Title: Lorna Guillen Pesca vs. Zosimo A. Pesca G.R. No.

136921, April 17, 2001

Facts:
Lorna Guillen (Petitioner) and Zosimo Pesca (Respondent) met sometime in 1975 and after months of
courtship they got married in the same year. They had a blissful marriage and begot four children.
However, sometime in 1988, Petitioner noticed that Respondent showed some signs of “psychological
incapacity” to perform his marital covenant. Respondent’s being emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. Respondent became cruel, violent and habitual drinker. These
acts continued that in 1994, Petitioner decided to left Respondent in their conjugal house for good and
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage involving
psychological incapacity. The trial court decided in favor of the Petitioner.

However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that the Petitioner failed
to establish the following: (a) That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him
to be truly incognizant of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code;
(b) that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; (c) that his incapacity to
meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; (d) that the root cause
of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and (e)
that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari and argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA and in Republic v. CA and Molina
should have no retroactive application. Further, Petitioner argued that the Santos and Molina dicta
should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrines enunciated in Santos v. CA and in Republic v. CA and Molina apply
to this case.

Held: In resolving petitioner's contention, the Court applied the "doctrine of stare decisis". The doctrine
as ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code declares that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim — "legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet" — that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit". In the case at bar,
the phrase "psychological incapacity", borrowed from Canon Law, is an entirely novel provision in our
statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped
jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos vs. Court of Appeals when, for the first time, the Court has given
life to the term. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, that followed, has additionally provided
procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity. The Court, therefore, concluded that the Molina doctrine has
strengthened, not overturned, the Santos doctrine. The Court also opined that petitioner has utterly
failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. The Court
stressed that the alleged emotional immaturity and irresponsibility of respondent, invoked by
petitioner, is not synonymous with psychological incapacity.