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

277 SCRA 268 (1997)

Facts: An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House of Representatives
involving taxations in the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. This waslater passed accordingly and
brought to the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on thesecond reading, herein petitioner moved for
adjournment for lack of quorum which isconstitutionally needed to conduct business. Petitioner’s motion was
defeated and wasrailroaded. The bill was then signed into law by President Fidel Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not the law was passed in violation of the constitutional mandate.

Ruling: There is no rule of the House that quorum shall be determined by viva voce or nominal voting. The
Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members betaken every time a House has to vote,
except only on the following instancesupon the last andthe third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the
Members present and in repassing a billover the veto of the President. Second, it is obvious on the part of the
petitioner to delaythe business of the House, thus eliminating the alleged unscrupulous behavior on part of the
accused.Third, the enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding
provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle of separation of powers, which
herein, is applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion
resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Osmeña v. Pendatum

FACTS: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In
the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during
his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to
disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the
resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada
Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and
Congress has the power to discipline its members.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

RULING: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic
world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered
disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

Santiago v. Sadiganbayan
FACTS: A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It
was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan
then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination
of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs
and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the
official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to Discipline its
Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan
to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

The United States v. Juan Pons

G.R. No. L-11530, 34 Phil 729
August 12, 1916
FACTS: Juan Pons and GabinoBeliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered
to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house.
On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were
not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of
trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines.
Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission
(Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01
March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since
this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed
made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond
the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere
with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against
the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature
adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining
to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

Casco Phil. Commercial Co. v. Gimenez

7 SCRA 347. February 28, 1963

Facts: Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea
and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the glues. They paid P33, 765.42 in
November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the
first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3,
1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of
the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption
granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609.
Issue: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee
Held: No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is a finished product which is
distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s struggle that the bill approved in Congress contained the
conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and
the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree

Morales v. Subido

Facts: "In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred,
reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its present form and
substance.

"It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase 'who has served the
police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,' under which the
petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the
second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the
phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"] was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment
was retained."

The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended at the behest of
Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged from
the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record."

In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the different drafts of
House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. In what purport to be the page proofs of the bill as finally
approved by both Houses of Congress.

It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or,"
was still part of the provision, but according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire provision
and substituted what now is Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief
of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of
captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer
in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."

The petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was
signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the bill,
explaining the change in Section 10, thus: "Section 10 was recast for clarity. (with the consent of Sen.
Ganzon & Congressman Montano)."

Issue: Whetherthe change an employee, as purportedty was a rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences, was in
truth an alteration of meaning.

Held: ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied.

Ratio: The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit
of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise
we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen
in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.

The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After
all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner —
can best be effected by the occupants thereof.

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree."

Astorga v. Villegas

Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on third
reading without amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were
introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as
having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing
the amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones
actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary
of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and
the Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became RA
4065.

Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the President
was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate President invalidated his
signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.

Issue: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered to.
Held: The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments,
which requires the judicial department to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the right
manner.

Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized by
the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by
the Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to
speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

Astroga v. Villegas
GR No. L-23475 56 SCRA 131 [1974] April 30, 1974

Facts: Antonio Villegas issued circulars to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065 which was issued to
be erroneously certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives for it was Senator Roxas
bill that was billed and not of Senator Tolentino, that he later made public that it was the wrong version of the
bill and considered his signature on the enrolled bill invalid and of no effect which immediately the President of
the Philippines withdraw his signature on House Bill No. 9266.
Herminio Astroga filed a petition with the court a mandamus, injuction and/or prohibition with the
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas. The petitioner agrees that the attestation
of bill is not mandatory and would not affect the validity of the statute instead it is pointed out, RA No. 4065
would remain valid and binding. While respondents position is that so-called RA No. 4065 never became a law
since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the
enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the matter.
Issue: Whether or not RA 4065 is invalid and the entries in the journal should be consulted.
Ruling: No. RA No, 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and did not become a law. For the
lawmaking process of the in the Congress ends when the bill is approved by both House and the certification
does not add to the validity of the bill or fix any of the defect already present upon its passage. It is the approval
of the Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that are essential. The Supreme Court
recognized the signature for withdrawal of the President of the Philippines and the Senate President, thus, the
bill did not become a law.
Yes. The journal should be consulted. The record of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. It is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject of misprinting and other records,
which point is irrelevant to the case. The journal disclose that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him.

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, vs.

HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents
Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause
with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial
proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional for a reason that the repeal of the franking privilege
from the petitioners was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200 and
did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its passage

Ruling: No. These argument are unacceptable. It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on
the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It
was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final
form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the
very least, a becoming courtesy.

Abakada Guro Partylist v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita

G.R. No. 168056, Sep 01, 2005

Facts: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods,
and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned
provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006. Petitioners argue that the law is
unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes
under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Section 28(2) of
the Constitution.

Ruling: No. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance to the President, the Secretary of Finance is
not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of
Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that
he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if
any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but
only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not
abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and
what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.