1.
) ATIENZA V BOARD OF MEDICINE
G.R. No. 177407 | February 9, 2011 | J. Nachura
Facts:
1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to
Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr.
Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic
laboratory tests. She underwent kidney operation after the tests
revealed that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing.
3. Private respondent’s husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint
for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine
for the removal of Editha’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the
left, against the doctors who allegedly participated in the kidney
operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr.
Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal
offer of documentary evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies
of X-Ray request forms where interpretation of the ultrasound results
were written, for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated.
5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Editha’s formal offer of
exhibits, alleging that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same
are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated,
intended to establish matters which are hearsay, and incompetent to
prove the purpose for which they are offered.
6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was
admitted by the BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
Order, which was denied on the ground that BOM should first admit
the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value
when it decides the case, and later on determine whether the evidence
is relevant or not.
7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence
Held:
No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of
evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative
bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe
strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence
which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that, “it is the safest policy to be liberal, not
rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them
unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they
are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can
easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.”
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand,
the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not
it proves an issue.
Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits
violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license
is misplaced in light of Section 20, Article I of the Professional
Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure. As pointed out by the
appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to
be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed
under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable
presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in
connection with Editha’s medical case, which contained handwritten
entries interpreting the results of the examination. The fact sought to
be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her “kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time” of her
operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial
notice. These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the
anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys because the position and
removal may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray
of her abdominal area.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also
inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before
the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right
functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney,
not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the
time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through
the exhibits offered in evidence.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the
exhibits, is allowed, especially as one of the witnesses testified that the
Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits
“because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new
building” and ultimately, the originals cannot be produced.
2.) People v. Wagas
G.R. No. 157943; 4 September 2013
Facts:
Alberto Ligaray (Ligaray) transacted business with Gilbert Wagas
(Wagas) in which the latter placed an order of 200 bags of rice over the
telephone. Ligaray released the goods to Wagas and at the same time
received the a check for P200,000 payable to cash. Upon depositing the
said check, the same was dishonoured because of insufficient funds.
Ligaray demanded from Wagas for the payment of the check but the
latter did not pay the former.
Wagas was charged with estafa in an information stating that he issued
a check in the amount of P200,000; however, when the check was
presented for encashment, it was dishonoured because it was “drawn
against insufficient funds.” Despite of notice and several demands upon
Wagas to make good said check, he failed to do so.
On arraignment, Wagas pleaded not guilty. On pre-trial, Wagas
admitted that the check alleged in the information had been
dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Trial ensued and on cross
examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas
because they transacted through telephone only; and he release the 200
bags of rice directly to Robert Cañada (Cañada), the brother-in-law of
Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice. In his
defense, Wagas admitted that he issued the check to Cañada for the
payment of Cañada’s property and denied he had any dealings with
Ligaray. The trial court convicted Wagas of the crime charged against
him. After denial of Wagas’ motion for new trial/ consideration, he
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Did the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of
the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling:
No, the prosecution was not able to establish beyond reasonable doubt
the identity of the perpetrator of the crime.
The prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to
Cañada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and
that the check was dishonoured when resented for payment because of
the insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, in this case,
the prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was
Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check..
First, even after the dishonour of the check, Ligaray expressly admitted
that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was
transacting over the telephone.
Second, the check was payable to case. This type of check was payable
to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need
of an indorsement.
Third, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from
and who delivered the check to him Considering that the records are
bereft of any showing that Cañada was then acting in behalf of Wagas,
the trial court had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that
Cañada had been an agent of Wagas.
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted
with him over the telephone was not reliable because the same should
be authenticated first before it could be received in evidence.
A fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the
onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt. The State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the
correct identification of the author of the crime, and (2) the actuality of
the commission of the offence with the participation of the accused. The
accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his
shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to
prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof
of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no
conviction.
3.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
FACTS: Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his
daughter. Testimonies revealed that the victim was left alone at home
while his father was having drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her
mother decided to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her
mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also went out with
some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his
pants and slid inside the blanket covering the victim and removed her
pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for
help. He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by
threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victim’s brother
arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for
staying out late. The two decided to leave the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house,
victim recounted to her brother what happened to her. They later told
the incident to their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance
of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing
only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which he
obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her
daughter because he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without
counsel admissible in evidence?
RULING: No.
llant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel admissible in evidence?
HELD: Negative.
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups,
as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local
government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific
scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan,"
particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective
insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise
known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as
evidence, it does not warrant the acquittal of the accused. The
appellant’s conviction is upheld because of the strong evidence showing
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Principle: The extrajudicial confession of appellant, which
was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
4.) TATING v. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155208 | 2007-03-27
FACTS: On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her
granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of
sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject
property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the
property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due
thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.However, the
land remained in possession Daniela. On December 28, 1977, Daniela
executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention
of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was
simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to
enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the
purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later
discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the
property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the
subject property reconveyed to her. Daniela died on July 29, 1988
leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos
informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence,
they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over
the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to
settle the case amicably proved futile. Hence, her son filed a complaint
with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
RTC decide in favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected
outright by the lower courts.
RULING: The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA
committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since
Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already
dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on
Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of
sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there
is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust
relationship was created between them. WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.
5.) PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA
FISHING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998
FACTS:
On the morning of September 21, 1977, M/V Maria Efigenia XV
(of the private respondent) was navigating the waters near Fortune
Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when
it collided with the vessel “Petroparcel”, owned at that time by Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).The Board of Marine Inquiry found the
Petroparcel at fault for the collision and based on this and after
unsuccessful demands on petitioner, private respondent sued LSC and
Petroparcel captain Edgardo Doruelo for actual and compensatory
damages.
During the pendency of the proceedings, PNOC Shipping
Transport Corporation acquired ownership of Petroparcel and replaced
LSC in the trial. CFI Caloocan ruled in favor of private respondent,
awarding it: the sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the
fishing boat with interest of 6% per annum; P50,000 attorney’s fees and
the cost of suit. The basis of said amount was the testimony of the
general manager of Maria Efigenia Fishin Corporation, Edilberto del
Rosario and several documentary evidence that included: ownership
certificate, price quotations, and invoices issued at the request of Del
Rosario. CFI ruled that PNOC-STC was unable to contest such evidence
with only the testimony of its senior estimator Lorenzo Lazaro as sole
witness and without any documentary evidence.
On appeal, petitioner questioned the admissibility and
competency of private respondent’s documents as basis for damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the CFI decision ruling that where a
lower court is confronted with evidence which appears to be of doubtful
admissibility, the judge should declare in favorof admissibility rather
than of non-admissibility.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner argued, among other things, that
the documents were not sufficient evidence to support the extent and
actual damages incurred by private respondent. The price
quotationswere not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del
Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the
writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof. CA
argued that the documents were sufficient and exempt from the hearsay
rule as they are part of “commercial lists” defined in sec.45 Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence in so far as they fall under the “or other
published compilation” phrase of the rule.
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so
stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
ISSUE: WON the documents fall under the exception to the hearsay
evidence rule under sec. 45 rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
and would therefore be competent enough to establish the amount of
actual and compensatory damages.
RULING: With respect to the documentary evidence, the SC ruled in
favor of the petitioner PNOC-STC. For actual and compensatory
damages, the injured party is required to prove the actual amount of
loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence available. Damages may not be awarded
on the basis of on the basis of hearsay evidence. The documents
presented by private respondent were regarded as hearsay evidence.
Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the documents as
he was not the author of them. He can only testify as to facts of his
personal knowledge. As such, the price quotations were considered
ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court
should be preferred along with the testimony of the writers thereof. One
of the exemptions to the hearsay evidence rule under Sec.37-47 of Rule
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is “commercial lists”.
However, the quotations do not fall under “other published
compilation” mentioned in the said exemptionas they are not published
in any list, register, periodical, or other compilation. They are also not
standard handbooks or periodicals containing data of everyday
professionals need and relied upon in the work of occupation. They are
merely letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, “where general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
Because of the absence of competent proof of the actual damage
suffered, SC modified the CA decision and awarded the private
respondent nominal damages amounting to P2,000,000.00.