G.R. No.
L-48931 July 16, 1979 that "the decision of the Bureau in all cases shall be final and
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), vs. DIRECTOR OF LABOR
RELATIONS, TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL
MILLING CORPORATION, and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS,
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This is a certification election case. On June 24, 1976, or within sixty days
prior to the expiration on August 19, 1976 of the unregistered collective
bargaining agreement between the Associated Labor Unions and the
General Milling Corporation, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a duly
registered labor union, filed with Regional Office No. 7 at Cebu City of the
Ministry of Labor a petition for certification election.
The med-arbiter in his order of October 12, 1976 granted the
petition. He ordered the holding of a certification election within twenty
days from notice among the rank-and-file employees of the company at
Lapu-Lapu City. The Associated Labor Unions appealed from that order to
the Director of Labor Relations.
Instead of deciding the appeal promptly, the Director turned
over the record of the case to the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
TUCP a federation of labor unions, allegedly by virtue of an arrangement
between the Ministry of Labor and the said federation that cases involving
its member-unions must first be referred to it for possible settlement in
accordance with its Code of Ethics.
The TUCP has not decided the controversy. On September 14,
1978, or more than twenty months after the federation received the
record of the case, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa filed in this Court
the instant petition for mandamus to compel the Director of Labor
Relations to decide the case, or, in the alternative, to require the TUCP to
return to the Director the record of the case.
The petitioner accused the TUCP of sitting indefinitely on the
appeal because its president and the president of appellant Associated
Labor Unions are the same person. The TUCP admits that its president is
also the president of the Associated Labor Unions but it clarifies that its
executive board, not its president, will decide the controversy.
The Director of Labor Relations manifested in his comment that he is
willing to decide the appeal. He prays that the TUCP be ordered to return
to him immediately the record of the case.
Respondent employer, the General Milling Corporation,
revealed in its comment that it has a registered collective bargaining
agreement with the Associated Labor Unions which will expire on August
19, 1979. Presumably, that agreement was a renewal of the unregistered
collective bargaining agreement which expired on August 19, 1976. It was
the impending expiration of that agreement which provoked the Ilaw at
Buklod ng Manggagawa to file its petition for certification election in June,
1976.
The petitioner in its reply to the TUCP's comment alleged that it
was affiliated with the TUCP only in 1978 or long after the certification
case was appealed to the Director of Labor Relations.
The petitioner further manifested that other certification cases
referred in 1976 to the TUCP have not been acted upon by it up to this
time and that the delay is a denial of labor justice.
The issue is whether it was legal and proper for the Director of
Labor Relations to refer to the TUCP the appeal of the Associated Labor
Unions in a certification election case.
We hold that the referral of the appeal to the TUCP is glaringly
illegal and void. The Labor Code never intended that the Director of Labor
Relations should abdicate delegate and relinquish his arbitrational
prerogatives in favor of a private person or entity or to a federation of
trade unions. Such a surrender of official functions is an anomalous,
deplorable and censurable renunciation of the Director's adjudicatory
jurisdiction in representation cases.
Article 226 of the Labor Code provides in peremptory terms
that the Bureau of Labor Relations and the labor relations divisions in the
regional offices of the Ministry of Labor "shall have original and exclusive
authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both
parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management
relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except
those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure
and/or voluntary arbitration."
Article 259 of the Labor Code provides that "all certification
cases shall be decided within twenty (20) working days." Article 260 of the
same Code provides that the Bureau of Labor Relations should decide
appeals in representation cases, within fifteen (15) working days", or
twenty working days, according to section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Section 10 further provides
unappealable."
Those provisions are mandatory and should be strictly adhered
to. They are part and parcel of the adequate administrative machinery
established by the Labor Code for the expeditious settlement of labor
disputes. The Director's act of referring the appeal of the Associated Labor
Unions to the TUCP is not only contrary to law but is a patent nullification
of the policy of the Labor Code to avoid delay in the adjudication of labor
controversies.
There is another aspect of this case which should be
underscored. And that is that the Labor Code never intended that the
original record of a labor case, an official public record, should be removed
from the legitimate custodian thereof and entrusted to a private person or
entity. It should be obvious that the delivery of an official public record to
a private person is fraught with mischievous consequences. (See sec. 27,
Rule 132, Rules of Court on irremovability of public record.)
Respondent Director of Labor Relations in imprudently and
illegally delivering to the TUCP the record of the certification election case
(instead of a transcript thereof) placed himself in the pitiable, lamentable
and ridiculous situation of having to beg the TUCP for the return of the
record and then to ask for a court order to compel its return since the
TUCP has cavalierly not heeded its request.
The petitioner and the Director could have reconstituted the
record and the Director could have decided the appeal on the basis of the
reconstituted record instead of awaiting the pleasure of the TUCP's
officers for the return of the original record.
WHEREFORE, the president, secretary, or any responsible
officer of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Marvex Bldg., South
Harbor, Port Area, Manila, is ordered to return to the Director of Labor
Relations within forty-eight hours from notice the original record of BLR
Case No. A-536-76 (LRD Case No. CE-0018).
The Director is directed to decide the appeal within ten days
from the receipt of the record. Costs against respondent TUCP
SO ORDERED.
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) VS DIRECTOR OF LABOR
RELATIONS
91 SCRA 482 Jul 16, 1979
FACTS
-This is a certification election case. The Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a
duly registered labor union and a member of Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (TUCP), filed with the Ministry of Labor a petition for
certification election.
-Instead of deciding the appeal promptly, the Director turned over the
record of the case to the TUCP, a federation of labor unions, allegedly by
virtue of an arrangement between the Ministry of Labor and the said
federation that cases involving its member-unions must first be referred to
it for possible settlement in accordance with its Code of Ethics.
-The TUCP has not decided the controversy. Thus the IBM filed in
this Court the instant petition for mandamus to compel the Director of
Labor Relations to decide the case, or, in the alternative, to require the
TUCP to return to the Director the record of the case.
ISSUE WON it was legal and proper for the Director of Labor Relations to
refer to the TUCP the appeal of the Associated Labor Unions in a
certification election case.
HELD NO.
Ratio The Labor Code never intended that the Director of Labor Relations
should abdicate, delegate and relinquish his arbitrational prerogatives in
favor of a private person or entity or to a federation of trade unions. Such
a surrender of official functions is an anomalous, deplorable and
censurable renunciation of the Director’s adjudicatory jurisdiction in
representation cases.
Reasoning
a. Article 226 of the Labor Code provides in peremptory terms that the
Bureau of Labor Relations and the labor relations divisions in the regional
offices of the Ministry of Labor “shall have original and exclusive authority
to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on
all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all
workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising
from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or
voluntary arbitration.”
b. Article 259 of the Labor Code provides that “all certification cases shall
be decided within twenty (20) working days. ” Article 260 of the same
Code provides that the Bureau of Labor Relations should decide appeals in
representation cases “within fifteen (15) working days”, or twenty working
days, according to section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code. Section 10 further provides that “the
decision of the Bureau in all cases shall be final and unappealable.”
DISPOSITION
The president, secretary, or any responsible officer of the TUCP is ordered
to return to the Director of Labor Relations the original record of the case.
The Director is directed to decide the appeal within ten days from the
receipt of the record.
G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989.
BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA
CORTES, J.:
On June 21, 1985 Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of
Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as BWLU- ADLO)
filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the rank and file employees of Benguet Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BENECO) at Alapang, La
Trinidad, Benguet alleging, inter alia, that BENECO has in its employ two
hundred and fourteen (214) rank and file employees; that one hundred
and ninety-eight (198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the
filing of the petition; that no certification election has been conducted for
the last 12 months; that there is no existing collective bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented by
BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no collective bargaining agreement in the
cooperative.
An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco
Employees Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as BELU) contending that
it was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter on
October 20,1980; that pending resolution by the National Labor Relations
Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO involving bargaining
deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases
bars any representation question.
BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition claiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative engaged in
providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers in the
City of Baguio and Benguet Province; and, that the employees sought to be
represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing because they are members and joint
owners of the cooperative.
On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving
due course to the petition for certification election. However, the med-
arbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of
petitioner who are non-members thereof and without any involvement in
the actual ownership of the cooperative. Based on the evidence during the
hearing the med-arbiter found that there are thirty-seven (37) employees
who are not members and without any involvement in the actual
ownership of the cooperative. The dispositive portion of the med-arbiter's
order is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election should be as
it is hereby ordered to be conducted at the premises of Benguet,
Electric Cooperative, Inc., at Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet within
twenty (20) days from receipt hereof among all the rank and file
employees (non-members/consumers and without any involvement in
the actual ownership of the cooperative) with the following choices:
>1. BENECO WORKERS LABOR UNION-ADLO
>2. BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION
>3. NO UNION
>The payroll for the month of June 1985 shall be the basis in
determining the qualified voters who may participate in the
certification election to be conducted.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 22-23.]
BELU and BENECO appealed from this order but the same was
dismissed for lack of merit on March 25,1986. Whereupon BENECO filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction and /or restraining order, docketed as G.R. No. 74209, which
the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated
April 28, 1986.
The ordered certification election was held on October 1, 1986.
Prior to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that
"the cooperative is protesting that employees who are members-
consumers are being allowed to vote when . . . they are not eligible to be
members of any labor union for purposes of collective bargaining; much
less, to vote in this certification election." [Rollo, p. 28]. Petitioner
submitted a certification showing that only four (4) employees are not
members of BENECO and insisted that only these employees are eligible to
vote in the certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU
garnered forty-nine (49) of the eighty-three (83) "valid" votes cast.
Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing
a Protest. Finding, among others, that the issue as to whether or not
member-consumers who are employees of BENECO could form, assist or
join a labor union has been answered in the affirmative by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 74209, the med-arbiter dismissed the protest on
February 17, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
director Pura Ferrer-Calleja affirmed the med-arbiter's order and certified
BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file
employees of BENECO.
Alleging that the BLR director committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction BENECO filed the
instant petition for certiorari. In his Comment the Solicitor General agreed
with BENECO's stance and prayed that the petition be given due course. In
view of this respondent director herself was required by the Court to file a
Comment. On April 19, 1989 the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent
director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent
BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representtative of the rank and
file employees of BENECO.
Under Article 256 of the Labor Code [Pres. Decree 442] to have
a valid certification election, "at least a majority of all eligible voters in the
unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of
the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of
all workers in the unit." Petitioner BENECO asserts that the certification
election held on October 1, 1986 was null and void since members-
employees of petitioner cooperative who are not eligible to form and join
a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining were allowed to vote
therein.
Respondent director and private respondent BELU on the other
hand submit that members of a cooperative who are also rank and file
employees are eligible to form, assist or join a labor union [Comment of
Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125; Comment of BELU, pp. 9-10; Rollo
pp. 99-100].
The Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are
qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining has already been resolved and clarified in the case
of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer Calleja, et al. [G.R.
No. 7795, September 26,1988] and reiterated in the cases of Batangas-
Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. [G.R. Nos. 62386, 70880
and 74560 November 9, 1988] and San Jose City Electric Service
Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, et al. [G.R. No.
77231, May 31, 1989] wherein the Court had stated that the right to
collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a cooperative who
at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect,
however, to employees who are neither members nor co-owners of the
cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the 1987
Constitution and applicable statutes.
Respondent director argues that to deny the members of
petitioner cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor union of
their own choice for purposes of collective bargaining would amount to a
patent violation of their right to self-organization. She points out that:
>Albeit a person assumes a dual capacity as rank and file employee and as
member of a certain cooperative does not militate, as in the instant case,
against his/her exercise of the right to self-organization and to collective
bargaining guaranteed by the Constitution and Labor Code because, while
so doing, he/she is acting in his/her capacity as rank and file employee
thereof. It may be added that while the employees concerned became
members of petitioner cooperative, their status employment as rank and
filers who are hired for fixed compensation had not changed. They still do
not actually participate in the management of the cooperative as said
function is entrusted to the Board of Directors and to the elected or
appointed officers thereof. They are not vested with the powers and
prerogatives to lay down and execute managerial policies; to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees; and/or
to effectively recommend such managerial functions [Comment of
Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125.]
Private respondent BELU concurs with the above contention of
respondent director and, additionally, claims that since membership in
petitioner cooperative is only nominal, the rank and file employees who
are members thereof should not be deprived of their right to self-
organization.
The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to respondents' claim, the
fact that the members-employees of petitioner do not participate in the
actual management of the cooperative does not make them eligible to
form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining with petitioner. The Court's ruling in the Davao City case that
members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining was based on the fact that as members of the
cooperative they are co-owners thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the
right to collective bargaining for "certainly an owner cannot bargain with
himself or his co-owners." [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v.
Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra]. It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative,
and not involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a
member from joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus,
irrespective of the degree of their participation in the actual management
of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a
cooperative is "enough to take away the constitutional protections
afforded to labor, then there would be no hindrance for employers to
grant, on a scheme of generous profit sharing, stock bonuses to their
employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are not
stockholders [of the corporation], albeit in a minimal and involuntary
manner, they are now also co-owners and thus disqualified to form
unions." To allow this, BELU argues, would be "to allow the floodgates of
destruction to be opened upon the rights of labor which the Constitution
endeavors to protect and which welfare it promises to promote."
[Comment of BELU, p. 10; Rollo, p. 100].
The above contention of respondent union is based on the
erroneous presumption that membership in a cooperative is the same as
ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations. While cooperatives may
exercise some of the rights and privileges given to ordinary corporations
provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other privileges not
granted to the latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8, Pres. Decree No. 175;
Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra]. Similarly,
members of cooperatives have rights and obligations different from those
of stockholders of ordinary corporations. It was precisely because of the
special nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the Davao City case
that members-employees thereof cannot form or join a labor union for
purposes of collective bargaining. The Court held that:
>A cooperative ... is by its nature different from an ordinary
business concern being run either by persons, partnerships, or
corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and
operate the business while the others are its employees. As above stated,
irrespective of the number of shares owned by each member they are
entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the affairs of the
cooperative. Their share capital earn limited interest. They enjoy special
privileges as-exemption from income tax and sales taxes, preferential right
to supply their products to State agencies and even exemption from the
minimum wage laws.
>An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a
member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective
bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-
owners.
It is important to note that, in her order dated September 2,
1985, med-arbiter Elnora V. Balleras made a specific finding that there are
only thirty-seven (37) employees of petitioner who are not members of
the cooperative and who are, therefore, the only employees of petitioner
cooperative eligible to form or join a labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining [Annex "A" of the Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 22]. However, the
minutes of the certification election [Annex "C" of the Petition: Rollo, p.
28] show that a total of eighty-three (83) employees were allowed to vote
and of these, forty-nine (49) voted for respondent union. Thus, even if We
agree with respondent union's contention that the thirty seven (37)
employees who were originally non-members of the cooperative can still
vote in the certification election since they were only "forced and
compelled to join the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action," the
certification election held on October 1, 1986 is still null and void since
even those who were already members of the cooperative at the time of
the issuance of the med-arbiter's order, and therefore cannot claim that
they were forced to join the union were allowed to vote in the election.
Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that:
>To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all eligible
voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all workers in the unit . . . [Italics supplied.]
In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent
union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the bargaining unit since
even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union within the
cooperative because of their membership therein were allowed to vote in
the certification election. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying
respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the rank and file employees of petitioner cooperative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
resolution of respondent director is ANNULLED. The certification election
conducted on October 1, 1986, is SET ASIDE. The Regional Office No. 1 of
San Fernando, La Union is hereby directed to immediately conduct new
certification election proceedings among the rank and file employees of
the petitioner who are not members of the cooperative.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989.BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PURAFERRER-CALLEJA
Facts: Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic
LaborOrganizations (BWLU- ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification
asthe sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and
fileemployees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) alleging
thatBENECO has in its employ 214 rank and file employees; that 198
or92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of the petition;
thatno certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months;
thatthere is no existing collective bargaining representative of the rank
andfile employees sought to represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there
isno collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative.An opposition to
the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees LaborUnion (BELU)
contending that it was certified as the sole and exclusivebargaining
representative of the subject workers pursuant to an orderissued by the
med-arbiter; that pending resolution by the NLRC are twocases it filed
against BENECO involving bargaining deadlock and unfairlabor practice;
and, that the pendency of these cases bars anyrepresentation
question.BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the
petitionclaiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative engaged in
providingelectric services to its members and patron-consumers; and, that
theemployees sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible
toform, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
becausethey are members and joint owners of the cooperative.The med-
arbiter issued an order giving due course to the petition forcertification
election. However, the med-arbiter limited the electionamong the rank
and file employees of BENECO who are non-membersthereof and without
any involvement in the actual ownership of thecooperative. The med-
arbiter found that there are 37 employees whoare not members and
without any involvement in the actual ownershipof the cooperative.BELU
and BENECO appealed but the same was dismissed for lack ofmerit. So
BENECO filed with the SC a petition for Certiorari which the SCdismissed
for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated April 1986.The ordered
certification election was held in October 1986. Prior to theconduct
thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that "thecooperative is
protesting that employees who are members-consumersare being allowed
to vote when they are not eligible to be members ofany labor union for
purposes of collective bargaining; much less, to votein this certification
election." BENECO submitted a certification showingthat only 4 employees
are not members of BENECO and insisted thatonly these employees are
eligible to vote in the certification election.Canvass of the votes showed
that BELU garnered 49 of the 83 "valid"votes cast.Thereafter BENECO
formalized its verbal manifestation by filing aProtest. The med-arbiter
dismissed the protest. BLR director Callejaaffirmed the med-arbiter's order
and certified BELU as the sole andexclusive bargaining agent of all the rank
and file employees of BENECO.
Issue: W/N employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or join alabor
organization for purposes of collective bargaining.
NO
Ratio: Under Article 256 LC, to have a valid certification election, "at least a
majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The
labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified
as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit."BENECO
asserts that the certification election held was null and void since
members-employees who are not eligible to form and join a labor union
for purposes of collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein. The
issue has already been resolved and clarified in the case of
Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer Calleja, et al. and
reiterated in the cases of Batangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union
v.Young, et al. And San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v.
Ministryof Labor and Employment, et al. wherein the Court had stated
that theright to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of
acooperative who at the same time is a member and co-owner
thereof.With respect, however, to employees who are neither members
nor co-
G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992
PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP) vs. THE HONORABLE
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA,
CRUZ, J.:
There was muffled excitement among the workers of the
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) because its collective
bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers
and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on
April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the
negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.
The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990, when the
Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for
certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the
employees in the bargaining unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or
eleven days after the petition.
On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the
Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.
Still another petition for certification election was filed by the
Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990.
The consent signatures were submitted on May 11, 1990, or thirty-five
days after the filing of the petition.
The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for
joint decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on
the ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in
Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as
follows:
In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise
where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is
questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor organization,
the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by
secret ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the
collective bargaining agreement and supported by the written consent of
at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining
unit. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall
be dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be
satisfied upon the filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be
dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance
with the requirement for the 25% consent signatures at the time of filing.
This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5,
1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions. 1
PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990,
arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the written
consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification
election. The principal petitioners did not appeal. On August 21, 1990,
DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the
Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP's appeal. 2
Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, which was concluded on September 28,
1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a majority of the workers in
the bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and subsequently
registered with the DOLE.
PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the public respondent in the application of Article 256 of the
Labor Code. The article provides in part as follows:
Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. —
In organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified
petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five (25%)
percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .
The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter
should automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition is
supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA
and PEALU substantially complied with the law when they submitted the
required consent signatures several days after filing the petition. The
petitioner complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification
election, including its own petition for intervention, had the effect of
indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the ICTSI employees.
Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was
based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as implemented by Section 6, Rule
V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under
Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, decisions of the
Secretary in certification election cases shall be final and unappealable.
ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v.
Inciong: 3
We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the Solicitor General,
while the petition of TUPAS for a certification election may have the
written support of 30 per cent of all the workers of the bargaining unit, it is
also an undisputed fact that UMI (the rival union of TUPAS) has a clear
majority of the said workers, as shown by the fact that 499 workers out of
the total working force of 641 have not only ratified the collective
bargaining agreement concluded between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also
affirmed their membership in UMI so that there is no more need for
holding a certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)
For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in these
proceedings in view of the lack of consent signatures in its petition, and
argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to represent SAMADA
or PEALU, which had not appealed. The private respondent also invokes
Tupas and maintains that the ratification of the new CBA by the majority
of the workers was an affirmation of their membership in the union that
negotiated that agreement.
In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the
petitioner that there has been substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law. He submits that Article 256 should be liberally
interpreted pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code, stating as follows:
Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties in their
respective pleadings and finds for the petitioner.
We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision
guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and collective
bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of this Court" has been
"to require a certification election as the best means of ascertaining which
labor organization should be the collective bargaining representative." 4
The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method
by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their
representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are
working. 5 As we stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 6 the
holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented.
This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local
101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines vs.
Trajano: 7
. . . it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is
indisputably partial to the holding of a certification election so as to arrive
in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor
organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit.
Conformably to said basic concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau
of Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion, may order a
certification election notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30%
requirement. (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85 SCRA
494 [1978]; Vicmico Industrial Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569
[1984])
In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule
requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures
upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly
applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of
the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in
Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why
the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly,
we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within
the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the
holding of a certification election, 8 subject to the submission of the
consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.
This interpretation is consonant with Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,9where we declared:
. . . even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the labor
force asking for a certification election had not been strictly complied with,
respondent Director is still empowered to order that it be held precisely
for the purpose of ascertaining which (of the contending labor
organizations) shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative.
(National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et al., 83 SCRA 607)
It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry
the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not
applicable to a petition in intervention. We so held in PAFLU v. Ferrer-
Calleja thus: 10
It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite
written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit
applies to petitioners for certification election only and not to motions for
intervention. . . . As long as the motion for intervention has been properly
and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to
anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose
of the Motion for Intervention is to participate in the Certification Election.
After all, the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.
The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the principal
petitioners which had not appealed the dismissal order is also not
acceptable. We repeat that the certification election is not litigation but a
mere investigation of a non-adversary character where the rules of
procedure are not strictly applied. 11 Technical rules and objections
should not hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union that has
the support of confidence of the majority of the workers and is thus
entitled to represent them in their dealings with management.
The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for
the holding of the election although it was initially only an intervenor. That
recognition should not be defeated by the circumstance that the other
petitioning unions have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal of their
petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is in fact being
reversed here. The petition for intervention was viable at the time it was
filed because the principal petitions had complied with the requirement
for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its
intervention should not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or
failure to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.
It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a
petition for intervention should be deemed automatically dismissed where
the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be
allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real representative of
the workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-organization and
collective bargaining.
Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents,
the Court has modified that decision in Associated Labor Unions vs.
Calleja, 12 where we held:
Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent
Director on the ground that "the ratification of the collective bargaining
agreement renders the certification election moot and academic."
This contention finds no basis in law.
The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule
where the law prohibits the holding of certification elections during the
lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said agreement was
hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid the
holding of a certification election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the
need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be imperative. 13 Subject to
this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the authorized
representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a
more certain indication of the will of the workers. As we stated
in Philippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, 14 any stability
that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the
law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their real
representative.
The private respondents contend that the overwhelming
ratification of the CBA is an affirmation of their membership in the
bargaining agent, rendering the representation issue moot and academic
and conclusively barring the holding of a certification election thereon.
That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say that the mere
ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers signified their
affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. That case required,
first, ratification of the CBA, the second, affirmation of membership in the
negotiating union. The second requirement has not been established in
the case at bar as the record does not show that the majority of the
workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with
APCWU.
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing
the Labor Code provides that the representation case shall not be
adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during
the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the
representation case. As the new CBA was entered into at the time when
the representation case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be
recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.
On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on
certification election is final and inappealable, this Court held in San
Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor 15 that:
It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power
in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. (73,
C.J.S. 506, note 56). . . . judicial review is proper in case of lack of
jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion. error of law, fraud or collusion
(Timbancaya v. Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v. Secretary of Public
Works and Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion,
59 Phil. 440).
There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents when they
dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent
signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The
issue of majority representation thus remains open and awaits settlement.
Following the rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-
concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding of a certification
election.
It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification
election, in which event the new CBA it concluded with ICTSI will be
upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another union will be
chosen, in which event it will have to enter into its own negotiations with
ICTSI that may result in the adoption of a new CBA. In the meantime,
however, the old CBA having expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules
regulating the relations of the workers with the management. For this
reason, the Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and
APCWU shall remain effective between the parties, subject to the result
and effects of the certification election to be called.
The certification election is the best method of determining the
will of the workers on the crucial question of who shall represent them in
their negotiations with the management for a collective bargaining
agreement that will best protect and promote their interests. It is essential
that there be no collusion against this objective between an unscrupulous
management and a union covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty
to labor, or at least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated because of its
representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval and support. It
is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation
of the workers be resolved in favor of the holding of the certification
election. This is preferable to the suppression of the voice of the workers
through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure
over substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order
dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the public
respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold certification election among
the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc., this to
be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.