RULE 118

[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.
RELEVANT PROVISION: RPC Art 48, 134,135
ELEMENTS: (of Rebellion, Art134)
1. That there be:
a. Public uprising; and
b. Taking up of arms against the government
2. For the purpose of either:
a. Removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws:
i. The territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, or
ii. Anybody of land, naval or other armed forces; or
b. Depriving the Chief Executive or Congress wholly or partially of any of their powers or prerogatives.
NATURE: petition for bail

FACTS:
 Hernandex et al. (31 defendants), were convicted by the lower courts of rebellion, w/ multiple murder, arsons and
robberies
 Organizations they were found to be affiliated w/ (and took part in ‘rebellious’ activities w/): Congress of Labor
Organizations (CLO) w/c is an instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP); HukbongMagpalayang
Bayan (HMB, a.k.a. Hukbalahaps/Huks)
 Defendants apparently took arms w/ the Huks to make armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and, as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, they also committed then and there committed acts of
murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property
 The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with
murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower
court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment
 The defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

ISSUES:
(1) WoN rebellion can be complexed w/ murder, arson, or robbery
(2) WoN defendants should be granted bail

HELD:
(1) NO. Consider first the following Articles of the RPC:
a. Art 48, RPC:“When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period.”
i. presupposes the commission of 2 or more crimes, does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one
crime
ii. a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should not be placed at a more
disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers or leaders of the movement, or the public
officers who join the same, insofar as the application of this article is concerned
b. Art 135; RPC: “…any person, merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.”
i. The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for “any person who
promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or
employment, takes part therein”: (1) “engaging in war against the forces of the government”, (2)
“destroying property”, or (3) “committing serious violence”, (4) “exacting contributions or” (5)
“diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated”.
ii. Whether performed singly or collectively, these 5 classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no
more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000.
 Since all of the acts enumerated in Art 135 constitute only ONE offense, Art 48 cannot apply since it presupposes the
existence of TWO. In no occasion has the court ever complexed the crime of rebellion. The rule is that the ingredients
of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either
separately therefrom or by the application of Art 48. (court uses several cases to show how this rules is applicable to
treason, then says the rule is even more applicable to rebellion, basically, these violent acts are part of the crime, they
are how one commits them, they are inherent to the crime).

Citing Spanish and other foreign cases, the SC states that national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they
are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with
the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

Further, if Art 48 were to be used in this case, it would be unfavourable to the culprit, and Art 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the
several acts performed by him were punished separately. SC also states that simply because one act may constitute two
or more offenses, it does not follow necessarily that a person may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other,
without violating the injunction against double jeopardy.

(2) YES. Since exclusion from bail in capital offenses is an exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the
constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation of the evidence in the
determination of the degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right. In the
evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be taken into account. The court
took into account the ff. things: (1) Whether it appears that in case of conviction the Defendant’s criminal liability
would probably call for a capital punishment (Answer: no clear showing); and (2) the probablility of flight (Answer:
possibility seems remote and nil). Additionally, the decision appealed from the opposition to the motion in question do
not reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release,
during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State.

PETITION FOR BAIL GRANTED.

TL;DR SEPARATE OPINIONS

 Padilla—Bail shouldn’t be granted. After conviction for a capital offense, the Defendant has absolutely no right to bail,
because even before conviction a Defendant charged with capital offense is not entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is
strong. Even if the majority opinion that the crime charged in the information is rebellion only — a non-capital offense
— be correct, still the granting of bail after conviction is discretionary, and I see no plausible reason for the reversal of
this Court’s previous stand, because the security of the State is at stake.
 Montemayor—Other crimes shouldn’t be absorbed by rebellion. The main contention to why it cannot be complexed.
is that it cannot be complexed as the acts enumerated in Art 135 are inherent to rebellion (necessary means to commit
it). However, “necessary means” as interpreted by criminologists, jurists and legal commentators, does not mean
indispensable means, but merely the means by which a crime is ordinarily committed. The logic is the same as why
abduction or trespass to dwelling are not necessary means to rape, they are simply ways the culprit used to facilitate his
crime. Applying Art 134’s description of rebellion, it may be committed by merely rising publicly and taking arms against
the government, thus acts mentioned in Art 135 are not necessary means to committing the crime. (Montemayor agrees
that bail shouldn’t be granted though)
 Labrador -- Agrees with J. Padilla that bail shouldn’t be granted, and w/ J. Montemayor that a complex crime of
rebellion exists in our laws.
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lucena City
convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts
entered into between the parties during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court.

FACTS:

A certain Roy Nadera sued ManoloFule for violation of BP 22. The parties during pre-trial entered into a stipulation of facts.
Prosecution presented evidence but the defense, in lieu thereof, only submitted a Memorandum confirming the stipulation of
facts. It appears, however, that neither Fule nor his counsel signed the stipulation of facts.

ISSUE BEFORE THE RTC:

Whether or not Fule is guilty of violating BP 22

DECISION OF THE RTC:

Petitioner is guilty, based on the stipulation of facts.

MODE OF APPEAL TO THE CA:

Ordinary Appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE BEFORE THE CA:

Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting petitioner based on the stipulation of facts

DECISION OF THE CA:

Negative. The RTC’s conviction of petitioner is proper.

MODE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT:

Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the judgment of the RTC convicting petitioner based solely on the stipulation of facts

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Affirmative. The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the
stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The confirmation by the defense of the said stipulation of facts by a
memorandum does not cure the defect because the Rules require both the accused and his counsel to sign such stipulation
offacts.
RULE 119

. Estrada v. People, G.R. No. 162371. August 25, 2005

FACTS:
An Information charging Mary Helen Estrada with estafa was filed with the RTC of Las Piñas City. Estrada signed an undertaking that
in case of her failure to appear during the trial despite due notice, her absence would constitute as an express waiver of her right to be
present during trial and promulgation of judgment and the lower court would then proceed with the hearing in absentia. When the
schedule for hearing and presentation for evidence came, counsel for petitioner failed to appear. Estrada jumped bail and was
considered to have waived her right to present evidence. The RTC thus rendered judgment based only on prosecution evidence:
JunimarBermundo (complainant) applied for employment in Japan with Estrada and paid P68,700.00 for it. Estrada then told Junimar to
proceed to the Japanese Embassy to claim the plane tickets, however, he learned that nothing was filed with the Embassy. Junimar
decided to abandon his plan of going to Japan and just get the money from Estrada— which she failed to return despite receipt of a
demand letter. She was convicted of Estafa by means of false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations by the RTC. The CA
denied her Petition for Certiorari, thus Estrada filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court denied Estrada of her constitutional right to be heard and to be assisted by counsel

HELD/ RATIO:
NO. At the outset, the undisputed fact that petitioner jumped bail while trial was pending should be emphasized. In fact, it appears that
from the beginning, the address she furnished the trial court was incorrect. From such facts alone, petitioner’s arguments regarding the
validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of her constitutional right to due process are
doomed to fail. The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
“after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.” The Court likewise upholds the validity of the promulgation in absentia of the RTC judgment and the
RTCs Order dated April 5, 2000, denying due course to petitioners notice of appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Rule applicable in this case since promulgation was held before the
effectivity of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.
However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. If the accused is
confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court that rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal. The
proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be
present at the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation shall consist in the recording
of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction
and the accuseds failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may
appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel.

Clearly, promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under the Rules. In Pascua vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that such
promulgation is valid provided the following essential elements are present: (a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket;
and (b) that a copy thereof be served upon the accused or counsel. In the present case, the records bear out the fact that copies of the
decision were sent by registered mail to the given addresses of petitioner and her counsel, Atty. Herenio Martinez, and there is no
question that the judgment was indeed recorded in the criminal docket of the court. From the foregoing, petitioner is deemed notified of
the decision upon its recording in the criminal docket on September 3, 1997 and she only had fifteen (15) days therefrom within which
to file an appeal. Evidently, the notice of appeal filed only on April 5, 2000 was filed out of time.
PEOPLE VS CA and JOSE PRING

FACTS:
Wenceslao Espinojr, alias Joe Pring is charged with kidnapping in the RTC of Bulacan. During the investigation
and trial, one NoniloArile, a policeman and co-principal, testified against him.
After a motion to discharge Arile was filed by the prosecution to testify gainstPring, Arile’s affidavit was given to
the defense counsel of Pring. Based on this events, the court ordered the discharge of Arile.
Pring questioned such procedure, arguing that the discharge was invalid due to the want of hearing. According
to Pring, Arile should testify in the witness stand subject to cross examination.

Issue:
Whether or not hearing constitutes personal testimony and not the affidavit.
HELD:

ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DISCHARGE OF THE ACCUSED TO BE STATE WITNESS; HEARING IN SUPPORT OF THE
DISCHARGE, AS A CONDITION; CONSTRUED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The present rule under Section 9, Rule 119
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure thus amends the old rule by categorically requiring a hearing where the
prosecution shall present the sworn statement of the proposed witness and its other evidence for the purpose of
proving to the satisfaction of the court that the conditions for discharge as enumerated therein exist. The rationale
behind this amendment is to avoid a repetition of the case of Flores v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. L- 63677, August 12,
1983, 124 SCRA 109) where the Supreme Court set aside the Order of Discharge of the Sandiganbayan because said
court merely relied on the information furnished by the fiscal in forming its conclusion of whether the conditions for
discharge have been met. The term "hearing in support of the discharge" as contemplated by said law refers to a
proceeding, separate from the trial itself, where the prosecution presents its evidence proving the existence of the
conditions for discharge and the sworn statement of the proposed witness. Necessarily, it does not foreclose; rather, it
affords an opportunity for the defense to enter its opposition against the motion to discharge. All of this is intended to
aid the court in fulfilling its mandated duty of determining the propriety or impropriety of the sought-after discharge. In
requiring therefore, a "hearing in support of the discharge," the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive
or possess evidence for or against the discharge which will serve as tangible and concrete basis, independent of the
fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions, in granting or denying the motion for discharge. Hence, in resolving the issue in this
petition, the proper question we should address is: Was there a failure to observe the spirit and intent of Sec. 9, Rule
119 in the case at bar? We rule in the negative. The prosecution has submitted the sworn statement of accused Nonilo
Arile and its evidence showing that the conditions for discharge have been met. Neither can it be denied that the
defense was able to oppose the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile. With both litigants able to present their side, the lack
of actual hearing was not fatal enough to undermine the court's ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed
under Section 9, Rule 119 were satisfied. Having received evidence for and against the discharge, the Court avoided a
repetition of the case of Flores v. Sandiganbayan (supra).

Hearing means only the opportunity to read what the witness will say and the opportunity to object. The prosecutor has
submitted the sworn statement of accused Arile and its evidence showing that the conditions for discharge have been
met. Neither can it be denied that the defense was able to oppose the motion to discharge Arile. With both litigants able
to present their side, the lack of actual hearing was not fatal enough to undermine the court’s ability to determine
whether the conditions prescribed under Sections 17, Rule 119 were satisfied.
YAP SAY LIM vs IAC

FACTS:

A complaint for legal redemption and rescission of a contract of sale was filed by spouses Trinidad Laborde and
Tan Lo, tenants of the land and warehouse subject matter of the suit, against Chateau de Manila Development
Corporation and Emiliana de la Costa, vendee and vendor, respectively, in the aforesaid contract. Subsequently, Juanita
Yap Say and William Lim, the petitioners herein, filed a complaint in intervention, alleging that as tenants of a portion of
the subject premises, they have a right of redemption over this portion pursuant to P.D. 1517, otherwise known as the
Urban Land Reform Law. This was followed by the filing by the defendants, the present private respondents, of a Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint in intervention on the grounds that the complaint in intervention stated no cause of action and
the same was barred by laches, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The trial court 1 granted the motion.
The intervenors filed a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal; likewise, plaintiffs filed a second motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the motion to dismiss their complaint; both motions for reconsideration were
denied by the trial court. Consequently, the plaintiffs and intervenors appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however,
denied their appeals.

Both the plaintiffs-appellants and intervenors-appellants have come to us by way of two separate petitions for
review. The petition filed by the plaintiffs-appellants was already denied by us in a resolution 3 dated January 20, 1986.

The notice of appearance of Jerry D. Bañares as counsel for petitioner, is NOTED. Acting on the petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack
of merit. l

Before us now are the intervenors as petitioners. Their petition was given due course in a resolution of the Court
issued on July 20, 1987.

ISSUE:

HELD :

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; PROPERLY AVAILED OF WHERE PARTY GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY
TO BE HEARD. — The only issue raised before us is the alleged denial of procedural due process; however, we find this
assertion to be unfounded and unsupported in the records of this case as well as in the proceedings conducted in the
courts below. In the trial court, petitioners were allowed to intervene and subsequently, to file a complaint in
intervention, despite the private respondents' opposition. Petitioners were heard in the trial and appellate courts
through the various pleadings filed by them. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court. Where a
party was given the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there can be no denial of
procedural due process. "Due process is not semper et ubique judicial process."
RULE 120

People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232

Subject Matter: Conspiracy

Facts:

On June 26, 1967, four principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal conspired
together, confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” dela Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by
profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation using a
deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in
Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentences each of them to the death penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the element of conspiracy.

Held:

No, the trial court’s ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the element of conspiracy was present, where the act
of one is the act of all, each of the accused is also liable for the crime committed by each of the other persons who
conspired to commit the crime. The SC modified the judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and
Eduardo Aquino are guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and each and every one of them is
likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is likewise convicted with
four death penalties and to indemnify the victim of the sum of P10,000 in each of the four crimes. The case against
Rogelio Cañal was dismissed only in so far as the criminal liability is concerned due to his death in prison prior to
promulgation of judgment.

ABAY SR. vs GARCIA 162 SCRA 665 (1988)

Facts: Petitioners were accused of the crime of direct assault. Trial commenced on July 26, 1976, with Ramiro Garque testifying
on direct examination and partly on cross-examination. The trial was transferred to September 14, 1976. But again the cross-
examination was not terminated so the case was reset to July 1, 197 . At the continuation of the trial on July 1, 1977, both
accused appeared without their counsel. The trial fiscal, Assistant Fiscal Angel Lobaton, was present, but the complainant,
Garque who was still to be cross-examined, failed to appear despite due notice. The private prosecutor, Atty. Henry Trocino,
also failed to appear. Whereupon, City Judge Felino Garcia verbally ordered, motuproprio, the dismissal of the case. Fiscal
Lobaton did not object to the dismissal. Both accused remained silent and later left the courtroom after the judge dictated the
order of dismissal. At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Atty. Trocino, together with Garque arrived in court
and upon learning that Criminal Case No. 29688 was ordered dismissed, verbally moved to have the order of dismissal set aside.
Atty. Trocino was allowed to present evidence in support of the verbal motion for reconsideration and to explain the failure of
Garque to appear on time. In his written order of July 1, 1977, Judge Garcia granted the verbal motion for reconsideration and
set aside the verbal order of dismissal. He further ordered the resetting of the case for hearing on another date. Petitioners
invoked double jeopardy, claiming that the verbal order of dismissal, even if provisional, was rendered without the express
consent of the accused.

Issue: WON the verbal order of dismissal acquitted the petitioners?

Held: No, the court held that the order was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge. Showing that this verbal order of
dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so
that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him,
reinstating the case.

US VS BALABA

FACTS:

Sentence of death having been imposed upon Francisco Balaba in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Agusan, the record of the proceedings had in the court below is before us en consulta, in accordance with the law made
and provided in such cases.

The information charges the accused with the crime of triple asesinato (triple murder) in the following language:

"The undersigned fiscal charges Francisco Balaba, the above-mentioned accused, with the crime of triple
murder, committed as follows:

"On the day of the crime the defendant Francisco Balaba was living in the house of his brother Agapito Balaba, in
the sitio of Alangilan, barrio of Tubay, municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan, Department of Mindanao and
Sulu, P. I. The defendant took care of fighting cocks. On February 20, 1916, he fell out with his sister-in-law, the
deceased Fortunata Cabasagan, wife of Agapito Balaba, because she had tethered the defendant's cocks, which were
injuring the corn plantings. On the 29th of the same month, in the morning, while the defendant was feeding this cocks,
he found among them one that was not his; so he caught, killed and ate it. This rooster belonged to the deceased
Claudia Ligao. The deceased Lazaro Daguplo was a brother of the respective first husbands of the deceased Fortunata
Cabasagan and Claudia Ligao. In the morning of that same day, the 29th, Donato Duero, second husband of Claudia
Ligao, at the latter's suggestion, went to look for the cock that had disappeared and made inquiry about it of the
defendant, whom he suspected of having stolen it. In reply to the inquiry, Balaba admitted that he had butchered the
cock and offered to pay for it or exchange another one for it; he therefore proposed that Duero choose one from among
those in the lower part of the defendant's house. Duero pointed out one of a bakiki color, but the defendant would not
give it to him, excusing himself by saying that it was not his. Then Duero, backed up by Sergio Daguplo, obliged the
defendant to follow him for the purpose of arranging the matter of the price of the cock, with Duero's wife. Claudia
Ligao. In walking toward the house of the spouses Duero and Ligao, the three men, Donato Duero, Lazaro Daguplo and
the defendant, went in file, one behind the other. On the way they met Claudio Ligao, who was going toward her hemp
plantation. Claudio Ligao left it to her husband to settle the matter of the price of the cock, to be paid by the defendant.
It appears that the defendant wanted to fix a low price, on which account Lazaro Daguplo laid blame upon him, saying to
him that he (Daguplo) knew that the bakiki, cock, selected in exchange by Donato Duero, belonged to the defendant,
and that the latter's refusal to part with it appeared to show his intention neither to make payment nor exchange for the
cock butchered by him. The defendant, disgruntled at this inter meddling on the part of Lazaro Daguplo, waited until the
latter was off his guard and was walking along in front of him, when with the bolo with which he had previously
provided himself, he treacherously assaulted Daguplo, inflicting upon him a wound in his right side, which caused his
death. Thereupon the defendant immediately ran to his brother Agapito's house, where he lived, and there found his
sister-in-law Fortunata Cabasagan near the fogon, preparing the meal. He informed her of the occurrence between
himself and Lazaro Daguplo and confessed that he had killed the latter because of a quarrel over the cock. Then his
sister-in-law, while continuing her work, said to him: 'You were a thief; now you are a criminal. You should go to jail.'
When the defendant heard this, and while Fortunata Cabasagan had her back toward him, was facing the water jug and
in the act of cleaning a kettle, he suddenly assaulted her with the same bolo and inflicted a serious wound in her left
side, which produced her death. The defendant then started to run, pursued by Agapito, to whom Fortunata had called
out and indicated her assaulter. Balaba went straight to the hemp plantation, where he saw that Claudia Ligao, the
owner of the stolen cock, was going, and there he also assaulted her with the same bolo, inflicting a would in her
stomach, which likewise produced her death.."

The trial judge convicted the accused of three separate offenses, two asesinatos (murders) and one homicidio
(homicide), the commission of two of the asesinatos (murders) being marked with the generic aggravating
circumstances of parentesco (relationship with the victim), one of these murders being also marked with the additional
generic aggravating circumstance of sex.

ISSUES:

1. Is the Information duplicitous?

2. Was the accused afforded his constitutional rights?

HELD:

CRIMINAL LAW; INFORMATION CHARGING MORE THAN ONE CRIME; FAILURE TO OBJECT. — The accused having gone to
trial, without objection, on an information charging more than offense waived the right secured to him under section 21
of General Orders, No. 58, to demur to the information on that ground.

2. ID; ID; ID; CONVICTION. — The accused having made no objection to the information on the ground that it
charged more than one offense, the prosecution properly submitted evidence as to the commission of each and all of
the offenses charged; and the court offenses which were established by the introduction of competent evidence at the
trial, and should, thereupon, have imposed the prescribed was convicted in accord with the provisions of article 87 of
the Penal Code.

3. ID; ID; ID; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED. — The rights of the accused in this regard are sufficiently safeguarded by the
provisions of General Orders No. 58 securing him from any attempt to force him to trial, over his objection, for more
than one offense charged in the complaint or information.

ROLITO GO VS CA

FACTS:

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan
was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson
St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and
J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked
over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the
shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol. Verification at
the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come
from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police
obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security
guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had
shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for
petitioner.
 On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he
was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed
petitioner, in the Presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he
must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such
waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in
court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information,
the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Counsel for petitioner filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper
preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of
the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
P100,000.00.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, embodying the following: (1) the 12
July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender
himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was
recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11
July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.

ISSUES:

1. W/N there was a lawful warrantless arrest?

2. W/N the petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

HELD:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST UNDER SEC. 5, RULE 113, NOT APPLICABLE IN
CASE AT BAR. —We do not believe that the warrantless "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within
the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: "Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting
of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of
the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses
to the shooting -- one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's
plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS. — Petitioner
was not arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact
placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of
a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the
erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive
error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without
any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be
released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; NO WAIVER THEREOF MADE IN CASE AT BAR. — Turning to
the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner
had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the
same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus
motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that petitioner should accordingly
be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory
right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be
conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus
motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record
whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor.
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-
investigation and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for
murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear
was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such
preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such
preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of
the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been
substantially complied with. We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time
of entering a plea at arraignment. In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment. We do not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. Petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in
one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the
cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver
of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for
leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT AND A COMPONENT PART OF DUE PROCESS. — While the right to a
preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty,
is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to
prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process
painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.

5. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO ACCORD PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT IMPAIR VALIDITY OF INFORMATION
FILED. — Contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of
the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the
information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.

6. ID.; ID.; ACCUSED ENTITLED TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION EVEN THOUGH TRIAL ON THE MERITS HAS
ALREADY BEGAN. — We consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the
merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation
forthwith accorded to petitioner. The constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by
way of procedural due process. Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without
preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he
submitted to arraignment and trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking. During the
proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before
arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because
of the denial of preliminary investigation.

7. ID.; ID.; ACCUSED ENTITLED TO BE RELEASED ON BAIL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. — In respect of the matter of
bail, petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record
concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial
court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment
of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail. It must also be recalled that the
Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the
part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17
July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself
within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly no
new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order
issued just five (5) days before.

8. ID.; ID.; RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF UMIL v. RAMOS, MISPLACED; OFFENSE COMMITTED NOT CONSIDERED A
"CONTINUING CRIME." — The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos (G.R. No. 81567,
promulgated 3 October 1991) is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote,
the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen (14) days after
the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those
offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New Peoples Army, etc. In the instant case,
the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed
at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing
crime."

9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE SHOULD REAFFIRM ITS OBLIGATION TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF
ITS CONSTITUENTS; TO ACCORD AN ACCUSED HIS RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND TO BAIL IN CASE AT
BAR, NOT AN IDLE CEREMONY. — To reach any other conclusion here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a
preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record
would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or
culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may
be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could
turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it
would not be idle ceremony; rather it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people
and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.
RULE 121

JOSE VS CA

FACTS:

On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Floridablanca, Pampanga, petitioner Jose was arrested by the local
police leading to the filing with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III of several criminal cases against him
to wit: illegal discharge of firearm (Crim. Case 6235), robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession of explosives
(Crim. Case 6237). These three cases were jointly tried after which the trial judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a decision
dated December 15, 1969, and promulgated on January 15, 1970 acquitted accused Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of
firearm and robbery, but convicted him for illegal possession of the handgrenade that was found on his person at the
time of his arrest.

After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day, filed his notice of appeal. Nine days thereafter
or more particularly on January 24, 1970, petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him to
present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in
question. The trial court in its order of January 30, 1970 denied the motion mainly on the ground that it had lost
jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very date the decision was
promulgated.

A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea that "assuming arguendo that the court a
quo lacked jurisdiction to act upon appellant's motion for new trial because of the perfection of the appeal, this
Honorable Court — before which said motion was reiterated and which has competence to act thereon — should have
granted the same if for no other reason than to prevent a miscarriage of justice which is the inevitable result of its
denial." This motion for reconsideration was denied in respondent court's resolution of April 3, 1974.

A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by Lorenzo Jose but this was also denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution promulgated on July 24, 1974.

ISSUE:

HELD:

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; NEW TRIAL; GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. — It is an established rule that
for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it
must go to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted.

2. ID.; ID.; GROUNDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. — Petitioner does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly
discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
Correctly so, the authority of appellate court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations
where the court may grant a new trial for reasons other than that provided in Sec. 13 of the same Rule, or Sec. 2, Rule
121 of the Rules of Court. While Sec. 13, rule 124, and Sec. 2, Rule 121 provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i. e.,
newly discovered evidence and errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, Sec. 11, Rule 124 does not so
specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the determination, on a case to case basis, of what would
constitute meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or retrial.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES ORDERED ON GROUNDS NOT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR BY LAW.
— Admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case, from them for the purposes of justice or, in a proper
case, disregard them. In this jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal case on
grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness (People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., Phil. 54), negligence or
incompetency of counsel (U.S. vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74 ), improvident plea of guilty (People vs. Solacito, L-29209, August
25, 1969), disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial (U.S. vs. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500),
and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense (U.S.
vs. Pobre, 11 Phil. 51).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW TRIAL WARRANTED IN CASE AT BAR. — The circumstances obtaining in the case at bar justify a
reopening of petitioner's case to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating evidence. This is a situation where
a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goals of courts of justice — to render justice where
justice is due — to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is
charged. The failure of the Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of the situation, involving as it does the liberty of
an individual, thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted, constitute a grave abuse of
discretion which calls for relief from this Court.
RULE 122

CHING V NICDAO

Facts:

Nicdao was charged eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas PambansaBilang (BP) 22. MTC found her guilty of said
offenses. RTC affirmed. Nicdao filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the decision and acquitted accused. Ching is
now appealing the civil aspect of the case to the Supreme Court. Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent
Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability. He
anchors his contention on Rule 111, Sec 1B: The criminal action for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized. Moreover, under the above-quoted provision, the criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the
corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the amount of the dishonored check representing the civil obligation of the
drawer to the payee.

Nicdao’s defense: Sec 2 of Rule 111 — Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has
been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal action.
According to her, CA’s decision is equivalent to a finding that the facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The
instant petition, which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the eleven (11) checks, is thus allegedly already barred by the
final and executory decision acquitting her. Statement of the case: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Samson
Ching of the Decision dated November 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055. Which rooted from 11
informations filed for violation of BP 22 from the Municipal Trial Court in Bataan against the respondent.

Issue: 1. WON Ching may appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period?

2. WON Nicdao is civilly liable?

Ruling:

1. Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period. “Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Petitioner Ching
correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s
acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute
it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action. If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but
the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or
both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefore. Civil liability is not extinguished
by acquittal: 1. where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; 2. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and 3. where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of
which the accused is acquitted.

2. A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s acquittal likewise carried with it the
extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner
Ching. CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she
did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check
which was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching.
RULE 126

POSADAS VS CA

FACTS:

On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force,
were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson
revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade 3
a and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom
office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy, the officer then on duty. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a
plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the
offense charged.

ISSUE:

1. Was the arrest valid?

2. Was the search and seizure valid?

HELD:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; SEC. 5, RULE 113
THEREOF. — From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace
officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE; NOT INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
ARREST IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search and seizure of the buri bag
then carried by the petitioner, argued that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually
committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the
police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree. At the time the peace
officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know
that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They
just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CAN BE VALIDLY EFFECTED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY AN ARREST; CASE AT BAR. — However,
there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa. As between a warrantless
search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no
question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of
a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may
prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

MALALOAN vs CA

FACTS:

Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search
warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions).
Firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a
Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence. However, the
court denied the quashal of the search warrant and the validity of which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court.

ISSUE:

W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its
territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial
jurisdiction

HELD:

A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.

A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the
court.

A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It isa special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. A judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant ,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial
process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or
reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover, in our
jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of
the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus
officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. The following are the guidelines when there are
possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another
court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case:1. The court wherein the criminal
case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An
application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the
applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending
on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by
said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution
of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search
warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is
pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for
said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search
warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to
 prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently
be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court
on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.4. Where the court
which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding
thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal
case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefore.

PEOPLE VS AMMINUDIN

FACTS:

IdelAminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in
Iloilo City.
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana
leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation.
Later on, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen and both were charged for Illegal Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs.
The fiscal absolved Ali after a thorough investigation.
Then trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted.
The his defense,
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two
pairs of pants.
He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with
a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed.
He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of
several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters.
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell
watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to
mention his other expenses.
Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when
he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling.
He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his
cousin, to a friend whose full name he said did not even know.
The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by
him.
On appeal, the Court finds it necessary to answer the legality of his arrest without warrant.

ISSUE:

WON The warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:

NO. Aminuddin was arrested illegally.

The mandate of the Constitution is clear that a valid search or arrest warrant shall be served first before the authorities can
check his personal properties or deprived him of his liberty.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after a personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

However, the present case presented no such urgency unlike the case of Roldan v. Arca.
Based on the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort
was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always
been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics
agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited
drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

As to the Court’s exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must, therefore, be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

Hence, accused-appellant is acquitted.

PEOPLE VS MENGOTE

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen
pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its
seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.

The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the
trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of
whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon
the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects
were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife
secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned
over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

ISSUES:

1. Was the arrest valid?

2. Was the search valid?

HELD:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE; EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION THEREOF; EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have
been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither
could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in
Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court. There is no question that
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the
absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed."

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; WHEN LAWFUL; REQUISITES; NOT
ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in
the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful
under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court. We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see
how we can agree with the prosecution. Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee
from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his
arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section. Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the
arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question,
the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or
at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent
requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an
offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had
yet to be committed.

VALMONTE VS DE VILLA

FACTS:

Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and
banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of
checkpoints, for the protection of the people.

According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because they were subjected to searches and seizures without the benefit of a
warrant. The petitioners averred that there’s a recent incident happened, where a certain Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly
killed in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for
ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the
air.

ISSUE:

WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against illegal search and seizures.
HELD:

NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered
as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers
and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in
such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions —
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner, that all
governmental power is susceptible to abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the
military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of
his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure.

Hence, petition dismissed.

PEOPLE VS SALANGUIT

FACTS:

On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches,
Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw
that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a
search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español.

At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer,
went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.

The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant's door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the
house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.

After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the
house. 8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip
box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana
wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. 10 A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.

After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.

PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. 13 The white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425
grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. 14

For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-
law, Soledad Arcano.

Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house,
they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire,
brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.

When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in
front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to
read it.

Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen
conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm,
jewelry, and canned goods.

The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-
appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained. 18

Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the
policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables.

ISSUE:

Was the search and seizure valid?

HELD:

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; REQUISITES; PROBABLE CAUSE; THE FACT THAT THERE
WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE APPLICATION FOR THE SEIZURE OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA DOES
WARRANT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WARRANT IS VOID; IT IS VALID AS TO THE SEIZURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE AS TO WHICH EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED SHOWING PROBABLE CAUSE AS TO ITS EXISTENCE. — The
fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant
the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search
warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. It
would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items
to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other
items not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the
search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with
respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not. CTacSE

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIFICITY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED; ONE SEARCH WARRANT IS SUFFICIENT TO COVER THE
VIOLATIONS OF THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 6425. — In People v. Dichoso the search warrant was also for
"Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and
seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This
Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant. Similarly, in another case, the search warrant was captioned: "For
Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was questioned on the
ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several
offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under §1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the
category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the
violations under the various provisions of the said law.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICULARITY OF THE PLACE; THE LOCATION OF APPELLANT'S HOUSE BEING INDICATED BY
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE WARRANT DESCRIBED THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED
WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY. — The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. For example, a
search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough,
Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground
and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made
determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused
"Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass". In this case, the location of accused-appellant's house being
indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity. IAaCST

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE; ONCE THE VALID PORTION OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT HAS BEEN EXECUTED, "THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE" CAN NO LONGER PROVIDE ANY BASIS FOR ADMITTING
THE OTHER ITEMS SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND. — Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus
known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the
valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for
admitting the other items subsequently found. The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the
conduct of a search pursuant to accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to
a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. The rationale
for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach
for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found,
i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the
search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition,
was invalid.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO APPARENT ILLEGALITY TO JUSTIFY THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA BRICKS. — The
marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar
to People v. Musa in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said
drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. No presumption of regularity may be
invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution. In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two
bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have
been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted
in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

PEOPLE VS GALIT

FACTS:

The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the
bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounded inflicted upon
different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban
picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, or
suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police
station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI
Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive
answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay
admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions
in the crime. As a result, he was charged with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide

ISSUES:

W/N the accused was afforded his constitutional rights?

HELD:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; PROCEDURE FOR PEACE OFFICER IN MAKING ARREST AND
CONDUCTING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. — This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct
procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We
reiterate: "At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for
the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have
the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by
telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by
the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."

ID.; ID.; ID.; A LONG QUESTION FOLLOWED BY A MONOSYLLABIC ANSWER DOES NOT SATISFY REQUIREMENTS OF THE
LAW. — A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation.
Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives
did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had
executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of
right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again
accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; CONFESSION OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION,
INADMISSIBLE. — The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence
because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES v. BENNY GO 411 SCRA 81 (2003)

A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appelant Benny Go in search of evidence for the violation of Republic
Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they
met Jack Go, son of the Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the time they then called on two
barangay kagawad to act as witnesses on the said search. They then seized properties and objects even those which were not
included in the warrant. When they were almost finished with their search Go arrived and immediately together with the two
witnesses was made to sign the inventory receipt. Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for violation of
R.A. 6425. Upon hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the prosecution against Go. However, the two
witnesses questioned the validity of some of the evidence presented such as the inventory receipt as well as the illegal drugs
said to have been seized from the search. The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense charged.
On appeal, Go assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search performed by the raiding team and the
admissibility of the evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the properties seized that were not included in the
search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be returned to Go.

HELD:

It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in
the warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant – to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time, the raiding team characterized
the seizure of the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as
―seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. To be sure, the policemen
also filed a complaint against Go for alleged possession of instruments or implements intended for the commission of
falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found
in appellant‘s residence. The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been
turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible that
SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a ―plain view of the items from his vantage point in the sala. In sum, the
circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the ―plain view doctrine to justify the seizure and
retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like
those not particularly described, must thus be ordered returned to him. Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals
and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they
may not be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to law. Moreover,
the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Alih vs. Castro

Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in
search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the
respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing,
paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also
confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the
provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior
orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination
of the city mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting
them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:

The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former
from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were
entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore,
there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of
justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against
the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation
should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-
incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice
Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material.”
RULE 132

G.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY
S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN
MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN
ALO, and JOHN DOES

FACTS:
A sub-police station was established upon the orders of Mayor Leroy S. Brown in sitioTipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City
of Basilan. Said sub-station was composed regular and special policemen all armed with pistols and high power guns. It
was alleged that criminal complaints were entertained in the said sub-station and that defendant Joaquin R. Pollisco
acted as investigating officer and exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the
camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court.
On June 4, 1958, YokanAwalinTebag was arrested upon orders of Mayor Brown without any warrant or complaint filed
in court. Tebag was allegedly maltreated while being taken into the sub-station and was again mauled at the sub-
station, said torture resulted to Tebag’s death.
The private respondents were then charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of the cities of
Zamboanga and Basilan.
Senator Roseller Lim entered his appearance for the private respondents. The prosecution is questioning said
appearance due to the constitutional prohibition for senators and members of the House of Representatives to appear
as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation of his office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged is committed in relation to the offices of the private respondents.

HELD:
Yes, a mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said
amended information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol
and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him
with pistols and high power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, ...
supervision and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law
and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan
City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated AwalinTebag, who died in
consequence thereof.

It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract,
as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is
intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
PEOPLE VS YATAR

Facts:

Appellant Yatar and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, KathylynUba. In June
1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels. Appellant received from the victim,
KathylynUba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998. Appellant was seen by
ApoloniaWania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang,
acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar. Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt.
Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching. SalmalinaTandagan saw appellant in a dirty
white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day KathylynUba was found dead. The door leading to
the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope. The victim, KathylynUba, lay naked in a pool of blood
with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants,
bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery. Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina.
The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood. DNA of the semen found
on the victim’s vagina, compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical and Appellant escaped two days
after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgement of conviction was meritorious.

Ruling:

Yes. The testimonies of the witnesses are afforded credibility as the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment
of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. The latter is in
a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.

Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence presentedby the prosecution, as presented in the facts of this case, proves
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction,
must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of
others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the use of DNA evidence, under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the DNA evidence obtained which was appreciated by the
court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.

It must be noted, however, that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly
find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty
of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is
certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed
the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, the present case passes the test of moral
certainty.