Feature

Cover Story
Report

Design Safer Solids

Processing Plants
This approach defines a Identify
raw materials
Review
MSDS, tech
Assess
hazard
& intermediates datasheets potential
systematic framework START Measure
and points toward relevant
properties

relevant sources in the Preliminary

process
Define operating
conditions /
Assess
severity of
public domain configuration window process hazards

Investigate alternate Identify measures

Shrikant Dhodapkar unit operations, configuration to reduce
and raw materials LO hazard severity
Konanur Manjunath PA
Pradeep Jain No
Process
The Dow Chemical Company Key Issues risk
acceptable?

C
hemicals, plastics, pharmaceuti-
cal, food, agricultural chemicals,
coal and bio-chemical industries
have a wide array of processes
where the raw materials, intermedi-
ates and products are in particulate
form. Hazards associated with par-
ticulate solids are unique, and in most
cases depend on the particle size. The
purpose of this paper is to present a
systematic framework for designing
particulate processes with appropri-
ate pointers towards relevant sources
in the public domain. We hope to raise
safety awareness among chemical en-
gineers dealing with particulate solids.
It is not possible to design and oper-
ate a process safely and reliably unless
the equipment suppliers, design team
and plant personnel are aware of the
potential hazards. Hazard awareness
should include material properties, pro-
cess design and operational issues. The
readers are strongly encouraged to read
relevant references cited in this article.
Background
Through dedicated efforts of the larger
process safety community, a tremen-
dous body of useful technical infor-
mation has been compiled in various
handbooks and publications [1–12].
These guidelines are based on current
state of knowledge and vast industrial
34 Chemical Engineering www.che.com January 2007
• Safety factors & design codes
• Corrosion and erosion allowances
• Specifications - flexibility vs. clarity Yes
• Environmental impact
Design Key Issues
• Energy efficiency
• Testing and inspection
• Proper
installation
• OSHA standards
Installation
of process
• EPA regulations • Testing and
• Management of change inspection
• Employee training & documentation • Guidelines
• Preventive maintenance vs. Operation &
for on-site
fabrication
predictive maintenance maintenance
Figure 1. Overall systematic approach for safer design
experience in handling and processing • Material (particulate) related
particulate materials. • Mechanical — rotating equipment,
A flowchart has been developed to pinch points
guide the reader through the process • Thermal — potential of burns
(Figure 1). Each step is discussed in • Environmental — noise, dustiness,
the supporting text. The overall design pollution or waste streams
process is an iterative process. Hazards During handling, manufacturing,
due to the material and due to the pro- storage and transport of particulate
cess must be considered independently solids, four generic chemical hazards
and then jointly to assess the risk. related to material properties can be
What makes solids or particulate identified:
processes challenging is the lack of ge- • Combustibility or flammability
neric databases of material properties. • Reactivity
Most of the properties have to be mea- • Toxicity
sured in the laboratory. Determination • Instability
of suitable tests and understanding the An in-depth discussion of these haz-
limitation of the test result is critical. ards can be found in the National Fire
Protection Association’s NFPA 704,
Assess hazard potential NFPA 654 and various publications
The hazards associated with particu- from the Center for Chemical Process
late process can be broadly catego- Safety (CCPS). Many important con-
rized per the following: cepts and issues are addressed here.

34-39 CHE 1-07.indd 34 12/26/06 5:22:55 PM


Fuel Ignition
Dispersion Confinement
Oxygen
Figure 2. These conditions must be
present for an explosion to occur
Table 1. Measured Properties of Combustible Dust
Property Definition
KSt Dust deflagration index
Pmax Maximum explosion
overpressure generated
in the test chamber
(dp/dt)max Maximum rate of pres-
sure rise
MIE Minimum ignition energy
MEC Minimum explosible
concentration
LOC Limiting oxygen concen-
tration
ECT Electrostatic charging
tendency
A two-step approach to assess-
ment of particulate hazards is recom-
mended. A preliminary assessment is
based on NFPA 704 rating, UN guide-
lines and material safety data sheets
(MSDSs). The final assessment must
include laboratory data and larger
scale testing.
Combustibility or flammability.
Information on combustibility is often
lacking in MSDSs. Even when the
data are reported, failure to report
test method and material-specific in-
formation (such as, moisture, particle
size distribution) makes the data un-
usable. Some guidance can be found in
Flammability Rating as described in
NFPA 704.
Handbooks written by Eckhoff [2],
Barknecht [4] and Babrauskas [5]
are excellent sources for ignition and
combustibility of wide variety of ma-
terials.
According to NFPA 654, combustible
dust is a combustible particulate solid
that presents a fire and deflagration
hazard when suspended in air or some
other oxidizing medium over a range
of concentration, regardless of par-
ticle size or shape. Dusts traditionally
have been defined as materials 420
34-39 CHE 1-07.indd 35
Others
26%
Mixers/
blenders 4%
Dryers
9%
Conveying
systems
10%
ASTM Test Application
Method
ASTM E Measures the relative explosion
1226 severity compared to other dusts
ASTM E Used to design enclosures and
1226 predict the severity of the conse-
quence
ASTM E Predicts the violence of an explo-
1226 sion. Used to calculate KSt
ASTM E Predicts the ease and likelihood
2019 of ignition of a dispersed dust
cloud
ASTM E Measures the minimum amount
1515 of dust, dispersed in air, required
to spread an explosion. Analo-
gous to LFL for gas air mixture
ASTM stan- Determines the least amount of
dard under oxygen required for explosion
develop- propagation through the dust
ment cloud
No ASTM Predicts the likelihood of the ma-
standard terial to develop and discharge
sufficient static electricity to ignite
a dispersed dust cloud
microns or smaller (capable of passing
through a U.S. No. 40 standard sieve).
The exceptions are fibers with high
aspect ratio and agglomerates of fine
particles formed by electrostatic at-
traction.
Combustible particulate solids, on
the other hand, include fines, chips,
chunks, flakes, fibers and mixtures of
these. Upon handling, these can attrit
and generate combustible dust.
A deflagration is propagation of a
combustion zone at a velocity that is
less than the speed of sound in the un-
reacted medium, whereas explosion is
bursting or rupture of an enclosure or
a container due to the development of
internal pressure from a deflagration.
For a dust explosion to occur, the fol-
lowing requirements must be met:
• Fuel — The dust must be combus-
tible
• Oxygen and dispersion —Dust must
be dispersed in air or an oxidant at
or exceeding minimum explosible
concentration (MEC)
• Process confinement
• Ignition source with sufficient en-
ergy (such as an electric spark, elec-
trostatic discharge, flame, hot sur-
face or glowing embers)
Chemical Engineering www.che.com January 2007
Dust collector
26%
Grinders /
pulverizers
13%
Silos /bunkers
12%
Figure 3. Equipment involved in dust
explosions in the U.S. (1975-2001), U.K.
(1979-1988) and Germany (1965-1985) [1]
These requirements are pictorially
represented by the dust explosion
pentagon (Figure 2). Two additional
requirements (dispersion and confine-
ment) have been added to the well-
established “fire triangle”. In the ab-
sence of these, fire or deflagration can
still occur.
Historical data (Figure 3) show that
the probability of dust explosion can
be varied, depending on the unit op-
eration. While explosions in dust col-
lectors are the most common, other
process units should also be designed
with particulate safety in mind. To de-
termine potential of deflagration of a
combustible dust, one must use actual
test data. Depending on the process
and operating conditions, some or all
of the following tests may be used:
1. Particle size distribution
2. Moisture content (as received)
3. Electrical volume resistivity
4. Charge relaxation time
5. Chargeability
6. Minimum ignition energy (MIE)
7. Minimum explosible concentration
(MEC)
8. Limiting oxidant concentration
(LOC) to prevent ignition
9. Maximum explosion pressure at
optimum concentration
10. Maximum rate of pressure rise at
optimum concentration
11. KSt (normalized rate of pressure
rise)
12. Dust cloud ignition temperature
13. Layer ignition temperature
These properties should be measured
according to ASTM standards (see Table
1). In addition, a number of consensus
and other government standards have
been prepared and universally prac-
ticed in the industry (Table 2).
Reactivity. Preliminary evaluation of
reactivity hazards can be done from
MSDSs and chemical incompatibility
charts provided by NOAA/EPA Chem-
ical Reactivity Worksheet. There are
specific NFPA guidelines for various
materials. Bretherick’s Handbook [8]
35
12/26/06 5:23:22 PM

Cover Story
and CCPS Guidelines [1, 9] on reac-
tivity hazard evaluation are excellent
resources. Other resources are listed
in Table 3.
Toxicity. Inhalation of fine particles
(typically 0.2 to 7 µm [1]) poses respi-
ratory hazard since the particles can
get lodged in the lungs. Other poten-
tial hazards include ingestion, dermal
contact and eye contact. It is also im-
portant to evaluate the carcinogenic-
ity and allergenic properties of partic-
ulate solids. Relevant parameters are
summarized in Table 4.
Instability. Instability refers to ma-
terial’s susceptibility to release energy
either through decomposition or po-
lymerization. NFPA 704 provides clas-
sification 0 to 4 in increasing order of
instability hazard. Many U.S.-based
companies include this information in
the MSDSs. Methods for measuring in-
stability are described in Table 5.
Measure relevant properties
Particulate hazards are related to par-
ticle size, size distribution, dispersion,
moisture content and chemical na-
ture. All the generic hazards stated
earlier (combustibility, reactivity,
instability and toxicity) increase
with decreasing particle size.
Unlike liquids, where general con-
clusions can be drawn from published
data, for particulate solids one must
generate material specific data. The
following parameters are important in
this context:
• Particle size and size distribution
• Shape
• Specific surface area
• Bulk Density
• Fluidization characteristics
• Dispersibility
• Abrasiveness
• Friability and hardness
• Moisture content
• Electrical volume resistivity
Common methods for measurement
of these parameters are shown in
Table 6.
Define the operating window
One must consider not only steady state
conditions but also include startup,
shutdown and transgression scenarios
in defining the operating window. Per-
form sensitivity analysis on control
variables to estimate the variability
36 Chemical Engineering www.che.com January 2007
34-39 CHE 1-07.indd 36
Table 2. Relevant NFPA Standards For Combustible Dusts
Standard Title Coverage or Purpose
NFPA 61 Standard for the Prevention of Fires Applies to facilities that receive, dry,
and Dust Explosions in Agricultural handle, process, blend, use, mill, package,
and Food Processing Facilities store, or ship bulk dry agricultural material;
their products or dusts; or facilities that
handle or manufacture starch, or facilities
that handle and process oil seed
NFPA 68 Guidelines for Deflagration Venting Provides technical guidance on designing,
sizing, installing, and maintaining deflagra-
tion vents
NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion Prevention Addresses the design of explosion preven-
Systems tion, protection, and mitigation systems
NFPA 654 Applies to the manufacturing, It covers all combustible dusts, except those
processing, blending, conveying, specifically addressed in other NFPA stan-
repackaging, and handling of dards, and is one of the most cited docu-
combustible particulate solids and ments for control measures for combustible
their dusts dust hazards (OSHA, 2005; CCPS, 2005)
NFPA 70 The National Electric Code — 2005 Addresses electrical equipment and wiring
requirements for special situations, includ-
ing those in which an explosive atmo-
sphere may exist. Defines combustible-dust
classified locations
NFPA 499 Recommended Practice for the Provides guidance for classifying dust pro-
Classification of Combustible cessing locations for electrical equipment
Dusts and Hazardous (Classified) installation
Locations for Electrical Installa-
tions in Chemical Process Areas
NFPA 655 Standard for the Prevention of Sul- Discusses facilities that handle, grind, pro-
fur Fires and Explosions cess, pulverize, or crush elemental sulfur
NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires Discusses facilities that process or manu-
and Explosions in Wood Processing facture wood and wood products, or that
and Woodworking Facilities create wood dust and particles
Table 3. Resources for Chemical Reactivity and Compatibility
EPA/NOAA Reactivity The EPA/NOAA Reactivity Worksheet defines 47 chemical group-
Worksheet Reactivity ings for reactivity hazard considerations. Representative group-
Groupings ings and combinations of groupings are shown in Table 2-10 of
Ref [1]
Coast Guard Chemical This chart has 22 primary reactive groupings, and another 14
Compatibility Chart groups that may potentially react with some of the primary
groups. An X in a particular cell of the chart indicates that the
corresponding combination of groupings should be avoided be-
cause of reactivity problems
Chemical-Specific Com- These are matrices that provide summary descriptions or hazard
patibility Charts ratings for pairs of specific chemicals, as opposed to chemical
groupings. The hazards of the individual materials are indicated
in the cells along the diagonal, while the hazards of binary com-
binations are indicated in the cells below the diagonal
in operating conditions. Consider situ- investigation. This is an excellent tool
ations corresponding to emergency to get inexperienced team members
shut-down and loss of utilities (electric familiarized with the process.
power, steam, water and nitrogen). Relative ranking: It is a strategy for
comparing and ranking the attributes
Assess severity of various process options to deter-
of process hazards mine whether they warrant further
A detail analysis and how-to guide investigation.
can be found in the CCPS publication Preliminary hazard evaluation:
“Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation It focuses on the hazardous materials
Procedures — Second Edition” [9]. A and major process areas in the plant.
brief snapshot of various available ap- It covers raw materials, intermediates
proaches is listed below. and final products, plant equipment,
Safety review: This is intended to operating conditions, operational pro-
identify plant conditions or operating cedures and facility layout.
procedures that could lead to signifi- What-if analysis: It is a brainstorm-
cant property damage, injury or envi- ing (hence relatively unstructured)
ronmental impact. This is also known approach where a group of experience
as Process Safety Review, Design Re- subject matter experts generate list of
view or Loss Prevention Review. questions and discuss about possible
Checklists: Provide a written list of undesired and unintended vents.
items or procedural steps written by a What-if/checklist analysis: This ap-
group of experienced experts drawing proach combines the systematic ap-
upon information from various codes proach of checklists with rather un-
and standards. The level of detail can structured approach of brainstorming.
vary depending on the process under Hazard and operability analysis
12/26/06 5:23:49 PM
 Table 4. Summary of Toxicity Parameters [1]
Property Governing body Amount
Threshold Limit Value American Conference of Maximum exposure concentration
(TLV) Government Industrial Hy- recommended
gienists (ACGIH)
Permissible Exposure OSHA Maximum permissible exposure limit
Limit (PEL) for systemic workplace 8-hour time-
weighted average exposures
Immediately Danger- Concentration that poses a threat of procedural and computer driven
ous to Life and Health either death, adverse health effects, • Hazard analysis of each unit opera-
(IDLH) or inability to escape danger without
respiratory protective equipment.
tion and interconnect unit opera-
Short Term Exposure American Conference of Limiting exposure concentration for tions where applicable
Limit (STEL) Government Industrial Hy- exposure durations up to 15 minutes, • Methodology to handle equipment
gienists (ACGIH)
failure or loss of utilities (steam, ni-
trogen, water and electric power)
Table 5. Methods to Measure Instability • Industrial hygiene and occupational
of Particulate Materials safety requirements
Parameter Standard Procedure Application • Analysis of environmental impact of
Differential ASTM Open-top double cham- In the case of
Mackey test ber for test sample and particulate ma-
the process
inert sample with a 10 g terials prone to Refer to the detailed check list pre-
of sample for up to 72 hrs self-heating and sented in CCPS publication [Table 7-1;
Self-accelerating BAM SADT 0.5 liter Dewar in oven possible spontane-
decomposition with 400 ml of sample ous ignition, in unit 1] for process hazard analysis for sol-
temperature size for 168 hrs operations such as ids processes. It should be noted that
Relative selfigni- VDI 2263 Grewer oven with pre- drying at elevated each company has its own guidelines
tion temperature heated air flow with 8 ml temperature, heat-
sample for uptp 5.5 hrs ing, and deposition and exhaustive list of questions to
Coal dust adia- Bureau Mines Adia- Oven with preheated air
of solids on heated evaluate process hazards.
surfaces.
batic heating batic Heating Oven (RI flow with 100 g General tips
8473)
• Take a system-wide approach. Pro-
cesses have interconnected unit op-
Table 6. Summary of Relevant Standards for erations. Sudden change in process
Material Property Standardized Measurement Methods conditions can have a dominoes ef-
Particle size and size distribution Sampling & Size Analysis (NIST SP-960); Sieving
(ASTM D-1921-96); Electrozone method (ASTM
fect in an interconnected system.
F577); • It is important to perform sensitivity
Bulk Density, Fluidity and Dispersity Carr Indices (ASTM D6393) analysis on the basic assumptions of
Moisture Content See Iinoya et al. [11] process parameters to ensure that
Hardness and Friability Hardness (ASTM E140), Fracture toughness
(ASTM E1820), Vicker’s Hardness (ASTM E384)
conclusions are still valid for the en-
Electrical Resistivity IEC 61241-2-2 tire range.
Combustibility See Table 1
Identify measures
(HAZOP): This technique identifies summarized in Figure 4. To prepare to reduce hazard severity
and evaluates safety hazards and po- for process hazard analysis, the follow- Process safety system measures or de-
tential operability problems in a pro- ing information should be gathered: sign solutions can be grouped into the
cess plant. • Material-specific hazard data (such following three categories:
Failure mode and effects analysis as flammability, reactivity, toxicity 1. Inherently safer processes / passive
(FMEA): This approach tabulates the and instability) 2. Active
failure modes of equipment and their • Process and instrumentation dia- 3. Procedural
effects on a system or process. grams and index flowsheets of the Inherently safer processes refer to se-
Fault tree analysis (FT): It is a de- process lection of alternate process conditions
ductive technique which focuses on • Instrumentation: Purpose (diagnos- or materials that are less hazardous. A
one particular event or failure and tics, safety or process control) and common example would be the use of
provides a method for determining list of critical instruments water as a solvent in paint formulation
the causes. • Control logic, including interlock logic as compared to an organic solvent. For
Event tree analysis (ET): This anal- and safety shutdown sequences particulate processes, particles with
ysis considers the responses of safety • Equipment specifications and main- larger particle size can be produced
systems and operators to the event tenance history (if preexisting) through agglomeration. However, the
and determines the potential outcome • Applicable codes, material of con- feasibility of this approach depends on
using a graphical approach. struction, chemical compatibility the chemistry of the process and final
Cause-consequence analysis (CCA): and corrosion tolerances for each application of the product.
It is a blend of fault tree analysis and equipment Other ideas include minimizing
event tree analysis. • Electrical area classification and re- hazardous material in the process,
Human reliability analysis (HRA): quirements designing the process with less severe
It is a systematic evaluation of factors • Steady state operating conditions conditions (temperature and pressure)
that influence the performance of op- and their range for each of the unit and simplifying process configuration.
erators, maintenance staff and other operations Passive systems rely on reducing the
plant personnel. • Effect of deviation of control vari- frequency and consequences of an in-
The applicability of these approaches ables on the system response, along cident through process or equipment
at various stages of a project has been with the response strategy — This is design, and without the use of any ac-
Chemical Engineering www.che.com January 2007 37

34-39 CHE 1-07.indd 37 12/26/06 5:24:16 PM


is
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HA -if c
Ch y re
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W -if
tiv
EA
t
t
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A
ha
ha
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Sa
FT
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Research and development
Conceptual design
Pilot plant operation
Detailed engineering
Construction / start-up
Routine operation
Expansion or modification
Incident investigation
Decommissioning
Rarely used or
inappropriate
Figure 4. Applicability of Hazard Evaluation Techniques [9]
tive device. For instance, a vessel can
be designed to contain the maximum
pressure during a deflagration. These
approaches are most robust amongst
all approaches because they do not re-
quire intervention.
Active safety systems are designed
to monitor a hazard and react to pre-
vent an incident or minimize its conse-
quences. They are also known as Engi-
neering Controls. Safety valves rupture
disks, sprinkler systems, safety inter-
locks, automatic shutdown, process
control system and check valves are
common examples of active systems.
Since their effectiveness depends on
reliable operation, these systems are
often installed with redundancy and
accompanied with a preventive or rou-
tine maintenance program.
Procedural safety measures (ad-
ministrative controls) refer to a set of
instructions that require action from
personnel to avoid an incident or mini-
mize its consequences. The human fac-
tor inherent in this approach makes
it least reliable. Standard operating
procedures (SOP), safety rules, pre-
ventive maintenance, emergency re-
sponse and management of change
are typical examples.
A simple hypothetical process exam-
ple is shown in Figure 5 with a sum-
mary of appropriate process safety mea-
sures listed in Table 7. To determine the
process safety measures, one must first
identify all the failure scenarios for
each unit operation. All the safety mea-
sures associated with each unit opera-
tion should then be listed. Consider the
consequences of each failure scenario
on connected unit operations, and check
if it leads to additional failures.
For example, dust explosion in a
dryer can damage the downstream
38 Chemical Engineering www.che.com January 2007
34-39 CHE 1-07.indd 38
t
g
Solvent
recycle
A
CC
ET
Reactants
A B
Reactor
Commonly Figure 5.
used Example of solids
processing plant with
some typical unit operations
dust collector. Prioritize the measures
by first selecting the most common
passive measures, followed by the ac-
tive measures and then the procedural
measures. One must keep track of
process economics while adding
each layer of protection.
Analyze and assess process risk
For any unit operation involving solids
or a combination of solids with vapors
and liquids, an analysis of risk using
tools such as layer of protection analy-
sis (LOPA) is recommended. A team of
people must be in place to carry out
LOPA, representing the facility, pro-
cess safety and the unit operation.
In order to identify the potential for
risk, the team must understand the
process and be familiar with the op-
erating conditions so that a potential
scenario can be identified. There may
be several such potential scenarios for
a given unit operation and the team
must focus on each of these scenarios
and provide independent, auditable
and measurable layers of protection
[12]. The independent layer is required
for a particular scenario and does not
depend on other scenarios. Its effec-
tiveness must be focused on stopping
the scenario, and in order to do so a
measurement layer must be in place.
LOPA is very effective in analyzing
the situation and designing a safer
plant. In order to conduct LOPA, fol-
lowing information is essential:
• Data on the four generic chemical
hazards (reactivity, flammability,
toxicity and instability
• Knowledge of various unit opera-
tions
• Knowledge of plant problems
• Knowledge to fix and troubleshoot
problems
Cyclone
Dust
collector Silo
Solid-liquid
separation
Dryer
Additives
Mixer
FIBC
Pneumatic
conveying
Engineering to minimize risk
Various engineering approaches are
possible to minimize risk in a process:
• Process equipment design (use pas-
sive measures)
• Select alternate unit operations
• Optimize process configuration or
sequence
• Use different chemistry or route
• Select less severe process conditions
• Use raw materials and intermediate
which are less hazardous
Process design
It is recommended that the following
issues be included while evaluating
design options:
• Noise generation (especially for air
movers)
• Energy efficiency (especially for
dryers)
• Capital intensity (capital invest-
ment / production rate)
• Process layout (minimize material
transfer distances and use gravity
whenever possible)
• Waste stream management
• Environmental impact of the process
While writing equipment specifica-
tion, one must pay close attention
to the code requirements in country
where the process will be installed.
Instrumentation: Identify critical
instruments and provide redundancy
or have an on-line spare. Include suf-
ficient instrumentation to aid process
diagnostics.
Any process design change must un-
dergo full review to understand unin-
tended consequences.
Installation
Make sure that delivered equipment
is inspected and tested.
Provide detailed guidelines for on-
12/26/06 5:24:56 PM
 Table 7. Summary of Typical Process Safety Measures
for The Hypothetical Process (Figure 5)
Unit Preventive Measure for Process Safety /
Potential Failure Design Solutions
Operation Scenario / Inherently Safe / Active Procedural
Process Hazard Passive
Reactor Explosive concen-
Design reactor to con- Vent the defla- Ground and
tration in head-
tain pressure; Con- gration; Inerting bond all conduc-
space sider non-flammable or purging tors and person-
solvent and reactants nel Authors
Solid-Liquid Mechanical spark Select design with no Relief valve; Fire Preventive main- Shrikant V. Dhodapkar is a
Separator in rotating equip- moving parts; Design suppression sys- tenance; Monitor technical leader in the Process
ment with flam- to contain the pres- tem; Inerting or vibrations Fundamentals Group at The
Dow Chemical Co. (B-4810, Dow
mable solvent sure; Non-flammable purging Chemical, Freeport, TX 77541;
solvent Phone: 979-238-7940; Fax: 979-
Filter plugging Design to contain Relief valve Frequent clean- 238-7463; E-mail: sdhodapkar
resulting in over- pressure; Select ing cycle @dow.com). He received his
pressure proper filter media B.Tech. in Chemical Engineer-
ing from I.I.T-Delhi (India) and
Dryer Combustible Design dryer to mini- Inerting or purg-Periodic inspec- his M.S.Ch.E. and Ph.D. from
dust buildup mize build up; Reduce ing; Venting def-tion and clean- the University of Pittsburgh.
in dryer residence time; Con- lagration; Auto- ing; Emergency During the past 18 years, he has published numer-
tain overpressure; Per- matic isolationresponse proce- ous papers in particle technology and contributed
manent bonding and dures; Manual chapters to several handbooks. He has extensive
grounding activation of fire industrial experience in powder characterization,
fighting fluidization, pneumatic conveying, silo design, gas-
solid separation, mixing, coating and the design of
Dust Col- Combustible fines Design to contain def- Venting deflagra- Frequent back- solids processing plants. He is a member of AIChE
lector built-up and un- lagration; tion or suppres- pulsing; Ground and chair of the Particle Technology Forum.
grounded cages Design to minimize sion; Automatic check during Manjunath Konanur is a
and bags dust buildup isolation installation core technology discipline
Mixer Combustible dust Design mixer to Inerting or purg- Operate mixer at leader for solids processing
concentration in contain deflagration ing; Venting low speed at The Dow Chemical Co.
mixer headspace Consider coating deflagration or (APB/1624, Dow Chemical,
Freeport, Tx 77541. Phone:
combustible dust with suppression; Au- 979-238-1501; Fax: 979-238-
inert material tomatic isolation 0688; E-mail: KManjunath@
Cyclone Discharge outlet Provide a secondary Level sensor in — dow.com. Previous to joining
plugged, resulting filter cyclone Dow, he worked in Norway,
in emission with CMR/POSTEC and
Norsk Hydro as a principal
Pneumatic Pipe joints (com- Use flanges instead System shutdown Regular inspec- scientist and group leader for solids processing.
Conveying pression coupling) with pressure tion and main- He received B.E.(Hons.) from the University of
System failure resulting in surge tenance of cou- Mysore (India) in mechanical engineering and
spillage plings Ph.D. in solids processing from the University
Silo Vent plugged re- — Provide pressure- Inspection and of Newcastle, Australia. He has about 20 years
Storage sulting in overpres- vacuum relief maintenance of experience in solids processing focusing on
various aspects of characterization, storage,
sure or vacuum of vent ­­— keep conveying, drying including dust explosion and
clean electrostatics for integrated designs and has con-
FIBC Ungrounded Use Type D FIBC Use self test- Make sure that tributed more than 30 publications.
ing grounding the FIBC is Pradeep Jain is a Sr. Scien-
clamps grounded and tist in the Performance Plas-
bonded (Type C) tics & Chemicals process R&D
at The Dow Chemical Co. (B-
4810, Dow Chemical, Free-
port, TX 77541; Phone:979-
site fabrication (such as welding), con- safety measures (design solutions) 238-2782; Fax:979-238-2347;
struction and testing. and leveraging extensive information Email: pjain@dow.com). He
received his B.Tech. In Chem-
available in the public domain [1–12] ical Engineering with honors
from the Institute of Technol-
Maintenance are essential for designing safer solids ogy, Banaras Hindu Univer-
There are two types of routine main- processing plants.  ■ sity (India) and his M.S.ChE from the University
of New Mexico. Over the past 20 years, he has
tenance: preventive and predictive. Edited by Rebekkah Marshall led the process development for the properiatery
The preventive maintenance schedule olefins polymerization technologies, including
draws upon recommendations from Acknowledgements INSITE* and INFUSE*. He has extensive in-
dustrial experience in reaction kinetics, reactor
the manufacturer, repair history, de- The authors would like to thank Tim design and heat transfer and has designed the
processes that helped launch several new prod-
sign life and mean time between fail- Overton (chief process safety engineer, ucts, including AFFINITY*, ENGAGE*, ELITE*,
ure data. This type of maintenance The Dow Chemical Company, Free- VERSIFY* and more recently INFUSE*. He has
been awarded several patents for these break-
can be planned and conducted safely port, Texas) for his valuable comments through product and process technologies. He is
in controlled conditions. Predictive and suggestions. a member of AIChE.

maintenance relies on real-time data

in put to anticipate the need for main-
tenance before a failure can occur.
Summary
In this paper, we have proposed a logi-
cal approach towards designing safer
solids processing plants. Particulate
materials behave differently from liq-
uids and gases, and it is essential to
appreciate these differences. Acquir-
ing relevant and reliable character-
ization data, evaluating process haz-
ards systematically, selecting effective
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