Qua Chee Gan vs Deportation Board

G.R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963

FACTS:
The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of habeas corpus, mandamus and
certiorari by the petitioners.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged petitioner before the
Deportation Board. The crimes:
•Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong
•Attempted bribery of Phil and US officials.
In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of
1951). Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authority to file warrants of arrest.

HELD:
Yes but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of deportation. Arrest
would have been necessary for deportation to take effect. However, in the case at bar,
investigations were still ongoing and no order for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O.
No 398, series of 1951: declared illegal
Deportation may be effected in 2 ways:
1. by order of President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the RAC
2. by Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners
under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613
Crime was an act profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of US dollars.
Santos

Santos vs. Commissioner

74 SCRA 96 (1976)

FACTS:
This case involves the application for habeas corpus filed by petitioner who was
detained under a warrant of arrest issued by respondent on the ground of his being a Chinese citizen who
entered the country illegally. Petitioner denied such assertion that he was an alien in his petition.
Respondent official could order the arrest of an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation."
Such was not the case here as admitted in the brief of respondent.

On January 18, 1966, the lower Court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the Commissioner of
Immigration to produce before it. on January 19, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. the person of Lucio Santos; to explain
under what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained; and to show cause why he should not
be set at liberty. On the scheduled day, respondent Commissioner asked the lower Court for three days
within which to submit his written return.

The lower Court granted his request and the hearing was set anew for January 25, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. On
January 21, 1966, respondent official filed his return to the writ of habeas corpus. In respondent’s written
return, it is stated
:1. That petitioner is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese subject whose real name is
Ong Hiong King.
2. That petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and was detained by virtue
of a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration.
3. That deportation proceeding against petitioner was pending hearing before the Board of Special
Inquiry.
4. That petitioner had confessed that he was an illegal entrant to this country.
5. That based on his own application for registration with the Philippine Consulate General
in Hongkong for documentation as a Filipino, it is evident that petitioner is a Chinese because,
even if he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, his election of Filipino citizenship was made
much too late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino citizenship.
6. That the lower Court is without jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action
— the deportation of petitioner — is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners
after due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportation.
7. And that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

The lower court, however, without passing on the question of citizenship, ordered the release of
petitioner upon posting a bond of P5,000 to insure his appearance at the deportation hearing when
ordered to do so. This order was appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could order the arrest of an alien only after there is already an order of
deportation?

HELD:
The SC ruled that the appeal cannot prosper. At the time of the challenged order
(the release the petitioner), the deportation proceeding was still pending. Moreover, the release was
provisional. The order of the lower court dated February 5, 1966 is affirmed with no costs.

1. The question that had to be decided in Qua Chee Gan was whether the power of the President to
conduct an investigation leading to deportation carries with it the authority to order an arrest. It was
answered in the negative. Thus: "Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is therefore, even doubtful
whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose
is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The
Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in
administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a
determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an
administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to
CARRY OUT a FINAL FINDING of a VIOLATION, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly
authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is NOT that mentioned in the Constitution
which is issuable only on probable cause.

HARVEY VS DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO (1988)

[162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 June 1988] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights|
Deportation|

FACTS:
American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72, Dutch Citizen Adrian Van
Den Elshout, 58, and 19 other foreigners residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna were apprehended
at their residences. The ―Operation Report of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) read that Harvey, Sherman and Van Den Elshout, et. al.
were suspected pedophiles.

Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with
two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report read
that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and living with him.
Seized during their apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected
child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex.
Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
The petitioners were apprehended after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID.

Deportation proceedings were then instituted against and warrants of arrest were issued
for violation of the Immigration Act.

ISSUE:
Whether deportation proceedings and warrants of arrest issued are valid.

HELD:
Yes. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close
surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest;
therefore the articles are admissible evidences.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance
with the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, provides that aliens shall be arrested and
deported upon warrant after a determination of the existence of a ground for deportation
against them.

The state has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as
it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens
is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police
measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in
this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.

Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag

175 SCRA 318 (1989)

FACTS:
A complaint was filed with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation against
petitioner alleging that the French national is an undesirable alien for “committing acts
inimical to public safety and progress.” Respondent CID commissioner issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioner after the latter twice refused to go to the CID headquarters
for verification of his status.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued and petitioner’s subsequent arrest were valid
and legal.

RULING:
NO. Petitioner was “invited” by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at
his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on
Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of
probable cause was conspicuously absent.

Petition is DISMISSED.
Salazar vs Achacoso
183 SCRA 145 (1990)

FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants
of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner.
Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was
found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the
team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily
allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie
Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required
to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced
upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more
waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by
Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the
confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the
house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought
to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the
petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,
we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force
and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it
was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a
warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who
may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final
order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. De La Rosa

197 SCRA 853 (1991)

FACTS:
The then Secretary of Justice issued a memorandumdirecting the Board of Commissioners
to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine citizen, including that of respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting respondents Gatchalian as Filipino
citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of Immigration issued a mission order commanding the
arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of Immigration was valid.

RULING:
NO. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for
the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null and void for being
unconstitutional. A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes
of investigation of the suspects, respondent Gatchalian included.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

c. IMPOSITION OF FINES AND PENALTIES

OCEANIC STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v STRANAHAN

214 US 320; White; June 1, 1909

Facts:

- Oceanic Steam Navigation Co sought the recovery of money paid to the collector of
customs of the port of New York which was exacted by that official under an order of the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The findings of the court showed that the money was
paid to the collector under protest, and involuntarily. It was established that the company
was coerced by the certainty that, if it did not pay, the collector would refuse a clearance
to its steamships plying between New York City and foreign ports at periodical and
definite sailings.
- Both the Secretary and collector were expressly authorized by law, entitled “An Act to
Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States”, enacted on March 3, 1903.
Section 9 of said Act, under which the Secretary and collector acted, provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person, including any transportation company other
than railway lines entering the United States from foreign contiguous territory, or the
owner, master, agent, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to the United States any
alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease; and if it shall
appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Treasury [Secretary of Commerce and
Labor] that any alien so brought to the United States was afflicted with such a disease
at the time of foreign embarkation, and that the existence of such disease might have
been detected by means of a competent medical examination at such time, such
person or transportation company, or the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any
such vessel, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the
port of arrival is located the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for each and every
violation of the provisions of this section; and no vessel shall be granted clearance
papers while any such fine imposed upon it remains unpaid, nor shall such fine be
remitted.

- Oceanic Steam argues that:

 1. However complete may be the power of Congress to legislate concerning the
exclusion of aliens, and to entrust the enforcement of legislation of that character to
administrative officers, nevertheless the particular legislation here in question is
repugnant to the Constitution because it defines a criminal offense, and authorizes a
purely administrative official to determine whether the defined crime has been
committed, and, if so, to inflict punishment
2. Even though it be conceded that Congress may, in some cases, impose penalties for
the violation of a statutory duty, and provide for their enforcement by civil suit instead
of by criminal prosecution, nevertheless that doctrine does not warrant the conclusion
that a penalty may be authorized, and its collection committed to an administrative
officer without the necessity of resorting to the judicial power. In all cases of penalty or
punishment, enforcement must depend upon the exertion of judicial power, either by
civil or criminal process, since the distinction between judicial and administrative
functions cannot be preserved consistently with the recognition of an administrative
power to enforce a penalty without resort to judicial authority.
3. The fines which constituted the exactions were repugnant to the 5th Amendment,
because amounting to a taking of property without due process of law, since, as
asserted, the fines were imposed, in some cases, without any previous notice, and in all
cases without any adequate notice or opportunity to defend.

Issue: WON the power conferred upon the named officials is consistent with the
Constitution

Held: YES

- The exaction which the section authorizes the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to
impose, when considered in the light afforded by the context of the statute, is clearly but a
power given as a sanction to the duty which the statute places on the owners of all
vessels, to subject all alien emigrants, prior to bringing them to the United States, to
medical examination at the point of embarkation, so as to exclude those afflicted with the
prohibited diseases. In other words, the power to impose the exaction which the statute
confers on the Secretary is lodged in that officer only when it results from the official
medical examination at the point of arrival not only that an alien is afflicted with one of
the prohibited diseases, but that the stage of the malady, as disclosed by the examination,
establishes that the alien was suffering with the disease at the time of embarkation, and
that such fact would have been then discovered had the medical examination been then
made by the vessel or its owners, as the stature requires.
- The power thus lodged in the officers was intended to be exclusive and that its exertion
was authorized as the result of the probative force attributed to the official medical
examination for which the statute provides, and that the power to refuse clearance to
vessels was lodged for the express purpose of causing both the imposition of the exaction
and its collection to be acts of administrative competency, not requiring a resort to
judicial power for their enforcement.
- The report of the Senate committee on immigration is considered:
“Section 10 [which became Section 9] therefore imposes a penalty of $100, to be imposed
by the [Secretary of Commerce and Labor] for each case brought to an American port,
provided, in his judgment, the disease might have been detected by means of medical
examination at the port of embarkation. This sufficiently guards the transportation lines
from an unjust and hasty imposition of the penalty, insures a careful observance of the
law, and leaves in their own hands the power to escape even a risk of the fine being
imposed, since they can refuse to take on board even the most doubtful case until
certified by competent medical authority to be entirely cured.”
- Court’s discussion on Oceanic Steam’s arguments:
1. The various sections of the Act accurately distinguish between those cases where it
was intended that particular violations of the Act should be considered as criminal and
be punished accordingly, and those where it was contemplated that violations should
not constitute crime, but merely entail the infliction of penalty, enforceable in some
cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil suit. The sole purpose of
Section 9 was to impose a penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the
statute provided, thus tending, by the avoidance of controversy and delay, to secure the
efficient performance by the steamship company of the duty required by the statute,
and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of Congress.
2. The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the
executive departments of the government would be productive of nothing but mischief.
- The legislation of Congress from the beginning has proceeded on the conception that it
was within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively
within its control, to impose appropriate obligations, and sanction their enforcement by
reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such
penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.

3. Court did not think it necessary to entertain the controversy, as it is evident that the
statute unambiguously excludes the conception that the steamship company was
entitled to be heard, in the sense of raising an issue and tendering evidence concerning
the condition of the alien immigrant upon arrival at the point of disembarkation, as the
plain purpose of the statute was to exclusively commit that subject to the medical
officers for which the statute provided.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v PHIL. AIRLINES INC.

63 SCRA 524 ESGUERRA; APRIL 30, 1975

Nature: Appeal from 2 resolutions of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)

Facts:

- On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of 20 passengers from Baguio to Manila who could
not be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these 20 passengers, PAL
required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio on its way
to Manila and pick up these passengers.

- Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CAB before operating
the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of RA 776, the CAB, through the first
questioned resolution, imposed a fine of P5000 upon PAL. Upon PAL’s MFR, the CAB,
through the second questioned resolution, reduced the fine to P2500. It also stated that
“Public Act 4271, as amended, requires the grantee (of a legislative franchise for air
service), PAL Inc. to comply with the provisions of RA 776, and regulations promulgated
thereunder from time to time.”

- PAL claims that there is nothing in RA 776 which expressly empowers the CAB to impose
a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in this case. “The power and authority
to impose fines and penalties is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of
justice, and that such power and authority cannot be delegated to the CAB by mere
implication or interpretation.”

Issue: WON the CAB has authority under the Civil Aeronautics Act to impose penalties

Held: YES.

Ratio The CAB is empowered to impose administrative penalties or those violations

punishable by a fine or civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations but no power
to impose fines in the nature of a criminal penalty.

Reasoning RA 776 created the CAB and the CAA (Civil Aeronautics Administration) so that
in the exercise and performance of their powers and duties, they shall consider among
other things, “as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience
and necessity” certain declared policies which include:

“… the regulation of air transportation in such manner as 'to recognize and preserve the
inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic
condition in, such transportation, and to improve the relation between, and coordinate
transportation by, air carriers;

…to promote safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines;”

(Sec. 4, RA 776)

“… the general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and control over, air carriers
as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise, in so far as
may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act” (Sec. 10 RA
776)

“… power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend or revoke, in whole
or in part, upon petition or complaint, or upon its own initiative, any temporary operating
permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity” (Sec. 10(c) (1) RA 776)

“…power to investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual
or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and
regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of
this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision, or rules and
regulations so issued.” (Section 10(D) RA 776)

“…power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision
or order of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil
penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and
regulations issued thereunder. It has the power also either on its own initiative or upon
review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to
determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil
penalties, as the case may be. (Sec. 10(F) (G) RA 776)
“…power to impose fines and/or civil penalties and make compromise in respect thereto is
expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator (Sec. 32(17) RA 776)

- The fine imposed on PAL by CAB is that fine or civil penalty contemplated in the
provisions of RA 776 and not a fine in the nature of a criminal penalty as contemplated in
the RPC, because the “fine” in this case was imposed by CAB because of PAL’s violation of
CAB rules on flagstops without previous authority. The CAB explained in its resolution that
the “imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed
as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules,
regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency.”

- There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.A.B. is fully authorized by
law (RA 776) to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and
regulations. To deprive the CAB of that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of
the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to
determine whether to “impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise” “fines and civil
penalties,” a power which is expressly given to the CAA whose orders or decision may be
reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the CAB
of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and
control over air carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations
designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. If everytime the
CAB would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and
regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations then it could
not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and effective supervision and
control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and
convenient air transit.

- However, PAL committed the violation of the CAB regulation against flagstops without
malice and with no deliberate intent to flout the same. For this reason, the penalty imposed
by the CAB may be mitigated and reduced to a nominal sum.

Disposition Resolution appealed from is modified by reducing the administrative fine

imposed on the appellant PAL to P100.

SCOTY'S DEPARTMENT STORE v MICALLER

99 Phil 762; BAUTISTA ANGELO; August 25, 1956

Nature: Petition for review

Facts:

- Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Dept Store

- This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen
Yang. - Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of
unfair labor practice against her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them
because of her membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation,
said employers had been questioning their employees regarding their membership in said
union and had interfered with their right to organize under the law.

- The employers denied the charge. They claim that the complainant was dismissed from
the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her
co-employees so much so that several criminal charges were filed against her with the city
fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed the corresponding informations against her
and the same are now pending trial in court.

- the court found the following facts: Nena Micaller was earning P4.80 a day. After every
New Year, she was given from P180 to P200 as bonus whereas the other employees were
only given P60. For three consecutive years, she was given a first prize for being the best
seller, the most cooperative and most honest employee. She organized a union among the
employees of the store which was latter affiliated with the National Labor Union. Later, the
National Labor Union sent a petition to the store containing ten demands and Nena was
called by the management for questioning and, in the manager's office, she was asked who
the members of the union were, but she pretended not to know them.

- Richard Yang and Yu Si Kiao, together with a brother-in law, went to Nena’s house and
questioned her regarding her union membership.

- Nena was brought by her employers to the house of their counsel, Atty. Joaquin Yuseco,
and there she was again questioned regarding her union activities and was even made to
sign a paper of withdrawal from the union.

- the manager of the Store, Yu Ki Lam asked each the every employee whether they were
members of the union.

- the union gave notice to strike to the management. Upon receipt of the notice, the
management hired temporary employees equal in number to the old. The new employees
were affiliated with another labor union.

- an information for threats was filed against Nena Micaller before the municipal court. This
was dismissed. Another information was filed against Nena Micaller for slander. A third
information for slander was filed against her before the same court. And on November 30,
she was dismissed for "insulting the owner of the store and for taking to the girls inside the
store during business hours." And on the strength of these facts the court found
respondents, now petitioners, guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered them to pay a fine
of P100.

- Petitioners contend that section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 being penal in character
should be strictly construed in favor of the accused and in that sense their guilt can only be
established by clear and positive evidence and not merely be presumptions or inferences
as was done by the industrial court. In other words, it is contended that the evidence as
regards unfair labor practice with reference to the three above-named petitioners is not
clear enough labor practice and the fine imposed upon them is unjustified.

Issue: WON petitioners can be legally punished by a fine of P100.

HELD NO.

Ratio The power to impose the penalties provided for in section 25 of RA 875 is lodged in
ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition
of the word "Court" contained in section 2(a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the of the
industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should
be nullified.

Reasoning

SEC. 25. Penalties.- Any person who violates the provisions of section three this act shall be
punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos,
or by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, or both by such
free and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.

Any other violation of this Act which is declared unlawful shall be punished by a fine of not
less than fifty nor more than five hundred pesos for each offense.

- The above provision is general in nature for its does not specify the court that may act
when the violation charged calls for the imposition of the penalties therein provided. It
merely states that they may be imposed "in the discretion of the court."

- The word “court” cannot refer to the Court of Industrial Relations for to give that meaning
would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every accused by our Constitution. We
refer to those which postulate that "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law", and that "In all criminal prosecution the accused . . .
shall enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, against him, to have a speedy
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf".

- The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial Relations in
dealing with the unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional guarantees to the
accused. And this is so because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in court for the courts of law or equity cannot be controlling and it is
the spirit and intention of this act that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members
and its Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objective and without regards to technicalities of law of procedure.

- legislative record containing the deliberations made on the bill eliminating the criminal
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relation show that the real intent of congress was to
place that court on the same footing as the Public Service Commission and the Court of
Industrial relations by confining their jurisdiction exclusively to civil matters.

- on the issue of WON there was unfair labor practice, the court did not rule on this as it
involves questions of fact. The industrial court has made a careful analysis of the evidence
and has found the petitioners have really subjected complaint and her co-employees to a
series of questioning regarding their membership in the union or their union activities
which in contemplation of law are deemed acts constituting unfair labor practice. This
finding is binding upon this Court following well-known precedents.
Disposition decision appealed from is modified by eliminating the fine of P100 imposed
upon petitioners.

U.S. VS BARRIAS

11 Phil 327; Tracey; Sept 24 1908

Facts:

- The defendant was charged in CFI Manila with violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of
Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs. After a demurrer to the complaint of
the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in
the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any
other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: “No heavily
loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River
without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.
- Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the violation of any part of the foregoing
regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more
than P500, in the discretion of the court.
- By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is
authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of
the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are
required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows:
SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized,
empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations
to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.
SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or
regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands,
under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a
fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine
and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may
be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that
prescribed in this section or by both.
- Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that
it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine
Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law,
they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.

Issue: WON Act No. 1136 is valid (as far as Sections 5 and 8 are concerned)

Held: YES
- The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of
harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor
requires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power,
and which, when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not
involving an undue grant of legislative power.
The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311
and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as
amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only
empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof,"
not exceeding a fine of P500.
- This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain;
only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself
is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative
has been intrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies
upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom,
and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to
confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)
- This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep.
402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations
as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a
violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the
misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in
the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the use
of canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require
alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules was held invalid,
as vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep.,
406.) The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a
commissioner of internal revenue to designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an
improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court
saying (p. 533):The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the
designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere
matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict
with the law itself.
- In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior
Redwood Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a
penalty under statues authorizing them to do so, the court saying: Conceding that the
legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with
reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and
regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.
Disposition judgment of the CFI as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355
and 1235 is revoked, and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of
$25

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), v BOARD OF

COMMUNICATIONS

G.R. No. L-43653; MARTIN; Nov 29, 1977

Nature: Petition for review by certiorari

Facts:

- This involves 2 cases consolidated by the Court for decision.

- In the first case, Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a
telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his
wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never
reached him. He had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch
up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its answer
petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from
Santiago, Isabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from
Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila
unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram
to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for
damages.

- In the second case, Pacifico Innocencio claims that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio
sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at
Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the purpose of informing him about the death of their
father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-receipt
and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lources Innocencio)
has not been notified about its non-delivery. As a consequence Pacifico Innocencio was not
able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of
RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the
death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada, Tarlac on August 14, 1975,"
and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for
damages.

- After hearing, the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by
petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case
a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended,
by Presidential Decree No. 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1. Hence, this appeal

Issue: WON the Board can impose a disciplinary fine on RCPI

Held: NO.

RATIO The Board exceeded its authority when it imposed a fine on RCPI since its enabling
law does not authorize it to do so. Its power is limited only to management of the facilities
and system of transmission of messages by radio companies.

REASONING The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of
transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public
convenience. If in the two cases before Us complainants Diego Morales and Pacifico
Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation
arising from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for
possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the
respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of P200
upon the petitioner.

- In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236) and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R.
No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled: "There can be no
justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as
successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer.
The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was fix rates. It could not
take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with
such authority. What it did then in these two petition lacked the impress of validity.

- In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Board lacked the required
power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which
empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion.

Disposition both decisions of Board of Communications reversed, set aside, declared null
and void for lack of jurisdiction

PEREZ V LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC

492 SCRA 638

QUISUMBING; Aug 28, 2007

Facts:

- Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession
for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of
P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4

- On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg.
33, which provides among others (pls see original for list of offenses and penalties)

SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS. (REQUIREMENT

ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF
THIS CIRCULAR)

A. LPG Refiller/Marketer

1st Offense – Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense – Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense – Recommend business closure to the proper local government

unit

- It is alleged that Circular No. 2000-06-010 (the “assailed Circular”) listed prohibited acts
and punishable offenses which are brand-new or which were not provided for by B.P. Blg.
33, as amended; and that B.P. Blg. 33 enumerated and specifically defined the
prohibited/punishable acts under the law and that the punishable offenses in the assailed
Circular are not included in the law.
Issue: WON the circular is valid

Held: Yes

- For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of
penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the
statute itself.

1.The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal
trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under
this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the
Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated,
namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight
markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial
number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder,
underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG
cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the
law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.

2.As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under
B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts
aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the
Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within
the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is
silent as to any maximum monetarry penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not
amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that
the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the
law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of
penalties.

- Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts
involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the
corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on
the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the
Circular contravenes the law.