CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A.

CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)

CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

PEOPLE V. FAUSTA GONZALES

(G.R. No. 80762, MARCH 19, 1990)

SARMIENTO, J.:

Facts:

At around 9pm on February 1981, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla Iloilo was
awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja
that his wife had just killed their landlord Lloyd Penacerrada and thus would like to surrender to
the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with
her dress smeared in blood, Paja immediately ordered his nephew to take the spouses to the
police authorities at their municipal hall.Thus, an investigation was made behind the killing, and
two days after the said incident, Augusto appeared before the police station and voluntarily
surrendered for detention and protective custody for “having been involved” in the killing of Lloyd.
He requested that he be taken in the same headquarters where his wife Fausta was detained.
During arraignment, the spouses entered a plea of ‘not guilty’. Before trial however, Huntoria,
who claimed to have witnessed the killing, presented himself to Nanie Penacerrada—the victim’s
widow, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution.
A reinvestigation was therefore conducted, and the prosecution’s case rested on
Huntoria’s alleged eyewitness account of the incident, who alleges to have seen the incident. The
Court of Appeals affirmed Huntoria’s testimony and found lone accused-appellant Custodio
Gonzales guilty, who, among all the accused-appellants, did not seek for parole before the
Department of Justice.

Issue:

Whether or not Custodio Gonzales is guilty of murder, based on Hustoria’s account where
the prosecution’s case rested.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s stand is insufficient to convict Custodio
Gonzales guilty of the crime charged. The investigation conducted by the police authorities leave
much to be desired. During investigation, there were conflicts as to where the scene of the crime
was. While the sketch indicated are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative
to the scenes of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. Considering there
were two versions where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have
provided a definite clue as to which version was more credible.
The police also failed to state the reason of Augusto Gonzales’ surrender. Further,
Augusto never mentioned the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim.
Furthermore, the autopsy report would show that the killing would have been caused by
two or more bladed instrument, but opined that one bladed instrument is still possible. And insofar
as Dr. Rojas’ testimony was concerned, while Huntoria admitted that he saw six persons
taking turns in killing the victim, he however could not determine who among the six accused
did the stabbing and what particular weapon was used.
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO
Further, Article 3 defines how felony is committed—which is either by means of deceit
(dolo) or by means of fault (culpa). Thus there is deceit when the act performed is by deliberate
intent, while there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.

In this case, while the prosecution accuses and the two lower courts both found that the
appellant has committed felony in Lloyd’s death, there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. Yet, Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted candidly that he failed
to see who stabbed or hacked the victim. In fact, he does not even know what specific act was
performed in the killing. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down
by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, Huntoria’s credibility as witness is tarnished by the fact that he only came out
eight months since he allegedly saw the incident. He also failed to explain satisfactorily the reason
for his long delay in revealing what he allegedly witnessed.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/mar1990/gr_80762_1990.html
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

PEOPLE V. ROMANA SILVESTRE AND MARTIN ATIENZA

(G.R. No. L-35748, DECEMBER 14, 1931)

VILLA-REAL, J.:

Facts:

Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage. Romana cohabited
with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan. On May 16,
1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint for
adultery after being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal
president of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint. The
two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in
Masocol (Atienza signed the promise). On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the
dismissal of his complaint and the justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case.
The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong. About November
20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo Niño and
followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves). Martin
Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas,
on the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it. He said that that was the only way he could be revenged
upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and
Romana.
Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him Nicolas and Antonia
went to ask for help but were too late. The fire destroyed about 48 houses, witnesses saw Martin
and Romana leaving the house on fire.
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena
temporal). Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor). The
court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI decision
with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana: The lower court erred in
convicting Romana as acoomplice. The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of
insufficient evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice?

Ruling:

No.Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one
who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other
to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous actions.
In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of
an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO
simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or
nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that
being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give
the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed
passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent.
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana
Silvestre, who is acquitted.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1931/dec1931/gr_l-35748_1931.html
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

PEOPLE vs. NEMESIO TALINGDAN

(G.R. No. L-3212, JULY 6, 1978)

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag. No
certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, they lived
with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra. Their relationship had been strained and beset
with troubles for Teresa had deserted her family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo
took time out to look for her. On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited
Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made
Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to go down the house and leave them. Bernardo had
gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa. About a month
before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period
of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen
together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time. Just two days before Bernardo was killed
(Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several
times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police. Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came
armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; Bernardo ignored him;
Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill him. On Saturday, June
24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house. The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of
what happened had variations.

Issue:

Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder?

It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspuracy to kill
her husband because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-appellants in
their culpable acts that led to his death
It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof on her
part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator

Ruling:

Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder. The court believed Corazon's testimony.
It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt;
she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting.
It is also not clear if she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is
convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object. There is in the record morally
convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed. She did not
only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to have no
suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate
Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding
the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-
appellants. These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the
crime".
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO
Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma,
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8
years of prision mayor as maximum.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1978/jul1978/gr_32126_1978.html
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

EDUARDO MANUEL VS. PEOPLE

(G.R. No 165842, NOVEMBER 29, 2005)

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Eduardo Manuel was charged with bigamy. According to the prosecution, in
1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña in Makati. That on January 1996, he met private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera. Manuel and Tina had an affair and Manuel proposed marriage
on several occasions, assuring her that she was single. After months, Tina agreed to marry
Eduardo, thus, a marriage was celebrated before Judge Reyes of the RTC Baguio (Branch 61).
The first 3 years of their married life was joyous. However, starting 1999, Manuel only
went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Sometime in January 2001, Manuel took all hi
clothes, left, and did not return. After months, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
NSO in Manila where she learned that Manuel had been previously married.
In his defense, Manuel believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid because
he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years, who should be presumed dead under
Article 390 of the Civil Code. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
After trial, the RTC convicted Manuel of Bigamy and the CA rendered judgment affirming
the decision of the lower court; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy

Ruling:

YES. Bigamy has two elements are: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been
lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It is a felony by dolo (deceit). Art.
3, par. 2 of the RPC provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Altough the words “with malice” do not appear in Art.
3 of the RPC, such phrase is included in the word “voluntary.”
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal
excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law
as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumed it to
have been intentional. For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a
confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus reus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. In
the present case, the petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is
a valid defense. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed
to know the law. Petition denied.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/165842.htm
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

PEOPLE VS. ISABELO PUNO

(G.R. NO. 97471, FEBRUARY 17, 1993)

REGALADO, J.:

Facts:

On January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the
personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on
account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC. He told
Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will
temporarily take his place. When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in
Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving. After the car turned right
on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the
car beside the driver. Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs
to "get money" from her. Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused,
but the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more. The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000. Mrs.
Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check. Isabelo then turned
the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
Pampanga.
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of
the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car.
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to
Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of
the car. He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer
had gotten a ride. He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across
the highway.

Issues:

Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged

Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Ruling:

No. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or
at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. For this crime to exist, there must
be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of
her liberty. In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. This does not constitute
kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO
No. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our
country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law
against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law
was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery).
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim.
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating
on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
This is not justified by the accused's intention.
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months
or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento
P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/feb1993/gr_97471_1993.html
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

PEOPLE VS. MARLON DELIM

(G.R. NO. 142773. JANUARY 28, 2003)

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:

Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias Bong and
Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder of Modesto Manalo Bantas, who was
adopted by the father of the accused. On January 23, 1999, Modesto was forcibly taken by
defendants who were armed from his home; Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and
Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim; Rita and Randy (his wife and son) being
warned not to leave the house. His body was discovered 4 days later by Randy and his relatives.
The accused were found guilty for murder. The Information read “that on or about January 23,
1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison,Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of
Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic),
conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold,
hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, broughtout and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and
Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim
from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto
Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.” The trial court rendered judgment finding
accused guilty of aggravated murder, and wassentenced to death.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime charged in the information is kidnapping or murder? Murder.

Ruling:

In determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts

recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling.
Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific
intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court
held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al. that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof
that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and
not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of
another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. What is primordial then is the specific intent
of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of
what crime the accused is charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.
Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances
indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a
specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the
particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged
in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.
Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. Specific intent may be proved by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions
of the accused as established by the evidence on record. Specific intent is not synonymous with
motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a
particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO
need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense
charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the
innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim.
In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for
the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive
is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is
revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the
malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely
to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting
Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no
specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive
Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping.
Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
The Court found the accused guilty of homicide (not murder) for failure of the prosecution
to present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before
and when he was attacked and killed (thus, not treachery nor use of superior strength).

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/142773.htm
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

ARSENIA GARCIA VS. CA AND PEOPLE

(G.R. No 157171, MARCH 14,2006)

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully
and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes. Pimentel
filed a complaint against Arsenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was acquited due to
lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined under Republic Act
6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in
relation to BP Blg. 881. Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no
motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant. Respondent on the other hand
contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the
class of mala prohibita.

Issue:

Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se.

Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

Ruling:

YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of
election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. Clearly, the
acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.

NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the
members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their
part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial
candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers
are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.

The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioners’ conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of
six months is AFFIRMED.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_157171_2006.html
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO
ORIEL MAGNO VS. CA
(G.R. NO 96132, JUNE 26, 1992)

PARAS, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but
he did not have complete equipment... he lacked funds with which... to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources
International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of
Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed... car repair service
equipment of which Mancor was a distributor. (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LS Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that
Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities on condition that petitioner has to put up
a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of
equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon
Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as... a
short term loan at 3% interest. Petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement, after
the documentation was completed, the equipment... were delivered to petitioner who in turn
issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered
the same to Corazon Teng.

Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Ruling:

NO. To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it
was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust
debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS
Finance.
As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being
paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner
failed to continue paying possibly... due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is
lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner. To argue
that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in
full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or
personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No. 22) violated. It would have been
different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the
lease agreement the financing of which was... covered by L.S. Finance Management.
The appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime charged. The noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism
in the highest degree.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/jun1992/gr_96132_1992.html
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

JASON IVLER VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO

(G.R. NO 172716 NOVEMBER 17, 2010)

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for
the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s
motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

Issues:

Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when
the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death
of respondent Ponce’s husband.

Ruling:

On Petition for Certiorari

The RTC dismissed Ivler’s petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second offense. Thus, without
reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing. Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to
disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO
Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case
No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property. In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court
granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the
public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by
counsel. Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation
to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.

On Double Jeopardy

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the
same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not." The two charges against petitioner, arising from the
same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The provisions contained in this article
shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws,
is nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense
by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Our ruling today secures for the accused facing
an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article
48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting
acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct
concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/nov2010/gr_172716_2010.html
CARIÑO, ALAN JAY A. CASE DIGESTS (ARTICLE 3 FELONIES)
CRIMINAL LAW 1 FRIDAY 5:30-9:30PM ATTY. REYNANTE ORCEO

PEOPLE VS. ROLUSAPE SABALONES

(G.R. NO. 123485. AUGUST 31, 1998)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts:

On June 1, 1985 at 11:45 PM, respondents including Rolusape Sabalones, armed with
firearms, attacked and ambushed individuals riding in two vehicles resulting to the death of two
persons and injury to three others. According to a witness presented, Sabalones was implicated
in the killing of Nabing Velez because of the slapping incident involving her father-in-law, Federico
Sabalones, Sr. and Nabing Velez which took place prior to the death of Junior Sabalones (whose
wake was during time of the commission of the crime). The conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial
statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of evidence
sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of having killed the recently
slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against them. The Trial Court
observed that “they went to their grisly destination amidst the dark and positioned themselves in
defense of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang of supporters of the recently slain
Nabing Velez.”

Issue:

Whether or not the case falls under abberatio ictus?

Ruling:

NO. The case is not one of aberration ictus but one of error in personae or mistake in
identity, as observed by the OSG. Transferred intent is used when a defendant intends to harm
one victim, but then unintentionally harms a second victim instead. In this case, the defendant's
intent transfers from the intended victim to the actual victim and can be used to satisfy the mens
rea element of the crime that the defendant is being charged with. The transferred intent doctrine
is only used for completed crimes, and is not used for attempted crimes. Aberratio ictus means
mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision of the
blow. In the case at bar, the appellants opened fire because they mistook the vehicles to be
carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez. The fact that they were mistaken does not diminish
their culpability. The Court has held that “mistake in identity of the victim carries the same gravity
as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.”

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/aug1998/123485.htm