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ELCANO VS HILL

Facts of the Case:.

Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A
criminal complaint was instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed
a complaint for recovery of damages against defendantReginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting
subsistence, for the same killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First
Instance of Quezon City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissed upon
motion for reconsideration.

Issues:

1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case.

2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married.

Ruling of the Court:

1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a civil case. To
find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.
Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted
from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill. Although parental
authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by marriage is not absolute, i.e.
he can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. As in the
present case, killing someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply to
Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son

CASTILLO VS CA
FACTS:
 Barnabe Castillo's Version (May 2, 1965, 2:00 p.m.)
 Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep on the right lane of the McArthur Highway with Generosa
Castillo, his wife, father Serapion Castillo, seated in front and Eulogio Castillo, then a minor
child at the rate of 25 kms/hr
 Juanito Rosario, with his wife, Cresencia Rosario drove his car speeding and oncoming the same
lane for the purpose of overtaking a cargo truck
 To evade collission, Bernabe swerved his jeep hard right and the car rested on the shoulder of the
right lane as the jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short tiremarks behind it while the
rear left long tire-marks
 The jeep suffered a shattered windshield, pushed-in radiator. The left mid-portion of its bumper
badly dented. The car had a flat tire on its right front wheel; its right fender badly dented as the
headlamp on top of it. The bumber stooped downward.
 Bernabe's patella on his right knee was fractured and he suffered serious physical injuries, in
other parts of his body. Serapion Castillo whose head crushed through the windshield and was
nearly beheaded, while the other two passengers suffered multiple slight and less serious injuries.
 Juanito Rosario's Version (May 2, 1965, 2:30 p.m.)
 He was about to overtake a slow cargo truck but due to a flat tire, he parked his car on the left
shoulder of the road
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 as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep driven by
Bernabe from the opposite direction
 In the criminal case, Juanito was acquited from the crime for reckless imprudence on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
 Court held that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito Rosario but it was Castillo's
own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was is the proximate cause of
the collision
 CA affirmed CFI: Dismissed the case against Juanito as well as the counterclaim against
Bernabe
ISSUE: W/N the negligence of Juanito can make him civilly liable despite being acquitted from his
criminal charges

HELD: YES.
 Since the civil action is predicated upon Juanito Rosario's alleged negligence which does not
exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal action, which is already final, carried with it the
extinction of civil responsibility arising therefrom
 findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court

JARANTILLA VS CA

EDGAR JARANTILLA,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING (G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989)FACTS:
Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar
Jarantilla in theevening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" towards the direction of the
provicional capitol resulting to seriousphysical injuries thru reckless inprudence.Sing did not reserve
his right to institute a separate civil action. Jarantilla was eventually acquitted because of reasonable
doubt.On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a complaint (civil case) against the Jarantilla in the former
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, in which civil action involved the same subject matter and
act complained of in the dismissedcriminal case. RTC wanted to “enrich our jurisprudence.” So RTC
denies motion to dismiss, grants damages to Sing,
proposed that the case be elevated to the SC by certiorari. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether Sing, who was the complainant in the dismissed criminal action (grounded on reasonable
dobut) for physical injuries and who participated in the prosecution without reserving the civil action
can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission.
HELD:
YES, because the civil action here is not based on DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT.
RATIO/DOCTRINES:
Well settled is the rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the
offender, thatis, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto
Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delictor crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of
these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit,subject to Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.Where the
offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case
through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar
to the subsequent civilaction based upon the same cause.The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes adeclaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist' Another consideration in favor of Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the
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court to make any pronouncement,favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused
amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civilliability litigated and determined in a separate
action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine thecivil liability it becomes no
longer enforceable.

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of
Article 29 is nolonger that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in
the view that, under suchcircumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability
based on Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode which presupposes the existence of criminal liability
or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the
causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civilaction based thereon
may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderanceof
evidence.
Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a
civilaction for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act
or omission.Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his
right to file a separate civilcase and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing
such separate civil action for damages.
The Court has also heretofore ruled in The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civilliability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
whereas the civil liability for the sameact considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declarationin the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed bythe accused
BARREDO VS GARCIA

Facts:

A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela was
overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of Garcia and Almario, died as a
result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was
prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the criminal case was instituted, Garcia and
Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and
Almario instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.

Issue:

Whether or not they can file a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo making him primarily and
directly responsible

Held:

(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the present Civil
Code. However, the principle enunciated in said case, that responsibility for fault or negligence as
quasi-delict is distinct and separate from negligence penalized under the Revised Penal Code, is now
specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the Civil Code.)

The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but
Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the
main issue, we must cut thru the tangle that has, in the minds of many, confused and jumbled
together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to the Supreme Tribunal of Spain:

“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
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and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article
1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to
cover the driver’s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1903 limits cuasi-delitos TO
ACTS OR OMISSIONS ‘NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW.’ But inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or
negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this
overlapping that makes the “confusion worse confounded.’ However, a closer study shows that such
a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. “Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code
are:

“1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.

“2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

“3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished only if there is
a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which ‘ any kind of
fault or negligence intervenes.’ However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.

ABERCA VS VER

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most
cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation
rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed
by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because
the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in
their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the
motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself
and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed,
and was only modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the
said complaint.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in
the constitution?

3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?

HELD

1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in
the constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The
rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their
superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot
be considered “acts done in their official duties”. Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private
individual, and violation of these constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming
damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial
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authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as
a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action
for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as
well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior officers
are the ones who gave the order, and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in
the complaintwho were the ones who directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a
motion to dismiss, they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.

SANTOS VS PIZARDO
Facts: In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudenceresulting to
multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries for which Sibayan was eventuallyconvicted in
December 1998. As there was a reservation to file a separate civil action,
no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the MCTC. In October 2000 Santos filed acomplaint
for damages against Sibayan and Rondaris, the president and chairman of
VironTransit. Viron Transit moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing, among others, prescription
alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in 4 years from the accrual of the cause of
action.
Held: Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil actionas a result of
the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation the MCTC did notmake any
pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability. Although there were allegations of negligence on the
part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing
a cause of action based on quasi delict,considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides,in cases of negligence, the offended
party has the choice between an action to enforce liabilityarising from crime under the Revised Penal
Code and an action for quasi delict under the CivilCode.An act or omission causing damage to
another may give rise to 2 separate civil liabilitieson the part of the offender,
(1) civil liability ex delicto under Article 100 of the RPC; and (2)independent civil liabilities (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the CivilCode; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file
an action independent and distinctfrom the criminal proceedings.While the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed, petitioners can
still pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of acti
on ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a
bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as thelatter action had been
expressly reserved.We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to
theenforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony,final
in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was indischarge
of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the RPC operates thecontrolling
force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnityeven after the
rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN
(1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353... owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic
(2) owner-type jeep... owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with
Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep.
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac.
North Luzon Expressway
Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
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The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move
to the shoulder on the right and then fall... on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The
bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries
Subsequently... respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before
the RTC of Dagupan City
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue and the
identities of the vehicles involved;
The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
The date and place of the vehicular collision;
The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the medical
certificate;
That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on the
right side where the jeep fell into.
counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)[4] of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in
evidence in the civil case in... as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan... to bring the TSNs of
the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,[5] Marcelo Mendoza[6] and Fernando
Ramos[7] in said case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour
on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit
Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of
the jeep on the left side.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the
jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left
lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because... it was to overtake another jeep in
front of it.
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and
PRBLI.
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.
the Court of Appeals... affirmed it in all respects.
Issue: the court of appeals erred on a question of law in affirming the trial court's unfair disregard of herein
petitioner prbl's defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Held: Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic's negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family.
Under
Article 2180[42] of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or... employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The
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liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to
exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic.
Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and
established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that
there... is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI.
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclic's negligence.
FRANCO VS IAC
At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the northbound Franco Bus
with Plate No. XY320-PUB he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing
north along the cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac,
thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate No. YL-735 being driven by one
Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous
eventuality.
Dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway the length of the parked truck with
trailer), the mini bus landed right side down facing south in the canal of the highway, a total wreck.
The Franco Bus was also damaged but not as severely. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two
(2) drivers, Macario Yuro and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue
and Fernando Chuay.
Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay, the
wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue,
filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the
owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company
ISSUE:
Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was predicated
upon crime or quasi-delict.
yes under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
RULING:
Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal
Code and the employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in
character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
which provide as follows:
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keepers and proprietors of establishments. —
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposits of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
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Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties;
while the second kind is governed by the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry,
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict committed by the
employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary
liability is to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is
imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict
and corresponding liability therefor are proved.
CEREZO VS TUAZON
Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga.
The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the
bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There was a
"Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias summons was served
upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.

In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because there was
no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a
separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages

HELD:

Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law but on quasi-delict
under the Civil Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or may
give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may choose between
the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal
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action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability
arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects
the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability.

Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An indispensable party is
one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for quasi-
delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a
solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or
renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary,
either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete
relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon
may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's
liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with
"subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the
character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent
act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes
damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is
civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly
liable directly and separate for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting
and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another) without including the
author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the
existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense that it
cannot be instituted till after the judgment against he author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the
criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the employer liable in a
subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds
from a delict, then the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.

However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is separate and independent
from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the filing of a separate civil
action. The purpose of allowing the filing the of an independent action based on quasi-delict against
the employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.
PHP SCHOOL OF ADMIN VS CA
Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the second-
floor premises of the school. The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic community
but were elements from outside the school. The parents of Carlitos filed a civil action against the
school authorities, alleging them negligent, reckless and with failure to take security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. The appellate court found in
their favor, primarily anchoring its decision on the law of quasi-delicts.

Hence, the petition.

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ISSUE:

o Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180 (in loco
parentis)
o Whether or not the application of the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre-existing
contract

HELD:

The SC did not agree with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article
2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law
(Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school could have
been made liable.

IS PSBA EXCULPATED FROM LIABILITY?

It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. Moreover, there is that “built-in” obligation to provide students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. The school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and
Carlitos, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is bound
to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such
a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same
act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art. 21 of the Civil Code comes to
mind, so that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and violative of Art. 21,
then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos had been
breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures.

SINGSON VS BPI
FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him
and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said
judgment became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A writ of
garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI — in which the Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-
Abrille’s credits against the Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the name of the Singson in the title
of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared a letter informing
Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service and another
in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the
check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had already been garnished and that they are now
constrained to close his credit account with them.

Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment,
which was served upon the bank. The defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed.
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Thus this action for damages.

ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiff’s claim for damages based on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who,
despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a
seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on
the latter’s part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature
… the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort”.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the
wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his
subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages — the amount of which
need not be proven — in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to
vindicate plaintiff’s rights.

AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO

Fact: The plaintiff, Rafael Carrascoso, paid for and was issued a “First class” ticket by Air France from
Manila to Rome. During a stopover in Bangkok, the manager of Air France asked the plaintiff to
vacate his seat because a white man has a “better right” than him. At first, the plaintiff protested, but,
as things got heated up, he was asked by the other Filipinos on board to give up his seat and transfer
in the tourist class. After the trip, Carrascoso sued Air France for the embarrassment and
inconvenience he suffered. The trail court awarded damages to the plaintiff which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.Air France assailed the decision. According to them, the issuance of a first class
ticket does not guarantee Carrascoso a seat in the first Class.
Issue: Whether or not Air France is liable for the damages to Carrascoso and on what basis
Decision: Yes. Air France is liable based on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana.Culpa
ContractualThere exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was
acontract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract wasbreached
when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;and Third,that there was bad
faith when Air France’s employee compelledCarrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth
“after he was already,seated”and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
sufferedinconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mentalanguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moraldamages.The Supreme
Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of afirst class ticket to a
passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first classseat. Such claim is simply
incredible.Culpa AquilianaHere, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air
Franceand Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers donot
contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by thecarrier’s employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They areentitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignitiesand abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct onthe part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damagesagainst the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with publicduty.
The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is aviolation of public
duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
FEBTC VS CA
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his request,
the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her
credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Luis' credit
card was not honored
Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt. The vice-
president of the bank expressed bank's apologies to Luis.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
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On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision
ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00
exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this
Court with this petition for review.
There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of
carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault
(which is presumed) of the common carrier.
Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for
breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even
where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine,
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or
omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test
(whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly:
Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless
amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the
application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is
predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission
complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort.