IV.

LIABILITY

Largo

 The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary (Article 2194),
and the sharing as between as such solidary debtors is prorata.

 There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two
or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause
of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors
and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194. - Far Eastern Shipping Co. V. CA

a. Vicarious Liability (Art. 2180)

Largo

 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. (Art. 2180, NCC).

 This is otherwise referred to as the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence.

 Explaining the doctrine, it was held that "[w]ith respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our
Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend
that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who
are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted
our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined
exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own
acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct." (Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768 (1918).

 The responsibility imposed arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part
of the persons made responsible under the article, derived from their failure to exercise due care
and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Negligence is
imputed to them by law, unless they prove the contrary. Thus, the last paragraph of the article
says that such responsibility ceases if it is proved that the persons who might be held responsible
under it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family (diligentissimi patris familias) to
prevent damage. It is clear, therefore, that it is not representation, nor interest, nor even the
necessity of having somebody else answer for the damages caused by the persons devoid of
personality, but it is the non-performance of certain duties of precaution and prudence imposed
 upon the persons who become responsible by civil bond uniting the actor to them, which forms
the foundation of such responsibility (Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al,
G.R. No. 104408, June 21,1993).

 Vicarious liability is a primary and direct liability. It is not subsidiary to the liability of the person
for whom one is made vicariously liable of. Although the negligence is simply imputed in the sense
that it arises from the act or omission of the person under one's care or control, the act being
punished is the negligent act of the one made vicariously liable. Hence, he may be proceeded
against singly or together with the person for whose acts or omissions he is made answerable for.
This was made clear by the Supreme Court in Cerezo vs. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004.

 Pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code that acknowledges responsibility under a relationship of
patria potestas, a person may be held accountable not only for his own direct culpable act or
negligence but also for those of others albeit predicated on his own supposed failure to exercise
due care in his supervisory authority and functions (Vitug, Concurring Opinion, Valenzuela vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115024 & 117944, February 7, 1996).

i. Parents and Guardians

Largo (Parents)

 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company. (Article 2180, NCC)

 The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenes
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent such damages.

 RA 6809 (lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18) - parental authority now ends when the child
reaches the age of 18 instead of 21. But even if the age of majority has been lowered to eighteen,
the vicarious liability of parents over children living in their company extends until these children
reach the age of 21. This is the import of the provision of Republic Act 6809 which states that
"[u]nless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years." [But] nothing in
this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians
for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. (RA 6809). --- THE CHILD MUST “LIVE IN THE
COMPANY” OF THEIR PARENTS.

 In a case where the act complained of was committed by a minor child whose adoption is being
processed with the Court, the question brought before the Supreme Court is who between the
natural and the adopting parents may be held liable. The Court settled the issue by determining
who has actual custody at the time of the act complained of. (Tamargo, et. al. V. CA)

Largo (Guardians)

 Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated person who are under their
authority and live in their company (Art. 2180). If the minor or insane person causing damage has
 no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an
action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed (Art. 2182).

 Three kinds of guardians under the law:

a) the legal guardian, who is such by provision of law without need of judicial appointment, as in
the case of parents over the persons of their minor children, or the father, or in his absence,
the mother with respect to the property of the minor children not exceeding P2,000.00 in
value (Art. 320, Civil Code, et seq.; see however, Art. 225 of the Family Code which supplanted
said provisions and increased the amount involved;

b) the guardian ad litem, who may be any competent person appointed by the court for
purposes of a particular action or proceeding involving a minor; and

c) the judicial guardian, who is a competent person appointed by the court over the person
and/or property of the ward to represent the latter in all his civil acts, and transactions.

Exconde v. Capuno, GR L-10134, June 29, 1957

Doctrine:

ART. 1903 (Spanish Civil Code). The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.

xxxxxxxxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is the
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and
instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to
correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code).

Summary:

Fifteen year-old Dante Capuno was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence for
causing the death of two persons. They were his passengers while he was driving a jeep that turned
turtle while they were in a school procession. The mother of the deceased filed an action for damages
against Dante and his father, Delfin, asking for P2,959. The father argued, however, that he can’t be
held liable because his son was not under his supervision when the incident happened and that he
didn’t know about the school event. The trial court sustained his claim and only ordered Dante to pay
for the damages, but the Supreme Court ruled that, in line with Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the
civil liability must be imposed on the father and in his absence, the mother . The only way he can
relieve himself of the liability is by proving that he exercised the diligence of a good father in
preventing the damage which the defendants failed to do. The teachers or directors of Dante cannot
be held liable because the provision only refers to schools of arts and trades, not academic
 institutions.

Facts:

Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School.
On March 31, 1949, he attended a school parade in honor of Jose Rizal upon the instruction of the
school supervisor. From the school, he boarded a jeep along with other students and when it began to
run, he took the wheels from the driver and drove the jeep.

The jeep didn’t reach far before it turned turtle wherein its two passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore
Caperiña, died. At the time, Dante’s father, Delfin, was not with his son and was not aware of the
school event.

Dante was found guilty of double homicide through reckless imprudence. During the trial, the mother
of one of the deceased, the petitioner, reserved the right to bring a separate civil action against Dante
and his father. She asked for P2,959 in damages. The trial court, however, sustained Delfin’s defense
and awarded the damages only to Dante.

Upon appeal, plaintiff argued that Delfin should be held jointly and severally liable with his son
because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim,
he was a minor and was then living with his father.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son for
damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of the minor (YES)

a) See doctrine. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code).

b) The civil liability for “teachers or directors of arts and trades for the damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody” in Art. 1903 applies only to an institution of arts
and trades and not to any academic educational institution. It is clear that neither the head of that
school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he
was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.

Held:

Defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of
P2,959.00 as damages.

Dissenting opinion (JBL Reyes):

- The father, Delfin, should be relieved of liability because there is no reason to distinguish between
teachers of arts and trades and that of academic institutions. In the phrase, “teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades" in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does
not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments".

- Where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not
the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the
 very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction.

- If a teacher or scout master was present, then he should be the one responsible for allowing the
minor to drive the jeep without being qualified to do so. On the other hand, if no teacher or master
was at hand to watch over the pupils, the school authorities are the ones answerable for that
negligence, and not the father.

- The father had every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with other
children, the school authorities would provide adequate supervision over them. Thus, the father has
rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the Exconde to show actual
negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable

Elcano v. Hill GR L-24803, May 26, 1977

Facts:

Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A criminal complaint
was instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because
of lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of
damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his
father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting subsistence, for the same killing.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the
motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.

Issues:

1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.

2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married.

Ruling of the Court:

1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a civil case. To
find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.
Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted
from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill. Although parental
authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by marriage is not absolute, i.e.
he can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. As in the
present case, killing someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply to
Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
 liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

ISSUES:

W/N the civil action should be barred by the acquittal of criminal action - NO

W/N the Civil Code can be applied to Atty. Marvin Hill even though Reginald is already married -YES

HELD:

Order appealed from is reversed

1. NO.

Separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life to find the accused guilty
in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. YES

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent
of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."

Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible
 the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while
still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of
real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent

Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to
that of his son.

Bahia v. Litonjua, 30 Phil 624

Tamargo v. CA GR 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle.
Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural
parents.

In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in
November 1982.

Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to
the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption
was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for
adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by
Adelberto.

RULING:

No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still
lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the
natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to
the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time
when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be
 essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

Sps. Libi v. IAC, GR 70890, Sept. 18, 1992

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after
she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not
granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a
single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private
respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE:

WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:

The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180
of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-
delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of
their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons
can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted
that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have
gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of
the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required
diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

ii. Owners and Managers of Establishments

 The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions (Art. 2180, NCC, par. 4).

 PARAGRAPH 4: apply to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

 COVERS negligent acts of EEs committed EITHER IN THE SERVICE OF THE BRANCHES or ON THE
OCCASION OF THEIR FUNCTIONS

 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry (par. 5).
  PARAGRAPH 5: apply to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry

 COVER negligent acts of EEs acting WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR ASSIGNED TASK

 WON engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by EEs
within the scope of his assigned tasks. BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH EER. Once done,
plaintiff must show, to hold ER liable, EE was acting within the scope of his assigned task when
the tort complained of was committed in order to make him liable. (Martin v. CA)

 At this point, it is important to bear in mind that the rule is entirely different in culpa contractual
cases. In breach of contract of carriage, Article 1759 of the Civil Code expressly makes the common
carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers. There, the
basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rest either on (1)
the doctrine of respondent superior, or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to
transport the passenger safely (53 ALR 2d 721-728; 732-734). Under the first, which is the minority
view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and
duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. Under the second
view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens
within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in
excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders (10 Am. Jur. 105-107; 263-265). The
carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults
committed by its own employees

 Article 2180, in relation to Art. 2176, of the Civil Code provides that the employer of a negligent
employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence
of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the
part of the employee either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after
such selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by
an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care
(Baliwag Transit vs. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 116624, September 20,1996). This provision of
law is not founded on the principle of respondeat superior, but on bonus pater familias.
Respondeat superior (Latin for "let the superior reply") holds that an employer is liable for
negligent acts or omissions of their employees that result in bodily harm or property damage to
third parties if these acts are done in the course of the employment.

 Under Article 2180, the liability of the ER is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent EE and a prior showing of insolvency of such EE.

 The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. This means
diligence in the selection and supervision of EEs. Thus, when an EE, while performing his duties,
causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence, there arise the juris tantum
presumption that the ER is negligent, either in the selection of the EE or in the supervision over him
after the selection.

 SUPERVISION includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulation for the guidance of its EEs
and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
 whom the ER has relations thru his EEs. In the SELECTION of prospective EEs, ERs are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the
supervision of EEs, ERs must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. Must be shown by
concrete proof, including documentary evidence, testimonial evidence not enough.

 TO FEND OFF VICARIOUS LIABILITY, ERs must submit concrete proof, including DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.

 MANAGER not included; he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his

employer

Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil 768

FACTS

Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo which is
located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. He used to travel by trade to the office
located in Manila for free. On January 21, 1915, on his way home by rail and when the train drew up
to the station in San Mateo, he rose from his seat, making his exit through the door. When he stepped
off from the train, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing him to
slip off from under him and he fell violently on the platform. He rolled and was drawn under the
moving car. He was badly crushed and lacerated. He was hospitalized which resulted to amputation of
his hand. He filed the civil suit for damages against defendant in CFI of Manila founding his action
upon the negligence of the employees of defendant in placing the watermelons upon the platform
and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passengers alighting from the train.
The trial court after having found negligence on the part of defendant, adjudged saying that plaintiff
failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering,
hence this appeal.

ISSUE

Is the negligence of the employees attributable to their employer whether the negligence is based on
contractual obligation or on torts?

HELD

YES. It cannot be doubted that the employees of defendant were guilty of negligence in piling these
sacks on the platform in the manner stated. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is
liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff’s own contributory
negligence. It is to note that the foundation of the legal liability is the contract of carriage. However
Art. 1903 relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as the Court cleared on the case
of Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and
control of the servant relieves the master from liability fro the latter’s act. The fundamental
distinction between obligation of this character and those which arise from contract, rest upon the
fact that in cases of non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself
which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently
of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual
relation. When the source of obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of action depends is a negligent
act or omission, the burden of proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove negligence. On the other hand, in
 contractual undertaking, proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is suffient prima facie to
warrant recovery. The negligence of employee cannot be invoked to relieve the employer from
liability as it will make juridical persons completely immune from damages arising from breach of
their contracts. Defendant was therefore liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach
of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual.

As Manresa discussed, whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the performance of a
contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to
carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. The contract of defendant to transport
plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of
entering and leaving its trains. Contributory negligence on the part of petitioner as invoked by
defendant is untenable. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act- that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly- age, sex, and physical
condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and
should be considered. It is to be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his
daily routine. Our conclusion is there is slightly underway characterized by imprudence and therefore
was not guilty of contributory negligence. The decision of the trial court is REVERSED.

Phil. Rabbit v. American Forwarders, 63 SCRA 231

Doctrine:

Civil Law (Torts) – The terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise” (dueños o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code (formerly Article 1903, the 1889 Civil Code of Spain/Old Civil Code) does not include
manager of corporation. The Supreme Court interpreted the term “manager” (directores, Spanish) is
used in the sense of employer, as it may be gathered from the article’s context.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that Balingit, as manager and employee of Philippine-American
Forwarders, is not liable for damages awarded to Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit.

Facts

Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit alleged that on 24 November 1962, Fernando Pineda drove
recklessly the freight truck owned by his employer Philippine-American Forwarders along the national
highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. It bumped the Philippine Rabbit bus driven by Felix Pangalangan.
As a result of the accident, Pangalangan was injured and the damaged bus cannot be used for
seventy-nine (79) days, causing loss of income amounting to PhP8,665.81 to Philippine Rabbit.

Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan as plaintiffs, filed a case for damages against the defendants
Philippine-American Forwarders, its manager Archimedes Balingit and the driver Fernando Pineda for
damages and lost income sustained by Philippine Rabbit and the injuries sustained by Pangalangan.

Balingit stated in defense that he is not Pineda’s employer and he asked for the dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ case as they had no cause of action against him.

The CFI Tarlac held only PAFI and Pineda liable for damages and injuries sustained and dismissed
 Balingit’s liability. As a result, Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan appealed the trial court’s decision to
the Supreme Court.

Issues

In their appeal, Felix Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit raised the issues:

1. Whether the trial court was right in dismissing the liability of PAFI manager Archimedes Balingit to
the damage sustained by them?

2. Whether the issue that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated
as one and the same civil personality can be raised and adjudged on appeal?

Legal Provisions

The New Civil Code states:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

Held by the Supreme Court

 The trial court’s decision on appeal is AFFIRMED and costs against plaintiffappellants.

The Supreme Court held that based on the allegations of the complaint of appellants Philippine Rabbit
and Pangalangan, Balingit has no liability based on tort or quasi-delict as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. In connection with the vehicular accident because he may be regarded as an
employee of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. The Supreme Court interpreted the term “manager”
(directores, Spanish) is used in the sense of employer, as it may be gathered from the article’s
context.

The Supreme Court disregarded the appellant’s argument raised on appeal that the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil be used against PAFI, Archimedes Balingit and his wife. Since that issue was
not raised in the trial court below, it cannot be raised also on appeal. The case has to be decided
based on allegations stated in the pleadings (complaint) of the appellants, where it was assumed that
Balingit and his wife has a separate legal personality from that of Philippine-American Forwarders,
Inc.

Fil. Broadcasting v. AMEC, 448 SCRA 435

Facts:

Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima (Rima) and Hermogenes Jun
Alegre (Alegre). Expos is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (FBNI). Expos is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas.

In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints
from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian
College of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory,
AMEC and Angelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages
against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990.

The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed
expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs
(AMEC and Ago) reputation. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.

On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision] finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel
except Rima. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification. The appellate court made
Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre.

Issues:

2.Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

3.Whether or not the award of attorneys fees is proper.

Ruling:

2.FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a corporation.

A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it
cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental
anguish or moral shock. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify the
award of moral damages. However, the Courts statement in Mambulao that a corporation may have a
good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages is
an obiter dictum.

Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This
provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical
person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other
form of defamation and claim for moral damages.

Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence
of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in
mitigation of damages.[46] Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of
actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case, the
broadcasts are libelousper se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

However, we find the award of P300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even
though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material
damage to its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages from P300,000
to P150,000.

3. The award of attorney’s fees is not proper.

AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for attorney’s fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to
warrant the award of attorney’s fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly
state in their respective decisions the rationale for the award of attorney’s fees.

In Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that:

[I]t is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than
the rule, and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the
court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the text
of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorney’s fees.[51] (Emphasis supplied)

Petition denied.

Filamer v. IAC, 212 SCRA 637

Facts:

Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now
deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged
employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the
evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for
which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. At the time of the vehicular accident, only
one headlight of the jeep was functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student driver’s permit, was
driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The
two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the
hospital. The trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at
fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party. Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith
Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a
consequence, said lower court’s decision became final as to Funtecha. For failure of the insurance
firm to pay the docket fees, its appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1984. On December 17, 1985,
the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court’s decision in toto. Hence
the present recourse by petitioner Filamer.

Issue:

Whether or not the term “employer” as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with
reference to Funtecha.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the
primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason
that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within
the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours
every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized
driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple
injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. At the time of the
injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was
employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full
brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had
caused. Furthermore, the Court cited Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code, under the Labor
Code, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha’s employer. Funtecha belongs to that
special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition Funtecha
worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school
passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As
admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll.

Jayme v. Apostol, GR 163609, Nov. 27, 2008

FACTS:

Fidel Loano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal, borrowed the pick-up truck owned by
Rodrigo Apostol from its current possessor Ernesto Simbulan to ferry Mayor Miguel of Koronadal to
 Buayan Airport. The pick-up accidentally hit a minor, Marvin C. Jayme, who was crossing the National
Highway. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin 50 meters away from point of impact, a clear
indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Despite medical
treatment, Marvin died six days after the accident.

Marvin’s parents filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against the driver, the mayor, the owner
of the pick-up, Simbulan and the Municipality of Koronadal (now City), pointing out that the
proximate cause was Lozano’s negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. And that applying the
doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability, Mayor Miguel should be liable for his employee’s
negligent acts. On the other hand, Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up
without their consent. Mayor Miguel and Lozano pointed that Marvin’s sudden sprint across the
highway made it impossible to avoid the accident.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Marvin’s parents, absolving Simbulan and the Municipality of
Koronadal from liability. Fidel, Rodrigo and Mayor Miguel are ordered jointly and severally liable to
pay Marvin’s parents damages. In his appeal, Mayor Miguel claims that the real employer of Lozano
was the Municipality of Koronadal and not him. The CA granted his appeal and dismissed the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned
to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian.

RULING: NO. PETITION DENIED.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one's own quasi-delictual
acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which
the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on
the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.

Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be
established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was
performing his functions.

Indeed, it was the Municipality of Koronadal who is the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of
accident. Though Mayor Miguel, also an employee of the municipality, “loaned” Lozano to drive him
to the airport, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer.

Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have
the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an employer-employee
relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow
employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant
may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious
liability.
Mercury Drug v. Huang, GR 172122, June 22, 2007

Liability of the employer for the acts or omissions of the employee

Once again, the SC in Mercury Drug, et al. v. Sps. Huang, et al., G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007, (Puno, J)
had the occasion to rule on the liability of the employer for the negligent act of the employee while in
the performance of his duties and functions.

The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee. (Art. 2194, NCC).

To be relieved of liability, the employer should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.
Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. (Estacion v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, February 27,
2006, 483 SCRA 222; Campo v. Camarote, 100 Phil. 459 (1056)). With respect to the supervision of its
employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these
requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. (Victory Liner,
Inc. v. Heirs of Andres Malecdan, G.R. No. 154278, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 520).

In this case, the employer, Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure.
According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of petitioner Mercury Drug,
applicants are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological examination. In
the case of employee, however, Mrs. Caamic admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological
examination when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position
of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that employee used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of
a truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills development,
perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand coordination and steadiness of the
employee. No NBI and police clearances were also presented. Lastly, he attended only three driving
seminars. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the accident which occurred in 1996 was held
twelve years ago in 1984.

Furthermore, in this case, the employer did back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, the
employee has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate. The witness
admitted that she did not know of any company policy requiring back-up drivers for long trips.

The employer likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline
over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, the employee was driving without a license. He
was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but
nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever
was taken against him. Thus, the employer failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee.

Damage recoverable.

Liability of the employer for the acts or omissions of the employee

With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that “Except as provided by law or
by stipulation one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved x x x.” In this case, the actual damages claimed were supported by receipts. The
amount of P2,973,000.00 represented cost of hospital expenses, medicines, medical services and
supplies, and nursing care services provided on the victim of the vehicular accident.

Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. (Art. 2202, NCC). The doctors who attended to the victim are one in their
prognosis that his chances of walking again and performing basic body functions are nil. For the rest of
his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications such as
pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and
fractures, and other spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent on the care
and support of his family, hence, the award of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of the victim was
uphold based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining years
that he is expected to live; and the conservative amount of P10,000,000.00, for the loss or impairment
of his earning capacity, (Art. 2205, NCC), considering his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his
health, and his mental and physical condition before the accident. He was only seventeen years old,
nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in fourth year high school, and a member of the
school varsity basketball team. He was also class president and editor-in-chief of the school annual. He
had shown very good leadership qualities. He was looking forward to his college life, having just passed
the entrance examinations of the University of the Philippines, De La Salle University, and the University
of Asia and the Pacific. The University of Sto. Tomas even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic
scholarship, but the accident prevented him from attending the basketball try-outs. Without doubt, he
was an exceptional student. He excelled both in his academics and extracurricular undertakings. He is
intelligent and motivated, a go-getter. Had the accident not happened, he had a rosy future ahead of
him. He wanted to embark on a banking career, get married and raise children. Taking into account his
outstanding abilities, he would have enjoyed a successful professional career in banking. But, now, it is
highly unlikely for someone like respondent to ever secure a job in a bank.

iii. State

Meritt v. Gov't, 34 PHil 311

Facts:
The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.

Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital Ambulance
which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn. Merrit was
severely injured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was
affected. The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanent injuries and the loss of wages during he
was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to
sue the government which later authorized the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the
Attorney- General to appear in said suit.

On this appeal, Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred:

“in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in
the complaint,” and

“in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing
the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.”

On the other hand, the Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred:

in finding that the collision between the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged agent or employee of the
Government;

in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and

in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.

Issues:

Whether or not the Government is legally liable to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence
against it.

Whether or not the ambulance driver is considered as an employee of the government.

Discussions:

The waiver of immunity of the State does not mean concession of its liability. When the State allows
itself to be sued, all it does in effect is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the
State is liable.

Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code reads that “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a
special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite
purpose which gives rise to the claim.
Rulings:

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a
special agent. Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As stated by Justice Story of United
States “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.”

Rosete v. Auditor-General, 81 Phil 453

Fontanillas v. Maliamanm, GR 55963, Dec. 1, 1989 and Feb. 27, 1991

FACTS:

In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision
dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and
its modification with respect to the denial of petitioner’s claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.

In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of the aforesaid
decision of the lower court. The original appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to
this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in the
resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent
National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially
by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and RestitutoDeligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika
Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and RestitutoDeligo were injured and brought to
the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan
Provincial Hospital where he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the
accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of
vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:

. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay to the
heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the parents of
the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla; and to
pay the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132)

Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent
National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No.
67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position.

Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant
petition with this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is legally
proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein
petitioners?

RULING:

The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees can very well be answered with the application of Arts. 2176
and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.

Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an
ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).

Under the aforequotedparagrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done
through special agents. The State’s agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to
do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official’s usual governmental functions. If
the State’s agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions,
then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent’s
tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting
through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984
Ed.)

Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less
generally agreed to be “governmental” in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On
the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly
when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a “proprietary” one, as to which there may
be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.

Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the
government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable
for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this
particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages.

It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that “as a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while RestitutoDeligo was
thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of
the road.”

It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city
limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away
from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This
is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and
the fact that the NIA group was then “in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible”, as shown by
their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction.

Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the
amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial
expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees of 20% of the total award.

SO ORDERED.

NIA v. Fontanilla, 179 SCRA 685

FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages
resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of
the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the
former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.

HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government, because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is
irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law
and is liable for actions of their employees.

iv. Teachers and Heads of Academic Establishments

Amadora v. CA, GR L-47745, April 15, 1988

Facts:

Alfredo Amadora, seventeen years old was about to graduate, however while in the school, Colegion de
San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his
expectations and his life as well. Damon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.Herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Damon and two other students, through their respective parents. The
complaint against the students was later dropped

The trial court held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. The petitioners
contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his
graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents
submit that Alfredo had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and
that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not school of arts and
trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be in its custody.

Ruling:

The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only
he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is
the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers"
should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the
word "apprentices."

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo
Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
While the court deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, the court nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they
seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked. Wherefore, the petition is denied.
 Palisoc v. Brillantes, GR L-29025, Oct. 4, 1971

FACTS:

Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics students at the
Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation
transpired between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was
sixteen years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador
looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As
a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon
Dominador’s stomach, which caused the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter
died, the cause of death being “shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The parents of Dominador
filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who
was the teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a member of the board of
directors and former sole proprietor of MTI.

The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause
“so long as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where
the pupil lives and boards with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents., and such control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the
father and mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA,
which in turn based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that Article 2180 was not
applicable in this case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials at the time of the
incident. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the defendant?

HELD:

The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and
severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI
board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded as
party defendant.

The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their custody” means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act
must live and board in the school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on
which it relied are deemed to have been set aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that
they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to
“exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” In this case, The unfortunate death
resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said
defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed
to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they cannot
likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court was modified, while
claim for compensatory damages was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim
for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part of the said defendants.

St. Mary's v. Capistranos, 376 SCRA 473

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with
the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way
to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the
same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned
turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it
was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany
the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a
causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any
efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the
petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore,
there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical
defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible
to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants
excluding herein petitioner.

St. Francis v. CA, GR 82465, Feb. 25, 1991

FACTS:

Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His
parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did
not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the
directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers,
Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process,
it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner
and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

RULING:

Petition granted.

RATIO:

Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In
the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks.
What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since it
was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the
picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same.

No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the
students who joined the picnic.

PSBA v. CA, GR 84698, Feb. 4, 1992

SUMMARY:

The relationship between the educational institution and the deceased arose from a contract.
Therefore, the former cannot be held liable under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, as the said provision
governs quasi-delicts, which is extra-contractual.

FACTS:

Carlitos Bautista is a junior college student enrolled in the Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA). Unfortunately, he was killed in a stabbing incident that occurred inside the school premises. The
assailant is an outsider to the school.

The present case was brought by the parents of the deceased before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against the school and its officers for damages for the death of their son. The suit impleaded the school
and various school officials. The parents of Carlitos Bautista alleged that the defendants were negligent
and did not provide adequate security measures to protect their students.

Defendants argued, however, that they are not covered by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, under
which they are sued. They asserted that the cause of action is hinged on quasi-delict, which requires
that there be no contract between the parties. However, their son’s enrolment in the school evinces the
existence of a contract. Therefore, they sought to dismiss the petition, which was denied by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals (CA).

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Is PSBA civilly liable under Art. 2180? NO.

Should the case be dismissed? NO.

RATIO:

The present case cannot be tried under Art. 2180

Art. 2180 governs quasi-delicts. Quasi-delicts are extra-contractual; that is, it only arises when there is
no prior contract between the parties of the case. The Court explained that the deceased, upon
enrolling the academic institution, entered into a contract with them:

“When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or “built-in” obligation of providing their students
with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore
the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.”

Thus, the CA was correct in dismissing PSBA’s petition, but it erred by grounding its decision on this
article.

Further proceedings are needed.

Because of the existence of a contractual relations between the parties, the cause of action should be
based on breach of contract. However, there is no material finding of fact on whether the contract
between the school and the student has been breached. Hence, the lower court must still hear the case
on the basis of more material evidence and facts to investigate if there was indeed a breach of contract.
The case was thus remanded to the RTC.

d. Primary/Strict Liability

Aquino

 There is strict liability if one is made liable independent of fault, negligence or intent after
establishing certain facts specified by law.
 It can be committed even if reasonable care was exercised and regardless of the state of mind of
the actor at that time.
 Liability without fault. A case is one of strict liability “when neither care nor negligence, neither
good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor ignorance will save the defendant.” (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 1968 Ed., p. 1968).
 The traditional bastion of strict liability includes liability for conversion and for injuries caused by
animals, ultra-hazardous activities and nuisance (American law).

Largo

 Thus, the concept of liability without fault, or strict liability torts (also referred to as strict
liability in torts) is now generally limited to acts which, though lawful, are so fraught with
possibility of harm to others that the law treats them as allowable only on the terms of insuring
the public against injury (74 Amjur 2d, at 631-632).
 The rule of strict liability is said to be applicable in situations in which social policy requires that
defendant make good the harm which results to others from abnormal risks which are inherent
in activities that are not considered blameworthy because they are reasonably incident to
desirable industrial activity. The basis of liability in such cases is the intentional behavior in
exposing the community to the abnormal risk (Ibid.).
 Under the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the liability is "strict" in the sense that it is
unnecessary to prove the defendant's negligence (63 Amjur 2d, at p. 723).

i. Possessor & Owners of Animals (Art. 2183)

Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
(1905)

Aquino
  “x x x the spirit of Article 1905 is clear and explicit by its own terms. Therein is published the
fault or negligence of one of who being able and duty bound to prevent the consequences of
the use of animals, does not prevent it, for not adopting convenient and adequate means of
precaution, or because, even exercising them, he could not attain said results, the risk may
occur in their use being imputed to him, inasmuch as in making use of them, he voluntarily
accepts, by reason of this act, the responsibilities arising from the consequences of the same.
“By virtue thereof, provided the damage that is caused is a consequence of the natural use of
the animal causing it, independent of all extraneous intervention or of whatever cause not
imputable to the possessor or to the person who makes use of it, these should bear said
consequence, repairing the damage caused, there having been no negligence or lack of care,
because having his possession said animal, or in using it, they already know to what they may
be exposed.” (12 Manresa, 4th ed., 572-574, cited in Francisco, Torts and Damages, pp. 79-80).

 In English law, the owner or possessor of non-domesticated animals known as animals ferae
naturae, was subject to strict liability if the animals attacked a person. The owners or possessors
of domestic animals are liable only if they knew or had reason to know that the animal had
vicious properties. On the other hand, Article 2183 by the Civil Code, does not admit of the
distinction under English law. The Civil Code provision, is therefore, applicable whether the
animal is domestic, domesticated or wild. (See Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
74431, November 6, 1989).

 The Court of Appeals ruled that the owner and Pelagia are both liable under Article 2183 of the
Civil Code because they exercised joint control over the dog. The question of ownership is
inconsequential under Article 2183. Even if the dog really belonged to another, Pelagia was
still liable not only because the dog was kept on her premises with her knowledge and
consent but also because she made use thereof (Milagros Ibardo v. Pelagia Nava et al., CA G.R.
No. 28587-R, January 8, 1963, 3 CAR2s 37).

CASES:

 Vestil v. IAC, G.R. No. 74431

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos
Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for
"multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to
"vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as
the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils
rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it
was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge
Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed
the complaint.
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or
of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs
to the property.

RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held
responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that
is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his
heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to anyone,
including himself.

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of
the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person
to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice
weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly,
her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the
dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and
until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners
offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them
only casually.

ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit
Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof.

RULING:
On the contrary, the death certificate declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had
nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need
not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog
bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia,
a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia,
which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of
water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo.
 On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison
v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of
the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia
is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death
certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be
expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the
Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter that, as the petitioners also contend, the
dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak
only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she
was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on
the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he
who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
such animal may cause.

We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only
as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2, 026.69, as prayed for
in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents
the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which
they are entitled.

 MARGARITA AFIALDA VS BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, G.R. No. L-2075 [November
29, 1949]

Facts of the Case:

Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos
at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while he was tending the animals, he was gored by
one of them and consequently died of his injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder sister
who depended on him for support, filed the action for damages. The complaint was dismissed
by the trial court upon granting a motion to dismiss filed by spouses Hisole. Subsequently, the
plaintiff had taken the present appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when damage is caused to the
animal’s caretaker.

Ruling of the Court:

Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages
caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner
would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. In
the case at hand, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was
paid for his work as such. Thus, it was his business to try to prevent the animal from causing
 injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and
for which he must take the consequences. Deceased does not fall within the ambit of
“stranger”, which is significant for the claim for damages under the said article.

Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come under Article 1905 of the
Civil Code but under the labor laws, i.e. Workmen’s Compensation Act. The complaint
contained no allegation as to constitute liability under the Civil Code or the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. Hence, it alleges no cause of action.

The order appealed from was affirmed.

ii. Owners of Motor Vehicles (Art. 2184)

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor
vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)

Aquino

 Solidary liability is imposed on the owner of the vehicle not because of his imputed liability
but because his own omission is a concurring proximate cause of the injury. This rule was first
laid down in Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. 374, 376-377 [1914]), where the Supreme Court
explained that the owner who was present is liable if the negligent acts of the driver are
continued for such a length of time so as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile and permits his driver to continue in violation of the law by the performance of
negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the
driver to desist therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. (see: Caedo v. Yu Khe
Thai, No. L-20392, Dec. 18, 1968; Malayan Insurance v. CA, No. L-36413, Sept. 26, 1988).

 In Marcial T. Caedo et al. v. Yu Khe Thai et al (G.R. No. L-20392, December 18, 1968) the
Supreme Court explained that the basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him,
reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
Nevertheless, the test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great
degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of
diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and
instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed
with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers
posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a
negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age
and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and
infirm person who is not similarly equipped. The law does not require that a person must
possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his negligence,
 within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught
with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional
drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers’ services, would
be effectively prescribed.

CASES:

 CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several
members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car
of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a
moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s
driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down
behind the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by the
caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of the caretela’s left wheel wrenching
it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming
vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the
collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and
members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver and
owner of the Cadillac car. There was no question that defendant’s driver was negligent and
liable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was solidarily
liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.

RULING:
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the causative
factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the
master’s liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master
and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in
order to prevent injury or damage.

Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course
which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do
not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning.
There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely
on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela
 when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not
constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that
distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela on its
left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The
time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was
that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the
situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence
required by law to prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was not liable.

 CARTICIANO VS. NUVAL, Carticiano vs Nuval, G.R. No. 138054, September 28, 2000

FACTS:
Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus, Cavite. He was driving his father’s
Ford Laser car. On the same date and time, defendant Nuval’s owner-type Jeep, then driven by
defendant Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to Parañaque. When the two
cars were about to pass one another, Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center
island of the highway an occupied the lane which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing. Zacarias’ Ford
Laser collided head-on with Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias
suffered multiple fracture. He underwent a leg operation and physical therapy. Nuval offered
P100,000.00 as compensation for the injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to accept it. Plaintiffs
filed a criminal suit against Darwin and a civil suit against defendants for damages. Trial court
ruled infavor of plaintiffs. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: W/N employer Nuval can be held liable.

RULING: Petition granted.

RATIO: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for damages caused
by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in the
case at bar show that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given him when the
collision occurred. That he had been hired only to bring respondent’s children to and from
school must be rejected. True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no convincing
proof was presented showing that it was his only task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s vehicle.
Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the vehicle owner
equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper selection of
employee as a defense. Respondent failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged this
burden.

 Alfredo Mallari, Sr. and Alfredo Mallari, Jr. v. CA and Bulletin Publishing Corp., G.R. No.
128607 January 31, 2000

Bellossillo, J.

FACTS:
The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr. collided with thedelivery
van of Bulletin along the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Mallari Jr.
testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on
 the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of Bulletin coming from the
opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The collision occurred after Mallari Jr.
overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The impact caused the jeepney to
turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel
Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.

Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and
Mallari Jr., and also against Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance
Co. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of Israel was caused by
the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery
van.

ISSUE:
WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel

HELD: Yes.
The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while
traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41,pars. (a)
and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary
situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in
safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for
keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left
hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite
direction comes into view.

Mallari Jr. already saw that the Bulletin delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and
failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning
mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook 2 vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway.
Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel was the sole
negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove
his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the
Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation.
Mallaris failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against Mallari
Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for
the payment of damages sought by the passenger. (See Arts. 1755, 1756 and 1759 for the
rationale of common carrier’s liability.)

iii. Manufacturers & Processor (Art. 2187)

Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall
be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
Aquino

 Product liability law is the law which governs the liability of manufacturers and sellers for
damages resulting from defective products. Liability for defective products may be based on
fraud, warranty, negligence, or strict liability. (Coca-Cola Bottler’s Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 227 SCRA 293 [1993]). All those theories may be used in this jurisdiction on the basis of
the provisions of the Civil Code, including Articles 33, 2176 and 2187.

 R.A. 7394: The Consumer Act of the Philippines

o An important development in product liability law is the passage of the Consumer Act of
the Philippines. As the title of the law indicates, it is a law that is meant to protect the
consumers by providing for certain safeguards when they purchase or use consumer
products.
o The law covers only consumer products and services, that is, “goods, services, and
credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes, which shall include but not limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics
and devices.” (Article 4, par. q).
o It should be noted that the above-enumerated special laws have penal provisions which
also give rise to civil liability ex delito following the general rule that a person criminally
liable is civilly liable. (Article 100, Revised Penal Code).

a. Civil Code
 Privity of contract is not required under Article 2187 because it expressly allows
recovery although no contractual relation exists.

 The use of the word “shall” indicates that the liability of the manufacturer and
processor is strict.

 Justice Trayor argued that the negligence should no longer be singled out as the basis of
plaintiff’s right to recover in cases of similar factual background. He opined that “it
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an
article that he placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection,
proves to have defect that causes injury to human being.” He supported his argument
with the following explanation:

“x x x Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that

responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufacturers can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others,
as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of the injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their
way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever
injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However
 intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the
risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there
should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to
afford such protection.”

b. Consumer Act.
 The problem that is encountered in justifying strict liability under Article 2187 of the
Civil Code is not present in the strict liability provisions of the Consumer Act because
the language of the applicable provision is clear and unmistakable. In particular, Article
97 of the statute expressly provides for liability for defective products “independently
of fault.” The provision is broad enough to cover cases governed by Article 2187 of the
Civil Code.

 Strict liability even extends to services under Article 99 of the Consumer Act which
imposes liability for defective service “independently of fault.” Service under Article 99
means, “with respect to repair and service firms, services supplied in connection with a
contact for construction, maintenance, repair, processing, treatment or cleaning of
goods or of fixtures on land, or distribution of goods, or transportation of goods.”
(Article 4[bo]).

(1) Privity not Required

Privity of contract is not required under Articles 97 and 99 of the Consumer Act because
the responsibility of the manufacturers is owed to the consumer. Article 4(n) of the
Consumer Act defines a consumer as a natural person who is a purchaser, lessee,
recipient or prospective purchaser, lessor or recipient of consumer products, services or
credit. The term recipient is broad enough to cover any person who might use the
product even if he was not the one who purchased the same (e.g. a relative of the
purchaser who used the product may be considered a recipient and the purchaser
donated the product to another person, the latter may likewise be considered a
recipient of the product and is therefore a consumer as defined under the law)

(2) Persons Liable.

o Manufacturer
The strict liability under the Act is imposed on the manufacturer. A manufacturer is
“any person who manufactures, assembles or processes consumer products, except that
if the goods are manufactured, assembled or processed for another person who attaches
his own brand name to the consumer products, the latter shall be deemed the
manufacturer. In case of imported products, the manufacturer’s representatives or, in his
absence, the importer, shall be deemed the manufacturer.” (Article 4[as], Consumer Act).

Thus, a supermarket that sells certain products using its own trademark, is considered
the manufacturer even if, in fact, it was produced by another person or entity.

o Seller

Ordinarily the tradesman or seller is not liable for damages caused by defective
products under the Consumer Act. He is liable only when:
 a) it is not possible to identify the manufacturer, builder, producer or importer;
b) the product is supplied, without clear identification of the manufacturer, producer,
builder or importer; and
c) he does not adequately preserve perishable goods. (Article 98, Consumer Act).

It is provided, however, that “the party making payment to the damaged party may
exercise the right to recover a part of the whole of the payment made against the other
responsible parties, in accordance with their part or responsibility in the cause of the
damage effected.” (ibid.).

A seller under the Act means “a person engaged in the business of selling consumer
products directly to consumers. It shall include a supplier or distributor if:
(1) the seller is a subsidiary or affiliate of the supplier or distributor;
(2) the seller interchanges personnel or maintains common or overlapping officers
or directors with the supplier or distributor; or
(3) the supplier or distributor provides or exercises supervision, direction or control
over the selling practices of the seller.” (Article 4[bn]).

On the other hand, a distributor and a supplier are defined as follows

“a) Distributor means any person to whom a consumer product is delivered or sold for
purposes of distribution in commerce, except that such term does not include a
manufacturer or retailer of such product.

b) Supplier means a person, other than a consumer, who in the course of his business,
solicits, offers, advertises, or promotes the disposition or supply of a consumer product
or who other than the consumer, engages in, enforces, or otherwise participates in a
consumer transaction, whether or not any privity of contract actually exists between
that person and the consumer, and includes the successor to, or assignee of, any right or
obligation on of the supplier.’’

Article 106 provides that “if the damage is caused by a component or part
incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the
person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable.” It may happen that
the manufacturer was not the one who actually manufactured all the components used
in the product. Usually, the manufacturer also gets components or parts from other
manufacturers. In such cases, the liability of the persons involved is joint.

(3) Reasons why Liability is Imposed on Manufacturers.

o See opinion of Justice Traynor quoted above.

o Legal writers likewise advance a number of rationales that are summarized in this wise:

A. The consumer finds it too difficult to prove negligence against the

manufacturer.
B. Strict liability provides an effective and necessary incentive to manufacturers
to make their products as safe as possible.
 C. Res ipsa loquitur is in fact applied, in some case, to impose liability upon
producers who have not in fact been negligent; therefore negligence should
be dispensed with.
D. Reputable manufacturers do in fact stand behind their products, replacing and
repairing those which prove to be defective; and many of them issue
agreements to do so. Therefore, all should be responsible when injury results
from a normal use of a product.
E. The manufacturer is in a better position to protect against harm, by insuring
against liability for it, and, by adding the costs of the insurance to the price of
the product, to pass the loss on to the general public.
F. Strict liability can already be accomplished by a series of actions, in which the
consumer first recovers from the retailer on a warranty, and liability on
warranties is then carried back through the intermediate dealers to the
manufacturer. The process is time-consuming, expensive, and wasteful; there
should be a short-cut.
G. By placing the product on the market, the seller represents to the public that
it is fit; and he intends and expects that it will be purchased and consumed in
reliance upon that representation. The middleman is no more than a conduit,
a mechanical device through which the thing sold reaches the consumer.
H. The costs of accidents should be placed on the party best able to determine
whether there are means to prevent the accident. When those means are less
expensive than the costs of such accidents, responsibility for implementing
them should be placed on the party best able to do so.” (Prosser, Wade and
Schwartz, Torts, 1988 Ed., p. 721).

Largo

 The basis of products liability is the responsibility put upon one who sends goods outs into the
channels of trade for use by others.

 Products liability would thus appear to cover any liability of a manufacturer or other seller of a
product where personal injury or damage to some other property is caused by a defect in the
product, albeit product liability is generally not considered to cover instances where the product
does not measure up to buyer's expectations, or on claims based merely on "bad bargains" (63
Amjur 2d at p. 34).

A manufacturer is strictly liable for torts when an article he places on the market, knowing that
it is to be used without inspection for defect, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human being. This is also sometimes referred to as the "enterprise liability" (Ibid., at p. 722).

The doctrine relates only to defective and unreasonably dangerous products and does not make
a manufacturer or seller an insurer that no injury will result from the use of his products nor
does the doctrine mean that such a manufacturer or seller is liable for any harm to anybody
under the circumstances (Ibid., at p. 734).

 R.A. 7394: The Consumer Act of the Philippines:

o Article 97:
 "Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for
redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting
from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection, formulas and handling
and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient
or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof."

A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking
relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:
a) presentation of product;
b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;
c) the time it was put into circulation.

A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been
placed in the market.

o Article 98:
The tradesman/seller is likewise liable, pursuant to the preceding article when:
a) it is not possible to identify the manufacturer, builder, producer or importer;
b) the product is supplied, without clear identification of the manufacturer,
producer, builder or importer;
c) he does not adequately preserve perishable goods.

The party making payment to the damaged party may exercise the right to recover a
part of the whole of the payment made against the other responsible parties, in
accordance with their part or responsibility in the cause of the damage effected.

o Article 99:
The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to
consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient
or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof. The service is defective
when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the
relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:
a) the manner in which it is provided;
b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it;
c) the time when it was provided. A service is not considered defective because of
the use or introduction of new techniques.

o Article 100:
The suppliers of durable or non-durable consumer products are jointly liable for
imperfections in quality that render the products unfit or inadequate for consumption
for which they are designed or decrease their value, and for those resulting from
inconsistency with the information provided on the container, packaging, labels or
publicity messages/advertisement, with due regard to the variations resulting from their
nature, the consumer being able to demand replacement to the imperfect parts. If the
imperfection is not corrected within thirty (30) days, the consumer may alternatively
demand at his option:
a) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind, in a perfect state
of use;
 b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating,
without prejudice to any losses and damages;
c) a proportionate price reduction

The parties may agree to reduce or increase the term specified in the immediately
preceding paragraph; but such shall not be less than seven (7) nor more than one
hundred and eighty (180) days. The consumer may make immediate use of the
alternatives under the second paragraph of this Article when by virtue of the extent of
the imperfection, the replacement of the imperfect parts may jeopardize the product
quality or characteristics, thus decreasing its value. If the consumer opts for the
alternative under sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph of this Article, and
replacement of the product is not possible, it may be replaced by another of a different
kind, mark or model: Provided, That any difference in price may result thereof shall be
supplemented or reimbursed by the party which caused the damage, without prejudice
to the provisions of the second, third and fourth paragraphs of this Article.

o Article 101:
Suppliers are jointly liable for imperfections in the quantity of the product when, in due
regard for variations inherent thereto, their net content is less than that indicated on
the container, packaging, labeling or advertisement, the consumer having powers to
demand, alternatively, at his own option:
a) the proportionate price;
b) the supplementing of weight or measure differential;
c) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind, mark or model,
without said imperfections;
d) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating
without prejudice to losses and damages, if any.

o Article 102:
The service supplier is liable for any quality imperfections that render the services
improper for consumption or decrease their value, and for those resulting from
inconsistency with the information contained in the offer or advertisement, the
consumer being entitled to demand alternatively at his option:
a) the performance of the services, without any additional cost and when
applicable;
b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with monetary updating
without prejudice to losses and damages, if any;
c) a proportionate price reduction.

Reperformance of services may be entrusted to duly qualified third parties, at the

supplier's risk and cost.

 Liabilities of Drug Store Owners/Persons engaged in Vending Drugs and Medicines by Retail

o The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. In a decision

which stands alone, the Supreme Court of Kentucky said: "As applicable to the owners
of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending drugs and medicines by retail, the legal
maxim should be reversed. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor.
 That is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a purchaser or send to a
patient one drug for another, as arsenic for calomel, cartharides for or mixed with
snakeroot and Peruvian bark, or even on innocent drug, calculated to produce a certain
effect, in place of another sent for and designed to produce a different effect. If he does
these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged pretexts that it was
an accidental or an innocent mistake; that he had been very careful and particular, and
had used extraordinary care and diligence in preparing or compounding the medicines
as required, etc. Such excuses will not avail him." (Fleet vs. Hollenkemp [1852], 56 Am.
Dec, 563.)
o Delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facie negligence,
placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under the circumstances
consistent with the exercise of due care. (See Knoefel vs. Atkins, supra) The druggist
cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate give instead to
the customer barium chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package labeled
"potassium chlorate," and expect to escape responsibility on a plea of mistake.

o The rule thus of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs; Reason:
The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arm’s length as in ordinary transactions.
An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious
injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature
of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser anything. It would be
idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can
know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver
the drug called for.

o "Pharmacists or apothecaries who compound or sell medicines, if they carelessly label a

poison as a harmless medicine, and send it so labeled into the market, are liable to all
persons who, without fault on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine, in
consequence of the false label; the rule being that the liability in such a case arises not
out of any contract or direct privity between the wrong-doer and the person injured,
but out of the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature
dangerous to the lives of others." (Nat. Savings Bank vs. Ward [1879], 100 U.S., 195,
following Thomas vs. Wincheste [1852], 2 Seld. [N.Y.] 397.) In view of the tremendous
and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines,
we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall
sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake (Ibid.).

iv. Municipal Corporations (Art. 2189) (Sec. 24, R.A. 7160)

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not exempt from
liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property (R.A. 7160).

CASES:

 Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan171 SCRA 382 (Mar 21, 1989)

It is not necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over
the defective road or street.

Facts:
Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter, was about to board a tricycle along a sidewalk when she
accidentally fell into a manhole that was partially covered by a concrete flower pot leaving a
gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide and 150 cm deep. Florentina suffered a fracture on
her right leg and as result thereof, had to be hospitalized. Florentina averred that she suffered
mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She became incapable of
reporting for duty within quite some time and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and is no
longer her former jovial self. Florentina sued the City of Dagupan. The City contends that the
manhole is owned by the National and the sidewalk on which it is found is located in Perez Blvd.,
which was also under the supervision of the National Government. While the lower court held
the City of Dagupan liable, the appellate court reversed the ruling on the ground that no
evidence was presented to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over the
Boulevard, where the manhole is located.

Issue: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liable for damages?

Ruling: Yes. The City of Dagupan is liable for damages. The liability of public corporations for
damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians by reason of the defective condition of
roads is expressed in the Art. 2189 of Civil Code, which states: Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision. For liability to attach, it is not even necessary for the
defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In the case at
bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan City and is exercised
through the City Engineer. This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other
public works is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although
these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the
City of Dagupan and receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained
by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, cannot be used to exempt the city from liability. The charter only lays down general
rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to
the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works.

Damages were awarded against the City of Dagupan although the street involved is a National
Road. Exemplary damages were awarded to serve warning to the city or cities concerned to be
more conscious of their duty and responsibility to their constituents, especially when they are
engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which
are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order to minimize or prevent accidents to the
poor pedestrians. The Court also explained that too often in the zeal to put up “public impact”
projects such as beautification drives, the end is more important than the manner in which the
work is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced
 flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and
inviting accidents.

 City of Manila v. Teotico (G.R. No. L-23052)

Facts:
At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a loading and unloading zone, waiting for a
jeepney when one came along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney
and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole. The fall caused
Teotico’s head to hit the rim and break his eyeglasses and the broken pieces thereof to pierce
his left eyelid. Respondent was then brought to PGH to be treated of his injuries. Respondent
suffered contusions in various parts of his body and allergic eruptions caused by the anti-tetanus
injections administered to him required further medical treatment and payment of these
charges. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor,
city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the City of Manila was sentenced to pay the damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for damages.

Ruling: YES.

Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by
reason” — specifically — “of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other-public works under their control or supervision.” In other words, Article 2189 governs
liability due to “defective streets,” in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that “the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected
and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned” who “have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective
functions and duties as imposed upon them by law.” Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that
P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. At any rate, under Article 2189 of
the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either “control or
supervision” over said street or road.

 JIMENEZ vs CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:
Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that it was flooded with
ankle-deep water. As he turned around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered opening w/c
could not be seen because of dirty rainwater. A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the
uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a depth of1½ inches. His left leg swelled and he
 developed fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked w/ crutches for 15 days and could not
operate his school buses. He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose
administration the Sta. Ana had been placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract.
TC found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with Asiatec

HELD: YES

RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, which City of
Manila is invoking in this case, establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City Of Manila
while Art 2189 NCC governs the liability due to “defective streets, public buildings and other
public works” in particular and is therefore decisive in this case. It was also held that for liability
under 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province, city or municipality over the
defective public building in question is enough. It is not necessary that such belongs to such
province, city or municipality. In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana public market
remained under the control of the City as evidenced by:

1. The contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that “prior approval” of the City is
still needed in the operations.
2. Mayor Bagatsing of Manila admitted such control and supervision in his letter to Finance Sec.
Virata (“The City retains the power of supervision and control over its public markets…)
3. City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market whose primary duty is to take
direct supervision and control of that particular public market
4. Sec. 30 of Tax Code “The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision,
administration and control over public markets…

It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably
safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could
have been taken during good weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole
could have been placed under the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should have seen
to it that the openings were covered. It was evident that the certain opening was already
uncovered, and 5 months after this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings that
during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water. Such acts were
not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of impending danger was evident.
Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle of the passageways
and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would not have
fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
Asiatec and City are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable.

 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA

FACTS:
MWSS entered into a contract for water service connections with KC Waterworks Service
Construction (KC).On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of
MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San
Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires. Only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact
 that the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping of
pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires. Between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the
evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991
at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards the
direction of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. She was with prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa.
The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on
a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on
the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured. Consequent to the foregoing incident,
Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila a complaint for
damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal
officials. After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa
adjudging MWSS and theMunicipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her. CA affirmed
RTC with modification.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable

HELD: YES

RATIO:
Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189[8] of the Civil Code,
ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a
controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or
supervision thereof.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.

We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, of the Local Government Code,
the phrases “regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water,
sewer, and other pipes”, and “adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals,
manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property”, are not modified by the
term “municipal road”. And neither can it be fairly inferred from the same provision of Section
149 that petitioner’s power of regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned applies only
in cases where such activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the
municipality’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of
the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether
the drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is
within its territorial jurisdiction.

Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported lack of knowledge of the
excavation and the condition of the road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30,
1988 when the accident occurred. It must be borne in mind that the obligation of the [petitioner]
to maintain the safe condition of the road within its territory is a continuing one which is not
suspended while a street is being repaired.

v. Building Proprietors (Art. 2190-2193)

Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)

Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;

(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;

(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;

(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place. (1908)

Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against
the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.
(1909)

Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages
caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)

 RE: Art. 2193

Aquino
o It is also evident from the text of Article 2193 that the liability is absolute. It does not
indicate a presumption or admit proof of care. (Reyes and Puno, p. 165).

o Unlike Article 2183, the provision does not exempt cases involving force majeure.
However, there is an opinion to the effect that the same are still exempt in
extraordinary circumstances. (VI Caguioa).
Largo
o In US vs. Topino, 35 Phil. 901 (1916), the husband was regarded as the head of the
family. Even in the fairly recent case of People vs. Llamo, G.R. No. 132138, January 28,
2000, it was said that "[i]n this culture, the father is called "haligi ng tahanan," the pillar
of strength upon whom his children look to for moral guidance and material as well as
emotional support. The father is the "padre de familia," the head of the family who is
morally and socially obligated to protect his family and to ensure their well-being."

o But under the Family Code, the management of the household is now the right and the
duty of both spouses (Art. 71).

o In the case of a family consisting of unmarried brothers or sisters, it seems that the
head of the family is one on whom the family depends for lead support.

CASES:

 FELISA P. DE ROY v. CA, GR No. 80718, 1988-01-29

Facts:
 The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents
and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.

Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity
to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of... which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987, but this was denied in the
Resolution of October 27, 1987.

Issues: Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision

Ruling:
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop
and, therefore, petitioners' prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last
clear chance", which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

 Dingcong vs Karaan 72 Phil 14

The term head of the family is not limited to the owner of the building and it may even include
the lessee thereof. The petitioner in Dingcong was a co-lessee of the property. He was made
liable for the act of a guest who left the faucet open causing water to fall from the second floor
and to damage the goods of Kanaan in the floor below. It should be noted however that
although Article 1910 of the Old Civil Code (now Article 2183) was cited, there was no finding
that the liability under the said Article is strict liability; Dingcong was held liable for his failure to
exercise diligence of a good father of a family.

Facts:
Jose Dingcong was the owner of a hotel in Iloilo. In 1933, a certain Francisco Echevarria rented a
room in the upper floor of the hotel. The room he rented was immediately above the store
occupied by the Kanaan brothers who are also tenants of the hotel. One night, Echevarria
carelessly left his faucet open thereby flooding his room and it caused water to drip from his
room to the store below. Because of this, the articles being sold by Kanaan were damaged.
Apparently also, the water pipes supposed to drain the water from Echevarria’s room was
defective hence the flooding and the dripping.
 ISSUE: Whether or not Dingcong is liable to pay for the damages caused by Echevarria.

HELD:
Yes. Dingcong as proprietor is liable for the negligent act of the guest of his hotel (Echevarria). It
was not shown that Dingcong exercised the diligence of a good father in preventing the damage
caused. The pipe should have been repaired prior and Echevarria should have been provided
with a container to catch the drip. Therefore, Dingcong is liable to pay for damages by reason of
his negligence.

vi. Architects & Engineers (Art. 2192 & 1723)

Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against
the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.
(1909)

Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable
for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by
reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor
is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects
in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of
the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily
liable with the contractor.

Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)

V. Defenses Against Charge of Negligence

a. Plaintiff’s Negligence is the proximate cause

 Bernardo vs Legaspi, 29 Phil 12

NATURE

Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to
recover damages for injuries

FACTS

- Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed
an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which he alleged were by reason of
Legaspi's negligence in causing said collision.
- Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks
for damages.

- The lower court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent
in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the
part of both as to prevent either from recovering.

ISSUE

WON the parties may recover damages

HELD

1. NO

- Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it
appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally
negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof,
neither can recover of the other for damages suffered.

DIGEST

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing the complaint
on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff’s automobile
by reason of defendant’s negligence in causing a collision between his automobile and that of
plaintiff.

The court in its judgment also dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for
damages against the plaintiff on the ground that the injuries sustained by the defendant’s
automobile in the collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff’s machine, were caused by the
negligence of the plaintiff in handling his automobile.

The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in
handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part
of both as to prevent either from recovering.

Upon the facts, as they appear of record, the judgment must be affirmed, as the evidence clearly
supports the decision of the trial court.

The law applicable to the facts also requires an affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Where
the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence,
that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover.

This is equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by their negligent acts, contributed to
the determining cause of the accident, neither can recover.
 The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

 PLDT vs CA, GR 57079, Sept 29, 1989

Facts:

A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open trench, the excavation was due to the
installation of an underground conduit system by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover
and any warning signs.

As a result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and their vehicle was also
damaged.

PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents own negligence. Also, it alleges
that L.R. Barte and company acting as an independent contractor, should be responsible for the
excavation was performed by them.

As for Barte, they alleged that they have complied with the due standards in performing their work,
and that it was not aware of the accident involving the Estebans.

Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved
petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.

Upon respondent’s second motion to reconsideration, CA reversed its decision, following he

decision of Trial Court and held PLDT liable for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not PLDT is liable

Held:

NO
 We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident
which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban
and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose
of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The
private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of
knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation
but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on
the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted
act would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for
their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It
is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for
his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT.
As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the
presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife
to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence
of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of
action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested,
otherwise his action must fail.

 Manila Electric vs Remoquillo, Supra

Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making
the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of
the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet
from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the
heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that
the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been
installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due
diligence. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.

Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.

Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occassion.

FACTS:

Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to fix a leaking “media agua,” (downspout).
He climbed up to the media agua which was just below the 3rd floor window and stood on it to
receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he
turned around and a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an electric
wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company) strung 2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua,
electrocuting him and killing him.

His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC rendered
judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the CA, which affirmed the judgment. It is this
CA decision the Company now seeks to appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the Company’s negligence in the installation and maintenance of its wires was the proximate
cause of the death.

HELD:

No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of
the injury to occur).

A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an
injury was made possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct, successive, unrelated and
efficient cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury.

If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was
not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.

We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. To
us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire,
evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the
street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter's length of 6 feet.
 The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When
he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story window, it is to
be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a
tinsmith or carpenter and had had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been
entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant
case, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft
iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all
prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his
body, thereby causing his own electrocution.

B. Contributory Negligence (Art 2179)

 Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf, GR L-1719, January 23, 1907

FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila.
Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there
were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each
weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the
cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the
testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to
that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the
water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and
caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact
and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression
of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the
severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the
officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition
frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman
swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to
 the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the
plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of
it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the
sliding of the iron rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to
his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or
his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having been
taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his employee of

a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant
rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-
servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

 Taylor vs Manila Electric & Railroad, GR 4977, March 22, 1910

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a
minor, by his father, his nearest relative. The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the
operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila.The plaintiff, David
Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of,15 years of age. On the 30th

of September , 1905 David together with his companion Manuel Claparols went to the company’s
premises and found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They
tried to break the cap with a stone and hammer but failed, so they opened one of the caps with a
knife and finding that it was filed with a yellowish substance they lighted it with a match and
explosion followed causing them more or less injuries and to the removal of the right eye of David.
So this action arises and the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: The claim of the plaintiff shows that evidence in the record
sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference
that the caps found on its premises were its property. Thus, applying the provisions of the Articles
1089of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902,1903, and 1908 of that Code, the company is
liable for the damage which was occurred. Not satisfied with the decision of lower court, counsel
for defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at
the trial do not establish the liability of the company under the provisions of these articles.
 ISSUE:

Whether or not David is entitled to damages

HELD:

In the case at bar, we are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to
the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified
him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by
him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless
act,so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligent

act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff’s own act

was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury .We think it is quite

clear that the immediate cause of the explosion ,the accident which resulted in plaintiff’s injury

,was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having “ contributed to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover”. Twenty days after the

date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below, without
costs to either party in this instance, and 10 days thereafter let the record be returned to the court
wherein it originated, where judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in
first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. SO ORDERED. Judgment reversed.

Taylor v. Manila Railroad and Electric Light Company

Facts:

Taylor- 15 yrs. Old, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his
age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. He had previously worked as a
cabin boy and as a mechanical draftsman.

Manila Railroad and Electric Company- foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a
street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the
eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del
Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for
vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
Taylor together with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge
to

the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who
and

promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was
not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual
interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon and no one was there.

They walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped
in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating
caps

scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol

cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged
by

the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite,
and

have in themselves a considerable explosive power. The boys picked up all they could find, hung
them

on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a
little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy
Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the
wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a
stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of
the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed,
causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut
in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.

Plaintiff’s Argument: because of his youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's

premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to
have

contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of
defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the
plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained
by him. In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many
of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and
"Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.

Torpedo Doctrine: While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover

damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been
free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in
each case by the circumstances of the case."

Issue:

WON the electric company should be liable for the damages sustained by David Taylor Swift (It’s a
love story baby just say yes uh uh yun oh)

Ruling:

No.

In order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it
must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries
incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the
negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
 cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking,
"attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that
plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the
proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that
the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of
plaintiff's

youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps

exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have

 Cadiente vs Macas, GR 191946, Nov 14, 2008

Topic: / Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS: Bithuel Macas while standing on the shoulder of the road was bumped and run

over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Cimafranca which resulted to the amputation of both legs

up to the groins of the victim. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the

name of Atty. Cadiente, who However, claimed that when the accident happened, he was

no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera since he already sold it to Engr. Jalipa on March

28, 1994. The victim's father, filed a complaint for torts and damages against Cimafranca

and Cadiente before the RTC of Davao City. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint

against Jalipa. Jalipa, however, filed a fourth-party complaint against Abubakar, to whom

Jalipa allegedly sold the vehicle on June 20, 1994.

The RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente and

Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintiff for their own

negligence. The Court of Appeals denied their appeal and subsequent motion for

reconsideration.
ISSUES:

1. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, hence not

entitled to recover damages.

2. Whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally

liable to the victim.

HELD:

1. NONE. Records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on

the shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial

court, the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles,

such as those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running

vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of the

highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as slowing down,

took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder,

and recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was just where he

should be when the unfortunate event transpired.

2. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else, is

primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may

cause.

In the case of Villanueva v. Domingo, we said that the policy behind vehicle

registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible in case

of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience

or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. Therefore,

since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the

misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it

caused the respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life
 with nary but two remaining limbs.

LIMITATIONS OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

LAST CLEAR CHANCE

 Picart vs Smith

FACTS:
The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union. Before he had gotten half
way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the
rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman
on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had
taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Seeing that the pony was apparently
quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that
the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side. The automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI – La Union – absolved the defendant from liability.

ISSUE:
whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

RULING:
Yes, he is liable.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to
bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to
take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
 blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

 Lapanday vs Angala

Doctrine:

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.

Facts:

On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., Apolonio De Ocampo driving the crew cab bumped into a 1958
Chevy pick-up owned by Michael Raymond Angala and driven by Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday
Agricultural Development Corporation owned the crew cab, which was assigned to its manager
Manuel Mendez. De Ocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running
along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City.

The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorney’s fees against LADECO,
its administrative officer Henry Berenguel and De Ocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was
slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour and was making a left turn preparatory to
turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crew cab, which was running at around 60
to 70 kph. The crew cab stopped twenty-one meters from the point of impact. Respondent alleged
that he heard a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and
was looking at the speedo meter when the accident took place.

Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at
the speedometer, Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment of the damages he
incurred because of the accident but he did not receive any reply, thus respondent filed the case
against LADECO, Berenguel, and De Ocampo. The Regional Trial Court of Davao City ruled in favor
 of defendant and ordered LADECO and De Ocampo to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court
found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crew cab. LADECO and
De Ocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on June13, 1995.
Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, however the appellate court affirmed in toto
the trial court’s decision, Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition was filed before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar?

Held:

Yes. Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies. The
doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.

In this case, De Ocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since De Ocampo was
driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the
vehicle in front of him. De Ocampo had the responsibility of avoiding from bumping the vehicle in
front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared
to running straight ahead. De Ocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast
while following the pick-up. De Ocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not
step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.

ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE

 HIDALGO VS BALANDAN

Topic: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance

Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice-plant factory in San Pablo, Laguna. In the factory,
there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. There was no
fence or top cover; the edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.
The factory itself was surrounded with a fence. However, the wide gate entrance was continually
open, and anyone could easily enter the factory. There was no guard assigned on the gate.

Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, was playing with
other boys his age when he entered the factory premises through the gate. Mario Balandan then
took a bath in one of the tanks of water and, later on, sank to the bottom of the tank. He died of
“asphyxia secondary to drowning.” The CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo Enterprises maintained an
attractive nuisance and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident to person
entering its premises.

Issue: Whether or not a water tank is an attractive nuisance.

Held: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance. Other
issues such as whether it exercised reasonable precautions, and if the parents were guilty of
contributory negligence are immaterial. Appealed decision reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises is
absolved from liability.

Ratio:

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a

character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent
children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. This is the doctrine of
attractive nuisance. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of
tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this' attractiveness is an implied
invitation to such children.

The majority of American jurisprudence posits that the doctrine of attractive nuisance is
generally not applicable to bodies of water, whether artificial or natural. The exception to this is if
there is some unusual condition or artificial feature other than mere water and its location.
Furthermore, in Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co., the Indiana Appellate Court explained why
bodies of water are not considered as attractive nuisance. It ruled that children have been
instructed early on to exercise caution around bodies of water and are presumed to know the
danger.

Dissent of J. Pablo: Children are naturally curious and do not have perfect knowledge of things.
They are amazed by the natural attraction of the waters and shall explore where their curiosity
leads them unless there is something that prevents them. As such, petitioners should have placed
fences around the ponds as an ordinary precaution. (Note: translated and paraphrased from
Spanish text)
 TAYLOR, SUPRA

RES IPSA LOQUITOR

 CAPILI, SUPRA

Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: Article 2176 of the Civil Code

FACTS:

 February 1, 1993: Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the San Roque Elementary School when a
branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her
instantaneous death. Her parents Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa filed a case for damages
against the school principal Joaquinita Capili knowing that the tree was dead and rotting did
not dispose of it
 RTC: dismissed for failing to show negligence on the part of Capili
 CA: reversed. Awarded P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Jasmin and P15,010 as
reimbursement of her burial expenses, moral damages P50,000 and attorney's fees and
litigation P10,000
ISSUE: W/N Capili can be held liable for damages under Res ipsa loquitur

HELD: YES.

 negligent act
 inadvertent(unintentional) act
 may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates
a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the
other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature
 an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances, would
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it
in a more careful manner
 The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is
clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As school principal, she was tasked to see to the
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its
premises. Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher,
she exercises supervision over her assignee
 Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school's premises shows that the
tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.
 Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner
to explain.The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference

Under the circumstances, we have to concede that petitioner was not motivated by bad faith or ill
motive vis--vis respondents' daughter's death.The award of moral damages is therefore not proper.
contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition,
although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper
to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co.
vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been
free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in
each case by the circumstances of the case. A well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his
entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation' but it is
wholly different question whether such youth can be said to have been free from fault when he
willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing,
as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion. On this point, which must be
determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable
and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the
"Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that
the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they
were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the explosive
instruments which fell into their hands.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature
both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy;
was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred;
and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he
well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who
was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of
his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly
that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of
age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and ran away.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which
might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate
the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion
might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts.
The question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the
character of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to
have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of
acts which may be done by him.

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the
cap; that he

was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the
injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held
to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it
may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.

Add-ons:

1. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a
considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded
as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap. No measures seems to
have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and
walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do.

There was a question on the ownership of the caps. Plaintiff presented evidence to establish
ownership. Defendant did not file introduce rebuttal evidence on this matter. Court ruled that the
caps are owned by the electric company. It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff,
were used, more or less extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track;
 that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's premises a few months
before the accident.

2. Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which
these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the
company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors.

It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed in blasting the well was

regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well
directly and immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's
foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley extension
was done by independent

contractors.

3. A doctrine in a case which is directly opposite with that of Torpedo exists. Magamit ta ta ni atung

sulat2x ni Mam Osorio sa dog2x nga nibite. Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated
and

disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs.

Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of
the

land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or
willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by
dangerous

machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to
cross the premises of another cannot be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken
to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the

circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's

premises.

c. Assumption of Risk

Afialda v. Hisole, GR L-2075, Nov. 29, 1949

Facts of the Case:

 Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their
carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while he was tending the animals, he was
gored by one of them and consequently died of his injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder
sister who depended on him for support, filed the action for damages. The complaint was
dismissed by the trial court upon granting a motion to dismiss filed by spouses Hisole. Subsequently,
the plaintiff had taken the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when damage is caused to the
animal’s caretaker.

Ruling of the Court:

Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for
damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the
owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code.
In the case at hand, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was
paid for his work as such. Thus, it was his business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury
or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal under those circumstances,
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must
take the consequences. Deceased does not fall within the ambit of “stranger”, which is significant
for the claim for damages under the said article.

Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come under Article 1905 of the Civil
Code but under the labor laws, i.e. Workmen’s Compensation Act. The complaint contained no
allegation as to constitute liability under the Civil Code nor the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Hence, it alleges no cause of action.

The order appealed from was affirmed.

d. Last Clear Chance

Picart v. Smith, supra

Sps Ong v. MWD, GR L-7664, Aug. 29. 1958

Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s
fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After
trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.

Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to
make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the
case at bench.

Ruling: Judgment affirmed.

(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by
the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome
 the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and
security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with
ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and
regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions
to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even death of its patrons.

(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to avoid
the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming
pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the
use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is
clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor
Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.

Glan Peoples Lumbar v. IAC

FACTS: Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo at the wheel, as it
approached a bridge going towards the direction of Davao City. At about that time, the cargo truck,
Zacarias coming from the opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. At about 59
yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which
Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a
result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,\
was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the
asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the
road.

A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo
against the driver and owners of the cargo truck with the CFI of Bohol.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint “for insufficiency of evidence”

The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on the plaintiffs’ appeal,
reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias to be negligent and his negligence “gave
rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary
and solidary.” It therefore ordered “the defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the plaintiffs

The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for a reversal of the judgment of
the IAC which, it is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established facts
ISSUE:

1. WON the decision o fthe IAC was erroneous

2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case

HELD: , the appealed judgment of the IAC is hereby REVERSED

1. YES

The SC found Calibo negligent instead, because of the following:

1. it is alleged that at the time of the collision, the truck was occupying 25 cm of the jeep’s lane.
However it was found out that the center stripe of the road is misaligned and with the correct
calculation of the width of the road, the truck on still on its proper lane and it was actually the jeep
who is intruding the truck’s lane.

2. Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Zacarias had acted negligently in applying his
brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon the coming of the approaching jeep. Being well
within his own lane, as has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep’s way
as said Court would have had him do. And even supposing that he was in fact partly inside the
opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still 30 meters away cannot be considered an
unsafe or imprudent action.

3. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police, Calibo’s companions,
Roranes and Patos, who suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to be so investigated
or give statements to the police officers is a “telling indication that they did not attribute the
happening to defendant Zacarias’ negligence or fault.” 7

The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter; there are also quite a few
significant indicators that it was rather Engineer Calibo’s negligence that was the proximate cause
of the accident. Zacarias had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later
confirmed in his written statement at the police headquarters that the jeep had been “zigzagging,”
which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically at the time. The other investigator
also testified that eyewitnesses to the accident had remarked on the jeep’s “zigzagging.” There
was also testimony that Calibo was drunk while driving the jeep.

2. YES

Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming
some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane,
incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any actionable
responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance.

Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other’s vehicle from a
distance of 150 meters. The truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters
away. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial
doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that
distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the
truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers
per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely
rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability
today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved
a similar state of facts.

Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer (and co-
petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports the latter’s additional
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and
wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record which has not been
controverted.

NOTES:

It must be pointed out, however, that IAC also seriously erred in holding the petitioners Agad and
Felix Lim solidarily liable for the damages awarded in its appealed decision, as alleged owners, with
petitioner George Lim, of Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, employer of petitioner Zacarias.
 This manifestly disregarded, not only the certificate of registration issued by the Bureau of
Domestic Trade identifying Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware as a business name registered by
George Lim, but also unimpugned allegations into the petitioners’ answer to the complaint that
Pablo S. Agad was only an employee of George Lim and that Felix Lim, then a child of only eight (8)
years, was in no way connected with the business.

In conclusion, it must also be stated that there is no doubt of this Court’s power to review the
assailed decision of the IAC under the authority of precedents recognizing exceptions to the
familiar rule binding it to observe and respect the latter’s findings of fact. Many of those exceptions
may be cited to support the review here undertaken, but only the most obvious — that said
findings directly conflict with those of the Trial Court — will suffice. In the opinion of this Court and
after a careful review of the record, the evidence singularly fails to support the findings of the IAC
which, for all that appears, seem to have been prompted rather by sympathy for the heirs of the
deceased Engineer Calibo than by an objective appraisal of the proofs and a correct application of
the law to the established facts. Compassion for the plight of those whom an accident has robbed
of the love and support of a husband and father is an entirely natural and understandable
sentiment. It should not, however, be allowed to stand in the way of, much less to influence, a just
verdict in a suit at law.

Pantranco v. Bacsa

FACTS:

Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding
anniversary of the Baesa spouses

While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.

As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico,
died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions
for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.

PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver.

CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa

ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid the
collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence

HELD: NO.
 Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to
a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim for damages

For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly
has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should,
with exercise of due care, have been aware of it

there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger

When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that
the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the
opposite direction

Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it

last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered

e. Prescription (Art. 1146)

Ferrer v. Ericta

Synopsis:

There was a vehicular accident which resulted to the plaintiff’s action for damages against the
parents of the minor tortfeasor. The suit was filed more than four years after the incident.

Defendants filed their answer, but the defense of prescription was invoked only when the case was
revived. The court eventually upheld the defense.

Doctrine:

Issue: WON the defense of prescription had been waived by the defendants’ failure to allege the
same in their answer.

While it is true that, as a rule, prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked in the
answer of the defense, the rule cannot be invoked when the evidence shows that the action has
already been barred by the statute of limitations.

Facts:

Mr. And Mrs. Franis Pfleider were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car. At about 5pm of
December 31, 1970, their son, defendant Dennis, who was only 16 at the time, without proper
official authority, drove the ford, without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, and without
taking the necessary precaution to prevent injury to persons or damage to property. The pick up
car was overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger,
which injuries paralyzed her and require medical treatment an confinement at different hospitals
for more than two year.

As a result of the physical injuries sustained by P, she suffered unimaginable physical pain, mental
anguish, and her parents also suffered mental anguish, moral shock, and spent a considerable sum
of money for her treatment.

Complaint was only filed on January 5, 1975

Pretrial (May 12, 1975), only Ferrer and counsel were present. As such, the Pfleiders were declared
in default and the court rendered judgment against them.

Upon filing a motion for reconsideration, respondent Judge, without setting aside the order of
default, issued an order absolving defendants from any liability on the grounds that:

Complaint states no cause of action because it does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living
with his parents at the time of the vehicular accident. Considering that under 2180, the father,
and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, is only responsible for the damages caused by
their minor children who live in their company.

That the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the complaint was filed more than 4 years
after the date of the accident and the action to recover damages based on quasidelict prescribes
in 4 years o Instant petition for mandamus

Issue/s: WON the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by PR’s failure to allege the
same in their answer.

Held-Ratio:

No. Defense of prescription (DP) not deemed waived.

Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the
defendant’s claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does
not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription.

o Defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed
waived unless such defense raises issues of fact appearing upon the preceding pleading.

It is true that the DP can only be considered if it is invoked as such in the answer of the
defendant and that in this particular instance, no such defense was invoked because the
defendants had been declared in default. But such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows
that the cause of action upon which plaintiff’s complaint us based is already barred by the statute
of limitations.

In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of
prescription. Action for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within
four years. The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of
the accident.

Dispositive:
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Kramer v. CA

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within
four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.

FACTS:

1.On April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and
Marta Kramer collided with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private
respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank,
taking with it its fish catch.

2.Both parties filed their protest with the Board of Marine Inquiry for the determination of the
proximate cause of the collission. The Board decided that the collision occurred due to the
negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia
Philippines.

3.The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant
of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia
Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.

4.On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private
respondent before the RTC. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the
Complaint on the ground of prescription.

5.Respondents argue that the prescription period for actions based on quasi-delict is 4 years from
when the cause of action accrued as stated in Art. 1146 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the period
should be counted from April 8, 1976 when the collision occurred.

6.Petitioners argue that the period should be counted from 1982, or when the date when the
Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final.
They claimed that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with
special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly
analyze and resolve.

7.RTC denied the MTD based on the arguments of the petitioners. It stated that prescriptive period
under the law should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the
crew of M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained.

8.The CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA stated that the decisions of an admin are not binding
on the courts. If an accrual of a cause of action has to be dependent on an action of an admin body,
then it might get delayed.

ISSUES:
 1.Whether or not the action has prescribed.

RULING + RATIO:

1.YES. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.

a.The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements,
namely:

i. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created

ii.An obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right

iii. An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff

b.The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arise.

c.It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the
four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party
need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for
damages.

d.The period should be counted from April 8, 1976.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

f. Fortuitous Event (Art. 1174)

Hernandez v. COA

It was one of those prosaic decisions not requiring deep thought or long deliberation. The
petitioner arrived at it almost as a matter of course, applying what he believed then to be common
sense. Little did he realize until later that it would cause him much anguish, even endanger his life,
and ultimately lead to this litigation. But such are the quirks of fate.

At the time of the incident in question, Teodoro M . Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and
special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite.
As such, he went to the main office of the Authority in Manila on July 1, 1983, to encash two checks
covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. He estimated that
the money would be available by ten o'clock in the morning and that he would be back in Ternate
by about two o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. For some reason, however, the processing
of the checks was delayed and was completed only at three o'clock that afternoon. The petitioner
decided nevertheless to encash them because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay
the following day. He thought he had to do this for their benefit as otherwise they would have to
wait until the following Tuesday at the earliest when the main office would reopen. And so, on that
afternoon of July 1, 1983, he collected the cash value of the checks and left the main office with not
an insubstantial amount of money in his hands.[1]

What would he do with the money in the meantime? The petitioner had two choices, to wit: (1)
return to Ternate, Cavite, that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take the
money with him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the
following morning. He opted for the second, thinking it is the safer one. And so, on that afternoon
of July 1, 1983, at a little past three o'clock, he took a passenger jeep bound for his house in
Bulacan.

It was while the vehicle was along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue that two persons boarded with
knives in hand and robbery in mind. One pointed his weapon at the petitioner's side while the
other slit his pocket and forcibly took the money he was carrying. The two then jumped out of the
jeep and ran. Hernandez, after the initial shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He
caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. The petitioner sustained injuries in
the lip, arms and knees. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. But the
hold-upper who escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been
recovered.[2]

On July 5, 1983, the petitioner, invoking the foregoing facts, filed a request for relief from money
accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code. This was favorably indorsed
by the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority the same day[3] and by its Corporate
Auditor on July 27,1983.[4] The Regional Director, National Capital Region, of the Commission on
Audit, made a similar recommendation on January 17, 1984, and also absolved Hernandez of
negligence.[5] On June 29, 1984, however, the Commission on Audit, through then Chairman
Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. denied the petitioner's request, observing inter alia:

In the instant case, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be
attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks
(replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate, Cavite, immediately after encashment for
safekeeping in his office, which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of
said cash thru robbery could have been aborted.[6]

In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the respondent Commission on Audit acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of the stolen
money. He avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and should not be
held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control.
The petitioner stresses that he decided to encash the checks in the afternoon of July 1, 1983, which
was a Friday, out of concern.for the employees of the Project, who were depending on him to make
it possible for them to collect their pay the following day. July 2 and 3 being non-working days and
July 4 being a holiday, they could receive such payment only on the following Tuesday unless he
brought the encashed checks 3 on July 1, 1983, and took it to Ternate the following day.

On his decision to take the money home that afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate, he
says that the first course was more prudent as he saw it, if only because his home in Marilao,
Bulacan, was much nearer than his office in Ternate, Cavite. The drive to Ternate would take three
hours, including a 30-minute tricycle ride along the dark and lonely Naic-Ternate road; and as he
would be starting after three o'clock in the afternoon, it was not likely that he would reach his
destination before nightfall. By contrast, the road to Marilao was nearer and safer (or so he
reasonably thought) and there was less risk involved in his taking the money the following morning
to Ternate rather than on that same afternoon of July 1.

The petitioner maintains that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was stronger in
Ternate than in Marilao, so he should not be blamed if the robbery did occur while he was on the
way to Marilao that afternoon. That was a fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been
foreseen, especially on that busy highway. At any rate, he contends, he had not been remiss in
protecting the money in his custody; in fact, he immediately pursued the hold-uppers and
succeeded in catching one of them who was subsequently prosecuted and convicted. It might have
been different if he had simply resigned himself to the robbery and allowed the culprits to go scot-
free. But he acted. His action after the robbery only goes to show his vigilance over the money
entrusted to his custody and his readiness to protect it even at great personal risk.

In his Comment, then Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez supported the denial of the petitioner's
request, arguing that Hernandez was negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds as correctly
found by the Commission on Audit.[7] Later, however, his successor, Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez, submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum in which he sided with the petitioner,
agreeing that Hernandez had not committed any negligence or, assuming he was guilty of
contributory negligence, had made up for it with his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture
of one of the robbers, who was eventually convicted.[8] This prompted the respondent Commission
on Audit to submit its own memorandum.

The Commission on Audit insists in this memorandum that the petitioner should not be relieved
from his money accountability because it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the cash he
had sought to take not to Ternate in Cavite but to Marilao.

Its contention is that the petitioner should not have encashed the checks on July 1, 1983, as the
hour was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate before nightfall. Knowing this, he
should have prudently deferred encashing the checks until the morning of the next working day on
July 5, 1983, when he could have safely taken the money to Ternate. His alleged concern for the
convenience of his fellow workers was not really a valid reason because one of the checks he had
encashed, in the greater amount of P6,964.00, was in fact not for salaries and wages but for the
operating expenses of the Project. There was no urgency to encash that check. Moreover, if it is
true that he had that much concern for the employees, he should have gone to the main office
earlier than July 1, 1983, since the vouchers representing the checks had already been prepared as
of June 29, 1983.

The memorandum concludes that in deciding to take the money with him to Marilao after
imprudently withdrawing it from the main office, the petitioner was assuming a risk from which he
cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as a result of the robbery to which it was
unreasonably exposed. In any event, the burden of proof in petitions for relief from money
accountability rests with the petitioner, who has not clearly established that the loss of the money
was not the result of his negligence.

Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:

SEC. 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty Notice to Auditor. When a loss of
government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other
casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the
Auditor General, or the provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of
the one or the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or provincial
auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his application for relief, with the available
evidence m support thereof. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss m the settlement of his accounts.

This provision has since then been reiterated, with some slight modification, in Section 73 of P.D.
No. 1445, otherwise known as the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines," which was
promulgated on June 11, 1978.

Applying the letter and spirit of the above-mentioned laws, and after considering the established
facts in the light of the arguments of the parties, this Court inclines in favor of the petitioner.

Hindsight is a cruel judge. It is so easy to say, after the event, that one should have done this and
not that or that he should not have acted at all, or else this problem would not have arisen at all.
That is all very well as long as one is examining something that has already taken place. One can
hardly be wrong in such a case. But the trouble with this retrospective assessment is that it
assumes for everybody an uncanny prescience that will enable him by some mysterious process to
avoid the pitfalls and hazards that he is expected to have foreseen. It does not work out that way in
real life. For most of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen, based on
common sense and our own experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and without any mystic ability
to peer into the future. So it was with the petitioner.

It is pointless to argue that Hernandez should have encashed the vouchers earlier because they
were dated anyway on June 29, 1983. He was not obliged to encash the checks earlier and then
again there might have been any number of reasons why he did so only on July 1, 1983. The point is
that he did encash the checks on that date and took the money to Marilao and not Ternate in view
of the lateness of the hour. The question before us is whether these acts are so tainted with
negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from
accountability for the stolen money.

It seems to us that the petitioner was moved only by the best of motives when he encashed the
checks on July 1, 1983, so his co-employees in Ternate could collect their salaries and wages the
following day. Significantly, although this was a non-working day, he was intending to make the trip
to his office the following day for the unselfish purpose of accommodating his

fellow workers. The other alternative was to encash the checks on July 5, 1983, the next working
day after July 1, 1983, which would have meant a 5-day wait for the payment of the said salaries
and wages. Being a modest employee himself, Hernandez must have realized the great discomfort
it would cause the laborers, who were dependent on their wages for their sustenance and were
anxious to collect their pay as soon as possible.

For such an attitude, Hernandez should be commended rather than faulted.

As for Hernandez's choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily agree
that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in
the trips to the two places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should
not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could
be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked
him in broad daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other
passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence. This was
undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been
reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did.

We find, in sum, that under the circumstances as above narrated, the petitioner is entitled to be
relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him in the afternoon of July 1, 1983.
 To impose such liability upon him would be to read the law too sternly when it should be softened
by the proven facts.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Southeastern College v. CA

Facts:

After a typhoon a complaint of culpa aquiliana was filed against the School for the reason that one
of their buildings was considered a structural hazard and the reason of inhabitability of the nearby
houses .The complaint is rooted to the claim that the school has a defective roofing structure and
that they have been remiss on the maintenance of such building. The school (petitioner) averred
that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the
past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its
responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school children, faculty members,
and employees, is "in tip-top condition"; and furthermore, typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and
therefore beyond human control" such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages
wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.

Issue:

Whether or not the destruction of the nearby houses was caused by a fortuitous event.

Held:

It was held that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause
of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.

g. Exercise of Diligence (Art. 2180)

h. Mistake and Waiver

Gatchalian v. CA

Lessons Applicable: Personal Injury and Death (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable:
FACTS:

July 11,1973: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames" mini bus at Aringay, La Union bound for
Bauang, of the same province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went
off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.

Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead

Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger and later paid for their hospitalization and medical
expenses. She also gave transportation expense of P12 in going home from the hospital and they
were made to sign a Joint Affidavit stating that they are no longer interested to file a complaint,
criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames.

Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages
stating that the mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the
forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part

as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends

scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment

Delim averred that it was a fortuitous event

CFI: dismissed because of the Joint Affidavit

CA: affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Gatchalian is entitled to damages

HELD: YES. CA, CFI REVERSED and SET ASIDE 1) P15,000 actual or compensatory damages to cover
the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000 moral
damages; and 3) P1,000 attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of
6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof

A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him.

while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had
also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint
Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether
petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit

To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable.
 To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the
ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the
casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid.

The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus after the snapping sound

Court of Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a
public school since, being a casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off.
Her employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers.

A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or
diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and
assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that
she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the
infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for
restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the
victim, the cost of surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.

In view of the testimony, and the fact that a considerable amount of time has lapsed since the
mishap in 1973 which may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the
difficulty of removing the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such
plastic surgery is not unreasonable

moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier

i. Damnum Absque Injuria

NAPOCOR v. CA

LIABILITY; PRINCIPLE OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA; NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENCE OF GROSS
NEGLIGENCE; CASE AT BAR. — We cannot give credence to petitioners’ third assignment of error
that the damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria,
which presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of
the fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to
operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be
countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the means,
particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways to
such extent.

Facts: NPC entered into a contract with private respondent, an engineering construction in
constructing tunnel work. When a typhoon hit the project area causing water from dam to spill
over, NPC opened the spillway gates of the dam only at the height of the typhoon. It caused the
inundation of the towns neighboring the Angat Dam, particularly Norzagaray, Bulacan, at the height
of the typhoon. It resulted to deaths and the loss and destruction of houses, farms, plants, working
animals and other properties of the people residing nearby.
 Issue: W/N petitioner is liable

HELD. Yes. NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss
and damage even though the typhoon was an act of God. It could have opened the gates at an
earlier time, hence it has been negligent. But exemplary damages should not be awarded since
there was no bad faith and gross negligence on the part of NPC.

j. Emergency Rule

McKee v. IAC

FACTS:

- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck ownedby private respondents, and driven by
Ruben Galang, and aFord Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted inthe deaths of Jose
Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc,and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
KohMcKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the FordEscort.- When the northbound Ford
Escort was about 10 meters awayfrom the southern approach of the bridge, two boys
suddenlydarted from the right side of the road and into the lane of thecar. Jose Koh blew the horn
of the car, swerved to the left andentered the lane of the truck; he then switched on theheadlights
of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so,
his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of thetruck, which was the
opposite lane, on the said bridge.- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.- On 1 March 1977, an
Information charging Ruben Galangwith the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
MultipleHomicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" wasfiled with the trial court.

- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal chargeand ordered him to pay damages.
Galang appealed to IAC.

IAC affirmed decision.- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awardedprivate
respondents moral damages and exemplary damages,and attorney¶s fee. Petitioners appealed to
IAC. In itsconsolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered
the defendants to pay damages. Thedecision is anchored principally on the findings that it
wasGalang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which causedthe accident. The appellate court
further said that the lawpresumes negligence on the part of the defendants, asemployers of Galang,
in the selection and supervision of thelatter; it was further asserted that these defendants did
notallege in their Answers the defense of having exercised thediligence of a good father of a family
in selecting andsupervising the said employee.- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil
cases wasreversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUES

WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolutionare supported by evidence or are
based on mere speculations,conjectures and presumptions.
HELD

YES

- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appealsmay be set aside when such findings
are not supported by theevidence or when the trial court failed to consider the materialfacts which
would have led to a conclusion different from whatwas stated in its judgment.- The respondent
Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the
collisionoccurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that thedriver of the car, Jose Koh, was
negligent. On the basis of thispresumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose
Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximatecause of the collision. This is an
unwarranted deduction as theevidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved
into the truck's lane because as it approached thesouthern end of the bridge, two boys darted
across the roadfrom the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.- Negligence is the omission to do
something which areasonable man, guided by those considerations whichordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
manwould not do

- The test by which to determine the existence of negligence ina particular case: Did the defendant
in doing the allegednegligent act use that reasonable care and caution which anordinarily prudent
person would have used in the samesituation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.- Using the test,
no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
tried toavoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away fromwhere they were even if this
would mean entering the oppositelane.- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule,
"onewho suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and isrequired to act without time to consider
the best means thatmay be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and uponreflection may appear to have been a better method,
unlessthe emergency in which he finds himself is brought about byhis own negligence

- Assuming,

arguendo

that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot besaid that his negligence was the proximate cause of
thecollision. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause,which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by anyefficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and withoutwhich the
result would not have occurred; the proximate legalcause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, allconstituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, eachhaving a close causal connection with its immediatepredecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effectingthe injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause whichfirst acted, under such circumstances that the personresponsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudentand intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
themoment of his act or default that an injury to some personmight probably result therefrom.-

Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot besaid that the same caused the eventual injuries and deathsbecause of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, thenegligent act of the truck driver, which was the
actual cause of the tragedy.
The entry of the car into the lane of the truckwould not have resulted in the collision had the latter
heededthe emergency signals given by the former to slow down andgive the car an opportunity to
go back into its proper lane.Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of theroad, which
was the proper precautionary measure under thegiven circumstances, the truck driver continued at
full speedtowards the car.

- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. Hehimself said that his truck was running
at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed bylaw on a bridge
is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of the CivilCode, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent
if at thetime of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.- Even if Jose Koh was indeed
negligent, the doctrine of lastclear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is adoctrine in
the law of torts which states that the contributorynegligence of the party injured will not defeat the
claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by theexercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided theconsequences of the negligence of the injured party. In suchcases, the
person who had the last clear chance to avoid themishap is considered in law solely responsible for
theconsequences thereof.

- Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of theplaintiff does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of thedefendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercisingreasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injuriousconsequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff'snegligence. The doctrine of last clear chance means that eventhough a person's own acts
may have placed him in a positionof peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled
torecovery. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding thenegligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputedto the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for theconsequences of the accident. The practical
import of thedoctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to anegligent plaintiff, or even to a
plaintiff who has been grosslynegligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff'speril,
or according to some authorities, should have beenaware of it in the reasonable exercise of due
care, had in factan opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid anaccident.

- As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are,under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarilyliable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they arenegligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. Thatpresumption, however, is only juris tantum, not
juris et de jure.Their only possible defense is that they exercised all thediligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage.The answers of the private respondents in the civil cases didnot
interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

On the separate civil and criminal actions

The civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil liabilityarising from a

uasi-delict

under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of criminalcase.
They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. Therecords do not indicate any attempt on the
 part of the parties,and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none wasmade, to
consolidate criminal case with the civil cases, or vice-versa.

- Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoida multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse,prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial
court, or in short, attain justice with the least expenseto the parties litigants, would have easily
sustained aconsolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if noludicrous, spectacle of two
judges appreciating, according totheir respective orientation, perception and perhaps
evenprejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Such was
what happened in this case.- The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liabilityarising from negligence under the Penal Code. In
the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the resultof the criminal case,
whether acquittal or conviction, would beentirely irrelevant to the civil action. What remains to be
themost important consideration as to why the decision in thecriminal case should not be
considered in this appeal is the factthat private respondents were not parties therein.

Dispositive

Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside whileits original is REINSTATED, subject to the
modification that theindemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 toP50,000.00 each for the
death of Jose Koh and Kim KohMcKee

k. Violenti Non-Fit Injuria

INERCO v. CA

FACTS:

A strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte on the evening
of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in
its wake.

Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen,
ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City,
and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the
owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged.

Wading in waistdeep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at
the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller
at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a
distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay"
and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from
doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a
post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz
came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters
away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had been electrocuted, he
acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the
City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric
Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero
Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the
electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the
deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.

In another place, at about 4:00 AM. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio Juan,
Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed
certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-
circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an
inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from
the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the
INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero.

At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another inspection trip. Having
learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of
Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been taken.

In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the restoration
of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the morning of June 29, 1967 was no
longer there.

An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the
deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968.

Defenses:

(1) Electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect
that might constitute a hazard to life and property.

(2) Service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior
to the date in question.

(3) Installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case
of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.

(4) 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas
respectively assigned to them.

(5) deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence
attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.

(6) deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by
connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging
the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs.

ISSUE: WON INELCO IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE?

RULING: YES.
PETITIONER NOT EXONERATED AS VICTIM'S DEATH IS CAUSED BY ITS NEGLIGENCE.

While is it true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be
held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim’s death. It was
through the intervention of petitioner’s negligence that the death took place.

Under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done
to the general public". . . considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of
care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger.
The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons
have a right to be".

The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by
arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines
or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the
injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission".

A PERSON WHO VOLUNTARILY ASSENTS TO A KNOWN DANGER MUST ABIDE BY THE

CONSEQUENCES; EXCEPTIONS.

The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" (To a willing person, injury is not done) relied upon by petitioner
finds no application in the case at bar.

It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the
comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida
Bulong the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery
store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded."

As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by
imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?
Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when
he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is
found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property .

Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced
with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at
a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to
protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

INELCO FAILED TO EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE.

"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to
discover and repair broken lines". The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National
Power Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw
grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO
lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office.

The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the
circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner.
VI. Kindred Torts/Medical Malpractice

Batiquin v. CA

RAmos v. CA, GR 124354, Dec. 29, 1999

RAmos v. CA, April 11, 2002 (MR)

Reyes v. Sisters of MErcy

Nograles v. CMC

PSI v. Agana