1.
Abella Jr V CSC, 442 SCRA 207 1982 under the Civil Service Academy,
2. Victorias Milling Company Inc. V SSS
4S
3. Rizal Empire Insurance Group V NLRC
150 SCRA 565
4. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A
Tolentino Jr V Comelec GR#: 189698
(2/28/2010)
5. Leah M. NAzareno V City of
Dumaguete GR# 181559, 10/02/2009
6. De La Rama v CA GR# 131136
7. Quirog V Aumentado
8. Municipal Board of Canvasser of Glen
V Comelec GR# 150946
9. Cerafica V Comelec GR# 205136
12/2/2014
10. BPI Leasing Corp. V CA 416 S4
11. RCPI V NTC 184 SCRA 517
12. PPA Employees Hired After V COA
469 SCRA 397
13. De Jesus V COA 294 SCRA 152
14. NEA V Gonzaga GR# 158 SCRA 761
15. Lokin V Comelec GR# 180443
16. Taxi Cab Operators of MMLA V Board
of Transportation 114 SCRA 597
17. Macario Katipon Jr V Jerome Kapson
18. Bellica V Executive Secretary
19. Ynot V IAC
1. Abella Jr vs CSC
Date: November 17, 2004
Petitioner: Francisco Abella Jr
Respondent: CSC
Ponente: Panganiban
Facts:
Petitioner, a lawyer, retired from the
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), as
Department Manager of the Legal Services
Department. He held a civil service eligibility
for the position of Department Manager,
having completed the training program for
Executive Leadership and Management in
pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850, which
was then the required eligibility for said
position.
The CSC issued Memorandum
Circular No. 21, series of 1994 (Pertinent
provision: Positions covered by the CES: (a)
the position is a career position, (b) above
division chief level (c) duties and
responsibilities require performance of
executive or managerial functions. Upon
promotion or transfer to other Career
Executive Service (CES) positions, these
incumbents shall be under temporary status
in said other CES positions until they qualify.’)
“Two years after retirement,
petitioner was hired by the SBMA on a
contractual basis. He was issued by SBMA a
permanent employment as Department
Manager III, Labor and Employment Center.
However, when said appointment was
submitted to CSC Regional Office No. III, it
was disapproved on the ground that
petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate.
Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the
disapproval of his appointment. In view
thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary
appointment. The CSC affirmed the
disapproval of his permanent appointment.
The CA shunned the issue of constitutionality
of the Memo Circular. It ruled that petitioner
has no standing as only the appointing officer
may request reconsideration of the action
taken by the CSC. Also, petitioner was not the
real party in interest as his appointment was
dependent on the CSC’s approval.
Issue:
Who may file reconsideration or
appeal?
Ratio: A permanent appointment in the
career service is issued to a person who has
met the requirements of the position to
which the appointment is made in
accordance with the provisions of law, the
rules and the standards promulgated
pursuant thereto. It implies the civil service
eligibility of the appointee. The law requires
the appointment to be submitted to the CSC
which will ascertain, in the main, whether the
proposed appointee is qualified to hold the
position and whether the rules pertinent to
the process of appointment were observed.
The appointing officer and the CSC
acting together, though not concurrently but
consecutively, make an appointment
complete In acting on the appointment, the
CSC determines whether the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications. If the
appointee does, the appointment must be
approved; if not, it should be disapproved.
According to the CA, only the appointing
authority had the right to challenge the CSC’s
disapproval. It relied on Section 2 of Rule VI
of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998,
which provides: “Section 2. Request for
Reconsideration of, or appeal from, the
disapproval of an appointment may be made
by the appointing authority and submitted to
the Commission within fifteen (15) calendar
days from receipt of the disapproved
appointment.”
Appointing Authority’s Right to Challenge CSC
Disapproval
The power of appointment
necessarily entails the exercise of judgment
and discretion. Significantly, “the selection of
the appointee -- taking into account the
totality of his qualifications, including those
abstract qualities that define his personality -
- is the prerogative of the appointing
authority.” No tribunal, not even this Court,
may compel the exercise of an appointment
for a favored person.
The CSC’s disapproval of an
appointment is a challenge to the exercise of
the appointing authority’s discretion. The
appointing authority must have the right to
contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of
Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s.
1998 is justified insofar as it allows the
appointing authority to request
reconsideration or appeal.
Appointee’s Legal Standing to Challenge the
CSC Disapproval
While there is justification to allow the
appointing authority to challenge the CSC
disapproval, there is none to preclude the
appointee from taking the same course of
action. Aggrieved parties, including the CSC,
should be given the right to file MRs or to
appeal.
Although commonly directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, “legal standing” and
“real party in interest” are different
concepts. “The question in standing is
whether such parties have ‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. On the other hand,
the question as to ‘real party-in-interest’ is
whether he is ‘the party who would be
[benefited] or injured by the judgment, or
the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’”
If legal standing is granted to
challenge the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act despite the lack of
personal injury on the challenger’s part, then
more so should petitioner be allowed to
contest the CSC Order disapproving his
appointment. Clearly, he was prejudiced by
the disapproval, since he could not continue
his office. Although petitioner had no vested
right to the position, it was his eligibility that
was being questioned. Corollary to this
point, he should be granted the opportunity
to prove his eligibility. He had a personal
stake in the outcome of the case, which
justifies his challenge to the CSC act that
denied his permanent appointment.
The Appointee a Real Party in Interest
The rule refers to a real or present
substantial interest as distinguished from a
mere expectancy; or from a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest. The appointee is rightly a real party
in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC
disapproval, because he is prevented from
assuming the office in a permanent
capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily
benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained,
as an approved appointment would confer
on him all the rights and privileges of a
permanent appointee.
Appointee Allowed Procedural Relief
The view that only the appointing
authority may request reconsideration or
appeal is too narrow. The appointee should
have the same right. , CSC Resolution 99-
1936 recognizes the right of the adversely
affected party to appeal to the CSC Regional
Offices prior to elevating a matter to the CSC
Central Office. The adversely affected party
necessarily includes the appointee. This
judicial pronouncement does not override
Mathay v. CSC, which the CA relied on. The
Court merely noted in passing -- by way of
obiter -- that based on a similar provision,
only the appointing officer could request
reconsideration of actions taken by the CSC
on appointments.
In that case, QC Mayor Mathay Jr.
sought the nullification of CSC Resolutions
that recalled his appointment. He filed a
Petition assailing the CA Decision, which had
previously denied his Petition for Certiorari
for being the wrong remedy and for being
filed out of time. The CSC Resolutions then
were already final and could no longer be
elevated to the CA. Mathay’s Petition for
Certiorari filed with the CA was improper,
because there was an available remedy of
appeal. And the CSC could not have acted
without jurisdiction, considering that it was
empowered to recall an appointment initially
approved.
The right of the appointee to seek MR or
appeal was not the issue in Mathay. At any
rate, the present case is being decided en
banc, and the ruling may reverse previous
doctrines laid down by this Court.
Issue:
WON the Section 4 of the CSC Memo Circular
is unconstitutional
Held:
Ratio: In the exercise of its authority, the CSC
deemed it appropriate to clearly define and
identify positions covered by the Career
Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to
issue guidelines to meet this objective,
specifically through the issuance of the
challenged Circular.
Career Service Classified by Levels
Positions in the career service, for which
appointments require examinations, are
grouped into three major levels:
“(a) The first level shall include clerical,
trades, crafts, and custodial service positions
which involve non-professional or sub[-
]professional work in a non-supervisory or
supervisory capacity requiring less than four
years of collegiate studies;
“(b) The second level shall include
professional, technical, and scientific
positions which involve professional,
technical, or scientific work in a non-
supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring
at least four years of college work up to
Division Chief level; and
“(c) The third level shall cover positions in the
Career Executive Service.”
Entrance to the different levels requires the
corresponding civil service eligibility. Those
in the third level (CES positions) require
Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a
requirement for permanent appointment.
The challenged Circular did not revoke
petitioner’s ELM eligibility. He was
appointed to a CES position; however, his
eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must
necessarily conform to the requirements of
the position, which in petitioner’s case was a
CSEE.
Rights Protected
The challenged Circular protects the
rights of incumbents as long as they remain
in the positions to which they were
previously appointed. They are allowed to
retain their positions in a permanent
capacity, notwithstanding the lack of
CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the
rule of prospectivity of regulations; hence,
there is no basis to argue that it is an ex post
facto law or a bill of attainder. These terms,
which have settled meanings in criminal
jurisprudence, are clearly inapplicable here.
The government service of petitioner ended
when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to
remain in a CES position, notwithstanding his
lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his
reemployment years later as department
manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary
for him to comply with the eligibility
prescribed at the time for that position.
Security of Tenure Not Impaired
First, security of tenure in the Career
Executive Service -- except in the case of first
and second level employees in the civil
service -- pertains only to rank, not to the
position to which the employee may be
appointed Second, petitioner had neither
rank nor position prior to his
reemployment. One cannot claim security of
tenure if one held no tenure prior to
appointment.
Due Process Not Violated
The classification of positions in
career service was a quasi-legislative, not a
quasi-judicial, issuance. This distinction
determines whether prior notice and hearing
are necessary.
In exercising its quasi-judicial
function, an administrative body adjudicates
the rights of persons before it, in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law. The
determination of facts and the applicable
law, as basis for official action and the
exercise of judicial discretion, are essential
for the performance of this function. On
these considerations, it is elementary that
due process requirements, as enumerated in
Ang Tibay, must be observed. These
requirements include prior notice and
hearing.
On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is
exercised by administrative agencies through
the promulgation of rules and regulations
within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain
powers flowing from the separation of the
great branches of the government. Prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party,
as elements of due process, are not required
since there is no determination of past
events or facts that have to be established or
ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice
and hearing are not essential to the validity
of rules or regulations promulgated to
govern future conduct.
Significantly, the challenged Circular was an
internal matter addressed to heads of
departments, bureaus and agencies. It
needed no prior publication, since it had
been issued as an incident of the
administrative body’s power to issue
guidelines for government officials to follow
in performing their duties.
Disapproval of Appointment
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the
CSC correctly denied his permanent
appointment. The appointee need not have
been previously heard, because the nature of
the action did not involve the imposition of
an administrative disciplinary measure. The
CSC, in approving or disapproving an
appointment, merely examines the
conformity of the appointment with the law
and the appointee’s possession of all the
minimum qualifications and none of the
disqualification.
2. Victoria’s Milling Company, Inc v. Social
Security Commission
FACTS:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security
Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring
all employers to include in the Employee's
remuneration (salary) all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of
other media of remuneration (service).
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner
Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through
counsel, wrote the Social Security
Commission in effect protesting against the
circular as contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957
expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus
in the computation of the employers' and
employees' respective monthly premium
contributions.
Counsel further questioned the validity of the
circular for lack of authority on the part of the
Social Security Commission to promulgate it
without the approval of the President and for
lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or
regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social
Security Commission "to adopt, amend and
repeal subject to the approval of the
President such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of this Act.”
RULING:
There can be no doubt that there is a
distinction between an administrative rule or
regulation and an administrative
interpretation of a law whose enforcement is
entrusted to an administrative body.
When an administrative agency promulgates
rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law
with the force and effect of a valid law, while
when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a
pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when
promulgated may be enforced by a penal
sanction provided therein.
In this sense, it has been said that rules and
regulations are the product of a delegated
power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law.
Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to
advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the
law, they should include in determining the
monthly compensation of their employees
upon which the social security contributions
should be based, and that such circular did not
require presidential approval and publication
in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
The Resolution appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.
In favor with Social Security Commission.
Costs against Victoria’s Milling Company.
3. RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR
SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and
ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 73140
May 29, 1987
Facts:
In August, 1977, herein private respondent
Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein
petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a
casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a
day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a
regular employee, having been appointed as
clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00.
Being a permanent employee, he was
furnished a copy of petitioner company's
"General Information, Office Behavior and
Other Rules and Regulations." In the same
year, without change in his position-
designation, he was transferred to the Claims
Department and his salary was increased to
P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was
transferred to the Underwriting Department
and his salary was increased to P580.00 a
month plus cost of living allowance, until he
was transferred to the Fire Department as
filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an
inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly
salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other
benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent
Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work,
allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and
unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a
complaint with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated
March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor
Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to
his position with back wages. Petitioner filed
an appeal with the National labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution
dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32),
the appeal was dismissed on the ground that
the same had been filed out of time. Hence,
the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal
on a technicality.
Held:
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National
Labor Relations Commission on appeal,
provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders
of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both of the parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of notice thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No
motion or request for extension of the period
within which to perfect an appeal shall be
entertained.
The record shows that the employer
(petitioner herein) received a copy of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985.
It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985
and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on
April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension
policy" of the National Labor Relations
Commission, aforesaid motion for extension
of time was denied in its resolution dated
November 15, 1985 and the appeal was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The Revised Rules of the National Labor
Relations Commission are clear and explicit
and leave no room for interpretation.
Moreover, it is an elementary rule in
administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce, have
the force of law, and are entitled to great
respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans
Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Under the above-quoted provisions of the
Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed
from in this case has become final and
executory and can no longer be subject to
appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent
promotions in rank and salary of the private
respondent indicate he must have been a
highly efficient worker, who should be
retained despite occasional lapses in
punctuality and attendance. Perfection
cannot after all be demanded.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
4. Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC GR No.
189698
FACTS:
The court declared as unconstitutional the
second provisio in the third paragraph of sec
13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
BACKGROUND:
Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second
provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA
9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679
as unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for
reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of
sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in
GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon filling of his
certificate of candidacy“
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second provisio in the
third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66
of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of
the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the
equal protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The Court reversed their previous decision
and declared the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
RULING:
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2
Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits civil service officers and employees
from engaging in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on
the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaign is
unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the
constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated different from the
other.
The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class
privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to
operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike under
like circumstances and conditions both as to
priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not enfringed
by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class
and reasonable ground exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists
between elective officials and appointive
officials. Elective officials occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
Appointive officials hold their office by virtue
of their designation by an appointing
authority.
5. Nazareno vs. City of Dumaguete (2009)
Doctrine: The general rule is that
appointments shall take effect immediately;
and should the appointees already assume
the duties of their positions, they shall be
entitled to receive their salary at once. There
is no need to wait for the approval of the
appointments by the CSC. The appointments
shall be effective until disapproved by the
CSC.
Facts:
1. The 52 petitioners in this case were
all bona fide employees of the City of
Dumaguete appointed to various
positions by City Mayor Felipe
Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. sometime in
 June 2001, shortly before the end of
his term.
2. On July 2001, the newly elected
Mayor Perdices announced that he
was not recognizing the
appointments made by former
Mayor Remollo. Thereafter, the
Treasurer was directed not to make
any disbursements pertaining to
petitioners and petitioners’ names
were deleted from the list of
employees.
3. The petitioners filed a petition for
Mandamus with injunction and
damages before the RTC of
Dumaguete against the Mayor and 4
other City Officers (Civil Case). On
the same day, Director II Fabio
Abucejo (Abucejo) of the Civil Service
Commission Field Office (CSC-FO),
pursuant to CSC Memorandum
No.001374, invalidated and revoked
the appointments made by former
Mayor Remollo in June 2001 because
the appointments were in violation
of Items No. 3(d) and 4 of CSC
Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June
2001, which prohibit the outgoing
chief executive from making mass
appointments after elections.
4. A copy of the CSC-FO’s findings were
given to the petitioners and upon
receipt, they filed a motion for
reconsideration before the CSC
Regional Office VII. The CSC RO
dismissed this reasoning that the
motion should be filed before the
CSC FO. The petitioners filed another
motion to treat their first motion as
an appeal. The CSC RO dismissed
appeal and affirmed the CSC FO’s
decision.
5. Petitioners elevated the case to the
CSC Proper. The CSC Proper noted
that generally, it is the appointing
officer who appeals invalidated
appointments but relaxed the rule in
this case as the appointing authority
was no longer in power. However,
the appeal was still dismissed.
6. The petitioners filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari. The CA
dismissed this and affirmed the CSC
decision. The petitioners filed a
petition for the review of this
decision before the SC.
7. Meanwhile, the RTC granted the
injunction prayed for in the Civil
Case. But upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the
respondents, the RTC lifted the
injunction. The CA affrimed. This
Court also affirmed on the ground
that the petitioners had already
availed the remedies of law when
they appealed the decision of the
CSC FO to the CSC RO and then to
the CSC Proper. Hence, the
injunction was lifted.
8. The petitioners filed a motion to
declare the respondents in default in
the Civil Case. This was denied by the
RTC but the CA declared the
respondents in default.
9. The RTC dismissed the case. Hence
this petition.
Petitioner’s argument:
1. They should receive their salaries for
the meantime because their
appointments are valid until
declared invalid (citing an
unnumbered CSC Memorandum
Circular, issued on 6 December 2001,
with the subject matter: “Reiteration
of the Strict Implementation of
Section 1, Rule IV and Section 3,
Rules VI, both of Memorandum
 Circular No. 40, s. 1998, otherwise in accordance with
known as the Revised Omnibus Rules pertinent laws and rules
on Appointments and Other shall take effect
Personnel Actions.”) immediately upon its
issuance by the appointing
Respondent’s argument: authority, and if the
1. The right of the petitioners to their appointee has assumed the
positions and salaries is unclear thus, duties of the position, he
mandamus will not lie. The RTC took shall be entitled to receive
note that the invalidation of his salary at once without
petitioners’ appointments by the CSC awaiting the approval of his
Proper was then pending appeal appointment by the
before the Court of Appeals and Commission. The
unless it was reversed, petitioners’ appointment shall remain
right to the salaries, salary effective until disapproved
adjustments, and other emoluments by the Commission. x x x
claimed, were doubtful.
Section 3. When an
Issues: appointment is
1. Whether petitioners are entitled to disapproved, the
the issuance of a writ of mandamus services of the appointee
ordering respondents to pay shall be immediately
petitioners’ salaries, salary terminated, unless a
adjustments, and other emoluments, motion for
from 28 September 2001 until this reconsideration or
Court finally resolves the issue of the appeal is seasonably
validity of petitioners’ appointments filed.
NO
2. Whether petitioners are entitled to Services
an award for damages resulting from rendered by a person for
the invalidation of their the duration of his
appointments NO disapproved
appointment shall not be
credited as government
Held/Ratio: Petition is denied. service for whatever
A. On their right to compel the City purpose.
Government to pay their salaries
1. The Court noted the following If the
pertinent rules: appointment was
Rule IV of the Revised disapproved on grounds
Omnibus Rules on which do not constitute
Appointments and Other a violation of civil service
Personnel Actions, Section law, such as failure of the
1. An appointment issued appointee to meet the
 Qualification Standards
(QS) prescribed for the
position, the same is
considered effective
until disapproved by the
Commission or any of its
regional or field
offices. The appointee is
meanwhile entitled to
payment of salaries from
the government.
If a motion for
reconsideration or an
appeal from the
disapproval is seasonably
filed with the proper
office, the appointment is
still considered to be
effective. The disapproval
becomes final only after
the same is affirmed by
the Commission.
2. The general rule is that
appointments shall take effect
immediately; and should the
appointees already assume the
duties of their positions, they shall
be entitled to receive their salary at
once. There is no need to wait for
the approval of the appointments by
the CSC. The appointments shall be
effective until disapproved by the
CSC.
3. The CSC has a three-tiered
organizational structure, i.e., the
CSC-FO, the CSC-RO, and the CSC
Proper acting as a collegial body. The
disapproval of the appointments by
the CSC FO and CSC RO is not final
and executory until affirmed by the
CSC Proper.
4. Nevertheless, the aforementioned
general rules cannot be simply
applied to the case at bar given its
peculiar circumstances.
5. Section 3 above only applies if there
was no violation of civil service laws
but if there was, Section 4 states
that: “The appointing authority shall
be personally liable for the salary of
appointees whose appointments
have been disapproved for violation
of pertinent laws such as the
publication requirement pursuant to
RA 7041.”
a. This consistent with Sec 65,
Chapter 10, Book V of the
Administrative Code which
states that: “No person
employed in the Civil Service
in violation of Civil Service
law and rules shall be entitled
to receive pay from the
government, but the
appointing authority
responsible for such unlawful
employment shall be
personally liable for the pay
that would have accrued had
the employment been lawful,
and the disbursing officials
shall make payment to the
employee of such amount
from the salary of the officers
so liable.”
6. The rules laid down by the CSC in
CSC Resolution No. 010988, dated 4
June 2001, are deemed included in
what is the “civil service law,” it
having the force and effect of law.
7. Since petitioners’ right to the
payment of their salaries by the City
Government of Dumaguete is still
unsettled at this point, the Court
cannot issue a writ of mandamus
 against respondents to make such
payment. Mandamus applies only
where the petitioner’s right is
founded clearly in law and not when
it is doubtful. Until the SC finally
resolves the pending petition for
review of the CA’s affirmation of the
CSC Proper’s disapproval of the
petitioners’ appointments, the issue
of who will pay their salaries cannot
be settled.
B. On damages
1. Mayor Perdices’ refusal to re-appoint
petitioners is merely in exercise of
the former’s discretion and does not
constitute bad faith.
6. Conrado L. De Rama, petitioner, vs. The
Court Of Appeals (Ninth Division, The Civil
Service Commission), Eladio Martinez, Divino
De Jesus, Morell Ayala, Aristeo Catalla, Daisy
Porta, Flordeliza Oriasel, Graciela Glory,
Felecidad Orinday, Ma. Petra Muffet Luce,
Elsa Marino, Bernardita Mendoza, Jane
Macatangay, Adelfo Glodoviza and Florino
Ramos, respondents.
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of
Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner
Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated
July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission
(or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal
employees. Justifying his recall request on
the allegation that the appointments of the
said employees were “midnight”
appointments of the former mayor, Ma.
Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article
VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The
CSC denied petitioner’s request for the
recall of the appointments of the fourteen
employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld
the validity of the appointments on the
ground that they had already been
approved by the Head of the CSC Field
Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s
failure to present evidence that would
warrant the revocation or recall of the said
appointments.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall made by
petitioner is valid.
Ruling:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall
an appointment initially approved, but only
when such appointment and approval are
proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and
regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the
Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the
Revised Administrative Code specifically
provides that “an appointment accepted by
the appointee cannot be withdrawn or
revoked by the appointing authority and
shall remain in force and in effect until
disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private
respondents may only be recalled on the
following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with
the procedures/criteria provided in the
agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to
pass through the agency’s
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of
the existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to
promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing
civil service law, rules and regulations.
7. QUIROG vs.AUMENTADO
Facts:
Liza M. Quirog was permanently appointed
as Department Head of the Office of the
Bohol Provincial Agriculture by then Bohol
Governor Rene L. Relampagos. The
appointment was confirmed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Quirog was
likewise certified by the Personnel Selection
Board (PSB) as one of the two candidates
qualified for the position.
However, the Director of CSCROVII
invalidated Quirog’s appointment upon the
finding that the same was part of the bulk
appointments issued by Gov Relampagos
after May 14, 2001 elections in violation of a
CSC Resolution prohibiting the issuance of
midnight appointments. In a motion for
reconsideration, it was contended by the
Relampagos and Quirog that the
appointment cannot be considered a
midnight appointment because it was made
days before the expiration of Relampago’s
term and that Quirog was already the acting
Provincial Agriculturists a year prior to said
appointment. The CSCROVII however ruled
that Quirog and Relampagos had no legal
personality to file the pleadings. That under
Section 2, Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. 40, series of 1998 only the
appointing officer may request
reconsideration of the disapproval of an
appointment by the Civil Service
Commission. Even if Relampagos was the one
who appointed Quirog, he could not file a
motion for reconsideration because his term
as governor had already expired. On appeal
with the CSC, the latter ruled in favor of the
petitioners. It ruled that the appointee
Quirog be allowed to question the decision
and that the latter was not a midnight
appointment. On appeal with the CA, it was
however contended by then incumbent
Bohol Governor Erico B. Aumentado that
Quirog and Relampagos had no legal
personality to file a motion for
reconsideration of the disapproved
appointment or to appeal the same and
insisted that Quirog's appointment was a
midnight appointment. The CA ruled against
the petitioners.
Issues
: (1) WON petitioners Relampagos and
Quirog have the legal standing to file a
motion for reconsideration of, or appeal
from the disapproval of the latter's
appointment by theCSC 2) WON the subject
appointment was a midnight appointment.
Held
: 1.) Yes.In the recent case of Abella, Jr. v.
Civil Service Commission, the Court declared
that both the appointing authority and the
appointee are equally real parties in interest
who have the requisite legal standing to
bring an action challenging a CSC
disapproval of an appointment. Clearly,
pursuant to Abella, Jr., Quirog had the right
to ask for reconsideration of, or to appeal
the adverse ruling of CSCROVII. In contrast,
Relampagos, by reason of the expiration of
his term as governor, had lost the legal
personality to contest the disapproval of the
appointment. 2.) No. It cannot also be said
that Quirog's appointment was a midnight
appointment. The constitutional prohibition
on so-called midnight appointments,
specifically, those made within two (2)
months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President. The
appointment of Quirog cannot be
categorized as a midnight appointment. For
it is beyond dispute that Quirog had been
discharging and performing the duties
concomitant with the subject position for a
year prior to her permanent appointment
thereto. Surely, the fact that she was only
permanently appointed to the position of
PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting
Provincial Agriculturist more than
adequately shows that the filling up of the
position resulted from deliberate action and
a careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's
qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been
the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June
2000 all the more highlights the public need
for said position to be permanently filled up.
8. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
GLAN, ENRIQUE B. YAP, JR., VENANCIO S.
WATA, JR., GILDO VILLORENTE, SR., JING
MUSA, BENEDICTO L. RUIZ, ANANIAS S.
EMNACE, VANNEVAR B. ALEGADO, ALITO
ARNOLD CARIO, SATURNINO BAG, JR., and
FEDERICO J. TANGAN, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (En Banc) and
FLORA L. BENZONAN, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
The present petition for certiorari, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, originated
from SPC No. 01-032, a pre-proclamation
controversy instituted by respondent Flora
L. Benzonan with the Commission on
Election (COMELEC) en banc. Benzonan,
who was a mayoralty candidate in the
Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during the
May 14, 2001 elections, sought to declare
null and void the canvass conducted by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of
Glan, Sarangani and to recall the
proclamation of petitioners Enrique B. Yap,
Jr., Venancio S. Wata, Jr., Gildo Villorente,
Sr., Ting Musa, Benedicto L. Ruiz, Ananias S.
Emnace, Vannevar B. Alegado, Alito Arnold
Carino, Saturnino Bag, Jr. and Federico J.
Tangan, as duly elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor
and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Glan, Sarangani, respectively.
Benzonan argued her pre-proclamation case
on the grounds that: a) after the original and
second MBC had resigned, the third MBC
was illegally constituted as its Chairman,
Vice-Chairman and Secretary are not
qualified under the Omnibus Election
Code;[1] b) the canvassing proceedings,
which were initially held in the Session Hall
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, were
later transferred to the Provincial Capitol of
Danao Province, contrary to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3848;[2] c) the Secretary of
the MBC failed to record the minutes of the
canvassing proceedings since the start of the
canvass; d) neither Benzonan nor her
representatives were notified of the last
three days of the canvassing proceedings
and, consequently, they were not able to
participate therein; e) a substantial number
of the election returns had been tampered
with or falsified; and f) the MBC had falsified
the certificate of canvass votes.[3]
On December 4, 2001, the COMELEC en
banc issued a resolution[4] finding that,
based on the evidence presented, the
canvass of votes had been conducted in a
place other than the previous venue at the
inception of the proceedings to which all
were notified. Thus, the proclamations of
the winning candidates were declared null
and void and a re-canvass of the election
returns was ordered.
To reverse the COMELEC en bancs
resolution, petitioners filed the present
petition with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary
prohibitory injunction.[5] On December 21,
2001, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order directing the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing its
December 4, 2001 resolution.
Although not raised as an issue, the Court is
compelled to resolve whether the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over this case.
Section 3 (c) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution reads:
The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite the disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies.
All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Beginning with Sarmiento v. COMELEC[6]
and reiterated in subsequent cases,[7] the
most recent being Balindong v. COMELEC,[8]
the Court has upheld this constitutional
mandate and consistently ruled that the
COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the
requisite authority to hear and decide
election cases in the first instance. This
power pertains to the divisions of the
Commission and any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election
cases decided by it in the first instance is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
It is important to clarify, however, that not
all cases relating to election laws filed
before the COMELEC are required to be first
heard by a division. Under the Constitution,
the COMELEC exercises both administrative
and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en
banc can act directly on matters falling
within its administrative powers. It is only
when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers
are involved that the COMELEC is mandated
to decide cases first in division, and then,
upon motion for reconsideration, en
banc.[9]
It is clear that SPC No. 01-032 is one that
involves a pre-proclamation controversy
that requires the exercise of the COMELECs
quasi-judicial powers, as the illegality of the
composition and proceedings of the MBC,
including the falsification of election returns
and certificate of canvass, were alleged to
be in issue.[10] Furthermore, in her
comment to the petition dated January 9,
2000,[11] Benzonan categorically stated that
it is not disputed that what is involved here
is a pre-proclamation controversy.
Also undisputed is the fact that Benzonan
filed her pre-proclamation case directly with
the COMELEC en banc and that the case was
subsequently decided by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. As aforestated, the
COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to
decide cases involving these types of
controversies in the first instance. Thus, the
procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a
resolution in her favor that the Court must
declare null and void and set aside.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is GRANTED. The resolution of the
COMELEC en banc dated December 4, 2001
in SPC No. 01-032 is hereby declared null
and void and set aside, and the COMELEC is
directed to assign SPC No. 01-032 to a
division.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
9. OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No.
205136, 02 December 2014,EN BANC ,
(Perez, J.)
Doctrine:
COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
Facts:
On October 2012, Kimberly filed her
certificate of candidacy (COC) for Councilor,
City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her
COC stated that she was born on 29 October
1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of
age on the day of the elections, in
contravention of the requirement that one
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on the day of the elections. As such,
Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory
hearing due to the age qualification. Instead
of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to
file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of
COC. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own
COC as a substitute of Kimberly. The
COMELEC rendered a decision ordering the
cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and the
denial of the substitution of Kimberly by
Olivia. COMELEC argued that Olivia cannot
substitute Kimberly as the latter was never
an official candidate because she was not
eligible for the post by reason of her age,
and that; moreover, the COC that Kimberly
filed was invalid because it contained a
material misrepresentation relating to her
eligibility for the office she seeks to be
elected to. Olivia countered that although
Kimberly may not be qualified to run for
election because of her age, it cannot be
denied that she still filed a valid COC and
was, thus, an official candidate who may be
substituted. Olivia also claimed that there
was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberly’s
COC on the ground of lack of qualification
and material misrepresentation because she
did not misrepresent her birth date to
qualify for the position of councilor, and as
there was no deliberate attempt to mislead
the electorate, which is precisely why she
withdrew her COC upon learning that she
was not qualified.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid substitution?
RULING:
Yes, in declaring that Kimberly, being under
age, could not be considered to have filed a
valid COC and, thus, could not be validly
substituted by Olivia, we find that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance
candidates and its power to deny due
course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78,
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the
COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015
The next question then is whether Olivia
complied with all of the requirements for a
valid substitution; we answer in the
affirmative. First, there was a va lid
withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last
day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia
belongs to and is certified to by the same
political party to which Kimberly belongs;
and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than
mid-day of election day.
10. BPI LEASING CORP. vs. CA, et al.
GR No. 127624, 18 Nov. 2003
FACTS:
BLC is a corporation engaged in the business
of leasing properties. For the calendar year
1986, it paid Commissioner of Internal
Revenue a total of P1, 139,041.49
representing 4% contractor’s percentage tax
as imposed by the National Internal Revenue
Code. However, in November 1986, CIR
issued a Revenue Regulation which provides
that companies registered under RA 5980,
likeBLC, are no longer liable for contractor’s
percentage tax, instead, subject only to
gross receipts tax. Thereafter, BLC filed a
claim for refund before the CIR and
simultaneously filed a petition for review
before the Court of Tax Appeal in order to
stop the running of the prescriptive period
for refunds. Both cases were denied, despite
motion for reconsideration by BLC, hence,
they appealed before the Court of Appeals,
which the latter affirmed the decision of CTA
and CIR. Aggrieved by the decision, BLC
instituted a petition before the SC. However,
the certification against non-forum shopping
attached to the petition was signed by the
counsel on record of the BLC, who was not
specifically authorized to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawyer is authorized to
validly sign, for and in behalf of itsclient, the
certification of non-forum shopping.
HELD:
It was held that while the certification of
non-forum shopping may be signed,for an
on behalf of a corporation, by a specifically
authorized lawyer who haspersonal
knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document, it doesnot
mean that any lawyer, acting on behalf of
the corporation he is representing,may
routinely sign a certification of non-forum
shopping – the lawyer must be“specifically
authorized” in order to validly sign the
certification.Since powers of corporations
are exercised through their board of
directorsand/or duly authorized officers and
agents, physical acts, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for
thepurpose by corporate by laws or by
specific acts of the board of directors.
Beingcounsel of record does not vest upon a
lawyer the authority to execute
thecertification on behalf of his
client.PETITION DENIED.
11. RCPI vs NTC Case Digest
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)
and JUAN A. ALEGRE
G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992
Facts:
Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr.
Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams
through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft
Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17
March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law
in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law
in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.
Both telegrams did not reach their
destinations on the expected dates. So,
private respondent filed a letter-complaint
against RCPI with National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for
poor service, with a request for the
imposition of the appropriate punitive
sanction against the company. Taking
cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed
RCPI to answer the complaint and set the
initial hearing.
NTC held that RCPI was administratively
liable for deficient and inadequate service
under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and imposed
the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30)
days from receipt in the aggregate amount
of one thousand pesos.
Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review
invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission
(precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Public Service Commission
(precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to
impose fines.
HELD:
The decision appealed from is reversed and
set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC
to render it. NTC has no jurisdiction to
impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146,
as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative
fine in cases of violation of or failure by a
public service to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions or regulations of the Commission.
Petitioner operated under a legislative
franchise, so there were no terms nor
conditions of any certificate issued by the
Commission to violate. Neither was there
any order, decision or regulation from the
Commission applicable to petitioner that the
latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed,
defied or disregarded.
No substantial change has been brought
about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked
by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster
NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not
an explicit grant of power to impose
administrative fines on public service
utilities, including telegraphic agencies,
which have failed to render adequate
service to consumers. Neither has it
expanded the coverage of the supervisory
and regulatory power of the agency. There
appears to be no alternative but to reiterate
the settled doctrine in administrative law
that:
Too basic in administrative law to need
citation of jurisprudence is the rule that
jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies, like respondent Commission, are
limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in
the legislation creating such body; and any
order without or beyond such jurisdiction is
void and ineffective (Globe Wireless case).
12. PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998
vs. COA
469 SCRA 397
Facts: PPA has been paying its officials and
employees COLA and amelioration allowance
equivalent to 40% and 10%, respectively, of
their basic salary pursuant to various
legislative and administrative issuances.
During the last quarter of 1989, the PPA
discontinued the payment thereof in view of
Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No.
10 prescribing the implementing rules and
regulations of R.A. No. 6758 otherwise
known as the Salary Standardization Law
which integrated said allowances into the
basic salary effective July 1, 1989. However,
the Supreme Court in the case of Rodolfo de
Jesus, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 109023 dated
August 12, 1998, declared CCC No. 10 as
ineffective and unenforceable due to non-
publication. Consequently, the PPA Board of
Directors passed Resolution No. 1856
directing the payment of COLA and
amelioration backpay to PPA personnel in the
service during the period July 1, 1989 to
March 16, 1999, the date of publication of
CCC No. 10. “Doubting the validity of said
Resolution, the PPA Auditor requested the
opinion of the General Counsel on the
propriety of the payment of the backpay. In
fully concurring with the recommendation of
the then Director, CAO II, the General
Counsel ruled that ‘in order for a PPA
employee to be entitled to backpay
representing COLA and amelioration pay
equivalent to 40% and 10% respectively, of
their basic salary, the following conditions
must concur: (1) he has to be an incumbent
as of July 1, 1989; and (2) has been receiving
the COLA and amelioration pay as of July 1,
1989.’ Aggrieved, PPA sought
reconsideration of the said advisory opinion
which was denied by the General Counsel in
a 1st Endorsement dated September 13,
2001, since she found no cogent reason to
set aside the earlier opinion. The PPA Auditor
accordingly ruled against the grant of the
subject backpay. The COA ruled that “in the
absence of effective integration of the COLA
and amelioration allowance into the basic
salary in 1989, the inevitable conclusion is
that they are deemed not integrated from
the time RA 6758 was promulgated until
DBM-CCC No. 10 was published in March
1999.” During that period, it thus disallowed
the disputed allowances on the ground that
these fell under the second sentence of
Section 12 of RA 6758. It held that only
officials hired on or before July 1, 1989 was
entitled to receive back pay equivalent to the
additional compensation (COLA and
amelioration allowance) mentioned.
Issue: Whether or not herein petitioners who
were hired by the Philippine Ports Authority
on various dates after July 1, 1989 -- are
entitled to the payment of back pay for cost
of living allowance (COLA) and amelioration
allowance?
Held: Court held that the COLA of
government employees from 1989 to 1999
was not “deemed integrated into their
salaries.” This means that the COLA during
that period is a legally demandable and
enforceable right. Employees of
government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether incumbent or not, are
entitled to the COLA from 1989 to 1999 as a
matter of right. Hence, in consonance with
the equal-protection clause of the
Constitution, and considering that the
employees were all similarly situated as to
the matter of the COLA and the amelioration
allowance, they should all be treated
similarly. All -- not only incumbents as of July
1, 1989 -- should be allowed to receive back
pay corresponding to the said benefits, from
July 1, 1989 to the new effectivity date of
DBM-CCC No. 10 -- March 16, 1999. The
principle of equal protection is not a barren
concept that may be casually swept aside.
While it does not demand absolute equality,
it requires that all persons similarly situated
be treated alike, both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. Verily,
equal protection and security shall be
accorded every person under identical or
analogous circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Commission on Audit ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
13. PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998
vs. COA
469 SCRA 397
Facts:
PPA has been paying its officials and
employees COLA and amelioration allowance
equivalent to 40% and 10%, respectively, of
their basic salary pursuant to various
legislative and administrative issuances.
During the last quarter of 1989, the PPA
discontinued the payment thereof in view of
Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No.
10 prescribing the implementing rules and
regulations of R.A. No. 6758 otherwise
known as the Salary Standardization Law
which integrated said allowances into the
basic salary effective July 1, 1989. However,
the Supreme Court in the case of Rodolfo de
Jesus, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 109023 dated
August 12, 1998, declared CCC No. 10 as
ineffective and unenforceable due to non-
publication. Consequently, the PPA Board of
Directors passed Resolution No. 1856
directing the payment of COLA and
amelioration backpay to PPA personnel in the
service during the period July 1, 1989 to
March 16, 1999, the date of publication of
CCC No. 10. “Doubting the validity of said
Resolution, the PPA Auditor requested the
opinion of the General Counsel on the
propriety of the payment of the backpay. In
fully concurring with the recommendation of
the then Director, CAO II, the General
Counsel ruled that ‘in order for a PPA
employee to be entitled to backpay
representing COLA and amelioration pay
equivalent to 40% and 10% respectively, of
their basic salary, the following conditions
must concur: (1) he has to be an incumbent
as of July 1, 1989; and (2) has been receiving
the COLA and amelioration pay as of July 1,
1989.’ Aggrieved, PPA sought
reconsideration of the said advisory opinion
which was denied by the General Counsel in
a 1st Endorsement dated September 13,
2001, since she found no cogent reason to
set aside the earlier opinion. The PPA Auditor
accordingly ruled against the grant of the
subject backpay. The COA ruled that “in the
absence of effective integration of the COLA
and amelioration allowance into the basic
salary in 1989, the inevitable conclusion is
that they are deemed not integrated from
the time RA 6758 was promulgated until
DBM-CCC No. 10 was published in March
1999.” During that period, it thus disallowed
the disputed allowances on the ground that
these fell under the second sentence of
Section 12 of RA 6758. It held that only
officials hired on or before July 1, 1989 was
entitled to receive back pay equivalent to the
additional compensation (COLA and
amelioration allowance) mentioned.
Issue:
Whether or not herein petitioners who were
hired by the Philippine Ports Authority on
various dates after July 1, 1989 -- are entitled
to the payment of back pay for cost of living
allowance (COLA) and amelioration
allowance?
Held:
Court held that the COLA of government
employees from 1989 to 1999 was not
“deemed integrated into their salaries.” This
means that the COLA during that period is a
legally demandable and enforceable right.
Employees of government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether incumbent
or not, are entitled to the COLA from 1989 to
1999 as a matter of right. Hence, in
consonance with the equal-protection clause
of the Constitution, and considering that the
employees were all similarly situated as to
the matter of the COLA and the amelioration
allowance, they should all be treated
similarly. All -- not only incumbents as of July
1, 1989 -- should be allowed to receive back
pay corresponding to the said benefits, from
July 1, 1989 to the new effectivity date of
DBM-CCC No. 10 -- March 16, 1999. The
principle of equal protection is not a barren
concept that may be casually swept aside.
While it does not demand absolute equality,
it requires that all persons similarly situated
be treated alike, both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. Verily,
equal protection and security shall be
accorded every person under identical or
analogous circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Commission on Audit ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
14. Rodolfo S. De Jesus, et al. vs. Commission
on Audit
294 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 149154, June 10,
2003
Facts: The Board of Directors (BOD) of the
Catbalogan Water District granted to
themselves RATA, rice allowance,
productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-
end bonus and cash gifts, as authorized by
Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA
disallowed and ordered the refund of these
allowances as they are not allowed by P.D.
No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of
1973.
Issue: Whether COA is vested with authority
to disallow release of allowance not
authorized by law even if authorized by the
LWUA.
Held: Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution
mandates the COA to audit all the
government agencies, including
government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC) with original charters.
The COA is vested with authority to disallow
illegal or irregular disbursements of
government funds. A Water District is a
GOCC with a special charter since it is
created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The
COA can disallow allowances not authorized
by law, even if authorized by the LWUA.
Considering that the disallowed allowances
were received in good faith, without
knowledge that payment had no legal basis,
the allowances need not to be refunded.
15. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs.
VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., , J.:
For review under Rule 45 are the March 6,
2003 Decision1 and June 10, 2003
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68769, which dismissed
petitioner’s appeal of the July 23, 2001
Order3 of the Pagadian City Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 21 in Civil Case No.
4282-2K, and denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively.
On November 13, 2000, respondent
Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for membership in the Board of
Directors of Zamboanga del Sur II Electric
Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO).
Later that day, the screening committee
resolved to disqualify respondent because
his spouse was an incumbent member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Diplahan,
Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the Electric
Cooperative Election Code (ECEC),
promulgated by petitioner National
Electrification Administration (NEA), a
candidate whose spouse occupies an
elective government position higher than
Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as
director of an electric cooperative.
ZAMSURECO’s by-laws, however, do not
provide for such ground for disqualification.4
On November 21, 2000, respondent filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4282-2K with the
Pagadian City RTC.
ZAMSURECO filed a Motion to Dismiss and
Answer on November 24, 2000, which the
RTC denied. However, it issued a temporary
restraining order, ordering ZAMSURECO’s
officials to refrain from conducting the
election for directorship set on December 2,
2000.
The RTC said that the petition was
dismissible because of the failure of
respondent to exhaust all administrative
remedies, as required by Section 2, 2.C of
the ECEC Guidelines on the Conduct of
District Elections for Electric Cooperative.
The section required that "a protest arising
from disqualification shall be filed with
the screening committee in not less than
FIVE (5) days before the election. The
screening committee shall decide the
protest within FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours from
receipt thereof. Failure of the applicant to
file his/her protest within the above-cited
period shall be deemed a waiver of his right
to protest."5
As observed by the RTC, respondent had
urgently filed the petition on November 21,
2000 because the election sought to be
restrained was going to be held on
December 2, 2000 and November 20 was a
holiday. Under the circumstances,
respondent had little time to exhaust the
remedy in Sec. 2 of the Guidelines, such that
an exception could be made. More
importantly, according to the RTC, the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies
cannot be invoked in the instant case since
the guidelines prescribing the administrative
remedy is a subject matter of the ECEC,
which is at issue, and is exactly what is being
sought to be invalidated.6
On December 12, 2000, respondent filed a
motion to withdraw the amended petition,
and to admit a second amended petition
that impleaded NEA as indispensable party.
Respondent also averred that the ECEC was
null and void because it had not been
published. On December 20, 2000, the RTC
admitted the second amended petition,
issued a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent the conduct of election for
directorship, issued summons to NEA, and
required NEA to comment if the ECEC was
published in any newspaper of general
circulation.7
On January 29, 2001, NEA filed a motion for
extension of time to file an answer, and
subsequently on April 10, 2001, a Motion for
Leave to Admit Pleading to which a Motion
to Dismiss was attached. NEA questioned
the jurisdiction of the RTC and alleged that
respondent failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.8
In its July 23, 2001 Order,9 the RTC denied
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss for being filed
out of time. More importantly, it noted
NEA’s failure to state whether the ECEC was
indeed published in a newspaper of general
circulation as required by the New Civil Code
and the Administrative Code of 1987. The
RTC said the failure rendered the ECEC null
and void. As regards the lack of jurisdiction
and non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the RTC noted that NEA
erroneously relied on Sec. 59 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 269 and misapplied the
cases it cited.
According to the RTC, Sec. 59 of PD 269
refers to "order, ruling or decision of the
NEA" in the exercise of NEA’s quasi-judicial
functions. And the RTC noted that Secs. 51
to 58 refer to hearings, investigations, and
procedures. On the other hand, the validity
of the ECEC, subject of the instant petition,
was an exercise of NEA’s quasi-legislative
function or rule-making authority.
Further, according to the RTC, NEA took Sec.
58 of PD 269 out of context when it said Sec.
58 dealt with the administrative remedy
available to petitioner. It said that Sec. 58
presupposed a ruling or decision of the NEA
and there was none in the case before it.
The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzaga, and
ordered ZAMSURECO to accept Gonzaga’s
certificate of candidacy for director.10 The
RTC denied NEA’s motion for
reconsideration.
The CA Ruled that the Courts Have
Jurisdiction Over
Issues on Legality of Codes
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA denied due course and dismissed the
petition. It said that NEA was not exercising
its quasi-judicial powers but its rule-making
authority. In the case before the trial court,
the CA stressed that the issue involved the
interpretation of the ECEC, and to this
extent, NEA had no jurisdiction because the
issue is within the province of the courts.
The CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration in its June 10, 2003
Resolution. Hence, we have this petition.
The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
SECTION 59 OF P.D. 269
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
TRIAL COURT’S NULLIFICATION OF
THE ECEC
Issues Involving NEA’s Rule-Making Authority
Are Cognizable by Regular Courts
The petition has no merit.
Sec. 59 of PD 269 provides:
SEC. 59. Court Review.—The
Supreme Court is hereby given
jurisdiction to review any order,
ruling or decision of the NEA and to
modify or set aside such order, ruling
or decision when it clearly appears
that there is no evidence before the
NEA to support reasonably such
order, ruling or decision, or that the
same is contrary to law, or that it
was without the jurisdiction of the
NEA. The evidence presented to the
NEA, together with the record of the
proceedings before the NEA, shall be
certified by the NEA to the Supreme
Court. Any order, ruling or decision
of the NEA may likewise be reviewed
by the Supreme Court upon writ of
certiorari in proper case. The
procedure for review, except as
herein provided, shall be presented
by rules of the Supreme Court. Any
order or decision of the NEA may be
reviewed on the application of any
person or public service entity
aggrieved thereby and who was a
party in the subject proceeding, by
certiorari in appropriate cases or by
a petition for review, which shall be
filed within thirty (30) days from the
notification of the NEA order,
decision or ruling on reconsideration.
Said petition shall be placed on file in
the office of the Clerk for the
Supreme Court who shall furnish
copies thereof to the NEA and other
interested parties.
Petitioner argues that based on the
foregoing provision, only the Supreme Court
has the authority to review the "acts" of NEA
as an administrative body with adjudicative
and rule-making power. It cited NEA v.
Mendoza, using the Court’s pronouncement
that:
[T]he power of judicial review of
NEA’s order or decision pertains to
the Supreme Court as decreed in
Section 59 of P.D. 269 which vests
specifically on the Supreme Court the
jurisdiction to review any order,
ruling or decision of the NEA and to
modify or set aside such orders,
rulings or decisions.11
It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to
"order, ruling or decision" of NEA. What is
being challenged in this case is the decision
of the screening committee of ZAMSURECO
to disqualify respondent. Likewise assailed is
the validity of the ECEC, particularly,
whether the requirement of publication was
complied with. The ECEC was issued by NEA
pursuant to its rule-making authority, not its
quasi-judicial function. Hence, the issue
regarding the controversy over respondent’s
disqualification and the question on the
ECEC’s validity are within the inherent
jurisdiction of regular courts to review.
Petitioner’s reliance on NEA is misplaced.
The subject in that case was the electricity
rates charged by a cooperative, a matter
which is clearly within NEA’s jurisdiction. The
issue in the present petition, however,
centers on the validity of NEA’s rules in light
of the publication requirements of the
Administrative Code and New Civil Code.
The present issue is cognizable by regular
courts.
With regard to the second issue, we find no
error in the appellate and trial courts’
nullification of the ECEC. The CA correctly
observed that while ZAMSURECO complied
with the requirements of filing the code with
the University of the Philippines Law Center,
it offered no proof of publication in
the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of
general circulation. Without compliance
with the requirement of publication, the
rules and regulations contained in the ECEC
cannot be enforced and implemented.
Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that
laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless
it is otherwise provided.
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987,
reinforced the requirement of publication
and outlined the procedure, as follows:
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every Agency shall
file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3)
Certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the
date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months
from that date shall not thereafter
be the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons.
(2) The Records Officer of the
agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under
pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules
shall be kept by the issuing agency
and shall be open to public
inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity – In addition to
other rule-making requirements
provided by law not inconsistent
 with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is
fixed by law, or specified in this rule.
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect –
Laws shall take effect after Fifteen
(15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, unless it is otherwise
provided.
We have already emphasized and clarified
the requirement of publication in this
Court’s Resolution in Tañada v. Tuvera:
We hold therefore that all statutes,
including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity
which shall begin fifteen (15) days
after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties.
(Emphasis supplied.) 12
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated
in Dadole v. Commission on Audit,13 De Jesus
v. Commission on Audit,14 andPhilippine
International Trading Corporation v.
Commission on Audit.15
In the case at bar, the ECEC was issued by
petitioner pursuant to its rule-making
authority provided in PD 269, as amended,
particularly Sec. 24:
Section 24. Board of Directors. — (a)
The Management of a Cooperative
shall be vested in its Board, subject
to the supervision and control of
NEA which shall have the right to be
represented and to participate in all
Board meetings and deliberations
and to approve all policies and
resolutions.
The composition, qualifications, the
manner of elections and filling of
vacancies, the procedures for
holding meetings and other similar
provisions shall be defined in the By-
laws of the Cooperative subject to
NEA policies, rules and regulations x
x x.
The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives
in the country. It is not a mere internal
memorandum, interpretative regulation, or
instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC
should comply with the requirements of the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of
1987. In previous cases involving the
election of directors for electric
cooperatives, the validity of the ECEC was
not put in issue. The ECEC then enjoyed the
presumption of validity. In this case,
however, respondent directly questioned
the validity of the ECEC in his second
amended petition. The trial court thus
required petitioner to show proof of
publication of the ECEC. Petitioner could
have easily provided such proof had the
ECEC actually been published in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation
in the country. This simple proof could have
immediately laid this case to rest.
Petitioner’s failure to do so only implies that
the ECEC was not published accordingly, a
fact supported by the certification from the
National Printing Office.
Lastly, petitioner avers that a petition for
mandamus and prohibition should not have
been resorted to by respondent. The proper
recourse, according to petitioner, is a
petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner
miserably errs on this point. Rule 63 on
declaratory relief states:
Section 1. Who may file petition.—
Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and
for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder.
As stated above, a requirement under Rule
63 is that the petition for declaratory relief
must be filed "before any breach or
violation" the questioned document may
cause. In the instant case, it cannot be
gainsaid that a breach has not yet occurred
since an actual dispute has already arisen
between ZAMSURECO and respondent––the
screening committee of the cooperative on
the erroneous implementation of a code
whose legality and implementation is being
questioned.
On the other hand, it is familiar and
fundamental doctrine that a writ of
prohibition or mandamus may issue when "x
x x a board unlawfully excludes another
from x x x enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled x x x."16
Considering that the screening committee of
the board has excluded respondent from
being elected as board member of
ZAMSURECO because of the latter’s
improper implementation of the code, a
petition for mandamus and prohibition is
the proper recourse.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition,
and AFFIRM IN TOTO the March 6, 2003
Decision and June 10, 2003 Resolution in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68769. Costs against
petitioner.
16. Taxicab Operators vs. The Board of
Transportation
GR L-59234, 30 September 1982 En Banc,
Melencio-Herrera (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in
the result
FACTS:
To insure that only safe and comfortable
units are used as public conveyances and in
order that the commuting public may be
assured of comfort, convenience, and
safety, the Board of Transportation (BOT)
issued Memorandum Circular phasing out
the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT
circular, respondent Director of the Bureau
of Land Transportation (BLT) issued
Implementing Circular formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be
allowed andaccepted for registration as
public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators
of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao
and Ace Transportation filed a petition for
"Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction and
TemporaryRestraining Order", to declare the
nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT
and Memorandum Circular of the BLT.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the implementation and
enforcement of the assailed memorandum
circulars violate the petitioners'
constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection
of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and
unreasonable classification and standard.
HELD:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they
were deprived of procedural due process.
Neither can they state with certainty that
public respondents had not availed of other
sources of inquiry prior to issuing the
challenged Circulars for the Board gave a
wide range of choice in gathering necessary
information or data in the formulation of
any policy, plan or program. It is not
mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of
position papers or other documents from
operators or persons who may be affected,
this being only one of the options open to
the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority. Furthermore, as public contend it
is impractical to subject every taxicab to
constant and recurring evaluation, not to
speak of the fact that it can open the door
to the adoption of multiple standards,
possible collusion, and even graft and
corruption. A reasonable standard must be
adopted to apply to an vehicles affected
uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
years supplies that reasonable standard. The
product of experience shows that by that
time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost
recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained. They are also generally dilapidated
and no longer fit for safe and comfortable
service to the public especially considering
that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours every day in three shifts
of eight hours per shift. With that standard
of reasonableness and absence of
arbitrariness, the requirement of due
process has been met. On Equal Protection
of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro
Manila only and was directed solely towards
the taxi industry does not violate their right
to equal protection of the law for the traffic
conditions are not the same in every city, a
substantial distinction exists so that
infringement of the equal protection clause
can hardly be successfully claimed. The
State, in the exercise, of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety
and welfare of society. It may also regulate
property rights. In the language of Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded". In so far as the non-
application of the assailed Circulars to other
transportation services is concerned, it need
only be recalled that the equal protection
clause does not imply that the same
treatment be accorded all and sundry. It
applies to things or persons identically or
similarly situated. It permits of classification
of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on
substantial distinction, which make for real
differences, and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. What is required
under the equal protection clause is the
uniform operation by legal means so that all
persons under identical or similar
circumstance would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and
the liabilities imposed. The challenged
Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the
questioned Circulars do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity. To declare a law
unconstitutional, the infringement of
constitutional right must be clear,
categorical and undeniable. Hence, the
Writs prayed for are denied and was
dismissed.
17. MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
JEROME JAPSON, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks
to set aside the December 11, 2009
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 94426 affirming the July 6, 2005
Decision3 of the Civil Service Commission-
Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR)
in CAR-05-034DC, as well as its March 17,
2010 Resolution4 denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. is the
holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce
from the Baguio Colleges Foundation. When
applying for graduation, he was allowed to
join the graduation ceremonies despite a
deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science,
pursuant to a school policy allowing
students with deficiencies of not more than
12 units to be included in the list of
graduates. However, a restriction came
after, which is, that the deficiency must be
cured before the student can be considered
a graduate.
In 1985, petitioner found employment with
the Social Security System (SSS) in Bangued,
Abra. Sometime in September 1993, the
personnel head of the SSS in Bangued, Abra
informed petitioner that the Civil Service
Commission was conducting a Career
Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in
October of the same year. Petitioner filed an
application to take the examination,
believing that the CSC still allowed CSPE
applicants to substitute the length of their
government service for any academic
deficiency which they may have. However,
the above-mentioned policy of the CSC had
been discontinued since January 1993
pursuant to Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of
1991 and Office Memo. No. 63, Series of
1992.
Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests
on October 17, 1993 and obtained a rating
of 80.52%. Eventually, petitioner was
promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-
Charge Branch Head of the SSS at Bangued,
Abra. In October 1995, he finally eliminated
his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.
On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome
Japson, a former Senior Member Services
Representative of SSS Bangued, filed a
letter-complaint with the Civil Service
Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging
that petitioner made deliberate false entries
in his CSPE application, specifically, that he
obtained his college degree in 1993 when
actually he graduated in 1995 only, after
removing his deficiency of 1.5 units in
Military Education. Also, that petitioner was
not qualified to take the CSPE examination
in 1993 since he was not yet then a
graduate of a four-year college course,
contrary to the entry in his application form.
After preliminary investigation, petitioner
was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of
Official documents, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service by the CSC-CAR.6
Respondent’s Letter-Complaint7 against
petitioner was docketed as CSC Disciplinary
Administrative Case No. BB-03-006.
In his Answer,8 petitioner essentially
pleaded good faith, lack of malice, and
honest mistake. He maintained that at the
time of his application to take the CSPE, he
was of the honest belief that the policy of
the CSC – that any deficiency in the
applicant’s educational requirement may be
substituted by his length of service – was
still subsisting.
On July 6, 2005, the CSC-CAR, through
Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S. Danipog,
rendered a Decision9 containing the
following pronouncements:
Clearly, respondent Catipon is not without
any fault under the foregoing circumstances.
The only issue now left is with respect to the
particular offense for which Catipon may be
held responsible. Respondent Catipon is
charged (with) four offenses: Dishonesty,
Falsification of Official Documents, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service.
The key document allegedly falsified in this
case is the Application Form x x x of
respondent Catipon for the purpose of
taking the CS Professional Examination
scheduled on October 17, 1993. Close and
careful perusal of the said application form
reveals that most of the entries filled up by
respondent are typewritten. The only
entries handwritten by respondent are
those corresponding to "Year Graduated"
and "School Where Graduated" which were
answered by Macario with "1984" and "BCF"
respectively. Another handwritten entry is
with respect to "Degree Finished", the
handwritten "BSC" entry, however, was just
superimposed on the typewritten
"Commerce".
The fact that majority of the entries or data
in the application form is typewritten
suggests that the said application form was
consciously drafted and meticulously
prepared before its actual submission to the
CSC for processing. They are relevant and
material entries or data sought from
respondent. It is worth emphasizing
however that the pre-drafted application
form, considering the typewritten entries,
shows respondent’s confusion on how to
make entries thereat. Respondent answered
both the IF YES column and IF NO column
corresponding to the question "Are you a
college graduate" in Item 8. x x x
xxxx
The manner that Item 8 was filled up by
respondent Catipon shows lack of deliberate
intent to defraud the government. He
manifested in his application his uncertainty
on how to take the fact that he only lacks
1.5 units Military Science to be conferred a
graduate status, vis-à-vis the CSC policy on
educational requirement. Though the entry
"undergrad" was erased, the CSC employee
who processed the application would have
doubted the truthfulness and authenticity of
respondent’s entries in Item 8 of the
Application Form, and thus the educational
status of Macario. x x x
xxxx
Catipon had tried to show the real state of
the matter regarding his educational
attainment as can be deduced from the
manner he answered Item No. 8 in the
application form. This may be taken as good
faith, which will serve to mitigate any
liability incurred by respondent Catipon. The
premeditated intent to deceive or willfully
distort the facts in this case is not present.
The acts of Catipon do not even show
blatant disregard of an established rule or a
clear intent to violate the law if at all, there
was attempt to reveal the truth to the
examination division processing the
application.
xxxx
With [regard] to the eligibility earned by
respondent Macario in view of his passing
the October 17, 1993 Career Service
Professional Examination, the same needs to
be revoked being the fruit of a poisonous
tree, so to speak. Paragraph 2 of Sec. 6, Rule
II, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 states:
Provided that when an applica[nt] for
examination is found to have x x x
intentionally made any false statement of
any material fact in his application, x x x the
Commission shall invalidate such
examination x x x.
With the foregoing, respondent Macario U.
Catipon, Jr., Senior Analyst and OIC Branch
Head, Social Security System, Bangued,
Abra, is hereby exonerated of the charges
Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Grave Misconduct.
However, respondent is found guilty of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable
penalty on the first offense of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
is suspension of six months and one day to
one year.
Under Section 53 of the same Rules, good
faith is enumerated as one mitigating
circumstance. Thus, respondent Macario
Catipon, Jr. is hereby meted a penalty of six
months and one day suspension, without
pay, which is the minimum period of the
penalty attached to the offense committed.
The Career Service Professional eligibility of
respondent is also ordered revoked, without
prejudice however to retaking of the said
examination. Thus, Catipon, after serving
suspension herein provided should not be
allowed to go back to his current position
without CS Professional eligibility.
Consequently, in case respondent Catipon
fails to retake or pass CSPE, after serving his
suspension, he may be demoted to any
available position that fits his
subprofessional eligibility.10
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but
the CSC-CAR sustained its judgment in a
March 23, 2006 Decision,12which contained
the following pronouncement:
Catipon also asserted that in view of his
exoneration of Dishonesty, Falsification of
Official Documents and Grave Misconduct,
there is no longer any basis to hold
respondent guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. This
contention is without legal basis. In the case
of Philippine Retirement Authority vs. Rupa
363 SCRA 480, the Honorable Supreme
Court held as follows:
Under the Civil Service laws and rules, there
is no description of what specific acts
constitute the grave offense of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service.
As alluded to previously in Decision No. CAR-
05-034DC, Catipon is not without fault
under the circumstances. To completely
exonerate respondent would be inequitable
and iniquitous considering the totality of
events surrounding this case. Though there
was no deliberate intent to falsify or to
make dishonest entry in the Application
Form as deduced from the manner that the
said form was accomplished, the fact that
there was indeed such dishonest or false
entry in the CSPE Application Form is
undisputedly established. In view of such an
established fact, the integrity of the Civil
Service Examination, particularly the CSPE
has been blemished which is sufficient to
constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the
Interest of the Service.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Review docketed with the
CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 94426, petitioner
prayed for injunctive relief and the reversal
of the above CSC-CAR decision. He argued
that the CSC-CAR incorrectly found him
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service when he has been
declared innocent of the charges of
dishonesty, falsification of official
documents, and grave misconduct; that
while the Supreme Court has held that
making false entries in public documents
may be considered as conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, such act
must be accompanied by deliberate intent
or a willful desire to defy or disregard
established rules or norms in the
service;14 and that with the finding that he
merely committed an innocent mistake in
filling up the application form for the CSPE,
he may not be found guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
On December 11, 2009, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision denying the petition,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision [sic] of the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative
Region dated July 6, 2005 and March 23,
2006 is [sic] AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA held that instead of filing a petition
for review directly with it, petitioner should
have interposed an appeal with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to
Sections 5(A)(1),43 and 49 of the CSC
Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases;16 that by filing a petition directly with
it, petitioner violated the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies; that
petitioner’s case is not exceptional as would
exempt it from the application of the
doctrine; that per the ruling in Bayaca v.
Judge Ramos,17 the absence of deliberate
intent or willful desire to defy or disregard
established rules or norms in the service
does not preclude a finding of guilt for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service; and that petitioner did not act
with prudence and care, but instead was
negligent, in the filling up of his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify
beforehand the requirements for the
examination.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but
the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant
recourse. Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for
resolution:
(A)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO REALIZE THAT GIVEN THE
IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SUSPENSION
IMPOSED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION-CORDILLERA
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING
JUDICIAL RECOURSE BEFORE (THE COURT
OF APPEALS);
(B)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
MISAPPLIEDIN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE
THE RULE ON PRIOR EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
(C)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE PETITIONER
ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND THIS NEGATES
GUILT FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.18
Petitioner’s Arguments
In his Petition and Reply19 seeking a reversal
of the assailed CA dispositions and,
consequently, exoneration from the charge
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, petitioner argues that he was
constrained to file the petition for review
with the CA as his decreed six-month
suspension was imminent as a consequence
of the executory nature of the CSC-CAR
decision; that immediate judicial
intervention was necessary to "prevent
serious injury and damage" to him, which is
why his CA petition included a prayer for
injunctive relief; that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies
should not have been applied strictly in his
case, given the special circumstance that his
suspension would mean loss of his only
source of income;20 that he should be
completely exonerated from the charges
against him, since conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service must be
accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful
desire to defy or disregard established rules
or norms in the service – which is absent in
his case; and that his career service
professional eligibility should not be revoked
in the interest of justice and in the spirit of
the policy which promotes and preserves
civil service eligibility.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment21 seeking denial of the
petition, respondent counters that
completion of all the academic
requirements – and not merely attendance
at graduation rites – confers the necessary
degree which qualifies a student to take the
CSPE; that petitioner’s claim that he is a
graduate as of 1984 is belied by his
Transcript of Records22 and other pieces of
evidence submitted, which reflect the date
of his graduation as October 1995 – or after
completion of his 1.5-unit deficiency in
Military Science; that petitioner cannot
claim to suffer irreparable injury or damage
as a result of the CSC-CAR’s Decision, which
is valid and binding; that the revocation of
petitioner’s eligibility is only proper, since he
was then not qualified when he took the
CSPE; that the CSC-CAR was correct in
finding that petitioner’s act compromised
the image and integrity of the civil service,
which justified the imposition of a
corresponding penalty; that this Court in the
Rupa case made it clear that the act of
making false entries in public documents
constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, a grave offense
punishable by suspension for six months and
one day to one year for the first offense, and
dismissal for the second offense; and that
indeed, petitioner violated the doctrines of
primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies when he proceeded
directly to the CA, instead of filing an appeal
with the CSC.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2
(1) and 3 of Article IX-B, state that –
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as
the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service
and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service. It shall strengthen the merit and
rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all
levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report
on its personnel programs.
Thus, "the CSC, as the central personnel
agency of the Government, has jurisdiction
over disputes involving the removal and
separation of all employees of government
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original
charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service."23
In line with the above provisions of the
Constitution and its mandate as the central
personnel agency of government and sole
arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service, the CSC adopted Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, which the CA cited
as the basis for its pronouncement. Section
4 thereof provides:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission. — The Civil Service
Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or
brought before it, directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and shall
review decisions and actions of its offices
and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, the Civil Service
Commission shall have the final authority to
pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in
the civil service and upon all matters relating
to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of
such officers and employees.
As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to
Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service
Commission Proper, or Commission Proper,
shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil
Service Regional Offices brought before it on
petition for review. And under Section 43,
"decisions of heads of departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities
and other instrumentalities imposing a
penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, may be appealed to the Commission
Proper within a period of fifteen days from
receipt thereof."24 "Commission Proper"
refers to the Civil Service Commission-
Central Office.25
It is only the decision of the Commission
Proper that may be brought to the CA on
petition for review, under Section 50 of MC
19, which provides thus:
Section 50. Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a
decision of the Commission before the Court
of Appeals by way of a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court.26
Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that
in filing his petition for review directly with it
from the CSC-CAR Regional Director,
petitioner failed to observe the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. As
correctly stated by the appellate court, non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies
renders petitioner’s CA petition premature
and thus dismissible.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that "before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, he or she should have availed himself
or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if
resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his or her jurisdiction, then
such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court's judicial power can be
sought.1âwphi1 The premature invocation
of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons. The
availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore,
the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied
with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case."27 Indeed, the
administrative agency concerned – in this
case the Commission Proper – is in the "best
position to correct any previous error
committed in its forum."28
The CA is further justified in refusing to take
cognizance of the petition for review, as
"[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special
competence."29 When petitioner’s recourse
lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper
in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be
faulted for refusing to acknowledge
petitioner before it.
We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement
that petitioner was negligent in filling up his
CSPE application form and in failing to verify
beforehand the specific requirements for
the CSPE examination. Petitioner’s claim of
good faith and absence of deliberate intent
or willful desire to defy or disregard the
rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as
to exonerate him from the charge of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service; under our legal system,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.30 Moreover,
petitioner – as mere applicant for
acceptance into the professional service
through the CSPE – cannot expect to be
served on a silver platter; the obligation to
know what is required for the examination
falls on him, and not the CSC or his
colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by the
appellate court:
In Bacaya31 v. Ramos, the Supreme Court
found respondent judge guilty of both
negligence and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service when he issued
an arrest warrant despite the deletion of the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on an
accused in a particular criminal case.
Respondent judge in the said case claimed
that the issuance of the warrant was a
mistake, done in good faith and that it has
been a practice in his office for the Clerk of
Court to study motions and that he would
simply sign the prepared order. The
Supreme Court rejected his defense and
stated that negligence is the failure to
observe such care as a reasonably prudent
and careful person would use under
ordinary circumstances. An act of the will is
necessary for deliberate intent to exist; such
is not necessary in an act of negligence.
Here, petitioner failed to verify the
requirements before filing his application to
take the CSPE exam. He simply relied on his
prior knowledge of the rules, particularly,
that he could substitute his deficiency in
Military Science with the length of his
government service. He cannot lay blame on
the personnel head of the SSS-Bangued,
Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of
the pertinent rules contained in Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of
1991. For, [if] he were truly a reasonably
prudent and careful person, petitioner
himself should have verified from the CSC
the requirements imposed on prospective
examinees. In so doing, he would certainly
have been informed of the new CSC policy
disallowing substitution of one’s length of
government service for academic
deficiencies. Neither should petitioner have
relied on an unnamed Civil Service
employee’s advice since it was not shown
that the latter was authorized to give
information regarding the examination nor
that said employee was competent and
capable of giving correct information. His
failure to verify the actual CSPE
requirements which a reasonably prudent
and careful person would have done
constitutes negligence. Though his failure
was not a deliberate act of the will, such is
not necessary in an act of negligence and, as
in Bacaya, negligence is not inconsistent
with a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.32
The corresponding penalty for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service
may be imposed upon an erring public
officer as long as the questioned act or
conduct taints the image and integrity of the
office; and the act need not be related to or
connected with the public officer’s official
functions. Under our civil service laws, there
is no concrete description of what specific
acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, but the
following acts or omissions have been
treated as such: misappropriation of public
funds; abandonment of office; failure to
report back to work without prior notice;
failure to safe keep public records and
property; making false entries in public
documents; falsification of court orders; a
judge’s act of brandishing a gun, and
threatening the complainants during a
traffic altercation; a court interpreter’s
participation in the execution of a document
conveying complainant’s property which
resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s family;
selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume
Program exemption cards to his officemates
during office hours; a CA employee’s forging
of receipts to avoid her private contractual
obligations; a Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) employee’s act of repeatedly
changing his IP address, which caused
network problems within his office and
allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS
network, thus putting the system in a
vulnerable state of security;33 a public
prosecutor’s act of signing a motion to
dismiss that was not prepared by him, but
by a judge;34 and a teacher’s act of directly
selling a book to her students in violation of
the Code of Ethics for Professional
Teachers.35 In petitioner’s case, his act of
making false entries in his CSPE application
undoubtedly constitutes conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service; the
absence of a willful or deliberate intent to
falsify or make dishonest entries in his
application is immaterial, for conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service
"may or may not be characterized by
corruption or a willful intent to violate the
law or to disregard established rules."36
Finally, the Court cannot consider
petitioner's plea that "in the interest of
justice and in the spirit of the policy which
promotes and preserves civil service
eligibility," his career service professional
eligibility should not be revoked. The act of
using a fake or spurious civil service
eligibility for one's benefit not only amounts
to violation of the civil service examinations
or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the
government and the public in general. It is a
transgression of the law which has no place
in the public service.37 "Assumption of public
office is impressed with the paramount
public interest that requires the highest
standards of ethical conduct. A person
aspiring for public office must observe
honesty, candor, and faithful compliance
with the law. Nothing less is expected."38
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
December 11, 2009 Decision and March 17,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
18. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE
M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN
M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by
sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet
Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos
from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery,
and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing agencies,
and the several presidents of the NGOs set
up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO. Several
petitions were lodged before the Court
similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for
Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a
writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an
Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being
acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court
issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that
the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and
a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members
of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and
all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under
Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of
 PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating
to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute
undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional.
The post-enactment measures which govern
the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be
confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step
beyond that will undermine the separation
of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf
article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any
form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President”‖ constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits
of the President‘s authority with respect to
the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. It gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the
law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects” was declared
constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE
ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF
THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE
FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT
CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE
SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A
―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT
SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.
19. Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987
FACTS:
In 1980 President Marcos amended
Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that
no carabao and carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another; such violation
shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture
by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for
the carabeef and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit in the case of the
carabaos.
On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6
carabaos were confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for having been transported from Masbate to
Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ
for replevin, challenging the constitutionality
of said EO. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the animals and declined to
rule on the validity of the law on the ground
that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision
was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this petition
for review filed by Petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not police power is
properly enforced
HELD:
NO. The protection of the
general welfare is the particular function of
the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power
is simply defined as the power inherent in the
State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. As long as
the activity or the property has some
relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. In the case at bar, E.O. 626-A has
the same lawful subject as the original
executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribio
case) but NOT the same lawful method. The
reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is
missing. The challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.