1. Salvador vs Chua [G.R. No. 212865. July 15, 2015.
] SEC 6,
Rule 120
FACTS:
 The petitioner and his wife were charged in the RTC with
estafa. On the date scheduled for the promulgation of the
judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the
promulgation because petitioner was then suffering from
hypertension.
 Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to
promulgate its decision finding the petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
 The RTC issued a warrant for the petitioner's arrest. He was
apprehended eight days from the promulgation of the
judgment.
 Petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal
and attached thereto the medical certificate.
 The RTC initially denied the petitioner's Motion for Leave to
file Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-compliance
with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 Respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal
case, filed her Motion for Execution praying for the
issuance of the writ of execution on the civil aspect.
 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration where the RTC
granted it giving due course to his notice of appeal. The
RTC also granted respondent’s motion for execution.
 Prosecution filed Motion for reconsideration against the
ME
 Petitioner opposed the Prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration and prayed that he be allowed to post
bail pending appeal.
 The case was re-raffled and the new judge denied the
Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and fixed bail of
P80,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the petitioner so the
respondent commenced a special civil action for
certiorari in the CA.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the respondent as the complainant in the criminal
case had the legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in
the CA to assail the orders of the RTC despite the lack of consent
of the OSG; (YES)
(2) whether the petitioner had lost his standing in court for his
failure to appear at the promulgation of his conviction. (YES)
RULING:
(1) The respondent had legal standing to assail the
questioned orders through certiorari because the case
falls within the exception of the
 General Rule: that the People of the Philippines, being
the real party in interest in every criminal proceedings,
can be represented only by the OSG in criminal
proceedings in the CA or SC.
 The exception: A special civil action for certiorari may
be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court. In a long line of cases, this
Court construed the term aggrieved parties to include
the State and the private offended party or
complainant.
 Respondent’s interest in the criminal case did not end
upon the granting of her Motion for Execution because
the questioned orders opened the possibility of defeating
the judgment in her favor should the CA reverse or modify
his conviction.
 She remained an aggrieved party like the State in every
sense, and, consequently, she had as much right as
 anyone else in the criminal proceedings to adopt and to
take the necessary procedural steps within the bounds of
the Rules of Court to serve and protect her substantial
interest.
(2) Petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction.
 As Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction may be done in absentia. The accused in such
case is allowed a period of 15 days from notice of the
judgment to him or his counsel within which to appeal;
otherwise, the decision becomes final. The accused who
fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of
Court against the judgment.
 Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of the
petitioner at the promulgation of the judgment in Criminal
was mandatory because the offense of which he was
found guilty was not a light felony or offense.
 Based on the records, the promulgation of the judgment
was on March 30, 2011; hence, the petitioner had only
until April 14, 2011 within which to meet the mandatory
requirements under Section 6.
 In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the
remedies under the Rules of Court , the petitioner filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and attached
thereto the medical certificate yet, he did not thereby
establish that his absence had been for a justifiable cause
because the purported issuer himself
 Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which
could have validly excused his absence from the
promulgation, the petitioner did not fulfill the other
requirement of Section 6, supra, to surrender himself to the
trial court. The term surrender used in the rule visibly
necessitated his physical and voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court to suffer any consequences of the
verdict against him
WHEREFORE, CA decision is affirmed. Petitioner is order to pay the
cost of suit.
2. People vs Vargas [G.R. No 208446 April 6, 2016]
FACTS:
 An information was filed before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan charging Jonel Vargas y Ramos and Jerienald
Villamero y Esman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder.
 Appellants entered a “not guilty” plea. Trial proceeded.
The prosecution’s lone eyewitness, Adolfo Lagac narrated
how he saw the appelant’s shoot the victim. Appellant’s
used denial and alibi as their defense. RTC rendered
judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder.
 The RTC relied on the lone eyewitness’ positive
identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime over appellants’ defense of denial and alibi. Then
the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA but
was denied. CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with
modification on the amount of damages awarded.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt due to the inconsistencies in the statements
given by the lone prosecution witness. YES
2. WON the trial court’s finding of treachery to qualify the crime
to murder cannot be presumed because the eyewitness did not
witness the whole incident. YES
RULING: commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been
committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly
 Yes. In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is
prove the offender’s identity. The constitutional presumption of
always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable
innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an
doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to
identification that is full of uncertainties. The deficiency in the
establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of
proof submitted by the prosecution cannot be ignored. A slight
the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even
doubt created in the identity of the perpetrators of the crime
if the commission of the crime is given, there can be no
should be resolved in favor of the accused.
conviction without the identity of the malefactor being
likewise clearly ascertained. In People v. Fernandez: It is better to liberate a guilty man than
to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved
In People v. Rodrigo, the Court had the occasion to instruct that
by the required quantum of evidence.
great care should be taken in considering the identification of
the accused especially, when this identification is made by a sole  2. Yes. The SC held that the appellants were correct in
witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the asserting that Adolfo did not witness the onset of the
reliability of the identification. commotion. For treachery to be considered, it must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of
In his Sworn Statement, Adolfo mentioned six (6) individuals
the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the
involved in the crime but that he could not remember who shot
killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery
the victim. In his testimony however, the number of participants
cannot be presumed. Adolfo merely saw the victim being
were reduced to two, who conveniently were the only two
chased by two armed men. He could not describe how
individuals arrested in connection with the crime. Adolfo also
the aggression began and who started it.
remembered seeing Jonel shoot the victim.
For failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
The SC held in People v. Flores that when serious and inexplicable
that appellants were the perpetrators of the crime, SC reversed
discrepancies are present between a previously executed sworn
and set aside CA’s decision, thereby acquitting appellants and
statement of a witness and her testimonial declarations with
ordering for their release.
respect to one’s participation in a serious imputation such as
murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the
witness’ account. There is no other evidence in this case aside
3. ESTRADA VS OMBUDSMAN [GR. NO. 212140-41]
from the testimony of the lone eyewitness which directly
implicates appellants to the crime. The inconsistent statements
FACTS:
could not be dismissed as inconsequential because the
 Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada two criminal
inconsistency goes into the very identification of the assailants,
complaints for plunder. 18 of Sen. Estrada’s co-
which is a crucial aspect in sustaining a conviction.
respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
In People v. Tumambing, the SC declared that: A successful affidavits. Sen. Estrada then filed his Request to be
prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual Respondents.
  Sen. Estrada’s request was made "[p]ursuant to the right
of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by
the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have
access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)."7
 On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued an order
assailing that the respondent is not entitled to be furnished
all the filings of the respondents.
 Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found
probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-
respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada filed
a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution
dated 28 March 2014) and prayed for the issuance of a
new resolution dismissing the charges against him. Without
filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman
issued an order denying his request, Sen. Estrada filed the
present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to
annul and set aside the 27 March 2014 Order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated his
right to due process. NO
(2) Whether or not Estrada has no appeal, or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law than to file the petition for certiorari.
(3) Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari
constitutes forum shopping. YES
RULING:
(1) NO. The Ombudsman’s denial of Sen. Estrada’s Request
did not constitute grave abuse of discretion nor did it
violate his constitutional right to due process.
There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish
a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his request for the counter
affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to
due process. However, he fails to specify a law or rule which
states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation for the Ombudsman to furnish a
respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
"probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is
not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused
can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence." Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which
the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the
right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine.
(2) Sen. Estrada’s present petition for certiorari is premature.
Justice Velasco’s dissent prefers that Sen. Estrada not "be
subjected to the rigors of a criminal prosecution in court”
because there is "a pending question regarding the
Ombudsman’s grave abuse of its discretion preceding the
finding of a probable cause to indict him." Restated bluntly,
Justice Velasco’s dissent would like this Court to conclude that
the mere filing of the present Petition for Certiorari questioning
the Ombudsman’s denial of Sen Estrada’s Request should have,
by itself, voided all proceedings related to the present case.
Although it is true that, the Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s
request, the Ombudsman subsequently reconsidered its Order.
On May 7 2014, the same date that Sen. Estrada filed the present
petition, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order that furnished Sen.
Estrada with the counter-affidavits his co-respondents and
directed him to comment within a non-extendible period of five
days from receipt of said Order. Sen. Estrada did not file any
comment, as noted in the Order of the Ombudsman.
On June 4 2014, the Ombudsman issued another Joint Order and
denied Sen. Estrada’s Motion for Reconsideration of its March 28
2014 Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen.
Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and
11 counts of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019. In
this June 4 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman stated that "this
Office, in fact, held in abeyance the disposition of motions for
reconsideration in this proceeding in light of its grant to Senator
Estrada a period of five days from receipt of the May 7 2014
Order to formally respond to the above-named respondents’
claims.
The court then underscored Sen. Estrada’s procedural omission.
Sen. Estrada did not file any pleading, much less a motion for
reconsideration, to the March 27 2014 Order. Sen. Estrada
immediately proceeded to file this Petition for Certiorari before
this Court. Sen. Estrada’s resort to a petition for certiorari before
this Court stands in stark contrast to his filing of his April 7 2014
Motion for Reconsideration of the March 28 2014 Joint Resolution
finding probable cause.
It is apparent that Sen. Estrada’s present petition for certiorari is
premature for lack of filing of a motion for reconsideration before
the Ombudsman. When the Ombudsman gave Sen. Estrada
copies of the counter-affidavits and even waited for the lapse of
the given period for the filing of his comment, Sen. Estrada failed
to avail of the opportunity to be heard due to his own fault. Thus,
Sen. Estrada’s failure cannot in any way be construed as violation
of due process by the Ombudsman, much less of grave abuse of
discretion. Sen. Estrada has not filed any comment, and still
chooses not to.
(3) YES. While his motion for reconsideration of the March 28
2014 Joint Resolution was pending, Sen. Estrada did not
wait for the resolution of the Ombudsman and instead
proceeded to file the present Petition for Certiorari. Sen.
Estrada resorted to simultaneous remedies by filing this
Petition alleging violation of due process by the
Ombudsman even as his Motion for Reconsideration
raising the very same issue remained pending with the
Ombudsman. This is plain and simple forum shopping,
warranting outright dismissal of this Petition.
4. ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION VS. JOAQUIN
ANG [August 17, 2015, G.R. No.182157]
FACTS:
 San Miguel Packaging Products-Metal Closures
Lithography Plant (SMC-MCLP) allegedly awarded
petitioner an exclusive contract to purchase its aluminum-
and tin-based scrap materials.
 Based on the narration of petitioner, Dela Cruz pretended
to be an agent of Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation
when she arranged for the transport of the scrap
materials. She had allegedly coordinated the hauling with
Alday, who was then working for SMC-MCLP.
 Alday purportedly allowed the trucks driven by Paniergo
and Bagaua to enter the plant and load the scrap
 materials in the cargoes based on a false representation
that the transaction was authorized by petitioner.
 Fortunately, the two trucks was not able to leave the
premises of SMC MCLP. Petitioner lodged a Complaint for
attempted estafa through falsification of
commercial/private document against dela Cruz, et al.
An information was filed and the RTC issued a Warrant of
Arrest.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC have jurisdiction to determine probable
cause? YES
HELD:
Petitioner explains that there are two determinations of
probable cause: the first is for the purpose of filing a criminal
information in the court, and the second is for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
Petitioner submits that since the first kind is executive in
nature, then the RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction to determine
the existence of probable cause to hold respondent as an
accused in the crime of estafa.
Petitioner's interpretation of the rules on the
determination of probable cause is inaccurate. Although courts
must respect the executive determination of probable cause,
the trial courts may still independently determine probable
cause. They are not irrevocably bound to the determination of
probable cause by the prosecutor and the DOJ.
The trial court actually has the following options upon the
filing of a criminal information: (1) immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause;
(2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause. These options are provided in Rule 112, Section 6 (a) of
the Rules of Court.
5. People vs Penaflor
6. Ongcoma Hadji Homar vs People of the Philippines [GR
No. 182534, September 2, 2015]
FACTS:
Prosecution’s version:
An Information was filed against Petitioner Homar for
possession of 1 heat-sealed plastic sachet of shabu.
PO1 Eric Tan [lone prosecution witness] testified that on 20
Aug 2002, at around 8:50pm, Chief Valdez ordered him to go
to South Wing, Roxas Blvd. While proceeding there, he saw
Homar crossing a “No Jaywalking” portion of Roxas. Tan and
civilian agent Tangcoy immediately stopped Homar and told
him to cross at the pedestrian lane. Homar was seen to be
picking up something from the ground. Tangcoy thus
conducted a frisk search resulting in the recovery of a knife.
then they did a more thorough search and found the shabu.
Defense’ version:
Homar was going home after selling some fake sunglasses
at the BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing the overpass,
Tan stopped and frisked him. They poked a gun at him and
accused him of being a holdupper. They confiscated a knife
for cutting cords, and Homar was investigated for alleged
possession of shabu.
- MTC acquitted him
- RTC, convicted him, ruling on the presumption of regularity of Tan before a search can be made — the process cannot be
and Tangcoy in their duties. reversed.
- CA affirmed RTC, ruling that R113 S5(a) validated the warrantless - S5 R113 provides the only occasions when a person may be
arrest, because Homar was committing jaywalking in the lawfully arrested without warrant. In this case, Tan alleged that
presence of the police, thus his arrest was lawful. Consequently, Homar’s arrest was due to his commission of jaywalking in
the subsequent stop and frisk search was incidental to the flagrante delicto
warrantless arrest, R126 S13. requisites
 1. the person the person to be arrested must
Homar’s arguments execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is
(1) the evidence of shabu is inadmissible as it was obtained attempting to commit a crime; and
as a result of an unlawful arrest. In fact, no report or  2. such overt act is done in the presence of
criminal charge was filed against him for the alleged
or within the view of the arresting officer.
jaywalking. Thus he did not commit, was not committing, Doctrine The prosecution has
or was not attempting to commit any crime.
the burden to prove the legality
(2) assuming that there was a valid arrest, R126 S113 permits
of the warrantless arrest from
a search that is directed only upon dangerous weapons
or anything that may have been used to constitute proof which the corpus delicti of the
in the commission of an offense. In this case, the shabu crime — shabu — was
had nothing to do with jaywalking. obtained. For, without a valid
warrantless arrest, the alleged
confiscation resulting from a
Respondent’s arguments warrantless search on the
Tan reiterated that the warrantless frisking and search was petitioner’s body is surely a
an incident to a lawful arrest for jaywalking, and that the violation of his right against
non-filing of a criminal charge of jaywalking against unlawful search and seizure.
Homar did not render his arrest invalid. - Tan failed to identify the area where Homar allegedly crossed.
Thus, Tan merely stated that Homar “crossed the street of Roxas
Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing.” Aside from
this conclusion, Tan failed to prove that the portion of Roxas
ISSUES and RULING
Blvd where Homar crossed was indeed a “no jaywalking” area.
(1) W/N there was intent on the part of the police to arrest the Homar was also not charged of jaywalking.
accused on the basis of the crime committed? - In the process of accosting Homar for jaywalking, Tangcoy
NO. recovered a knife and shabu, thus there is doubt as to whether
they intended to arrest Homar for jaywalking.
Doctrine Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order
- Prosecution failed to prove that Homar was committing a crime
that he or she may be bound to
related to the evidence obtained from the warrantless search
and seizure. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest answer for the commission of
 an offense. Application of
actual force, manual touching
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE
of the body, or physical
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 10, 2008, and
restraint, nor a formal
its Resolution dated April 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29364.
declaration of arrest, is
Petitioner ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR is ACQUITTED and ordered
required. It is enough that there
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for
be an intention on the part of
any other lawful cause.
one of the parties to arrest the
other, and that there be an
intent on the part of the other 7. Basilonia v villaruz
to submit, under the belief and 8. Enrile vs sandiganbayan
impression that submission is 9. Ppl vs CA
necessary. 10. PPL VS CHI CHAN
- Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the 11. Enrile vs ppl
petitioner. When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw Homar 12. JANET LIM NAPOLES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No.
jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and 224162. November 7, 2017.]
pointed to him the right place for crossing FACTS:
- Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under
custody or to restrain his liberty. The intent to arrest Homar only  The Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the
came after the discovery of shabu. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommending to
- Luz v. People: Shabu confiscated from the accused was prosecute Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes, and
inadmissible as evidence when the police who flagged him for several other named individuals for the crime of Plunder
traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. Due to the lack of for essentially misappropriating former Senator Enrile's
intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful. This is Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) through non-
notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being caught in governmental organizations (NGOs) that were selected
flagrante delicto for violating an ordinance, could have been without the required bidding procedure.
therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending  Ombudsman Special Panel of Investigators found
officers. probable cause to indict Napoles, among others, with one
(1) count of Plunder and (15) counts of violating Section 3
(2) W/N Homar had waived the inadmissibility of the evidence (e) of RA No. 3019.
seized when he submitted to the court’s jurisdiction  Napoles filed motion for reconsideration but was denied
NO. by The Special Panel of Investigators
 Napoles filled her Petition for Bail, arguing that the
- Despite having actively participated in all the proceedings, this evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove her
waiver does not automatically carry with it a waiver of the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed
inadmissibility of the evidence seized. the credibility of the State witnesses
 The Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearing and denied
- The shabu as evidence is inadmissible and precludes Napoles’ Petition for bail for lack of merit
conviction.
  Prosecution presented witnesses but Napoles manifested
that she will not present any evidence
 MR was also denied. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying Napoles’
bail application. NO
RULING:
Since this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, this Court's review is limited to whether the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions denying
Napoles' application for bail. The Court's certiorari jurisdiction
covers only errors of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
 The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the
evidence of Napoles' guilt for the crime of Plunder is
strong.
As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the
jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence of the prosecution
and the defense.
At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are limited to
the determination of whether there is a strong presumption of
Napoles' guilt. It is merely a preliminary determination, and the
Sandiganbayan may deny admission to bail even when there is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles.
As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Sandiganbayan may deny the application for bail on
evidence less than that required for the conviction of Napoles.
 The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying Napoles' Petition for Bail.
Upon receiving Napoles' Petition for Bail, it scheduled hearings to
allow the parties to submit their respective pieces of evidence.
The prosecution submitted numerous testimonial and
documentary evidence, endeavoring to establish evident proof
of Napoles' guilt.
Napoles, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence
on her behalf and relied instead on the supposed weakness of
the prosecution's evidence.
The Sandiganbayan's first assailed Resolution also reveals
straightaway that the evidence of the prosecution was
summarized accordingly, effectively complying with the due
process requirements.
 The prosecution was able to establish with evident proof
that Napoles
participated in the implied conspiracy to misappropriate public
funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth.
Seeing as it would be difficult to provide direct evidence
establishing the conspiracy among the accused, the
Sandiganbayan may infer it "from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that
they are merely parts of some complete whole."
It was therefore unnecessary for the Sandiganbayan to find
direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, former Senator
Enrile and Reyes. The conspiracy may be implied from the
intentional participation in the transaction that furthers the
common design and purpose.
As long as the prosecution was able to prove that two or more
persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred
even if no actual meeting among them was proven.
Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-
accused was proven
through various documentary and testimonial evidence showing
that they acted
towards the common goal of misappropriating the PDAF of former
Senator Enrile.
Consistent with the doctrine on implied conspiracy, these actions
on the part of
Napoles and her co-accused are sufficient to prove the
existence of a "concurrence in sentiment," regardless of any
proof that an actual agreement took place.
Napoles' participation in the conspiracy was established through
testimonial evidence, not only from one of her former employees,
but from four (4) witnesses — all of whom corroborate each other
on material points. More importantly, they testified on the minute
details of the scheme that only those privy to the conspiracy
would be able to provide. Notably, Napoles did not even refute
their claims that they were her former employees.
SO Napoles’ evidence of guilt is strong.
 The Sandiganbayan may rely on the testimonies of the
whistleblowers,
especially since these were corroborated by other available
evidences
13. People vs Caoli [G.R. No 196342 August 8, 2017]
FACTS:
 First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Raul O. Nasayao filed
an Information against Caoili, charging him with the crime
of rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article
266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC as amended
by R.A. No. 8353, and R.A. No. 7610. RTC issued an
order confirming Caoili 's detention at the Municipal
Station of the BJMP after his arrest. Upon arraignment
Caoili pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the
pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. RTC rendered its
decision declaring Caoili guilty of rape by sexual assault.
 Pursuant to a commitment order issued by the RTC,
provincial jail guards escorted Caoili for his confinement
at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm. Thereafter, Caoili
filed his appeal before the CA. CA set aside the appeal
and ordered for the case to be immediately remanded to
the trial court.
 CA held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by
sexual assault, what the trial court should have done was
to direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information
charging the proper offense, and after compliance
therewith, to dismiss the original Information. The
appellate court found it "imperative and morally upright"
to set the judgment aside and to remand the case for
further proceedings pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110, in
relation to Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
 Thereafter, Caoili and the OSG filed two respective
petitions for review before the SC. G.R. No. 196342 was
instituted by the OSG and G.R. No. 196848 was filed by
Caoili. These petitions were ordered consolidated by the
Court in its Resolution.
ISSUE/S:
(1) WON RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED
IN RAPE BY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE. NO
(2) WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF
CAOILI ON THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. NO
(3) WON THE CASE MAY BE REMANDED TO THE COURT A
QUO FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION
14, RULE 110 AND SEC. 19, RULE 119 OF THE RULES OF
COURT. NO
 (4) WHETHER THE DECISION OF CA ACQUITTED CAOILI. NO
RULING:
(1) No. Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape
through sexual intercourse. The variance doctrine, which
allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved
which is different from but necessarily included in the
crime charged, is embodied in Section 4, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof. When there is variance between the offense charged in
the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.
By jurisprudence, however, an accused charged in the
Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found
guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was
proven during trial. This is due to the substantial distinctions
between these two modes of rape.
Rape under the RPC, as amended, can be committed in
two ways:
(1) Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through
sexual intercourse, also known as "organ rape" or "penile
rape." The central element in rape through sexual
intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual
assault, also called "instrument or object rape," or
"gender-free rape." It must be attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
of paragraph 1.
The elements of rape through sexual intercourse are: (1) that the
offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using
force or intimidation. Rape by sexual intercourse is a crime
committed by a man against a woman, and the central element
is carnal knowledge.
On the other hand, the elements of rape by sexual assault are:
(1) that the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that
the act of sexual assault is committed by inserting his penis into
another person's mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person; and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by
using force or intimidation, among others.
The language of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC,
as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provides the elements that
substantially differentiate the two forms of rape, i.e., rape by
sexual intercourse and rape by sexual assault. It is through
legislative process that the dichotomy between these two
modes of rape was created. To broaden the scope of rape by
sexual assault, by eliminating its legal distinction from rape
through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation which the
SC cannot traverse without violating the principle of separation
of powers. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers
within the constitutional sphere of applying the law as enacted
by the Legislature.
The variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused
of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through
sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be
considered subsumed in the latter.
(2) No. Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual
intercourse in violation of Article 266-A of the RPC and R.A.
No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4,
in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e.,
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
which was the offense proved, because it is included in
rape, the offense charged.
The Court is aware of its previous pronouncements where,
applying the variance doctrine, it convicted the accused,
charged with the rape of a minor, for the offense designated not
as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" but
as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation
to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
Thus, in People v. Bon,the accused was charged with having
carnal knowledge of a six-year-old child against her will and with
the use of force and intimidation. The trial court convicted the
accused of rape. The evidence, however, merely showed that
accused inserted his finger into the victim's vaginal orifice.
Applying the variance doctrine, the Court en banc held that the
accused could still be made liable for acts of lasciviousness
under the RPC because said crime is included in rape. The
accused was convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, since
all the elements of the said offense were established.
Based on the language of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, however,
the offense designated as Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 should be
used when the victim is under 12 years of age at the time the
offense was committed. In this case, AAA was a little over 14
years old when the lascivious conduct was committed against
her. Thus, the SC used the nomenclature "Lascivious Conduct"
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
(3) No. The CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court
for the purpose of filing the proper Information on the basis
of the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 and Section
19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. x x xxxxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss
the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule
119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense. When it becomes manifest at any time before
judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the
accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon
the filing of the proper information. (Emphasis ours)
The SC held that it is clear that the rules are applicable
only before judgment has been rendered. In this case, the trial
has been concluded. The RTC already returned a guilty verdict,
which has been reviewed by the CA whose decision, in turn, has
been elevated to this Court.
(4) No. Contrary to Caoili's stance, the CA's decision did not
amount to a judgment of acquittal. It is true the CA
declared that given the substantial distinctions between
rape through sexual intercourse, as charged, and rape by
sexual assault, which was proved, "no valid conviction can
 be had without running afoul of the accused's
Constitutional right to be informed of the charge." This
statement, however, must be read alongside the
immediately succeeding directive of the appellate court,
remanding the case to the RTC for further
proceedings pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 and Section
19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Said directive clearly
shows that the CA still had cause to detain Caoili and did
not discharge him; in fact, the CA would have Caoili
answer for the proper Information which it directed the
prosecution to file. These are not consistent with the
concept of acquittal which denotes a discharge, a formal
certification of innocence, a release or an absolution.
While the procedure adopted by the CA is certainly
incorrect, its decision cannot be deemed to have the
effect of an acquittal.
SC denies the two respective petitions for review filed by Caoili
and the OSG, sets aside the two resolutions of the CA and finds
accused Noel Go Caoili alias Boy Tagalog guilty of Lascivious
Conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility of parole, and to pay a fine of Php 15,000.00. He is
further ordered to pay the victim, AAA, civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages each in the amount of Php
75,000.00. The fine, civil indemnity and damages so imposed are
subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
14. MALAYAN INSURANCE VS PICCIO [GR. NO. 203370 April
11, 2016]
FACTS:
 Gimenez, President of the Philippine Integrated
Advertising Agency - the advertising arm of the
Yuchengco Group of Companies which Malayan
Insurance is a corporate member - filed a Complaint-
Affidavit for thirteen (13) counts of Libel against herein
respondents for purportedly posting defamatory
articles/statements on the website
www.pepcoalition.com that besmirched the reputation
of the Yuchengco family and the Yuchengco Group,
including herein petitioners.
 Respondents filed a Motion to Quash, asserting, among
others, lack of jurisdiction, since the residences of
petitioners were not alleged in the Information. RTC
Makati granted the said motion and dismissed Criminal
Case Nos. 06-877 and 06-882 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It found that the Information filed in these
cases failed to state that any one of the offended parties
resides in Makati City, or that the subject articles were
printed or first published in Makati City. Hence, the failure
to state the aforementioned details was a fatal defect
which negated its jurisdiction over the criminal cases.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but was later
on denied.
 RTC Makati then issued an order dismissing the criminal
case for lack of probable cause and ruled that the
element of malice was lacking since respondents did not
appear to have been motivated by personal ill will to
speak or spite Malayan Insurance. The prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration but such was denied, hence
the appeal of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the court erred in denying petitioner’s
appeal due to the lack of OSGs authorization. NO
(2) Whether or not the court erred in denying petitioner’s
appeal due to the based on jurisdictional grounds
RULING:

(1) NO. The authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested
solely in the OSG45 which is "the law office of the
Government whose specific powers and functions
include that of representing the Republic and/or the
People [of the Philippines] before anycourt in any
action which affects the welfare of the people as the
ends of justice may require."
In People v. Piccio (Piccio), which involved one of the thirteen
(13) criminal cases between the same parties, this Court held that
"if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there
is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring
an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The
rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected
by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the
petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For this reason,
the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in
the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent
them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
In view of the corollary principle that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the
criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG
is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended
party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of
the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari
even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of
preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case."
There being no authorization given, the appeal was rightfully
dismissed by the CA.
(2) Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the
place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but constitutes an
essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires
even greater import in libel cases, given that Article
360 [of the RPC], as amended [by Republic Act No.
436354 ], specifically provides for the possible
venuesmfor the institution of the criminal and civil
aspects of such cases," to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible. –
xx x.The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the off ended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: x x x.
Thus, generally speaking, "the venue of libel cases where
the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of
two places, namely:
1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or
2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published."
In this case, the CA proceeded to deny Malayan
Insurance's appeal in for lack of jurisdiction. It held that this Court's
ruling in Bonifacio is already "controlling here because they
involve the same parties and the same issues," observing that this
case is "one ( 1) of the thirteen ( 13) cases/[I]nformations filed
before the [Makati-RTC] which originated from the complaint
initiated by [Gimenez ]."
The right to prosecute criminal cases pertains exclusively
to the People, which is, therefore, the proper party to bring the
appeal, through the representation of the OSG. The People are
deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and,
therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
Hence, in view of Malayan Insurance's lack of legal
personality to file the present petition, this Court has to dismiss the
same, without prejudice, however, to Malayan Insurance's filing
of the appropriate action to preserve its interest in the civil aspect
of the Libel case following the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
15. DERILO VS PPL
16. LOPEZ VS PPL
17. PPL VS URZAIS
18. PPL VS CASTANAS
19. PPL VS JUGUETA
20. BELITA VS SY
21. UZON VS OMBUDSMAN
22. People Of The Philippines Vs. Gerry Lipata Y Ortiza [G.R.
No. 200302. April 20, 2016.]
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions; Section 3, Rule III
FACTS:
 The sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified she
saw appellant, his brother Larry Lipata and a certain
[Rudy] repeatedly stabbing the victim using a tres cantos,
an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse. She
was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from the
incident.
 Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other
assailants left the scene. Mercelinda rushed the victim to
a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
E
 The daughter of the victim, testified that she saw
appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata
[stab] her father to death in front of their house.
 She recounted that upon coming home of her father from
her aunt's house to ask for malunggay leaves, her father
was attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the victim
to run away. Thinking that his assailants were no longer
around, the victim proceeded to their house but then the
Lipatas stabbed him to death. She was at a distance of six
(6) to eight (8) meters away from the scene.
 On the other hand, according to appellant, he was resting
in his house when his two children called him and told him
to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to
his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed
by the victim. He instantaneously assisted his brother but
the victim continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to
the ground.
 Thereafter, appellant managed to grab the knife from the
victim and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of
the crime] because he was wounded.
 Appellant's sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to
the Amang Medical Center for treatment of his stab
wound where he was apprehended by police officers.
 The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of murder.
 PAO filed a notice of appeal which the RTC granted.
 The CA dismissed appellant's appeal and affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTC's ruling
that appellant's claim of defense of a relative must fail.
There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of
appellant or of his brother Larry. There was also no reason
for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was outnumbered by
the Lipata brothers, three to one. The requirement of lack
of provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the
 multiple stab wounds that Cueno sustained. The CA
disagreed with appellant's contention that the
prosecution failed to establish treachery.
 The PAO filled a notice of appeal on behalf of appellant.
The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the records to
the SC.
 The BuCor, informed this Court that there is no record of
confinement of appellant as of date. The SC required the
Jail Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison
and to report compliance within ten days from notice.
 The Jail Warden, in a letter informed this Court that
appellant passed away on 13 February 2011
 In view of appellant's death prior to the promulgation of
the CA's decision, the SC issued a Resolution dated which
ordered the PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal
representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant
as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of
appellant within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution."
 The PAO filled its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil
Liability of the Deceased Appellant. According to the
PAO the relatives of the deceased appellant have not
communicated with it since the case was assigned to its
office.
 The SC issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO]
shall continue as the legal representative of the estate of
the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the
estate in the civil aspect of this case."
ISSUE:
Won appellant’s death extinguished his civil liability. YES
RULING:
 Appellant's death has the effect of extinguishing his
criminal liability based on Article 89 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
 The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of
the accused after arraignment and during the pendency
of the criminal action to reflect in the ruling in Bayotas.
 The current Rules, pursuant to the pronouncement in
Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his heirs, in
this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their
claims against the estate of the deceased appellant.
 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against
the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is
taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 in
relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his
estate in Rules 86 and 87.
 Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found
that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the
criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing
a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict.
 Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a
separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution
for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause
of action arising from quasi-delict leads us to the
conclusion that, a decade after Cueno's death, his heirs
cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts
awarded by the CA.
 SC declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused
does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
based on Article 29 of the Civil Code
WHEREFORE, decision of CA is SET ASIDE. The criminal and civil
liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are
declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.
Note:
Bayotas’ Ruling
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency
of the criminal case,
23. People vs Oandasan [G.R. No 194605 June 14, 2016]
FACTS:
 Three informations were filed against the accused, two of
which were for murder involving the fatal shooting of
Edgardo Tamanu and Danilo Montegrico, and the third
was for frustrated homicide involving the near-fatal
shooting of Mario Paleg. The accused-appellant raised
the defense of denial and alibi.
 RTC rendered its judgment, finding the accused Mariano
Oandasan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal for Murder for killing Danilo Montegrico, for
Homicide for killing Edgardo Tamanu and for Frustrated
Homicide for wounding Mario Paleg. On appeal, the CA
denied the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
Hence, this ultimate appeal, with the accused still insisting
on the reversal of his convictions.
ISSUE/S:
(1) WON denial and alibi overcome positive identification of the
accused. NO
(2) WON the trial court and CA erroneously pronounced the
accused guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide as to the
second and third victims on the basis that treachery was not
shown to be attendant. YES
RULING:
(1) No. The SC affirms the finding of his being criminally
responsible for the killing of Montegrico and Tamanu, and
the frustrated killing of Paleg, subject to the rectification of
the characterization of the felonies as to Tamanu and
Paleg. Denial and alibi do not overcome positive
identification of the accused. There is no doubt that
Prosecution witness Ferdinand Cutaran positively
identified the accused as the person who had shot
Montegrico. Considering that Cutaran’s credibility as an
eyewitness was unassailable in the absence of any
showing or hint of ill motive on his part to falsely incriminate
the accused, such identification of the accused as the
assailant of Montegrico prevailed over the accused’s
weak denial and alibi. As such, the CA properly rejected
the denial and alibi of the accused as unworthy,
Denial and alibi do not prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by the State’s witnesses who are categorical and
consistent and bereft of ill motive towards the accused. Denial,
unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
undeserving of weight in law for being negative and self-serving.
Moreover, denial and alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
(2) Yes. The SC disagree’s with both lower courts because
treachery was competently shown to be attendant in the
shooting of Tamanu and Paleg. Thus, the SC pronounces
the accused guilty of two counts of murder and one count
of frustrated murder. The CA and the RTC appreciated the
attendance of treachery only in the fatal shooting of
Montegrico. Although no witness positively identified the
accused as the person who had also shot Tamanu and
Paleg, the record contained sufficient circumstantial
evidence to establish that the accused was also criminally
responsible for the fatal shooting of Tamanu and the near-
fatal shooting of Paleg.
Furthermore, the SC held that although the CA and the RTC
correctly concluded that the accused had been directly
responsible for the shooting of Tamanu and Paleg, the Court is
perplexed why both lower courts only characterized the killing of
Tamanu and the near-killing of Paleg as homicide and frustrated
homicide while characterizing the killing of Montegrico as murder
because of the attendance of treachery. The distinctions were
unwarranted. The fact that the shooting of the three victims had
occurred in quick succession fully called for a finding of the
attendance of treachery in the attacks against all the victims.
The attack was mounted with treachery because the two
conditions in order for this circumstance to be appreciated
concurred, namely: (a) that the means, methods and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend themselves or to retaliate; and (b) that such means,
methods and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person.13 The essence of treachery lay in the attack that came
without warning, and was swift, deliberate and unexpected,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victims no
chance to resist, or retaliate, or escape, thereby ensuring the
accomplishment of the deadly design without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of
the victims.
The rule is that the allegations of the information on the nature of
the offense charged, not the nomenclature given to it by the
Office of the Public Prosecutor, are controlling in the
determination of the offense charged. Accordingly, considering
that the information stated in its first paragraph that the accused,
“armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and with treacher[y], conspiring together and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shot one Engr. Mario Paleg y Ballad, inflicting
upon the latter a gunshot wound,” the accused can be properly
found guilty of frustrated murder, a crime sufficiently averred in
the information.
SC finds accused MARIANO OANDASAN, JR. GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of TWO COUNTS OF MURDER for the killing of
Edgardo Tamanu and Danilo Montegrico and of FRUSTRATED
MURDER for the frustrated killing of Mario Paleg.
24. PPL VS BRIOZO