Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 101328

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 101328, April 07, 1993
EMILIANA CANDIDO AND FRANCISCA CANDIDO, PETITIONERS, VS.
HONORABLE DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
18, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN AND MILA CONTRERAS,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Orders dated July 10,
[1]

1991 and August 9, 1991 of the trial court dismissing the complaint of
petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido against private respondent Mila
Contreras on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for petitioners' failure to comply
with the mandatory barangay conciliation process required by Presidential
Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

It appears on record that petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido are the
only legitimate children of spouses Agapito Candido and Florencia Santos as
shown by the certificates of the latter's Record of Marriage and the petitioners'
[2]

Record of Birth.

However, petitioners' father eventually left his legitimate family and lived with
Sagraria Lozada until his death on May 6, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina
Candido and Eduardo Candido who represented themselves to be the sole heirs
of the late Agapito Candido executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of
Estate with Sale covering parcels of land owned by the latter and sold to private
[3]

respondent Mila Contreras in whose name said properties are now registered
under TCT No. T-120656-M.

On November 6, 1990, petitioners instituted an action with the Regional Trial

Court of Bulacan, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 against Sagraria
Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido, Eduardo
Candido, Register of Deeds of Bulacan and private respondent Mila Contreras
to annul the Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, to cancel
TCT No. 120656-M issued in the name of private respondent and to reinstate
TCT No. 223602 in the name of Agapito Candido married to Sagraria Lozada.

On December 5, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the [4]

ground that petitioners failed to comply with the mandatory conciliation process
required under P.D. No. 1508 as she resides in the same municipality with the
petitioners.

On July 10, 1991, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, as prayed for, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED in

so far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned for lack of prior referral of the
dispute before the Katarungang Pambarangay, without prejudice." [5]

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied

[6]

in an Order dated August 9, 1991.

[7]

Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge dismissing private respondent in the complaint instituted by
the petitioners notwithstanding the fact that the other defendants in Civil Case
No. 697-M-90 reside in different municipalities and cities.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508 provides:

"SEC. 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. - The Lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
“(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
“(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;
“(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exceeding P200.00;
“(4) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
“(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the
interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice
and the Minister of Local Government.”

Further, section 3 of the same law provides:

"SEC. 3. Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the

same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of
said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the
same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent
or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
"The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; x x x."

From the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear that the barangay
court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disputes between parties who are actual
residents of barangays located in the same city or municipality or adjoining
barangays of different cities or municipalities.

In the instant case, petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are residents
of Barrio Paliwas, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan while defendants' residences
are as follows: Sagraria Lozada and Jorge Candido at Javier Compound, Bo. Sto.
Niño, Taytay, Rizal; Virginia and Maximina Candido at Road 2, Doña Faustina
Village, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City; Eduardo Candido at 388
Barrio Paliwas, Municipality of Obando, Bulacan; Mila Contreras at San Pascual,
Municipality of Obando, Bulacan; and the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan at his
official address in Bulacan.

The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all
types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality,
city or province. Where the complaint does not state that it is one of the
excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process,
or it does not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been
reached by the parties, the case could be dismissed on motion. In the instant
[8]

case, the fact that petitioners and private respondent, reside in the same
municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory conciliation under
P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-defendants reside in barangays of different
municipalities, cities and provinces.

Petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It would not serve the purpose
of the law in discouraging litigation among members of the same barangay
through conciliation where the other parties reside in barangays other than the
one where the Lupon is located and where the dispute arose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of the

trial court dated July 10, 1991 and August 9, 1991 dismissing Civil Case No.
697-M-90 in so far as defendant Mila Contreras is concerned are hereby
annulled and set aside. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan for further proceedings and to REINSTATE private respondent Mila
Contreras as defendant in civil case No. 697-M-90. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

June 26, 1987

G.R. No. L-59495-97

GREGORIO GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAR EVANGELISTA, LUCIANO and ROSITA SESE and
ESTRELLA BAUTISTA, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petition seeks the review of a judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals, 1 setting aside the
decision rendered by the former City Court of Caloocan City, now Metropolitan Trial Court, in Civil
Cases Nos. 13501, 13502, and 13503 thereof, all actions for unlawful detainer. The challenged
decision dismissed the cases for failure of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, to avail himself of the
barangay conciliation process under Presidential Decree No. 1508, preliminary to judicial recourse.

There is no controversy as to the facts.

The petitioner is the owner of an apartment located in Caloocan City. Three doors thereof, Nos. 110-
D, 110-B, and 110-C, were leased to the private respondents for less than P200.00 a month in
rentals. 2

On October 1, 1979, the petitioner filed three separate complaints for ejectment against the private
respondents in the City Court of Caloocan City. According to him, he is in need of the premises for
the use of his married children who do not allegedly have residences of their own, 3 which is a
ground for ejectment under the provisions of Batas Blg. 25. The private respondents duly filed their
answers, after which the cases were consolidated and then heard.

On January 6, 1981, the said City Court rendered judgment ejecting the private respondents. 4 They
appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXII, now Regional Trial Court, which
affirmed the trial court's decision. 5 Reconsideration having been denied, 6 the private respondents
commenced proceedings in the respondent Court of Appeals. Among others, the private
respondents alleged that the Court of First Instance erred in sustaining the jurisdiction of the City
Court "notwithstanding the admitted fact that there was no compliance in the cases with the
mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508. 7

On October 31, 1981, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. 8 On January
5, 1982, it denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 9 As we noted, the respondent Court
dismissed the ejectment cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the City Court for failure of the
parties to undergo a confrontation at the barangay level. Hence, this petition.

The issue to be resolved here is not one of jurisdiction, as erroneously supposed by the respondent
Court of Appeals and by the parties as well. The question, rather, is simply one of procedure.

In Ebol v. Amin, 10 we held that the conciliation process under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not
jurisdictional. Jurisdiction is conferred by Batas Blg. 129 and the Judiciary Act of 1948. 11

Presidential Decree No. 1508 does not vest jurisdiction in the lupong tagapayapa. Jurisdiction
means the power to try and decide a case.12 The lupon does not decide cases. It is vested only with
conciliation functions. 13 It is not a court of law.

While in Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 we ruled that "non-compliance with the condition
precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity, 15 we
held in the same case that "the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case,
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire
proceedings a quo. 16 There is a similar waiver in the cases at bar. There is no allegation in the
private respondents' answers 17 that the petitioner failed to invoke the authority of the lupon
tagapayapa before going to court. Moreover, they took part in the trial, argued their case, and
adduced their evidence. These amount to a waiver.

Other than these, we find the decision 18 of the then City Court of Caloocan, now Metropolitan Trial
Court, as affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXII, now Regional Trial Court, in
the aforesaid three cases to be in conformity with the law and evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, and its resolution denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of the City Court in Civil Cases Nos.
13501, 13502, and 13503, as sustained by the Court of First Instance, is REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-65629 November 24, 1986

TERESITA E. AGBAYANI and LUCAS F. AGBAYANI, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. BELEN, in his capacity as Regional Trial Judge, Branch
XXXVIII, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and SPOUSES SEVERO A. VILLAFUERTE
AND ANA P. VILLAFUERTE, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Nullification is sought by petitioners of the Order of respondent Judge 1 dated September 28, 1983, dismissing
the civil action instituted by said petitioners against private respondents and other persons for quieting of title and damages involving three
(3) parcels of land in Dayomaca (Tobuan), Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan. 2 The Court sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss "on the
ground that ... (it had) not yet acquired jurisdiction to try the case" because of the failure of the petitioners to submit the controversy to
conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. No. 1508 before filing their complaint with the Court. The Trial Court justified its action as follows:

The Court after carefully examining and studying the ground set forth by the defendants in their
motion to dismiss, as well as the arguments advanced by the plaintiff, together with the pertinent
provision of P.D. 1508 cited by the parties, hereby finds that the instant action falls within the
authority of the Lupon Tagapayapa, and therefore the parties should first appear before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat of the barangay (Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan) where the properties are
located for confrontation as mandated in Section 6 of P.D. 1508. While it appears in the record
that the parties reside in barargays of different cities or municipalities, the real property subject
matter of the case are not however located in different barangays but in one and the same
barangay, that is, Barangay Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan. Based on these facts obtaining in this case,
it is clear and clean that the present action is within the authority of the Lupon, hence the provision of
P.D. 1508 should first be complied with before the complaint could be flied in court. 3

The Order is incorrect and win have to be reversed.

PD 1508 declares that generally, disputes involving parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality, or in adjoining barangays of different cities or municipalities, should first be brought
before the appropriate Barangay Lupon which shall have the authority to bring together the parties
for amicable settlement." 4 The proceedings before the Lupon are a "precondition" to the filing of any action or proceeding in court
or other "government office," PD 1508 further declaring that "No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudiration
unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated." 5

A complaint or petition filed in court or other government office without compliance with the
precondition may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action. 6 The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to
dismiss or answer, 7 the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. 8

The venue of these pre-requisite proceedings for conciliation is the Lupon of the barangay: (1) in
which the parties to the dispute are actually residing, or (2) where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, if the parties are actual residents of different barangays within the
same city or municipality,or (3) where the real property or any part thereof is situated, if the dispute
affects real property or any interest therein. 9

But the "precondition" does not apply to disputes over which the Lupon has no authority, namely:
those —

1) where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

2) where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

3) involving "offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days or a fine

exceeding P200.00," or "where there is no private offended party;

4) which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine, upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government; 10
 5) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and

6) involving real property located in different municipalities.11

The question presented in this case is whether the "precondition," i.e., the prior submission of the
dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation, should apply to actions affecting real property
situated in one city or municipality al-though the parties actually reside in barangays which are
located in different cities or municipalities and do not adjoin each other.

The question has already been passed upon and answered by thisCourt. In Tavora vs. Veloso, et
al., 12 the Court en bancheld that the "precondition" had no application to cases over which the Lupon had no authority. Specifically, the
Court ruled that by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not
actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other." 13 In such a
situation, where the Lupon is without jurisdiction of the controversy because the parties are not actual residents of the same city or
municipality or of adjoining' barangays, the nature of the controversy is of no moment-whether or not affecting real property or interest
therein, located in the same city or municipality. And the principle is not at an altered by the proviso of Section 3 of PD 1508(governing
venue) that "disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part
thereof is situated." The "quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed in the principal clauses of
the first paragraph of Section 3;" 14 but obviously, the rule on venue is utterly in-consequential as regards a case over which the Barangay
Lupon does not, in the first place, have any jurisdiction.

Since the dispute between the parties in this case was never within the authority or jurisdiction of the
Barangay Lupon because the parties admittedly reside in different cities and municipalities (and not
in adjoining barangays), there was no occasion or reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue
governing disputes concerning real property. Petitioners were there-fore under no obligation to
comply with the "precondition" of first referring their dispute with private respondents to the Barangay
Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement before instituting their suit in court. Hence, it was
incorrect for the Trial Court to ascribe this obligation to them, and to dismiss their action for omission
to fulfill it.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the Trial Court dated September 28, 1983 is hereby annulled and set
aside, and the case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings, with costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-56011 October 31, 1984

ELMER PEREGRINA, ADELAIDA PEREGRINA and CECILIA PEREGRINA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo
City, Branch III, PROCOPIO SANCHEZ and CARMELITA SANCHEZ, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: ñé+.£ª wph!1

Respondent Court's assumption of jurisdiction, without prior conciliation proceedings between the
parties in the Lupon Tagapayapa, is questioned in this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction. We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Judge from
taking further action in the case pending resolution of the controversy.

The Complaint filed below by the SPOUSES Procopio and Carmelita Sanchez against
PETITIONERS Elmer, Adelaida and Cecilia, all surnamed Peregrina, is a civil action for damages for
alleged disrespect for the dignity, privacy and peace of mind of the SPOUSES under Article 26 of the
Civil Code, and for alleged defamation under Article 33 of the same Code.

Admittedly, the parties are actual residents of the same barangay in Olongapo City. In fact, they are
neighbors. Unquestionably, too, no conciliation proceedings were filed before the Lupon. It is not
surprising then that the Complaint is silent regarding compliance with the mandatory requirement,
nor does it allege that the dispute falls within the excepted cases. 1

PETITIONERS, as defendants below, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint. Before firing an
Opposition, the SPOUSES applied for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter, the SPOUSES
presented their Opposition claiming that, under Section 6(3) of P.D. No. 1508, the parties may go
directly to the Courts if the action is coupled with a provisional remedy such as preliminary
attachment.

In resolving the Motion to Dismiss, respondent Judge at first, dismissed the Complaint for failure of
the SPOUSES to comply with the pre-condition for amicable settlement under P.D. No. 1508, stating
that the application for a provisional remedy was merely an afterthought. On motion for
reconsideration by the SPOUSES, however, respondent Judge denied PETITIONERS' Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that under Rule 57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the application for
attachment can be made at the commencement of the action or any time thereafter. PETITIONERS
now assail that Order of denial before us.

We uphold PETITIONERS. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 specifically provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Disputes between or among persons actually respectively in the same barangay

shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. ...

It is also mandated by Section 6 of the same law: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No complaint,

petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon
as provided. in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the
parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary,
attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated. ...

Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1,,983), and Vda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217
(1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a
condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. 2The condition is
analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, 3 or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise
suits between family members, 4 lacking which the case can be dismissed. 5
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are actual residents in the
same barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted cases. 6

It will have to be held, therefore, that respondent Judge erred in reconsidering his previous Order of
dismissal on the ground that the provisional remedy of attachment was seasonably filed. Not only
was the application for that remedy merely an afterthought to circumvent the law, but also,
fundamentally, a Writ of Attachment is not available in a suit for damages where the amount,
including moral damages, is contingent or unliquidated. 7 Prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation
proceedings, therefore, was indubitably called for.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge's Order, dated November 17, 1980, is SET ASIDE, and the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 2946-0 for damages is DISMISSED, without prejudice. The Temporary
Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No costs.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.