US v.

Roemer
Justice Joseph Smith, Circuit
514 F.2d 1377
FACTS:
 After a jury trial in the US District Court in the Southern District of New York, Judge Wyatt found
Martin Roemer guilty of violating USC 371 – conspiracy to defraud the US.
 Roemer’s challenges the conviction on the ground that his trial was not begun within the time limits
established by Rule 6 of the Southern District’s Plan for Achieving Prompt Disposition of Criminal
Cases
o Also claims that a reversal is required to vindicate him from the violation of his constitutional
right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, and that, minimally, he is entitled to a new
trial because the trial court erroneously excluded relevant evidence he presented
 The charges are based on the ff. circumstances:
o Roemer was a civilian buyer for the Army and Air Force Exchange Service’s post exchanges
in Europe
o He supposedly received payoffs from Fritz Mintz and Morton Penn for using his position to
influence the exchanges to purchase merchandise from businesses represented by the two
o Penn was granted immunity by becoming a key witness, Mintz was a fugitive from justice
o The government postponed the prosecution dated February 25, 1970 while Mintz was still
being attempted to be extradited from Europe
o Judge Lasker, assigned to the case had dismissed their indictments in December 1972 – this
decision was based on Rule 4 of the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition
of Criminal Cases which  Although the government plainly was not ready for trial within 6
months after indictment as required by Rule 4, the Court found that its delay was excused under
the allowance of Rule 5 (e) for a “reasonable period of delay”
 Of course, it wasn’t the council’s aim to make the government vulnerable to dismissal
of an indictment where a co-defendant is a fugitive, with some reason, delays action
against the defendants who are present
o August 3, 1973: the 3 other defendants, not including Roemer petitioned for a rehearing,
however it was denied, and on March 18, 1974, the SC denied certiorari
o After this, ensued a series of errors in miscommunication:
 The government in March of 1972 indicated its readiness for trial, Judge Lasker chose
to postpone trying the various indictments until the SC had an opportunity to review
this court’s issuance of mandamus  a notification that certiorari had been denied
would therefore have set the trials in motion; the Clerk of the SC immediately sent
counsel notice upon the denial of said certiorari
 The attorneys failed to convey this information to Judge Lasker, in addition, through
an oversight in the SolGen’s Office, the notice of the action did not reach the US
Attorney’s Office in Southern District as well
 June of 1974, Judge Lasker’s secretary telephone the US Attorney’s office who had
agreed to inform the judge of the progress of the case in the SC. Because of this call,
the Asst. US Atty. Frank Whol then called the Solgen’s Office where he learned for
the first time of the denial of certiorari
 Wohl promptly conveyed this information to the secretary of Judge Lasker
 August 1, 1974: Judge Lasker reassigned the case to Judge Wyatt, held a pretrial
conference on August 14 and set the case for trial on October 29

ISSUE:
1. W/N the title of Rule 6 as its title states “retrials” is limited to retrials of cases – NO
 Under Rule 6 Retrials, where a new trial has been ordered by the district court or a new trial has been
ordered by an appellate court, it shall commence at the earliest practicable time, but in any event not
later than 90 days after the finality of such unless extended for good cause.
 o The Court stated that the appellee’s contention that Rule 6 is inapplicable because it only deals
with delays of retrials  The Court stated that they should give greater effect to the
draftsmen’s intent for them to regard the title “retrials” as a generally accurate but somewhat
under-inclusive description of the rule’s subject matter than to ignore entirely the text’s express
affirmation of its applicability to situations “where a trial has been ordered by an appellate
court”  This interpretation of the rule accords the basic principle of statutory construction
which gives precedence, in the event of irreconcilable conflict, to words in the body of a
provision over those in the caption
 The rationale underlying this principle of construction confirms the propriety of invoking it to interpret
Rule 6:
o “Headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text. Nor
are they necessarily designed to be a reference guide or a synopsis. Where the text is
complicated and prolific, headings and titles can do no more than indicate the provisions in a
most general manner; to attempt to refer to each specific provision would often be ungainly as
well as useless. As a result, matters in the text which deviate from those falling within the
general pattern are frequently unreflected in the headings and titles.”
o The title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text
 The Court then stated that Rule 6 is not limited to retrials but instead extends to cases like the one being
discussed, which an appellate court orders to a first trial

2. W/N the delay beyond 90 days was the result of “good cause” within the meaning of Rule 6 – YES
 The 90-day limit was clearly not met in this case, it took more than 7 months
 Judge Lasker’s Supreme Court Counsel and his secretary were obviously remiss in failing to relay to
him messages that certiorari in US v. Lasker had been denied
o Both his office and the US attorney’s office of NY assumed that Rule 6 like Rule 4 (Trial
readiness and effect of non-compliance) and the superseded Second Circuit Rules establishes a
date by which the government must declare its readiness for trial, rather than a deadline b which
the trail itself must begin
o US v. Drummond held that Rule 6 was a trial-oriented rather than readiness rule – but since this
case was only decided by February 11, 1975, the court and the government obviously lacked
the advantage of Drummond’s clarification of the rule’s focus on the trial itself
 The Court reject’s the appellant’s contention that Rule 6 of the Southern District’s plan requires
dismissal of his indictment. There were a number of mishaps that generated the delay beyond 90 days
and provided “good cause” within the meaning of the Rule
 The Court then discussed their serious concern over the “sluggishness” with which justice was finally
achieved in this case. Failure to act swiftly in the future will not be treated lightly  Particularly because
of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
3. W/N the Court’s refusal to allow Roemer to offer additional evidence violated his rights – NO
 Roemer concedes that the evidence he wanted to submit is regularly excluded on grounds of relevance
– but maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding his evidence after it had allowed
the prosecution to offer proof of Roemer’s general faithlessness to his public trust
o Court stated that this was a plain error tack in favor of one based on the proposition that the
erroneous admission of evidence offered by the prosecution justifies the otherwise erroneous
admission of evidence offered by the defense
o An elaborate attempt to argue that two wrongs make a right
Ruling:
“The judgment of conviction is therefore affirmed.”