Ethics Labor Merc

LABOR LAW
Second Division
Dismissals
Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Gonzaga

698 SCRA 103, G.R. No. 187722, June 10, 2013
Gonzaga’s gross and habitual neglect of duties and responsibilities, serious misconduct, misappropriation of
Rural Electric Cooperative (REC) funds and failure to remit collections/monies to the petitioner warrant the
former’s dismissal from employment under the Labor Code.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Work-related Illness
Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated vs. Candava

700 SCRA 174, June 26, 2013
Joselito contracted his illness in the course of employment. It cannot also be denied that the same was
aggravated during the same period. Thus, there was a clear causal connection between such illness and his
eventual death, making his death compensable.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Termination of Employment
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. Estrella

700 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 197789 July 8, 2013
Neither do the text messages sent to Jacobe predicate any corrupt motive on Estrella’s part since the causal
connection between these messages and the conduct of Estrella’s bid inspection and/or approval was not
adequately shown.
LABOR LAW
En Banc
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz

701 SCRA 682, G.R. No. 192571 July 23, 2013
A probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Martinez vs. Central Pangasinan Coorperatuin,

701 SCRA 205, G.R. No. 192306 July 15, 2013
Martinez’s failure to properly account for his shortage of such a significant amount is enough reason for
CENPELCO to lose trust and confidence in him. Hence, a ground for valid dismissal of an employee.
of their right to possess the property.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Substantial Evidence
XAVIER C. RAMOS, vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. and ALFONSO L. SALCEDO, JR.
711 SCRA 590, G.R. No. 203186, DECEMBER 04, 2013
In cases files before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported
by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Damages
SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION OLALIA, represented by PORFERIA

SALIBONGCOGON, vs. SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or SANG IK JANG, JISSO JANG,
WISSO JANG, and NORBERTO TADEO
It is well to stress that while SPI had a valid ground to terminate its employees, i.e., closure of business, its
failure to comply with the proper procedure for termination renders it liable to pay the employee nominal
damages for such omission. An employer which has a valid cause for dismissing its employee but conducts the
dismissal with procedural infirmity is liable to pay the employee nominal damages. However, case law exhorts
that in instances where the payment of such damages becomes impossible, unjust, or too burdensome,
modification becomes necessary in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances.
LABOR LAW
First Division
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., vs. MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ

753 SCRA 218, G.R. No. 212054, MARCH 11, 2015
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representative in connection with his
work. Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer’s orders, regulations, or
instructions must be: (1) reasonable and lawful; (2) sufficiently known to the employee; and, (3) in connection
with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Retirement
GRACE CHRISTIAN HIGH SCHOOL, represented by its Principal, DR. JAMES TAN, vs.
FILIPINAS A. LAVANDERA
733 SCRA 498, G.R. No. 177845, AUGUST 20, 2014
An employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than
those provided under the same – that is, at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction
of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year – and that unless the parties provide for broader
inclusions, the term one-half month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th
month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Disability Benefits
ACE NAVIGATION COMPANY and VELA INTERNATIONAL MARINE LIMITED, vs.

SANTOS D. GARCIA
759 SCRA 274, G.R. No. 207804, JUNE 27, 2015
A judicious review of the records reveals that Garcia was indeed unable to obtain any gainful employment for
more than 120 days after his repatriation. However, this fact does not ipso facto render his disability total and
permanent. The company-designated physician is given a leeway of an additional 120 days, or a total of 240
days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature
of the latter’s disability.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Project Employees
DIONISIO DACLES, vs. MILLENIUM ERECTORS CORPORATION and/or RAGAS TIU

762 SCRA 420, G.R. No. 209822, JULY 08, 2015
For an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show that: (a) the employee was assigned
to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the
time the employee was engaged for such project. Being assigned to a project or a phase thereof which begins
and ends at determined or determinable times, the services of project employees may be lawfully terminated at
the completion of such project or phase. Consequently, in order to safeguard the rights of workers against the
arbitrary use of the word “project” to prevent them from attaining regular status, employers claiming that their
workers are project employees should prove that: (a) the duration and scope of the employment was specified
at the time they were engaged; and (b) there was indeed a project.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Due Process
LEI SHERYLL FERNANDEZ, vs. BOTICA CLAUDIO represented by GUADALUPE JOSE

733 SCRA 133, G.R. No. 205870, AUGUST 13, 2014
Jose eventually participated in the appeal proceedings by filing not only one but two motions for reconsideration
from the NLRC Resolution, thereby negating any supposed denial of due process on her part. The availment
of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of in labor cases amounts to due
process.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Resignation
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. and ANTONIO STEVEN L. CHAN, vs. JANET T.
SIASON
764 SCRA 494, G.R. No. 215555, JULY 29, 2015
Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office. It is the voluntary act of an
employee. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. While it may be said that
she did not tender her resignation wholeheartedly, she voluntarily resigned from her job in order to avoid a
full-blown administrative trial regarding her misdeeds which could potentially result in her termination for just
cause.
LABOR LAW
First Division
MELVIN P. MALLO, vs. SOUTHEAST ASIAN COLLEGE, INC. and EDITA ENATSU
772 SCRA 657, G.R. No. 212861, OCTOBER 14, 2015
Mallo’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with his prior acts of actively inquiring about his
teaching load, negate any intention on his part to sever his employment. Abandonment of position is a matter
of intention and cannot be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed, from certain equivocal acts. Since Mallo
was not dismissed and that he never abandoned his job, it is only proper for him to report back to work and
for respondents to reinstate him to his former position or a substantially equivalent one in its stead.
LABOR LAW
First Division
UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION, vs. ELMER ABLAY, ILDEFONSO

CLAVECILLAS, STANLEY BLAZA, VINCENT VILLAVICENCIO, ROBERTO CACAS, and
ELSA CADAYUNA, in behalf of her deceased husband, ELEAZAR CADAYUNA
787 SCRA 593, G.R. No. 218172, MARCH 16, 2016
Ablay’s conviction as an accomplice to the murder of petitioner’s former assistant manager had strained the
relationship between Ablay and petitioner. Ablay should not be reinstated in the company instead be paid
separation pay, as reinstatement would only create an atmosphere of antipathy. It should be clarified that said
strained relation should not affect the grant of benefits in his favor prior to his conviction, as the latter pertains
to an offense entirely separate and distinct from the acts constituting petitioner’s charges against him.
LABOR LAW
First Division
CRISPIN B. LOPEZ, vs. IRVINE CONSTRUCTION CORP. and TOMAS SY SANTOS

733 SCRA 589, G.R. No. 207253, AUGUST 20, 2014
Lopez is a regular and not a project employee. The supposed layoff of Lopez was hardly justified considering
the absence of any causal relation between the cessation of Irvine’s project with the suspension of Lopez’s
work. The continuation of his engagement with Irvine, either in Cavite or in any of its business locations should
not have been affected by the culmination of the Cavite project alone.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Demotion
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., vs. ALEXANDER P. BICHARA
769 SCRA 139, G.R. No. 213729, SEPTEMBER 02, 2015
Already settled is the illegality of Bichara’s demotion with finality, he should be awarded the salary differential
of a flight purser from a flight steward from the time of his illegal demotion up until he was retrenched. The
award of salary differential is not dependent on the validity of his termination as it is intrinsically linked to the
illegality of his Demotion. With this direct relation, there should be no obstacle in rendering this award.
LABOR LAW
First Division
CEBU PEOPLE’S MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE and MACARIO G. QUEVEDO, vs.

NICERATO E. CARBONILLA, JR.
782 SCRA 418, G.R. No. 212070, JANUARY 27, 2016
Employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the services of employees who perform
functions by which their nature requires the employer’s full trust and confidence. Mere existence of basis for
believing that the employee has breached trust and confidence of the employer is sufficient and does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, when an employee has been guilty of breach of trust or his employer
has ample reason to distrust him, a labor tribunal cannot deny the employer the authority to dismiss him.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Length of Service
SECURITY BANK SAVINGS CORPORATION (formerly PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT

BANK)/HERMINIO M. FAMATIGAN, JR., vs. CHARLES M. SINGSON
784 SCRA 30, G.R. No. 214230, FEBRUARY 10, 2016
The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to
his dismissal does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and
worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the
meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables. Length of
Service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Labor-only Contracting
CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, INC. (CEPALCO) and CEPALCO
ENERGY SERVICES CORPORATION (CESCO), formerly CEPALCO ENERGY SERVICES &
TRADING CORPORATION (CESTCO), vs. CEPALCO EMPLOYEE’S LABOR UNION-
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(TUCP), CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, INC. (CEPALCO) and
CEPALCO ENERGY SERVICES CORPORATION (CESCO), formerly CEPALCO ENERGY
SERVICES & TRADING CORPORATION (CESTCO), vs. CEPALCO EMPLOYEE’S LABOR
UNION-ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (TUCP)
794 SCRA 95, G.R. Nos. 211015 & 213835, JUNE 20, 2016
Labor-only contracting is considered as a form of unfair labor practice when the same is devised by the
employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights of self-organization. It
would be the employees of CESCO who are entitled to seek the foregoing reliefs since in cases of labor-only
contracting, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be
responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
However, they have not been impleaded in these cases.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Nominal Damages
ARMANDO N. PUNCIA, vs. TOYOTA SHAW/ PASIG, INC.

795 SCRA 32, G.R. No. 214399, JUNE 28, 2016
While Toyota afforded Puncia the opportunity to refute the charge of gross inefficiency against him, the latter
was completely deprived of the same when he was dismissed for gross insubordination – a completely different
ground from what was stated in the Notice to Explain. Considering that Toyota had dismissed Puncia for a just
cause, albeit failed to comply with the proper procedural requirements, the former should pay the latter nominal
damages.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Seafarers
JOSE RUDY L. BAUTISTA, vs. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.,

AUGUSTEA SHIPMANAGEMENT ITALY, and/or Captain ANTONIO S. NOMBRADO
767 SCRA 657, G.R. No. 206032, AUGUST 19, 2015
It is not required that the employment of the petitioner as Chief cook should be the sole factor in the
development of his hypertensive cardiovascular disease so as to entitle him to claim the benefits provided
therefor. It suffices that his employment as such had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development
of the disease. Thus, it is safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of petitioner’s employment had
contributed to the aggravation of his illness, considering that as Chief Cook, he was exposed to constant
temperature changes, stress, and physical strain.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Quitclaims
WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION and/or WILLIAM GO QUE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and DANNY SINGSON, RODOLFO PASAQUI, LENDO LOMINIQUI, and JUN ANDALES
790 SCRA 309, G.R. No. 191699, APRIL 19, 2016
Legitimate waivers resulting from voluntary settlements of laborers’ claims should be treated and upheld as the
law between the parties. There is no longer any justiciable controversy between petitioner and private
respondents Singson and Pasaqui on account of the Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of Claim they executed
in the petitioner’s favor subsequent to the filing of the instant case rendering the same moot and academic, and
dismissible with respect to them.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Two-Notice Rule
RODFHEL BACLAAN TORREFIEL, MYRA SUACILLO, LORLIE ORENDAY, SHEELA LAO,

and LEODELYN LIBOT, vs. BEAUTY LANE PHILS., INC./MS. MA. HENEDINA D.
TOBOJKA
799 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 214186, AUGUST 03, 2016
The copies of the Notices to Explain and Preventive Suspension issued to them did not specify charges against
them but simply stated that they condoned and failed to report anomalies to the management. The failure to
inform an employee of the charges against him deprives him of due process.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Disability Benefit
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, MARLON R. ROÑO
and “STAR PRINCESS,” vs. ROMEO V. PANOGALINOG
763 SCRA 140, G.R. No. 212049, JULY 15, 2015
The employer is liable for a seafarer’s disability arising from a work-related injury or illness, only after the degree
of disability has been established by the company-designated physician. A seafarer shall be entitled to the
payment of the full amount of his disability compensation only if his injury, regardless of the degree, results in
loss of profession, i.e., his physical condition prevents a return to sea service.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Work-related Illness
Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated vs. Candava

700 SCRA 174, June 26, 2013
Joselito contracted his illness in the course of employment. It cannot also be denied that the same was
aggravated during the same period. Thus, there was a clear causal connection between such illness and his
eventual death, making his death compensable.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. Estrella

700 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 197789 July 8, 2013
Neither do the text messages sent to Jacobe predicate any corrupt motive on Estrella’s part since the causal
connection between these messages and the conduct of Estrella’s bid inspection and/or approval was not
adequately shown.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Loss of Trust and Confidence
Martinez vs. Central Pangasinan Coorperatuin,

701 SCRA 205, G.R. No. 192306 July 15, 2013
Martinez’s failure to properly account for his shortage of such a significant amount is enough reason for
CENPELCO to lose trust and confidence in him. Hence, a ground for valid dismissal of an employee.
LABOR LAW
En Banc
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
701 SCRA 682, G.R. No. 192571 July 23, 2013
A probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Reinstatement
Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. vs. Pionilla
704 SCRA 362, August 28, 2013
The reinstatement of the respondent without backwages was proper because the penalty of dismissal was too
harsh of a penalty to be imposed against him for his infractions and because his employer was in good faith
when it dismissed Pionilla as his dereliction of its policy on ID usage was honestly perceived to be a threat to
the company’s security.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Nominal Damages

of their right to possess the property.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Damages

LABOR LAW
Second Division
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Damages

LABOR LAW
First Division
Regular Employees
Omni Hauling Services, Inc. vs. Bon,
734 SCRA 270, September 03, 2014
Because the employees were not explicitly informed of the duration and scope of the project, they cannot be
considered as project employees under the guise of the Labor Code.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Surety Bond
Philippine Touristers, Inc. vs. MAS Transit Workers Union-Anglo-KMU,
While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal
in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA. However, the filing of the motion to reduce
bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period
to perfect an appeal. In this regard, it bears stressing that the reduction of the bond provided thereunder is not
a matter of right on the part of the movant and its grant still lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon
a showing of meritorious grounds and the reasonableness of the bond tendered under the circumstances.
Hence, the court finds merit in favor of the petitioner.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Seafarers
Canuel vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
738 SCRA 120, October 13, 2014
Canuel suffered a work-related injury when he figured in an accident while performing his duties in the vessel.
Compensability does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre- existing at the time of the
employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Retirement Pay
Villena vs. Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc.

750 SCRA 55, February 04, 2015
While retirement pay and separation pay are not mutually exclusive of each other, Villena cannot be granted
entitlement to retirement pay which was not included as an issue in the illegal dismissal case which had already
been finally decided.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Strained Relations
Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation Security Agency, Inc.
752 SCRA 55, February 25, 2015
As reinstatement is no longer feasible in this case because of the strained relations between the parties and the
fact that Tatel had since been employed with another company, separation pay is awarded in lieu of
reinstatement.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Valid Termination
Gadia vs. Sykes Asia, Inc.
748 SCRA 633, January 28, 2015
Records reveal that Sykes Asia adequately informed petitioners of their employment status at the time of their
engagement, which provides that they were hired in connection with a particular project, thus, they were indeed
project-based employees and not regular employees.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Two-notice rule
Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Avestruz

751 SCRA 161, February 18, 2015
Avestruz was illegally dismissed there being no compliance with the two-notice rule when he was merely
verbally informed that he was dismissed from service and would be disembarked from the vessel by the captain
because of the oily cover of the garbage bin.
LABOR LAW
First Division
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., vs. MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ

753 SCRA 218, G.R. No. 212054, MARCH 11, 2015
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representative in connection with his
work. Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer’s orders, regulations, or
instructions must be: (1) reasonable and lawful; (2) sufficiently known to the employee; and, (3) in connection
with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Retirement
GRACE CHRISTIAN HIGH SCHOOL, represented by its Principal, DR. JAMES TAN, vs.
FILIPINAS A. LAVANDERA
733 SCRA 498, G.R. No. 177845, AUGUST 20, 2014
An employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than
those provided under the same – that is, at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction
of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year – and that unless the parties provide for broader
inclusions, the term one-half month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th
month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Disability Benefits
ACE NAVIGATION COMPANY and VELA INTERNATIONAL MARINE LIMITED, vs.
SANTOS D. GARCIA
759 SCRA 274, G.R. No. 207804, JUNE 27, 2015
A judicious review of the records reveals that Garcia was indeed unable to obtain any gainful employment for
more than 120 days after his repatriation. However, this fact does not ipso facto render his disability total and
permanent. The company-designated physician is given a leeway of an additional 120 days, or a total of 240
days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature
of the latter’s disability.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Project Employees
DIONISIO DACLES, vs. MILLENIUM ERECTORS CORPORATION and/or RAGAS TIU

762 SCRA 420, G.R. No. 209822, JULY 08, 2015
For an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show that: (a) the employee was assigned
to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the
time the employee was engaged for such project. Being assigned to a project or a phase thereof which begins
and ends at determined or determinable times, the services of project employees may be lawfully terminated at
the completion of such project or phase. Consequently, in order to safeguard the rights of workers against the
arbitrary use of the word “project” to prevent them from attaining regular status, employers claiming that their
workers are project employees should prove that: (a) the duration and scope of the employment was specified
at the time they were engaged; and (b) there was indeed a project.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Due Process
LEI SHERYLL FERNANDEZ, vs. BOTICA CLAUDIO represented by GUADALUPE JOSE

733 SCRA 133, G.R. No. 205870, AUGUST 13, 2014
Jose eventually participated in the appeal proceedings by filing not only one but two motions for reconsideration
from the NLRC Resolution, thereby negating any supposed denial of due process on her part. The availment
of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of in labor cases amounts to due
process.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Resignation
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. and ANTONIO STEVEN L. CHAN, vs. JANET T.
SIASON
764 SCRA 494, G.R. No. 215555, JULY 29, 2015
Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office. It is the voluntary act of an
employee. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. While it may be said that
she did not tender her resignation wholeheartedly, she voluntarily resigned from her job in order to avoid a
full-blown administrative trial regarding her misdeeds which could potentially result in her termination for just
cause.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Reinstatement
MELVIN P. MALLO, vs. SOUTHEAST ASIAN COLLEGE, INC. and EDITA ENATSU
772 SCRA 657, G.R. No. 212861, OCTOBER 14, 2015
Mallo’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with his prior acts of actively inquiring about his
teaching load, negate any intention on his part to sever his employment. Abandonment of position is a matter
of intention and cannot be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed, from certain equivocal acts. Since Mallo
was not dismissed and that he never abandoned his job, it is only proper for him to report back to work and
for respondents to reinstate him to his former position or a substantially equivalent one in its stead.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Length of Service
SECURITY BANK SAVINGS CORPORATION (formerly PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT

BANK)/HERMINIO M. FAMATIGAN, JR., vs. CHARLES M. SINGSON
784 SCRA 30, G.R. No. 214230, FEBRUARY 10, 2016
The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to
his dismissal does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and
worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the
meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables. Length of
Service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Labor-only Contracting
CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, INC. (CEPALCO) and CEPALCO
ENERGY SERVICES CORPORATION (CESCO), formerly CEPALCO ENERGY SERVICES &
TRADING CORPORATION (CESTCO), vs. CEPALCO EMPLOYEE’S LABOR UNION-
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(TUCP), CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, INC. (CEPALCO) and
CEPALCO ENERGY SERVICES CORPORATION (CESCO), formerly CEPALCO ENERGY
SERVICES & TRADING CORPORATION (CESTCO), vs. CEPALCO EMPLOYEE’S LABOR
UNION-ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (TUCP)
794 SCRA 95, G.R. Nos. 211015 & 213835, JUNE 20, 2016
Labor-only contracting is considered as a form of unfair labor practice when the same is devised by the
employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights of self-organization. It
would be the employees of CESCO who are entitled to seek the foregoing reliefs since in cases of labor-only
contracting, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be
responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
However, they have not been impleaded in these cases.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Nominal Damages
ARMANDO N. PUNCIA, vs. TOYOTA SHAW/ PASIG, INC.

795 SCRA 32, G.R. No. 214399, JUNE 28, 2016
While Toyota afforded Puncia the opportunity to refute the charge of gross inefficiency against him, the latter
was completely deprived of the same when he was dismissed for gross insubordination – a completely different
ground from what was stated in the Notice to Explain. Considering that Toyota had dismissed Puncia for a just
cause, albeit failed to comply with the proper procedural requirements, the former should pay the latter nominal
damages.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Occupational Disease
JOSE RUDY L. BAUTISTA, vs. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.,

AUGUSTEA SHIPMANAGEMENT ITALY, and/or Captain ANTONIO S. NOMBRADO
767 SCRA 657, G.R. No. 206032, AUGUST 19, 2015
It is not required that the employment of the petitioner as Chief cook should be the sole factor in the
development of his hypertensive cardiovascular disease so as to entitle him to claim the benefits provided
therefor. It suffices that his employment as such had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development
of the disease. Thus, it is safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of petitioner’s employment had
contributed to the aggravation of his illness, considering that as Chief Cook, he was exposed to constant
temperature changes, stress, and physical strain.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Quitclaims
WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION and/or WILLIAM GO QUE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and DANNY SINGSON, RODOLFO PASAQUI, LENDO LOMINIQUI, and JUN ANDALES
790 SCRA 309, G.R. No. 191699, APRIL 19, 2016
Legitimate waivers resulting from voluntary settlements of laborers’ claims should be treated and upheld as the
law between the parties. There is no longer any justiciable controversy between petitioner and private
respondents Singson and Pasaqui on account of the Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of Claim they executed
in the petitioner’s favor subsequent to the filing of the instant case rendering the same moot and academic, and
dismissible with respect to them.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Two-Notice Rule

TOBOJKA
799 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 214186, AUGUST 03, 2016
LABOR LAW
First Division
Disability Benefit
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, MARLON R. ROÑO

and “STAR PRINCESS,” vs. ROMEO V. PANOGALINOG
763 SCRA 140, G.R. No. 212049, JULY 15, 2015
The employer is liable for a seafarer’s disability arising from a work-related injury or illness, only after the degree
of disability has been established by the company-designated physician. A seafarer shall be entitled to the
payment of the full amount of his disability compensation only if his injury, regardless of the degree, results in
loss of profession, i.e., his physical condition prevents a return to sea service.
LABOR LAW
First Division
HOLCIM PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. RENANTE J. OBRA, respondent.

799 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 220998, August 8, 2016.
To constitute a valid cause for dismissal within the text and meaning of the Labor Code, the employee’s
misconduct must be serious, such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant, as in
this case where the item which respondent tried to take out was practically of no value to petitioner. The
dismissal imposed on respondent as penalty for his attempt to take a piece of scrap wire is unduly harsh and
excessive, as such act cannot be considered as a serious misconduct under the Labor Code.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Work-Related Death
CONCHITA J. RACELIS, petitioner, vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and/or

HOLLAND AMERICA LINES, INC.,** and FERNANDO T. LISING, respondents.
740 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014.
Rodolfo’s work-related illness during the term of his employment that caused his medical repatriation and,
ultimately, his death was work-related, and, it is but proper to consider the same as a compensable work-related
death despite it having occurred after his repatriation. The work-related death need not precisely occur during
the term of his employment as it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually
causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Compensable Illness
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, and MS. CYNTHIA C.
MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. JOEL P. HIPE, JR., respondent.
740 SCRA 330, G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014.
Hipe was subsequently declared fit to work by the company-designated physician merely 65 days after his
repatriation, thus negating the existence of any permanent disability for which compensability is sought. Two
(2) elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable: (a) the injury or illness must
be work-related; and (b) that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s
employment contract.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Permanent Total Disability
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and/or V-SHIP NORWAY and/or CYNTHIA C.

MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. CARLOS L. FLORES, JR.,** respondent.
761 SCRA 323, G.R. No. 207639, July 1, 2015.
Case law instructs that, if after the lapse of the 240-day period, the seafarer is still incapacitated to perform his
usual sea duties and the company-designated physician had not yet declared him fit to work or permanently
disabled, whether total or permanent, the conclusive presumption that the seafarer is totally and permanently
disabled arises. It is but proper to hold that respondent was permanently and totally disabled, and hence, entitled
to the corresponding benefits stated under the CBA.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Abandonment
FORTUNATO R. BARON, MANOLO B. BERSABAL, and RECTO A. MELENDRES,

petitioners, vs. EPE TRANSPORT, INC.** and/or ERNESTO P. ENRIQUEZ, respondents.
765 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 202645, August 5, 2015.
Abandonment of work does not per se sever the employer-employee relationship. It is merely a form of neglect
of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for termination of employment. Since petitioners’ abandonment was not
proven by respondents in this case, the NLRC correctly ruled that the former were illegally dismissed.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Fixed-term Employment
OKS DESIGNTECH, INC., represented by ZAMBY O. PONGAD, petitioner, vs. MARY JAYNE L.
CACCAM,** respondent.
765 SCRA 433, G.R. No. 211263, August 5, 2015.
An employee is said to be under a fixed-term employment when he is hired under a contract which specifies
that the employment will last only for a definite period. The Court upholds the NLRC’s finding that respondent
was a fixed-term employee and not a regular one whose employment may be validly terminated upon the
expiration of her contract.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Due Process
QUANTUM FOODS, INC., petitioner, vs. MARCELINO ESLOYO and GLEN MAGSILA,
respondents.
777 SCRA 532, G.R. No. 213696, December 9, 2015.
It is well to emphasize that technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before the NLRC. In fact, labor
officials are enjoined to use every and reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, in the interest of due process. Consequently,
the NLRC cannot be faulted for relaxing its own rules in the interest of substantial justice.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Floating Status
RAFAEL B. QUILLOPA, petitioner, vs. QUALITY GUARDS SERVICES AND INVESTIGATION

AGENCY and ISMAEL BASABICA, JR., respondents.
The unjustified failure to place petitioner back in active duty within the allowable six (6)-month period hold
respondents liable for petitioner’s constructive dismissal. Placing a security guard in temporary “off-detail” or
“floating status” is part of management prerogative of the employer-security agency and does not, per se,
constitute a severance of the employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, the security guard must not remain
in such status for a period of more than six (6) months; otherwise, he is deemed terminated.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Burden of Proof
VICENTE C. TATEL, petitioner, vs. JLFP INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY AGENCY, INC.,
JOSE LUIS F. PAMINTUAN, and/or PAOLO C. TURNO, respondents.
Jurisprudence has placed upon the employer the burden of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, that the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause. In this case, respondents have adequately
discharged this burden, proving that they did not dismiss Tatel. Accordingly, the burden of proof has shifted
to the latter to establish otherwise, which he, however, failed to do.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Control Test
Felicilda vs. Uy
803 SCRA 296, G.R. No. 221241 September 14, 2016
The power of control refers merely to the existence of the power. It is not essential for the employer to actually
supervise the performance of duties of the employee, as it is sufficient that the former has a right to wield the
power, as in this case.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Service Incentive Leave
HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. vs. Villastique

801 SCRA 163, G.R. No. 219569 August 17, 2016
Villanueva, an employee of petitioner for more than 1 year is entitled to service incentive leave pay which may
be used as leave days or he may collect its monetary value, unless the working days in the establishment as a
matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which
case said period shall be considered as one [(1)] year.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Separation Pay
Manila Doctors College vs. Olores

804 SCRA 482, G.R. No. 225044 October 3, 2016
Failure of the petitioners to comply with said order, the CA correctly declared respondent to be entitled to the
payment of his accrued salaries during the period of the appeal until the reversal of the December 8, 2010
Decision of LA Amansec.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Presumptions
Toyota Pasig, Inc. vs. De Peralta

807 SCRA 120, G.R. No. 213488 November 7, 2016
The failure of employers to submit the necessary documents that are in their possession gives rise to the
presumption that the presentation thereof is prejudicial to its cause.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Willful Disobedience
Sta. Isabel vs. Perla Compañia de Seguros, Inc.

The refusal of Sta. Isabel to appear before Perla’s Head Office despite due notice and warnings constitutes
insubordination. Thus, a valid ground for dismissal.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Project Employees
Quebral vs. Angbus Construction, Inc.

A project-based employee is assigned to a project which begins and ends at determined or determinable times.
The services of employees who are hired as such may be lawfully terminated at the completion of the project.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Termination
BUENAFLOR CAR SERVICES, INC. vs. CEZAR DURUMPILI DAVID, JR.

GR No. 222730, November 07, 2016
Respondent’s termination was grounded on his violation of petitioner’s Code of conduct and behavior which
was held to be tantamount to serious misconduct and willful breach of trust. Hence, the dismissal was legal.
LABOR LAW
First Division
POEA-Standard Employment Contract
Jebsens Maritime, Inc. vs. Rapiz

814 SCRA 303, G.R. No. 218871 January 11, 2017
The provisions of the stipulations of a contract under POEA-SEC shall determine the amount of disability
benefits a claimant shall be entitled to.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Mandatory Contribution
Navarra vs. People

821 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 224943 March 20, 2017
FENICS’s President and Chairman of the Board of Directors at that time, is charged for violation of Section
22(a), in relation to Section 28(h) and (f), of RA 8282 for FENICS’s failure and/or refusal to remit its
employees’ SSS contributions to the SSS during the period from July 1997 to June 2000.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Two-Notice Rule

TOBOJKA
799 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 214186, AUGUST 03, 2016
LABOR LAW
First Division
UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION, vs. ELMER ABLAY, ILDEFONSO

CLAVECILLAS, STANLEY BLAZA, VINCENT VILLAVICENCIO, ROBERTO CACAS, and
ELSA CADAYUNA, in behalf of her deceased husband, ELEAZAR CADAYUNA
787 SCRA 593, G.R. No. 218172, MARCH 16, 2016
Ablay’s conviction as an accomplice to the murder of petitioner’s former assistant manager had strained the
relationship between Ablay and petitioner. Ablay should not be reinstated in the company instead be paid
separation pay, as reinstatement would only create an atmosphere of antipathy. It should be clarified that said
strained relation should not affect the grant of benefits in his favor prior to his conviction, as the latter pertains
to an offense entirely separate and distinct from the acts constituting petitioner’s charges against him.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Suspension of Business Operation
CRISPIN B. LOPEZ, vs. IRVINE CONSTRUCTION CORP. and TOMAS SY SANTOS

733 SCRA 589, G.R. No. 207253, AUGUST 20, 2014
Lopez is a regular and not a project employee. The supposed layoff of Lopez was hardly justified considering
the absence of any causal relation between the cessation of Irvine’s project with the suspension of Lopez’s
work. The continuation of his engagement with Irvine, either in Cavite or in any of its business locations should
not have been affected by the culmination of the Cavite project alone.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Demotion
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., vs. ALEXANDER P. BICHARA
769 SCRA 139, G.R. No. 213729, SEPTEMBER 02, 2015
Already settled is the illegality of Bichara’s demotion with finality, he should be awarded the salary differential
of a flight purser from a flight steward from the time of his illegal demotion up until he was retrenched. The
award of salary differential is not dependent on the validity of his termination as it is intrinsically linked to the
illegality of his Demotion. With this direct relation, there should be no obstacle in rendering this award.
LABOR LAW
First Division
Loss of Trust and Confidence
CEBU PEOPLE’S MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE and MACARIO G. QUEVEDO, vs.
NICERATO E. CARBONILLA, JR.
782 SCRA 418, G.R. No. 212070, JANUARY 27, 2016
Employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the services of employees who perform
functions by which their nature requires the employer’s full trust and confidence. Mere existence of basis for
believing that the employee has breached trust and confidence of the employer is sufficient and does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, when an employee has been guilty of breach of trust or his employer
has ample reason to distrust him, a labor tribunal cannot deny the employer the authority to dismiss him.
LABOR LAW
Second Division
Separation Pay
BENSON INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP and/or VILMA GENON, EDISA

HORTELANO, LOURDES ARANAS, TONY FORMENTERA, RENEBOY LEYSON, MA.
ALONA ACALDO, MA. CONCEPCION ABAO, TERESITA CALINAWAN, NICIFORO
CABANSAG, STELLA BARONGO, MARILYN POTOT, WELMER ABANID, LORENZO ALIA,
LINO PARADERO, DIOSDADO ANDALES, LUCENA ABESIA, and ARMANDO YBAÑEZ,
petitioners, vs. BENSON INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
732 SCRA 318, G.R. No. 200746, August 6, 2014.
The postulation that Benson had closed its establishment and ceased operations due to serious business losses
cannot be accepted as an excuse to clear itself of any liability since the ground of serious business losses is not
considered as an exculpatory parameter under the aforementioned CBA. While serious business losses generally
exempt the employer from paying separation benefits, it must be pointed that the exemption only pertains to
the obligation of the employer under the Labor Code.
LEGAL ETHICS
Third Division
Practice of Law
A.C. No. 6903. April 16, 2012.*

SUZETTE DEL MUNDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, respondent. Del
Mundo vs. Capistrano, 669 SCRA 462, A.C. No. 6903 April 16, 2012
Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for failure to exercise
that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal
profession, the courts and society.
LEGAL ETHICS
Third Division
Disbarment
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO
678 SCRA 60, A.C. No. 6116, AUGUST 01, 2012
The practice of law is considered a privilege, the act of Atty. Pefianco of offering to share his attorney's fees to
someone who isn't even licensed to practice law is a blatant violation of the values and norms embodied in
such practice.
The betrayal of marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral
and call for a sanction of suspension, or in some instances, disbarment, in the practice of law.
LEGAL ETHICS
Third Division
Duty of an Attorney
EMILIA O. DHALIWAL, vs. ATTY. ABELARDO B. DUMAGUING

678 SCRA 68, A.C. No. 9390 AUGUST 01, 2012
When delivery of title and damages becomes premature due to the counsel's withdrawal of funds and he fails
to return the same upon demand, it is presumed that he appropriated the same for his own use in violation of
the trust reposed in him by his client.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Code of Professional Responsibility
Abella vs. Barrios, Jr.

698 SCRA 683, Adm. Case No. 7332 , June 18, 2013
Labor Arbiter’s extortion of money from the complainant as a condition for the former to act on the latter’s
Motion for Execution constitutes gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Gross Negligence
Cabanes, Jr.,
700 SCRA 734, A.C. No. 7749 July 8, 2013
Atty. Cabanes was suspended from the practice of law for his failure to file his pre-trial brief as well as to
attend the scheduled hearings constitutes negligence
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Practice of Law
MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, vs. ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE
707 SCRA 13, A.C. No. 9532, OCTOBER 08, 2013
The Court observes that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a grave injury as she was subjected
to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion largely due to the advice of respondent.
Were it not for respondent’s imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during the
proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal prosecution. The Court
finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period
of three years as recommended by the OBC.
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorneys
AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, vs. ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN
709 SCRA 287, A.C. No. 7965, NOVEMBER 13, 2013
A lawyer’s duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the
former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance. In this case, despite that singular
encounter, respondent had thereafter all the opportunity to return the subject amount but still failed to do so.
Besides, the obligatory force of said duty should not be diluted by the temperament or occasional frustrations
of the lawyer’s client, especially so when the latter remains unsatisfied by the lawyer’s work.
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorneys
FELIPE C. DAGALA, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR. and ATTY. AMADO T. ADQUILEN
711 SCRA 206, A.C. No. 5044, DECEMBER 02, 2013
A retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence and not to sit idly by and leave
the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty. He is oblige to attend scheduled hearings or conferences, prepare
and file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urge their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The appropriate penalty on an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Attorney-Client Relationship
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE, vs. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR.

753 SCRA 350, A.C. No. 10672, MARCH 18, 2015
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Suspension from Practice of Law
SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA, vs. ATTY. OTILIO SY BONGON

754 SCRA 205, A.C. No. 8826, MARCH 25, 2015
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time,
failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Supreme Court imposed upon them
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. However, there have been instances where the Court
tempered the penalty imposed upon a lawyer due to humanitarian and equitable considerations. Taking into
consideration respondent’s advanced age, medical condition, and the fact that this is his first offense.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Attorneys
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA
732 SCRA 12, A.C. No. 8000, AUGUST 05, 2014
Respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer which resulted to complainant seeking his
assistance when in truth he had no specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact. His deception
is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession and reveals a basic flaw that
makes him unfit to practice law.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
SPOUSES JONATHAN and ESTER LOPEZ, vs. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS

782 SCRA 609, A.C. No. 7618, FEBRUARY 02, 2016
Undoubtedly, the Court’s patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amount to a lawyer’s
impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice
respect, courtesy, and such other becoming conduct essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial, and speedy
justice. The blatant disregard on directives of the Investigating Commissioner of IBP to attend the mandatory
conference and to submit a position paper, such audacity caused undue delay in the resolution of the instant
administrative case and contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Attorneys
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, duly represented by ERLINDA I. BILDNER, vs.

ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and ATTY. SIKINI C. LABASTILLA
790 SCRA 173, A.C. No. 11139, APRIL 19, 2016
Since the indirect contempt case is criminal in nature, respondents cannot insist that the filing of an
administrative case against them on the basis of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling in the aforesaid case is premature
on the premise that their conviction has not attained finality. A disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct
from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite being involved in the same set of facts. A finding of guilt
in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Practice of Law
Cabanes, Jr.,
700 SCRA 734, A.C. No. 7749 July 8, 2013
Atty. Cabanes was suspended from the practice of law for his failure to file his pre-trial brief as well as to attend
the scheduled hearings constitutes negligence.
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorney’s Fees
Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs. Sumitomo Corporation

704 SCRA 332, August 28, 2013
The CA’s deletion of attorney’s fees is proper because the stipulation on attorney’s fees between the parties
was inoperative and the records disclosed that there was no gross and evident bad faith on the part of the
petitioner.
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorneys
Orola vs. Ramos
Respondent’s justification that no confidential information was relayed to him and was only a friendly
accommodation cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests
provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Practice of Law
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorneys

LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Penalties
the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty. He is obliged to attend scheduled hearings or conferences,
prepare and file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urge their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The appropriate penalty on
an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Practice of Law

LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorneys

LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Penalties
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Practice of Law

LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorneys

LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Penalties
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorneys Fee
The President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints vs. BTL Construction Corporation
713 SCRA 455, January 15, 2014
Since the case lacks the essential requirement of bad faith, the court deemed it inappropriate to award the
attorneys fee in favor of either party. It was evidenced when CIAC, CA and this Court have all found the parties
original claims to be partially meritorious.
LEGAL ETHICS
Second Division
Attorney’s Fees
Rana vs. Wong,
727 SCRA 539, June 30, 2014
Initially, Sps. Rana are to be granted of the nominal damage and temperate damage caused by the demolition
of the subject portion by Wong et al., she is being similarly held liable for nominal damages by way of
constructing the subject portion thus introducing the nuisance per accidens. Naturally, the court sees it ample
to offset the damages caused by parties against each other. Since the case does not clearly and convincingly
show that the motive for filling the case is precipitated by malice or bad faith, neither of the parties shall be
awarded of the damages prayed for.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Notary Public
Crisostomo vs. Nazareno,
726 SCRA 1, June 10, 2014
The court ruled that the acts of Navarro in filling ejectment and rescission cases among different individuals
without disclosing such on the attached Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping constitutes not a failure to comply
but a violation to the prohibition. Notably, he was the counsel and the notarial public for the submitted
certificates. On the same breath, Navarro failed to refute the allegation berated towards him. The matter
establishes administrative liability. Further, the court sanctioned him to be suspended to practice law for 1 year.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Lawyer’s Oath
Almazan, Sr. vs. Suerte-Felipe,
The ruled that the act of the respondent in notarizing the Extra-Judicial settlement in the City of Marikina
constitutes falsehood. Despite being registered in the cities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan and Mandaluyong in
the years 1998 – 1999, he was not vested with the authority to notarize outside his jurisdiction, herein in this
case is in Marikina City. It also is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for it constitutes engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The respondent is hereby
sanctioned to be suspended from the practice of law for the period of six (6) months.
ETHICS
First Division
Notice
Pagdanganan, Jr. vs. Sarmiento

The reglementary period for filing a petition should be reckoned from the date the counsel of record had the
notice of resolution, which is in consonance with the rule that if a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of
all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is considered
notice to his client.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Conflict of Interest
Anglo vs. Valencia
751 SCRA 588, February 25, 2015
Respondents’ law firm represented conflicting interests when the opposing parties in the present criminal case
against Anglo was represented by the same law office which handled complainant’s labor cases.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE, vs. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR.

753 SCRA 350, A.C. No. 10672, MARCH 18, 2015
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA, vs. ATTY. OTILIO SY BONGON

754 SCRA 205, A.C. No. 8826, MARCH 25, 2015
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time,
failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Supreme Court imposed upon them
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. However, there have been instances where the Court
tempered the penalty imposed upon a lawyer due to humanitarian and equitable considerations. Taking into
consideration respondent’s advanced age, medical condition, and the fact that this is his first offense.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
First Division
Motion for Extension of Time
FLORANTE A. MIANO, vs. MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR

785 SCRA 338, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408, MARCH 02, 2016
Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. The Court is not unmindful of
the circumstances that may delay the speedy disposition of cases assigned to judges, thus, the Court allows
extensions of time within which pending cases may be disposed of, upon a seasonable filing of a request therefor
and sufficient justification. For failing to do so, respondent cannot evade administrative liability.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Attorneys
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA
732 SCRA 12, A.C. No. 8000, AUGUST 05, 2014
Respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer which resulted to complainant seeking his
assistance when in truth he had no specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact. His deception
is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession and reveals a basic flaw that
makes him unfit to practice law.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc; Attorneys
SPOUSES JONATHAN and ESTER LOPEZ, vs. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS

782 SCRA 609, A.C. No. 7618, FEBRUARY 02, 2016
Undoubtedly, the Court’s patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amount to a lawyer’s
impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice
respect, courtesy, and such other becoming conduct essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial, and speedy
justice. The blatant disregard on directives of the Investigating Commissioner of IBP to attend the mandatory
conference and to submit a position paper, such audacity caused undue delay in the resolution of the instant
administrative case and contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Disbarment
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, duly represented by ERLINDA I. BILDNER, vs.

ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and ATTY. SIKINI C. LABASTILLA
790 SCRA 173, A.C. No. 11139, APRIL 19, 2016
Since the indirect contempt case is criminal in nature, respondents cannot insist that the filing of an
administrative case against them on the basis of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling in the aforesaid case is premature
on the premise that their conviction has not attained finality. A disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct
from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite being involved in the same set of facts. A finding of guilt
in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
ALEX NULADA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, respondent.

789 SCRA 111, A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016.
The issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Respondent’s conviction for
violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, constitutes a violation of the lawyer’s oath.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Suspension
SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO and GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
EDGAR R. NAVALES, respondent.
792 SCRA 377, A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016.
When the Supreme Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from performing
all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension, including desisting
from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law. Hence, respondent’s continuous
discharge of his functions as Assistant City Prosecutor for Quezon City despite the suspension order against
him constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court’s order of suspension against him.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY.

WYLIE M. PALER, and ATTY. ANGELES GRANDEA, of the ANGELES, GRANDEA & PALER
LAW OFFICE, respondents.
799 SCRA 624, A.C. No. 11113, August 9, 2016.
The misrepresentations and deceits on the part of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler tend to undermine and/or
denigrate the integrity of the courts. As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.”
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc; Attorneys
Borrowing Money from Clients
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, complainants, vs.

ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, respondent.
749 SCRA 26, A.C. No. 10681, February 3, 2015.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent
abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally held administratively liable on this score.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Notary Public
MELANIO S. SALITA, complainant, vs. ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE, respondent.

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. Atty.
Salve’s act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the personal appearance
of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Lawyer’s Oath
SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA UMAGUING, complainants, vs. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA,
respondent.
It is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the documents
he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and
within the bounds of the law. The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land
but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court,
and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts
as well as to his clients.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Notary Public
ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME, complainant, vs. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO,

respondent.
772 SCRA 213, A.C. No. 10783, October 14, 2015.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very person who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
By failing in this regard, the notary public permits a falsehood which does not only transgress the Notarial Rules
but also the Code of Professional Responsibility.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Notarized Documents
ELENA BIETE LEONES VDA. DE MILLER, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO B.

MIRANDA, respondent.
774 SCRA 205, A.C. No. 8507, November 10, 2015.
Respondent’s failure to carefully double-check the draft of the original SPA submitted to him by his secretary
led him to notarize a document which did not reflect the true intent of his client. Respondent himself caused
the intercalation of the notarized SPA by inserting handwritten alterations therein which changed its meaning,
thus, violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
LEGAL ETHICS
En Banc
Reyes vs. Nieva

802 SCRA 196, A.C. No. 8560 September 6, 2016
Lawyers may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Felipe layos vs. Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva
A.C. No. 8085. December 1, 2014.
Atty. Villanueva was suspended for his constant failure to attend hearings which resulted to the issuance by the
RTC of an adverse decision against his client, Layos.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Attorney’s Fees
Jakerson G. Gargallo vs. DOHLE Seafront Crewing
G.R. No. 215551, August 17, 2016
Absent any showing of any bad faith on the part of the respondents to pay, the award of attorney’s fees must
be deleted.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Grave Misconduct
Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman vs. Castillo

801 SCRA 586, G.R. No. 221848 August 30, 2016
Respondent was held guilty of Grave Misconduct which was classified as a grave offense punishable by
dismissal even for first time offenders, with all the accessory penalties.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Suspension
Dumanlag vs. Intong

805 SCRA 489, A.C. No. 8638 October 10, 2016
For failure to file his position paper upon directive of the court, the latter finds it proper to reprimand him for
his first infraction with warning that commission of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely. Since it was also his first infraction, respondent therein was merely reprimanded by the Court, as in
this case.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Egger vs. Duran

802 SCRA 571, A.C. No. 11323 September 14, 2016
The letter signed by Reposo herself shows that she and complainant jointly sought the services of respondent
to work on their annulment case. Thus, attorney-client relationship has already exist.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Attorneys
Curammeng vs. People

The mistakes of counsel binds the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in
the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Attorneys
Belo-Henares vs. Guevarra

811 SCRA 392, A.C. No. 11394 December 1, 2016
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification
for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Attorney’s Fees
Dinglasan-Delos Santos vs. Abejon

821 SCRA 132, G.R. No. 215820 March 20, 2017
The award attorney’s fees demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. In this case, the Court finds no
justification for the award of attorney’s fees to either party. Accordingly, any award for attorney’s fees made by
the courts a quo must be deleted.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Penalties
Yap-Paras vs. Paras

820 SCRA 116, A.C. No. 5333 March 13, 2017
Atty. Paras cannot resume to practice law without the order of the court lifting the suspension order against
him.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Attorneys
Festin vs. Zubiri

A.C. No. 11600, June 19, 2017
Atty. Zubiri’s disregard of the procedural rules, misusage of rules to causes injustice, and failure to exhibit
fairness towards is professional colleagues undoubtedly violated his professional obligations under CPR.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Penalties
Montecillo vs. Gatchalian

828 SCRA 222, A.C. No. 8371 June 28, 2017
The court may suspend the lawyer from the practice of law for neglecting their clients’ affairs by failing to
attend hearings and/or failing to update clients about court decisions.
LEGAL ETHICS
First Division
Penlties
Samonte vs. Jumamil
831 SCRA 180, A.C. No. 11668 July 17, 2017
Atty. Jumamil was suspended from the practice of law for his neglect of duties which adversely caused the
interest of his client.

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LABOR LAW

Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Gonzaga

Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated vs. Candava

PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. Estrella

Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz

Martinez vs. Central Pangasinan Coorperatuin,

of their right to possess the property.

SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION OLALIA, represented by PORFERIA

ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., vs. MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ

ACE NAVIGATION COMPANY and VELA INTERNATIONAL MARINE LIMITED, vs.

DIONISIO DACLES, vs. MILLENIUM ERECTORS CORPORATION and/or RAGAS TIU

LEI SHERYLL FERNANDEZ, vs. BOTICA CLAUDIO represented by GUADALUPE JOSE

UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION, vs. ELMER ABLAY, ILDEFONSO

CRISPIN B. LOPEZ, vs. IRVINE CONSTRUCTION CORP. and TOMAS SY SANTOS

CEBU PEOPLE’S MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE and MACARIO G. QUEVEDO, vs.

SECURITY BANK SAVINGS CORPORATION (formerly PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT

ARMANDO N. PUNCIA, vs. TOYOTA SHAW/ PASIG, INC.

JOSE RUDY L. BAUTISTA, vs. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.,

WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION and/or WILLIAM GO QUE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

RODFHEL BACLAAN TORREFIEL, MYRA SUACILLO, LORLIE ORENDAY, SHEELA LAO,

Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated vs. Candava

PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. Estrella

Martinez vs. Central Pangasinan Coorperatuin,

SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION OLALIA, represented by PORFERIA

SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION OLALIA, represented by PORFERIA

SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION OLALIA, represented by PORFERIA

Villena vs. Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Avestruz

ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., vs. MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ

DIONISIO DACLES, vs. MILLENIUM ERECTORS CORPORATION and/or RAGAS TIU

LEI SHERYLL FERNANDEZ, vs. BOTICA CLAUDIO represented by GUADALUPE JOSE

SECURITY BANK SAVINGS CORPORATION (formerly PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT

ARMANDO N. PUNCIA, vs. TOYOTA SHAW/ PASIG, INC.

JOSE RUDY L. BAUTISTA, vs. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.,

RODFHEL BACLAAN TORREFIEL, MYRA SUACILLO, LORLIE ORENDAY, SHEELA LAO,

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, MARLON R. ROÑO

HOLCIM PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. RENANTE J. OBRA, respondent.

CONCHITA J. RACELIS, petitioner, vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and/or

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and/or V-SHIP NORWAY and/or CYNTHIA C.

FORTUNATO R. BARON, MANOLO B. BERSABAL, and RECTO A. MELENDRES,

RAFAEL B. QUILLOPA, petitioner, vs. QUALITY GUARDS SERVICES AND INVESTIGATION

HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. vs. Villastique

Manila Doctors College vs. Olores

Toyota Pasig, Inc. vs. De Peralta

Sta. Isabel vs. Perla Compañia de Seguros, Inc.

Quebral vs. Angbus Construction, Inc.

BUENAFLOR CAR SERVICES, INC. vs. CEZAR DURUMPILI DAVID, JR.

Jebsens Maritime, Inc. vs. Rapiz

Navarra vs. People

RODFHEL BACLAAN TORREFIEL, MYRA SUACILLO, LORLIE ORENDAY, SHEELA LAO,

UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION, vs. ELMER ABLAY, ILDEFONSO

CRISPIN B. LOPEZ, vs. IRVINE CONSTRUCTION CORP. and TOMAS SY SANTOS

BENSON INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP and/or VILMA GENON, EDISA

A.C. No. 6903. April 16, 2012.*

EMILIA O. DHALIWAL, vs. ATTY. ABELARDO B. DUMAGUING

Abella vs. Barrios, Jr.

EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE, vs. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR.

SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA, vs. ATTY. OTILIO SY BONGON

SPOUSES JONATHAN and ESTER LOPEZ, vs. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, duly represented by ERLINDA I. BILDNER, vs.

Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs. Sumitomo Corporation

AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, vs. ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, vs. ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE

AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, vs. ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN