ADMELEC SESSION 1

Doctrines of Cases

While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which ". . . appears illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution
and the Ombudsman Act have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of
judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. It would
seem to us that the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed
jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed,
the recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE to award Contract APM-01 appears to be yet pending consideration and
action by the MWSS Board of Trustees. (Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez)

It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor
to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the
Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he
comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally
act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman. (Lastimosa v.
Vasquez)

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office
against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the
case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. (Fuentes v. Ombudsman)

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when
it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other
appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but
which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
(Compania v. Public Utility)

A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can make a
law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or
state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the
president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an
attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained. (US v. Ang Tang Ho & Pelaez v. Auditor
General)

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local
governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. (Edu v. Ericta)

Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-
legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
(Agustin v. Edu)

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that
some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the
manner of the exercise of the delegated power. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard
which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied. (PhilComSat v. Alcuaz)

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. (Santiago v. COMELEC)
 (Schechter Poultry v. US)

(White et al., v. Roughton)

(Panama v. Ryan)

The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law
thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private, rights
do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power
to declare the existence of facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners
and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the
enforcement of particular laws. (Lovina v. Moreno)

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid
law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules
and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction
provided in the law. (Victorias Milling v. SSC)

When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts
that finally determine what the law means. It has also been held that interpretative regulations need not be
published. (Peralta v. CSC)

(Meralco v. Energy Regulatory Board)