Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
The "Psychology
of Terrorism
•
Volume III
Theoretical Understandings
and Perspectives
Westport, Connecticut
London
Library' of Congress Cataloging-ill-Publication Data
Firsr published
First publ ished in 2002
~.
The paper used in this book complies
com plies with the
Permanrn tr Paper Standard issued by lhe
the National
OrS2ni1.2lion (Z39.48-1984).
Information Standards Org2niution
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
1
Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism
and the Response to Terrorism
C lark McCauley
TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS
Individuals become terrorists in many different ways and fo r many different rea-
sons. Here I will simplify to consider three kinds of explamuion of the September
II auacks:
au:acks: thL'Y :are
arc crazy, thc:y 2fC crazed by hatred :rnd
they 2ft and :anger,
anger, or tht.'Y
thL'Y are rational
within their own perspective. My argument is that terrorism is not to be undcr- under-
stood as pathology, and that terrorists emerge out our of a normal psychology of emo-I!mo-
tiona!
tional commitment to cause :lnd comrades.
Terrorism as Individual
Turorum Individua.l Pathology
A common suggestion thert must be something wrong with terrorists.
suggcstion is that thl!re
TerroristS must bc
be crazy, oorr suicidal, or psychopatbs
psychopaths without moral fedings.
fl!dings. Only
someone with something wrong wi rh him could do the cold-blooded killing [hat a
with
terrorist d0C5.
Tht S,4rch
S,4nh for P4thology
Thirty years ago, this suggestion was taken raken very seriously, but thirty yL-ars
yl!ars of
rCSL":Irch has found lime (,'Vidence that terroristS arc suffering from psychopatholo-
rest.-arch
gy. This research has profit~ by what now amount to hundreds of interviews with
terrorists. Some terrorists arc are captured and interviewed in prison. Some active ter-
rorists can be found in their home neighborhoods. if the interviewer knows where
to look. And some rttiroo retircd tttrorists
tc:trorists arc willing to talk about ,heir
their t-arlier :activities,
activitics,
parricularly
panicularly if these aClivitics
aClivities were successful. Irl.hak Shamir and Menachem Blogin.
fo r instance, moved from anti-Arab :rnd I~d crsh ip of the
and anti-British terrorism to leadership
state orot' Israel . InterviL-WS
InterviL"WS with terrorists rarely
rardy find any disorder listed in the Ameri-
A~soci ation 's Dingnostic
can Psychiatric Auociation's Dingnosric and Statistical
Stntistical Manunl
ManUAl ofMmtal Disordm.
Disordtrs.
More systematic research confirms the interview re.m lts. Particularly thorough
wen:
were the German studies of the Baader-Meinhof
Baadcr-Meinhof Gang. Although the terrorists had
gone underground and their locations were wer~ unknown, their identities were known.
Excellent German records provided a grear gr~r dcal of information about each eaeh individ-
ual. Prenatal rt.'Cords,
n:cords, perinara.1
pcrinara.1 rl'Cords, pediatric records, prcschool
preschool records. lower-
.~c hoo l records,
rtcords, grade school records, high school records, university rccords (most
had had some universiry
univcrsiry eduC3rion)-a11
eduC2.tion)-a11 of thcst
these werc
were comlx:d for clues to under-
standing thcse these indi\'idu:als.
individuals. Family. neighbors, schoolmarts-all rhose who had
schoolmates-all those
known an individual before the leap to terrorism-were in rervicwt.-d. A comparison
intervicwl"CI.
sample of individuals from the same neighborhoods, matched fo r gl!nder, gt.'nder, age. and
,ncioeconornic status, w;u similarly studied
"ocioeconomic studied.. The results of these investigations take rake
several feet of shdf space,~ pa ce, but are
arc easy to summarize. The terrorists did not differ difft.'r
from the comparison group of nontl!rrorisu way; in panicular,
nonteTTorisu in any substantial way;
rhl! rl!rrorists did
rhe rerrorists d id nor show higher rates of any kind of psychopathology.
Terrorism as
u Emotiooal
Emotio oal Expression
Expressio n
When asked at a press conference on October
Ocwber II , 200 1. why people in lhe
Muslim world hate the United States, President Bush expressed am:.tzement
amazement :.tnd
and
replied. ~Th at's because they don't know w."
replied,
President Bwh is not the only one o ne ro accept the idea that the September 11 11
:macks were an expression of harred. ~ Why do they hale
ofharred. hate us?~ has bttn
been the headline
ncws pa ~rs and magazines. Despite the head-
of numerow stories and editorials in newspapers
lines, there h3.'
hasl been little analysis of what haired means or where it may corne from
fro m..
I,,,/i,,iJIl4l Fnu"'41;01l
l"dillidll4l 411d Insull
Fnu"..,;o" ."" Inndt
The immediate:
immediate difficulty of seeing the September 11 11 terrorists as crazed with
anger is the fact ., much cited by journalists
journalistS and pundits, that thethe: September 11 ter-
rorists were not obviously suffering from frustration or insult. Mohammed Ana
arne
came from a middle-class f.unily in Egypt, EgyPt, studied architecture
architctture in Cairo, travded
traveled to
Hamburg, Germany, for funher studies smdies in architecture, and h:Jd a part-time job
doing architectural
archiu.-:crural drawings for a German fi rm. rm. H is German thesis, on the ancient
archirecture of AJeppo,
architecmre AJeppo. was wdl well received. According to Thomas Friedman's (2002b) (2oo2b)
oth~rs of the September 11 pilOl-leadets came
inquiries, several others cam~ from similar mid· mid-
dl~-class backgrounds. with similar threads
dle-class thn:ads of personal success.
The origins of the th~ September II terrorist-leaders
terrorist-Iead~rs arc thus strikingly different
differ~nt
from the:
the origins of the th ~ Palestinian suicide terrorists that Arid Me:rari
Merad has be~n been
studying for decades in Israel (Ldyveld, 2001). 2001 ). The Palestini
Palestinianan terrorists arear~
young, male, poor, and un ~ducated. Their motivations arc
uneducated. are manifold but notably
include the several thousand dollars awarded to the fami ly of a Palestinian martyr. m;utyr.
amount is small by Western standards bur enough
The :amount to lift a Palestinian family
e:nough lO
abject poverty. including suppOrt for par~nls
OUt of :abject parents and aged rdatives and a dowry
for th~ marryr's sist~rs. It is easy to charact~riu
m:arryr's sisters. charact~riu: thc:sc:
these suicide terrorists
terroristS as frwtrat
frwtrateded
by poveny and hopelessness, with frustration leading to anger against Israd :as as the
perceived source of their problems.
But this explanation doc:s not fit at least the leaders of the September II terror-
ists. W'hence their anger, if anger is the explanation of their attacks? Perhaps
ists. Perhaps they
thc:y
ate angry, not about their own personal experience
c:xperience of frustration
frustrat ion and insult, but
about [he
the frustrations
frus trations and insults experienced by their group.
Group identification makes sense of sacrifice from individuals who are not per-
sonally frustrated or insulted. T The
he mistake is to imagine that self-sacrifice must
come from personal problems. rather than identification with group problems. problems.
This mistake rests in ignorance of the fact that many post-World War II terrorists
have been individuals of middle-class origins,
origins. people with options. The Baader-
Mei
Meinhof
nhof Gang in Germany, the Red. Red Brigade in Italy. the Weather Underground
in the United States-these and many other post-WWII terrorist groups are made
up mostly of individuals with middle-class origins and middle-class skills honed by
at least some university eduCltion
education (McCauley & Segal, 1987).
1987) . Explaining self-sac
self-sacri-
ri-
fice
fi ce as a result of personal problems is no more persuasive for terrorists than for
Mother Teresa or U.S. U.S. Medal of Honor winners.
winners.
The power of group identification is thus the foundation of intergroup confl
conflict,
ict,
especially fo
forr large groups where individual self-interest is probably maximized by
free-riding, that is, by letting other group members pay the COStS COStS of advancing
wdfar~ th:1t
group wdfare that the individual will profit from.
from . Here
Hen" I am assening brieRy whal
what
McCau l~y. in press-a).
I elsewhere argue fo r in more detail (McCauley. 2001; McCauley.
Th
T he~ explanation of (errorist
rerrorisr sacrifice as a fit of anger overcoming self-interest
can now be reformulated in terms of anger over group insult and group frustradon.
The potential origins of such anger arearc not difficult to d iscern .
Insu/tllna Frustrlltion
Insu/lana lIS S~~n by Muslinu (ana
Frustration II.J (llna Othen)
From Morocco to Pakistan lies a belt of Muslim states in which governmt nts nu
have police and military power but liltle public support. Tht gulf betY.'een rich and
poor is deep and wide in these countries, and government is associated with West-
ern-leaning elites for whom government,
government. not private enterprise, is the source SOUfce of
wealth. Political mreat
threat [0 to the Stale
state is not tolerated; imprisonment, tonure, ;md and
death are the
me tools of the Stale state against political
political opposition. Al the Catholic Church
in Poland under communism came to be the principal refuge of political opposi-
lion.
tion. so fundament'.tlist MuslimMwlim mosques arc the principal refuge of political oppo-
sition to government in these states.
In this conRk t between Muslim Mwlim governments
govcrnmems and Muslim peoples, the Unitt'<i
States and other Westt rn countries have supported {he the governmenlS.
governments. When the
Algerian government was about [0 to lose an dection
d ection [0
to (he
the lsi2mic Salv.uion Front in
1992. the government
1992, govt rnment annulled the election and Europeans and Americans were
glad (0
to accept the lesser
lessc:r of two evils. Western countries have h av~ supported authoritari-
an governments of
govemmenlS Eg)'pt . Eg)·pt, Jordan, and Pakistan with credits
crroilS and military assisance.
U.S. support for fo r Israel against the Palestinians is only one part of th is panern parrern of
supporting power against people.
A1-Qaeda is an association of exiles exilcs and refugees from the political violence
going o n in Muslim countries. Long before declaring Jihad j ihad against
again$! the Un ited
States, bin Laden was attacking the house of Saud fo r letting U.S. trOOps
Statcs, trOO ps remain in
the holy land of Mecca and Medina afte r the Gulf War. Fifteen of the September
I I terrorists came originally from from Saud i Arabia, although most seem to have hav~ been
r~c ruired from (he
recruited the Muslim diaspora in Europe. The United Stltes St:ltcS has bc~o
become me a
targel because
beause it is seen as supporting the governments that created the d iaspora. iaspora .
Th~ United Statd
The States is in the position of someone who has stumbled into a f.un f.uniily
ly
sc~n a ri o seems
feud. If this scenario se~ms strained, consider the th~ parallel between Mw Muslims
lims declar-
ing Jihad th~ United States for supporting
jihad on the supponing state terrorism in Muslim countries.
and the United States declaring war on any country that supports supporlS terrorism agai nst
the United States.
It is important to recognize that it is not only Arab and Muslim countries in
respo ns ibl ~ fo
which U.S. policies are seen as responsible forr terrorist attacks against the United
States In an IHT/ Pew poll of 275 ~ o pinj pini on- m ake
akersM
rs M in twenty-fou
twenty-fourr countries,
respondents were asked how many ordi nary people think that U.S. policies and
actions in the world were we r~ a major cause of the September II attack (Knowlton,
200 1). In the United States, only 18 percent of respondents respond~nts said many people
think this; in twemy-three other countries, an average of 58 percent said most or
many people think th this.
is. In Islamic countries, 76 percent sa n id most or many think
this, and even in Western European counuies, 36 percent said moS[ or many think
this. Americans do not have to accept the judgments of other
orner countries, but will
have to deal with them.
AnK" or Low! .
If group identification
identifi cation can lead to anger fo r frustrations and insults suffered by
the group. it yet remains to be determined if there
me there: is any evidence
evidence: of such emotions
in tbe September 11 II terrorists. O ur best guide to the motives of those: mose who carried
the attacks of September 11
O Ut me II is the document found fo und in the luggage of several of
the attackers. Four of the fi ve pages of this document have been rc!casro relcasro by the FBI
these pages have been translated and interpreted
and mese in terpreted by Makiya
Malciya and Mneimnch
(2002). IJ am indebted to Hassan Mneimneh for his assistance in understanding
this documenr.
The
T he four pages arc are surprising
su rprising fo r what meythey do nOi contain. There is no list of
group fru.s[l2tions
fru.srrarions and insults, no litany of injustice to justify violence. "The sense
throughout is that the would-be martyr is env-ged
Ihroughout engoaged in his action solely to please
God. There
T here is no mention of any communal purpose behind his behavior. In all of
the four pages available to us there is not a word or an 2n implication
impliC2lion about
2bout any
wrongs that are to be redressed mrough through m2ttyrdom,
martyrdom, whether in Palestine or Ir:aq Iraq or
in 'the land of Muhamm2d,'
Muhammad,' the me phrase:
phrase bin Laden used in the :.al-Jauera
21-Jau:era video that
was shown after September 11 II"" (Makiya & Mneimneh, 2002, p. 21). Indeed, the
text cites approvingly
2pprovingly a Story from the Koran Kora n about Ali ibn Talib, cousin and son-
in-law of the Prophet, who is spat upon by an infidel in combat. The Muslim
holds his sword until he can master the impulse for vengeance-an individu.al individual and
human motive-and strikes only when he can strike for the sake of God.
Rather than anger
2nger or hatred, the:the! dominant message of me the text is a focus on the
eternal. There arc 2fe many references to the Koran, Koran , and the vocabulary departS from
scventh-century Arabic only for a few references to mode:!rn
scventh-ccntury modern concepts such as air- 2ir-
pon and plane (and these modern words are arc reduced to one-letter
one-leftC:r abbreviations).
connection with God and the work of God, to fed
To fl-el conncction peace of submission
fed the pe2ce
to God's will- these are imper:atives and the prom
2fe the imperatives ~ of the text. Invocations
promises
and prayers are to be oofferedffered at every srage
stage of the journey: the last nighl night , the jour-
ney to Ihe
the airpon, boarding the plane, takeoff. taking the plane, welcoming death.
The reader is reminded [hat fear is an act of worship due only to God. If killing is
that fe2r
necessary, the langu2ge
language of the text makes the killing a ritual slaughter with wim vocabu-
2I)' that
1lary mat refers to animal sacrifice. including the sacrifice of Isaac th2[ that Abraham was
prepared [to0 offer.
prep2red
Judging from this [cxt. lext. the psychology of the September 11 {errorim terrorists is not a
psychology or of anger,
2nger, or hatred, or vengeance. T he terrorists
terrorisu arc
2le not righting human
wrongs but acting with God and for God av-inst 2goainst evil . [n
In most general [erms,
terms, it is a2
psychology of artachmem
2rtachmem [0 to the good ralher
rather than
th2n a2 psychology of hatred fo forr evil.
Research with U.S.
Rese2fch U.S. soldiers in World War" War 11 found something similar; hatred of
the enemy W2S was a minor mOlive
motive in combat perfo rmance, whereas attachment 2nachmenr 10 lO
buddies and not W2ming w:.aming to lei let them down was a major motive (Stouffer et aI., al.,
1949). This resonance with the psychology of combat-
combat-aa psychology usually treat-
ed as normal psychology-again suggests the possibility that terrorism and terror-
ists may be more normal than is usually recognized.
thing that
thar makes sense of our life life and our death, something that thar makes our death
different from
nom the death of a squirrel lying by the side of the road as we drive to
work. The doser
closer and more immediate death is, the more we need the group values
that give meaning to life and death. T These
hese include the values of family, religion,
ethnicity, and nationality-
nationality-the the valucs
values of our culmre.
culture. Dozens of experiments have
shown that thinlcing about death, their own death, leads people w to embrace more
Strongly the values of their culmre (Py=nski
(Pyszcznski , Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997).
nOt have w
These values do not to be expl
explicitly
icitly religious. Many of the terrorist groups
since World War II have been radical-socialist groups with purcly purdy secular roots; the
Red Brigade in Italy, the Baader-Mei nhof Gang in Germany, the Shining Path in
Peru. Animal rights and saving the environment can be causes that justify terror-
ism. For much of the rwentieth century, atheistic communism was such a cause.
Thus there is no special relation berween religion and violence; religion is only one
lcind of cause in which individuals can find fi nd an answer w to mortality.
mortality.
What is essential is that the cause should have the promise of a long and glori-
ous fumre.
fumre . History is important in supporting this promise. A cause invented yes-
terday cannot easily be seen to have a glorious and indefiniteindefinit e futu re. The histoty
history
must be a group history. No one ever seems to have had the idea that she or he
alone will achieve some kind of immortality. Immortality comes as part of a group:
family group, cultural group, religious group. or ideological group. A good partici-
pant in the group, one who lives up to the norms of the group and contributes to
the group. will to that extent live on after death as part of the group. The meaning
of the individual 's life is the fumre
future of the cause, embodied in the group that goes
on into the fum re:
re after the
the: individual is dead.
TIu Psycho/OD
P¥holoD o/ComTl,th,
ofComrlltUl
T he group's
The grou p's values are focu.scd [0 a personal intensity in the small group of Iike-
minded people who perpetr.He terrorist violence. Most individuals individ uals belong [0 many
groups--f.unily, co-workers, neighborhood, religion religion,, country-and ach of these
groups has some infl influence
uence on individual
individ ual beliefs and behavior. Different
Diffe rent groups
have different values, and the competition of values reduces the power of anyone
group over its members. But members of an underground terrorist group have put
this group fi rst in their lives, dropping or reducing every other connection. T he
power of this one group is now enormous, and extends Qtends [0 to every kind of personal
and moral judgment . This T his is the power that
thar an
can make violence against the enemy
no!
not just acceptable but necesnry.
Every army aims [0 to do what the terrorist group does: to link a larger group
cau.sc with the small-group dynamics that acan n deliver individuals to sacrifice. Every
army cuts trainees off from their previous lives so that the combat unit can become
their fam ily; thei r fellow-soldiers become their brothers and their fear of leuing
down their comrades becomes greater {han their fear of dying. The power of an
isolating group over
ovcr its members is not limited to jUSlifying
jUSlifying violence. Many nonvi-
olent groups also gain power by separating individuals from groups mat might
offer competing values. Groups using usi ng this
mis tactic include religious cults, drug treu-treat-
ment centers, and residential schools and colleges. In brief, the psychology behind
terrorist violence is normal psychology, abnormal only in the intensiry of me the group
dynamics thaIthat link cause with comrades.
Some commentators have noted that the September II terrorists, a( least the
pilot-leaders,
pilot-laders, spent long periods of time dispersed in the United States. How could
the intense group dynamics that are arc typical of underground groups be maintained
in dispersal? There are two possible answers. The first fi rst is that physical dispersal is
connections. It
not the same as developing nL'W group conncctions. h seems thai
that the dispersed ter-
rorists lived without close
d ose connections
connect ions [0 others outside the terrorist group. They
d id not take interesting jobs, become dclose ose to co-workers, or develop romantic rela-
tionships. Although living apm, apart, they remained con nected [0 and anchored in only
one group, meir terrorist group.
The second possibility is that group dynamics can be less important to the
extent that the ause--the
cause--rhe ideology of the cause-is more impom impomnt. nt. As noted ear-
lier, the pilot-leaden
pilot-leaders of the September II terrorists were wen~ not
nOl poor o r unulented;
untalented;
they were men with a middle-class background and education. For educated men,
the power of ideas may substitute
substitu(e to some degree for the everyday reinforcement of
Indet:d , the terrorist document referred to above is a kind of
l like-minded group. Indet:d,
The Psychology
PsycholoO ofCmis
The psychology of cause and comrades is multiplied by a sense of crisis. Many
observers have noted an apocalyptic quality in the worldview of terroristS.
terroristS. Terror-
is(S see the world precariously balanced berween good and evil, at a point where
ists
action can bring about the triumph of the good. The "end times" or the millenni-
um or the uiumph of the working class is near, or can be made near by the right
extreme action, is required immediately, for the triumph of the
action. Action, exneme
good and the defeat of evil. This "ten minutes to ro midnight" feeling is part of what
makes it possible for normal people [0 risk their lives in violence.
Consider the passengers of the hijacked flight that crashed in western Pennsyl-
van ia. The passengers found out from their cell phones thar hijacked planes had
crashed into the World Trade Center. They had every reason to believe that their
plane was on its way [0 a similar end. Unarmed, they decided to attack me the hijack-
ers, and sacrificed their
rheir lives in bringing the plane down before it could impact its itS
intended target , which was probably the Pentagon or the White House. When it is
ren minutes to midnight, there is lirtle [0 lose and everything to gain.
ten
The sense of crisis is usually associated with an overwhelming threat. In the case
of the September II terrorists, the threat seems to be a fear that mat fundamentalist
Muslim culture is in danger of being overwhelmed by Western culture. The military
and econom ic power of the West, and the relative feebleness of once-great Muslim
nations in the modern era, are submerging Muslims in a tidal tida] wave of individual-
attachmem to :I.a view of what Muslims should be
ism and irreligion . Note that it is attachment
and fear for the future of Muslims th:l.t
that are the emotional foundations of the terror-
PlJchologiuli bnul
Prychologiuli flnul in UndnlUlnding Tt'7TorUm
TnTorUm IInd,k Rrtpopur
Rrtponsr tv
to Trrrorinn 15
TerTorum as Strategy
Psychologists recogniu: [WO aggression. emotional :and
twO kinds of aggression, and instrumental.
Emotional aggression is associated
associ:ated with angcr
anger :and
and does not calculate
c:a1cu1:ne long-term
co ns~ uen
ucn ces
ces.. The rewud
reward of emotional :aggression
aggression is hurling
hurting someone who has
hun
hurt you. instrumenu.l
Instrumental :aggression
aggression is more a1cu1:ating-the
calculating-the use aggression as :aa
usc of :aggression
means
me2J1S to other ends. The ba.lance
balance between these twO in the behavior individual
beh:avior of individua.l
terrorists is usually nor clear
cle:lr and might usefully be studied morc
more explicitly in the
future.
furure. The ba.lance may be import2
balance m:ay important dctermining how to respond to terrorism:
nl in determining
As argued :above.
above. emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objcctive
cmotiona.l :aggression objective rew21ds
rewards
and
2J1d punishments. while instrument:Li
insuument:Li :aggression
aggression should be more sensitive.
course. tlJe
Of course, the balance may be very different in those who perpcU1lle
perpetrate the vio-
lence than in those who plan it. The planners are probably more instrumental
planners:are instfumcnta.l ; they
arc usually thinking about wh:at
are what they wanl
want to accomplish. They aim to infl ict long-
They:aim
cOSts on their enemy and to gain long-Ierm
term coSts long-term adv:antage
advantage (or
for themselves.
MAtnitJ DllmA,c
M"tnitJ DllmA,e to the Enemy
inflias immediate damage
Terrorism inflicts desu oying lives and property. bUI
dam:age in destroying but [er-
ter-
rorists hope iliat the long.
dI:a1 dIe long-term
term costs gra ter. They w:ant
COSts will be much grater. want to creare fear
Fear
and uncertainty
uncertain!}' far beyond me viclims victims and those dose ({ O0 Ihem.
them. They want their
enemy 10 to spend time :and and money on securi!)'.
security. In effect ., the lefforists
terrorists :aim
aim to lay an
cnormous lax
enormous tax on every :aspect
aspect of the enemy's society, :aa t2X that It:I.flsfefS
tax mat transfers resources
from product pu rposes [to0 anti-productive security
p roduct ive purposes measu rcs.
securi!}' me:asu res. The COS tS of
COStS of
increased security are
incre:ased securi!}' arc likely to be particularly high fo r a country like Ihe the United
States.
States, where an open sociery society is the found ation of ~onomi c succc$s and a high-
tech military.
[ech
The United States already paying enormous t2Xes
S[:ates is :a.lready taxes of this kind. Billions more
doU
do Uars
m arc2lC going to the FBI , the CIA, C IA. the Pentagon, dIethe National
Nuiona.l Securiry Agency.
Security Agency,
and
2nd :aa new bureaucracy fo r the director homeland securi!}'.
di rcctor of homel2J1d security. Billions arc going to
bailout theme airlines. to increase the number and 2nd quality airpon securi!}'
quali!}' of airport security person-
nel, 10
to pay methe N:ational
National Guard
G U21d stationed at :airpons.
s[uioned :at airports. The COSts to business
busi ness aaivity
aClivi!},
are perhaps even greater. Long lines :1.( airpon: security and fear of air travel
navel cur
business travel and holiday travel. Hotel bookings are down,
down , urban restaurant busi-
ness is down, all kinds of lOurist businesses are down. Long lines of trucks at the
MeriClln borders are slowed for more intensive searches, and the
Canadian and Merion
delays necessarily contribute to the COSt of goods transported. The Coast Guard
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service focus on terrorism and decrease
attention 10 the drug trade. I venture to guess that the costs
COSts of increased security
and the war on terrorism will farfa r OU(fun the costs of losses at the World Trade
Center and the reparations to survivors of those who died there.
and freedoms
frec:doms of ordinary Americans. No doubt fewer would say so in the after-
math of the recent atuclu, ad2ge that "war is the health
atDcIu. a shift consistent with the acl2ge
of the state.n But
Bu[ if more security could ensure:
ensure [he
the safety of the nation.
nation, the Soviet
Union would still be: with us. It is possible mat bin Laden had the Soviet Union in
mind in an interview broadcast by CNN. "Osama bin Laden tOld a reporrer reponer with
the AI Jazeera network in Octobe:r that 'freedom and human rights in America are
doomed' and that the U.S. government would lead itS people and the West ' imo into
an un bearable hell and a choking life'" (KurtZ,
(Kuru, 2002).
for recruits. The terrorists hope that a clumsy and overgeneralized strike againsl
them will hit some of those in the pyramid below them. The blow will enlarge
their base of sympathy, tum the sympathetic
sym pathetic bUi un mobilized to action and sacri-
fice, and strengthen their own status as leaders al the apex of this pyramid.
AI-Qaeda had reason to be hopeful hopeful that U.S. strength could help them. In
1986, for instance, the United States attempted 10 10 reply to Libyan-supported ter-
rorism by bombing Libya's leader, Muammar Qaddafi. The T he bombs missed Qad-
dafi's
dafi 's residence but hit a nearby apaHmenr
apaHmem building and killed a number of women
children. This mistake was downplayed in the United States but it was a pub.-
and children.
lic relations
rclations success for anti-U.S. groups across North Africa. In 1998, the United
States attempted to reply to aI-Qaeda attacks on U.S. U.s. embassies in Africa by send-
cmist'. mi s.~i1e.~ against
ing cruise aga inst terrorist camps in Afghanistan and against a supposed
bomb faclOry in KhartoumKhartoum,, Sudan. It II appears now that the ~bo mb faCtory~ was in
fact producing only medical supplies.
A violent response 10 terrorism that is not well aimed is a success for the terror-
ists. The Taliban did their best to play up U.S. bombing mistakes in Afghanistan,
largcly disappointed.
but were largely d isappointed. It appears that civilian casualties resulting from U.S.
attacks
anacks in Afghanistan had by February 2002 added up to somewhere between
1,000 and 3,700 deaths, depending on who is estimating (Bearak, 2002). Although
Afghan civilian losses may thus approach the 3,000 U.S. victims of September II ,
clear that U.S. accuracy has betn
it is elear bew oUlStanding by the standards of modern war-
f.ue. Al-Qaeda might still hope to profit by perceptions of a crusade against Mus-
fue.
lims if the United States extends the war on terrorism to Iraq, Iran, or Somalia.
Cohesion
CohesioD After September II : ReJac..ioru
ReJatioru iniD Public
News repom immediately after September II I I suggested a new interpersonal
interpersonal
tone in New York City. C ity. Along with shock and fear was a new lOne in public inter-
actions of strangers.
stra ngers. a tone ofo f increased po liteness, helpfulness. and personal
warm th. Several reporu
warmth. repom suggested a notable
nouble ddrop
rop in crime:.
crime. especiaJly violent crime.
crime:.
in the days after the anacks.
It would be interesting to know if these reports can be substantiated with more
objective measures or social behavio r in public places (McCauley, Coleman, &
DeFusco, 1978). Did the pace oflife in New York slow after the attacks? auacks ~ That is.
did people walk slower on me su ters? Did
streets? e:ye contact between strangers increase?
D id eye
Did commerciaJ transactions (e.g.• with ponal clerks, supermarket
wirh bus drivers, postal
cashie:rs) indude
cashiers) include more personaJ exchange? Did interpersonaJ distance distance: in interac-
tions of Strangers decrease? This research will be hampered by the absence of rele-
nrange:rs de:cre:ase?
vant measures fro fromm New York in Ihe months before Seprember II I I,. but it may nO[
not
be tOO late to chart a decline
de:dine from levels of public sociability
sociabil ity and polile:ness
politeness that
still have been elevated in early 2002.
may sdll
Cohesion After September 11: Minoriry Identiry Shifts
A few reports have suggested that minority groups experienced major changes of
group identity after September II. Group identity is composed of twO partS: pri-
vate and public identity. Private identity is how the individual thinks of him- or
herself in relation to groups to which the individual belongs. Public identity is how
the individual thi nks others perceive him.
hhlic Identity
IJentity Shift for Africll"
Africlln AmericAns
The attacks of September 11 may also have produced an effect on the public
identity of African Americans.
Americans. Their sharing in the costs and threats of terrorist
au ack may have strengthened their public Slams
an stams as Americans.
Americans. Several African
Americans have suggested that the distancing and unease they often feel from fro m
whites with whom they interact was markedly diminished after September 11 . The
extent and distribution of this feeling of incrased acceptance by white Americans
could be investigated in interviews with African Americans. Again, the distinction
between personal experience and perception of group experience could be impor-
tant in estimadng the political impact of September lion li on African Americans.
Finally, there is an issue of great practical importance in understanding the pub-
lic identity of Muslim African Americans as a minority within a minority. This
group is likely to have faced conflicting changes after September II , with increased
acceptance as African Americans opposed by decreased acceptance as Muslims. Muslims. The
distinctive attire of African American Muslims, particularly the attireanire of women of
this community, makes them readily identifiable in public settings.
settings. With the attire
goes a community lifestyle that also sets this minority apart from other African
Americans. Thus
T hus public reactions to Muslim African Americans should be very
salient in their experience, and this experience could be determined by researchers
with entree to their community. Again, the distinction between personal experi-
respo ndent and perceived group experience may be important.
ence of the respondent
One
O ne way of learning about shifts in the public identities of minorities is to study
changes in the mutual stereotyping of majority and minority. Stereotypes are today
understood as perceptions of probabilistic differences
generally undemood diffe rences between groups,
differences that may include personality traits, abilities, occupations.
occupations, physique,
clothing, and preferences (McCauley, Jussim , & Lee, 1995).
clothing, 1995). T Thus,
hus, researchers
might ask both minority and majority group members about abom whether and how
September II changed their perceptions of the differences between berween majority and
minority.
Perhaps even more important for understanding the public identity of minori-
ties would be research that asks about mnasurtorypes.
mnasurtotypn. MetaStereorypes are percep-
tions of what "most people~ believe about group differences. Although they are lit- li[-
tie studied, there is some evidence that metastereotypes are more extreme than per-
tle
sonal stereotypes, that is, that individuals believe that most people see stronger
PIJChoiogic41luueJ in UnJuJunJing
Pl]fhQiQgi€"iiuueJ UndnJunding Tn'NIrism
Tn-rorism and
anJ the Retponu to T","orimr 25
ingroup-outgroup differences than thlJ' do (Rem_ ow, Billman, & Davis, 1993) . T
The
he
public identity of the minority might thus be measured as the average minority
individual's perception of what "most people~ in the majority group see as the dif-
fuences berween minori[)-· and majority. ReI:tled
Related metastereotypes might also be of
interest: [he
the average minority individual's perception
percept ion of what most minority mem-
bers believe about majority-m inority differences, the average majority member's
majority- minority
perception of what most majority members
perccption members believe about these differences, and the
average.: majority member's perception of what most minority members membe rs believe
about these ditferences.
The attacks of September 11 and their aftermath offer a natural experiment in
conflicting pressures on public identity.
idcntity. Research
Rescarch on public identitieS of minorities
could enliven
enliveo theorctical
theoretical development
dcvclo pment even as the research con
contributes
tributes to gauging
the potential for terrorist recru itment in groups-Muslim Arabs in the United
States. Musl im Africao
African Americans-that security services arc likely to see as being
at firisk
:It sk tor terrorist sympathies. In panicular, public identity shifts for Muslim
African Americans will be bener better understood
undersrood by comparison with whatever shifts
shifts
may obtain for African Americans who arc oor not Muslim.
ro the group that comes from £wo kinds of interdependence. The obvious kind of
interdependence arises from common goals of material interest, statuS, status, and conge-
niality. The hidden interdependence arises from the need for certainty that can
niality.
only be obtained from the consensus of others. Agreement with those around us is
the only source of certainty about questions of value, including questions about abo ut
good and evil and about what is worth living for, for, working fo r, and dying for.for.
h seems possible that identification with large and faceless groups is analogous
to cohesion in small face-co-face
face-to-face groups (McCauley, 2001 2001;; McCauley, in press-a).
A suled-up theory of cohesion leads immediately to the implication that grou groupp
identification is not one thing but a number of related things. Research has shown
that differen
differentt sources of cohesion lead to different kinds of behavior.behavior. C Cohesion
ohesion
based on congeniality, for instance, leads to groupthink.
groupthink, whereas cohesion based on
group status or material interest does not lead to groupthink (McCauley, 1998b).
Similarl y, different sources of ethnic identification may lead to different behav-
Similarly.
iors. Individuals who care about their ethnic group for status or material interest
may be less likely to sacrifice for the group than individuals who care abo about
ut their
group for its social reality value-for the moral culture that makes sense of the
world and the individual 's place in it. Research on the effects of September li on
group identities might try to link different measures of group identification with
different behaviors after September II: giving blood or money. money, community volun-
tct:r
teer work, revising a will, changing travel plans.
plans, spending more time with family. family.
The distinctions be£ween patriotism and nationalism.
nationalism, and be£ween constructive
and blind patriotism,
patriotism. as cited above, are steps in this di
direction.
rection.
Group dynamics research has shown that shared threat is a particularly potent
source of group cohesion; similarly, as discussed above,above. the threat represented by
the September II attacks seems to have raised U.S. U.S. patriotism and national identi-
fication. Research also shows that high cohesion leads ro accepting group norms, norms.
respect for
fo r group leaders, and pressure on deviates (Duckiu, 1989). 1989). Similarly, U.S.
response
respo nse ro the September II attacks seems to have included new respect for group
norms (less crime, more politeness), new respect for group It:adersIt.-aders (President Bush,
Mayor G iuliani), and new willingness to sanction deviates (hostility toward those
who sympathize with Arabs and Muslims; see sec Knowlton
Knowlton,, 2002) .
CONCLUSION
In the first
fi rst part of this paper.
paper, group dynamics theory was the perspective brought
to bear in understanding the power of cause .md comrades in moving normal peo-
ple to terrorism.
terro rism. In particular I suggested that the power of a group to elicit sacri-
fice
fice depends upon its terror-management val value.
ue, which is another way of tallcing
about the social reali
reality
ty value of the group.
G roup dynamics research and the psychology of cohesion also provide a useful
Group
starting point foforr theorizing about [he origins and consequences of group identifi-
cation, including many aspectS of public reaction [Q to terrorism. T
Terrorism
errorism is a threat
to all who idemify with the group ra rgcted.rgeted. and at least the initial
initial result of
or an
attack is lllways
lways increased ididentifica tion-increased
ent ificati co hesion- in the group
on-increased cohesion-in grou p
:It(:I.cked. T he no
:Itl:l.cked . The n-obvious qual
non-obvious iry or
qualiry of this idea is conveyed by the many unsucc("Ss-
fu
rull anemplS to use ai r power 10 demoralize
demoraliz.e an enemy by bombing its civilian popu-
lation (Pape, 1996).
In sum. 1 I have argued that both origins and effeclS
eFreelS of terrorist acts
aCtS are anchored
in group dy namics. Along the way I have tried to suggest how the response to ttef-
dynamics. ef-
REFERENCES
riley: TOUl{lrd
TOUJ{lrd IIpp"dllting gro up diffirl'nm
dijJmnm (pp. 293-3 12). Washingto W ashington, n. DC: APA Books.
Mym, D. G. (200 1). Do we fear far the the: right things~ Amffltlln PS]f"'loxitlll Socitty Oh1nwr.
Ammclln Ps]chologicill Obstrwr.
14,3,3
/4",3.3 1.
Papt, R. A. (1996). &mhing to win: AiT Air poUMTlfnd ('onn'on WIlT. Ithaca; Cornell Universi-
l'onrion in WIl'.
ty Preu.
PfC$S.
Pfdferbaum, B B.,.• Flynn, B. W W.,.• Brandt.
Brandt, E. N Lc:nsgraf, S. J. (1999). Organiring the men-
N.,.• &: Lc:nsgraf.
w halth
ta! health response: 10 human-c:a1U«l
human-clllUcd community dis:,lSlersdiS-lSters with refe~nee 10 the Okla-
homa City bombing. PsythiAt11l'PsythiAt11l'Anfl4l/s,
An_is, 29. 109-113.
Pynanski, T ., Grttnbc:rg. J., j., &: Solomon, S. (1997).
( 1997). Why do we need nero Whal n~? A tcr-
what we nc:cd? ter·
ror management ~rspe,tive
~rspeetive on ,he the fOOtS
roots of human sodal soda! mot ivation. Psy(hOU,git'AI
Inquiry.
/nquiry.8, 8, 1- 20.
Reltcw, D. c., Billman.
Rencw, Billman, D., &: Davis, R. A. (1993). inaccu Inaccu raTe perceptions of the amount
others stereotype: EstimaTes about stereotypes nereorype5 of one's own group and other groups.
&.sir And Applird &ciA' PIJCMf4tJ, /4, 121 - 142.
&uit'AnJApplird5«iAIPsyrki4tJ,
Rummd, R. J. j . (1996). DrAlh by goWl'Tlmmt.
( 1996). lkAlh gowrnm",'. Ncw Brunswick, Nj: NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Sabini, J. (1995). SMa! p1]thDf4tJ
Sabini, p1]thDi4tJ (2nd ed.). New York. York, Norton.
SchaD., R. T..T., St:lub,
St:lub. EE.,.• &: Lavine,
Lavine. H. (1999). On the varieties of national ana,hmenl! attachment!
Blind versus conmuctive patriotism. Politit'A! Politit'a! PrychDl4gy, 20, 151-15 1- 174.
Sengupta, S. (2001
Sengupta. (2001,, October 10). Sept. altac:k narrows the racial divide. N~
Sepe II anac:k Nrw Yo,k
York Timn,
p. BI.
Sidanius, J., &: PC'ltocik,
Pwocik, J. R. (2001). Communal and national identity in a mulriethnk mulricthnic
stale: A COmp;ati50n of ,hrtt
Stale: thrtt pc-npectives.
pe-npectives. in In R. D . Ashmore, L Jussim,juuim, &: D. Wilder
(Ecis.), &ciAI iJnItity, i"'rrgro~p
5«iAI idmtity, i"'trgTO~p ((Injlin, And amflia "d",aiM
conjlicr. and ndurtiM (pp. 101-129). New York:
Chford
Oxford University Press.
Sprinz.ak, E. ((1991).
Sprinz.ak. 1991). The process of delc:gitimiution;
delc:gitimiz;uion; Towards a linbge linkage theory of political
McCaul()' (Ed.l, TrrTOrism
terrorism. In C. Mr£aulc:y ~rism rtuArl'h AM puhlit' pDfif]
,maTCh 111111 polif] (pp. 50-68). lon-
don; Frank Cas5.
Stouffer, S. A..
A.• Lumsdaine, lumsdaine, M. H ..., et aI. (1949). Thr
Lumsdaine. A. A., lumsclaine, 1"hr Amm('lfn
Amm(lfn lC(Ji".
MJ(Jirr.
vol"mr 2: UtmlMt
I/O/"ml' And its
ul1nIM, lind il1 llJUmr.th.
afkmulth. Princeton,
Princelon, N}; Prinu!on
PrinCC:lon Universi!}'
University Press.
T versky. A.. & Kahncman, D. (1971). Belief in Ihe the law
Jaw of smaJl /'syfhok>gi(1I1 Bul-
smaJ l numbc:rs. /'syfhok>gi(1l18ul-
kh''', 2, 105-110.