The Law On Negotiable Instruments by de

IV.
DISPOSITION OF LANDS BY PUBLIC GRANT;

1. Regalian Doctrine;
a. Collado vs CA Oct 4, 2002;

Facts: Edna T. Collado (Collado) filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of
120.0766 hectares situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal. Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot which stated
that, "[tJhis survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." The Republic, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to Collado, et al.'s application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of general default
against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
Issue: Whether Collado, et al. have registrable title over the lot.
SC decision: Collado, et al. did not acquire private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed
reservation. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of CA 141. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal
grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composition con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase. Or, that
he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by CA 141. Clearly, Collado, et al. were unable to acquire a valid and
enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33,
or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, Collado, et al. had acquired
ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. Verily,
Collado, et al. have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed.
Since then, the Lot became nondisposable and inalienable public land. At the time Collado, et al. filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has
been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners' application. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO
33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance
or alienation. CA 141, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Forestlands, including watershed reservations, are
excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
b. Valiao vs Republic Nov 28, 2011;

FACTS: On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC an application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality
of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been
declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for
registration.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio
who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language.
Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse,
notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966,
whenoppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and
Qualified Theft against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for registration of the subject property.Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:WON the piece of land in question alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
HELD: Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of law may be raised. This rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. Due to the
divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.
Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove that: (1)
the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must
consider the same as still inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land
subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
c. Hermoso vs CA Apr 24, 2009;

FACTS: Two lots which form part of a bigger parcel of land were tenanted. The tenants filed an application for the coverage of the landholding
under PD 27. The said application was granted but the issuance of EP in favor of the applicants was suspended because a separate case for the
declaration of tenancy relationship was filed by the said applicants with the DARAB. In the latter case, the DARAB ruled that tenancy relationship
existed. Subsequently, the applicants moved for the issuance of EPs in their favor. The OSEC approved the same. However, upon review by the OP
where the owners raised the issue that the landholding was not within the ambit of PD 27, it having been previously reclassified by the OSEC as
suited for residential, commercial, industrial and urban purposes.
Rulings/Principles:
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS;
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The primary classification
comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.
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Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.
COVERAGE UNDER PD 27;
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is
agricultural. Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows: (c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. And Section 3 (b) specifies
agricultural activity as: (b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of
fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered
as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27.
CONVERSION UNDER RA 3844 AS AMENDED BY RA 6389;
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes
within a certain period was deleted. With the enactment of the amendatory law, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the
conversion of the agricultural land to a non-agricultural purpose within a certain period was deleted. The remedy left available to the tenant is to
claim disturbance compensation.

d. Cariño vs Insular Gov’t Mar 25, 1907;
Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land
he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State
opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo
averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs
Government; and that the right of the State over said land has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine).
Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many
years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by Cariño for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the
absolute owner.
2. Lands of the Public Domain;

a. Republic vs Herbieto May 26, 2005;
Summary: The applicants for judicial title was challenged by the government for failing to comply with the length of ownership required by law of
two parcels of land just recently classified as alienable and disposable.
Rule of Law: A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the
land through publication and service of notice.
Facts: The Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, filed with the MTC a single application for registration of two parcels of land located in
Consolacion, Cebu. They claimed to be owners having purchased the lots from their parents.
The government opposed the registration arguing that: (1) the Herbieto's failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by law; (2)
their evidence were insufficient to prove ownership; and (3) the Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not
subject to private appropriation.
The MTC set the initial hearing on September 3, 1999. All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial
Hearing. A copy of the Notice was also posted on July 27, 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the
municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on August 2, 1999 and The Freeman Banat
News on December 19, 1999.
Issues: Did the MTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: No. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all,
having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and
to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David as well as the MTC Order declaring its Judgment of final and executory, and directing the
LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without
jurisdiction

b. Omandam vs CA Jan 18, 2001;
FACTS: On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling,
Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also issued an Original Title Certificate in his name.
On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that
petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patent
before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola, who
executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title.
On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with
the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they are the true owners of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who have been in possession for almost twenty years.
After the parties were duly heared, the RTC issued a decision on November 15, 1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their
predecessor-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. The court ordered the Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the name of
the petitioners.

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The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the DENR dismissed Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of
Lands. It said that Omandan failed to prove that Lasola committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for
the revocation and cancellation of its title.
On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject land and
surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of Appeals declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private
respondents' accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners'
action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of
possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a possessory action on the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application
and decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?
RULING: Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands
primarily and to the Secretary of the DENR ultimately the authority to dispose public lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire
into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree.
Thus, reversal of the RTC of the award given by the Director of Land to Lasola was in error.
DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions
stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly with the
grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.
Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.
c. Bagunu vs Aggabao Aug 15, 2011

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177
The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioners
free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office). The subject land was previously owned by
Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty.
[3]
Samson Binag. On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands
[4] [5]
Management Bureau). On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as
the free patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent
[6] [7]
application. The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands survey, and the free patent applications uniformly
identified the subject land as Lot322. The deeds covering the second and
[8]
third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land. On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioners
free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23,
[9]
1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR
conducted an ocular inspection and formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates the
[10]
area in dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents].
On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this
lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:
1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;
2. [The petitioners free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D, as included in Lot No. 258;
3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties] respective technical description of x x x
[11]
Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office
denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling.
Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner
[12]
acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot322. On appeal, the DENR Secretary
[13]
affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties respective Deeds of
Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the respondents. The
DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty.
Binags affidavit - claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner
[14]
really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
COURT OF APPEALS RULING

The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the
identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as
[15]
affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality. The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court.
Civil Case No. 751
In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint for reformation of

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instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly identified the boundaries of the land sold,
[16]
the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322, instead of Lot 258.
On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of
[17]
Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss.
After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing a
complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention captioned the respondents causes of action as one for Quieting of
[18]
Title, Reivindicacion and Damages. The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim over Lot 322 is a cloud on their title and ownership
of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully
acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring
[19]
his possession from Lot 258. The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as owners of Lot 322.
After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution on the respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC to suspend the
[20]
civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling. In their prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to:
1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of action xxx for reformation of
contracts be granted;
2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to exclude Lot 322 xxx.
3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.]
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarys jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims
of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot
322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined claims of ownership
over a real property matters beyond the DENRs competence to determine. The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the specialized technical expertise of the DENR. On the contrary,
the issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters
within the competence of the courts. The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to the
evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag
identified in his free patent application; that the area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag),
tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present
possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its ocular investigation. The petitioner also invites our
attention to the incredulity of the respondents claim of ownership over Lot 322, based on Atty. Binags testimony during the hearing on the
respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had they
already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as 1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty.
Binags free patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already
substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership.
Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents favor by claiming that the respondents presented no sufficient evidence
to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title. In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any
reversible error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his
arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
THE RULING
We deny the motion for reconsideration.

Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45
The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged error of the DENR and the CA in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner
bought an error that adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner
apparently took a cue from our April 13, 2009Resolution, denying his petition, since his present motion limitedly argues against the DENRs
jurisdiction and the CAs application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case,
the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual
boundaries in accordance with the parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are instances where the Court departs
from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized
[21] [22]
exceptions. On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR
[23]
Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts, and even on this Court, when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall
consequently confine our discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.
The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive jurisdiction to
manage and dispose of lands of the public domain
[24]
The petitioner insists that under the law actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts belong, and those
involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending
before the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and ordering the
respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.
[25]
In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties written agreement reflects their true intention. In the present
case, this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and third sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court
resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to
[26]
prove not only his ownership, but also the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.

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While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving ownership
of real property extends only to private lands. In the present case, neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents
acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention,
instead of asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioners act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of
[27]
Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public land whose management and disposition belong to the DENR
[28]
Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 292 reads:
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall:
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the
process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such
revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole
agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.]
(Underscoring supplied.)
[29]
Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192, the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the
[30]
DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141) by having direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents against the petitioners free patent
application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both
parties. This issue of identity of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative agency with direct
control over the disposition and management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction
to manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicants entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the
[31]
DENR Regional Office still has to determine the respondents entitlement to the issuance of a free patent in their favor since it merely
ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival
claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of
[32]
the DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands, unless grave abuse of discretion exists.
After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related
[33]
issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction, such as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same
property. Note that the contracts refer to the same property, identified as Lot 322, - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR Secretary and the CA
found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the
[34]
subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of
step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid
authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal
[35]
power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.
The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public lands
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a better right
over Lot 322) does not require the specialized technical expertise of the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts,
appreciation of evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within the competence of regular courts.
We disagree.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
[36]
fact
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means
that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
[37]
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need
only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed out and determined.
[38]
Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served. (Emphases added.)
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, this
issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public
[39]
character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition and management of public lands fall within
[40]
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of
[41]
jurisdiction over possessoryactions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations), the respondents

Page 5 of 29
complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis
to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its
ruling on the respondents reivindicatory action pending final determination by the DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents
entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and his consequent directive for the
respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretarys exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente
[42]
Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al, which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the
rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a
technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when they
apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No costs. SO ORDERED.

d. Gordula vs CA Jan 22, 1998;
FACTS: Petitioner Gordula filed an application for a free patent over a land, which he had been in possession since 1949, in January, 1973. The Free
patent was issued on January 01, 1974. The subject land in 1973 was still part of the Caliraya- LumotRiver Forest reserve and was no longer open to
private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good. Thereafter, on November 18, 1987, the REPUBLIC, thru the
NAPOCOR, filed an action for annulment of petitioner’s Free Patent, cancellation of titles and The CA also held that the petitioners could not claim
ownership by acquisitive prescription since 1969; Gordula had been in possession of the property for only 25 years. The period of Gordula’s
occupancy after 1969 should not be tacked to the period from 1944 since by then the property was not susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation.
HELD: Forest lands/reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession thereof however long can not convert them into private
properties. (Director of Lands vs. CA). This ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Further, no public land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title
from the State. Gordula did not acquire title to the said land prior to its reservation under Proc. . He filed his application 3 years after said
Proclamation was issued in 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya- Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private
ownership as it has been classified as “public forest reserve for public good.”
3. Classification of Public Lands;

a. Republic vs Fabio Dec 23, 2008
Facts: The heirs of Juan Fabio filed an application for registration of title to a Lot which they claim to have been in the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest for more than 100 years. One of the documents they presented as evidence is an approved survey plan which contained a
notation that reads "this survey falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation xxx." Conversely, the Republic of the Philippines opposed the
application, claiming that the Lot sought to be registered falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation
as placed under the exclusive use of the military through three presidential proclamations. The heirs, on the other hand, maintain that they have
acquired a vested right over the Lot by acquisitive prescription.
Issue: Whether a lot under military reservation may be acquired through acquisitive prescription.
Ruling: No. Being a military reservation, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, to which the Lot is a part of, cannot be subject to occupation,
entry or settlement. Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In
view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that it was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is
inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration.
b. Yngson vs Sec. of DENR Jul 20, 1983

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the
Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure question of law was involved in the appeal.
There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the Solicitor-General's brief. We do the same:
The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio
Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond
purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila
Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both
applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond
purposes.
On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by
those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19
and April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes
and the same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of
the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and
rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of
the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and
901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal).
In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director
of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole
area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a petition for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid
order of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by the Office of the President of the Philippines on
December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on
August 3, 1956. A second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also denied on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960,
respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal).
Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance against the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez.

Page 6 of 29
The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries
awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff had not established such "capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President of the
Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special civil action.
The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH 'CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL
EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS- APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT
ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE 'PRIORITY RULE' ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF
THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE
APPLICATIONS OF THE APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING ONLY AND IN
ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS AWARDING ONE-
THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE APPLICANTS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in
interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case.
The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:
SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:
(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of
preference thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered
thereby has been certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT
therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as available for fishpond purposes, provided that not more than
one (1) year has expired since the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond application which was rejected or cancelled
before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond applications filed for the same area shall be rejected.
The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:
1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.
2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947
3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952
4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953
5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five
applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and cnversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed
their applications.
After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngzon's application and rejected those of
Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngzon's priority of application.
We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no grave abuse of discretion.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and
alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23
SCRA 1184).
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while
such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.
All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d"
of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a
period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue
such an administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly
not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private
respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact
that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary's order states that all three applications
must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66
hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in
toto.
The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature application and to
consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not to grant a premature application a better right over another of the same category. We find
such an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed. In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we
reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling
weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate
department head must be respected. The records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present case.

Page 7 of 29
During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Patricio Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and nine other respondents,
declared in contempt of court. Petitioner charged that Bayoborda and Amamio entered the property in controversy and without petitioner's consent,
laid stakes on the ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were claiming; that the other respondents likewise entered the
property on different dates and destroyed petitioner's hut and the uppermost part of his fishpond and started to build houses and to occupy the same.
In their comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied petitioner's charges. Bayoborda and Amamio stated that they were bona-fide
applicants for fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22 hectares alloted for the petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the areas
they applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP)
showing that their applications have been duly received and acknowledged by the latter and in compliance with government regulations, they placed
markers and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise stated that these markers and signs were subsequently destroyed and later
on Mr. Yngson started development by building dikes in the area applied for, which he has no authority to do so due to the present conflict. The
resolution further prohibited Yngson from constructing any improvements in any area outside his 22 hectares and also prohibited Bayoborda and
Amamio from entering and making constructions in the applied for areas pending the issuance of their permits.
The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper administration of justice and
processes of the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of petitioner's rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued
the resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises
factual considerations including boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court.
We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina
v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140,142)
The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one-
third's share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct action before the proper lower court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
c. Republic vs CA, Carag Aug 6, 2008

The Case
1 2 3
This is a petition for review of the 21 May 2001 and 25 September 2002 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
4
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents),
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No.
5
11585 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title
6
were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277, issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000
7
square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278, issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of
6,997,921 square meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of
Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still
classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject
property.
The investigating team reported that:
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag
and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G.
Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-
8
interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.
Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982."
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an
action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the
recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of
9
judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the
subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber
land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion
was classified as alienable and disposable.
10
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original
proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so.
Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private
respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No.
11
496. Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of
the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind

Page 8 of 29
12
against private respondents.
13
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of
Appeals declared:
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains
no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for
Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended
Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around
2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that
hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be
14
threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. (Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
appropriate remedies are no longer available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted
jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.
The Ruling of the Court
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for
annulment of decree has no merit.
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for
15
annulment of decree.
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or
reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of
the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the
timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative
titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First
Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472
16
Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court’s
lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not
alienable and disposable.
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioner’s failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available."
17
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in
the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null
and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
18
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.
Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner’s complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial
19
court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:

Page 9 of 29
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be
referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case.
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims
that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In
effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to
declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the
20
subject matter of the claim. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing
21
of the action.
22
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government, we ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and
timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they
are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any
23
private or juridical person x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands
were deemed alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in
24
accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that
in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and
25
Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.
26
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and
disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to
Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid
law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for
reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or
been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the
Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not
covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish
regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to
private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither
has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.
27
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as
a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The
Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the
28
authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 and 2874. The Court ruled:
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable
and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized
and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the
issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination
that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land
for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land
applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the
land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party
in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural.

Page 10 of 29
Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond
review.
The finality of the trial court’s decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized
that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established
29
under this Constitution." When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an
existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

d. Republic vs Iglesia ni Cristo Jun 30, 2009
Republic v Iglesia ni Cristo G.R. No. 180067 June 30, 2009
FACTS:
The subject of the case is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre located in Ilocos Norte.
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title
before the MCTC in Paoay Currimao. Appended to the application were the Sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo 1001047, the technical description of
subject lot, the Geodetic Engineers Certificate, Tax Declaration No. (TD) 5080261 covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale
executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and
deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs application. Cadastral Court and Court
of Appeals = Rendered in favor of INC.
ISSUE:
May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945?
HELD: No.
It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is
indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on
May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration was filed by INC.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the period of possession is
the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of
the application for registration of title is filed. In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in
Naguit, the Court ruled that
the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed
.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is
also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors In interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945,
as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and occupation from Sabuco, including those
of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC had been in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property.
These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s witnesses
4. Non-Registrable Properties;

a. Chavez vs Public Estates Authority Jul 9, 2002;
Facts: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed
foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources
of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain
b. MIAA vs CA Jul 20, 2006;

Page 11 of 29
Facts: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real
estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy
on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should
MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the
Airport Lands and Buildings.
The City of Parañaque contended that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “government-
owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of
public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Parañaque can impose real tax, levy against and auction for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
Held: MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion
and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420
of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes
seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and
domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of
the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property
whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public use.”
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of
public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on
execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and
compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
c. Ramos vs Director of Lands Nov 19, 1918;

Facts:In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva
Ecija. Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land (by taking advantage of the Maura Law or Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1994) and
registered the land in 1896. In 1907, the part of the land was sold by Ponce to petitioner Ramos and to his wife Ambrosia Salamanca. Ramos
instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. The Director of Lands and Director of Forestry opposed the application on the
following grounds: Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and such parcel was forest land. RTC and CA ruled against
Ramos. It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to Ramos at least held this tract of land under color of title.
Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?
Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in O.P.N. possession;
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property,
sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural
public land.
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against
the Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except when
prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is a forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular
piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the
court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with
authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Ruling: Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No.
926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and Ponce’s possessory
information. RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A.

d. Amunategui vs Director of Forestry Nov 29, 1983;
FACTS: Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar
Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry,

Page 12 of 29
through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp
which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion
of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have
on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private
persons for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation
of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari
was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint
against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in
favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain.
The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision
after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove
swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.
RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed
to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being
classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as
stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime
Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as “public forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.
e. Sta. Rosa Realty Dev’t Corp vs CA Oct 12, 2001

[1]
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
[2]
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (hereafter DARAB) ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioners property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay
Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are
[3]
watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area.
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985,
[4]
respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of
counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents.
In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate complaints for forcible entry
[5]
against respondents.
After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the compulsory acquisition of the
SRRDC property under the CARP.
On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of coverage to petitioner and invited
[6]
its officials or representatives to a conference on August 18, 1989. During the meeting, the following were present: representatives of petitioner, the
Land Bank of the Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna, the BARC Chairman of Barangay Casile and some potential farmer
beneficiaries, who are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the consensus and recommendation of the assembly that the
landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition.
On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a Protest and Objection to the
compulsory acquisition of the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with
[7]
slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the
land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of
[8]
the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory Acquisition Folder
[9]
Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO).
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR forwarded two (2)
Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to the President, Land
[10]
Bank of the Philippines for further review and evaluation.

Page 13 of 29
[11]
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to petitioner, stating that
petitioners landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and
P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
[12]
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the
two (2) notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just compensation under R. A. No.
6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders previously referred for review and evaluation to the Director of BLAD
mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to forward the two (2) claim
folders involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation for the land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles were exempt
from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two (2) claim folders (CACFs) to the Executive Director of the DAR
Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation.Acting on the CACFs, on September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the
[13]
office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory
Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations)
and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two issues raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of
the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory
acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said
property. During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically concerning the parcels of
land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties interested, setting the hearing for the administrative valuation of the
subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma. Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the
Board requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction of the records of the case because the records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty.
Ricardo Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for SRRDC and had possession of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and could
not be contacted. The Board granted counsels request and moved the hearing to April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDCs petition for exemption from CARP coverage
before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without objection from
counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of subject property at Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and
marked as Exhibit 5 for SRRDC. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification issued
on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were classified as industrial Park per Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-
[14]
89 dated March 29, 1989.
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a
[15]
petition with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to address the issue of beneficiaries.
[16]
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision, finding that private respondents
illegally entered the SRRDC property, and ordered them evicted.
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust account
in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:
1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation
(Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766 hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of
Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-One
Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos (P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer
Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should there be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for
said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation;
3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and new one be issued
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and encumbrances;
4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional Office, Region IV, to
conduct a final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the
Register of Deeds to the name of the Republic of the Philippines;
5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to take immediate
possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the
immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao,
[17]
Laguna.
[18]
On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. B-2333 ruling that respondents
were builders in bad faith.

Page 14 of 29
[19]
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the DARAB decision. On November 5, 1993, the
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated September 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa
[20]
Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court on the issue of just compensation.
[21]
Hence, this petition.
On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:
G. R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) Considering the compliance, dated December 13, 1993,
filed by counsel for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8, 1993 which required petitioner to post a cash bond or surety bond in the amount of
P1,500,000.00 Pesos before issuing a temporary restraining order prayed for, manifesting that it has posted a CASH BOND in the same amount with
the Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the attached official receipt no. 315519, the Court resolved to ISSUE the Temporary Retraining Order
prayed for.
The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing its decision dated December 19,
1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which
ordered, among others, the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take
immediate possession of the landholding in dispute after title shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines and to
distribute the same through the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian
Officer of Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons
acting for and in their behalf and under their authority from entering the properties involved in this case and from introducing permanent
infrastructures thereon; and (c) the private respondents from further clearing the said properties of their green cover by the cutting or burning of trees
[22]
and other vegetation, effective today until further orders from this Court.
The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a
watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657.
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. In the case at bar, the Department
of Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16, to wit:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
a.) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners
thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall
of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay corresponding value in accordance
with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
b.) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his
administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c.) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days
after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and other muniments of title.
d.) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After the
expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days
after it is submitted for decision.
e.) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this act, the
DAR shall make immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue Transfer Certificate of
Titles (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to
the qualified beneficiaries.
[23]
f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After
identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place
in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within
thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title.Within thirty days
from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the
DARs offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The
landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within
thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party
may question the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts (provisionally the Supreme Court designated branches of the regional trial court
as special agrarian courts) for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and
the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued
Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with the assistance of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall:

Page 15 of 29
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area of responsibility; the masterlist should include such
information as required under the attached CARP masterlist form which shall include the name of the landowner, landholding area,
TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the
CARP except those for which the landowners have already filed applications to avail of other modes of land acquisition. A case
folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1MARO investigation report
b) CARP CA Form No 2 Summary investigation report findings and evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3Applicants Information sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the
same are true and correct.
3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case
Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference meeting shall also be sent to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC
representatives, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and the other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the
valuation of the property.
He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The
landowner shall also ask to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form
an integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, series of 1988. The
valuation worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO and all the personnel who
participated in the accomplishment of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular inspection and verification of the property. This ocular
inspection and verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds P500,000 per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with the duly accomplished valuation forms and his
recommendations, to the Central Office.
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the
property covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared and duly certified by the BLAD
Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized representative, a notice of acquisition (CARP Form 8) for the subject
property. Serve the notice to the landowner personally or through registered mail within three days from its approval. The notice shall
include among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DARs offered value, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the order of
acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a summary
administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with the procedures provided under Administrative Order No.
13, series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARABs decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to
the Secretary for approval the required order of acquisition.
4. Upon the landowners receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection
or non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall
take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries.
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all
agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory
Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a Notice of Coverage and a letter of
invitation to a conference/ meeting over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the
representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to discuss
the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is
asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the
land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the computed value of the estate exceeds
P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the
DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary
or his duly authorized representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject property. From this point, the provisions of R. A. No. 6657, Section 16
shall apply.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary
conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No.
12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be
understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise
of the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an

Page 16 of 29
exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the
owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking
contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and
all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with
the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that The CARP Law, for its part, conditions
the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of
[24]
ownership is contemplated either.
Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals DARABs decision ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioners property.
[25]
Here, petitioner pressed the question of whether the property was a watershed, not covered by CARP.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of
Natural resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the
owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere
with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters.
Watersheds may be defined as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds. Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The
answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the property as watershed
area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as PARK by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as
certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a
[26]
Resolution voiding the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now classified as agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent
domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given
[27]
political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.
[28]
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform we held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL
may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land
[29]
in question form a vital part of a watershed area.
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a watershed or part of the protected area for watershed purposes. Ecological
balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land must be aware of this
deadly combination. In the case at bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory acquisition simply because the land was allegedly
devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable land that may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land
form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. In a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau
(ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they concluded that:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the
Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger
the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which
acts as recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matang Tubig
structures they couldnt care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected
by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities
like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures.Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately
stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degredation threatens the livelihood of
thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be
immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and program be formulated and implemented by the Canlubang Estate in coordination
[30]
with pertinent government agencies.
The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team headed by Dr. Emilio Rosario, the ERDB Director, who holds a doctorate degree in water
resources from U.P. Los Banos in 1987; Dr. Medel Limsuan, who obtained his doctorate degree in watershed management from Colorado University
(US) in 1989; and Dr. Antonio M. Dano, who obtained his doctorate degree in Soil and Water management Conservation from U.P. Los Banos in
1993.
Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the President dated September 7, 1993 (Subject: PFVR HWI Ref.: 933103
Presidential Instructions on the Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna) which reads:
It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations,
among others. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP beneficiaries will be affected, it is important that a larger view of the situation
be taken as one should also consider the adverse effect on thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained
for watershed purposes.
The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate area be allocated for the affected farmers, and that the Canlubang Estates

Page 17 of 29
[31]
be mandated to protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent watershed reserved.
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the
most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has
slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides:
Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers,
church sites and convents appurtenent thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the
inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act.
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory
acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-
evaluation of the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved
to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary
restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
f. Palomo vs CA Jan 21 1997;

FACTS: Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands
and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original
certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954
President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the
Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither
susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however,
continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts.
On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a
loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE: Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.
HELD: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of
the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of
improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
g. Republic vs Southside Homeowners Association Inc. Sep 22, 2006

Before the Court are these two petitions having, as common denominator, the issue of ownership of a large tract of land.
In the first, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 156951, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
[1]
seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision dated January 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59454, affirming the dismissal
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, of the Republics complaint for declaration of nullity and cancellation of a land title
against the herein private respondent, the Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (SHAI). \
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 173408, petitioners Rene Saguisag and five (5) retired military officers pray that Lt.
Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., the present Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), be asked to show cause why he should not
be cited for contempt for having announced time and again that the military officers and their families in the contempt action would be ousted and
evicted from the property subject of the main petition even before the issue of ownership thereof is finally resolved by the Court.
[2]
After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 156951, the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA), followed by the Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP, joined causes with the petitioner Republic and thus sought leave to
[3] [4]
intervene. The Court, per its Resolutions dated September 3, 2003, and September 29, 2003, respectively, allowed the intervention and admitted
the corresponding petitions-for-intervention.
Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both petitions were ordered consolidated.
The Republics recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast against the following backdrop:
[5]
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 establishing a military reservation known as Fort William
McKinley later renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). The proclamation withdr[ew] from sale or settlement and
reserve[d] for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff of the [AFP] the [certain] parcels of the public domain [indicated in
plan Psu-2031] situated in the several towns and a city of what was once the Province of Rizal. On its face, the proclamation covers three (3) large
parcels of land, to wit: Parcel No. 2 (portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A). Parcel No. 3 with an area of 15,912,684 square meters
and Parcel No. 4 with an area of 7,660,128 square meters are described in the proclamation as situated inside Fort McKinley, Rizal. Specifically
mentioned as excluded from Parcel No. 4 albeit within its boundaries are the American Battle Monument Cemetery (606,985 sq. m.), the Traffic
Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and the Diplomatic and Consular area (100,000 sq.m.).
Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding certain defined areas from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
[6] [7]
declaring them open for disposition. These are Proclamation No. 461 and Proclamation No. 462, both series of 1965, excluding portions of the

Page 18 of 29
reservation and declaring them the AFP Officers Village and the AFP EMs Village, respectively, to be disposed of under Republic Act (R.A.)
[8] [9]
274 and R.A. 730 in relation to the Public Land Act (C.A. 141, as amended). Excluded, too, under Proclamation No. 172 dated October 16, 1987
and to be disposed pursuant to the same laws aforementioned, save those used or earmarked for public/quasi-public purposes, are portions of the
reservation known as Lower and Upper Bicutan, Western Bicutan and the Signal Village, all in Taguig, Metro Manila.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and Development Act (R.A. 7227, as amended), investing the BCDA the power to own,
[10]
hold and administer portions of Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President and to dispose, after the lapse of a
[11]
number of months, portions of Fort Bonifacio.
At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less,
known as or are situated in what is referred to as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio. As may be gathered from the pleadings, military
officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed
by the AFP on the JUSMAG area.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able
[12]
to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 15084 - in its name to the bulk of, if
not the entire, JUSMAG area. TCT No. 15084 particularly describes the property covered thereby as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmang (sic)
Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx.
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as shown on subdivision Plan Psd 76057, being a portion of parcel 3 of plan
Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, FortBonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (1,320)
SQUARE METERS xxx.. (Underscoring added.)
[13]
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991 on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly executed on the
same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total purchase
price as written in the conveying deed wasP11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter.
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of
the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The
results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino are embodied in his Questioned Documents Report (QDR)
[14]
No. 815-1093. Its highlights:
QUESTIONED SPECIMENS:
1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) containing the signature of
ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR. designated as Q-961 .
2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of SHAI containing the signature of ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.
... designated as Q-962.
PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
To determine whether or not the questioned and sample/specimen signatures ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR. were
written by one and the same person.
FINDINGS:
Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the specimens, submitted, under stereoscopic microscope and
magnifying lens, with the aid of photographic enlargement reveals that there exist fundamental, significant differences in writing
characteristics between the questioned and the standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." such as in:
- The questioned signatures show slow, drawn, painstaking laborious manner in execution of strokes; that of the
standard/sample signatures show free, rapid coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the manner of execution of letters/elements.
Furthermore, the questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a product of TRACING
PROCESS by CARBON-OUTLINE METHOD.
CONCLUSION: Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned and the standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO
G. PALAD, JR." were not written by one and the same person. The questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD,
JR." marked "Q-961" is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon process.
REMARKS: The other questioned Deeds of Sale containing the signatures of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." are still
[15]
in the process of examination.
[16]
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a
bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding
nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63883 and eventually
raffled to Branch 71 of the court, the Republic alleged that fraud attended SHAIs procurement of TCT No. 15084. In paragraph No. 5 of the
complaint, the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is void owing, inter alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying deed is spurious as
the purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged
payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No.
[17]
423.
In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI denied the material allegations of the complaint and countered that the impugned title as well as
[18]
the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale are valid documents which the Republic is estopped to deny. SHAI also alleged paying in full the purchase price
indicated in the deed as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 6030203-C dated October 29, 1991.
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in
evidence) the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B." Respondent,
then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and B as its Exhibits "1" and 2, respectively. As the pre-trial order was written, it would appear that the
[19]
parties agreed to limit the issue to the due execution and genuineness of Exhs. A and B.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No.

Page 19 of 29
815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit A is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the
same document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point,
Palad stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the
LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place. The testimony of other witnesses revolved around the absence of bureau records respecting SHAIs
[20]
application to acquire, payment of the purchase price and Psd-76057, the plan described in TCT No. 15084.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who brought
with him PNP QDR No. 001-96 and testified that Palads signature in Exhibit A (same as Exh. 1) is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI
[21]
president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by
the payment in full of the contract price. Atty. Vicente Garcia, the then Register of Deeds of Rizal, also testified about his having endorsed to Palad a
letter-inquiry he received from SHAI respecting the authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palads response-letter dated January 23, 1992 (Exh. 10),
according to Atty. Garcia, is to the effect that TCT No. 15084 must be genuine as it emanated from the Registrys office on the basis of the October
[22]
30, 1991 Deed of Sale. On rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit 10 and an LMB official would disclaim transmitting the same to Atty.
[23]
Garcia. Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Republics complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint dated November 15, 1991 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
The counterclaims are also DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
In not so many words, the trial court considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic
went on appeal to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 59454.
[24]
In the herein assailed Decision dated January 28, 2003, the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court. Hence, this petition of the
Republic on the threshold abstract submission that the CA completely ignored, overlooked and/or grossly misappreciated facts of substance which, if
duly considered, will materially affect the outcome of this case.
In its COMMENT To Petition, private respondent SHAI parlays the what-can-be-raised line. It urges the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
the issues raised therein, particularly those bearing on the authenticity of Exhibit A/1, are mainly questions of fact, adding that the matter of the
inalienability of the area purportedly sold is outside the issue agreed upon during the pre-trial stage.
The desired dismissal cannot be granted on the bases of the reasons proffered above. While the Court, in a petition for review of CA
decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far from absolute. Reyes v.
[25] [26]
Court of Appeals, citing Floro v. Llenado, for one, suggests as much. In Floro, we wrote:
xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court to review the finding of facts of
the [CA], summarized in and subsequent cases as follows: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the [CA] are based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; 6) ; 7) ; 8) ; 9) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if
properly considered would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of facts are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Words in bracket, added.)
To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least three of the exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9.
Private respondent SHAIs stance about the petitioner Republic being barred from raising the issue of inalienability since it failed to plead or assert
[27]
the same at the pre-trial proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the general rule, as articulated in Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, is
that the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of others on appeal. It should be pointed out, however, that the
rationale for such preliminary, albeit mandatory, conference is to isolate as far as possible the trial out of the realm of surprises and back-handed
[28]
maneuverings. And lest it be overlooked, the adverted rule on the procedure to be observed in pre-trials is, as Bergano v. Court of Appeals teaches,
[29]
citing Gicano v. Gegato, subject to exceptions. And without meaning to diminish the importance of the same rule, the Court is possessed with
[30]
inherent power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the demands of justice so require.
Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be generally observed in pre-trial conferences hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to
tackling the question of inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue more legal than factual. As it were, the element of surprise is not really
present here. For the issue of inalienability, which is central to the Republics cause of action, was raised in its basic complaint, passed upon by the
[31]
CA and, before it, by the trial court and of which at least one witness (Palad) was examined as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of land in question at the time of the land alleged sale was part of the
[FBMR]. Now as part of the [FBRM] do you know whether the said parcel of land can be the subject of disposition?
A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be sold and it is already part of those government lands that has been
assigned to other government agencies that is no longer within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say I have no more say on that
[32]
because the proclamation to the effect was reserving this for particular purpose under the DND . (Words in bracket added.)
[33]
At any rate, Palads testimony drew nary an objection from private respondent SHAI. It even cross-examined said witness. The rule
obtains that the introduction of evidence bearing on an issue not otherwise included in the pre-trial order amounts to implied consent conferring
[34]
jurisdiction on the court to try such issue.
Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we now consider the clashing assertions regarding the JUSMAG area. Was it, during
the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been
separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The Republics and the intervenors parallel assertions are correct.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract
[35]
or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such
tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable.
[36]
Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private
[37]
appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public
[38]
land. And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by
[39]
presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a
purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. So it must be here. There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the
questioned October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent

Page 20 of 29
[40]
SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that subject land is within military reservation, and even
[41]
dared to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se, its
own evidence themselves belie its posture. We start with its Exhibit 2 (petitioners Exh. B), a copy of TCT No. 15084, which described
the area covered thereby measuring 399,922 square meters as a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031 situated in Jusmang (sic)
area Fort Bonifacio. Complementing its Exhibit 2 is its Exhibit 1 - the deed of sale - which technically described the property purportedly being
conveyed to private respondent SHAI as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic)
area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx (Emphasis added)
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described in private respondents Exhibits 1 and 2, formed part of that wide expanse
under Proclamation No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land of the public domain as falling within its coverage. These
include, inter alia, the entire 15,912,684-square meter area constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 located inside the now
renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a redundant point, was declared a military reservation.
The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation Map of Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu
[42]
2031 prepared in September 1995 and certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates in colored ink the
outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by Proclamation No. 423. As there also shown, the 399,992-square meter area embraced by SHAIs TCT
No. 15084, defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the violet-colored borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No.
423.
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084 was and is still part of the FBMR, more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter
Parcel No. 3 of the reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors BCDA, DND and AFP in this appellate proceedings, has
maintained all along this thesis. Towards discharging its burden of proving that the disputed property is part of the reservation, the petitioner
Republic need only to demonstrate that all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 have been reserved for military
purposes. The evidence, however, of the fact of reservation is the law or, to be more precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself, the contents and issuance
[43]
of which courts can and should take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to
the proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered
inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the appellate court seemed to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind
eye on, certain admissions made by the private respondent, the most basic being those made in its answer to the Republics allegations in paragraph 5
(e) and (g) of its complaint. To the Republics allegations that the property covered by TCT No. 15084 was and remains part the FBMR, SHAIs
answer thereto reads:
2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs 5 of the complaint, the truth of the matter being that in the
Deed of Sale , the Director of Lands Certificate (sic) that he is authorized under the law to sell the subject property and that the
[44]
lots were duly awarded by the [LBM] to the vendee. ( Emphasis and word in bracket added.)
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the petitioner Republic alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the formers
denial to such allegations on the inalienable nature of the property covered by TCT No. 15084 being in the nature of a general denial. Under the rules
[45]
on pleadings, a specific, not a general, denial is required; a denial is not specific because it is so qualified or termed specific by the pleader. The
defendant must specify each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely denies and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the
[46]
substance of the matters upon which he will rely to support his denial. Else, the denial will be regarded as general and will, therefore, be regarded
as an admission of a given material fact/s stated in the complaint.
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to enter what, under the Rules, is tantamount to a general denial of the
Republics averments that what SHAIs TCT No. 15084 covers is part of the military reservation. In the process, private respondent SHAI is deemed to
admit the reality of such averment.
To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had more than sufficiently established its claim on the inalienability of the parcels of
land covered by TCT No. 15084. In fine, it had discharged the burden of proof on the issue of inalienability. Be that as it may, the burden of evidence
to disprove inalienability or, to be precise, that said parcels of land had, for settlement purposes, effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or
excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423, devolves upon the private respondent. This is as it should be for the cogency of SHAIs claim
respecting the validity of both the underlying deed of sale (Exh. A/1) and its TCT No. 15084 (Exh. B/2) rests on the postulate that what it purportedly
bought from the LMB had ceased to be part of the reserved lands of the public domain. Elsewise put, SHAI must prove that the JUSMAG area had
been withdrawn from the reservation and declared open for disposition, failing which it has no enforceable right over the area as against the State.
Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden by reason of lack of evidence. To be sure, it has not, because it cannot even if it
wanted to, pointed to any presidential act specifically withdrawing the disputed parcels from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423. Worse still, its
[47]
own Exhibit 5, a letter dated March 19, 1991 of then PA Commanding General, M/Gen Lisandro Abadia, to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the
SHAI, cannot but be viewed as a partys judicial admission that the disputed land has yet to be excluded from the military reservation. The Abadia
letter, with its feature dis-serving to private respondent SHAI, reads in part as follows:
Dear Mrs. Gabon:

This is in connection with your move to make a petition to President Aquino regarding the possible exclusion of
Southside Housing Area from the military reservation and for its eventual allotment to the military officers presently residing
thereat. Allow me to state that I interpose no objection . I find it helpful to our officers to be provided a portion of
the Fort Bonifaciomilitary reservation . (Underscoring added.)
Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard put to understand how the CA could still have found for SHAI.. The
[48]
appellate court, apparently swayed by what SHAI said in its Brief for the Appellees that:
Appellant [petitioner Republic] is probably unaware that , then President Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation 461 when he excluded
from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 an area of 2,455,810 square meters more or less. Likewise on October 16, 1987, then President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 also located at
Fort Bonifacio containing an area of 4,436, 478 . So if we deduct the 6,892,288 [2,455,810 + 4,436,478 = 6,892,288] square meters covered
by Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 of the areas reserved for military purposes of 7,053,143 square meters, what is only left is 160,857
[49]
square meters or more or less 16 hectares .
justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land with the following disquisition:

Page 21 of 29
The foregoing admission aside, appellants [now petitioners] reliance on Proclamation No. 493 [should be 423] in insisting that the land in
litigation is inalienable because it is part of the [FBMR] is too general to merit serous consideration. While it is true that, under the
said July 12, 1957 Proclamation, then President Carlos P. Garcia reserved the area now known as FortBonifacio for military purposes,
appellee [now respondent] correctly calls our attention to the fact, among other matters, that numerous exceptions thereto had already been
declared through the years. The excluded areas under Proclamation No. 461, dated September 29, 1965 and Proclamation No. 172,
dated October 16, 1987 alone already total 6,892,338 square meters. (Figures in bracket added.)
The CAs justifying line does not commend itself for concurrence.
For one, it utilizes SHAIs misleading assertion as a springboard to justify speculative inferences. Per our count, Proclamation 423 reserved
for military purposes roughly a total area of 25,875,000 square meters, not 7,053,143. On the other hand, Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172
excluded a combined area of 6,892,338 square meters. Now then, the jump from an acknowledgment of the disputed parcels of land having
been reserved for military purposes to a rationalization that they must have been excluded from the reservation because 6,892,338 square
meters had already been withdrawn from Proclamation 423 is simply speculative. Needless to stress, factual speculations do not make for
proof.
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent SHAI - and quite understandably, the appellate court - had not pointed to any
proclamation, or legislative act for that matter, segregating the property covered by TCT No. 15084 from the reservation and classifying
the same as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To reiterate what we earlier said, lands of the public domain classified as a
military reservation remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from such classification and
[50]
declared open to disposition. The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its authenticity,
could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent
SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area
[51]
is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were,
still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of the JUSMAG area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its
reclassification as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Still, such hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI.
[52]
The reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas had stated the observation that the reason for the ban is not very
[53]
clear under existing jurisprudence, the fact remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are prohibited from purchasing or otherwise acquiring
alienable public lands.
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this disposition. An appropriate closure to this case could not be had, however,
without delving to an extent on the issue of the validity of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale which necessarily involves the question of the
authenticity of what appears to be Palads signature thereon .With the view we take of the case, the interplay of compelling circumstances and
inferences deducible therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.
Consider:
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The Court perceives no reason why he should lie, albeit respondent
[54]
states, without elaboration, that Palads declaration is aimed at avoiding criminal prosecution. The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads
[55]
allegation on forgery. Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the
NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity,
Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to PasigCity to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry
and there stamped Received by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In
other words, the whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is
why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed
notarized.
[56]
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act. There is also
no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the
property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC,
[57]
Records Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B.
Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry
[58]
pertaining to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the deed of sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203C dated 29
October 1991, (sic) as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price.. An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove
[59]
payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment, it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence.
A Certification under date September 15, 1993 of the OIC Cash Division, LMB, states that OR # 6030203 in the amount of P11,977,000.00
supposedly paid by [SHAI] is not among the series of [ORs] issued at any time by the National Printing Office to the Cashier, LMB, Central Office.
[60]
A copy of the OR receipt is not appended to any of the pleadings filed before the Court. We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if
it does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
[61]
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount
apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit.

Page 22 of 29
A final consideration in G.R. No. 156951. This case could not have come to pass without the participation of a cabal of cheats out to make a
dishonest buck at the expense of the government and most likely the members of SHAI. No less than its former president (Ms. Virginia Santos)
testified that a facilitator did, for a fee, the necessary paper and leg work before the LMB and the Registry of Deeds that led to the execution of
[62]
the Deed of Sale and issuance of the certificate of title in question. Ms. Santos identified Eugenia Balis, a geodetic engineer, as
[63] [64]
the facilitator who facilitated all these presentation of documents, and most of the time, directly transacted with the LMB and the Register of
[65]
Deeds leading to acquisition of title. Engr. Balis was, in the course of Ms. Santos testimony, directly mentioned by name for at least fifteen (15)
[66]
times. Not surprisingly, Engr. Balis did not appear in court, despite SHAIs stated intention to present her as witness.
The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio land involved in this and the NOVA area litigations is, as described in the Report of the
[67]
FactFinding Commission, so epic in scale as to make the overpricing of land complained of in the two hundred AFP [Retirement and Separation
[68]
Benefits System] RSBS cases (P703 million) seem like petty shoplifting in comparison. The members of private respondent SHAI may very well
have paid for what they might have been led to believe as the purchase price of the JUSMAG housing area. The sad reality, however, is that the
over P11 Million they paid, if that be the case, for a piece of real estate contextually outside the commerce of man apparently fell into the wrong
hands and did not enter the government coffers. Else, there must be some memorials of such payment.At bottom, this disposition is nothing more
than restoring the petitioner Republic, and eventually the BCDA, to what rightfully belongs to it in law and in fact. There is nothing unjust to this
approach.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 173408 need not detain us long. As it were, the question raised by the
petitioners therein respecting the ownership of the JUSMAG area and, accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain in
the housing units each may be occupying is now moot and academic. However, contempt petitioners expressed revulsion over the efforts of the
military establishment, particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from their respective dwellings, if that really be the case, even before G.R.
No. 156951 could be resolved, is understandable as it is justified. We thus end this ponencia with a reminder to all and sundry that might is not
always right; that ours is still a government of laws and not of men, be they in the civilian or military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not treat
lightly any attempt to trifle, intended or otherwise, with its processes and proceedings. A becoming respect to the majesty of the law and the
prerogatives of the Court is a must for the orderly administration of justice to triumph.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is GRANTED and the appealed CA Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 (Exh. A/1) purportedly executed in favor of private respondent SHAI and TCT No. 15084 (Exh. B/2) of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis ofsuch deed are declared VOID. The Register of Deeds of Pasig
or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby ordered to CANCEL TCT No. 15084 in the name of SHAI and the area covered thereby
is DECLARED part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the same has, in the interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation from
such reservation. Private respondent SHAI, its members, representatives and/or their assigns shall vacate the subject parcels of land immediately
upon the finality of this decision, subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development
Act . Cost against the private respondent SHAI.
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further thereon other than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same. SO
ORDERED.
h. Republic vs CA and Republic Nov 25, 1998(see J. Puno concurring opinion);
FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their
own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct,
maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with
the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and
entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of
the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the
commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. RTC
rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
ISSUEs: Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area and Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area are
within the commerce of man.
HELD: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes
the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a
low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International
Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If
the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify
the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
i. Almagro vs Kwan Oct 20, 2011 CARPIO, J.

FACTS
This case involves a 17,181 square meter land which is known as Lot No. 6278-M located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and
inherited by respondents from their parents who died in 1976 and 1986respectively.

Page 23 of 29
On September 18, 1996, respondents filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners as well as
those who are occupants within the boundary of the land in controversy.
During the pre-trial, the Court and the parties designated geodetic engineer Suasin to perform the task of verification and relocation survey
of said lot and which was accordingly executed on September 12-13, 2000.
In the written report of Engr. Suasin, it contained, inter alia, that the big portion of the lot is submerged under the sea and a small portion
remain as dry land, and that some of the defendants have constructed buildings or houses inside the dry land.
In the Court’s judgment dated May 11, 2001, the MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of Lot No.
6278-M has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.
Respondents appealed to the RTC, which subsequently concluded upon conducting two ocular inspections, that the disputed remaining
portion is not foreshore land because it remained dry even during high tides.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but were denied. They also filed separate petitions for review withthe Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still private land or has become foreshore land which forms part of the public
domain, as contended by petitioners
HELD
The SC held that the disputed portion is private land and is rightfully owned by respondents, in contravention to the claim of petitioners
that is has become foreshore land and therefore owned by the public domain, and that they have foreshore lease permits from the DENR on claimed
foreshore land, albeit failing to present evidence to prove validity of such claim.
j. Republic vs Alagad Jan 26 1989

1 2
The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming two orders of the defunct Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissing
3
its petition for "annulment of title and reversion. The facts appear in the decision appealed from:
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with
an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with
an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971, amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land
openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the
public domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. (LRC Case No. 189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 4922 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna).
By virtue of a final judgment in said case, promulgated January 16, 1956, supplemented by orders issued on March 21, 1956 and August 13, 1956,
defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree No. N-51479 was entered and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1, dated October 18, 1956, was issued in the names of defendants.
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot
1. On August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction case ordering the defendants therein to return possession of the premises to herein
defendants, as plaintiffs therein. The defendants therein did not appeal.
The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the filing of the instant case. On October 6, 1970, as prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 52, and
the defendants from selling, mortgaging, disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the area.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite notice of the pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada, Special Attorney, Bureau of Lands,
representing plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16, 1971, the court a quodismissed the complaint. The Republic filed a motion for
reconsideration, was set for hearing, and finally denied by the court a quo, hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972. It appears that the appeal was dismissed by this Court for failure to show in the record on
appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Plaintiff went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on the action of this Court. On November
4
19, 1982, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal resolution of this Court and ordered Us to reinstate and give due course to plaintiffs appeal.
In commencing proceedings below, the Republic claims that the decree and title [rendered and issued in LRC Case No. 189, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. L-
5
4922] insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab initio, for the following
reasons:
(a) That said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or end of Lot l, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, like the adjoining Lot 2 of the same survey plan containing
2.8421 hectares, had since time immemorial, been foreshore land reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia,
L-20950, May 31, 1965; Antonio Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez, et al., L-20355- 56, April 30, 1965);
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is actually now the site of Barrio Aplaya, formerly a sitio of Linga, Pila, Laguna, having been occupied

Page 24 of 29
by the barrio people since the American occupation of the country in the early 1900's where they established their houses;
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years since the early 1900's have filled up and elevated the land to its present condition of being some
feet above the level of the adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu-116971 and the rest of Lot 1 of the same survey plan so much so that this barrio site of Aplaya
where there are now sixty-eight (68) houses occupied by more than one hundred (100) families is no longer reached and covered by the waters of the
Laguna de Bay; and
(d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio people, the land in question would not have been fit for human habitation,
so much so that defendants and their predecessors-in-interest could not have acquired an imperfect title to the property which
could be judicially confirmed in a registration case, as in fact said defendants and their predecessors-in-interest have never been
6
in actual possession of the land in question, the actual occupants thereof being the barrio people of Aplaya;
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that under Section 20, of Rule 20, of the Rules of Court, dismissal was proper upon failure of
the Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled that the judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No. 189 has long become final, titles
to the properties had been issued (in favor of the private respondents), and that res judicata, consequently, was a bar.
In its petition, the Republic assails the decision insofar as it sustained the lower court: (1) in dismissing the petition for failure of the Republic to
appear for pre-trial; and (2) in holding that res judicata is an obstacle to the suit.
I.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the Court of Appeals has been guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It is well-established that the State
7
cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its official or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof.
This is so because:
... [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land under the
basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present charter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of
such patrimony. There is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions thereof are judicially
accorded recognition, especially so where the matter is sought to be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such primordial
8
consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much less the acquiescense of public officials, is the controlling norm . . .
9 10
The cases of Ramos v. Centra l Bank of the Philippines and Nilo v. Romero, cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its decision, are not
applicable. In Ramos, we applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the part of the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its
promises. In Nilo, we denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the defendant had been "erroneously' represented in the
complaint by the City Attorney when it should have been the City Mayor, on a holding that the City Attorney, in any event, could have ably defended
the City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen that the acts that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and intentional in character, in which cases, it
could not be said that the Government had been prejudiced by some negligent act or omission.
11
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is an impediment to reversion of property. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court stated:
... [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v Animas, et al., . supra), and the cancellation may be pursued
through an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the
said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does
not apply. For it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites
must concur; (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza vs.
12
Arrieta, et al., 91 SCRA 113)...
In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the names of the private respondents were foreshore land, the land registration court could not have
validly awarded title thereto. It would have been without the authority to do so. The fact that the Bureau of Lands had failed to appeal from the
decree of registration could not have validated the court's decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
II.
13
"Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public dominion or of private ownership ." Property is of public dominion if it is:
(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
14
roadsteads and others of similar character; or if it:
(2) . . . belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
15
national wealth.
All other property of the State, it is provided further, which is not of the character mentioned in ... article [4201, is patrimonial
16 17
property, meaning to say, property 'open to disposition by the Government, or otherwise, property pertaining to the national
18
domain, or public lands. Property of the public dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by the State by regalian right.
They are things res publicae in nature and hence, incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution, [w]ith
19
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.'
Specifically:
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds
themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and their beds;
(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, which are also of public dominion;
(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;
(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even if constructed by a contractor;
(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands belonging to private persons, to the State, to a
province, or to a city or municipality from the moment they leave such lands;

Page 25 of 29
20
(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public establishments.
So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by public waters, belong to the public domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private individuals, or the State or provinces, belong to the respective owners of such lands, and
those situated upon lands of communal use belong to their respective pueblos.21
Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition, that the lands subject of the Republic's reversion efforts are foreshore in nature, the Republic has
22
legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. In that case, res judicata or estoppel is no defense.
Of course, whether or not the properties in question are, indeed, foreshore lands is the core of controversy. According to the trial court, the
23
aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and hence, available disposition and
registration. As we have pointed out, the Government holds otherwise, and that as foreshore laud, it is not registerable.
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the parcel foreshore or is it part and parcel of the public domain?
24
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake . Thus:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is
25
connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the definition just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.
And, "[i]nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so Colegio de San Jose further tells us, "we must resort to the legal provisions governing the ownership
26
and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the parcels of land in question. The recourse to
legal provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, [T]he natural bed or basin of lakes ... is the ground covered by their waters
27
when at their highest ordinary depth. and in which case, it forms part of the national dominion. When Laguna de Bay's waters are at their highest
ordinary depth has been defined as:
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the regular, common, natural, which
28
occurs always or most of the time during the year . . .
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not
considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public
dominion, and land capable of registration as private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as follows:
29
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides...
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the
30
tide.
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling, in the first place, because it is not a trier
31
of facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition We therefore remand the case to the
court a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. We, consequently, reverse both the Court of Appeals and the
trial court and reinstate the Republic's complaint.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

k. Republic, rep. by the Mindanao Medical Center vs CA Sep 30, 1976;
Facts: On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, father of the respondent Alejandro deJesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 33-
hectare land situated in barrio Libranon, Davao. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands through theDavao Land District Officer accepted the
sealed bids for the purchase of the subjected land. Irineo Jose bidded P20 per hectare while Dr. Jose Ebro bidded for P100.50 per hectare. The
director annulled the said auction for the reason that sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus failed to participate in the bid. Another bidding was held on
October 3, 1934 and Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equaled the bid submitted by Dr.Jose Ebro at P100.50 and made a deposit of P221 as
10% deposit of the price of the land at P110.50 per hectare. That on November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issuedan award order to Eugenio de
Jesus with regards to the said lot stating the coverage of the land which is located in Davao with an area of 22 hectares at P100.50 per hectare or
P2210 for the whole tract. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands amended the sales application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of the
said land is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes thereby excluding 12.8081 hectares which is the land in question. On
September 7, 1936, President Manuel Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 thereby declaring the said lot to be withdrawn from sale and settlement
and reserving the same for military purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de
Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8 and 10 installment for the 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the sales application was amended which did
not include the military camp. Thereafter, on May 15, 1948, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio deJesus for the tract of
land having an area of 20.6400 hectares. On the same date, the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources likewise granted a sales patent to
Eugenio de Jesus containing an area of 20.6400 hectares. On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked the Proclamation No.85 and
declared the disputed lot opens to disposition under the provisions of Public
Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in Davao City. Then on October 9, PresidentRamon Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation and reserved the
same lot for medical center site under the administration of the Director of Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center applied for Torrens registration of the said lot with the Court of First Instance of Davao, claimed “fee simple” title to the Appellate Court
denied the motion on June 17, 1975. Forthwith, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court for appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Mindanao Medical Center has a registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of the
Proclamation No. 350 reserving the said land for medical site purposes.
Conclusion: Yes, Mindanao Medical Center had a registerable title over the lot with area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of Proclamation No. 350
reserving such land for medical site purposes. The Supreme Court held that:
1. Proclamation No. 350 is free from infirmity and it proceeds from the recognized competence of the President to reserve alienable lands of the
public for specific public use or service. The law authorizes the President to designate tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for
the commonwealth of the Philippines. A special proprietary right was vested in Eugenio de Jesus when the sales award was issued to him in 1934
which was for 22 hectares (later found to be 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey). The privilege of occupying public lands confers no contractual or
vested rights and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by public, or to reserve them for public use may defeat
the imperfect right of a settler. Such proclamation of the President to reserve lands terminates any rights previously acquired by persons t not
proprietary right for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the
State

Page 26 of 29
5. Disposition under Public Land Act and other Laws(Page 649 Agcaoili)
5.1. Reason for the Patent;
a. Kasilag vs Rodriguez Dec 7, 1939(see Dissenting of J. Moran);

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure the
payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years
and in such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid
within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on the land. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a
verbal agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the condition that they would not collect the interest of the loan,
would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, & would introduce improvement thereof.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a
contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner
of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw
in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good
faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the
mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land.
In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of
the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to
the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
5.2. Homestead Patent;
b. Lopez vs CA Mar 5, 2003

c. Nieto vs Quines Jan 28, 1961;
SUMMARY: This is a motion to reconsider the decision of January 28, 1961, declaring appellees' title to the land in dispute as valid, enforceable and
superior to that of appellant's title. A study of the facts disclosed that Arturo Nieto's predecessor-in-interest, Muriu Florentine) claimed ownership
over Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. During the cadastral proceedings her claim was not opposed and the court found no irregularity in the
proceedings and infirmity of Florentine's claim of ownership. Subseqeuntly, it adjudicated the Lot and ordered a title issued therefor in the name of
Maria Florentine. On the other hand, Bartolome Quines' Homestead Application filed long before the cadastral proceedings covers the same tract of
land claimed by Maria Florentine In like manner, Quines' application was not opposed, legal requirements were fully complied, and there being no
more impediments, the Bureau of Lands, pursuant to the Public Land Law ordered the issuance of a Homestead Patent in favor of Bartolome Quines.
Hence, these circumstances of two valid titles registered on the same date, in the name of two different persons and were the results of two lawful
proceedings, one judicial and the other administrative. This gave rise to the question of whose title should be recognized. The Supreme Court
reversed its decision and upheld appellant's title
HELD: Cadastral cases initiated by the Government are judicial in nature and one in rem. Decisions therein are binding against the whole world,
including the government. After the finality of the degree, title of ownership becomes vested upon the adjudicatee and the land could no longer be
disposed of. Tho government had lost its right to convey the land by homestead grant. Homestead patent title issued by the Bureau of Lands wag the
result of administrative proceedings initiated by the homestead applicant. The proceedings are under the control and determination of tho Director of
Lands whose decisions on the contest are not final and conclusive. In view of the nature and manner of acquisition of appellees' title over the
disputed land, it must perforce give way to the appellant's title acquired by judicial adjudication.

d. Flores vs Bagaoisan Apr 15, 2010
5.3. Free Patent and Residential Free Patent under RA 10023(Free Patent Act);

e. Del Rosario-Igtiben vs Republic Oct 22, 2004
5.4. Sales Patent under CA 141(Public Land Act) and Sales of Agricultural Residential Land Under RA 730(Sales Patent Act);
f. Dela Rosa vs Valdez Jul 27, 20011

g. Agura vs Serfino Dec 4, 1991
5.5. Reservations(pages 84-96, Agcaoili);

h. Int’l Hardwood and Veneer Co. vs UP Aug. 13, 1991;
SUMMARY:
International Hardwood was the grantee of a License Agreement effective until 1985. On 1961, Proc. 791 segregates from the public domain parcels
of land and reserved them for use by UP. The land subject of Hardwood’s timber concession was covered by said Proclamation.
On 1964, RA 3990 was enacted fully ceding ownership over the land described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP sought to collect forestry charges from
Hardwood and demanded that the latter subject itself to the control and supervision of UP. Hardwood resisted and filed a petition for declaratory
relief.
The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those established by law. In this case, that exception
is made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area
ceded and transferred to UP until February 1985. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties to
the new owner, UP
DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to UP. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to
existing concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be
affected, impaired, or diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were
effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public

Page 27 of 29
forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise
terminated.
BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry
charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer.
i. Republic vs Doldol Sep 10, 1998

TS: Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of
land in Opol, Misamis Oriental. On 1963, he filed an application for saltwork
purposes for the said area but the Director of Forestry rejected the same.
Sometime in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a
resolution reserving a certain lot as a school site. This lot unfortunately
included the lot of Doldol.
Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion
possessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on school’s power.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling that Doldol
was entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32
years (1959-1991)
years (1959-1991)
years (1959-1991)
years (1959-1991)
ISSUE: Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in
dispute?
HELD: No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that
the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation
of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
title/certificate of tile being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable
and disposable in accordance with the District Forester’s Certification. Doldol
thus meets the first requirement.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the
disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much
later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by
law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to
assert a right superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved
the lot for Opol National School.
“The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting
confers no contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of
the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to
reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof
stands eventhough this may defeat the imperfect right of settler.
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful
settlement on them can be acquired” (Solicitor General)
In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over
the
land in dispu
DOCTRINE: Under PD 1073, a person acquires a right to a government rant over a particular land, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued, if: (a) The land is alienable public land (b) The person has open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the

Page 28 of 29
same which must be for the period prescribed by the law, which is since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
FACTS: Sometime in 1959 Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipalty of Opol, Misamis Oriental. In 1963, he filed
an application for saltwork purposes for the said area but the same was rejected by the Bureau of Forest Development in 1968. While his application
was pending, in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving Lot 4932 as a school site, which was eventually
occupied by Opol High School in 1970. The reserved lot included the land area occupied by Doldol. Seventeen years later, or on November 2, 1987,
Pres. Corazon Aquino issued a Proclamation still reserving the said area to Opol High School, which was then renamed to Opol National Secondary
Technical School. By virtue of said declaration, the school demanded that Doldol vacate the land, but he refused. 1991: Opol National School filed a
complaint for accion possesoria with the Cagayan de Oro RTC. The trial court ruled in favor of the school and ordered Doldol to vacate. CA reversed
and held that since Doldol has possessed the land from 1959 up to 1991 or for 32 years, he is now entitled to the same by virtue of prescription.
CA cites as basis for its decision Sec. 48 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by RA 1942: Section 48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxxxxxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether Doldol, having occupied the lot for 32 years, acquired a right over the land.
RULING: No. While the laws provide for prescription as a way for acquiring ownership over a particular land, the CA erred in applying Sec. 48 of
the Public Land Act which is the outdated version of the said law. Sec. 48 has now already been amended by PD 1073, which now states that: (b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Under
the said act, a person acquires a right to a government rant over a particular land, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued, if: (a) The
land is alienable public land (b) The person has open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same which must be for
the period prescribed by the law, which is since June 12, 1945, or earlier. IN THIS CASE: The land is alienable and disposable, in accordance with
the District Foresters Certification. However, Doldol had been occupying the land reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law requires that
the possession of lands of public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. Thus, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title or a right to the disputed lot. He cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to
the school, given that the President has reserved the said lot as a school site. Having been reserved in its favor, Opol National School has a better
right of possession over the land in dispute. o The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested
right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public
use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.
5.6. Friar Lands;

j. Pugeda vs Tnias Mar 31, 1962
Doctrine: Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal
properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the
widow or by the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered
evidence.
Facts: Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the operation of the Friar Lands Act which at the time of his death were not
yet fully paid and were subsequently transferred in the name of the widow who paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits of said lands and
thereafter the title was issued in her name, belong to her as her exclusive paraphernal property not conjugal;
(2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals; and
(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Movants cited the case of Arayata vs. Joya,
et al., 51 Phil. 654. The Supreme Court denied the motion and declared the decision as final.
Ruling:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the
husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the
setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence. The doctrine
in the Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case refers to the superior right of the widow recognized in Section 16 of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act) over transfers
made by the husband without the approval of the Director of Lands; hence, not applicable in the instant case. Adjudication may be made pro indiviso
in a project of partition without the need of actual division or partition of the properties among the heirs.
k. Solid State Multi-Products Corp. vs CA May 6, 1991

Page 29 of 29

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IV.

DISPOSITION OF LANDS BY PUBLIC GRANT;

​a. Collado vs CA Oct 4, 2002;

​b. Valiao vs Republic Nov 28, 2011;

​c. Hermoso vs CA Apr 24, 2009;

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Issues: Did the MTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

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Hence, this petition for review.

​c. Bagunu vs Aggabao Aug 15, 2011

R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177

COURT OF APPEALS RULING

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We deny the motion for reconsideration.

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b. Yngson vs Sec. of DENR Jul 20, 1983

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​c. Republic vs CA, Carag Aug 6, 2008

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​b. MIAA vs CA Jul 20, 2006;

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​c. Ramos vs Director of Lands Nov 19, 1918;

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​e. Sta. Rosa Realty Dev’t Corp vs CA Oct 12, 2001

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​f. Palomo vs CA Jan 21 1997;

​g. Republic vs Southside Homeowners Association Inc. Sep 22, 2006

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

Dear Mrs. Gabon:

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​i. Almagro vs Kwan Oct 20, 2011 ​CARPIO, J.

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​j. Republic vs Alagad Jan 26 1989

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​ a. Kasilag vs Rodriguez Dec 7, 1939(see Dissenting of J. Moran);

5.2. Homestead Patent;

​b. Lopez vs CA Mar 5, 2003

​f. Dela Rosa vs Valdez Jul 27, 20011

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

​ i. Republic vs Doldol Sep 10, 1998

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

k. Solid State Multi-Products Corp. vs CA May 6, 1991

https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/40232508_547604…h=e3c41647c227f0de43492395defc176b&oe=5BB4643E&dl=1 01/10/2018, 3G36 PM

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen

a. Collado vs CA Oct 4, 2002;

b. Valiao vs Republic Nov 28, 2011;

c. Hermoso vs CA Apr 24, 2009;

c. Bagunu vs Aggabao Aug 15, 2011

c. Republic vs CA, Carag Aug 6, 2008

b. MIAA vs CA Jul 20, 2006;

c. Ramos vs Director of Lands Nov 19, 1918;

e. Sta. Rosa Realty Dev’t Corp vs CA Oct 12, 2001

f. Palomo vs CA Jan 21 1997;

g. Republic vs Southside Homeowners Association Inc. Sep 22, 2006

i. Almagro vs Kwan Oct 20, 2011 CARPIO, J.

j. Republic vs Alagad Jan 26 1989

a. Kasilag vs Rodriguez Dec 7, 1939(see Dissenting of J. Moran);

b. Lopez vs CA Mar 5, 2003

f. Dela Rosa vs Valdez Jul 27, 20011

i. Republic vs Doldol Sep 10, 1998