3. OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998 [G.R. No.

[G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights| Right to
Puno, J.
Facts: Privacy
BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, et.al.
On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
“ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”.
FACTS:
The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for
(PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . the Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was
published in four newspapers of general circulation on January. Petitioner filed
The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds:
the instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that:
1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative
powers of the Congress of the Philippines;
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is unconstitutional since
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure; and

3. The AO violates the citizen’s right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of
Held: Rights.

1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life
and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed HELD:
by Congress that implements it, not by an Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such
Power, which is supposed to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of applying policies
and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a
is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from fully deserving of constitutional protection.
the foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The subject
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power. right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a “common narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS
TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is the confirmation of an individual’s identity through a
fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government offices has
1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the instrumentalities and ;
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered shall
be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for
what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the
information. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET, THERE issuance of the said order. The broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O.
ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE
CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and
SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE present danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O.
THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our
people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizen’s right to privacy.

Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.

Republic v. Drugmakers Laboratories, GR No. 190837, March 5,2014
FACTS:
The DOH, thru then Secretary Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, issued Administrative Order No. AO 67, s.
1989, entitled “Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical Products.” It
required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with the FDA before
they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory
bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for
these products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold
because there was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of the Circular No.
1, s. 1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the
establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8, s.
1997 which provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on
drug products.
ISSUE:
Who has the power to validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997: Secretary of Health
or FDA? Do the assailed circulars partake of administrative rules and regulations and, as such, must
comply with the requirements of prior hearing, consultation and publication?
RULING:
The FDA has sufficient authority to issue the circulars and since they would not affect the
substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern, as they are not administrative regulations,
no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity. CircularNos. 1 and 8, s.
1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing
statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or(c) ascertain the existence of certain
facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. The only purpose of the circulars is
for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989,
including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720.
Republic of the Philippines vs Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc.
GR No. 190837 March 5, 2014
Facts: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act”
primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measure of foods, drugs and devices and
cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of Health, thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon
issued AO 67 s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical products.
Among others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before
they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence
(BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products. However, the implementation of
the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local facility capable of conducting the
same. The issuance of circulars no. 1 s. of 1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing
requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued
circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing
requirement on drug products.
Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.
Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only if there exist a law
which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of
the granting statutes and must not involve discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix
the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the
doctrine of separation of powers and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers.
An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule or a contingent rule.
Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a d designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations
pursuant to authority properly delegated by the congress amd effect a change in existing law or policy which
affect individual rights and obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or
explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective
is merely to construe the statue being administered and purpory to do no more than interpret the statute.
Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern
all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those
issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of the law depends.
In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by EO 292 s. of 1988
otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing and publication in order to be valid
and binding except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because when an administrative rule
is merely intepretative in nature its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that ca facilitate or render least cumbersome
the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed
before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that A0 67 is actually the rule that originally
introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the issuamce of CPR covering
certain pharmaceutical products as such, it is considered an administrative regulation – a legislative rule to be
exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720
to implement the statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to
their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the court
deems that AO 67 complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice and publication pursuant to the
presumption of regularity accorded tl the govt in the exercise of its official duties.
On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because
they do not: a.) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; b.) Interpret, clarify or explain
existing statutory regulation under which FDA operates and/or; c.) Ascertain the existence of certain facts or
things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to
administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s. of 1989 including those covering the
BA/BE testing requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority
to issue the said circulars and since theu would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to
govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing,
consultation and publication are needed for their validity.
 EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, 482 SCRA 673 Executive Secretary v. Southwing Industries (2006)
Ynares-Santiago, J

On December 12, 2002, President Arroyo issued EO 156 entitled “PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.” Doctrine: A declaratory relief may be availed of even after the right of petitioners
have been breached or violated
Under Section 3.1 of the said EO, THE IMPORTATION INTO THE COUNTRY, INCLUSIVE OF
FREEPORT, OF ALL TYPES OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES IS PROHIBITED.

The private respondent, which has a business of importing all kinds of used motor vehicles
questioned the constitutionality of said EO. Facts: Petitioners are all locators inside the Subic Bay Freeport, who are all
exporters of used motor vehicles and spare parts, except used cars. Then President
I s s u e s: Arroyo issued EO 156 intended to promote the growth of he local vehicle
manufacturing industries and thus prohibiting the importation of used cars.
1. Does the private respondent have the personality to sue or to question the constitutionality
of EO 156?

2. Does the President have the authority to promulgate EO to promote police power like in
this case? The Subic Bay locator-companies filed a petition for Declaratory Relief with RTC
Olongapo seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1
3. Is EO 156 constitutional? of said EO. The RTC, affirmed by the CA, declared the EO unconstitutional for
usurping legislative powers and being repugnant to the Bases Conversion Law.
Held:

1. The private respondent has the personality to sue to question the constitutionality of an
administrative issuance because it will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Respondents would suffer a direct injury if said EO will be implemented because in its Certificate The government’s defense was that the petition for Declaratory Relief was not
of Registration , it is allowed import/trade used motor vehicles and spare parts. Clearly, it would
suffer prejudice if importation of all motor vehicles, not only used cars will be prohibited.
proper as it may only be filed prior to any violation of rights. It further said that
considering the there already a breach of respondents supposed right because the
2. The President is authorized to issue an executive order provided it complies with the cases were filed more than a year after the issuance of EO 156. In fact, numerous
following requisites: warrants of seizure and detention were issued against imported used motor
vehicles belonging to respondents.
a. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

b. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

c. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and WON: The locators properly availed of the remedy of Declaratory Relief? YES

d. It must be reasonable.

There is no question that no less than Art. VI, Section 28 [2] of the Constitution authorizes Congress HELD: The propriety of declaratory relief as a vehicle for assailing the executive
to in turn authorize the President by law, within specified limits, and subject to such restrictions
and limitations, to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas…”. Likewise, the Tariff and Customs
issuance, suffice it to state that any breach of the rights of respondents will not
Code likewise delegates to the President similar powers. affect the case. In Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province
of Cebu, the Court entertained a suit for declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt
3. Is the EO prohibiting the importation of all motor vehicles, not only used cars constitutional? In as to the proper interpretation of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a
this case, while the first two requisites are present, the 3rd is not. This is so because it is not within
the powers of the President to prohibit the importation of other vehicles, not only cars, even in the violation of the right of the party affected. We find no reason to deviate from said
Freeport Zones like Subic which is allowed by RA 7227. The EO therefore is ultra vires or beyond the ruling mindful of the significance of the present case to the national economy
limits of the authority conferred on the President because it tries to supplant or modify the
Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws.
The 4th requisite is not also present because the same is unreasonable since it likewise prohibit the
entry of used motor vehicles into the Freeport which is owed by law, RA 7227.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES (ATIENZA)
Facts:
This is a petition to annul the decision of a RTC of Olongapo declaring unconstitutional the
EO 156 Art. 2 Sec. 3.1. The said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country,
inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or
Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.
CA upheld the ruling of the RTC on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President
to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an
exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise
thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is void.
The petitioners argue that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant to EO 226,
the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application should be extended to
the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is
merely an exemption from customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not
an open floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.
Issue: WON the EO is valid? Held:
Partially Yes. It is valid insofar as it is outside the Freeport zone, but void if the vehicles are
within the Freeport zone.
According to the SC, Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation
of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as
well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay.Such delegation
confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority
delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
17
intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. To be
valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
 (2) It must be promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within the scope of the authority
18
given by the legislature; and (4) It must be reasonable.
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of
the Constitution through Congress’ delegation by law.
The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:
 1) The Tariff and Customs Code which
authorizes the President, in the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security, to, inter alia, prohibit the importation of any
commodity.
 2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines
that empowers the President to
approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any equipment or raw materials or
finished products 3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the "Safeguard Measures
Act" (SMA), ,"
 Second requisite:
The general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous notice
and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that
the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules. An interpretative rule, however,
give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed; and are
designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge
of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation,
crafted to implement a primary legislation.
The SC adds that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means
that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially
increases the burden of those governed, the agency must let those who are going to be affected
be heard and informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law.
In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute
primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on
the importation of a specified product.
Third requisite
According to the petitioners, the purpose of the EO is for the domestic industry. EO 156,
however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation
of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory.
The domesticindustry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory"
which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227
Fourth requisite:
This brings us to the fourth requisite. Rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to secure the end in view.
The SC found no logic in the all encompassing application of the assailed provision to the
Freeport which is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehicles do not
enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not
arise.
Lokin Jr. vs Commission on Elections
GR No. 179431-32
Facts: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered
under the partylist system of representation that manifested their intention to participate in the May 14,
2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,
CIBAC, through its President Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The
nominees in order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, were:
1.) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; 2.) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin Jr.; 3.) Cinchora C. Cruz-Gonzales;
4.) Sherwin Tugma; and 5.) Emil L. Galang. The nominees certificate of acceptance were attached to the
certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspaper of
general circulation. Prior to elections, however, CIBAC still through Villanueva filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, hereby it withdrew
the nominations of Lokin, Tugma and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.
Issue: Whether or not the substitution is valid.
Held: No. The legislative power of the government is vested exclusively in accordance with the doctrine
of separation of power. As a general rule, the legislative cannot surrender pr abdicate its legislative power
for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the
legislative to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.
Under certain circumstances, the legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards
the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the legislature must declare
the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The legislature should
set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is
laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power when the legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate
rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative
board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law
and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for
the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
It must be promulgated in accordance with thr prescribed procedure;
It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC, despite the role as implementing arm of the government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority
nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement. The IRRs the
COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not
be override, supplant or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out.
CASE: Lokin Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
FACTS: The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups registered under the party-
list system, which manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007. CIBAC, thru its president Joel Villanueva,
submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required
number of qualifying votes. The nominees are: Villanueva, herein petitioner Lokin, Jr, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, and
Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, through Villanueva, filed a certificate amending the list of its nominees whereby
it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. The amended list includes: Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and
Borje. Villanueva even sent a letter to COMELEC transmitting signed petitions of 81% of the CIBAC members in order
to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of the three.
After the election, CIBAC was proclaimed entitled to two seats. CIBAC, supposedly thru its counsel, filed with
COMELEC en banc a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. This was opposed by
Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. It appears that COMELEC failed to act on the certificate filed by Villanueva indicating
the amended list of nominees. Thus, he filed a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment. Consequently, COMELEC en banc approved the withdrawal of the nominees Lokin, Tugna and Galang.
As a result, COMELEC proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of
CIBAC and he likewise assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 and the issued approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the
proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was
an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has
no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
 2. Whether or not a special civil action for quo
warranto is the proper remedy?
HELD: An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who
between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It
can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding
elections.
 A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the
winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the
petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties
strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very
peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest
may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine
which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes,
Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another
nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case
does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz- Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other
cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the
September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented
by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the
Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC. Petitions for certiorari and mandamus
granted. COMELEC ordered to proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List Representative representing
CIBAC in the House of Representatives.
Facts
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list
system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local
elections. CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees were: (1)
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna;
and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by
CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News and
The Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1)
Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. Using all relevant formulas, the
motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation but the motion was opposed
by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC were
presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the
CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the party's
manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all
indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative
and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written
Board approval, was accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the
party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC, Cruz-
Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
Summary of Cases
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC
to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007; and the
resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-
Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution
No. 7804). He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. the law that the
COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the
proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was an
electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no
jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.
For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition
for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Issues :
1. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act
2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC
without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in
nature.
Held:
1. YES, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the
doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for
doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other
authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the
authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following
requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the
second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting IRRs
must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress, for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to
modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law
it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the
Legislature.
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from
which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named
in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective
office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed
after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in
the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system
shall not be considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change
its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee
dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision
must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even
where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal
interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law,
from which the courts must not depart.[34] When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason
for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement
a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.
2. YES, they committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of nominees of CIBAC without any basis
in fact/law. CIBAC's withdrawal and substitution of its nominees are invalid and ineffectual which makes Lokin the
winner based on:
1. RA 7941 (Party List Act) Sec 8
a. Deprives the party lists of the right to change its nominees or alter the order of nominees once it is
submitted to the COMELEC EXCEPT WHEN
i. nominee dies
ii. nominee withdraws nomination in writing
iii. nominee becomes incapacitated
iv. this enumeration is exclusive
2.Resolution No. 7804 (COMELEC) Sec 13
b. Provided 4 instances when order/names of nominees can be altered
i. "when the nomination is withdrawn by the party"
ii. grave abuse of discretion in expanding to 4 the 3 grounds for substituting a nominee
IRRs should always accord with the law to be implemented

4. ABELLA V. CSC (2004)
Both the appointing authority and the appointee are the real parties in interest, and both have legal standing, in a suit
assailing a Civil Service Commission (CSC) order disapproving an appointment. Despite having legal interest and standing,
herein petitioner unsuccessfully challenges the constitutionality of the CSC circular that classifies certain positions in the
career service of the government. In sum, petitioner was appointed to a Career Executive Service (CES) position, but did not
have the corresponding eligibility for it; hence, the CSC correctly disapproved his appointment.
The Facts:
“Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held
a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership
and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was
then the required eligibility for said position.
Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis. On
January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment
Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was
disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of
his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and
Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999.
Decision:
Approval Required for
Permanent Appointment
A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the
appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of law, the rules and the standards promulgated pursuant thereto. [13] It
implies the civil service eligibility of the appointee.[14] Thus, while the appointing authority has the discretion to choose whom to
appoint, the choice is subject to the caveat that the appointee possesses the required qualifications. [15]
To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal requirements.[16] Thus, the law
requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is
qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were observed. [17] The applicable
provision of the Civil Service Law reads:
“SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the
following powers and functions:
“x x x x x x x x x
“(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential
appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jail guards, and disapprove those where
the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately
upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is
disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for
appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of
appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as
herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment
becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.”[18]
G.R. NO. 152574, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
FRANCISCO ABELLA JR., PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.
[PANGANIBAN.]
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal Services
Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager, having completed the
training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant
to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility for said position.
On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994 with Section
4 enumerating the positions covered by the Career Executive Service (CES). These positions require Career
Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent appointment. But, this provides that
incumbents to CES shall retain their permanent appointment but upon promotion or transfer to other CES
positions, they shall be under temporary status until they qualify.
Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a
contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department
Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to respondent
Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility
was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof,
petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center,
SBMA on July 9, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disapproval of his permanent appointment by respondent to the
Civil Service Commission, which issued Resolution No. 000059, dated January 10, 2000, affirming the action
taken by respondent. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the CSC in Resolution No.
001143 dated May 11, 2000.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but it ruled that he did not have legal standing to question the
disapproval and was not the real party in interest.
Issue/s:
Whether the petitioner has the personality and the real party in interest to question the disapproval of his
appointment.
Whether the issuance of Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994, which deprived petitioner his
property right without due process of law, is constitutional.
Whether the CSC correctly denied his appointment.
Ruling:
A. Personality and real party in interest.
The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority’s discretion.
The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. While there is justification to allow the
appointing authority to challenge the CSC disapproval, there is none to preclude the appointee from taking the
same course of action. Aggrieved parties, including the CSC, should be given the right to file motions for
reconsideration or to appeal. On this point, the concepts of “legal standing” and “real party in interest” become
relevant.
The question in legal standing is whether such parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ If legal standing is granted to challenge
the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act despite the lack of personal injury on the
challenger’s part, then more so should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC Order disapproving his
appointment. Clearly, the petitioner was prejudiced by the disapproval, since he could not continue his office.
Although petitioner had no vested right to the position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary
to this point, he should be granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal stake in the outcome
of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied his permanent appointment.

A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of
the suit. “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
Otherwise stated, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere
expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has
no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is adversely affected by the CSC’s
Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the
CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would
necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on him all the
rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.
B. Due Process
Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and regulations to carry out its
mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify positions
covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this objective,
specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.
The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner’s ELM eligibility. He was appointed to a CES position; however,
his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the requirements of the position, which in
petitioner’s case was a Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE). The challenged Circular protects the rights of
incumbents as long as they remain in the positions to which they were previously appointed. They are allowed
to retain their positions in a permanent capacity, notwithstanding the lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular
recognizes the rule of prospectivity of regulations; hence, it is not an post facto law or a bill of attainder.
In the present case, the government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to remain
in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment years later as
department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply with the eligibility prescribed at the
time for that position.
On petitioner’s averment that he was not afforded due process for CSC’s alleged failure to notify him of a hearing
relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular, is not convincing. The issuance of the circular was an exercise
of a quasi-legislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due
process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or
ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct.
C. Whether CSC correctly denied his appointment
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment. The appointee
need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an
administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines
the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee’s possession of all the minimum qualifications
and none of the disqualification. In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC
Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the position he was appointed to.
The Petition was GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal standing for petitioner, but DENIED insofar as it prays for
the reversal of the CSC Resolutions disapproving his appointment as department manager III of the Labor and
Employment Center, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
ABELLA, JR.. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
RATIO: Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and
regulations to carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to
clearly define and identify positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to
issue guidelines to meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.
On petitioner’s averment that he was not afforded due process for CSC’s alleged failure to notify him of
a hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular, is not convincing. The issuance of the
circular was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every
affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past
events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment. The
appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the
imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an
appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee’s
possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. In sum, while petitioner
was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his
eligibility to the position he was appointed to.
DOCTRINES:
1.) Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it
is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.”
Significantly, “the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality -- is the prerogative of the appointing
authority.” No tribunal, not even this Court, may compel the exercise of an appointment for a favored
person.
The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority’s
discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of
Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the appointing authority
to request reconsideration or appeal.
2.) The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial,
issuance. This distinction determines whether prior notice and hearing are necessary
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before
it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable
law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance
of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as enumerated
in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.
On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there
is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule,
prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern
future conduct.
Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of departments, bureaus
and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued as an incident of the administrative
body’s power to issue guidelines for government officials to follow in performing their duties.
GMA NETWORK, INC., et al v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R.Nos. 205357, 205374, 205592, 205852, and
206360, 2 September 2014, EN BANC, (Peralta, J.)
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. “Freedom of speech, of train an astounding additional 39,055 personnel working on eight-hour shifts all over the country.
expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy.” The “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the
ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.

Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) changed the airtime limitations for political campaign from G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
“per station” basis, as used during the 2007 and 2010 elections, to a “total aggregate” basis for the 2013. Various broadcast
networks such as ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, RMN and KBP questioned the interpretation of the COMELEC on
the ground that the provisions are oppressive and violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and of
the press.

Collectively, they question the constitutionality of Section 9 (a), which provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the
previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates' television and radio guestings and appearances. Petitioners claim that Section 9(a) limits the computation of PONENTE: Peralta
“aggregate total” airtime and imposes unreasonable burden on broadcast media of monitoring a candidate’s or political party’s
aggregate airtime. On the other hand, COMELEC alleges that the broadcast networks do not have locus standi, as the TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
limitations are imposed on candidates, not on media outlets.

Comelec maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with the Fair Election Act as
this would truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a more
effective way of "levelling the playing field" between candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those without
much.
ISSUES:
 1. Does Section 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limit violate the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?
2. Does resolution No. 9165 impose unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry?
UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015
RULING:
1. Yes, Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the “aggregate-based” airtime limits
unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political
parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowablebroadcast
time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for
political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television
and radio guestings and appearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtimelimits violates freedom of
expression, of speech and of the press.

Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. “Freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.”
GMA came up with its analysis of the practical effects of such a regulation: Given the reduction of a candidate’s airtime
minutes in the New Rules, petitioner GMA estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for his
political advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days, or will only have 81.81 seconds per day
TV exposure allotment. If he chooses to place his political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he
will only have 27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates to 1 advertisement spot on a 30-second
spot basis in television.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits –
leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

The Court agrees. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state
interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
2. No, Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a
lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate
to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his
message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and
relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to
express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.

The Court cannot agree with the contentions of GMA. The apprehensions of COMELEC appear more to be the result of a
misappreciation of the real import of the regulation rather than a real and present threat to its broadcast activities. The Court
is more in agreement with COMELEC when it explained that the legal duty of monitoring lies with the COMELEC.
Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the COMELEC in ensuring that candidates are not
sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. There is absolutely no duty on the broadcast stations to do monitoring, much less
monitoring in real time. GMA grossly exaggerates when it claims that the non-existent duty would require them to hire and Heirs of MAXIMINO DERLA v. Heirs of CATALINA DERLA Vda. de HIPOLITO
April 13, 2011
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
PABIONA
Topic and Provisions involved: Enforcement of Agency Action; Res Judicata, Finality of Judgment
Doctrine-
Facts
Petitioners are surviving heirs of Maximino Derla, respondent Catalina is cousin of Derla. Respondent owned
23.9 ha fishpond area. 20.5 ha was originally maintained by Derla. Derla subsequently executed a SPA to Catalina
wherein his rights are recognized and that Catalina owns one half of the fishpond. Derla soon sold all his interests
to Catalina for 10k. The fishpond application for the 20.5 ha fishpond bought from Derla was soon filed.
Derla filed his own application over a 7.5 ha fishpond area adjoining Hipolito’s fishpond area. On November 21,
1960, Catalina charged Derla with Qualified for gathering and carrying away fish from Catalina’s fishpond. Derla,
in his defense, claimed that he was still part-owner of the fishpond when he harvested the fish. On the strength
of the "Transfer of Rights in Fishpond Permit" and Hipolito’s Affidavit that he and Derla are co-owners of the
fishpond and that he promised to pay Derla after the settlement of the fishpond boundary conflict, the court
acquitted Derla on November 29, 1960.
Director of Fisheries approved the application but was reversed by Sec. of Agri due to appeal by Catalina. Derla
now sought the CFI for a “Declaration of Nullity of Transfer of Right in a Fishpond Permit” but was dismissed on
the grounds of prescription and estoppel, since it has now been 10 years, action to annul contract has prescribed
and estoppel because that document was used to acquit him in the earlier criminal case.
Office of the President affirmed the decision by the Agri Sec. on the fishpond application. But the application for
the fishpond area was opposed by Panabo, saying this will affect their development as directed by RA 5743. This
claim was denied by the Office of the President.
Appeal by Derla to the CA and SC denied. SC decision became final and executory.
Panabo filed for Certiorari w/Prelim Injunction to assail the application of Catalina. In the midst of the case,
President Marcos commented via a letter to Sec. Zamora that the sale of the fishpond area will affect the
developments in Panabo. OP revoked its former decisions on granting the application to Catalina. Catalina then
filed for Certiorari w/Preliminary Injunction. Latter relied was granted/
After EDSA, she filed a petition with the OP saying she was a victim of the Marcos regime’s schemes, as to her
fishpond application. It was referred to the Sec. of Agri who found for Catalina, saying that she was not afforded
due process in denying her the sales application.
November 11, 1991 Order by the OP: Deciding in Catalina’s favor, the Office of the President held that the late
Hipolito, having complied with all the terms and conditions for an award of the subject fishpond area, had
already acquired a vested right therein.The Office of the President also applied the doctrine of res judicata as its
February 5, 1974 decision rejecting Hipolito’s fishpond sales application was based on then President Marcos’
marginal note, which it found to be legally and constitutionally suspect for having been issued after the February
11 and November 2, 1972 decisions had become final and executory. The Office of the President also ruled on
the prohibition under Presidential Decree No. 43, saying that the SANR at that time directed the continuance of
the processing of the pending fishpond sales application subject to a final inspection and verification.
Petitioners once again came into the picture but both the RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’
claims on the ground of res judicata. The lower courts have similarly held that the annulment of the titles, as
sought by the petitioners, relied on the same facts and evidence that were already presented and passed upon in
the earlier O.P. Case No. 4732; thus, barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
ISSUE: WON the action for annulment of title of the petitioners can still prosper
Held – No.
Ratio –
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we enumerated the elements of res judicata as follows:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the same parties.
The petitioners assert that there can be no res judicata as the November 11, 1991 decision in O.P. Case No. 4732
is null and void for having overturned an earlier final and executory decision and for not giving them an
opportunity to be heard. Instead of explaining to this Court why the elements of res judicata are not present in
this case, the petitioners decided to once again reiterate their worn-out arguments, discussed above, on why the
November 11, 1991 decision should not be accorded validity.
The November 11, 1991 Decision in O.P. Case No. 4732 has attained finality twenty (20) years ago. It is valid and
binding. In fact, on April 27, 1995, the Office of the President issued an Order for the sole purpose of declaring its
November 11, 1991 decision final and executory.
This Court has held time and again that a final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be
changed even by this Court:
There can be no mistake as to the presence of all the elements of res judicata in this case. The parties, although
later substituted by their respective successors-in-interest, have been the same from the very beginning and in
all the proceedings affecting the subject fishpond area. The concerned agencies and the lower courts have validly
ruled on the rights to the subject fishpond area, the validity of the documents covering it, and even the actions
associated and related to it. The subject fishpond area is undoubtedly the same subject matter involved in O.P.
Case No. 4732 and the petition now before us. With regard to the identity of the causes of action, this Court, in
Mendiola v. Court of Appeals held that:
The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would
support and establish the former and the present causes of action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid
cases is of no moment. x x x.
While it is true that this Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers,we have also limited the latter to proceedings purely
administrative in nature. Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the
doctrine of res judicata certainly applies. As this Court held in Fortich v. Corona:
The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.
Carlito C. Encinas v PO1 Alfredo Agustin, Jr and PO1 Joel Caubang GR No. 187317, April 11, 2013
Case Doctrine:

There is forum shopping when litis pendencia or res judicata is present.

FACTS:

The petitioner Encinas was the Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija. He was charged administratively
with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987. He was dismissed from the service. The two respondents were holding the
positions of Fire Officer I. He petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Civil Service
Commission to dismiss the petitioner from the service.

The case arose when the petitioner allegedly required the respondents to pay him P5,000 in order not to
relieve them from their station at the Cabanatuan City and re-assign them to a far flung area. The
respondents decided to pay in fear of the re-assignment, but they manage to come up with P2,000 only
causing the petitioner to order for their re-assignment to Cuyapo and Talugtug.

As a result, the respondents decided to file a complaint for illegal transfer before the Bureau of Fire
Protection and at the same time filed another complaint before the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office in Pampanga and the Civil Service Commission in Cabanatuan. Based on the filed complaints, the
petitioner alleges that the respondents are guilty of forum shopping by filing the two identical complaints.
The petitioner claims that the charges of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to public
interest that were filed before the Civil Service Commission and the BFP are in violation of the rules
against forum shopping.

ISSUE:

Is there a violation on the rules against forum shopping?

RULING:

The court held the respondents are not guilty of forum shopping. The court enumerated what constitutes
a violation of forum shopping which include the presence of the requisites of litis pendentia and res
judicata. There is litis pendentia when: (1) identity of parties is the same with the same interests in both
actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for and founded on the same facts, (3) identity of
the two preceding cases where a judgment rendered in the pending case will amount to res judicata in the
other case.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites include (1) the
former judgment is final, (2) the court rendering the said decision has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter, (3) judgement is based on the merits, (4) between the two actions, there must be identity
of parties, subject matter and cause of action.

In applying the above requisites, the court held that the dismissal of the petitioner based on the BFP
complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSC complaint. The dismissal by the BFP is not
based on the merits, but based on the recommendation of the fact finding committee in determining
whether a formal charge of an administrative offense may be filed. There is therefore no rights and
liabilities of the parties that were determined in the said action with finality. The court thereby affirmed
the dismissal of the petitioner and denied the petition.
Maglalang vs PAGCOR GR No 190566 11 December 2013
Facts: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In
December 2008, he committed an error counting the money of a lady customer. Due to
tension that arose between the two, they were invited to the casino’s Internal Security
Office in order to air their respective sides. He was required to file an Incident Report. By
January 2009, he was issued a memo charging him with Discourtesy. He was later on
found guilty of the same and 30-day suspension was imposed. He filed MR seeking
reversal of the decision and also Motion for Production to be furnished with documents
relative to the case. Both were denied. He then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the CA. He ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to
observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh
penalty of a 30-day suspension. He further explained that he did not appeal to the Civil
Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension
which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition
for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before seeking recourse from the CA.
Issue: WON CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before
it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Decision: CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all
the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
Exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is
purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no
administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot.
The case falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is
covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for
not more than 30 days.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil
action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. An appeal and a special civil action
such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One
cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available,
even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case
fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not
be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
G.R. No. 190566 : December 11, 2013
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR), AS REPRESENTED BY ITS INCUMBENT CHAIRMAN EFRAIM
GENUINO, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). While he was performing his functions
as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and
handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills. There were 45
P1,000.00 and ten P500.00 bills for the total amount of P50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid
the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five
clusters worth P 10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared
the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out
P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which
she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster
contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the
full and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of
trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain,
but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break.
After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate
petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casinos Internal Security Office in order to air their
respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same
day of the incident.
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casino informing him that he was being
charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of
the memorandum why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a
letter-explanation dated January 10, 2009.
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day
suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
seeking a reversal of the boards
decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a
reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. During the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for
Production dated April 20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case
including the recommendation of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board
supposedly containing the latter's factual findings.
Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum dated June 18, 2009 practically reiterating the
contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. It informed petitioner that the Board of Directors 2009 resolved to
deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the
finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper
procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30 -day suspension. Justifying his
recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because
the penalty imposed on him was only a 30- day suspension which is not within the CSCs appellate jurisdiction.
He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is
punishable only by reprimand.
In its assailed Resolution dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for
being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA.
Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over
issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
of the Government, including government- owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as
PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution dated
November 26, 2009. In denying the said motion, the CA relied on this Courts ruling in Duty Free Philippines v.
Mojica citing Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA, where this Court held as follows: It is now settled
that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution] government-owned or controlled
corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original charters, as distinguished
from those created under general law. PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by
PD 1869 on July 11, 1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the
management of PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil
Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987. Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in
the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia to: a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases
involving officials and employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal
or separation from the service which may be appealed to the Commission.
Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA committed grave and substantial error of judgment
ISSUE: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision reversed.
POLITICAL LAW: prior exhaustion of administrative remedies
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings,
Inc.on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit: Under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she
should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if
resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case.
POLITICAL LAW: exception to prior exhaustion of administrative remedies
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following
exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative
review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and
regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
POLITICAL LAW: availability of appeal in administrative disciplinary cases
Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,provides
for the unavailability of any appeal: (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days , or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official
or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. (b) The heads of
departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days
or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case
the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the department head.
Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 47 of E.O. No. 292 essentially providing that cases of
this sort are not appealable to the CSC.
POLITICAL LAW: judicial review in administrative cases
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still
subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco, we held: Decisions of administrative or quasi-
administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they
fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary
conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may
be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that
it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
REMEDIAL LAW: distinction between ordinary appeal and petition for certiorari under Rule 65
It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action
for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule
65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of
petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on
the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set
aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of
jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should
refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are
constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or
when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on
record.Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for
its judicious resolution is in order.
Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
FACTS
• Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed,with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the
complaint for Specific Performance anddamages filed by Lacap against RP
• Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992
where Lacap and twoother contractors were pre-qualified
• Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain
baranggay, andthereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and
labor in connection with
• On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end
product and fountit 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter
sought the payment of the DPWH
• DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final
release of funds dueto Lacap’s license as contractor having expired
• Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist.
Eng that theContractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a
contract entered into by acontractor after expiry of license is void and that
there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
• DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on
July 20 1994recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such
recommendation, no paymentwas issued
• On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance
and Damagesagainst petitioner before the RTC.14
• On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the complaint states no cause of actionand that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the nature of the action since respondent did notappeal to the COA the
decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
• Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss,the RTC issued anOrder dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion
to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise
denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
• On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the
State
• Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering
DPWH to payLacap for the contract of the project, 12% interest from demand
until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
• CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE
WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed
projects
RULING
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed
projects, but does notexonerate him from corresponding fines thereof.
Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:“
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or
wage, submits or attemptsto submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or
undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in asupervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing
alicense to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall
present or file thelicense certificate of another, give false evidence of any
kind to the Board, or any member thereof inobtaining a certificate or license,
impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall
be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced
to pay afine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five
thousand pesos.
The "plain meaningrule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the
statute is clear, plain and free fromambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566
are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts
entered into bya contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless,
such contractor is liable for paymentof the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Suchpayment,
however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the
law.