A.C. No.

7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
(respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom
he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had
been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you,"
or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following
day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept
at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of
furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face,
which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene,
reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you
that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the
two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love
you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent
together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
 . . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL
BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila
where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that
when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple
attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM
Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue
of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics
and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship"
supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting
of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership
in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact
they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with
Irene.
 xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter
to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer,
has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked
the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits
adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named
respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a
copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter
Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and
Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted
as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly
reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the
Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against
him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in
the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on
an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their
relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under
the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of
Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an
illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his
special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has
not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery"
being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be
married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
is havingflaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise
Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the
child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he
identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's
father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than
that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which is the quantum of evidence needed
in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary;
in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is
required.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly
immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is,
following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
 ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with
her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair
was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are
punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders
him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license
confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear
that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates
the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes
a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner,
filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his
(complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that
the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts
alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are
inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which
provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has
been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be
aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise,
to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the
judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being
married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents.
Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with
respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and
text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact,
he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal
home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11thStreet, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church
where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of
Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala
asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and
Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For
one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after
her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was
carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St.
Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the
certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too
eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents.
Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for
 both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of
the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ
no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene
were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have
been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of
office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants, vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging
respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).1

Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice of Judge
Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30)
hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several
parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the government’s agrarian reform program,
Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus,
Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons.2

Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons, as follows:

1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;

2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy;

3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;

 4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;

5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;

6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and

7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3

Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in need of funds
for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by offering the parcels to
prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4

About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any sale, complainants confronted
respondent. Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles.5

On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file petitions in court for re-
issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious owners of the seven
parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance of titles.6

In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the signatures of the supposed owners
that were affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public
prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the court to have the supposed owners summoned.7

Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to their
being re-filed.8

Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the fictitious owners’ signatures in
the hope of making them look more varied.9

Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed several documents that
included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious)
owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.10

Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and
announced that these were for sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total
of ?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.12

Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their complaint
directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 03-1054.

In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had
voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels and
that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the
seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given a "balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to
defame him and seek his disbarment.13

In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004,14 IBP Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found
respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report of Commissioner Navarro.
However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to the
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the IBP. The Court noted
that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants were mere photocopies and affidavits and that the
persons who supposedly executed such documents were neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus, there could not
have been adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a penalty as grave as disbarment.

The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings were conducted on March
22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25,
2007.17

The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of the Swiss American Lending
Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced
himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot
priced at ₱900,000.00. His company, however, paid only ₱668,000.00. Heinze noted that his company withheld
payment upon his realization that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim and upon
respondent’s failure to produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.

Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras.19 He testified that Heinze introduced him to respondent
who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on
the purchase of a lot priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel in two (2) installments. Upon learning that
Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he wrote to respondent asking him to either work on
the cancellation of the claim or to reimburse him. He added that respondent was unable to produce Amelia Andes,
the ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased.

Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for complainants.20 He testified that in
February 2001, he was introduced to respondent who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty (30)
hectares were owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for the price of ₱2,000,000.00 which he
paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van).

Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint.21

On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their Position Paper. Respondent filed
his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived him of
the chance to cross-examine complainants’ witnesses, and was "bent on prejudicing"22 him.

Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to Investigating Commissioner
Rico A. Limpingco.

In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-CBD’s Rules of Procedure, it was deemed
proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit his/her Report and Recommendation based on matters
discussed during the mandatory conferences, on the parties’ Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on
the results of clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was found to be necessary). As such, respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he was required to file his Position Paper.23

On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper.24 Subsequently, the case was deemed submitted for
Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation.

In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang on account of
Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed that
since 1996, he had relied on the Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang.
He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs executed by
the parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere agent and him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the
public announcements (where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and Memorandum of Agreement.
He surmised that the signatures on such documents appearing above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere
forgeries and crude duplications of his own signature.

In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010,25 Commissioner Limpingco found respondent liable for
gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent was absent in most of the hearings
without justifiable reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR.26 He recommended that respondent be disbarred
and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 adopting the Report of Investigating
Commissioner Limpingco.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.28

Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.

On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for Extension of Time (to file
Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011, the Court granted respondent’s Motion and gave him an
extension of thirty (30) days to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned respondent that no further extension will
be given. Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more Motions for Extension – the first on September 29, 2011 and
the second on November 3, 2011 – both of which were denied by the Court.

Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on December 14, 2011 a Motion to Admit
Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied by the Court on April 17, 2012.

For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.

After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits
of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own
complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his
offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and
skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it.
Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the supreme penalty of
disbarment.

Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the following
grounds:

deceit;

malpractice;

gross misconduct in office;

grossly immoral conduct;

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

violation of the lawyer's oath;

willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and

willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
deceit in usurping the property rights of other persons. By way of examples:

In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for having used a spurious SPA to
mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for administration.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was disbarred for having
acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported vendors and for taking advantage of his position as
Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that the
deed was fictitious.

In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having converted to his personal
use the funds that he received for his clients.

Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court noted in Moran v. Moron:32

Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should
no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such,
the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member
of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a
reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.33

Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify its imposition.34

As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side
is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."36

Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining preponderance of evidence:

All the facts and circumstances of the case;

The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which
they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony;

The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately
appear in the trial; and

The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent committed gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but more so through the
testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that:

respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of the subject parcels;

respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;

respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in cash or in kind – of the subject
parcels;

such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and

respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.

More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been confronted with Lilia Tabang’s
adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities of the supposed owners of the subject parcels, he had failed
to produce such persons or even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this regard, the testimonies of Dieter
Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are particularly significant in so far as they have been made
despite the fact that their interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants.

In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.

Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that
they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. Respondent also evaded the allegations against him by flinging counter-
allegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the proceeds of
the sale of the subject parcels and that after she had been refused, she threatened to defame respondent and seek
his disbarment. In support of this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia
Tabang. He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing above the name "Glenn C.
Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his signature.

Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,37 the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of
his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the
Court Administrator v. Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence
in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is sustained.

It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners of the seven parcels are real
persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the slightest proof of their identities and existence, much less
produce their actual persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat and the
forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just that – allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts and
circumstances which support these claims.

At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the very basis of complainants’ own
allegations and which are actually being assailed by complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent.
Respondent makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her
name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs39 and how he merely respected the title and ownership of the ostensible
owners.40 Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs.41However,
respondent loses sight of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs indicate and the
deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging this Court to sustain him, respondent
would have us rely on the very documents assailed as fraudulent.

Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and self-serving allegations of (1)
how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang as "it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept
Torrens title [sic] unless it is related to a court case"42 and because "[he] does not borrow any Torrens title from
anybody and for whatever purpose;"43 (2) how complainants could not have confronted him to demand the return of
the TCTs and how he could not have told them that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects
and recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his properties of value;"44 and (3)
how he could not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his services only to refuse Lilia
Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no reason for him to refuse an occasion to
earn income.45

Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely embarks on conjectures and
ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from
the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame him and to seek his disbarment after
she had been refused. This evasive posturing notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to adduce
1âwphi 1

even the slightest proof to substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient basis to file the
present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.

Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the sheer lack of evidence adduced
by respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the acts of which
he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State – the administration of justice – as an officer of the
court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."47

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took
advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others.
He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous
wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has
conducted himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’
plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from the
IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to
comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants’
cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's
personal record as attorney.

WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with
malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.

On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he
had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint
for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on
March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at
11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall.

An entrapment was set up by the NBI.

Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to
the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the
entrapment.

When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So
complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with
respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the
latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To
which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked
money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to
the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow
florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-
Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent
declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.

On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the
institution of disbarment proceedings against him.

On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and disposition of his
administrative case (Case No. 74).

Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against
respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13,
1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative
Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution.

In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the
marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent.

He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant
was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30,
1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption
of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.

In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge,
malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed
by respondent against him.

In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition.

On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.

II

We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from
complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent
filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of
extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179
SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial
Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81
SCRA 393 [1978]).

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds
(Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a
source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action
(Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let
a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the
personal records of respondent.

E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative Case No. 2148 1 and by
spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice
and gross misconduct.

In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the Office of the
Solicitor General submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from
the practice of law during the pendency of these cases. 3

The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and
September 13, 1976 in G.R. Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With
commendable thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the
scope and magnitude of respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous transactions
complained of, we quote extensively from said reports which are sustained by the evidence of record.

I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are reported by then Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows:

PREPATORY STATEMENT

This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called
respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan
to the Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975 which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few lots on installment
basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the
attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a "Contract of Sale".

Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said company claim that
although there is a pending case No. L-39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the
property being sold, the case is almost won in their favor and are just waiting for your
final decision within a couple of months or even less.

In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order to bring to your
attention this transaction and to protect my rights in the event that any unfavorable
circumstances may arise in the future.

xxx xxx xxx

Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred
the copy of Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for "investigation of the existence of
sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of
record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of
attorney and for appropriate action." The resolution reads as follows:

L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.) The court NOTED the letter dated January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B.
Cayanan with its attachments (copy thereof has been furnished Atty. Felipe C.
 Navarro, counsel for respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to
inform him of the status of the cases at bar.

It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been selling the lots in
litigation herein on installment basis to the public (among them, Mr. Cayanan) as
"absolute owner by virtue of this contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321,
etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision
Contract of Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein petitioner and not in Atty.
Navarro's name and that the unwarranted claim is made on his behalf that 'the case
is almost won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court RESOLVED
FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter with its attachments to the
Solicitor General under Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the
existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City)
for suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate action.

Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to communicate in the
premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with
address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of
June 10, 1974 on file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available
documents in their possession showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of
properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a total selling price of P75
million and down payments of almost P 0.6 million.

On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit embodying the
circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his letter dated January 25, 1975, especially the
second paragraph thereof. The letter was sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the same was
returned unserved for the reason that the addressee had moved to another address.

On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio
R. Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents evidencing the sales made by respondent
Navarro.

On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L-39620-29
(Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco
Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the existence of sufficient grounds for the
prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for suspension or removal from office and for appropriate
action" and directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose
with a copy of said letter and all its pertinent attachments."

The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Dear Justice Teehankee,

This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who
has previously been reported to the Supreme Court as selling properties titled in the
name of this Company.

We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots
he is now selling to the public include those titled in the names of the heirs of the late
Don Vicente Madrigal and this Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus
expanded his activities despite recent detention by the Military. As could be seen
from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to be the owner of that huge property
(actually titled in the name of the Madrigals and this Company) bounded by Ortigas
 Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez Avenue,
comprising approximately of 260 hectares.

As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be the owner of
some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in virtue of his handling the
case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. He contends that whereas his squatters-clients
occupy only about a hectare, he has become, in virtue of his contract of legal
services' with them, the owner of thousands of hectares of land as these are
allegedly0 covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell these properties.

Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover properties
already with buildings and other improvements. He has nevertheless been quite
successful in selling portions thereof, as when he sold lots within the De La Salle
College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus
operandi is described in this Company's letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen.
Prospero Olivas, copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference.

Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is now again
openly selling titled properties of other persons. We have provided more than
sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and the Solicitor General and we hope
that formal administrative charges can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him
from further perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the public.

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.

COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE

The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most of which were presented in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil
cases before the said court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Complainants' sole
witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified the various documentary exhibits presented by the
complainants.

From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-
two (22) cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in
her name, and to eject the twenty-two (22) families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases
were raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro
Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by respondent NAVARRO.
On behalf of his clients, respondent NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged nullity of
the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which it emanated actually originated from
Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.

The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Salas
rendered a decision on August 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering
the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for
the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as follows:

After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court finds that
most of the documentary evidence submitted by defendants are irrelevant to the
case since they pertain to defendants claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of
land when the area of the property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700
square meters. This Court also believes that the above-mentioned claims of
defendants are untenable.
Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the issuance in her
name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043. It is a settled rule in this
jurisdiction that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of
the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is
based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil.
558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco,
et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April 15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco
Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957).

Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by adverse
possession is without merit considering that title to land becomes non-prescriptible
Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession
(Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. Registered
title under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once
registered, is notice to the World. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).

Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property in question

when they filed a petition with the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein
they sought the latter's intervention for the acquisition of the property and for the
subdividing thereof into small lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition
defendants not only named the plaintiff as the owner of the property in question but
they also indicated therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote hereunder the pertinent
facts and data concerning the property in question in defendants' petition submitted
to the General Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal

2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer

3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez
Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila

4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043

5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh G).

As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since
1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void, this Court is of the opinion that
defendants cannot assail the validity of said title in this proceeding, which is for
recovery of possession. Any attack on the decree of registration of title must be direct
and not by collateral proceeding. The title which may be issued in pursuance of said
decree cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral
proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the case of Director of Land
vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951, our Supreme Court, in reversing the
decision of the trial court where the registered owner was considered disqualified to
acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the right to
constitute his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by the Court is untenable in
the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collateraly attacked. That issue
can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for that purpose". (See also
Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347,
 November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte, et al. vs.
Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).

In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our opinion that
there is no need to discuss the merits of the reasons claimed by defendants why
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh.
W) Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691,
8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).

In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in favor of the defendants-
squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the
complaints, Judge Navarro stated as follows:

Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of

12,000 square meters situated at the corner of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C.
Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly
described in, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
and indicated in the sketch plan attached to the complaint as Annex A.

xxx xxx xxx

It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the Municipal Court
of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City against several persons
occupying other parcels by Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, where
decisions have been rendered in favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall
executions of these decisions defendants in said ejectment cases filed class suit
before this Court by the occupants of the land which was heard and tried before
Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a party-defendant. The
decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made part of the evidence of these
defendants in the herein eleven cases for whatever the same may be worth as aid in
the determination of the merits of the issues raised herein.

As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein assailed the
validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious and the proceedings in
GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree was based as also null and void. The
Court sustained the herein plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the
proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and
void; (3) all original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all transfer
certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title declared void under No.
3 above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and
77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative
Transfer Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and
void; (5) that the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs . . . and so
forth.

The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed findings of
facts too ponderous to be ignored.

That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings leading to
the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and, as an inevitable corollary, the nullity
of Decree No. 1425 issue by virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original
certificates of title issued as consequence thereof.

In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things, found that while
the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on April 25, 1905, the survey of
the property subject matter of therein application was not made until June 16 to
 August 16, 1906, or some one year after the decision. It found no proof of initial
hearing of the application for registration being published as required by law without
which the Land Registration Court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Said decision also made inference that since the survey of the property was not
made until a year after the rendition of the judgment the technical descriptions
appearing in the original certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree
No. 1425, could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any.
Publication of accurate technical description being an essential jurisdictional
requirement which cannot be dispensed with and non-compliance with this
requirement renders the proceedings and the decision and decree and titles issued
arising therefrom null and void.

The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross who was
said to have penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of the
Court of Land Registration at the time the decision was supposedly rendered
because the Gaceta Official for the year 1905 does not show that James Ross was
listed as Judge of the Land Registration Court or that he was ever appointed in that
capacity. Furthermore, the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court
on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he signed it as Clerk of
Court. The Court even found the supposed decision in that proceedings missing and
made its conclusion that since the decree which was supposedly issued by a person
who was not the Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not contain the
description of the property ordered in the decision to be rendered because the survey
of the property was only made some one year later and that said decree cannot now
even be found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too ponderous to be
ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original certificate of title cannot be the
source of a valid transfer certificate of title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the
law, inexistent and cannot give source to any legal right.

The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before
Branch XV of this Court are also the defendants in the herein eleven cases in which
their properties are also involved. Since the case before Branch XV directly assails
the nullity of the proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title
of the plaintiff over the parcels of land occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a
derivative from such decree, it is the considered opinion of this Court that until and
unless the decision of Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set aside by final
judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven
cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses
are built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said decision of Branch
XV will be finally affirmed, or that the same becomes final and executory, all the
claims of rights to ownership and possession of properties embraced in the decision
in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities.
Possessions by actual occupants of all these properties had better be maintained
until after final decision in Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered.
(Exh. R, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383, 8385,
8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).

On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by respondent NAVARRO, issued an
order cancelling HABERER's title over her property in question and directing the issuance of a new
title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus —

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the

complaints in the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379,
8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and hereby
ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina
 Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of
the defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of Attorney Felipe
Navarro in accordance with the terms of the "Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng
Abogado" which is quoted in his ex-parte motion for clarification and/or modification
of the decision.

As so modified the decision stands in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).

On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, and on
September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the following order:

In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision
in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the
certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null
and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until
said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their
possessions of the land.

Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and new trial was set only
for reception of alleged newly discovered evidence.

The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is now under review by
order of our Appellate Court.

It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971,
sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the
interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff
is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders or
decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company.
Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case.

The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971,
must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now
being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of
adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is
not even a party herein.

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the
decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present
occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).

HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the defendants-clients of respondent
NAVARRO appealed from the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 was not
appealed by respondent NAVARRO's clients.
After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the decision rendered by Judge
Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in
the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following:

LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY OUR

SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND LATIFUNDIO
COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON
CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26, 1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING
THE DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN
FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS
AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD)
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a
possessor in bad faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right comes
along, when he becomes aware that what he had taken for granted is at least
doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse contention, good
faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that his right is more secure, because
we resign ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes, but when the
final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion necessarily
disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing Manresa and Articles
528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil Code).

He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil Code)

HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING

PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER THE ACTIONS WERE
BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND
FOR THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR:

The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One
of those is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only
that which it produces but that which it united to it either naturally or artificially.
Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where however, the planter,
builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without
causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating
what Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law
has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option
to acquire the improvements after the payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the
owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and
because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).

So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as we are ready to ask
for the execution of the decision pursuant to law and avoid a scire facias Ordinary
prudence requires that those involved may please make some kind of arrangements
with the undersigned before execution by calling through the following telephones:
 xxx xxx xxx

BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF OUR

PEOPLE'S VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL STREETS
OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM
9 A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY, SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL
BEGIN FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL,
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR
LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.

(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO

Counsel for the Defense

60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City

(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).

Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally covered by Decree

1425 including the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (hereinafter
called ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them.

In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the lot buyers of ORTIGAS and
among the property owners whose titles were derived from Decree No. 1425. As a counter measure
to allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners, ORTIGAS caused the publication in the
Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971 the following:

WARNING

SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW

In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership

with reference to an advertisement published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971
supposedly affecting the validity of all original certificates of title and transfer
certificates of title derived from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a party to ANY case allegedly decided
on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any other court and therefore ALL ITS
TITLES DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED
BY SAID DECISION.

The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling lands and/or rights to
lands belonging to and in the name of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.

The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING adverstisements and/or

persons basing their rights to lands of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on
such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which is claimed to be "final and executory."

ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).

After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the officers of ORTIGAS and the
officials of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases
damages allegedly sustained by him on account of his failure to consummate thousands of sales by
reason of the publication of the above notice. In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO
presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various subdivisions, the locations of which overlap the
properties owned by ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings).

On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these two cases for libel for lack of
merit (Exhibit D).

Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the libel cases, the complainants
also presented documents relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, et al."
and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled
"Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."

In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them.
Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there was no publication for
the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no survey of the property sought to be
registered; (3) the judge presiding over the defunct Court of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the
Clerk of Court of the said Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares and/or
orders:

1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and void;

2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious;

3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities;

4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title
declared void under No. (3) above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null and void;

5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs,
the portions owned by them being as indicated in Exhibit P;

6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from molesting the plaintiffs in
the enjoyment and peaceful possession of their respective landholdings;

7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal,
and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II, City Court of Quezon
City, and the defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, their agents,
representatives and any and all persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist
absolute (sic) and perpetually from proceeding with or taking any action on Civil
Cases Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921 filed by the
herein defendant Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs;

8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of Lands;

9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees;

10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and
 Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).

ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1971, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge Ruiz and ordering a new trial to
enable the petitioner to introduce newly discovered evidence. The case was then remanded to the
lower Court. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz
who was separated from the service by the President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, as against the plaintiffs:

1. Dismissing the amended complaint;

2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente 917 and all titles emanating
therefrom;

3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant Company:

(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them from the time of the filing of the
complaint on October 20, 1967, with legal rate of interest, until they surrender the possession thereof
to defendant Company;

(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any person or persons acting in their
behalf, who are found to be in possession of defendant company's land to vacate the same and
remove and demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiffs expenses;

(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he
prematurely collected from defendant company, with interest; and

(6) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).

The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the approval of the record on appeal,
ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment. After exchange of pleadings by the
parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution in favor of Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et
al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge
Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge Alcantara, granted the
motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of Judge Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of
Judge Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.

On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the respondent Judge
dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set aside and the order of Judge
Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate execution, is hereby revived, with instructions
to the respondent judge to fully implement the latter order, including the approval of
the petitioner's bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs of execution. The
restraining order issued at the inception of this action is hereby (sic) permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).

This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the
same was denied. So also with the motion for reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court (Annex
"A" of Exhibit FF)

In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil
Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.

On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision in favor of Ortigas as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud in claiming and
selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's fees. This court finds the
amount of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 to be fair and reasonable
considering the extent and value of the property involved and the nature of the case.

Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a result of the
issuance of the restraining order, he suffered damages in the amount of
Pl,000,000.00 daily.

Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this court can only
treat it as an affirmative defense.

Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages. Under the
same authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiffs claim for damages,
therefore, he has failed to establish what damages he had suffered.

Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for. It
follows, therefore, that the issuance of the restraining order was proper and, hence,
can not be the basis for a claim for damages.

This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition and hope. The
people who will ultimately suffer the most from defendant's acts in question are his
buyers, who in all probability are middle class people who themselves wanted to
make money out of the apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon
the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the advent of the
NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make a fresh start in life.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title

over the land in question;
 2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the defendant, his
successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any person or persons acting for or in his
behalf, from selling and advertising, verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in
question and from asserting any claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or
over the said property, directly or indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and

3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost
of suit.

SO ORDERED.

(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).

The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-
53125-R.

On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case affirming
the decision of Judge Apostol.

Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his
petition was denied for lack of merit. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of Judge Apostol has now been laid to rest.

EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT

Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary evidence. His testimonial
evidence consist of his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one of the complainants;
and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of Lands. His documentary evidence consist
of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.

On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present charges are the same as the
charges in administrative Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, respondent",
which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. He further declared that
this Honorable Court deferred action on the said administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos.
L-42699-42709, the heirs of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
is terminated. Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these two matters and on the
identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.

On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the counsel for the defendants in
the twenty-two (22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio Salas of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal; that he became the owner of the lands not occupied by his clients by virtue of his
contract of legal services signed by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9,
1977). Said contract for legal services, which appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as
follows:

KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA MGA KINAUUKULAN

NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT MAKARATING

Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa serbisyo ni Atty.

Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan sa lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy
Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip
(Cases Nos. 699, 875, 917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain
defunct Court of Land Registration) na ang nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425
na siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng
mga Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig at nagbunga ito ng
maraming Transfer Certificates of Title na sa kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak
ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil.
324, 340) dahil sa kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa
mula't sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga nakalagda
sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at ibang mga kliyente ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay siyang nararapat maging kalahok sa
animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil
Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI
contesting the genuineness and due execution of Decree No. 1425 of the defunct
Court of Land Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng mga
kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man ay mayhawak ng titulo na sakup ng
diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan ng maybisa galing
sa Hukuman upang matahimik at mapayapa ang dahilan paninirahan kanilang mula't
sapul ay kanila nang pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at
walang paglilihim ng kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa
mula't sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito at ng
kanilang ninuno o nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest) na siyang mga pangyayari
ay sapat na upang maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain
kailanmay di naging pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling pag-aari ng
nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga
pangyayari na 'natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-bisa ng batas di lamang ng
karapatan sa pag-aangkin ng lupain kungdi maging ang karapatang ipinagkaloob sa
kanila ng pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa kanila ng
pamahalaan ng titulo ay di na kinakailangan upang ang nasabing karapatan ay di
kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil.
242; Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off.
Gaz 2188). Ngunit sa dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng
mga lupain at nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang Hukuman
magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito ayon sa Section 10 ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court. Sapagkat ang
pamumusisyon sa isang bagay ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan
ng pagmamay-ari nito ng makalipas ang mahabang panahong takda ng batas,
maging ito man ay walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina
at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa at halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring nasa
bagay na iyon na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari. Bunga nito, ang
pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa tatlumpung (30) taon na tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang
may-ari kahit na walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng
sapat na titulo upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan sapagkat ang lampas-
bisa o ang panahong itinakda ng batas sa pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng
mahigit na tatlumpung (30) taon ay tiyakang hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay
na titulo na kinikilala ng batas ay hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid
vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga
nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo ay naangkin na nila
ang lupain o di kayay gawing batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang masabing
sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring maganap sapagkat ang krimen at
panlilinlang ay hindi maaring maging batayan ng panimula ng ay isang tunay at
mabisang titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili ng
karampatang halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, 439). Dahil sa itinuring
ng batas na sila ay 'constructive trustees, lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampas-
bisa (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249). Subali't
dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba
ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang naganap na pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na
katotohanan ay di naman ito naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang nararapat silang
nagbayad ng rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay binili ang lupain gayong ang katotohanan
ay sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree
No. 1425) ng defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng gawa-gawang titulo
na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit kumulang ng 4,000 hectares na
samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40) milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay
matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan
sapagkat sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act No. 942, ang bahagi
ng Punta sa Maynila sapagkat sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na ngayon, kalahati
ng bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng Lungsod ng Quezon
sapagka't pinilas lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina, Pasig, San Juan at
Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng Commonwealth Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong
Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o
survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong ilog ng San Juan patungong
dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa bahaging matatagpuan ang
ilog ng Pasig sa Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng agos ng ilog
Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa Namayan, Mandaluyong
pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog hanggang sa
ilog ng Mariquina at pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng Mariquina
hanggang sa sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw hanggang sa
pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan
at pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang nasabing baybay-sukat o survey sa abot
makakaya ng sino mang may sapat ng kakayahang agrimensor (surveyor) ay di
makabuo ng ni isa man lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo (polygon).

Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng

Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng
karampatang hakbang sa Hukuman ng Unang Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City
hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan at gawin ang anumang paraang
isinasaisip niyang tumpak at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa batas upang matamo ng
mga makalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa
paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa
kanyang pangalan at kung sa kanino man niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi
ng lupain na aming minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest) nguni't
ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong kabayaran
ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng
kasunduang ito maliban na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming
mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at sumasangayon kami sa
pagbabayad ng karampatang halaga sa paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang
naayon sa isinasaad ng kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa
pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga gastos o kabayaran
ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey)
ng mga ari-arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga sukat upang
mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands), paghahanda at
pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari, pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng
pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado (filing fees), pagpapatala
(registration), paggawa ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin ng mga rekord
(transcripts), pagpapatunay (certifications) at iba pang mga kinakailangang bayaran
at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan
ng naaayon sa kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang
tunay na hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas ang aming kani-kaniyang
mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling
iniatang namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito,
sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian o nabibigkisan ng kasunduang ito na magbayad
ng halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng
lupaing matitituluhan sa aming pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawat metro
kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunang-bayad upang ang proyektong ito ay
mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling panahon at ang matitirang dapat bayarang
halaga na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro kuwadrado ay aming
babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin sa kasunduang kapag
buhat sa isang taon mula sa petsang ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami
nakababayad ng buo sa halagang natitira o balanse na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00)
sa bawat metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro nguni't ang kasunduang ito na isang taong pagbibigay-palugit ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang kabayaran sa kanyang
 mga paglilingkod sa usaping ito at sumasang-ayon si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kami
ay pahintulutang isangla ang aming mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di
huwad at pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito ang magsilbing bayad
sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping ito at iyon lamang ang
natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng obligasyon o tungkuling
bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng
lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan
nang naayon sa batas. Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang
sinuman sa aming nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang
magbayad ng paunang-halaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't metro
kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng karampatang magbayad ng makahalintulad na halaga sa
bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o dalawampung (20) taon sang-ayon sa mga
hinihingi ng pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais
umangkin nito kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro kasama na ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito ngunit kinakailangan
magbigay sila ng paunang bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang panimulan
ang pagbabayad buwan-buwan (monthly installment condition) at magiging mabisa
lamang ito kung matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang
buwan-buwan (monthly installment) na maaring magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso
(P5.00) hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat buwan nang naayon sa laki o
kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. Sa dahilang ang
buhay ng tao ay walang katiyakang magtatagal na habang panahon ay isinasalin
namin ang aming mga karapatan at tungkulin sa aming tagapagmana lamang at
gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin ang kanyang karapatan sa
kasunduang ito sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang itaguyod nila ang
paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.

SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT NA KASUNDUANG

ITO

ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang lahat ng isinasaad sa

kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kanyang
tuparin ang kanyang tungkulin bilang manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami
ay mapagkalooban ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang lupain ng naayon
sa batas at siyang isinasaad din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming
mga pangalan na siyang nais naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming kani-
kaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad at petsa na kami'y
lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang pagpapatunay sa aming taos-pusong pagsang-
ayon at hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.

In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that he has sold, and is still
selling, properties covered by Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others,
but he claims that the titles of said parties are null and void because they emanated from Decree No.
1425; that he has no title over the properties sold by him except the contract of legal services which
his clients allegedly signed; that he has no approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly
owned by him; that he has not obtained any certificate of registration or license to sell from the
National Housing Authority; that he has not declared for taxation purposes the thousands of hectares
of prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and Marikina, allegedly owned by
him; and that he has not filed any case directly attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33,
t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).

Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-case" before
Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that
said case covers lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City including those
involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).
 Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the Ortigas Transfer Certificate of
Title and enjoining respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said title, NAVARRO still
continued selling properties covered by the injunction claiming that the said decision is ineffectual
because the same has been appealed. (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4

On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as
complainant, praying that respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and
that his certificate of admission to the bar be recalled.

On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of suspension. 5 Complainant
Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his
manifestation dated August 8, 1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to lift
the order of suspension. 8

On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion praying for the lifting of the order of
suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion
filed on January 5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981. 12

II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E.
Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter
referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for
appropriate action. 13

Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed his answer with motion to dismiss on June
29, 1979. 15 The corresponding
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 18

On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the following findings and
recommendation:

CHARGES

In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged respondent with deceit, malpractice
and gross conduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having deliberately
misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as counsel for the defendants in the following civil
cases:

a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land subject of the cases mentioned
above; he falsely alleged that to his personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name of one
Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made despite the final decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin
vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was
fraudulent and had been effected thru falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the title
issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of the Complaint and the
Decision in said case are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.

b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our clients' title was rendered null and
void by virtue of the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our clients' title to the aforesaid property was
acquired by hereditary succession from the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925.
The ownership therefore of our clients is protected both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. Any
lawyer, even a law student, knows that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the Quasha
case, supra, covers cases where property was acquired by virtue of the Parity Amendment. Mr.
Navarro is either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of complete and unabashed contempt for
facts, the law of the land and for the Courts.
c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title covering the land subject of the
above cases had been declared null and void in the "final and executory" decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits to give the title of the case and its docket
number for the obvious and malicious reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still pending resolution before the Supreme Court and hence
cannot be "final and executory."

d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases heretofore enumerated is not
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and hence the court has no jurisdiction.
Further, that title thereto having described the land to be part of the Municipality of San Juan del
Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim knowledge however of the fact that the area in the vicinity of
Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory
of Quezon City when the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact, Mr. Navarro's
representation is false and malicious.

e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic norms of honesty and decency in
that having prejudiced the interest of his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a timely
manner from the decision of the court and having adopted the wrong remedy, in complete ignorance
of the law, he had influenced his clients into commencing a case before the Tanod Bayan against
the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The
case is obviously calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's
conduct speaks ill of his respect for the law and the courts.

f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not stop before the City Court of
Quezon City. He continues to do so in the petition he filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et
al." Copies of the Petition and the undersigned attorney's Comments thereto are hereto attached as
Annexes "D" and "E", respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record)

RESPONDENTS ANSWER

In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:

1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned respondent was never
furnished with a copy of the complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the complaint is clearly
intended to prevent the undersigned respondent to proceed in defending his clients' cause in CA-
G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E.
Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.) still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals.
To allow complainants to harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in our courts of justice is
an act in contempt of court for which complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable.

2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave his entire
devotion to the interest of his clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights and
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from his
clients, save by the rules of law, legally applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by law as was done by the undersigned respondent in
the ejectment case filed by the complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin against the
several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record)

After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that respondent's Answer does not
deny any of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder
dated September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:

1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin who are citizens of the
United States of America held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT
No. 180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which TCTs are described to be
located at Santolan Road, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila)
filed ejectment proceedings before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients Victorino
 Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which later
were elevated to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et
al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.

2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the defendants Victorino Manaois and
Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty (20) other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their rights
and exerted his utmost learning and ability within what the law allows that at this stage, the
controversy is still under litigation before the courts as stated above.

3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must have been resorted to by the
complainants at the instigation of their counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of their
God-given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no other conclusion left but that the
administrative complaint against the respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)

FINDINGS

When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor General, the parties agreed that
there is no dispute as to the fact of the case. Hence, they were granted a period of thirty (30) days
within which to file their respective memoranda, if they so desire, after which the case will be
considered submitted for resolution.

Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in fact admitted during the
hearing of the case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of
this case, it follows that the specifications of the charges against him, which are duly supported by
documents, are deemed sufficiently proven.

The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire devotion to the interest of his
clients" and that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning
and ability.

Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the misrepresentations specified by

complainants, as quoted above.

RECOMMENDATION

Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148 entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has
been suspended from the practice of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension is still in effect.

The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be likewise

suspended from the practice of law.

Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19

No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent Navarro failed to deny the material
allegations in the complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.

The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148 are:

1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the consent of the
latter; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs.
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al." Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over all
parcels of land (including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer)
covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared null and void in the decision dated
March 31, 1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the
subject properties as payment for his legal services rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in
Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal.

1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly
assailed the nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued,
as well as the original certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These original certificates of title include
the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On
March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring Decree
No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz
decision to the Court of Appeals which set the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On
November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision confirming the
validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was pending appeal with the Court
of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted.

We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in
toto the November 3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar
as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al.
appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18,
1985. The denial became final and executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded
to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for execution.

The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the
basis of the decision rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint
for ejectment filed by Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his decision
categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of
this court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these
eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses are built has become
premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:

In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was
mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating
from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be
one of them. The Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be
maintained in their possessions of the land. 21

However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the Court of Appeals which
remanded the case for new trial and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973
upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign
ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason
that it was his clients who appealed the former decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his
bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged ownership
rights over the Ortigas properties.

2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15043 issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject
to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal services.
However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:
 It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be
reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor
of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the
plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders of decisions are made in this case cannot be
made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case.

The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be
reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of
further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein.

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated
May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the
decision stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22

It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the inescapable conclusion is that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer.
Consequently, the defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of Haberer. And, since
respondent Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere transferee, with more reason can
he not validly become the owner of the above properties.

3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with his clients, the defendants in the
Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425. It
must be noted that the said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against respondent
Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an
aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent
Navarro over properties which they did not actually occupy and which virtually extended to all the properties covered
by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not
presented any document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their lawyer.

From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended ownership rights over the
parcels of land covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault
on credulity to assume that he was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.

In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of integrity and respectability
required and expected of the law profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal profession is
achieved only after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed
means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value
of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to
the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer of the court. 23

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of
the United States Supreme Court in this wise:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of
his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously
taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should
be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some
controlling power, some discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it
must be exercised. 24

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a
punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public
from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client
and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. 26

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved,
and that, as an officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27 Therefore, in
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. 29

We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two administrative cases and we cannot but
find that strong and unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate sanction of
disbarment on respondent.

Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services, executed by his clients whom he
represented in the twenty-two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of
Rizal, and quoted in full in the earlier part of this discussion.

It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial court made no finding as to the
validity of the claim of ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I
found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.

In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely on the ground that "since the
evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of their respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession
must be maintained and respected. 30

Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the
Register of Deeds was thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff and to
issue new titles in the name of defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in
accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed.

Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the order of September 15, 1972,
"because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is not even a
party herein," but it reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present
occupants.

As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the ejectment cases were declared
the true owners of the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the courts
recognized was merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become the owners of the
subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason of which they could
not have legally transmitted any ownership rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that
any further claim of ownership on their part was finally settled by the order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the
order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the
rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded the title of said
partnership from the effects of its decision.

Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent
whatever properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed
upon. As hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the right to possess for the
nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more. That respondent acquired no better right than the defendants
from whom he supposedly derived his claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21,
1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of title to herein respondent who, to further stress the obvious, was
not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is
patently and indisputably illegal.

Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal
services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the award of
said properties to the therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication, respondent's pretense is
unmasked as an unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land involved in the two ejectment
cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land,
the sheer absurdity of which he could not be unaware.

Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the present, the entirety of the land
covered by Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.

It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing the defendants' right of
possession is subject to the final outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No.
1425. The latter decision, at the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is
precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by setting aside the order of
registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He could not properly rule on the ownership rights of
defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of said decree, which thus prompted him to find
merely on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se justify the performance of any
act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier
discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered confirming
the validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become final and executory.

In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined
from selling, offering for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a decision was
subsequently rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership
which became final and executory after respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However,
respondent continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said decision. This was
categorically admitted by respondent himself during the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General. 33

Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if
this were true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is
compelling reason enough for him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void
certificates of titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that
Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas & Company from the
effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in
Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all
these pronouncements and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell
properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. 34

Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent
inexplicably posits that the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his suspension was
automatically lifted by virtue of our resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:

The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other things that the complaint against
respondent could not prosper if respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-
42699-42709 and his request for certification by the Chief Justice to the effect that the petition in
G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution
are granted, are NOTED.

There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our
resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's
motions for the lifting of his suspension.
It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law,
he continues to do so in clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the
aforestated resolutions reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in G.R.
No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second Division case filed on April 25,
1987, counsel for private respondents therein questioned herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in
the case since he was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his suspension had
allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition
wherein was filed on December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as
counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was prepared, signed and verified by
respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that his suspension had
already been lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in
G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution
dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing therein as counsel for
petitioner which fine he paid on February 5, 1990.

In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel
for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed
on June 11, 1986 and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on
May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30, 1988 and
decided on February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners in
the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not
reflect whether he also appeared before the different courts a quo.

Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and illustrate his
incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust
and confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of
the court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine
Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total
stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over
the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately
P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check
dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount
of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice
of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had
bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for
estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed
respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court
rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

 (b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay
a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in
the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in
the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in
the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in
addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as
follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic)
which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law
and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the
Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED. 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a
Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and
declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of
the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that
respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the
reglementary period.

In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower
court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits
at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense
charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause
damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent
Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

 The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property but an offense against public order.

xxx xxx xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. 3(Italics supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or
for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics
supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in
the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not)
relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its
1âwphi1

continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded
to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition1 for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final
judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tacloban City.2

The dispositive portion of the same states:

 WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the Information. He is imposed a penalty of one (1)
year imprisonment and fine double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00)
PESOS, plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and costs against
the accused.3

Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of Judgment from this Court
dated 20 March 1996.

On 03 July 1996, we required4 respondent to comment on said petition within ten (10) days from notice. On 17
February 1997, we issued a second resolution5 requiring him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him for failure to comply with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997, we
imposed a fine of P1,000 for respondent's failure to file said Comment and required him to comply with our previous
resolution within ten days.6 On 27 April 1998, we fined respondent an additional P2,000 and required him to comply
with the resolution requiring his comment within ten days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five
(5) days or until his compliance.7 Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we declared respondent
Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered his
imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolutions.8

On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported9 that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on
26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17
February 1997 and 27 April 1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue Comment.

In the said Comment10 dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:

1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at that time undergoing medical
treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;

2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and

3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in respondent's favor (as
plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the execution of judgment in
his favor and the eviction of the family of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present
administrative case.

In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban
City submitted a letter11 to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in
another estafa case before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case involving the
victims of the Doña Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a
decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,12 it appears that herein respondent
Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff
in the said civil case was issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths of
his wife and two daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then deposited in the
account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez's wife. When plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover a total
of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000 as his attorney's fees. Holding that it was "absurd and
totally ridiculous that for a simple legal service … he would collect 2/3 of the money claim," the trial court ordered
Atty. Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and exemplary
damages, and the costs of the suit.

Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's dilatory tactics during the trial, citing fourteen (14) specific
instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure
to file his brief, despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.13

On 16 June 1999, we referred14 the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
The report15 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part that:

Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties appeared before the
Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date
respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in
June 1997 and that dismissal is warranted because "the case filed by him does not survive due to his
demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death."

We disagree with respondent's contention.

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable Supreme Court or the IBP
may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or
when their attention is called by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a
lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions.

As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the Honorable Supreme
Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects an utter lack of good moral character.

Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly
shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions
against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA
815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco P.

Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys immediately.

On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution16 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.

On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation,17 in the
instant case alleging that:

1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law, although admittedly the practice of law is a privilege;

2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to adduce evidence, the
result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at by the Investigating Commissioner; and

3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various capacities (from acting city
judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter President) for almost 17 years prior to resuming his law
practice.

On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16 February 2004, we
received a Manifestation and Motion19 from complainant's daughter, Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they
had not been furnished with a copy of respondent's Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent ostensibly lives
next door to complainant's family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until now failed to do so.

The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to herein complainant. The
records also show that respondent was given several opportunities to present evidence by this Court20 as well as by
the IBP.21 Indeed, he only has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several occasions to do
so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to receive his evidence.

This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited for his comment on the
original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, we find the evidence on
record sufficient to support the IBP's findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The issue with which we are now concerned is whether or
not the said crime is one involving moral turpitude. 22

Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."23 It
involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."24

In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the erring lawyer was indefinitely suspended for having been
convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and stated:

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the
laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense…26 (emphasis supplied)

Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on Elections27 and disqualified a
congressional candidate for having been sentenced by final judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
accordance with Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which states:

SEC. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)

Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of
the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full
upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioner's averment that he
was not a lawyer, we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that

(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person." [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the
landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest." Thus, paraphrasing Black's
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
or good morals.28(emphasis supplied)

In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,29 we stated that:

(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C.
No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. [Lao v.
 Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyer's low regard for her commitment to the oath she has taken
when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold
in high esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]

Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the
general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume
jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however, the
misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from the office of attorney."30

The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of
law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding
for disbarment is "to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence."31 "A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them."32 "Verily, lawyers must at
all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court."33

Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea that if "given another chance to have his day in court
and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at." We note with
displeasure the inordinate length of time respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment
on the original petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court,
which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment.
Thus, from the time we issued our first Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16
March 1999, when he submitted said Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years had elapsed.

It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to comply, his Comment consists of all
of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to furnish complainant.34 And while he claims to have been
confined while undergoing medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely
reserved the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer any explanation for his
failure to submit his Comment from the time we issued our first Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In
fact, said Comment alleged, merely, that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June 1997,
and imputed upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against him, which argument has
already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.

Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the Commission as the main reason for
the long delay, until the same was finally submitted for Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore,
squandered away seven years to "have his day in court and adduce evidence" in his behalf, which inaction also
unduly delayed the court's prompt disposition of this petition.

In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we reminded attorneys that "there must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5
of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful violation
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.36 It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has
disciplined lawyers and judges for willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant's briefs, as a penalty
for disobedience thereof. 37

For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's old age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in
various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence,38 and his conduct should be above reproach.39 The fact that
respondent has chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself in less
honorable – or indeed in a less than honorable – manner.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege,40 demanding a high degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.41 Sadly,
herein respondent falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. We agree.

We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld
the imposition of one year's suspension for non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension
of six months upon partial payment of the obligation.42 However, in these cases, for various reasons, none of the
issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that
the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law.

In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands convicted by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda, which is similar to this case in that both respondents were
convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension
from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.

However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have held disbarment to be the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus:

1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,43 we disbarred a lawyer convicted of

estafa without discussing the circumstances behind his conviction. We held that:

There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of respondent's
conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed.
No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on
him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved
himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.44

2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,45 a lawyer was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. "And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral
turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of
respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127."46

3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,47 the erring lawyer acknowledged the execution of a
document purporting to be a last will and testament, which later turned out to be a forgery. He was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document, which the Court held to be a
crime involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, and was
subsequently disbarred.

4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,48 Atty. Gutierrez was convicted for
murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President.
Holding that the pardon was not absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him.

5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating the
amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We held thus:

Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no question that the
term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act
is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263,
 July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot
now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)50

6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avanceña,51 the conditional pardon extended to the erring lawyer by the Chief
Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment imposed by this court.

7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,52 a lawyer was charged and found guilty of the crime of falsification of
public document for having prepared and notarized a deed of sale of a parcel of land knowing that the
supposed affiant was an impostor and that the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that
disbarment follows as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public document involves moral turpitude, we ordered
respondent's name stricken off the roll of attorneys.

8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,53 we upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents,
because she was "totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession."54

9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,55 a lawyer was disbarred for having been
convicted of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds of his client.

In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."56

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby dISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

MARCOS MEDINA, complainant, vs. LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954, Marcos Medina charged

respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission of certain acts
constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. To this
complaint respondent filed an answer on October 19, 1954. The case was
referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
This official in turn referred the case to the provincial fiscal of Cagayan for
investigation and report. Later after the reception of the corresponding
evidence, the Solicitor General submitted his report to this Court finding
respondent guilty of the acts of malpractice complained of and recommending
his disbarment. Together with this report he submitted a complaint formally
charging respondent with acts constituting the alleged malpractice as found in
his investigation with the prayer that the name of respondent be stricken off
from the roll of attorneys. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

A copy of this formal complaint was served on respondent so that he

may answer it if he so desires in accordance with the rules. Thereupon, he
answered the complaint denying the material allegations thereof and praying
that it be dismissed. He, however, also prayed that he be allowed to introduce
additional evidence. This was allowed and the case was set for hearing. The
first hearing was set on May 4, 1964, which, by agreement of the parties was
postponed to June 22, 1964. On this last date, however, no hearing was held,
and so it was again postponed to July 22, 1964. And having neither
respondent nor his counsel appeared on the last date set, complainant and his
counsel submitted additional evidence consisting of several decisions of the
Court of Appeals showing that respondent was found guilty of estafa.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. chanroble svi rtualaw lib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel filed a complaint

for reconveyance of a parcel of land before the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan against complainant Marcos Medina. In the early of January, 1954,
complainant Medina approached the plaintiff seeking a compromise of the
case. Plaintiff told him to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista, respondent herein,
whereupon he went to see the latter in his office at Aparri, Cagayan.
Respondent demanded P500.00 as a consideration for the amicable
settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash then, he asked to be
allowed to pay the same in small installments paying on that occasion the sum
of P35.00. Respondent agreed and thereupon prepared a motion for an
extension of time to file his answer in the case. Complainant returned to his
hometown. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

One month later, complainant received an order declaring him in

default and so he went to respondent to ask him why in spite of their
agreement he was declared in default. Respondent assured him that he had
nothing to worry about, and on that occasion respondent again asked for
P50.00 which then and there complainant gave. Before complainant left
respondent told him to look for more money. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion for an extension
of time to file an answer for, in lieu thereof, he filed a motion to declare
complainant in default. Consequently, a decision was rendered detrimental to
complainant since the court allowed plaintiff to repurchase the property in
litigation for the sum of P1,200.00. chanrobl esvirt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office of respondent

in Luna, Mt. Province apparently with the purpose of having the papers for the
amicable settlement of the case prepared, but on this occasion respondent
prepared two documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it was
made to appear that Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to complainant in
consideration of the sum of P8,000.00 and, on the other, the latter reconveyed
the same property to the former for the sum of P1,200.00. Both documents
were witnessed by respondent. Both documents were also found to be
fictitious in the sense that the considerations mentioned therein were never
received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by respondent to sign Exhibit C
without knowing its contents upon the assurance that it was necessary in
order that she could recover the land. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Sometime later, complainant received a letter from Atty. Bienvenido

Jimenez, co-counsel of respondent in the civil case, requesting him to bring
the title of the property pursuant to the decision of the court, and complying
with this request complainant went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of
bringing the title he showed him the document which he was made to sign
purporting to be a deed of sale by Maria Ragsac Cabel in his favor of the
property for the consideration of P8,000.00. Atty. Jimenez asked Mrs. Cabel if
she received the amount mentioned therein, which she denied. Instead Mrs.
Cabel told Atty. Jimenez that she had given P800.00 to respondent to be
deposited in court with the understanding that said respondent would raise the
additional P400.00 to complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was fixed by the
court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the property. After inquiry,
Atty. Jimenez found that there was no such amount deposited in court, and in
order to correct the wrong generated by the two fictitious documents, Atty.
Jimenez prepared another document embodying the terms of the amicable
settlement which they agreed would be submitted in the civil case. This
settlement having been carried out, it put an end to the controversy.
According to complainant, he paid all in all to respondent the sum of
P500.00. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

From the foregoing narration, the following facts are deemed to have
been established: (1) respondent after agreeing with complainant to settle the
case amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer, but
instead he filed a motion to declare the latter in default; (2) being fully aware
of the decision rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two fictitious
deeds of sale in the sense that the consideration in either was never in fact
received; (3) pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of the case,
respondent received on different occasions from complainant several sums
totalling P500.00. (4) respondent, taking advantage of the ignorance of his
client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document wherein it was made to
appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact she did not
receive said amount; and (5) respondent received from his client Mrs. Cabel
the amount of P800.00 with the understanding that the amount was to be
deposited in court for the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing
it he misappropriated the money. These facts constitute malpractice and
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No. 18560-R, respondent

was convicted of estafa and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from 4 months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day ofprision correccional,
with the accessories of the law, and to indemnify the offended party in the
sum of P800.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. And in
CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of Appeals made the following derogatory
comment against respondent:

A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and client need not

be indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer should be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity. A high degree of
fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm. Case
No. 221, May 21, 1958). Here, appellee (herein respondent Bautista) violated
the trust. He was bound to deposit the P800.00 in court. But he did not; he
converted it to his own use and benefit to the damage of appellant. Indeed, he
was convicted of estafa. Not only that. The confidence reposed in him by
appellant was once again infringed when he lent his signature to Exhibits 2
and 3 which he knew to be spurious. Upon these documents, appellant - for
nothing - lost the land already won in court. She had to compromise with the
defeated suitor. But she got the very short end of the bargain. And yet,
appellee had the temerity to come to court for attorney's fees. Good morals
and sound public policy bar the portals of justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one
count and bad faith on another, he has forfeited all legal claims for services in
procuring the judgment in Case No. 634-A of the Cagayan Court (6 C.J. 725;
C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am. Jur. 363; Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961],
p. 99).

There is no question that the crime of estafa is one which involves

moral turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rych anro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby disbarred and, as

a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys.
In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva for the Government.
Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a
fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule
128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of his
profession.

In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court considering that he has six children
to support the eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary
action be taken against him. He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is attributed to him, it
was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and sincerely deplores.

Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as attorney if he is convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the result that
the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment (Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628).
And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court,
much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by section
25 of Rule 127.

It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney and that his name be stricken out from
the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.