SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DIGESTS (WEEK 2)

1. CAYETANO V. LEONIDAS, G.R. NO. L-54919, MAY 30, 1984.

FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America and a
permanent resident of Philadelphia. She executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat, and that while in temporary sojourn
in the Philippines. Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila, leaving property both in the
Philippines and in the United States of America. The Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common
Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and
letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws
of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Nenita C. Paguia, daughter or the
testator, was appointed administratrix of the estate of said decedent.

This was opposed by Adoracion’s father, Hermogenes Campos, who earlier filed an Affidavit of Self-
adjudication not being aware that Adoracion had left a will. He later died and was substituted by
Polly Cayetano as petitioner in the instant case. A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the
respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12,
1983.Cayetano alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the right of a forced heir to his legitime
can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced
heir incomplete disregard of Law of Succession.

ISSUES: Whether the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the
testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite.

RULING:

YES, the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the testate case. The contention of the petition
as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it
is provided that:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at
the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.

2. VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189
(1976)

FACTS: Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by
Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, of the property owned by Amado G.
Garcia who died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places." At the same time she moved ex parte for her appointment as
special administratrix over the estate. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia,
contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all
persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for

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the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should
be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the
estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special
administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, a motion to remove Fule as special administratrix
has been filed alleging that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or
incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that
she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

During the hearings for the case, Virginia presented that Amado resided in Quezon City 3
years before his death, therefore CFI Calamba has no jurisdiction over the case. CFI denied the two
petitions of Preciosa.

CA reversed the decision. It vacated the decision made by the CFI. It held that CFI Calamba, Laguna
does not have jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether is the venue improperly laid?

RULING: Yes, the venue was improperly laid. Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record."

With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make
the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied
upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to
be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in
the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration.

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a
matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.

Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the merits or the
substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the
constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.

On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of
the court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the
case. In some cases it may be waived or stipulated by the parties.

"Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9Residence simply requires bodily presence as

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an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.

In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of
the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death
certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death.

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore
Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special administratix.

3. CUENCO VS. CA, 53 SCRA 360 (1973)

FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor
sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the
children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with
properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa CayetanoCuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with
CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over
the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction
and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes
and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUE: Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI
Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings

RULING: Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If
this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of
the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

4. TASIANA ONGSINGCO VS. HON. BIENVENIDO TAN AND JOSE DE BORJA

JULY 25, 1955| BAUTISTA ANGELO

FACTS: Petitioner TasianaOngsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was
declared incompetent by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving
spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being settled in Spec. Pro. No. 7866 in the same court.
Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa
Tangco.After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land
situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing
thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained
from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands has been resolved by the court or by
agreement of the parties.

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Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed out
elsewhere and not by the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent
Jose from interfering with the harvest. The CFI of NueveEcija granted the preliminary injunction
prayed for by Tasiana.
Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay
harvested in the disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
She then filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between
TasianaOngsingco and Jose de Borja?

RULING: No. In Franco vs. O’Brien, it was held that “the question of ownership is one which should
be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the
property is alleged to belong to the estate”. In another case it was held that “the general rule is that
questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings” or
stating the rule more elaborately, “When questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to
be a part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person to be his property,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative
proceedings”.
Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in
acting upon the question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been
squarely raised in an action pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what
respondent court merely did was look into the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily
imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one can hardly draw the line of
demarcation that would separate one from the other.

5. URIARTE VS. CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, 33 SCRA 252 (1970)

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein that as a natural son of the
latter, he was his sole heir and that during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil
Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son.
HiginioUriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-
mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had
executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain. Juan UriarteZamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged
to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss.

Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to
take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Negros
Court sustained Juan UriarteZamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No.
6344 pending before it.

After proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to
probate the document submitted to it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate
appearing not to have been contested.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Negros Court has jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case.
2. WON the petitioner is correct in contending that since the Negros Court had first taken
cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special

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 Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special
Proceeding No. 51396

RULING:

1. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original
exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or intestate. While
their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue , or the
particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is
regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the
province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the
estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the
Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate.

2. It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of
a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally
true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a
will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

6. OCAMPO VS. POTENCIANO 89 PHIL 160 (1951)

FACTS: EdilbertoOcampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed purporting to convey to his
relative, ConradoPotenciano, and the latter's wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro
for the sum of P2,5000, a town a lot with a house as strong materials standing thereon. On that same
day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear that the vendees were leasing to him the
house and lot for the duration of the redemption period. Though registered in the name of Ocampo
alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as conjugal property.

Potenciano filed with the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title in his
name and his wife. Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to repurchase the property and to lease the
same. Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a cross-complaint,
alleging that the option to purchase granted by their father to plaintiff was null and void as to the
share of their deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share passed to
them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in the same property they, the
intervenors, were exercising the right of redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held
in common, for which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth day
after they learned of said option through plaintiff's complaint.

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ISSUE: WON the CA erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto
administrator of the conjugal estate

RULING: Yes, the CA erred in deciding that the surviving spouse had such authority. As pointed out
by appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are now obsolete. Those
decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the
husband must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed by Act No. 3176
(approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, which provides that
when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must
be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.

Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the option agreement in
question was nothing more than mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgagee debt,
since in the mind of the parties the real transaction had between them was that of loan with security,
or equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form of sale with right to
repurchase.

7. PRADO vs NATIVIDAD, G.R. No. L-23235, August 27, 1925

FACTS:Casimiro Natividad and Maria Prado contracted marriage in the month of May, 1889. Casimiro
Natividad brought to the marriage some real properties which he had received from his mother as
his future share in her inheritance. Maria Prado did not bring anything. During the marriage the
spouses acquired on different dates real and personal properties. On April 27, 1904, Maria Prado died
from pulmonary tuberculosis in Manila, where she had been taken for treatment.

On the 14th day of February, 1917, Jose Maria Prado, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of
the deceased Maria Prado, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against
Casimiro Natividad, wherein he alleged that the latter had refused to make an liquidation of the
estate of the conjugal partnership brought into existence by the marriage of Casimiro Natividad and
the deceased Maria Prado and which was dissolved by the death of the latter, and prayed the court
for judgment, decreeing the liquidation of said partnership, adjudicating to the plaintiff administrator
one-half of the conjugal property described in the complaint with its products, that is to say, one-half
of P26,125, Philippine currency, with the costs of the action.

The lower court rendered judgment, holding that no residue existed which should be divided
between the husband and the heirs, and dismissing the complaint.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the trial court erred in not ordering a formal liquidation of the conjugal partnership
formed by the spouses Casimiro Natividad and Maria Prado
2. Whether the trial court erred in having taken into account the value of the property of the
conjugal partnership at the time of the acquisition thereof, and not of its liquidation
3. Whether the trial court erred in charging to the conjugal partnership debts contracted for the
expenses of the administration of the property of the conjugal partnership and the last sickness
and funeral of Maria Prado

RULING:
1. NO. The complaint filed herein contains a detailed statement of the movable and immovable
properties that were acquired during marriage. At the trial of the case, evidence was introduced
tending to show the existence of said properties with their prices and fruits. Also evidence was
introduced in an attempt to show the true expenses incurred during the administration of the
conjugal partnership. With that evidence in the record, it is not necessary to order the defendant,
in his capacity as administrator of the estate of said partnership, to make a formal liquidation
thereof; because what was done during the trial of the case amounts to a liquidation, and to
make another one would be to do double work, and would give rise to new controversies when

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 the liquidation is submitted for the contesting thereof by the adverse party. The trial court has
not, therefore, committed any error in not ordering a formal liquidation.

2. YES. As to the appraisal of the real property of the conjugal partnership, it is not the purchase,
but the market, or in default thereof, the assessed, value at the time of the liquidation that must
be taken into account. (Art. 1428 in connection with art. 1367 of the Civil Code.) Urban, as well as
rural, property has its value in the market which rises and falls according to the movement of the
population, market, and trade, and it is not just nor equitable that the conjugal partnership
should not share the advantages or disadvantages that those fluctuations give to its property.

3. NO. Said debts having been contracted by Casimiro Natividad as legal administrator of the
conjugal partnership formed by virtue of his marriage with Maria Prado, must, according to law
(art. 1408 of the Civil Code), be charged to said partnership at the making of the liquidation
thereof and not to the estate of Maria Prado, inasmuch as she did not personally intervene in
obtaining said loans.

8. DE LA RAMA vs DE LA RAMA, G.R. No. L-7476, October 9, 1913

FACTS: The plaintiff in this action charged her husband with adultery and prayed for a divorce, the
division of the conjugal property, and alimony pendente lite. Defendant in his answer denied the
adultery charged against him, charged his wife with adultery, and alleged that his only income was a
salary of P450 per month received as manager of the firm "Hijos de I. de la Rama." Judgment was
rendered against the defendant by the trial court granting a divorce, dissolving the conjugal
partnership, and allowing plaintiff the sum of P81,042.76 as her share of the conjugal property, and
P3,200 as alimony.

From this judgment the defendant appealed to this court, which reversed the judgment of the trial
court, being of opinion that the evidence showed that both plaintiff and defendant had committed
adultery and that neither was entitled to a divorce.

Thereafter plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which reversed the
judgment of this court and remanded the case to this court for further proceedings.The only thing
considered by the Supreme Court of the United States was that part of the decision of the Court of
First Instance which relate to the right of the plaintiff to a divorce. It did not pass upon the division of
the conjugal property.

ISSUE: Whether the CFI erred in fixing the amount of the half of said alleged conjugal property at
P81,042.75, without having examined the necessary antecedents and data, and, moreover, without
having taken into account the losses suffered and the debts contracted by the firm Hijos de I. de la
Rama.

RULING: The Civil Code states in detail the manner in which the affairs of a conjugal partnership shall
be settled after the same has been dissolved. Article 1418 provides, except in certain cases not here
important, that an inventory shall at once be made. We have held in the case of Alfonso vs. Natividad
(6 Phil. Rep., 240), that when the partnership is dissolved by the death of the husband this inventory
must be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. And in the case of Prado vs.
Lagera, that the inventory thus formed must include the bienesparafernales of the wife. It is very
evident from the provisions of the Civil Code that the inventory includes the capital of the husband,
the dowry of the wife, the bienesparafernales of the wife, and all the property acquired by the
partnership during its existence. After this inventory has been made it is provided by article 1421 that
there shall be first paid the dowry of the wife, in the second place the bienesparafernales of the wife,
in the third place the debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership, and in the fourth place the
capital of the husband.

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Articles 1424 and 1426 then provides as follows:
"ART. 1424. After the deductions from the inventoried estate specified in the three preceding articles
have been made, the remainder of the same estate shall constitute the assets of the conjugal
property."
"ART. 1426. The net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided, share and share alike,
between the husband and the wife, or their respective heirs."

It is thus seen that the conjugal property which is to be divided when the partnership is dissolved is
determined not with reference to the income or profits which may have been received during the
partnership by the spouses, but rather by the amount of the actual property possessed by them at
such dissolution after making the deductions and payments aforesaid. This is positively provided by
article 1424.

An examination of the decision of the Court of First Instance shows that no attempt was made to
comply with any one of these statutory provision. No inventory of the partnership property existing
at the time of the trial, at which the liquidation was made, was ever formed. No provision was made
for paying to the wife the sum of 2,000 pesos which was either the dowry or bienesparafernales of
the wife. No provision was made for returning to the husband his capital in the partnership, which
amounted to at least one-third of the assets of the firm of Hijos de I. de la Rama, which assets,
according to the inventory made January 30, 1901, amounted to 1,130,568 pesos. The court below
rejected entirely the method prescribed by the Civil Code for the liquidation of this partnership and in
fact liquidated it, as appears from the decision, upon an entirely different basis.

It needs no argument to show that this manner of liquidating the affairs of the conjugal partnership
is entirely unwarranted by the law. The theory of the Civil Code is that the conjugal property is the
actual property which is left at the dissolution of the partnership. It can, therefore, never be
determined by adding up the profits, which had been made each year during its existence, and then
saying that result is the conjugal property.

9. FULGENCIO VS GATCHALIAN, GR NO. L-5772 JANUARY 23, 1912

FACTS: Josefa Fulgencio (Fulgencio) and Benita Gatchalian (Gatchalian) were conjointly appointed as
administratrix of the intestate estate of DionisioFulgencio. However, Benita Gatchalian tendered her
resignation which was accepted by the court. The conflict arose when, in the exercise of Fulgencio of
her duties, was not able to acquire possession of the all conjugal private property which was under
the legal possession of Benita Gatchalian, PetronaClavo, Emerita Cristobal, Leoncia Belen and
Gabriela Lopez despite a repeated demand for them to deliver the estate.

In Fulgencio’s complaint, the deceased, DionisioFulgencio, legally married, in second wedlock, the
defendant Benita Gatchalian, with whom he did not have, during the time they were married, any
surviving or posthumous child, and left only one legitimate son, by his first marriage, named
Fernando Fulgencio. On marrying Gatchalian, he brought the sum of 2,500 pesos Mexican currency
as shown as private property and such sum produced, up to the time of the husband's death, several
thousand pesos and the several properties, including the one’s under the supervision of Gatchalian.
With the exception of the said sum of 2,500 pesos Mexican currency, all the conjugal private
properties are under the control and in the legal possession of the defendants.

Gatchalian and the other defendants denied absolutely each and all the facts alleged against them in
the complaint filed by Fulgencio. As a special defense, Gatchalian added that her deceased husband,
DionisioFulgencio, on his marriage with her, brought as property of his own only a few articles from
his drug store, amounting to the sum of 100 pesos; that the defendant Gatchalian, on her marriage
with the said deceased, brought 9,000 pesos in cash and 3,000 pesos in goods; that the profits
obtained by the widow Gatchalian, in the business in which she engaged with the said sum, as well as
with the 100 pesos brought in by her deceased husband, were squandered by the latter in his lifetime

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in gambling, and that consequently, the capital brought to the marriage by Gatchalian, far from
increasing, was considerably diminished. She further claims that all the property designated under
the letters A and G, paragraph 8 of the complaint, was acquired by the defendant Gatchalian with her
own funds, except those which were the subject matter of current accounts, yet unsettled, with
various commercial houses in Manila. The lower court then required Gatchalian to surrender
possession of the properties subject of the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the wife’s paraphernal property must be included in the settlement of the husband’s
estate.

RULING: Yes. It has not been conclusively proven that the property claimed by the administratrix is
paraphernal and belongs exclusively to the defendant Benita Gatchalian. As such they are deemed to
be conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of the conjugal partnership, and therefore, the
administratrix has the right to be placed in possession of the same for the purpose of its inventory in
the special proceedings, without prejudice to the rights of the widow Benita Gatchalian in relation to
her own property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia, for, once the inventory of the property of
the intestate estate has been made, the latter will have the same opportunity to claim the exclusion
of the property belonging to her exclusively and that of the nature of paraphernal property.

10. LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC, 98 PHIL 574 (1956)

FACTS: Lourdes married Francisco and after a big quarrel, Francisco left and was never heard again.
Lourdes also inquired with his friends and family but to no avail. He was no where to be found. And
now, she files a petition to declare the presumption of death of her husband for the purpose of
securing a second marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Francisco could be declared presumptively dead by the court.

RULING: While it is true that a special proceeding is an application to establish a status or right of a
party, or a particular fact, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose to seek the declaration of death
of the husband but not to establish a presumption of death.

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