RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |1
RULE 83: INVENTORY AND APPRAISAL PROVISION FOR
SUPPORT OF FAMILY
1. G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987
PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE
SANTERO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR,
RODRIGO, ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO,
and REYNALDO EVARISTO, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of PABLO SANTERO,
respondents.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for certiorari which questions the order of the
respondent court granting the Motion for Allowance filed by
private respondents.
Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and
Winy Santero are the children begotten by the late Pablo
Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents
Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are
four of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo Santero
with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children
of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was
married to their father Pablo. Pablo Santero in turn, who died on
November 30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual
Santero who died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
who died in 1976.
Meanwhile before We could act on the instant petition private
respondents filed another Motion for Allowance to include
Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children
of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz which was granted
by the respondent court.
On September 10, 1985, an Amended Order was issued by
respondent Court directing Anselma Diaz to submit her
clarification or explanation as to the additional three (3) children
of Anselma Diaz included in the motion. In compliance therewith
Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating among others that
in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as
represented by the mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the
motion for support and her first three (3) children who were then
of age should have been included since all her children have the
right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares
in the inheritance of Pablo Santero under Art. 188, of the New
Civil Code.
ISSUE:
WON the additional children which were of age are entitled to
receive support? Basis?
RULING:
The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New
Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading
as follows:
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
according tothe social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be
supported until he completes his education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be
given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the
liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to
them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount
received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining
to them.
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed,
or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the
determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor
or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code
gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance
from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil
Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the
children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the
estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule
83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it
noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be
the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the
mothers of the children here).
2. G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO
SEBIAL. BENJAMINA SEBIAL, petitioner-appellee, vs.
ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF
BALBINA SEBIAL, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu.
According to the appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife
Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919, begot three
children named Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his second
wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in 1927, he
supposedly begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina,
Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano.
On June 17, 1960 Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu a verified petition for the settlement of Gelacio
Sebial's estate. She prayed that she be appointed as
administratrix. Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the
ground that the estate of Gelacio Sebial had already been
partitioned among his children. In a supplemental opposition the
children of the first marriage contended that the remedy of
Benjamina Sebial was an action to rescind the partition.
After hearing, Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found that
the alleged partition of the decedent's estate was invalid and
ineffective. Letters of administration were issued to Benjamina
Sebial on January 19, 1961. On the same date, a notice to
creditors was issued. The oppositors moved for the
reconsideration but the same was denied.
The oppositors filed on March 16, 1961 a motion to terminate
the administration proceeding on the grounds that the
decedent's estate was valued at less than six thousand pesos
and that it had already been partitioned and, therefore, there
was no necessity for the administration proceeding.
On April 27, 1961 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and
appraisal of the decedent's estate allegedly consisting of seven
unregistered parcels of land.
On May 6, 1961, the administratrix filed a motion to require
Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the spouses Roberta
Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her the four parcels of
land.
On June 24, 1961 the probate court issued an order suspending
action on the pending incidents in view of the possibility of an
amicable settlement. It ordered the parties to prepare a
complete list of the properties belonging to the decedent, with a
segregation of the properties belonging to each marriage.
On November 11, 1961 the oppositors submitted their own
inventory of the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia
Manikis, consisting of two parcels of land. They alleged that the
conjugal estate of Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted
of only one parcel of land allegedly purchased with money
coming from the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia
Manikis. They further alleged that the said seven- hectare land
was sold by the children of the second marriage to Eduardo
Cortado.

The oppositors claimed that the aforementioned two parcels of
land acquired during the first marriage were partitioned in 1945
among (1) Roberta Sebial, (2) Juliano Sebial, (3) Francisco
Sebial as the representative of the estate of Balbina Sebial and
(4) Valentina Sebial as the representative of the six children of
the second marriage, some of whom were minors. They clarified
that under that partition the three children of the first marriage
received a three-fourths share while the six children of second
marriage received a one-fourth share. They also alleged that
Eduardo Cortado, Emilio Sialongo, Lorenzo Rematado and
Lazaro Recuelo were the third persons involved in the transfer
of the lands pertaining to the estate of Gelacio Sebial. To the
inventory submitted by the oppositors, the administratrix filed an
opposition.
In an order dated November 11, 1961 the lower court
inexplicably required the administratrix to submit another
inventory. In compliance, she reproduced her inventory dated
April 17, 1961 and added two other items, namely, two houses
allegedly valued at P8,000 and the fruits of the properties
amounting to P5,000 allegedly received by the children of the
first marriage. The oppositor interposed an opposition to the said
inventory.
The lower court approved the second inventory dated
November, 7, 1961 because there was allegedly a "prima facie
evidence to show that" the seven parcels of land and two houses
listed therein belonged to the decedent's estate. In another
order, it allowed the delivery to the administratrix of certain
parcels of land and it directed that the heirs of Gelacio Sebial,
who are in possession of said parcels of land to deliver those
properties to her and to not disturb her in her possession and
administration of the same.
ISSUE 1:
WON the probate court has jurisdiction to approve the inventory
made by the administratrix despite the fact that it was filed 3
months from the date of her appointment? YES.
RULING:
The three-month period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83
(formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After
the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of
First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's estate and
retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact
that an inventory was filed after the three-month period would
not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it.
However, an administrator's unexplained delay in filing the
inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2, Rule 82,
Rules of Court).
ISSUE 2:
Oppositors contend that the value of the decedent's estate is
less than five thousand pesos and he had no debts; hence, the
estate could be settled summarily under section 2, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court or that an administration proceeding was not
necessary. Is the contention proper? NO.
RULING:
While in the verified petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, it was alleged that the gross value of the
decedent's estate was "not more than five thousand pesos", in
the amended inventory the valuation was P17,000. Indeed, one
of the lower court's omissions was its failure to ascertain by
preponderance of evidence the actual value of the estate, if
there was still an estate to be administered. The approval of the
amended inventory was not such a determination.
No useful purpose would be served by dismissing the petition
herein and ordering that a new petition for summary settlement
be filed. Inasmuch as a regular administrator had been
appointed and a notice to creditors had been issued and no
RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |2
claims were filed, the probate court could still proceed summarily
and expeditiously to terminate the proceeding. With the
cooperation of the lawyers of the parties, it should strive to effect
an amicable settlement of the case (See arts. 222 and 2029,
Civil Code).
If the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement prove fruitless,
then the probate court should ascertain what assets constituted
the estate of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to those assets and
whether the children of the second marriage (the petitioner was
a child of the second marriage and the principal oppositor was a
child of first marriage) could still have a share, howsoever small,
in the decedent's estate.
The lower court's order approving the amended inventory of
November 11, 1961, is not a conclusive determination of what
assets constituted the decedent's estate and of the valuations
thereof. Such a determination is only provisional in character
and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on
the issue of title or ownership.
ISSUE 3:
Was the order of the court directing the delivery of certain
properties to the possession of the administratrix proper? NO
RULING:
The probate court failed to receive evidence as to the ownership
of the said parcels of land. The general rule is that questions of
title to property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate
proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the
decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court
the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the
probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon.
Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the
decedent. They are third persons. The rule is that matters
affecting property under administration may be taken
cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the intestate
proceedings provided that the interests of third persons are not
prejudiced.
However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had
been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in court and
be examined under oath as to how they came into the
possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of
Court) but a separate action would be necessary to recover the
said assets (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 12 Phil. 543; Guanco vs.
Philippine National Bank, 54 Phil. 244).
The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant
contentions of the parties as to the assets of decedent's estate,
the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some
of the assets. The issue of prescription should also be
considered (see p. 84, Record on Appeal). Generally
prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership (Art. 494,
Civil Code). But from the moment that a coheir claims absolute
and exclusive ownership of the hereditary properties and denies
the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer
one of partition but that of ownership (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40
Phil. 857).
At the hearing of the petition for letters of administration some
evidence was already introduced on the assets constituting the
estate of Gelacio Sebial. The probate court should require the
parties to present further proofs on the ownership of the seven
parcels of land and the materials of the two houses enumerated
in the amended inventory of November 17, 1961, on the alleged
partition effected in 1945 and on the allegations in oppositors'
inventory dated November 7, 1961.
After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide once
and for all whether there are still any assets of the estate that
can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the requisite partition and
distribution. If the estate has no more assets and if a partition
had really been made or the action to recover the lands

transferred to third person had prescribed, it should dismiss the
intestate proceeding.
3. G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ,
Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES,
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ,
MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
FACTS:
On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will
naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his
three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond
Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash,
personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor
of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the
cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond
Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's
will. For unknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did
not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic
will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was
Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the
petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue
influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the
house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which
the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline4 — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third
persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to
deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and
payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease
of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, Edmond turned over
the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent
after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance
expenses on the estate.5
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the
probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18,
1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with
Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed a motion for the release of the
rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.
Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed
a motion for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the
distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance
with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's
motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes'
motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered
the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three
granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and
possession of the properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a
bond of P50,000.00.
ISSUE 1:
RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |3
WON the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but
before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the
authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for
the support of the testator's grandchildren? NO.
RULING:
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor
or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and
the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to
receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate
proceedings. He contends that the testator's three
granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they
are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age,
married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision
expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes the
latter's grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule
83 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children
of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the
testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and
children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and
duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even
beyond the age of majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly
limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend
it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority
or incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to
sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the
grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.
ISSUE 2:
WON the probate court has the authority to order the release of
certain properties to heirs? NO
RULING:
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of
the titles of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six
months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors.
An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to
an advance distribution of the estate.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral
charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the
titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments
to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the
date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned
order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and
obligations.
Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes
on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained.
The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid
before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires
that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to

meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was
issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried
and appraised.
RULE 84: GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
1. G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ,
Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES,
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ,
MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
FACTS: (for detailed facts, see previous case)
On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will
naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his
three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond
Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash,
personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor
of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. For unknown reasons,
Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the
probate of his father's holographic will. Four years after the
testator's death, it was Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed a
petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for
the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond which petition
was opposed by Edmond.
On November 2, 1992, the Valle Verde property was leased out
by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to
deposit the rental deposit and payments of the property.
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the
probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18,
1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with
Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed a motion for the release of the
rent payments deposited with the court. Montes opposed the
motion and concurrently filed a motion for the release of the said
rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties,
specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's
motion for release of funds but granted Montes' motion. Thus, it
ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three
granddaughters and for the delivery of the titles to and
possession of the properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Montes.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner was deprived of his right to take possession
of the properties of the estate? NO
RULING:
The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as
it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of
Court explicitly provides:
RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |4
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay
debts, and to administer estate not willed. — An executor or
administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited
with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the
probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance
expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the
real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the
release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously
cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit
an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration
before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had
deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income
from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its
succeeding rents after renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he
render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is
a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in
his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot
unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents'
properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the
expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court
as to their veracity, propriety and justness.32
2. G.R. No. L-46001 March 25, 1982
LUZ CARO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and BASILIA LAHORRA VDA. DE BENITO, AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARIO
BENITO, respondents.
FACTS:
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the
original co-owners of two parcels of land. Mario died sometime
in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his
father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed in
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon as joint administrators of Mario's estate.
On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito,
executed a deed of absolute sale of his one-third undivided
portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz
Caro, for the sum of P10,000.00. This was registered on
September 29, 1959. Subsequently, with the consent of
Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito, a subdivision title was
issued to Luz Caro.
Sometime in May 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda.
de Benito learned from an allegation in a pleading presented by
petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 508 that the latter acquired
by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third
undivided share in each of the two parcels of land. After further
verification, she sent to petitioner thru her counsel, a written offer
to redeem the said one-third undivided share dated August 25,
1966.
Inasmuch as petitioner ignored said offer, private respondent
sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 2105 entitled "Rosa
Amador Vda. de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and
mortgage and cancellation of the annotation of the sale and
mortgage involving the same parcels of land, but did not
succeed as the principal case was dismissed. Private
respondent, thus, filed the present case as an independent one
and in the trial sought to prove that as a joint administrator of the
estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as

required by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the
New Civil Code.
On the other hand, petitioner presented during the hearing of
the case secondary evidence of the service of written notice of
the intended sale to possible redemptioners in as much as the
best thereof, the written notices itself sent to and Saturnino
Benito, could not be presented for the reason that said notices
were sent to persons who were already dead when the
complaint for legal redemption was brought. Instead, the
affidavit of Benjamin Benito, executed ante litem motam,
attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were
formally notified in writing of his intention to sell his undivided
share, was presented in evidence. The deposition of Saturnino's
widow was likewise taken and introduced in evidence, wherein
she testified that she received and gave to her husband the
written notice of the intended sale but that the latter expressed
disinterest in buying the property.
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that: (a) private respondent, as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not
have the power to exercise the right of legal redemption, and (b)
Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his obligation of
furnishing written notice of the sale of his one-third undivided
portion to possible redemptioners.
On appeal, the CA held that since the right of the co-owner to
redeem in case his share be sold to a stranger arose after the
death of Mario Benito, such right did not form part of the
hereditary estate of Mario but instead was the personal right of
the heirs, one of whom is Mario's widow. Thus, it ordered to
execute a deed of redemption over the one-third share of
BENJAMIN BENITO in favor of plaintiff for herself and as
representative of the children of Mario Benito and therefrom, to
deliver said one-third share of BENJAMIN BENITO.
ISSUE:
WON respondent, as administratrix of the estate, has the power
to redeem the property? NO
RULING:
Private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to
exercise the right of legal redemption for and in behalf of the
intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as
co-administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent
to the sale of the one-third portion to petitioner cannot bind the
intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of
redemption was not within the powers of administration, in the
same manner, private respondent as co-administrator has no
power exercise the right of redemption — the very power which
the Court of Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of
administration.
While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator
has the right to the possession of the real and personal estate
of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the
expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring and
defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or
right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession
and administration do not include the right of legal redemption
of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners
after the death of another, because in such case, the right of
legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the
stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of the
deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to
the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte vs. Manuel Uy and
Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526).
Private respondent cannot be considered to have brought this
action in her behalf and in behalf of the heirs of Mario Benito
because the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint
specifically stated that she brought the action in her capacity as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito.
3. OLAVE VS REYES 123 SCRA 767
RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |5
FACTS:
The petition alleged that the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is
the owner of a parcel of land situated in sitio Tibambam, barrio
Tibambam, municipality of Sigaboy (now Governor Generoso),
province of Davao, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-27 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao Province. On April
1965 herein private respondent Southwest Agricultural
Marketing Corporation (SAMCO), as plaintiff, filed against
Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their
capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute
Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness of
P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02 (Civil Case No.
4623). Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute in said Civil Case,
filed an answer denying their lack of knowledge and questioning
the legality of the claim of SAMCO.
On October 25, 1966 in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, issued an order directing the
administrators to secure the probate court's approval before
entering into any transaction involving the seventeen (17) titles
of the estate, of which the property described in OCT No. 0-27
is one of them.
On October 20, 1967, the parties in Civil Case No. 4623 of the
Court of First Instance of Davao, submitted to the respondent
court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate
covered by OCT No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed and ceded to
SAMCO as payment of its claim; that the said Amicable
Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not submitted
to and approved by the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch IV, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor notice thereof made to
the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.
That on November 10, 1967, respondent court, despite the
opposition of the other parties who sought to intervene in Civil
Case No. 4623 and despite the utter lack of approval of the
probate court in Manila, APPROVED the said Amicable
Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court
decision which, in effect, ceded the property covered by OCT
No. 0-27 to SAMCO in payment of its claim; and, that if the said
Order of respondent dated November 10, 1967 is not set aside,
the same will operate as a judgment that "conveys illegally and
unfairly, the property of petitioner-estate without the requisite
approval of the probate court of Manila, which has the sole
jurisdiction to convey this property in custodia legis of the estate.
ISSUE:
WON the amicable settlement needs to be approved by the
probate court
RULING:
YES, the amicable settlement needs to be approved by the
probate court.
The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from
a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the
administration proceedings in the CFI of Manila for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave;
and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed,
otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Section
5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of
the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of
deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator
will be able to examine each claim and determine whether
it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the
primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is
to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the
existence of the claim so that a proper and timely
arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-
rata portion in the due course of the administration,
inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate
is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no
creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them

shag share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the
deceased.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts." The law is clear that where the estate of the
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
RULE 85: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
1. HERNANDEZ VS PASCUAL GR 127165/ MAY 2 2006
(ps: mejo taas gyud ni nga case)
FACTS:
The case actually centers on two estate proceedings, that of
Doña Adela Pascual (Doña Adela) and the other, her husband
Don Andres Pascual’s (Don Andres), who predeceased her.
Don Andres died intestate, while Doña Adela left behind a last
will and testament.
On 1 December 1973, an intestate proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of Don Andres was
commenced by his widow Doña Adela before the then Court of
First Instance. Apart from his wife, who bore him no children,
Don Andres was survived by several nephews and nieces from
his full-blood and half-blood brothers. This proceeding proved to
be the source of many controversies, owing to the attempts of
siblings Olivia and Hermes Pascual, acknowledged natural
children of Don Andres’s brother, Eligio, to be recognized as
heirs of Don Andres. Olivia and Hermes Pascual procured the
initial support of Doña Adela to their claims.
However, on 16 October 1985, the other heirs of Don Andres
entered into a Compromise Agreement overthe objections of
Olivia and Hermes Pascual, whereby three-fourths (3/4) of the
estate would go to Doña Adela and one-fourth (1/4) to the other
heirs of Don Andres, without prejudice to the final determination
by the court or another compromise agreement as regards the
claims of Olivia and Hermes Pascual. Subsequently, the
Intestate Court denied the claims of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.
Said denial was eventually affirmed by this Court in 1992 in
Pascual v.Pascual-Bautista, applying Article 992 of the
CivilCode.
Doña Adela died on 18 August 1987, leaving behind a last will
and testament executed in 1978, designating Olivia Pascual as
the executrix, as well as the principal beneficiary of her estate.
The will also bequeathed several legacies and devises to
several individuals and institutions. Olivia Pascual then engaged
the services of petitioner in connection with the settlement of the
estate of Doña Adela. Their agreement as to the professional
fees due to petitioner is contained in a letter dated 25 August
1987, signed by Atty. Esteban Salonga in behalf of petitioner
and Olivia Pascual. It is stipulated therein, among others, that
the final professional fee “shall be 3% of the total gross estate
as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved
inventory of the estate. Fruits shall be reckoned from the time of
[Olivia Pascual’s] appointment as executrix of the estate. The
3% final fee shall be payable upon approval by the court of the
agreement for the distribution of the properties to the court
designate d heirs of the estate”.
There was an opposition filed by one Miguel Cornejo, Jr. After
due trial, on 1 July1993, the Probate Court rendered a decision
allowing probate of the 1978 Last Will and Testament of Doña
Adela and disallowing the purported 1985 Will alleged by the
oppositor. Letters testamentary were issued to Olivia Pascual.
RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |6
This was followed by another Order, dated 11 November 1993,
wherein it was directed “that notice be x x x given, requiring all
persons having claims for money against the decedent, Doña
Adela S. Vda. de Pascual, arising from contracts, express
orimplied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, for
funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said
decedent, and judgment for money against her, to file said
claims with the Clerk of Court at Malabon.
It was at this stage, that the Intestate Court rendered a Decision
in Sp. Proc. No. 7554, fi nally giving judicial approval to the
aforementioned 1985 Compromise Agreement, and partitioning
the estate of Don Andres by adjudicating one-fourth (1/4)thereof
to the heirs of Don Andres and three -fourths (3/4) thereof to the
estate of Doña Adela. The Intestate Court also awarded
attorney’s fees to Atty. Jesus I.Santos, equivalent to 15% of the
three-fourths (3/4) share of the estate of Doña Adela. Olivia
Pascual filed a petition for annulment of the award of attorney’s
fees with the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied, first
by the appellate court, then finally by this Court in its 1998
decision in Pascual v. Court of Appeals.
On 26 April 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Writ of Execution
for the partial execution of petitioner’s attorney’s lien estimated
at P1,198,097.02. The figure, characterized as “tentative,” was
arrived at based on a Motion to Submit Project Partition. This
sum was in turn derived from the alleged value of the total estate
of Don Andres, three-fourths (3/4) of which had been
adjudicated to Doña Adela. At the same time, petitioner noted
that the stated values must be considered as only provisional,
considering that they were based on a July 1988 appraisal
report; thus, the claim for execution was, according to petitioner,
without prejudice to an updated appraisal of the properties
comprising the gross estate of Doña Adela.
On 29 April 1994, Olivia Pascual, through Atty. Antonio Ravelo,
filed her comment and/or opposition to the motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution on attorney’s fees. She argued
that a lawyer of an administrator or executor should charge the
individual client, not the estate, for professional fees. On 2 June
1994, the Probate Court issued the first assailed order denying
the motion for writ of execution in view of the fact that “the bulk
of the estate of the late Doña Adela S. V da. De Pascual is still
tied -up with the estate of the late Don Andres Pascual, the
proceedings over which and the final disposition thereof with
respect to the partitionand segregation of what is to form part of
the estate of the late Doña Adela S. Vda. De Pascual is pending
with another court On 14 November 1994, Olivia Pascual, filed
with the Probate Court a Motion to Declare General Default and
Distribution of Testamentary Dispositions with Cancellation of
Administrator’s Bond. It was noted therein that no creditor had
filed a claim against the estate of Doña Adela despite due notice
published pursuant to Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The Probate Court was also informed of the fact that the
proceedings before the Intestate Court had already been
terminated.
In response, petitioner filed a Comment/Manifestation praying,
among others, a writ of partial execution be issued for the
satisfaction of the attorney’s lien, without prejudice to the
issuance of a writ of execution after the re appraisal of the
present market value of the estate and the determination of the
amount due to petitioner as attorney’s fees.
On 17 March 1995, the Probate Court issued an order which
denied petitioner’s motion for a re appraisal of the property and
the issuance of a partial writ of execution “for being prematurely
filed as there is no exact estate yet to be inventoried and re-
appraised, assuming re-appraisal would be proper, because the
bulk of the estate subject of this case, as far as this court is
concerned, has not yet been turned over to the executrix or to
the court itself.” Likewise, petitioner filed an appeal at Court of
Appeals. However, CA affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a lawyer who renders legal services to the
executor or administrator of an estate can claim attorney's fees
against the estate instead of the executor or administrator.
RULING:
As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is
primarily liable for attorney's fees due to the lawyer who
rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in
relation to the settlement of the estate. The executor or
administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the
sums paid in attorney's fees if it can be shown that the services
of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate. However, if
the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees,
the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file
an action against the executor or administrator, but in his /her
personal capacity and not as administrator or executor. Second,
the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate
proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney's
fees as an expense of administration. If the second mode is
resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and
interested parties be made so as to enable these persons to
inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the
necessity of his employment. However, said notice was not
made by the petitioner.
The character of such claim for attorney's fees partakes the
nature of an administration expense. Administration expenses
include attorney's fees incurred in connection with the
administration of the estate. It is an expense attending the
accomplishment of the purpose of administration growing out of
the contract or obligation entered into by the personal
representative of the estate, and thus the claim for
reimbursement must be superior to the rights of the
beneficiaries.
Hence, in order not to unduly protract further the settlement of
the estate of Doa Adela, the Court deems it proper instead to
mandate the Probate Court to treat the Motion for Writ of
Immediate Execution as a petition seeking a court order to direct
the payment of attorney’s fees as expenses of administration,
but subject to the condition that petitioner give due notice to the
other designated devisees and legatees so designated in the will
of the claim prior to the requisite hearing thereon. Petitioner may
as well seize such opportunity to formally amend or reconfigure
its motion to a petition to direct payment of attorney’s fees. Once
this step is accomplished, there should be no impediment to
petitioners claim for recovery of attorney’s fees as
reimbursement for necessary administration expenses, within
the terms established by law, jurisprudence, and this decision.
One final note, Petitioner’s final prayer before this court is that
it be issued a partial writ of execution, consistent with its position
before the Probate Court that it is already entitled to at least a
partial payment of its attorney’s fees. This prayer cannot
obviously be granted at this stage by the Court, considering the
fatal absence of due notice to the other designated beneficiaries
to the estate of Doa Adela. Still, we do not doubt that the
Probate Court, within its discretion, is capacitated to render the
award of attorney’s fees as administration expenses either
partially or provisionally, depending on the particular
circumstances and its ultimate basis for the determination of the
appropriate attorney’s fees.
2. TESTATE ESTATE OF TUMANG GR L-50277
FACTS:
In Special Proceeding no. 1953 involving the estate of the late
Dominador Tumang, his wife, Magdalena Tumang, who is also
the adminstratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to
declare the testate proceedings definitely terminated and closed
with respect to her and her two children, Melba and Nestor. The
petition was premised on the claim that the said heirs have
already received the properties adjudicated to them and that to
be able to transfer the said properties in their names, there
should be an order from the court declaring that the testate
proceedings closed with regard to the said heirs. The petition
RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |7
was opposed by Guia T. Laguio, another child of Magdalena, on
the ground that not all the properties adjudicated to them have
been delivered and that there could not be a partial termination
of the proceedings. Magdalena, the administratrix withdrew the
petition.
In the hearing of the motion to withdraw the petition, the
administratrix submitted a pleading alleging to show that the
attached receipts showed that the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes have been paid and that there is a certification
from the deputy clerk of court that there is no claim that there
are still properties not given to Guia and to her minor children,
and that the Guia had received the properties as well as the
dividends from the shares of stock, as shown in the projects of
partition. In this action, Guia also asked the court to require the
admninistratrix to render an accounting of her administration of
the estate. The lower court ruled in favor of the administratrix
and held that there is no need to render an accounting because
the final accounting of the administratrix had already been
approved. Guia filed an MR but it was denied, the court held that
Guia’s acceptance of the cash dividends constituted a waiver
on her part to question the correctness of the accounting filed by
the administratrix.
ISSUE:
WON the court should have required the administratrix to render
an accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the
approval of her final accounting?
RULING:
YES. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or
administrator shall render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration * * *, and be shall render such further accounts
as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."
In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to
be in order, in view of the fact that the dividends sought to be
accounted for are not included in the final accounts rendered by
the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the parties will
be better served and the conflict between petitioners and
respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is
made. Further, "it has been held that an executor or
administrator who receives assets of the estate after he has filed
on account should file a supplementary account thereof, and
may be compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect to
matters occurring after the settlement of final account that
representatives will be compelled to file supplementary
account."
SC held that the executor/administrator should account for his
receipts and disbursements subsequent to his last accounting.
As to the alleged waiver, SC held that the said acceptance does
not constitute a waiver. The duty of an executor or administrator
to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration
proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It is a duty that
has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the
administration is finally ordered closed and terminated, to the
end that no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted for.
The fact that the final accounts had been approved does not
divest the court of jurisdiction to require supplemental
accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the Rules
provide that "he shall render such further accounts as the court
may require until the estate is wholly settled."
3. ALBERTO F. LACSON VS HON. LUIS R. REYES
GR NO. 86250, FEBRUARY 26, 1990
FACTS:
On August 26, 1987, the private respondent, Ephraim Serquina,
petitioned the respondent court for the probate of the last will
and testament of Carmelita Farlin. He also petitioned the court

in his capacity as counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners,
and as executor under the will. The petition was not opposed
and hence, on November 17, 1987, the respondent court issued
a "certificate of allowance"
On March 14, 1988, Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for
attorney's fees" against the petitioners, alleging that the heirs
had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the
sum of P68,000.00.
Thereafter summonses were served upon the heirs "as if it were
a complaint against said heirs" directing them to answer the
motion.
After pre-trial, the respondent court rendered judgment directing
the respondent heirs (herein petitioners) to pay their lawyer the
sum of P65,000.00 as true and reasonable attorney's fees which
shall be a lien on the subject properties.
On December 5, 1988, the respondent court issued an order
granting execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court gravely abused its
discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to the provisions
of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes. It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently an
executor of a will is barred from recovering attorney's fees from
the estate. The Rule is specifically as follows:
SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or
administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney.
Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. —
An executor or administrator shall be allowed the necessary
expenses in the care, management and settlement of the estate,
and for his services, four pesos per day for the time actually and
necessarily employed, or a commission upon the value of so
much of the estate as comes into his possession and is finally
disposed of by him in the payment of debts, expenses, legacies,
or distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or devisees, of
two per centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value,
one per centum of so much of such value as exceeds five
thousand pesos and does not exceed thirty thousand pesos,
one-half per centumof so much of such value as exceeds thirty
thousand pesos and does not exceed one hundred thousand
pesos, and one-quarter per centum of so much of such value as
exceeds one hundred thousand pesos. But in any special case,
where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended
with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity
on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may
be allowed. If objection to the fees allowed be taken, the
allowance may be reexamined on appeal.
If there are two or more executors or administrators, the
compensation shall be apportioned among them by the court
according to the services actually rendered by them
respectively.
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not
charge against the estate any professional fees for legal
services rendered by him.
When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the
compensation of his executor, that provision shall be a full
satisfaction for his services unless by a written instrument filed
in the court he renounces all claim to the compensation provided
by the will.
The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor may
be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as
such, but he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate. His
compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in
the nature of executor's or administrator's commissions, and
never as attorney's fees. In one case, we held that "a greater
sum [other than that established by the rule] may be allowed 'in
RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |8
any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement
has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high
degree of capacity on the part of the executor or
administrator.'" It is also left to the sound discretion of the
court. With respect to attorney's fees, the rule, as we have seen,
disallows them. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court set
aside the sum of P65,000.00 as and for Mr. Serquina's
attorney's fees, to operate as a "lien on the subject
properties," the trial judge must be said to have gravely abused
its discretion (apart from the fact that it never acquired
jurisdiction, in the first place, to act on said Mr. Serquina's
"motion for attorney's fees").
The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders attorney's
fees? We have held that a lawyer of an administrator or executor
may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his
client. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is himself the
counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor.
In that connection, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual
damages, which must be duly proved. They are also subject to
certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be reasonable, that is to
say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject
matter in controversy; (2) the extent of the services rendered;
and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. In all cases, they
must be addressed in a full-blown trial and not on the bare word
of the parties. And always, they are subject to the moderating
hand of the courts.
4. [G.R. No. 2370. December 12, 1905. ]
MARIANO ESCUETA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEON SY
JUILLIONG, Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS;
LAWYERS’ FEES. — One B died intestate, leaving an estate of
about 46,000 pesos consisting principally of his share in his
father’s estate, yet undivided. Held, That the settlement of B’s
estate in court was not so far unnecessary that a lawyer who
had advised it could not recover for his services and expenses
therein.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENTATION OF CLAIM. — The claim for
such services, having arisen after the death of the intestate,
cannot be presented to the committee appointed in the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate, for the allowance of
claims against it.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; — ACTION FOR FEES. An action cannot be
maintained by the lawyer in such case to recover for his services
against the administrator as such. The creditor’s remedy is
either an action against the administrator as an individual or a
petition to the court in the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate to have the claim allowed as an expense of
administration.
FACTS:
In Manila, 21 February 1902, Joaquin Martinez Sy-Tiongtay
executed his last will, whereby he disposed of an estate of
212,862 pesos among his five children, Carlos Pabia,
Baldomero (the mother of these two being Chan-Sinnin), Felipa,
Manuel, and Faustina (the mother of these three being Ana
Cuanci). Apparently the testator’s business was connected with
shipping interests. He afterwards died, the exact date of his
death not appearing in the record, and Sy-Giang was appointed
his executor and at the time this case arose was in possession
of the property left by the deceased. After the death of his father
his son and her, Baldomero, died, leaving no will, and leaving as
his only heirs his brothers and sisters above named. When
Baldomero died the property left by his father had not been
divided, and he had an interest therein.
After the death of Baldomero, Carlos Pabia, his brother,
employed the plaintiff, who is a lawyer, to procure the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of Baldomero and
to attend to the settlement of that estate in the Court of First

Instance. The plaintiff, by virtue of such employment, performed
services and expended money in procuring the appointment of
the administrator, and in other work connected with the
settlement of the estate. The person appointed as administrator
of the estate of Baldomero was Carlos Pabia. Carlos Pabia died
in the month of February, 1904, and the defendant was
appointed administrator of the estate of Baldomero in
succession to said Carlos, and this action was commenced
against the defendant in his capacity as administrator of said
estate, to recover the value of such services and the money so
expended.
The court below entered judgment in favor of the defendant on
the ground that the services rendered by plaintiff were entirely
unnecessary; and that there was no occasion for the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of Baldomero.
We cannot agree with this opinion.
Baldomero left an estate of about 46,000 pesos. Almost all of it
consisted of his interest in his father’s estate. This estate had
not been divided and was in the hands of the executor of that
estate. It appeared from the evidence that this executor refused
to deliver any of the property to the administrator of the estate
of Baldomero, or to the heirs of the latter. It also appears that
the question as to whom such heirs are as now in litigation in
court. Under these circumstances it seems to us that the
appointment of an administrator and the settlement of
Baldomero’s estate in the probate court was necessary. The
final decree rendered in the proceeding under the provisions of
section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be a
determination of the question as to who the heirs of Baldomero
were, and when such decree was presented to Sy-Giang, the
executor of the estate of the father, he would be obliged to
deliver the interest of Baldomero to the persons named in that
decree.
Moreover, in a case where there is an estate of 46,000 pesos,
and there are no known debts, if not necessary it is at least
extremely advisable that an administrator be appointed and the
estate regularly administered in the Court of First Instance,
exercising its probate jurisdiction, for the purpose of having the
fact that there are no debts conclusively determined. When an
estate is regularly administered in the Court of First Instance,
and commissioners appointed before whom claims must be
presented within the time fixed in the order, they are by law, with
some few exceptions, barred unless so presented. This time
may be limited by the court to six months. It is important to the
heirs of an estate to know as soon after the death of the intestate
as possible what claims exist against it. If they then know that
demands are made against it, they have an opportunity to
ascertain the facts relating to such demands when evidence
concerning their validity can be easily obtained. Unfounded
claims in such cases can be more easily defeated than they
could if they were presented several years after the death of the
intestate.
So far from the services of the plaintiff being unnecessary in this
case, we think that he acted wisely in advising his client that the
estate of Baldomero should be regularly administered in court,
and we think he has a claim for the amount of money he
expended on account of the estate, and for the reasonable value
of his services.
The question remains, however, against whom this claim can be
enforced by him. The claim or cause of action arose after the
death of Baldomero. It was therefore not a proper claim to be
presented before the commissioners appointed in Baldomero’s
estate. (Philippine Trading Company, Ltd., v. Crossfield, Judge.
1)
The contract which the plaintiff made was made with Carlos
Pabia. If it was made with Carlos Pabia as an individual, then
the plaintiff’s cause of action is against him.
RULE 83 to RULE 85 – CASE DIGEST |9
If it was made with Carlos Pabia as the administrator of the
estate of Baldomero, the question arises:
ISSUE:
A. whether such a contract imposes any direct liability upon the
estate which the creditor can enforce by an action;
B. whether he can secure a judgment which will be binding and
conclusively upon the estate and upon all the persons interested
therein.
RULING:
The provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure relating
to the settlement of estates of deceased persons are taken from
similar provisions in the United States.
There the decisions, which are numerous, are practically
unanimous in holding that in a case like the present, the contract
made between the administrator and the lawyer does not bind
and estate to such an extent that the lawyer can maintain an
action against it and recover a judgment which is binding upon
it.
In such a case the creditor has two remedies: (1) He can
prosecute an action against the administrator as an individual. If
judgment is rendered against the administrator and it is paid by
him, when he presents his final account to the Court of First
Instance as such administrator he can include the amount so
paid as an expense of administration.
(2)The creditor can also present a petition in the proceeding
relating to the settlement of the estate, asking that the court,
after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct
the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration.
Whichever course is adopted the heirs and other persons
interested in the estate will have a right to inquire into the
necessity for making the contract and the value of the work
performed by the attorney.
If Carlos Pabia were now alive the plaintiff might have a right of
action against him, but under the rule above stated he has no
right of action against the present defendant, because he (the
present defendant) is not in any way connected with Carlos
Pabia. He is not his executor or administrator. The estate which
he present defendant represents is the estate of Baldomero, and
against that estate, as we have seen, an ordinary action cannot
be maintained by the plaintiff.
The court below ordered the action to be dismissed. This
judgment should be modified so as to provide that the dismissal
should be without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to
prosecute his claim against the person responsible therefor, or
to make an application in the proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of Baldomero for its allowance and payment. As so
modified the judgment is affirmed. No costs will be allowed in
this court, and after the expiration of twenty days let judgment
be entered in accordance herewith and the case be returned to
the court below for execution of said judgment. So ordered.
5. G.R. No. L-19722. February 28, 1966.
TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED. DR.
PATRICIO BELTRAN, Special Administrator, ATTY.
FLORENCIO L. ALBINO, movant-appellee, v. TOMAS L.
BORROMEO and AMELIA BORROMEO, Oppositors-
Appellants.
1. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS;
ATTORNEYS FEES FOR SERVICES TO ADMINISTRATOR,
WHEN CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE ESTATE. — The rule is
that for attorney’s fees for services rendered to an administrator
to be chargeable against the estate such services must have
been so rendered to assist him in the execution of his trust. Even
then, the attorney cannot hold the estate directly liable for his
fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and
not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the
executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to
 R U L E 8 3 t o R U L E 8 5 – C A S E D I G E S T | 10
the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to reimbursement. (Uy
Tioco v. Imperial and Panis, 53 Phil. 802, 805).
FACTS:
In special proceeding No. 916-R of the CFI Cebu, Jose H.
Junquera was appointed special administrator of the testate
estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo.
Teofilo Borromeo and Crispin Borromeo, who were oppositors
to the probate of the will, moved for Junquera’s removal on
January 2, 1953 on the ground that he has failed and refused to
file an inventory of the estate. After hearing the motion was
granted by the court in an order dated June 9, 1953, from which
order Junquera appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
thereafter certified the appeal to US.
On September 23, 1953 the trial court appointed Dr. Patricio
Beltran special administrator "in the interim that the order for the
removal (of Junquera) is on appeal".
On February 19, 1955 Beltran, without specific authority from
the court, cabled Attorney Florencio L. Albino in Manila
appointing him as his lawyer in the appealed case, particularly
in connection with the hearing scheduled in the Court of
Appeals. Albino appeared before said court and filed a written
memorandum in behalf of Beltran.
On August 22, 1956 Attorney Albino filed a motion in the lower
court praying that his fees be fixed at P4,000.00 and that
Beltran, as special administrator, be ordered to pay the same to
him. Junquera opposed the motion, but it was granted
nevertheless in the court’s order of March 26, 1957. It was then
that the instituted heirs — Thomas L. Borromeo, Amelia
Borromeo and Fortunato Borromeo — took a hand in the
incident by appealing from said order, although the appeal of
Fortunato was not allowed because it was filed out of time.
On March 4, 1958, upon motion of Attorney Albino, the lower
court ordered partial execution of the order of March 26, 1957,
and directed Beltran to pay the movant the sum of P2,000.00 be
from the funds of the estate under administration. The order was
forthwith carried out.
Appellants ask that the award of attorney’s fees be set aside;
that the partial payment of P2,000.00 be declared null and void;
and that the movant-appellee be ordered to return the same to
the estate.
ISSUE: WON the award of attorney’s fees are proper
RULING: NO
The estate should not be saddled with the payment of appellee’s
fees.
Beltran engaged appellee to defend him although his position as
special administrator was not in issue. He was not even a party
in that appeal. The order appealed from was for the removal of
Junquera as special administrator, upon motion of Crispin
Borromeo and Teofilo Borromeo, and not the order appointing
Beltran as special administrator "in the interim." There was no
need or him to appear or put up any defense for himself at the
hearing in the Court of Appeals, nor in behalf of the movants-
appellees Crispin Borromeo and Teofilo Borromeo, who were
already being represented by two reputable lawyers, namely,
Attorneys Miguel Cuenco and Numeriano Estenzo.
If Beltran had any interest at all in the outcome of that appeal it
was entirely personal to him. The rule is that for attorney’s fees
for services rendered to an administrator to be chargeable
against the estate such services must have been so rendered to
assist him in the execution of his trust. Even then, it has been
held that the attorney cannot "hold the estate directly liable for
his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator
and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the
executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to
the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to reimbursement from
the estate." (Uy Tioco v. Imperial and Panis, 53 Phil. 802, 805).
There is no showing that appellee’s employment as lawyer had
to do with Beltran’s performance of his duties; if anything, the
transcript of the record below (consisting of his own testimony)
quoted in appellant’s brief discloses certain actuations of Beltran
as special administrator that were in violation of his trust and
prejudicial to the estate.
One other point deserves to be noted in connection with the
payment to the movant-appellee of the sum of P2,000.00. Such
payment was authorized ten months after the appeal had been
taken, with the approval of the record on appeal and appeal
bond, from the order of March 26, 1957, which fixed the fees of
movant-appellee at P4,000.00. No special reasons were given
by the court for the partial execution pending appeal, and there
is no law to justify it.
6. G.R. No. L-27871 July 21, 1928
TIRSO DACANAY, administrator-appellee, vs. SILVERIO
HERNANDEZ, in his own behalf and as guardian of the
minor Maria Hernandez, EDUVIGIS HERNANDEZ, and
CARIDAD HERNANDEZ, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
Justiniano Rogero Dacanay died in Bacnotan, La Union, on May
14, 1905. He left only one legitimate child, Bienvenida Julia
Dacanay, the issue of his marriage to Maria Ronquillo, who died
on or about the year 1875. In addition to aforesaid legitimate
child, he also left three acknowledged natural children,
Herminigilda, Tirso, and Paulina Dacanay. Bienvenida married
Silverio Hernandez in the year 1886 and died on September 18,
1907, leaving three children, Eduvigis, Caridad, and Maria.
Herminigilda Dacanay died in 1919, being survived by her
husband, Gelasio Belmonte, and her children, Florencio,
Eduvigis, Maria, Isabelo, and Celestino Belmonte.
The deceased Justiniano Dacanay also left a will executed on
September 1, 1904, and in which Tirso Dacanay was named
executor. It greatly favored the natural children at the expense
of Bienvenida, the testator stating that she and been disobedient
and that he therefore felt justified in curtailing her inheritance.
The will was presented for probate shortly after the death of
Justiniano and, notwithstanding the opposition of Bienvenida
Dacanay, was duly probated on April 24, 1906. Tirso Dacanay
immediately qualified as an administrator and on March 4, 1907,
Angel Lopez, Casimiro Carbonel, and Liberato Buccat were
appointed commissioners on claims and appraisal.
The commissioner prepared and filed a final report in due time,
but no further steps were taken towards settlement of the estate
until March 19, 1913, when Judge W. E. McMahon, then
presiding the Court of First Instance of La Union, appointed Sixto
Dacanay, Casimiro Carbonel, and Liberato Buccat
commissioners for the partition of the estate among the heirs
.On May 3, 1913, these commissioners submitted a scheme of
partition in which the provision of the will were closely followed
while the law governing succession appears to have been
disregarded.
Silverio Hernandez, in representation of his deceased wife and
his children, opposed the approval of the scheme of partition,
principally on the ground that the partition of the estate assigned
to the natural children greatly exceeded the maximum shares
allowed them as acknowledged natural children by articles 806,
808, 840, et seq. of the Civil Code and correspondingly
diminished the legitimate shares of the children of Bienvenida.
Upon hearing, Judge McMahon rendered a decision in which he
among other things said:
For these reasons the court disapproves the partition made by
the commissioner dated the 13th of May, 1913, and orders that
they proceed to make a new partition of the property left by the
deceased Justininano Rogero Dacanay in conformity with the
law in such cases provided, and once having this they will submit
 R U L E 8 3 t o R U L E 8 5 – C A S E D I G E S T | 11
their report at the earliest opportunity to the Court of First
Instance of La Union for its approval.
No further action seems to have been taken by the
commissioners, but only July 8, 1915, the executor Tirso
Dacanay, presented a plan for the partition of the estate.
Another scheme of portion was submitted by Silverio Hernandez
on January 21, 1916. Both the plans submitted were
unsatisfactory to the court, but on September 23, 1916, Judge
Manuel Camus, who in the meantime have been appointed
judge of the district, rendered a carefully prepared decision in
which among other things provided for a complete and
apparently fair distribution of the estate based upon the
evidence contained in the record.
On October 3, 1916, Tirso Dacanay filed a motion for a new trial
on the ground that the decision was contrary to the evidence and
to the law. The motion was denied, and on January 27, 1917, he
filed an exception to the order denying the motion and
announced in his intention and appealing to the Supreme Court.
The appeal was duly perfected and the case was docketed in
the office of the clerk off the Supreme Court under the number
G.R. No. 12662, but on February 23, 1917, Dacanay filed a
motion for the reopening of the case on the ground that after the
record of the case had been transmitted to the Supreme Court,
he had discovered new evidence consisting in an inventory of
property alleged to have been donated to Bienvenida Julia
Dacanay on the occasion of her marriage in July, 1886.
On March 22, 1917, the Supreme Court granted the motion, set
aside Camus' decision, and ordered the case remanded to the
Court of First Instance for additional proof.
Considerable evidence was taken in regard to the authenticity
of the inventory alleged to have been newly discovered, and on
August 11, 1919, Judge J.R. Burgett, then Judge of the Court of
First Instance of La Union, rendered a decision in which he
found that the aforesaid inventory, was genuine and directed the
commissioners of petition appointed in 1913 to submit a new
scheme of partition of all the property belonging to the estate of
Justiniano Dacanay, including by collation the property
described and referred to in the document. His Honor further
directed said commissioners to be careful to follow the
instructions set forth in Judge McMahon's decision of August
14,1914, and also the rulings, findings and conclusions of Judge
Camus in his decision of September 23, 1916, in so far as these
two decisions were "not contrary to the present decision."
From this decision Silverio Hernandez appealed to this court,
but on January 15, 1920, the appeal was dismissed on the
ground that it was premature in so far as the appellant should
have awaited the termination of the partition of the property of
the estate. 2
The court approved the stipulation, rejected the scheme of
partition presented by the commissioners, and ordered the
administrator to present, with his final account, a new scheme
of partition on the basis agreed upon in the stipulation. Pursuant
to this order, the administrator on April 10, 1923, submitted a
scheme of partition according to which Bienvenida Dacanay, or
rather her successors in interest, after bringing to collation the
property described in Exhibit A-1, would owe the estate the sum
of P20.50, with the result that all the property of the estate would
go to the natural children of Justiniano Dacanay. This scheme
of partition was, of course, objected to by Silverio Hernandez,
but Judge Anastacio R. Teodoro in a decision dated August 11,
1926, overruled the objections and approved the administrator's
plan of partition. The heirs of Bienvenida Dacanay excepted to
the decision and the case is now before this court on appeal.
No regular final account was presented by the administrator, but
annual accounts for the period from July 18, 1915, until October
31, 1925, were submitted to the court. These accounts show an
income of P4,511.32 from the estate as against expenses of
administration amounting to P14,511.32, thus leaving a balance
of P10,147.80 in favor of the administrator and against the
estate. Silverio Hernandez and his daughters opposed the
approval of the accounts. Upon hearing, Judge Teodoro in a
decision dated August 6, 1926, approved the principal items of
the accounts in question but disallowed some of the minor items,
thereby reducing the amount alleged to be due the administrator
to P7,925.97. The opposing parties duly excepted to the
decision and perfected their appeal to this court where it has
been argued and considered in direct connection with the
appeal from the decision of August 11, 1926, through separate
briefs have been filed in the two appeals.
ISSUES:
a. WON The court erred in declaring that Exhibit A-1 is an
authentic document executed by the deceased Justiniano
Rogero Dacanay.
b. won the court erred in approving the scheme of partition
presented by the administrator, Tirso Dacanay.
The first assignment of error raises the principal question in the
whole controversy. It appears from the record that in the earlier
stages of the case not only the administrator but also his original
counsel seem to have been under the erroneous impression that
the admission of the will of Justiniano Dacanay to probate
validated all of its provisions as to the distribution of the estate
and that therefore Bienvenida Dacanay and her successors in
interest could not successfully claim more than the share
allotted to her by the will. This conception was probably dispelled
by the lucid and well considered decision of Judge Camus dated
September 23, 1916, and it must then have become clear to the
administrator that the devises and bequests made by the
testator in favor of the natural children could only be taken from
the one third of libre disposicion and that devises and bequests
in excess of that third would be invalid, notwithstanding the fact
that the will had been duly probated. Apparently with the object
of overcoming this difficulty, Exhibit A-1 was manufactured. As
we have already stated, that document purports to be an
inventory of property donated by Justiniano Dacanay to his
daughter Bienvenida on the occasion of her marriage to Silverio
Hernandez. The alleged total value of the property described in
the "inventory" was over P14,000 and according to the testimony
of the appellee's witness, Dionisio Garcia, it constituted the
greater part of Justiniano Dacanay's fortune. By bringing this
property and the income therefrom into collation, Bienvenida
could be very neatly excluded from further participation in the
inheritance.
That the document in question is a forgery is, in our opinion,
established beyond all doubt. It is alleged to have been
discovered in 1916 or 1917. Pedro Floresca, who at that time
was the principal public school teacher in Bacnotan and a
boarder in the house of Tirso Dacanay, testified that while there
he wrote the document from a draft furnished him by Tirso, but
that he did not write the signatures. Judge Burgett in his decision
of August 11, 1919, discredit this testimony and bases his
conclusions principally upon the "conduct, manner and
demeanor" of the witness. It must be conceded that the
testimony is somewhat confused and indicates nervousness,
but considering the interruptions and hecklings to which he was
subjected by the trial court, his nervousness is easily explained,
and but very little weight can be given the deductions draws
therefrom by the trial judge. Standing alone, the testimony might
possibly have been open to doubt, but it is corroborated by so
many circumstances that there cannot be the slightest doubt as
to its truthfulness. The body of the document, although it is dated
July 24, 1886, it is written in a Spencerian hand, and is clearly
the handwriting of Pedro Floresca as appearing in authentic
documents introduced in evidence. It is highly improbable that
the style of handwriting could have been found in Bacnotan in
1886.
But that is not all. An examination with a good lens of the alleged
signature of Justiniano Dacanay appearing at the bottom of
Exhibit A-1 shows clearly that the pen strokes are quite different
from those of the authentic signatures of Justiniano.
It is also improbable that Justiniano, who in the inventory
attached to his will claims that the property received by his wife
from Bienvenida Ronquillo was community property, should
 R U L E 8 3 t o R U L E 8 5 – C A S E D I G E S T | 12

have donated the greater part of property in his possession to
his daughter Bienvenida Dacanay. And can it be believed that if
such an important donation had been, Justiniano would have
said nothing about it in his will where he among other things says
that Bienvenida had been disobedient and that he therefore
reduced her share of the inheritance?
It is further to be noted that the document Exhibit A-1 is not in
the form usually followed during the Spanish regime. The date
of which it is alleged to have been written appears at the end of
the document instead of in the introductory clause and the town
name "Namacpacan" is written "Namagpakan" (the letter K was
not commonly in use prior to the insurrection of 1896 but was
quite generally used thereafter).
It may also be noted that the paper on which the document is
written bears indications of having been subjected to some
artificial process for the evident purpose of giving it the
appearance of age.
There are several other circumstances tending to support our
conclusions, but which we shall not take the time and space to
discuss. We may, however, call attention to Exhibits A-2 and A-
3, which were offered in evidence by the appellee for the
purpose of using them as a standard of comparison with Exhibit
A-1. They are dated January 4, 1882, and May 24, 1880,
respectively, but are signed by cross marks, a practice which
was unknown in the Philippines under the Spanish regime. The
paper used for the exhibits was identical with that used in Exhibit
A-1 and bear the same indications of artificial aging. The
documents are unquestionably forgeries.
remaining periods from July 15, 1917, until October 31, 1925,
the court below allowed the sum of P3,944 for a total number of
986 days. In view of the fact that according to the administrator's
accounts, the total income of the estate for the ten years from
July 28, 1915, to October 31, 1925, amounted only to P4,368.52,
the compensation allowed the administrator seems excessive.
We think, however, that the allowance of P1,320 for the period
from March 14, 1913, till July 14, 1917, may be sustained. But
we cannot agree with the court below in allowing the
administrator compensation for the subsequent period. The
prolongation of the settlement of the estate was due entirely to
the efforts of the administrator to defraud the legitimate heirs,
and we cannot allow him to profit by his own fraud. Moreover,
his services for the period in question would have been
unnecessary if he had not, by his fraudulent acts, prevented the
settlement of the estate. The rule is that the per
diem compensation of an administrator can only be allowed for
necessary services. For these reasons the allowance of P5,264
granted by the court below will be reduced to P1,320.
3. (E)In not holding the administrator Tirso Dacanay to be
manifestly unfit, negligent, dishonest, and acting in bad
faith in the performance of his duties as such administrator
of this testamentary estate.
4. (F) In denying the petition to have the administrator Tirso
Dacanay removed from his office.
5. (G) In approving the administrator's accounts showing a
balance of P7,925.97 against the testamentary estate and in
favor of the administrator

ISSUE 2: Assignments of error E and F are well taken and must be

As to this accounts the appellants present the following
assignment of error:
SUB-ISSUE:
The trial court erred:
1. (A) In finding the items of attorney's fees to be legitimate
expenses of the administration, and approving said items.
Assignment of error A is, in our opinion, well taken. The
attorney's fees referred to are entered as follows in the accounts
for the periods October 17, 1920, to December 25, 1921;
October 17, 1922, to September 12, 1923; September 12, 1923,
to October 28, 1924; and October 28, 1924, to October 31, 1925.
All of the fees relate to services rendered for the benefit of the
administrator himself and for that of the other natural children of
Justiniano Dacanay and not for the benefit of the estate.
sustained. It is difficult to find a more glaring example of bad faith
and dishonest intentions than that of the present administrator.
Having been unfaithful to his trust has no right to be retained as
administrator, and we agree with the appellant that the court
below erred in not moving him from office.
From what has been said in the foregoing discussion, it follows
that assignment of error G must also be sustained.
According to the accounts of the administrator, the estate on
October 31, 1925, owed him the sum of P9,902.54. The total
amount of the items disallowed by us, in accordance with the
foregoing discussion, is P11,771.37. Instead of being a creditor
of the estate, the administrator is not indebted to it in the sum of
P1,868.83 plus the amount of the greater part of the shortages
found by Judge Teodoro.

"The estate cannot be held liable for the costs of counsel

fees arising out of litigation between the beneficiaries
thereof among themselves, or in the protection of the
interest of a particular persons" (Woerner on Administration,
2d ed., sec. 516, and authorities there cited). It is true that an
administrator may employ competent counsel on questions
which affects his duties as administrator and on which he is in
reasonable doubt and that reasonable expenses for such
services may be charged against the estate subject to the
approval of the court. But such is not the case here. In this case
the administrator deliberately and knowingly resorted to falsified
documents for the purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs of
the deceased and through his own breach of trust, brought on
the litigation for which he now demands reimbursement for
counsel fees. We know of no legal authority for such
reimbursement in these circumstances. The claim for P6,175 is
therefore disallowed.

2. © In awarding the sum of P5,264 to administrator Tirso

Dacanay as compensation for his services.

Assignment of error C deal with the per diem compensation

claimed by the administrator. The administrator's claimed, and
the court below allowed, the sum of P1,320 for 330 days during
the period from March 14, 1913, until July, 1917. For the