COMMENTARY
A New ‘Washington Consensus’
‘Indo–Pacific’ and India’s Emerging Role
K M Seethi
The United States administration
is fervently promoting the
“Indo–Pacific” as an alternative
geopolitical construct to mobilise
a large number of countries in
the Asia–Pacific region to contain
Chinese and Russian influence.
However, India under the
Narendra Modi administration
has become a strategic
contraption by yielding to the
pressures of the Donald Trump
regime for a programmed
“Indo–Pacific” ploy. In the
emerging scenario, New Delhi’s
rhetoric on “strategic autonomy”
has become a political liability.
The author thanks the referee for their
comments and suggestions.
K M Seethi (kmseethimgu@gmail.com) teaches
at the School of International Relations and
Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala.
20
T
he geopolitical construct of “Indo–
Pacific” has gained considerable
significance in international rela-
tions recently. Scholars, policymakers
and think tanks across the world argue
that the locale of Asia–Pacific has been
substituted more realistically by an
appropriate category encompassing two
oceanic political and strategic heritages
of both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
Ocean. Leaders and policymakers from
Japan, Australia, the United States (US),
to India and Indonesia have frequently
deployed “Indo–Pacific” in their speech-
es, statements and writings. However,
the construct of the Indo–Pacific has a
much wider meaning and implication
today against the background of the
changing US strategy in the region with
a view to containing China as a rising
power, both economically and militarily.
The US President Donald Trump and
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
enunciated this construct within the
framework of their countries’ strategic
and economic interests. While Trump
has been more explicit in his position on
the potentials and challenges of the
region, Modi talked about “strategic
autonomy” and “free, open, prosperous
and inclusive Indo–Pacific Region” at
the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore
FEBRUARY 23, 2019
(MEA 2018a). However, just before the
commencement of the Shangri-La Dia-
logue, it may be noted, Washington had
rechristened its military command in
charge of the Asia–Pacific region from
the “Pacific Command” to the “Indo–
Pacific Command.”
The renaming was done in a function
where America’s South Korean ambassa-
dor, Admiral Harris, charged that China
was seeking “hegemony in Asia.” He also
warned that Russia should be watched,
calling it a “spoiler.” The US Secretary of
Defense James Mattis was even more
categorical, saying that the US would
continue its naval activities in the South
China Sea aimed at challenging China’s
territorial ambitions (Sputnik 2018).
Plausibly, the American strategy in the
Indo–Pacific is to contain China and
co-opt India, both economically and mil-
itarily. This strategy obviously stemmed
from Washington’s long-term fear about
the “rise” of Asia and the decline of
American power.
Revisiting Washington Consensus
The “Washington Consensus,” as it has
been known for more than a quarter cen-
tury, unfolded an array of free market
economic policies enunciated and rein-
forced by Washington-based institutions
and agencies, as popularised by John
Williamson. In a paper “What Washington
Means by Policy Reform,” Williamson
said that the Washington, as he referred
to in his paper,
is both the political Washington of Congress
and senior members of the administration
and the technocratic Washington of the
vol lIV no 8 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

international financial institutions, the eco-
nomic agencies of the US government, the
Federal Reserve Board, and the think tanks.
(Williamson 2004, 1990)
He brought out a set of reforms that
dealt with a broad agenda of fiscal disci-
pline, reordering public expenditure
priorities, tax reform, liberalising inter-
est rates, a competitive exchange rate,
trade liberalisation, liberalisation of in-
ward foreign direct investment, privati-
sation, deregulation, and property rights.
Williamson, in fact, reflected on the
emerging Washington Consensus on what
the global South countries “should do”
(Williamson 2004).
Furthermore, he argued that “lagging
countries should catch up with the policy
reforms on my list,” pointing to the fact
that the East Asian countries “had broadly
followed those policies,” and that it
would be “more natural to attribute the
fast growth of the East Asian newly
industrialised countries to what they
had in common, such as fiscal prudence,
high savings rates, work ethic, competi-
tive exchange rates” (Williamson 2004).
The term “Washington Consensus” be-
came popular after 1991 even as the
world system moved broadly towards an
intensive market-driven order of inter-
national exchanges, especially after the
formation of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in 1995. Ever since the forma-
tion of the WTO, the countries in the
global South were compelled to follow
the Washington Consensus on reforms
and restructuring, and thereby accom-
modated themselves within a neo-liberal
economic framework.
However, over the years, critics have
pointed out that this “consensus” only
put on ruthless conditions on the global
South countries. The East Asian crisis in
the late 1990s and the global recession of
2008–09 were further reminders that
increased deregulation would only re-
sult in financial instability that would
spell disaster for both global North and
global South economies. Meanwhile, what
agitated the minds of the Washington
Consensus experts was obviously the
“peaceful rise” of China notwithstan-
ding the setbacks in the world economy.
Containing China, economically, could
hardly be a feasible project for them.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRUARY 23, 2019
Moreover, there were apprehensions in
place with regards to the decline of the
US power and the rise of China. For ins-
tance, Kevin Brown (2008) argued that
the US entered the 21st century with its
losing of hegemony in international rela-
tions. He also pointed out that the “US
power on the world stage as a whole has
been challenged due to the rise of other
powers namely China and India” (Brown
2008; Seethi 2014: 69–70).
The scenario, thus, called for revisit-
ing the Washington Consensus based on
certain strategic calculations of the emer-
ging challenges from China. This obvi-
ously called for a new strategic eng-
agement with countries across the Asia–
Pacific region by making them “aware”
of the threat from China. The new Wash-
ington Consensus inevitably involves the
role of Pentagon (US Department of De-
fense) alongside the other agencies of
the “consensus” that John Williamson
(1990) had mentioned in his seminal
paper in 1989.
This was what the US President Obama
began to emphasise in his speeches and
statements on the Asia–Pacific region
during his tenure, and what his successor,
Trump, tried to reorient (semantically as
Indo–Pacific) in the emerging national
security strategy. President Obama ear-
lier said that the US would “have new op-
portunities to train with other allies and
partners, from the Pacific to the Indian
Ocean.” Underlining “America’s en-
hanced presence across Southeast Asia,”
Obama pointed out that the US would
have partnership with a large number of
countries in the region, including India,
which “looks east” and “plays a larger
role as an Asian power.” He declared
that in “the Asia Pacific in the 21st cen-
tury, the United States of America is all
in” (White House 2011).
A White House fact sheet on Obama’s
policy later on underlined the rising en-
gagements of the administration which
reflected “the growing importance of
the region to US national interests” and
its commitment to advancing a “broader
regional strategy, known as the Rebal-
ance.” The region, having “nearly half of
the earth’s population, one-third of global
GDP, and some of the world’s most capable
militaries, [is] increasingly the world’s
vol lIV no 8
COMMENTARY
political and economic center of gravity”
(White House 2015).
With the change of administration in
the White House, the US strategy in the
region has undergone profound chang-
es. The Trump administration now has a
different orientation of issues in the
region and it has been trying to coalesce
economic and strategic issues with a
view to containing China in a broader
framework of flexible engagements with
countries like India. The “new” Washing-
ton Consensus, thus, entails a carrot-
and-stick policy enunciated by the Trump
administration through the involvement
of the Pentagon, US Treasury and the
Bretton Woods institutions.
‘Peaceful Rise’ of Asia?
Almost a decade ago, when I joined the
deliberations of the Mahatma Gandhi–
Daisaku Ikeda Peace Research Confer-
ence at the National University of Singa-
pore (NUS), Kishore Mahbubani had
already shot into fame with his seminal
thesis on the “rise” of Asia. A former
diplomat of Singapore and Dean of the
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at
the NUS, Mahbubani’s (2008) book The
New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible
Shift of Global Power to the East became
a sensation then. Many scholars at the
Gandhi–Ikeda Conference picked up
Mahbubani’s arguments across the table,
both formally and informally, to ponder
over the “rise of China and India,” altho-
ugh I was sceptical about India’s potential
for several reasons (Seethi 2009).
Calling 21st century as the “Asian cen-
tury,” Mahbubani had put the thesis
across that the centre of gravity of power
in international relations was shifting
from the “West” (consisting of North
America, Australia, New Zealand and the
European Union) to the “East” (includ-
ing China, India, Japan, the Islamic World,
and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations [ASEAN). Marshalling facts and
figures, he said that the West’s domina-
tion of the world system was declining
and that the East was undergoing a great
transformation, with India and China
poised to become powerful economies.
Mahbubani pointed out that Asia was set
to restore its domination in the world
which it lost about 200 years ago. He
21
COMMENTARY
also posed a major question as to whether
the West would be willing to accommo-
date itself to this reality of Asia “emer-
ging” with its fast-growing economies.
Mahbubani was apparently sceptical
about it precisely because of the West’s
reluctance to give up its global hege-
mony (Mahbubani 2008).
However, about a decade before Mah-
bubani had talked about this phenomenon,
Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) had writ-
ten about this “shift” of global economy
extensively. In his keynote address at a
symposium held in Meiji Gakuin Univer-
sity, Tokyo, in January 1997, Wallerstein
tried to explain the rise of East Asia within
the “fundamental contradictions of the
capitalist system” expressed through the
“systemic process by a series of cyclical
rhythms” (Kondratieff cycles). He argued
that the “cyclical rhythms resulted in
regular slow-moving but significant geo-
graphical shifts in the loci of accumula-
tion and power.” Within this matrix,
Wallerstein sought to analyse the rise of
East Asia which occurred during a Kon-
dratieff B-phase, a period that was also
the beginning of the decline (or B-phase)
of US hegemony.” The “immediate impact
of the Kondratieff B-phase was felt most
sharply in the most defenseless areas,”
but “one zone that substantially escaped
from the negative impact was East Asia.”
He pointed out that there were two
possible scenarios for the future. The
world system might continue more or
less as before and enter into another set
of cyclical changes. Or the world system
would have “reached a point of crisis”
and therefore would “see drastic struc-
tural change, an explosion or an implo-
sion” (Wallerstein 1997; Hopkins et al
1995). Wallerstein had argued elsewhere
that a new cyclical phase would begin,
sooner or later, and there would be an
acute competition between the US and
other leading capitalist countries
(Wallerstein 1991).
The forewarning of Wallerstein had
come true with the global financial crisis
of 2008 and its pervasive effect on dif-
ferent regions across the world, includ-
ing the European Union. Perhaps, the
only region that has not been hit hard
with the global meltdown is East Asia
(including China and some of the countries
22
in South East Asia). It is this “richness” the media after signing. During his
of East Asia—with China emerging to election campaign, Trump said, “The
overtake the global players—that wor- Trans-Pacific Partnership is another dis-
ries Trump and his colleagues. More- aster done and pushed by special inter-
over, China’s Belt and Road Initiative ests who want to rape our country, just a
across the South, Central and South East continuing rape of our country” (Popken
Asian terrain, alongside its South China 2017). He also reminded everyone that
Sea policy, became a major challenge to he had decided to pull out from the TPP
the Trump administration. Under these with a view to creating “an incentive for
circumstances, it was natural that Trump our trading partners to diversify, to look
was not willing to undertake any addi- for their own way, to have conversations
tional responsibility in the Asia–Pacific and negotiations in which we will not be
by perpetuating the US’s deficit-driven participants” (Solís 2017).
trade and its domestic impact. After Trump withdrew from the deal,
the other members of TPP moved ahead,
American Spin on Trade Policy without the US, and brought forth a new
It may be noted that President Trump pact named the Comprehensive and Pro-
withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific gressive Agreement for TPP (CPTPP) on
Partnership (TPP) on his first day in 8 March 2018 in Santiago, Chile (DFAT
office. This obviously reflected a major 2018). However, after a year, President
spin for the US on trade policy which he Trump said in a social media post that he
said sought “to create fair and economi- was open to returning to the TPP, but
cally beneficial trade deals that serve only if he could get a “substantially bet-
their interests.” Trump further said that ter” deal than done by his predecessor.
“it is the intention of my administration Many observers criticised him for the
to deal directly with individual coun- withdrawal from the TPP which would
tries on a one-on-one (or bilateral) basis have become the world’s largest free
in negotiating future trade deals” (White trade zone by joining the Pacific Rim
House 2017a). “Great thing for the Amer- countries that collectively would generate
ican worker, what we just did,” he told nearly 40% of global economic output.
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FEBRUARY 23, 2019 vol lIV no 8 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

But Trump moved against the agree-
ment, making it a major challenge for his
“America First” doctrine. Although Aus-
tralia, Japan and New Zealand welcomed
Trump’s interest for renegotiated TPP,
senior policymakers of these countries
warned that they would resist any rene-
gotiation of the deal. The guarded res-
ponse from allies in Asia indicated that it
would be a challenge to narrow down
the differences between the members of
the TPP and the US (Financial Times 2018).
Even as Trump has been settled to
continue his TPP policy, the US state
apparatuses seemed to be determined to
recast Washington’s strategic interests in
the Pacific Rim by reformulating the geo-
political layout inherited from the Obama
administration (the construct of “rebal-
ancing”). The “rebalance”—initially descri-
bed as a “pivot”—was expected to mean
that Washington would play an activist
role in the “Asia–Pacific” region in the fu-
ture, strengthening diplomatic ties, pro-
moting a regional free trade agreement,
and bolstering military and strategic re-
lations with many Asian clients (White
House 2014). However, during the his-
toric trip by President Trump to the region
in November 2017, he introduced the
strategic concept of the “free and open
Indo–Pacific” (White House 2017b), a
cleverly enunciated concept to offset the
Obama formulation. Its politico-securi-
ty implications have been further docu-
mented by the Trump administration.
Washington’s apprehensions about the
key players in the region were clearly
enunciated in the document “National
Security Strategy of the United States,
December 2017” (USNSS, 2017). The USNSS
2017 is more explicit in its reference to
Indo–Pacific:
China and Russia want to shape a world anti-
thetical to US values and interests. China
seeks to displace the United States in the
Indo–Pacific region, expand the reaches of
its state-driven economic model, and reor-
der the region in its favor. Russia seeks to re-
store its great power status and establish
spheres of influence near its borders … Con-
trary to our hopes, China expanded its pow-
er at the expense of the sovereignty of others
... It is building the most capable and well-
funded military in the world … Russia aims
to weaken US influence in the world and di-
vide us from our allies and partners … (and
it) is investing in new military capabilities,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRUARY 23, 2019
including nuclear systems that remain the
most significant existential threat to the
United States. (White House 2017d: 25)
According to the USNSS, 2017,
China is using economic inducements and
penalties, influence operations, and implied
military threats to persuade other states to
heed its political and security agenda. China’s
infrastructure investments and trade strate-
gies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its
efforts to build and militarize outposts in the
South China Sea endanger the free flow of
trade, threaten the sovereignty of other na-
tions, and undermine regional stability. China
has mounted a rapid military modernization
campaign designed to limit US access to the
region and provide China a freer hand there.
China presents its ambitions as mutually ben-
eficial, but Chinese dominance risks dimin-
ishing the sovereignty of many states in the
Indo–Pacific. States throughout the region
are calling for sustained US leadership in a
collective response that upholds a regional
order respectful of sovereignty and independ-
ence. (White House 2017d)
The USNSS, 2017 stated that the Amer-
ican allies “are critical to responding to
mutual threats … preserving our mutual
interests in the Indo–Pacific region.” Its
alliance and friendship with South
Korea remains “stronger than ever.” It
supports “the strong leadership role of
our critical ally, Japan.” Australia “con-
tinues to reinforce economic and security
arrangements” that support the US’s shared
interests across the region. New Zealand
will remain “a key US partner.” The US
also acknowledged “India’s emergence
as a leading global power and stronger
strategic and defense partner.” It says,
We will expand our defense and security co-
operation with India, a Major Defense Part-
ner of the United States, and support India’s
growing relationships throughout the region.
The US also sought “to increase quadrilateral
cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.
The USNSS, 2017 also underlined that
“the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) and Asia–Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) remain centerpieces
of the Indo –Pacific’s regional architec-
ture and platforms for promoting an
order based on freedom” (White House
2017d: 45–46). It further warned that the
US “will maintain a forward military pres-
ence capable of deterring and, if neces-
sary, defeating any adversary.” Moreover,
it would strengthen its “long-standing
military relationships and encourage the
vol lIV no 8
COMMENTARY
development of a strong defense network
with our allies and partners” (White
House 2017d).
Important Implications
Thus, Washington’s aim to promote “Indo–
Pacific” as a new geopolitical construct
has obvious strategic implications. India
is undeniably a key factor in this emerg-
ing schematic reordering of the region.
Months before Trump’s visit to the re-
gion, Prime Minister Modi had indicated
this prospective strategic alliance. For
example, during his visit to the US in
June 2017, he said that both India and
the US “are committed to such a bilateral
architecture that will take our strategic
partnership to new heights.” According to
Modi, “maintaining peace, stability and
happiness in the Indo–Pacific region is
the primary objective of our strategic
cooperation.” Modi said that India “will
continue to work with the US in this re-
gion. Our growing cooperation in the
area of defence and security is extremely
important in the context of security
challenges” (MEA 2017a).
Three months after the USNSS, 2017
came out, the Trump administration fur-
ther underlined the role of India in the
emerging US strategy in the Indo–Pacific.
In a special briefing on 2 April 2018, Alex
N Wong, the Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs said that the term
Indo–Pacific acknowledges the historical re-
ality and the current-day reality that South
Asia, and in particular India, plays a key role
in the Pacific and in East Asia and in South-
east Asia. That’s been true for thousands of
years and it’s true today.
It is “in our interest, the US interest, as
well as the interests of the region, that
India play an increasingly weighty role
in the region. India is a nation that is in-
vested in a free and open order. It is a
democracy. It is a nation that can bookend
and anchor the free and open order in
the Indo–Pacific region, and it’s our poli-
cy to ensure that India does play that
role, does become over time a more in-
fluential player in the region.”
“India for sure has the capability and
potential to play a more weighty role.
But the role is on all fronts, whether
it’s security, economic and diplomatic”
(DoS 2018).
23
COMMENTARY
Wong further noted that
It’s not just India that is pursuing greater eng-
agement with East Asia and Southeast Asia.
There are a number of crisscrossing strate-
gies throughout the region. So if you look at
India’s Act East Policy, if you look at South
Korea’s New Southern Policy, if you look at
Japan’s own Free and Open Indo–Pacific
Strategy, if you look at Australia’s Foreign
Policy White Paper, if you look at Taiwan’s
new Southbound Policy, these partners in
the region are all seeking to increase politi-
cal, security, and economic ties, particularly
with the ASEAN states. And that’s in our in-
terest. If we can have these crosscutting re-
lationships that form a very strong fabric de-
voted to a rules-based free and open order,
that can only strengthen the prosperity of
the region, strengthen the fabric of stability
in the region, and that’s something that we
support. (DoS 2018)
The strategic dimension of the “free
and open Indo–Pacific Strategy” has also
been highlighted by Wong. He said that
at the international level, it implies that
“the nations of the Indo–Pacific to be free
from coercion, that they can pursue in a
sovereign manner the paths they choose
in the region.” At the national level, the
US “wants the societies of the various
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Indo–Pacific countries to become pro- setting the rules of the road of free trade
gressively more free—free in terms of for trade agreements—if you’re working on
a bilateral basis to lower trade barriers and
good governance, in terms of funda-
working through organisations like APEC to
mental rights, in terms of transparency reform economies in the region so that they
and anti-corruption.” By “open, we [mean- are more open to trade and investment. So
ing the US administration] first and fore- you have to set the rules of the road. But
number two, you have to enforce the rules
most mean open sea lines of communica-
of free trade. You have to ensure that nations
tion and open airways.” These open sea
cannot abuse the rules, cannot force tech-
lines of communication are “the life- nology transfer, cannot prize their national
blood of the region.” champions, can’t steal intellectual property.
If you don’t do this, if you don’t enforce the
And if you look at world trade, with 50 per-
rules of free trade, what ends up happening
cent of trade going through the Indo–Pacific
is that over time, the free, fair, and recipro-
along the sea routes, particularly through
cal trading regime is weakened, and that’s to
the South China Sea, open sea lanes and
the detriment not just of the United States’s
open airways in the Indo–Pacific are inc-
prosperity but to the prosperity of the region
reasingly vital and important to the world.
and the world as a whole. (DoS 2018)
(DoS 2018)
At the Shangri-La Dialogue, what Modi
Wong also brought to light the said was nothing but a reiteration of a
economic objectives of the US’s Indo– new Washington Consensus on the Indo–
Pacific strategy: Pacific region. Modi’s support for a “free,
The United States for decades has supported
open, prosperous and inclusive Indo –
free, fair, and reciprocal trade. … And if you Pacific Region” and “common commit-
look specifically at the Indo–Pacific, the two- ment, based on shared values and princi-
way trade every year with the region is $1.4 ples, to promote a rules-based order in the
trillion. US foreign direct investment in the
Indo –Pacific” (MEA 2018a) are all repli-
region is $860 billion a year. And both those
numbers are going up. But when you talk
cations of the White House–Pentagon-
about free, fair, and reciprocal trade, there State Department “briefs” on the matter.
are two parts to that. Number one, there is Washington’s renaming of its “Pacific
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FEBRUARY 23, 2019 vol lIV no 8 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Command” into “Indo –Pacific Com-
mand” suggests Pentagon’s strategic
hankering for hegemony in the Indian
Ocean. According to Tetsuo Kotani
(2018), a major aim of Japan’s strategy is
“a quad among Japan, India, Australia
and the US, or the democratic security
diamond.” Kotani noted that Shinzo Abe
and Modi had agreed “to seek interac-
tion between Japan’s Indo–Pacific strat-
egy and India’s Act East policy. This ass-
umes considerable strategic importance
given New Delhi’s apprehensions about
the Belt and Road Initiative, the China–
Pakistan economic corridor project and
China’s port development in countries like
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.
According to Kotani, the Malabar naval
exercise among India, the US and Japan
in the Bay of Bengal in July 2017 showed
“the participants’ resolve to defend the
free and open Indo –Pacific” (Kotani
2018). The American Council on Foreign
Relations expert Alyssa Ayres says that
the Trump administration has recast the
term “Indo–Pacific” to represent “its
larger strategic area of interest across
the pan-Asian region. Fully realising this
strategy’s potential will require reconcil-
ing differences over the boundaries of
the Indo–Pacific and what can and
should be done across this enormous
geography” (Ayres 2018).
India’s ‘Act East’ Stance
It is in the background of an evolving
strategic milieu in the Indo –Pacific
region that a kind of intense competi-
tion, if not rivalry, is set to begin, be-
tween India and China in the areas of
both security and trade. India sees this
as an opportunity in its global bargains
and Prime Minister Narendra Modi,
thus, tried to reorient New Delhi’s Look
East policy as Act East policy with a view
to strengthening India’s engagements in
the Indo–Pacific region. The process
initiated by him in 2014 brought in major
partnership ties with ASEAN, South
Korea, Japan, and Australia which sig-
nalled a proactive role of India in the
region (MEA 2017b). There has been a
growing trajectory of trade between
India and ASEAN, on the one hand, and
India and other East Asian countries, on
the other.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRUARY 23, 2019
India also faces challenges from China
in its South China policy, particularly in
engaging Vietnam. China sees India’s
Vietnam policy as an attempt to offset
Beijing’s influence in the region. A
Chinese scholar wrote that
Vietnam is a springboard for Indian naval
forces to expand influence from the Indian
Ocean to the West Pacific. India has also
helped Vietnam build military capabilities.
New Delhi is hosting the biennial, eight-day
exercise codenamed ‘Milan’ on the Anda-
man and Nicobar Islands in the eastern In-
dian Ocean ... where Vietnam is one of 23
participating nations. Containing China in
strategy and security is the driving force of
India–Vietnam ties. Economic cooperation
between the two states also carries strategic
motives. In 2013, India’s ONGC Videsh signed
an agreement with Petro Vietnam to explore
and develop oil and natural gas fields in
the disputed areas in the South China Sea.
(Zongyi 2018)
In another context, China indicated
that if New Delhi “treats its enhance-
ment of military relations with Vietnam
as a strategic arrangement or even
revenge against Beijing, it will only cre-
ate disturbances in the region and Bei-
jing will not ‘sit with its arms crossed,’”
reacting to a report that India would sell
surface-to-air Akash missiles to Hanoi
(Economic Times 2018). The responses of
Chinese media and its think tanks thus
create a conducive situation for Indian
strategic community to beef up its per-
ceptions of threat. In sum, the strategic
positions of India and the US are thus not
at variance given their conceptualisation
and engagements on the Indo–Pacific.
Recent trends in India’s relations with
China and Russia would have given an
impression that New Delhi is rather
maintaining “strategic autonomy” in
dealing with them. But the “autonomy”
that India enjoys and is seeking to sus-
tain is perfectly within the logic of the
security scenario set out by Washington.
India is all set to further its Act East
policy with a view to cashing in on the
“prosperous East.”
Obviously, the strategic autonomy is
enunciated with a double mission. First,
to strengthen economic and military ties
with the countries in the ASEAN region
and beyond, including South Korea,
Japan, and Australia; and, second, to
explore the ties with Russia and China
for further bargain with the West. This
vol lIV no 8
COMMENTARY
autonomy has no more and no less of an
agenda. For the US, however, this new
geostrategic space of East Asia has a
long-term “investment potential” also. It
has, thus, something to do with the long-
held view that East Asia is the only
region in the world system that has rela-
tively escaped the ill-effects of the global
financial meltdown, and China (along-
side India) is likely to overtake the US
and other Western powers. Thus, Wash-
ington has also a double mission: first, to
restructure the geopolitics of the “East”
to suit the American strategic interests
and second, to help facilitate the “eco-
nomic containment” of China and other
potential powers from being the front-
runners of the global economy, as pro-
jected by many. Thus, the geopolitics of
the Indo–Pacific has much to do with the
US’s long-term strategy to contain the
potential/emerging powers of Asia and
thereby seeking to ensure American
hegemony in the world system.
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Features
Presents All-India
and state-wise
annual data from
1980 onwards.
Structured in six
major sections :
• Demography
• Health Status
• Infrastructure
• Human Resources
• Health Education
• Health Finance
vol lIV no 8 EPW Economic & Political Weekly