05 De Guzman v.

Angeles
No. L-78590. (June 20, 1988)
Gutierrez, Jr., J. / kam-on in out of the rain

Subject Matter: Rule 79 – Section 3 Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof.
Summary: Elaine de Guzman, wife of the deceased Manolito, filed a petition for the settlement of Manolito’s intestate estate.
Elaine also filed a motion for writ of possession over 5 vehicles allegedly registered under Manolito’s name which at the time
was in the possession of Pedro de Guzman, Manolito’s father. Before the motion for writ of possession was heard by the RTC
Makati, Elaine filed an ex-parte motion to appoint her as Special Administratix and also a motion for the assistance of the
deputy sheriffs in “preserving” the estate of Manolito. RTC granted Elaine’s motions without giving notice to Pedro.
Elaine and the respondents deputy sheriffs immediately enforced the order as to the assistance in the preservation of
the estate. They tried to seize the bulldozer located in Pedro’s home which resulted to trouble and a near shootout. The
bulldozer was put in the custody of Mayor Jejomar Binay while the parties clarified the orders with the RTC Makati (Judge
Angeles). It was clarified that the order was only for properties not being claimed by third parties.
Pedro filed this instant petition to nullify the RTC Makati’s orders. The SC held that the lower court failed to give
notice to all interested parties as mandated by Sec. 3 Rule 79 before it acted on the motions of Elaine (1) to be appointed as
special administratrix, (2) to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and
(3) to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito. Such failure makes the proceeding for the settlement
of the estate void. SC granted Pedro’s instant petition and thus nullified the RTC’s orders and remanded the case to the lower
court for further proceedings. (Judge Angeles voluntarily inhibited himself so the SC directed RTC Makati to re-raffle the case.)

Doctrine:
Probate court must cause notice through publication of the petition after receiving the same otherwise the proceeding for the
settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled
It is very clear from Sec. 3, Rule 79 that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the petition after it
receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the
judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.

Effect of non-publication: Where no notice as required by Sec. 3, Rule 79 has been given to persons believed to have an
interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and should be
annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in order that no person may be deprived of
his right to property without due process of law.

 Notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional,
the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to
annulment.

Action before the SC: PETITION to review the orders of the RTC Makati, Br. 58. (Respondent Judge Angeles)

Parties:
Petitioner Pedro de Guzman
Respondents The Honorable Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles, RTC Branch 58, Makati, Metro Manila; Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora
and Honorio Santos; and Elaine G. de Guzman

Facts:
RTC Makati
1. May 5, 1987 – Private respondent Elaine de Guzman (Elaine), widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman (Manolito),
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito docketed as Special Proceedings No. M-1436.
2. Among the allegations1 in the petition are the possible creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable and existing
claims against the firm C. Santos Construction and are listed in Annex “E”.

1 Allegations in the petition for settlement of estate (just in case Atty asks)
a) Manolito died on March 22, 1987 in Makati City;
b) He was a resident of Makati City at the time of his death;
c) He left personal and real properties as part of his estate, listed in the annexes of the petition;
d) The properties were acquired after the marriage of Elaine & Manolito and therefore are included in their conjugal partnership;
e) The estate has a probable net value which may be provisionally assessed at 4 million pesos more or less;
f) [RELEVANT] The possible creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable and existing claims against the firm C. Santos Construction are listed in Annex "E";
g) The compulsory heirs of the decedent are Elaine as the surviving spouse and their 2 minor children namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman (11 y/o) and Peter Brian
de Guzman (9 y/o);
h) After diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent left a last will and testament, none has been found and according to the best knowledge
information and belief of Elaine, Manolito died intestate; and
i) Elaine as the surviving spouse of the decedent, is most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of administration.
 3. May 22, 1987 – Elaine filed a motion for writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under Manolito’s name,
alleged to be their conjugal properties but which are at the time in the possession of Manolito’s father, herein
petitioner Pedro de Guzman (Pedro). Elaine alleges that as co-owner & heir, she must have possession of said vehicles
in order to “preserve” the assets of her late husband.
- Lower court set the hearing of the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the deputy sheriff to notify Pedro.
- After Pedro filed motions for extension and resetting of hearing, the hearing was finally reset to June 15, 1987.
4. Back to the settlement of the estate – On May 28, 1987, Elaine filed her Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint her as Special
Administratix of Manolito’s Estate. On the order dated May 28, this motion was set for hearing on June 5. In this same
order, the lower court directed that all parties be notified. However, no notice of the order was given to
Pedro. [RELEVANT TO TOPIC]
- Lower court granted Elaine’s motion and appointed her as special administratix in an order dated June 5, 1987.
- On June 8, 1987, lower court issued another order, acting on special administratix Elaine’s Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Assistance, appointing respondent deputy sheriffs Flora & Santos together with some militarymen
and/or policemen to assist her in “preserving” the estate of Manolito.

Trouble that ensued (ie nagkagulo gulo sila)

5. Respondents tried to enforce the June 8 order by taking the subject vehicles from Pedro. According to Pedro, there
was a near shootout between the Makati Police who were trying to maintain peace & order and CAPCOM soldiers who
were aiding respondent sheriffs & Elaine. The timely arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay defused the very volatile situation
and the parties agreed that the bulldozer which was sought to be taken will be placed in the custody of Binay while
the parties seek clarification from respondent Judge Angeles’ June 8 order.
6. Clarification during the conference (before RTC & attended by both counsels): The order "must be merely to take and
preserve assets admittedly belonging to the estate, but not properties, the ownership of which is claimed by third
persons."
7. Pedro then filed a manifestation listing properties which he claimed to be his own.

Instant petition (this petition)

8. This petition was filed to annul the June 5 (appointing special administratix) and June 8 (appointing the assistance of
the deputy sheriffs) orders of Judge Angeles. On June 10, a TRO was issued by the SC enjoining the RTC from enforcing
said orders.
9. Oct. 28, 1987 – SC gave due course to the petition.

Contentions
10. Petitioner Pedro’s contentions:
a) June 5 order appointing Elaine as special administratix is a patent nullity, the RTC not having acquired
jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito
was not yet set for hearing and published for 3 consecutive weeks, as mandated by the Rules of Court.
o Also, the appointment constitutes grave abuse of discretion for having been made without giving
petitioner and other parties an opportunity to oppose said appointment.
b) As to the June 8 order, Pedro alleges that the immediate grant of the motion, without notice to Pedro, and its
immediate implementation on the very same day by respondent Elaine with the assistance of respondents deputy
sheriffs, at no other place but at Pedro's home, are eloquent proofs that all the antecedent events were
intended solely to deprive Pedro of his property without due process of law.
o He also prays that the respondent Judge Angeles be disqualified from further continuing the case.

Issue: WON a probate court may (1) appoint a special administratrix and (2) issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of
a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate even before the probate
court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79? (NO)

Ratio:
1. As early as March 18, 1937, in the case of Santos vs. Castillo, it has already been ruled by this Court that before a court
may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of the properties left by a
deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or
circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to
be probated.

Application to this case: RTC Makati acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the
settlement of an intestate estate by Elaine since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the
deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule
79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

2. However, the Court differentiated between (1) the jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings for the
administration of an estate and (2) its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate
of the deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased person but the
determination of the properties comprising that estate must follow established rules.

3. Manalo vs. Paredes: It is very clear from Sec. 3 Rule 79 that the probate court must cause notice through publication of
the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the
court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.
4. Eusebio vs. Valmores: Where no notice as required by Sec. 3 Rule 79 has been given to persons believed to have
an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and
should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in order that no person
may be deprived of his right to property without due process of law. Verily, notice through publication of the
petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes
court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment.

Application to this case:

5. No notice as mandated by Sec. 3 Rule 79 was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of
Elaine to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased
person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito.

6. The explanation2 of Judge Angeles while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the disregard of the Rule. If
indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both the estate and the person who have interest in the estate, then it
could have caused notice to be given immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of Court. All interested persons
including herein petitioner who is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in the petition (P850,240.80) could have
participated in the proceedings especially so, because the respondent (Elaine) immediately filed a motion to have
herself appointed as administratrix. The petitioner (Pedro) as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the
preservation of the estate as the private respondent (Elaine) who happens to be the widow of deceased
Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of Court.

7. If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate justify a court’s immediately taking some
kind of temporary action even without the required notice, no such emergency is shown in this case. The need for the
proper notice even for the appointment of a special administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case.

8. The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the preservation of the estate was limited to properties not
claimed by third parties. If certain properties are already in the possession of the applicant for special administratrix
and are not claimed by other persons, the Court sees no need to hurry up and take special action to preserve those
properties. As it is, the sheriffs took advantage of the questioned order to seize by force, properties found in the
residence of the petitioner which he vehemently claims are owned by him and not by the estate of the deceased
person.

Dispositive: Instant petition GRANTED. RTC orders are SET ASIDE. Case is REMANDED to the lower court for the hearing of
the petition with previous notice to all interested parties as required by law.

In view of the voluntary inhibition of the respondent Judge, the Executive Judge of RTC Makati is directed to re-raffle the case
to another branch of the court. The Temporary Restraining Order dated June 10, 1987 is made permanent. No costs.

2 Judge Angeles: In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned acted in the honest conviction that it would be to the best interest of the estate without unduly
prejudicing any interested party or third person. Any delay in issuing the said Orders might have prejudiced the estate for the properties may be lost, wasted or
dissipated in the meantime.