Republic of the Philippines

National Capital Judicial Region

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Manila, Branch 46

THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,

- versus – Criminal Case No. R-MNL-

19-01141-CR

REYNALDO SANTOS JR.,

MARIA ANGELITA RESSA,
and RAPPLER, INC.,
Accused.

x ------------------------------------- x

MOTION TO QUASH

THE ACCUSED, by counsel, hereby moves to quash the

Information against all accused on the grounds and for the reasons
stated below:

1. The Information filed by the prosecution states that:

“That on or about 19 February 2014, the above named

accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly re-publish an article entitled “CJ Using SUVs of
Controversial Businessman” quoted hereunder:

“Shady past?

At the time we were tracing the registered owner of the

Chevrolet in early 2011, we got hold of an intelligence
report that detailed Keng's past. Prepared in 2002, it
described Keng as a "naturalized Filipino citizen" whose
exact birthdate is unknown. In the report, he was also
 identified as bearing the alias "Willy," using a surname
also spelled as "Kheng."

The report stated that Keng had been under surveillance

by the National Security Council for alleged involvement
in illegal activities, namely "human trafficking and drug
smuggling." He is supposedly close to lawmakers and
had contacts with the US embassy at the time.

The document also said Keng was involved in a murder

case for which he was "never jailed." It could be referring
to the death of Manila Councilor Chika Go in 2002
where Keng had been identified as a mastermind. Go
was also the architect of Keng's Reina Regente
condominium residence in Binondo, Manila.

According to a 2002 Philippine Star report, Keng was

also accused of smuggling fake cigarettes and granting
special investors residence visas to Chinese nationals for
a fee. Keng has denied his involvement in this illegal
transaction, saying it's easy to get visas to the
Philippines.”

in the website of Rappler, Inc. with malicious intent and evil

motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the reputation
of one Wilfredo D. Keng, with residence at Carriedo Street,
Manila, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, as a
businessman, and as a private citizen, thereby exposing him
to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor.”
(Underscoring supplied)

THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT

CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE.

2. The Information alleges that all three accused committed cyber-

libel by republishing the ostensibly defamatory article on
February 19, 2014. The prosecution, however, was less than
candid when it conveniently fails to mention that the same article
was originally published on May 29, 2012.

2.1. The prosecution misapplies the “multiple republication”

principle to cyber libel as there is no basis in law for such
application.

2
 2.2. Since “multiple republication” is not applicable, the only
basis for determining whether an offense exists is the original
posting made in May 2012 and not the supposed republication
in February 2014.

2.3. No offense exists as Republic Act No. 10175 cannot be

applied retroactively without offending Article III, section 22
of the 1987 Constitution as well as Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The prosecution misapplies the

“multiple republication” principle
to cyber libel as there is no basis
in law for such application.

3. In its Resolution, the Department of Justice floats “multiple

publication” as a theory for this prosecution (Resolution, January
10, 2019, at 5-6) for cyber libel under Section 4(c)(4) of Republic
Act No. 10175 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.

The prosecution’s theory is that the supposed republishing in

2014 of a 2012 article gives rise to a separate offense or as many
offenses as there are publications. It relies on a Third Division
ruling of the Supreme Court in Marcelo Soriano v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72383, November 9, 1988 where the
Court ruled that the Philippines adopts the “multiple
publication” rule.

4. Soriano is not applicable nor does it constitute authority

for the proposition that the same defamatory statement
published several times gives rise to as many offenses as there are
publications.

4.1. First, Soriano does not constitute precedent or

authority. It is a Third Division decision that binds only the
parties thereto. It is canonical that only decisions of the
Supreme Court En Banc are vested with authoritativeness
or precedential character.

4.2. Second, the “only issue to be threshed out in (Soriano

was) whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Leyte may
try the libel case or whether or not it should be tried

3
elsewhere.” (Soriano, supra.) “Multiple republication” was
invoked only to answer the sole issue of venue and
jurisdiction in a libel case filed by a public officer. It does
not constitute authority for the proposition that a multiple
republication gives rise to as many offenses of cyber libel as
there are publications. Using the words of the Court in
Soriano, “(s)tated more succinctly for purposes of
ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, every time the same
written matter is communicated such
communication is considered a distinct and
separate publication of the libel.”

4.3. Third, the invocation in Soriano of “multiple

republication” has not been cited in any other
Supreme Court decision, whether rendered in Division
or En Banc, since 1988.

4.4. Fourth, the “multiple republication” principle cited in

Soriano applies distinctly and specifically only to print
media.

The specific portion of Soriano on “multiple republication”

makes express reference to two older cases—Montinola v.
Montalvo, G.R. Nos. 10114 & 10137, August 3, 1916 and
United States v. Sotto, G.R. No. 13990, September 24,
1918—both of which involved print and not online media.

In both Montinola and Sotto, the Court cited “multiple

republication” in relation to newspaper articles which, by
their very nature, required separate publications. The
multiple publication principle is based on the premise that
each publication of a defamatory statement is a distinct and
separate act. The Court’s adoption of the principle in both
Montinola and Sotto, expressly referenced in Soriano, was
made in relation to libel in print.

This court may take judicial notice of the difference

between print and online media. In the absence of any law
or Supreme Court decision that adopts “multiple
republication” as a principle applicable specifically to
online media, there is no basis for the prosecution’s
reliance on Soriano.

4
 4.5. Fifth, the “multiple republication” principle does not
apply to online media. In Firth v. State of New York (98
N.Y.2d 365 (2002), the New York Court of Appeals rejected
the application of multiple republication and adopted a
single publication rule because “a multiple publication rule
would implicate an even greater potential for endless
retriggering of the statute of limitations, multiplicity of
suits and harassment of defendants. Inevitably, there
would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive
dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet
which is, of course, its greatest beneficial promise.” (Firth,
supra)

In the absence of controlling Philippine jurisprudence,

American case law is persuasive and provides guidance for
this court in addressing this specific issue of first
impression. (See Belen v. People of the Philippines, G. R.
No. 211120, February 13, 2107; Borjal and Soliven vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 126466, January 14, 1999)

4.6. Tangentially, the Supreme Court in Disini, et al. v.

Secretary of Justice, et al. (and consolidated companion
petitions), G.R. Nos. 203335, 203299, 203306, 203359,
203378, 203391, 203407, 203440, 203453, 203454,
203469, 203501, 203509, 203515 & 203518, February 18,
2014 [henceforth Disini I] struck down section 51 of
Republic Act No. 10175 (Aiding or Abetting in the
Commission of Cybercrime) in relation to Section 4 (c) (4)2

1 SEC. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who

willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in
this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully

attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held
liable.
2 SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxx
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any
other similar means which may be devised in the future.

5
 with respect to cyber libel for providing a chilling effect on
freedom of expression.

This is a repudiation of the “multiple republication”

principle for online media and cyber libel because
otherwise each act of “sharing” a defamatory statement
would then constitute a separate and distinct act of libel, a
proposition which the Court rejected by its striking down
of section 5 of RA 10175.

Assuming arguendo that

“multiple republication” applies, it
does not apply to a change that is
non-substantial or made with the
intent to communicate the
previous post to a new audience.

5. The inapplicability of “multiple republication” to cyber libel

precludes the treatment of the February 2014 posting as a
separate publication.

In Firth, supra, the NY court stated that –

"The publication of a defamatory statement in a single issue of

a newspaper, or a single issue of a magazine, although such
publication consists of thousands of copies widely distributed,
is, in legal effect, one publication which gives rise to one cause
of action and that the applicable (s)tatute of (l)imitation(s)
runs from the date of that publication."

6. Even assuming arguendo, “multiple republication” applies, the

updating in February 2014 of the original post made in May 2012
does not constitute republication.

6.1. Firth, supra, ruled that the addition of unrelated

material does not constitute republication, to wit:

“The mere addition of unrelated information to a

Web site cannot be equated with the repetition of
defamatory matter in a separately published edition of a
book or newspaper, as in Rinaldi and Cook. The
justification for the republication exception has no
application at all to the addition of unrelated

6
 material on a Web site, for it is not reasonably
inferable that the addition was made either with the
intent or the result of communicating the earlier and
separate defamatory information to a new audience.”

6.2. That there must be substantial change in order to constitute

republication was likewise upheld in the case of Churchill v.
State, 876 A.2d 311, 378 N.J. Super. 471, 23 June 2005, where
the New Jersey Superior Court ruled:

“We also reject plaintiffs’ contention that updates to the SCI’s

website constituted republications of the report. The
updates were merely technical changes to the
website. They altered the means by which website
visitors could access the report, but they in no way
altered the substance or form of the report.
Therefore, to treat the changes as republications
would be inappropriate and defeat the beneficial
purposes of the single publication rule.” (Emphasis
supplied)

6.3. In Atkinson v. McLaughlin, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 28

November 2006, the District Court of North Dakota employed
the test of substantial modification in the context of
republication, to wit:

“However, even under the single publication rule, the courts

have recognized that a website may be republished
and create a new cause of action for defamation if the
website is substantially modified. Republication triggers
the start of a new statute of limitations and occurs upon a
separate aggregate publication from the original, on a
different occasion, which is not merely a delayed circulation
of the original edition... (Emphasis supplied).”

6.4. These tests--Firth, Atkinson, and Churchill--provide the lens

with which to view the supposed republication in February 2014
of the original May 2012 post. In the absence of a specific
authoritative Philippine precedent on the applicability of
“multiple republication” to cyber offenses, these tests are
persuasive. In Montinola, supra, the Court acknowledged that
Philippine libel law was borrowed almost verbatim from

7
 American laws, thus the persuasive character of American
authorities on the matter:

“Bearing in mind that the Libel Law was enacted by an

American commission, the majority of whose members were
American lawyers, and that its provisions were borrowed
almost verbatim from the statutes of one or the other of the
States of the Union, we may, as we have frequently done, cite
American authorities in support of our holdings in the instant
case.”

6.5. Applying Firth, Atkinson, and Churchill, it is clear that the

update made on February 19, 2014 to the original May 2012 post
does not constitute a republication as it did not create a
substantial change. The update to the article consisted of
the correction of a misspelled word from “EVATION” to
“EVASION”, with the “t” changed to “s.” Not a single
sentence in the original post was changed.

6.6. Even assuming arguendo only that the changes made in

February 2014 could constitute republication as to make the
updated post a separate felony of cyber libel, no showing has been
made of any criminal intent to defame through the updates made,
i.e., the corrected spelling as well as the reformat. To repeat, not
a single sentence or word was altered, with the only change being
a spelling correction.

7. Because there was only one single publication, i.e., May 2012,
this Information which charges the crime of cyber libel based on
a “republication” in 2014 must be quashed for failure to state an
offense.

The Cyber Crime Protection Act of 2012

was applied in an ex post facto manner
to the supposed republication because
of the Supreme Court’s TRO, thus
rendering the characterization of the
felony unconstitutional and all
proceedings arising therefrom null and
void.

8. Even assuming arguendo that the Information correctly

characterizes the updates made in February 2014 as a

8
 republication, the Supreme Court’s Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) barred any action that could have been taken under
RA 10175 until the same was lifted.

9. It is a matter of judicial notice that the Supreme Court in Disini

I, supra, had issued a TRO against the enforcement of RA 10175
on October 9, 2012. This TRO lasted until April 22, 2014,
when the Motions for Reconsideration in Disini I were
resolved by the Supreme Court with finality. (Disini, Jr.
v. Secretary of Justice, et al. [and consolidated companion
petitions], G.R. Nos. 203335, 203299, 203306, 203359, 203378,
203391, 203407, 203440, 203453, 203454, 203469, 203501,
203509, 203515 & 203518 (Resolution on Motions for
Reconsideration, April 22, 2014; henceforth Disini II) During
the duration of this TRO—October 9, 2012 continuously until
April 22, 2014—there was effectively no RA 10175. That is the
legal, practical, and actual effect of the Supreme Court’s TRO.

10. The alleged republication was done on February 19,

2014, when the TRO was still in effect. Even assuming
arguendo that multiple republication applies, consideration of
the February 19, 2014 update as the basis for criminal liability for
cyber libel results in an ex post facto application of RA 10175,
thus rendering the same unconstitutional.

11. This court is presumed to be fully aware of the constitutional

prohibition against the passage of an ex post facto law under
Article III, section 22 of the 1987 Constitution. It is also
presumed to be fully aware of a similar prohibition against the ex
post facto implementation of existing penal law under Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the retroactive application of a
penal law that is prejudicial to the accused. It is, finally,
presumed to be fully aware of the En Banc Decision of the
Supreme Court in People v. Ringor, G.R. No. 123918, December
9, 1999, where the Court refused to apply retroactively the then-
new requirement that an unlicensed firearm used in the killing of
a person should be considered a special aggravating
circumstance because it was prejudicial to the accused under
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

12.This court has to obey the Constitution, the law, and the decisions
of the Supreme Court. It is the sworn duty of each magistrate to
do so. Thus, it must strike down the Information for containing

9
 a charge that resulted from an ex post facto, and thus
unconstitutional, application of RA 10175 to a post made in
February 19, 2014—whether the same be considered an original
post or an alleged republication--when implementation of RA
10175 remained suspended by reason of the Supreme Court’s
TRO. To repeat, the TRO was lifted only when the Supreme Court
denied the various motions for reconsideration in Disini II in
April 2014.

13. It is simply sophistry to argue, as the prosecution does, that the

TRO merely suspended the implementation of RA 10175.
During the duration of the TRO, there was effectively no
RA 10175 by judicial fiat.

Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, RA 10175 could only

apply prospectively (unless beneficial to the accused which is not
the case here), i.e., from April 22, 2014 onwards.

The prosecution’s characterization of the February 19, 2014

update to the May 2012 original post thus constituted a
retroactive and prejudicial, i.e., ex post facto, application of a
penal law, prohibited under Article III, section 22 of the 1987
Constitution and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and
inconsistent with the Decision of the Court in Ringor, supra.

Characterizing the original

May 2012 post as the basis for
liability would similarly
result in an ex post facto
application of RA 10175.

14.Due to the inapplicability of “multiple republication”, the only

relevant post to be considered is the original post in May 2012.
This, the prosecution has conveniently omitted from the
Information.

15. Republic Act No. 10175, which took effect in September 2012 but
became fully effective—due to the lifting of the October 2012
TRO—only in April 2014 cannot apply to the original post in May
2012 without grossly offending Article III, section 22, Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code, and Ringor, supra, all of which
proscribe the ex post facto application of a penal statute.

10
16. The Supreme Court has ruled in Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons, G.R. No. L-30026, January 30, 1971, that “(o)nce a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court
that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.”
While Gumabon spoke of habeas corpus as a remedy and then
only after a conviction, the principle upon which the great writ of
liberty was granted in Gumabon applies to this case with even
greater cogency and urgency.

17. The accused come not at the end of these proceedings but at the
start to plead what ought to have been evident and manifest—
that this court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this
charge—one that has arisen out of an unconstitutional and ex
post facto application of law. Should it insist on trying accused,
it would result in an unconstitutional act that ousts the court of
jurisdiction.

THE INFORMATION DOES

NOT STATE AN OFFENSE
AS AGAINST RAPPLER,
INC.

18. Specific to accused corporate entity Rappler, Inc., the

Information must be quashed because it does not state an offense
committed by Rappler Inc. even under the most liberal reading
of Section 9 of RA 10175.

19.Section 9 reads:

SECTION 9. Corporate Liability. — When any of the

punishable acts herein defined are knowingly committed on
behalf of or for the benefit of a juridical person, by a natural
person acting either individually or as part of an organ of the
juridical person, who has a leading position within, based on:
(a) a power of representation of the juridical person
provided the act committed falls within the scope of
such authority; (b) an authority to take decisions on
behalf of the juridical person: Provided, That
the act committed falls within the scope of such authority; or (c)
an authority to exercise control within the juridical
person, the juridical person shall be held liable for a fine
equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7 up
to a maximum of Ten million pesos (PhP10,000,000.00).

11
 If the commission of any of the punishable acts herein defined
was made possible due to the lack of supervision or control by a
natural person referred to and described in the preceding
paragraph, for the benefit of that juridical person by a natural
person acting under its authority, the juridical person shall be
held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines
imposable in Section 7 up to a maximum of Five million pesos
(PhP5,000,000.00).

The liability imposed on the juridical person shall be without

prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural person who has
committed the offense.

20. The instant Information may be scoured at length for any of

the relevant elements of liability for a corporate entity under
section 9 and none will be found. The accusation against all three
accused, without distinction, is terse— “(t)hat on or about 19
February 2014, the above named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly re-publish an article…”
(emphasis supplied)

21.Taking the Information at face value only for purposes of arguing

this instant Motion to Quash, none of the elements required
under section 9 appear. In the absence of any of these elements,
none can—and must—be presumed by this court, at the risk of
violating the due process rights of accused Rappler Inc. as well as
co-accused Ressa and Santos.

22. Additionally, this court is presumed to be familiar with the

January 10, 2019 Resolution of the Department of Justice
National Prosecution Service DISMISSING the complaint as
against Rappler, Inc.’s corporate officers, except accused Ressa.

The dispositive portion of the January 10, 2019 Resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that

REYNALDO SANTOS, JR., MARIA ANGELITA RESSA, and
RAPPLER INC. be charged with violation of Section 4(c)(4) of
R.A. No. 10175 and that the complaint as against MANUEL I.
AYALA, NICO JOSE NOLLEDO, GLENDA M. GLORIA,
JAMES BITANGA, FELICIA ATIENZA, DAN ALBER (sic) DE
PADUA, and JOSE MARIA G. HOFILENA (sic) be dismissed.”

12
23. The dismissal of the complaint as against all corporate
officers, except accused Ressa, is telling. It bars any charge
against the corporate entity under section 9 which expressly
requires an affirmative showing of the act of a specific corporate
director acting within the scope of authority. There is no act
imputable to the corporate officers alleged and there is none
found, as shown by the dismissal of the complaint as against
them, except for accused Ressa.

24. The Information also does not state, as against accused Ressa
or Santos, any acts allegedly committed by them under Section 9
such as would make Rappler, Inc. susceptible to the fine
prescribed. Notably, the elements of the offense as committed by
the natural persons differ from the elements of the offense as may
make a juridical person, acting through a specific natural person,
liable for fines. There is nothing in the Information that would
indicate any act or omission by any of the two natural persons
under section 9 that would make the accusation against the
corporate entity stand.

25. Even assuming arguendo that the corporate entity could be

charged herein, it must be emphasized that section 9 of RA
10175 does not impose a fine on its own. It refers to
section 7, which however does not impose any fines, to
wit:

“Section 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution

under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, or special laws.”

26. Congressional mistakes that become law should not be the

concern of the accused, but of this court. This court cannot
speculate on what Congress intended by the vague, possibly
mistaken, reference to section 7. What is crystal clear, however is
that without any specific provision that imposes a penalty, a
corporation cannot be held liable for a criminal offense.

27. To forestall any such speculation that perhaps the mistaken

reference to section 7 should actually be section 6 or section 8,
this court may take judicial notice that the Supreme Court in

13
 Disini I declared section 63 unconstitutional as it relates to
section 74 whereas section 8 does not provide for any penalty in
relation to section 4(c)(4) or section 9.

28. It is elementary that a Motion to Quash must take into account

only the allegations in the Information and nothing aliunde. The
Information, on its face, does not contain any of the elements
under section 9 and it, thus, cannot stand.

THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN

EXTINGUISHED.

29. Republic Act No. 10175 does not define a new offense of cyber
libel. It simply adds an additional means to commit libel, as
defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. This is evident
in section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175:

(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined

in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed through a computer system or any other similar
means which may be devised in the future.

30. By express provision, cyber libel under section 4(c)(4) is

defined as libel under Article 355 “committed through a
computer system or any other similar means which may be
devised in the future.” It is not a new felony, simply the exact
same felony of libel committed in a different manner.

30.1. In Disini I, supra, the Supreme Court expressed this in

unmistakable language:

“Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since

Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4 (c) (4) above

3 SECTION 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant
provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, as the case may be.
4 SECTION 7. Liability Under Other Laws. — A prosecution under

this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

14
 merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar
means" for committing libel.”

30.2. The Court repeated this emphatically in Disini II, thus:

“The movants argue that Section 4 (c) (4) is both vague and
overbroad. But, again, online libel is not a new crime. It is
essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised
Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace.”

30.3. Disini I and Disini II represent the current state of

authoritative judicial thought on the question of cyber libel, i.e.,
cyber libel is not a new offense, it is the same 1930 offense
committed with 21st century tools, much like putting old
wine into new wine skins.

31. For this reason, the prescriptive period for cyber libel is
one year because it is, for every intent and purpose, the Article
355 offense committed through new and additional means.
(Revised Penal Code, Article 90, as amended by RA 4661, vis RA
10175, section 4(c)(4); see also Disini I, Disini II) Under Article
91, the prescription period is interrupted only upon the filing of
an Information.

32. The only relevant act of supposed libel in this case is the
original May 2012 post, which under Articles 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code gave the prosecution one year to prosecute.
The complaint, which gave rise to this prosecution, was instituted
only in 2014. The instant Information was filed only in 2019. It
does not take much to conclude that the one year period for
prescription has lapsed, thus making the supposed act of libel
time barred and the instant Information subject to no judicial
action other than quashal.

33. Assuming arguendo that a longer prescription period can be

cobbled together from a reading of section 6 of RA 10175, which
imposes a penalty one degree higher than the original penalty
provided, the same cannot be applied in an ex post facto manner.
In Disini II, the Court stated that:

“Prescription is not a matter of procedure over which the

Court has something to say. Rather, it is substantive law since
it assumes the existence of an authority to punish a wrong,

15
 which authority the Constitution vests in Congress alone.
Thus, there is no question that Congress may provide a
variety of periods for the prescription of offenses as it sees fit.
What it cannot do is pass a law that extends the
periods of prescription to impact crimes committed
before its passage.”

34. This prosecution is based on a theory that the updated article

is a republication that gives rise to a new offense and thus a new
prescriptive period. As stated clearly supra, multiple
republication does not apply and thus, the single publication in
May 2012 gives rise to only one applicable period of
prescription—one year. The Revised Penal Code is a statute that
is pro reo (for the benefit of the accused) and any doubt must be
resolved in the accused’s favor.

While there is no doubt that multiple republication does not

apply here and there is similarly no doubt that the prosecution’s
theory is based on an ex post facto application of law, even
assuming arguendo that a new period of prescription may be
conjured up on the basis of the increased penalty under section
6, any doubt must be resolved in the accused’s favor, i.e., in favor
of the shorter period of prescription and the abatement of this
prosecution.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, for the reasons

given, the Information against all the accused be QUASHED.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

26 February 2019, Quezon City for the City of Manila.

…//signatories

16
 FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
(F L A G)
Counsel for the accused Santos Jr., Ressa, and Rappler Inc.*
2nd Floor, Eastside Building
77 Malakas Street, Quezon City, PHL 1100

JOSE MANUEL I. DIOKNO

ARNO V. SANIDAD
GREGORIO TANAKA VITERBO JR.
THEODORE O. TE

By:

ARNO V. SANIDAD
SC Roll No. 31374
PTR No. 7347669, January 04, 2019, Q.C.
IBP Lifetime Member No. 07913, January 09, 2009, Ilocos Sur
MCLE Exemption No. VI-001428 (Valid until 4-14-22)
Tel No. 920-0177/920-0044
lawyers@sanidadlawfirm.com

GREGORIO TANAKA VITERBO JR.

SC Roll No. 37225
PTR No. 7347666, January 04, 2019, Q.C.
IBP Lifetime Member No. 00218, January 10, 1995, Capiz
MCLE No. V-0015505/issued on March 07, 2016
Tel No. 920-0177/920-0044
flag.metromanila@gmail.com

THEODORE O. TE
SC Roll No. 37142
PTR No. 7601766, January 25, 2019, Q.C.
IBP No. 071683, January 31, 2019, Makati City
MCLE Exemption No. VI-001316 (Valid until 4-14-22)
Tel No. 9205514 loc. 418/CP-09175202295
Theodore.te@gmail.com

* The assistance and input of the Disini and Disini Law Office in the preparation

of an initial draft of this Motion to Quash is gratefully acknowledged.

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 Request for and Notice of Hearing

THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT

Regional Trial Court
Manila, Branch 46

Please submit this Motion to Quash for the Honorable Judge’s

attention immediately upon receipt, or as soon as it may be
convenient, and please calendar the same for hearing on March 1,
2019 at 8:30 in the morning.

THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Regional Trial Court
Branch 46, Manila

VILLA JUDAN & CRUZ

Counsel for Private Complainant
Penthouse, BPI-Philam Life Alabang Building
Alabang-Zapote Road corner Acacia Avenue
Madrigal Business Park
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City

Please take notice that counsel has requested to be heard on

the instant Motion to Quash on March 1, 2019 at 8:30 in the
morning.

THEODORE O. TE

18