For admelec digest pool [first batch of cases]—digests by Emille Llorente

Compania General de Tabaco v. Public Utility Commission

Case: petition to review order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the PH Islands requiring petitioner to file
detailed report of its finances

Petitioner Compania General De Tobacos de Filipinas—alleges it is a (Spanish) foreign corp in the PH engaged in the
business as common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water.

Respondent Board of Public Utility Commissioners—issued an order to show cause why petitioner should not be
required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances, relying on the authority of this section of Act 2307:

Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein
defined:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Board
may from time to time by order prescribe.

Petitioner denied authority of the board to require such report.

Issue:

- WON the board has authority to require petitioner of said report relying on the provision of Act No 2307
- WON such provision is invalid for constituting an unlawful attempt of the Legislature to delegate legislative
power to the Board

Ruling:

Yes on both. A statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public
utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon
which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing
its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.

Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to it,
what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have
in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the
State.

The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information
the board wants. The Legislature, by said provision, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its
powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute.

In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the
commission shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. The Legislature, by the
provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain
the information which the board wants.
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Agustin v. Edu

Facts:

To reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars, Pres Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 299 which
read that all drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least 1 pair of early warning device
consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors; when a motor vehincle is stalled or
disabled or parked for over 30 mins, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned to be
installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked.

Petitioner Leovillo Agustin—the owner of a Beetle, does not want to install such early warning device as his car is
already equipped with a similar feature. He claims unconstitutionality of LOI 229 and its implementing order No. 1
issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. He says the LOI violated the consti guarantee of due process and the
provisions of police power, while Order No. 1 transgressed the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

He also says it was oppressive because they make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the burden and expense
of car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.

OSG—denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation
of police power to such acts.

The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner,
this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Issue:

WON the LOI is a valid delegation of police power, thus making it constitutional? YES

Ruling:

Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the power of
government inherent in every sovereignty. In Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Also, in Ermita
Malate Hotel, the SC held that the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record in over
throwing the statute.

Petitioner's effort to nullify both the LOI and the IRR is futile considering his failure to lay the necessary factual
foundation to rebut the presumption of validity.

On his claim that the statute was oppressive for being expensive and redundant (as some cars are already equipped with
blinking lights), the Solicitor General was correct in saying that "Such early warning device requirement is not
an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive.

This is because such device, being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions,
and visible even under adverse conditions, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world who
sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device will conclude without thinking that there is a motor vehicle
stationary and it obstructs or endangers passing traffic. While a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned
other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get advance warning.
 For admelec digest pool [first batch of cases]—digests by Emille Llorente

White v. Roughton

Case: G. C. Roughton and W. W. Murrah, doing business under the firm name and style of Roughton-Murrah Company,
instituted this suit, praying for judgment against Mrs. J. L. White, individually and as independent executrix of the estate
of her husband, and against her son J. L. White.

Plaintiffs—alleged that they were real estate agents employed by Mrs. J. L. White to sell or exchange certain lands in
Denton county, Tex.,; that they secured a purchaser who was ready, willing, and able to purchase said lands; that the
contract of sale or exchange was duly executed October 8, 1915, by James Jackson, a party procured by appellees, and
by J. L. White, the son of Mrs. J. L. White;

The said J. L. White (son) represented that he was instructed and authorized by his mother to enter said contract, and
duly authorized to sign the check for $500, which was deposited to guarantee the performance thereof; He (the son)
further represented that he was looking after the business of the estate of his deceased father and acting for his mother
to exchange said land for the Dallas property.

Note: plaintiffs knew that J. L. White (son) did not own the Denton county land and that they were dealing with him in a
representative capacity and not in his individual capacity. Evidence also did not show that under the contract he would receive any
consideration individually.

Plaintiffs relied upon such representations, and they prayed that in the event the representations made by said son J. L.
White were not true, they recover upon his warranty damages in the sum of $500.

The deed to the Dallas property was never tendered to Mrs. J. L. White. Mrs. J. L. White denied the authority of her son
to execute the contract or to sign and deliver the check for $500 in her name.

The court concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover against Mrs. J. L. White in any
capacity, but concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to recover against "J. L. White individually upon the contract sued
upon, $500 being the amount of liquidated damages therein set out, and all costs of suit and judgment is so rendered.”
[note: this is where the lower court erred]

Issue:

WON plaintiffs can claim from J.L. White (the son) individually—No

Ruling:

According to the doctrine announced in Heard v. Clegg, by Connor, C.J., appellant could not recover the liquidated
damages stipulated in the contract against J. L. White. The case states: “The fact that one assumes to act as agent for
another in signing an obligation in the name of such other without authority does not bind the acting agent on a
contract. The damages in such case are measured by the injuries resulting from want of power, and not by the terms of
the contract.”

It does not appear that any evidence was offered by appellees to sustain their right to recover under their alternative
plea against J. L. White. The proposition is urged that since no deed to the Dallas property was ever tendered to Mrs.
White by Jackson or any one for him, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover in any event. It would not be necessary to
show tender of performance to Mrs. White to entitle the plaintiff to recover against J. L. White on his warranty. Any
competent proof that Jackson was ready, willing, and able to consummate the exchange would suffice.
 For admelec digest pool [first batch of cases]—digests by Emille Llorente

Peralta v. Civil Service Commission

Facts

Petitioner Peralta—is appointed Trade- Specialist II in the DTI (before his appointment he worked at a GOCC under the
DA). When he received his first salary, he saw that since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his
salary the amount of his absences, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays.

—questioned the said administrative interpretation.

The Chief of General Administrative Service answered his query explaining—Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A.
No. 2260) which conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, the Commission interpreted provisions of
Republic Act No. 2625 amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy that when an employee who was
on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday,
he is also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday.

Respondent Commission—ruled that a reading of R.A. 2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave
of absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to
payment of his salary for said days.

Issues:

WON the Civil Service Commission’s interpretation is valid and constitutional—NO;

WON it is binding upon the courts—NO.

Ruling:

(1) The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent.
R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to leaves of absence with full
pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays.

The law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have
accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right.
Government employees, regardless if they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on
Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working days. A
different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.

(2) Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may
be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment. When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is
the courts that finally determine what the law means.
 For admelec digest pool [first batch of cases]—digests by Emille Llorente

Legislation, general rule: an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

Exception: as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:

“The actual existence of a statute, prior to determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects.

To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted
salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial
burden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also,
administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective
application.

Respondent Commission is directed to take the appropriate action so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts
previously but unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary as above indicated.
 For admelec digest pool [first batch of cases]—digests by Emille Llorente

Vigan Electric Co. v PSC

Case: original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission.

Facts:

Petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company Inc—granted a franchise to construct and operate electric light, heat and power
plant to generate and distribute the same for sale within several municipalities in Ilocos Sur. They secured from
respondent Public Service Commission a cert of public convenience. Petitioner then entered into contract to purchase
electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation (NPC) for resale to customers in accordance with the
approved rates.

Respondent PSC—five years later, held conference to revise petitioner’s authorized rates. Informed petitioner and
charging them of being in the black market, the sale being anomalous and illegal. Says petitioner commercialized these
privileges which property belong to the people, and the electric meters were installed in bad faith for registering more
than the actual consumption.

PSC issued subsequently a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce before PSC, during a conference
scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain book of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash such subpoena. In May 1962, PSC
issued an order, which after finding that petitioner had an excess of revenues by 18%, lowered the present meter rates
of petitioner.

Petitioner objected to said reduction without a hearing, alleging that its rates could be reduced only if proven by
evidence validly adduced to be excessive; that petitioner offered to introduce evidence to show the reasonableness of
its aforementioned rates

ISSUE: WON notice and hearing is required—YES

RULING:

The determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes the nature of quasi-judicial function and
that, having been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of the due process clause,
and hence, null and void.

Discussion: what respondent PSC (wrongfully) maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rule-
making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice or hearing.

Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates – when such are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the Philippines – may partake of legislative character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Here, the order exclusively applies to petitioner. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact,
whether the petitioner is making a profit more than 12% of its invested capital which is denied by the petitioner.

Thus, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of the said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the
contents thereof and/or explain, and to refute the conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent.

In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character,
the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.
 For admelec digest pool [first batch of cases]—digests by Emille Llorente

Indeed, Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of CA No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing. (SEC. 16. The Commission shall
have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provision of this Act, x x x)