UN-ASSING THE AO

Withdrawal action. Un-assing the AO. Retrograde action. Disengaging. Strategic

withdrawal. Getting’ outta Dodge. Retirement. Fall back. Turn tail. Attack in
another direction (Marines only). Beating feet. Or, as King Arthur put it so
eloquently in regards to the Killer Rabbit in Monty Python’s Search for the Holy
Grail, “Run away! Run away!”

Whatever you want to call it, there comes a time when the best course of action
is just to get the hell away from a superior enemy force. It is actually one of the
hardest military tasks to perform successfully, without the withdrawal turning into
a rout. To the Western way of thinking, this is usually considered “manly”, but it
sometimes makes good sense in a particular situation. The Eastern and guerilla
mentality sees it as a perfectly viable course of action with no dishonor in turning
tail almost before the last shots echo out. But as the old saying goes: “He who
fights and runs away, lives to fight another day.”

Here’s a short lesson from the official U.S. Army course on the subject,
INFANTRY PLATOON DEFENSE, with tactics for withdrawal, delay and
disengagement towards the end of the chapter.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/accp/in0497/lesson3.htm

Let’s examine some of the tactics used by some of our enemies (and a handful of
friends) in the past and in the present. Under-estimating and/or deigning to learn
lessons from the enemy has often been a costly failing which could have been
corrected easily enough.
 USE OF SNIPERS

Snipers have traditionally played a vital role in covering withdrawals and delaying
enemy pursuit, with their effectiveness all out of proportion to their small
numbers. The word “sniper” was often over-used during WWII, to include men
armed with machine pistols or even light machineguns, but the effect was the
same.

German, Russia: Some of Germany’s top WWII snipers on the Eastern Front
certainly agreed that such a use of crack marksmen worked very well in a
delaying action:

“In most cases four to six snipers were ordered to rear guard and eliminate any
enemy appearing; very good results. Use machine guns for rear guard only in
emergencies since snipers delayed enemy's advance by one or two hits without
easily revealing his own position.”

German, France: “We found that the Germans usually tried to pin down our
leading elements by directing fire from machine pistols and other small weapons
against their front and machinegun fire against their rear. The Schmeisser
machine pistol has a high cyclic rate of fire, but is by no means accurate. It was
used extensively by German snipers who placed themselves 3 or 4 miles outside
towns or villages, along roads leading to these communities. The snipers would
cut in on the leading element of a company or battalion in order to hold it back.
They would fire until they were out of ammunition, and then would jump out of
their trees and come running towards our lines, shouting ;Kamerad!’ Each sniper
wore a specially camouflaged uniform and also had camouflaged his weapon by
painting it and tying leaves to it so that it would blend with the surrounding
foliage. An important mission of German snipers was to delay the advance of our
columns into populated places. This was why they fired on our leading elements,
instead of holding their fire and trying to engage a larger force.”

German, Italy: “Individual snipers armed with light machine guns, submachine
guns, or rifles were concealed in the vineyards and trees forward of, and on the
flanks of, the main German positions. The mission of these snipers probably was
to protect the German flanks and to harass the United Nations force.”

Red Army, Russia: Red Army tactics included covering a retreat with 3-4
snipers accompanied by a single automatic rifleman, with the latter cautioned to
fire sparingly and change positions often.

Japanese, WWII, Burma: The Japanese in WWII made use of snipers, some of
them armed with light machine guns, in delaying actions in Burma.

“Sometimes, instead of outposts, a screen of snipers would be pushed forward

from the main position. On occasions when a sniper screen was used in place of
outposts, the snipers would fire a few rounds at the advance guard, slip out of
their trees, retire 100 yards to a new position, then fire and retire again at the first
opportunity. This procedure was continued until the snipers had fallen back to
the main defense position.”

FORCING THE ENEMY TO DEPLOY

 An assault is an exhausting endeavor, especially when conducted
repeatedly.

This is one of the most important missions of delaying elements or a rear guard.
Every time the enemy is force to deploy his troops into battle formation, lay down
covering fire, and flank and/or assault, it robs him of time, expends prodigious
amounts of ammunition, and eventually exhausts the assault troops.
There is also a powerful psychological effect, as the enemy is forced to react to
you and loses the initiative. As well, if the rear guard continually sneaks out the
backdoor to leave the assault teams storming vacant positions and inflicting very
small casualties, it quickly becomes discouraging.

Rebels, Chechnya: “The insurgents intend ambushes…to impede…the enemy.

The type of ambush chosen depends on the combat situation, the correlation of
forces, and the terrain. If the purpose is to delay the movement of forces and
assets, to alter their direction, or to force a premature deployment into combat
positions, then the insurgents can use a significantly smaller force than they
would need for ambushes to destroy or capture the enemy…only a few
insurgents can detain a company-size or smaller unit for several hours…”

Japanese, WWII, Burma: “It was the function of the outposts to open fire as
soon as the Allied advance guard came within range, and so pin down the
leading elements and force them to deploy and waste time probing for the flanks
of the Jap position. This accomplished, the outpost would retire before it was
encircled

Native fighters, German East Africa [Tanzania]: “After discharging their

firearms, the natives retire hastily…to get ahead of the column so that they may
repeat their attack…By constantly harassing their enemy in this way, they hope,
while avoiding serious losses on their own side, to tire him out, compel him to
expend his ammunition and gradually reduce his power of resistance till he can
finally be overwhelmed…”

German, Italy: “Fire will be opened at extreme ranges on an enemy advancing

for a major attack…” [to force them to deploy early.]

AMBUSH, OBSTACLES & LIMITED COUNTER-ATTACKS

German, Mountain Ski Troops: German Gebirgsjaeger mountain and ski

troops, especially small raiding parties who often encountered larger enemy
groups, employed the age-old and still-used “fish hook” technique of ambushing
their back trail during withdrawals.
 Figure 28.-Ambush position on a ridge.

“If possible, ambush positions will be established on ridges from which it is

possible to direct effective enfilading fire at the enemy during his slow ascent,
while the troops not yet in position dodge quickly to the rear (fig. 28).”

German, WWII, Italy: “Every opportunity to inflict casualties on an enemy

advancing recklessly must be taken by carrying out limited counterattacks.”

British, Crete: When Allied forces on Crete were forced to retreat from the
German airborne forces on Crete, the paratroops were quick to spot the
withdrawal. Fortunately for the retreating British, Greek and Commonwealth
troops, their retrograde was covered by a company of Maoris. With their warrior
hearts, chilling cries, and unexpected, aggressive bayonet charges, they
repeatedly sent the pursuing Germans fleeing in disarray. Due in large part to the
Maoris and their unconventional tactics, the British retreat was successfully
conducted overnight with very few casualties.

Red Chinese, Korea: “Tactical traps were employed by the enemy to lure
United Nations troops into an area. Withdrawals were made by some enemy
troops to entice UN forces into a hasty exploitation. Other enemy troops
positioned themselves to strike the flank or flanks force, in an attempt to destroy
small UN units. In selecting an ambush site, the number of riflemen on the first
line decreased, but an increase of automatic weapons was provided. The bulk of
the enemy troops deployed under cover to afford a quick attack.”

Rebels, Chechnya: [Guidelines for jihadist commanders include] “Conduct an

organized withdrawal in small groups while deploying ambushes and delivering
retaliatory fire if the forces of law and order launch a surprise attack on a broad
front. Maintain psychological pressure on the forces of law and order by firing on
them regularly.”

Viet Cong, Vietnam: “It should be noted that the VC have a negligible ability to
support a withdrawal with indirect fire weapons. His chief defenses against
pursuit are the use of rapid movement, ambushes, booby traps and snipers
along his routes of withdrawal.”

USE OF RESTRICTIVE OR IMPASSABLE TERRAIN

The worse the terrain, the easier it is for a small rearguard to greatly delay
the opponent’s advance with a relative handful of men. In addition to
mountains, urban terrain can be considered a formidable terrain barrier.

Taliban, Afghanistan: “The Taliban used Afghanistan’s varying terrain to their

advantage when defending against Coalition offensives. In the mountainous
Gumbad valley of northern Kandahar, insurgents fought from behind piles of
rocks on a mountain face, fled through irrigation ducts designed to channel
snowmelt, and disappeared over the ridgeline into a nearby mountain range
totally inaccessible to Coalition forces except by air…In Kandahar’s lush and
heavily cultivated Panjwayi valley, the Taliban fired from the cover of fields and
orchards, and moved unobserved through the valley’s many irrigation canals…In
the third offensive, insurgents ambushed advancing troops in outlying areas to
the south, and employed a sniper whose position was never identified. In all
three instances, the insurgents fled using pre-planned escape routes minutes
before air support arrived...The insurgents broke contact shortly before the
aircraft arrived. They escaped by climbing up a set of irrigation ducts running
down the mountain. They then flooded the ducts to prevent the soldiers below
from giving chase.”

Red Chinese, Korea: “The covering force or delaying party which covered an
enemy withdrawal was usually selected from the last unit to break contact with
United Nations Forces….The covering forces ranged in size from a 3-man group
to a platoon, although a squad was normally employed…These delaying parties
were placed at strategic points where the land was least favorable to attack,
where the roads were poor and natural approaches few. Thus, a small number of
men armed with automatic weapons were able to hinder a United Nations
attack.”

Mujahideen, Afghanistan: “The Mujahideen from Lezhi retreated south while a

20-man Mujahideen force blocked the Manay Kandow pass. The pass is
dominated by a high peak which is capped with a thick rock slab. Under the slab
was a natural cave which the Mujahideen improved. The cave could
accommodate the 20 Mujahideen during artillery and air strikes. The Mujahideen
also dug communications trenches so that they could quickly reoccupy their
fighting positions once the firing stopped. The firing positions dominated the Tani
plain and were well positioned to stop any infantry attack. The DRA [Soviet
puppet government forces] repeatedly attacked the pass but could make no
headway. The infantry would attack, meet withering Mujahideen fire and stop.
Then massed air and artillery would pound the area. The infantry would again try
to attack, but would again be stopped immediately. The procedure would then
repeat itself, but the DRA made no headway during its 10-day attack. After 10
days, the DRA called in heavy Soviet airstrikes which continuously hit the
mountain top. The thick rock slab began to sway and rock. The Mujahideen were
afraid that the rock slab might shift and crush their cave, so they finally
withdrew.”

Finnish, Finland: Grossly outnumbered by Soviet forces equipped with modern

tanks, aircraft and artily, the Finnish Defense Forces during the 1939-40 Winter
War became masters of the unseen delay and withdrawal with extreme economy
of forces. In the thick forests and deep snow of the central regions, the
mechanized Soviet Army was literally trapped on the few existing roads, unable
to maneuver or flank. Without skis or snowshoes, not even the infantrymen could
move off the roads in snow several feet deep. It didn’t take much for small groups
of snipers to halt a Soviet advance. In one case near Lake Suojarvi, a well
camouflaged sharpshooter with a Lahti automatic rifle held up an entire Russian
regiment for over an hour.

Above the Arctic Circle in Lapland, a flat endless tundra devoid of trees seemed
to be made for rapid advances. But in a scorched earth policy, the Finns, out-
numbered five to one and without any tanks or anti-tanks guns, destroyed each
and every man-made or natural feature which might provide Red Army soldiers
any food, shelter or warmth as the winter temperatures dropped to as low as 40
below zero. Despite a lack of cover, the Arctic nights provided long hours
darkness and blizzards swept the landscape, allowing warmly dressed native
Lapp snipers to whittle away at the Russian soldiers practically at will.

DISPERSAL & PRE-PLANNED ESCAPE ROUTES

Viet Cong, Vietnam: “Recognition of the VC doctrine of emergency dispersal is

of vital importance to successful pursuit. The VC commander may exercise one
of two options, both of which are based on prior planning. He may elect to
withdraw his force as a unit(s) or order dispersal into small groups. If emergency
dispersal should be required due to pursuit, blocking of the withdrawal route or
intensive air effort, small unit leaders take over again, possibly ordering total
dispersal on a man for man basis. If the unit commander sends a few men off in
different directions to draw fire and mislead the aircraft, when dispersing as
individuals and being pursued by ground forces.”

Japanese, Burma: “After the withdrawal had begun, the Japanese would
disperse in groups of three or four men, who would work their way back over
unmapped trails and rendezvous at an assembly point about ½ to 1 mile to the
rear. From here the rear guard would proceed in column down the trail until it
came to the position selected for the next stand.”

German, Mountain Ski Troops: “As long as the raiding party is under fire, it will
retreat, if possible, on previously prepared tracks made from one assembly point
to another, as designated by the leader. Ski tracks often remain visible for a long
time and betray the route. Therefore, the enemy must be deceived as to the
return route by dummy tracks, loops, and false route signs. In newly fallen snow
the tracks may be blurred by spruce branches dragged by the last skier. If the
enemy pursues, as many delays as possible must be arranged for him. These
include sudden fire from ambush, trail-breaking through difficult terrain,
preparation of road blocks and obstacles, and mining of trails.”

Taliban, Afghanistan: “Most ambush positions were carefully placed to

facilitate a quick retreat. Fields, irrigation ditches, bunkers, and small compounds
provided cover for insurgents to escape unnoticed from the air or to wait out
bombardment.”
Native fighters, Tanzania: “[The native soldier’s]…mobility and incredible
marching powers, coupled with accurate knowledge of the country, maker him
able to carry out apparently impossible detours. He has no fixed line of retreat,
for after a defeat his forces break up into small parties, which retire in all
directions and concentrate again at points previously agreed upon, often in the
rear of the victorious troops.”

USE OF LIMITED VISIBILITY

Bad weather has always been a mixed blessing to the infantryman. (I never really
did see the Army’s thinking that one needs to go out and practice being cold, wet
and miserable. Ma Nature and Mr. Murphy will take care of that eventually. But
that’s neither here nor there.) When it comes time for an undetected advance or
withdrawal, “Infantry Sunshine” becomes the grunt’s best friend.

“Infantry Sunshine” provides cover for a withdrawal.

Japanese, Burma: “When the Jap rear guard abandoned a delaying position,
such a move was made at night, usually starting about 1 hour after sunset… they
were accustomed to leaving a light machine gunner or a sniper in position until
first light. He would fire an occasional burst to create the impression that the
position was still occupied.”

German, Italy: In the Italian campaign, it was noted that the Germans usually
withdrew in the early morning, between 0200 and 0400 hours. The rearmost
delaying parties were equipped with smoke grenades, pots, and candles to
concealment of their movements with smoke screens

Red Army, Russia: [Organized withdrawals were conducted] “Especially at night

and during the extended periods of morning and evening fog that are
characteristic of damp forests and swamps, the evacuation of a position cannot
be observed from the air or ground.”

Mujahideen, Afghanistan: “That night, the weather cooperated with the

breakout. There was a heavy gusty wind which blew sand around. The noise of
the wind and the dust concealed us as we moved between the enemy tanks.
There were many Mujahideen in that cordon. There were Mujahideen from two
districts and other areas as well. About 2,000 Mujahideen escaped into the night.
The dust and wind also helped the civilians exfiltrate and covered their escape.
When we got out, the wind died down.”

PRESERVATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES

This is the crux of the whole matter. A withdrawal that leaves your forces
scattered and in disarray, without cohesive units, is a wide open invitation for
defeat in detail or a complete rout. It’s a tricky matter to pull it off successfully.
But there are ways.

Japanese, Burma: “By such actions [small rearguards & snipers firing and
retreating] the Japs avoided the isolation and eventual destruction of any sizable
portion of their troops.”

Native fighters, Tanzania: “The natives think themselves beaten in a fight only
when they have suffered great losses: flight and escape with small losses they
regard as success.”

Viet Cong, Vietnam: “VC will seek concealment in the local area in preference
to panic and purposeless flight. The individual’s knowledge of fieldcraft, evasion
techniques, and familiarity with the local area are decisive factors. If pursued to a
settlement, he is taught to hide his weapon and other equipment and demand
concealment from the villagers whose fear of possible reprisal from the VC may
provide him temporary protection. His personal safety is the VC’S only
responsibility. If VC personnel have to hide out for weeks before returning to their
unit, this is acceptable as they have no requirement to be back by reveille, and in
their absence, they leave no vital installations unguarded or in danger of attack.”

Taliban, Afghanistan: “In populated areas, insurgents often hid their weapons,
mingled with civilians, and waited until nightfall to retrieve their arms. The
insurgents rarely took serious casualties in hit-and-run ambushes. Their
command-and-control often broke down when US or British forces struck from
multiple directions and closed. Yet, Taliban fighters were rarely cornered. When
assaulted by a large, heavily armed force, they tended to melt away well ahead
of time – particularly in the mountains – and return later after Coalition forces
withdrew.”

Unfortunately, even after all this, you can’t just kick back and have a brewski, eh.
It’s time to get your poop in a group and get ready for the next round. Still, it sure
beats being tits up in the mud or locked in a POW cage.