MIDTERM IN CONFLICT OF LAWS

1. Distinguish “residence” from “domicile”. Explain the meaning of “residence” within the
context of our election law and in the context of international law.
Answer: It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election
law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said
purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."[22]
When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside
in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party
actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to
which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law."[23]

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is
adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile."[24]

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern
Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election
laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue
for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of
petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This
is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time."

2.On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo who is a duly accredited honorary consul of
Uruguay at Manila married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena (a Filipina) and after
seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to
live separately each other. On May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in part says
that each one is free to look for a rightful partner.
On June 15, 1935, the Rodolfo without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of
divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11,
1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the
peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the
city of Manila.
Questions: (1) Is the divorce obtained by Rodolfo valid in the Philippines? (2) Can the two
complaints against him, one for bigamy and another for concubinage prosper in the
Philippines? (3)Rodolfo contends that he is immune from suit as he is a consul of Uruguay, is
he correct? (4) Based on your readings, is Rodolfo liable for bigamy and concubinage? Explain
your answer.
Answer: (a)The divorce obtained by Rodolfo is not valid in the Philippines. There is no divorce
law in the Philippines. (b)The complaint for bigamy is proper since he obtained two
marriages. THE concubinage charge however must be dismissed for the reason that there is
already condonation when they agreed to part ways based on the executed document. (c) A
consul does not enjoy immunity,hence he is not immune from suit. (4) Rodolfo is made liable
for bigamy only.(Sheneckenburger case)

3. What is the effect of a foreign judgment in our Philippine courts?

Answer: SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

4.Is their an obligatory rule from treaties and conventions that requires the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgments? Or allow for the enforcement thereof? Explain.
Answer: There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof.
However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations.The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread,
and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

5. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District
Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having
suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of
police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for
the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious
violations of international law. These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian
citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were
tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or
paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand
(10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked by the plaintiffs.
Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3)
sub-classes of torture, summary execution and disappearance victims.Trial ensued, and
subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages
in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge
Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total
of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars
and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.

On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of
Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are
members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. They
argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme
Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of
the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and
enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.

On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the
non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred
Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to
enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US
Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to
the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that
an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation;
hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section
7(c) of Rule 141.
Questions: As judge, will you grant the motion to dismiss? Explain your answer.

6. Petitioner Alice is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent Richard filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business
in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Is the ruling of the Court correct? Explain your answer.

7. Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter,
Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from
the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree
against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over
the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive
forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain
from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60
(trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement,
respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction
because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s motion and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from
taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to
respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree
obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that
unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of
his nationality.
Question: Is the ruling of the Court correct? Explain your answer.

Answer: The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is
contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to
the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from
the beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary
Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s
joint child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed:
(1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2)
petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because
of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact
or in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed:
"no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x." 16 (This statutory
awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy
consideration,19 subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. 20 ) Clearly then,
the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent
and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated
by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be
valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
authority when spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother
takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of
(2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to
take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the
separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal
custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother
who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons
deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under
the second paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only
to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
To limit this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private
agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children
under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by
the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the
separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her."23 This ignores the legislative basis that
"[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender
age."24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the
other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs
the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25
However, these are objections which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform
enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court.
At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements
the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation and other
privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody
under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on
the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in
duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s
emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual
limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that
petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint
custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over
Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default
custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on
respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument
that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van
Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad.28 There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery
filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino
spouse because he no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints
under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree
carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction
of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

8. The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States
of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her
for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death,
the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by
his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have
any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
Question: Is the contention of Rodolfo San Luis correct? Explain.

9. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court
of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered
as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,in order for him or her to be able
to remarry under Philippine law. Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."
Question: Is the RTC correct in its ruling? Explain.

10. On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by
a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living
apart since April, 1982.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
 On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". The city fiscal approved a resolution
directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.
Question: Will the adultery case against Imelda prosper? Explain your answer.

NO. When the foreign spouse obtained divorce, he is no longer considered as a proper person to file the
case for adultery, as strictly speaking he can no longer be considered as the spouse of the Filipina.

sample examination

1. The RTC of Sindangan appointed X as guardian of minor Y, in a special proceeding. Y is

allegedly the son of a U.S. Veteran. X received the arrears of beneficiary Y. Later on, the U.S.
Veterans Administration filed a case in Washington D.C. for the refund of the benefits
received by Y, on the ground of wrong payment since it was found that the U.S. Veteran was
a fake. Question: Does the court in Washington D.C. have jurisdiction concerning the case of
refund? Explain.

No, the point of contact here is the Philippines. (see p. 316)

It was ruled: The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of
the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims properly submitted to
him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is
not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the
Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed
by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions
where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their
jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that
would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party,
conclusive on our courts. That in effect, would deprive our tribunals or judicial discretion and
render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the veterans' Administrator.

(In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. SEVERO VILORIA, guardian and
oppositor-appellee, vs.ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, G.R. No. L-
9620 June 28, 1957petitioner-appellant.)
In an analogous case, we have ruled:
 By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator has submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his vesting
order. He can not therefore now dispute this power. (Brownell vs. Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz.,
4772.)

From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to the appellee guardian, for
the ward's benefit, the latter became their lawful possessor and he can not be deprived thereof
on the sole allegation of the Veterans' Administrator that the money was erroneously paid. The
burden lies upon him to satisfy the court that the alleged mistake was really committed; and the
Philippine courts' determination of the question is as binding upon the Veterans' Administrator
as upon any other litigant.
Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not properly filed in the
guardianship proceedings, since the latter are solely concerned with the ward's care a custody
and the proper administration or management of his properties. Conflicts regarding ownership
or title to the property in the hands of the guardian, in his capacity as such, should be litigated in
a separate proceeding.

2.Can Philippine courts recognize a foreign decree of adoption? Explain your answer.

See p. 313 of the book

Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on
the principle that the status of adoption, created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to
create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the
status of adoption when created by its own law.4It is quite obvious then that the status of
adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country,
except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and
demand the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil Code just
quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption "remains subject to local law." 5

(JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, respondent-appellee. G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967)
It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign adoptions. We hold
that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the
corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of
such adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.6

3.Ching Leng , a Chinese man was granted Philippine citizenship upon his marriage to a
Filipina in 1950. His wife filed an adoption to Ching's five illegitimate minor childen. The
adoption was granted. Ching then filed a petition to cancel the alien certificates of
registration of said minors on the theory that they have become Filipino citizens by virtue of
the adoption. Is Ching Leng correct? Explain.
Cheng Leng is wrong. The Alien certificates of registration will not be cancelled because the
adopted children have not become Filipinos (see p. 312). Minor children refer to legitimate
children only and not the illegitimates.

4.Alvin, a natural born U.S. citizen and his wife Evelyn, a natural born filipina who in 1988
became a naturalized citizen, jointly filed in 1990 a petition for adoption of Solomon, Evelyn's
12 year old brother. Are Alvin and Evelyn qualified to adopt? Explain.

NO, an alien who may adopt a Filipino is one who is a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt
a relative by consanguinity, or one seeking to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse, or one who is married to a Filipino seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter. None of these requisites are present in the case at bar.
(p. 308)

Section 4. Who may adopt. – The following may adopt:

(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights,
of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude; who is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and
care for his children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of a 16-
year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee’s
parent;
(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided, That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until
the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular
office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his
country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his
adopted child. Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification
of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of
the Filipino spouse.
(3) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of one spouse by the other
spouse; or
 (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child: Provided, however,
That the other spouse has signified his consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the illegitimate child of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

Section 5. Who may be adopted. – The following may be adopted:

(1) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been voluntarily committed
to the Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No. 603 or judicially
declared available for adoption;
(2) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse;
(3) An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the status of the former to that
of legitimacy;
(4) A person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption, said person
has been consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their own child since
minority;
(5) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(6) A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no
proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said
parents.
(7) A child not otherwise disqualified by law or these rules.

5.In State X, all children whether born inside or outside wedlock are considered legitimate. In
State Y, all children born outside wedlock are illegitimate. Now then, a child is born outside
wedlock of a father, who is a citizen of State Y, and a mother, who is a citizen of State X.
Questions: (a) Should the Philippine courts consider the child legitimate or illegitimate? (b)
What country's law shall govern the relationship of parents and child?

(p. 304) The child shall be considered illegitimate since that is the characterization under the
father’s law. Inasmuch as the child is illegitimate, the relationship shall be governed by the
mother’s law.

6.Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
Question: Does petitioner have the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy? Why?

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the
foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may
restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the
petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that
respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and
whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio.

7. Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married.
The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage,
however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parent as averred by Leouel. The
couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living
independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite
Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to
return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in
the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to
no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a case to nullify their
marriage due to Julia’s psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to
return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological
incapacity. Question: As judge will you grant the nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity? Explain.

Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code
did not define the term “psychological incapacity”, which is adopted
from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some
resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of
PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art.
68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his
petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not
clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings
do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of
marriage.

8. IN 1948, Pastor and Vicenta were married before the catholic church in Cebu City. On Oct.
22, 1950 Vicenta obtained an absolute divorce in Nevada U.S.A., after which she married John
Nichols, an American.They resided in Nevada since then, when she finally acquired her
American citizenship in 1958.
Meanwhile, Pastor filed legal separation proceedings in the Philippines plus damages.
Questions:(a) Will the petition for legal separation and the claim for damages prosper?(b)
State the "doctrines" laid in this case.
The petition for legal separation will not prosper.
THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves:
With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident
defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation
or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case,
because, then, they have jurisdiction over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal
status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in
another country, cannot be applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The
principle is well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be
enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicenta’s refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to
damages (2176). When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects the
personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of
marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have
jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in
the Philippines, 45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive: filing of suit nay
have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their
reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in
present society.

9. Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968.
The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital
problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April
27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the
First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in
the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union
produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in
the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under
Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

Question: Does Perez have a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be-
intervenor in Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife? Why?

No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan
was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
 Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a
citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect
to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity.
Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a
petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful
in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce. Petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated
abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which
her motion for intervention is based.

10. October 1986, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married in Bacoor, Cavite. One month after
their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate
the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines
but he did not bother to see her and their child.
Questions: (1) Is the abandonment by the husband of his family and his insensitivity to them
automatically constitute psychological incapacity? (2) Do the requirements of psychological
incapacity apply to mixed marriages? Explain.

1. No. the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Toshio’s act
of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere
fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. In
Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as
a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

2. The husband being a Japanese national is immaterial in proving psychological incapacity,

no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
Final examination in Conflict of Laws

1.Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI
hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government
projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
and mudflows.On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST),
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract. On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money
claims.Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the
case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution
became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint, docketed
as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc.
as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The
complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed
respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government projects and that respondent was not
paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of
BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had
combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer,petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign
corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any
arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied
combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said
companies.Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales
Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of
failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim.
AS judge, will you dismiss the case for said reasons? Explain.

2. Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office.
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.
IS THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECT? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

3. Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,the Court outlined three consecutive phases

involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law,
and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Explain these three consecutive phases.

4. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Is this true or false? Explain your answer.

5. It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it. What are these three alternatives?
 6. Note that resolving a conflict of laws problem, one or more circumstances may be
present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law, such as the
following: "(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or
his origin;(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; (3) the situs of a thing,
that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved; (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus,
such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;(5) the place where
an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the
place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;6) the intention of the contracting parties as to
the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis. (7) the place where judicial
or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori"the law of the forum"is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of ‘procedure’ not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for
the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the
ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly
contracts of affreightment.

Under CONFLICT OF LAWS, WHAT DO YOU CALL THE ABOVE

CIRCUMSTANCES?

7. Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and

existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It has a Philippine office located at
4/F, Metro House Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City.[3] In its Petition filed with
this court, Saudia identified itself as follows:
1. Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing under the Royal
Decree No. M/24 of 18.07.1385H (10.02.1962G) in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA").
Its Philippine Office is located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati
City (Philippine Office). It may be served with orders of this Honorable Court through
undersigned counsel at 4th and 6th Floors, Citibank Center Bldg., 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati
City.
Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by Saudia
as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.[5] After undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration for deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by
Saudia (e.g., initial flight attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as
Temporary Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then
entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette) on
May 16, 1990;[6] Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen
Ruth) on May 22, 1993;[7] and Loraine Schneider-Cruz (Loraine) on August 27,
1995.[8]Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from
service on various dates in 2006.[9]
Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal. They alleged that
the termination was made solely because they were pregnant.As respondents alleged, they had
informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures
to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on informed
respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves.
In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters.[11]
xxx
Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are not in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. This is because respondents' Cabin Attendant
contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, rather than those of the Philippines.
It claims that the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law calls into operation the principle of forum
non conveniens, thereby rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals.
QUESTION: IS SAUDIA CORRECT? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

8. Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted
over a third party mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing an action for the
collection of the principal loan before foreign courts? Explain your answer.

9. The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and
petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest,
Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]Before the outbreak of the Pacific War,
Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo,
Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.[6]Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]On December 4, 1945, Paula gave
birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father's name was left
blank.[9]Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the
United States Navy as part of Lorenzo's salary and all other obligations for Paula's daily
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in
accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their
conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula
for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from
Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed
by Paula's father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro
Osabel.[10]

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November
27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]On December
4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married
Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even
if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-
five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. X x xOn May 18, 1987, the
Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the
late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so
the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she
is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739”
QUESTION: IS THE RULING OF THE RTC CORRECT? EXPLAIN YOUR
ANSWER.

10. Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On
September 8, 1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens
of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity
Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary
Villa&mdashan institution for unwed mothers and their babies—stating that she (the mother)
could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's) family.Being
without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of
the petition on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the
Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air
Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the
Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.
QUESTION: Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are
qualified to adopt Baby Rose. RULE AND EXPLAIN.

the final exam

Final Examination in Conflict of Laws

Saturday, 10 am

Rule on the issue/s posed by the given facts of the case.

 1. Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for
an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had
eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered
into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to
either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After
ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was
approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral
conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

2. Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently
ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November
18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First
Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the children was
granted to the father.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a
German court.
2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?

3. On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. LapuzSy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio,
alleging, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had
lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child;
that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which,
among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.In his second amended answer to the petition, respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative
and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for
the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. LapuzSy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before
the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O. LapuzSy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for
petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
ISSUES:
1. Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
2. If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
 4. Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco
for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of
concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent
elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or
acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal
case for concubinage.

5. On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner filed civil case against petitioner for
legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October
1986, private respondent also filed criminal case against petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986,
application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation,
was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10
December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente lite.

ISSUES:1. Does conviction for concubinage be secured first before the action for legal separation can prosper or
succeed?
2. Did the respondent judge gravely abuse his discretion on the alleged partiality in ordering the
payment of support to the wife pendente lite. ?

6. Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals On February 8, 1931 –
Respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino. Then on September 15, 1943 – Marriage was
dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute
divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years Arturo
Tolentio married Pular Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. Constancia married Arturo Tolentino
on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo
Tolentino. Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that
the complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo
Tolentino (brothers and sisters). Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the
surname of Tolentino. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Issues: 1. Whether or Not the petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed
2. Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the
surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.

7. Vicente and Rebecca are husband and wife. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then
26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar TanchiongMakapugay, American, and
Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic. The Dominican court granted the divorce and the same court settled the couple’s property relations
pursuant to an agreement they executed.
 Meanwhile, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approvalof the motion to withdraw the
petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not
of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the
amount of PhP 220,000.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by
the prior judgment of divorce. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino
citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, filed adultery and perjury
complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.

8. On 7 February 1958 plaintiff Lavern R. Dilweg, a nonresident American citizen, through counsel, instituted
the complaint at bar consisting of six causes of action against defendants Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros,
and Isaac S. Eceta, claiming civil damages arising out of alleged libelous and defamatory statements uttered and
published in the Philippines by the latter. On 24 February 1958 the first two named defendants presented a motion to
dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff interposed an opposition thereto on 7 March 1958.
On 11 May 1961 the trial court issued an order, which is the subject of the present appeal, the
pertinent portion of which is as follows:
"This action is one for damages by reason of alleged libelous statements uttered in the Philippines by
the defendants against the plaintiff. In other words, it is an action bared on a tort or act, which under the law of the
Philippines, is defined as a criminal offense. At the time the said libelous statements were uttered, the plaintiff was in
Washington, D.C. where, he was and has always been a resident. There is no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff
has ever been in the Philippines or has resided at anytime therein.
"The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by
the filing of his complaint. It was contended that as the plaintiff therein has never been a resident of the Philippines,
the courts of this country have not acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of his action bared on a contract which
was executed in the State of New York,USA.
The Court has come to conclusion that in order that it may validly try this case, it must have jurisdiction
not only over the persons of the parties and over the subject matter and the plaintiff must be a resident within the
territorial of this Court in order that jurisdiction over his person can be acquired, otherwise the Court will not be able
to render a valid judgment against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not our Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdiction over a personal action
instituted by a nonresident alien who is not within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts?

9. On September 2, 1952, Alfonsa Pelingon filed a claim for compensation for herself and her two minor
children with the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., who refused to
entertain the claim on the ground that said company was not the employer of the deceased husband of the claimant.
On September 17, 1952, the Workmen's Compensation Commission, believing that the Pacific Far East Line, Inc., a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, was not an agent of petitioner with authority to receive
service of process, served notice of the claim on an official of said foreign corporation who in turn forwarded the
notice to petitioner even if the latter was not an agent of, nor was it authorized to accept service of process in behalf
of, said petitioner.
 On October 10, 1952, petitioner filed a special appearance with the Workmen's Compensation
Commission for the sole purpose of asking for the dismissal of the claim on the ground that the Commission had no
jurisdiction over it because it is a foreign corporation not domiciled in this country, it is not licensed to engage and is
not engaging in business therein, has no office in the Philippines, and is not represented by any agent authorized to
receive summons or any other judicial process in its name and behalf.
ISSUE:
Since petitioner is a private foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines in contemplation
of the rule, can it be brought within the jurisdiction of our courts by serving the summons upon the agent who
represented it in entering into the contract of employment with the deceased Luceno Pelingon?

10. The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, Manila, with a total area of
29,151 sq. m., which, after the last world war, was found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be
registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan. For such reason, the said
Custodian, on March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the
United States, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2; and subsequently under
the same statue, on Lots 3 and 4 on July 6, 1948. Two formal agreements were then executed, one referring to Lots
1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4; whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic
of the Philippines upon indemnifying the U.S.

On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed
on November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. On
November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a
complaint in the CFI of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney
General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents.

ISSUE: Has the action for the recovery of real property prescribed stripping the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter?

End of the Examination