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CRIMINAL LAW BOOK 2

CASE OUTLINE
(Part Two)

Title Seven
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

First Year – Sanchez Roman


2nd Semester
2018-2019

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Baviera vs Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098
Gumana, Neslin Angelique D.

FACTS:
Baviera, a former employee and investor of the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), claimed
that he was defrauded by the officers or directors, including Sridhar Raman, an Indian
national and Chief Finance Officer of the bank. Baviera requested the Secretary of Justice
for the issuance of a Hold Departure Order (HDO) against some of the officers and
directors of SCB, including Raman which was subsequently granted. However, Raman
was still able to leave the country following an Order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice
Merceditas N. Gutierrez. In said Order, she stated that the Chief State Prosecutor had
indicated that he interposed no objection to the travel of Raman to Singapore. Baviera
hence filed a complaint against Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a), (e), and (j) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether Gutierrez is guilty of the crime charged

RULING:
No. The Court affirmed the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding that
Baviera has failed to establish probable cause for violation the said provisions of RA 3019.
With respect to the charge of violation of Section 3(a), there is no evidence that Gutierrez
received material remuneration in exchange for her decision to allow Raman to travel
abroad. As to the charge of violation of Section 3(e), no actual or real damage was
suffered by any party, including the government as Raman immediately returned to the
Philippines. Baviera also did not suffer undue injury as an element required by the law.
By the same token, the essential ingredient of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence required for the commission of such offense has not been
proven in the instant case. With regard to the charge of Violation of Section 3(j),
Gutierrez, as Acting Secretary of Justice, is authorized not only to allow the travel abroad
of Raman under specific conditions but also to order the lifting of such HOD. Gutierrez
has not granted any privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified or not legally
entitled to such privilege or benefit when she allowed Raman to travel abroad under
specific condition and for certain period of time as Raman still enjoys the constitutionally
guaranteed right to travel or liberty of abode even if a preliminary investigation involving
him is still pending at the office of the concerned DOJ Prosecutor.

Soriano, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. L-65952


Jaraplasan, Bernadette

FACTS:
Soriano was an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation he demanded
P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the qualified theft case against him. Tan
reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment.
Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were
marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and

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an information was then filed with the Sandiganbayan. He was then found guilty of for
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as
a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019

RULING:
No. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the Soriano was not a contract.
Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the
term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the Soriano. It was an error for the Sandiganbayan to convict
Soriano of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. Soriano was convicted of Bribery under
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs Sandiganbayan and Justice Secretary Perez, GR No. 188165


Macacua, Alvia Aisa B.

FACTS:
Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama delivered a privilege speech in Congress denouncing
acts of bribery allegedly committed by Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez (2 Million
Dollar Man). Consequently, the Ombudsman sued Perez before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019. However, Sandiganbayan quashed the
information by applying the definition of “transaction” as involving money only.

ISSUE: Whether the word “transaction” under Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019 involves
monetary consideration only

RULING:
Yes, transaction involves monetary consideration only.
Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019 is "limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. It does
not help the State that the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and liberally, considering that
laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing penalties and forfeitures
are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party seeking to enforce them,
and liberally against the party sought to be charged.

Addendum:
Secretary Perez reportedly receive $2-million bribery to allow a Latin American firm to
operate a power plant in Laguna. One of the documents shown by Cong. Villarama is a
deposit detail report of the Trade and Commerce Bank (Uruguay) which shows the route
taken by the $2 million transfer that ended up in a Coutts Bank (Hong Kong) account
associated with the Cabinet member.

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Merencillo vs. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70
Mangontawar, Nor-Hidaya M.

FACTS:
On 1995 Merencillo, a public official connected with the performance of official duty as
Group Supervising Examiner of BIR, demand that the certification for payment of the
capital gains tax be released by him only upon payment of an additional under the table
transaction in the amount of P20,000.00 to Cesar. But upon prior consultation with the
military authorities, the accused was set up to an entrapment resulting to his being caught
in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of P20,000.00.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Merencillo is liable for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019
2. Whether or not he may be charged for violation of Section 3(b) and at the same time
be charged with Direct Bribery

RULING:
1st issue: Yes. Merencillo is liable for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. The
inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner were neither material nor relevant to the
elements of the offenses for which he was charged. For instance, whether or not it was
petitioner himself who handed the CAR to private respondent was immaterial. The fact
was that petitioner demanded and received money in consideration for the issuance of
the CAR.

2nd issue: Yes he may be charged for both crimes. Although the two charges against
petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate
and distinct offenses.

The violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of
direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the essential elements of one
offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other.

Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is
enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or
offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving
monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the
law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a)
performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not
constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his
official duty to do.

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Jaravata vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-56170
Narciso, Girly Mae A.

FACTS:
Hilario Jaravata, an Assistant Principal, informed the teachers of the approval of the
release of their salary differentials. To facilitate its payment, they have agreed that
Jaravata follow-up the papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom
teachers to reimburse him of his expenses. He incurred expenses in the total amount of
P220.00 and divided it to six classroom teachers. The teachers received their salary
differentials and pursuant to said agreement they gave Jaravata their payment.

ISSUE: Whether Jaravata "in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" in the
payment of the salary differentials in violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019

RULING:
No. Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention is
required by law in a contract or transaction. There is no law which invests the petitioner
with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the complainants
or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any power, the petitioner played the humble
role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the salary differentials. In
his official capacity as assistant principal he is not required by law to intervene in the
payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the
law afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary
differentials.

Mendoza-Ong vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146368-69


Clint Ace Norcos

FACTS:
In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Northern Samar, passed Resolution No. 93-
132, authorizing the municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the Philippine Army’s
53rd Engineering Battalion, to be utilized in the improvement of Laoang's Bus Terminal.
Allegedly, however, the borrowed equipment was diverted to Madeleine Mendoza-Ong
(then town mayor) to develop some of her private properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza-Ong was correct when she contended that the value of
the alleged gift directly or indirectly requested or received must be manifestly excessive
for one to be guilty under Section 3(c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

RULING:
No, Section 3 (c) applies regardless of whether the gifts value is manifestly excessive or
not, and regardless of the occasion. What is important here is whether the gift is received
in consideration for help given or to be given by the public officer. The value of the gift is
not mentioned at all as an essential element of the offense charged under Section 3 (c),

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and there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify such value in order to
comply with the requirements of showing a prima facie case.

Valera vs Ombudsman, GR. No. 167278


Ramos, Rovi Kennth T.

FACTS:
Gil A. Valera was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of Customs by then President
Gloria Arroyo. He was charged in violation of Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019. It was alleged
that he caused the employment of his brother-in-law with the Cactus Cargoes System,
Inc. whose principal business involves transactions with the Bureau of Customs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty in violating Section(d) of R.A. No. 3019

RULING:
Yes, the accused is guilty in violating such Act.
Mere acceptance by a member of his family of employment with a private enterprise which
has pending official business with the official involved is considered a corrupt practice. It
is clear, therefore, that mere acceptance by Ariel Manongdo, a family member, of the
employment with the CCSI rendered petitioner liable under the law. In addition, contrary
to petitioner’s assertion, family relation is defined under Section 4 of R.A. 3019 which,
according to the said section, “shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or
affinity in the third civil degree. Thus, a brother-in-law falls within the definition of family.

Consigna vs People, G.R. No. 175750-51


Reyes, Desiree Mae E.
FACTS:
Municipal Treasurer Consigna obtained a loan from private respondent Moleta, to whom
they misrepresented to be for the municipality of General Luna, when in fact the same is
not. As payment, 3 checks were issued by the petitioner. Moleta demanded payment from
petitioner, but to no avail. Thus, she tried depositing the checks but all were dishonored,
resulting to the damage and prejudice of Moleta in the amount of ₱320,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019

RULING:
Yes. The the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 are: 1. The accused
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3.
That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. Petitioner, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer discharging official
functions when she misused such position to be able to take out a loan from Moleta, who
was misled to believe that Consigna was acting on behalf of the municipality. Therefore,

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a direct relation exists between the commission of the crime and petitioner’s office – the
latter being the very reason or consideration that led to the unwarranted benefit she
gained from Moleta, for which the latter suffered damages in the amount of ₱320,000.00.

Constantino vs Sandiganybayan GR No. 140656


Reyes, Robea Anne Q.

FACTS:
The Municipality of Malungon listed as one of its program, the acquisition of a fleet of
heavy equipment needed for its development projects. The Sangguniang Bayan passed
Resolution No. 21, authorizing Constantino to enter into a negotiated contract as such
petitioner entered into a Lease Agreement with Norlovanian Corp. However after an audit
it was found out that the lease/purchase procedure utilized by the municipality was
uneconomical and resulted to a wastage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Constantino, mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province, violated


Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

RULING:
No. The Sandiganbayan held that manifest partiality could not be rightfully imputed to
Constantino. The prosecution did not present proof that he was actuated with malice or
fraud sufficient to meet the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
respondent court found that Constantinos act of entering into a purportedly pure lease
agreement instead of a lease/purchase agreement was a flagrant violation of Resolution
No. 21, the Sandiganbayan found that his conduct constituted gross inexcusable
negligence. Likewise, the anti-graft court ruled that Constantinos acts resulted in undue
injury to the Municipality of Malungon.

Jaca vs People, G.R. No. 166967


Sambrano, Jan Loureene P.

FACTS:
A surprise audit revealed that there were cash shortages in the Cebu City Government
brought about by Badana’s scheme of double-recording vouchers and payrolls to cover
up the money she takes from the government. The petitioners are implicated in the
criminal and administrative investigations based on their duties attached to their
designations. They raise the defense of the limitations of their duties, as well as reliance
on others that the others have faithfully complied with their jobs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners should be held liable for Sec. 3 (e) of RA3019,
taking into account the duties imposed upon them by virtue of their designation

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RULING:
Yes. The finding of gross inexcusable negligence was evident. First, for the Treasurer,
for abiding to that long-standing practice of simply requiring a written request without
being accompanied by proper supporting documents and his vital role in the release of
the funds, second, for the Accountant, for admitting that she was just signing the vouchers
in order to avoid delay even when she knew that the previous cash advances were not
yet properly settled and accounted for and lastly, for the City Administrator, for ignoring
the obvious when supporting documents are absent though he could have at least
required its presentation and if there is a practice of some employees being paid weekly,
it should have alerted him that there should be four payrolls prepared, instead of only two.

Katigbak vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140183


Suyo, Alexandra Cates Erika B.

FACTS:
The NHA entered into a land development contract with Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz
Construction. Before the project’s completion, the NHA rescinded the contract and hired
Jose Cruz’s company to finish it. Arceo Cruz then charged the petitioners Katigbak and
Merelos for conspiring with co-accused Robert Balao in rescinding the contract with Arceo
Cruz, and subsequently awarding the same, without public bidding and at an exorbitant
rate, to Jose Cruz, thereby granting unwarranted benefits to Jose Cruz while causing
damage and undue injury to the government and Arceo Cruz.

ISSUE: Were the accused liable under Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019?

RULING:
No, as a careful scrutiny of the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution only
served the purpose of establishing the liability of their co-accused, Robert Balao, and not
those of the petitioners. A prosecution witness stated that petitioners Katigbak and
Merelos had no participation in the preparation of all the documents identified in court.
Nowhere in said testimony did it appear that petitioners participated in the decision to
rescind the subject contract and to award the remaining project to Jose Cruz. As such,
the petitioners are found to have no liability under Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019.

Extra:
In order to be held liable for violation of Section 3 paragraph (e) of RA 3019, as amended, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action has caused
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.

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Bustillo vs People, G.R. No. 160718
Tan, Daniel Carlos

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed Resolution No. 95-27, authorizing the
transfer of certain vehicles to the San Francisco Water District. Accordingly, Mayor
Bustillo executed a Deed of Transfer. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur,
however, passed Resolution No. 183, shooting down Resolution No. 95-27, and,
Resolution No. 246, declaring the Deed of Transfer as being null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Bustillo, and two co-accused, violated Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019

RULING:
No, the accused did not violate Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Only the first element was
proven, given that all three were public officers as members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
However, the transfer of vehicles to SFWD was made to aid the waterworks projects in
Agusan del Sur. The transfer was also made in recognition of SFWD’s technical expertise
regarding waterworks projects. As such, the Court did not find the accused as motivated
by bad faith when they made the transfer. They have in their favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.

Coronado vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 94955


Villa-Abrille, Trisha Marie O.

FACTS:
Juan Coronado, Jr., a process server of all the RTC of Rizal, was charged with the
violation of the R.A. 3019 for delaying the service and finality of an order of dismissal
issued involving a land litigation. A couple of attempts were made by the accused to effect
the service but was unsuccessful, further delaying the same for 5 months. It was alleged
to be for the purpose of giving undue advantage in favor of the plaintiffs and discrimination
against defendants in said case as it is without sufficient justification, despite due demand
and request made by defendant therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is in violation of Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act

RULING:
No. The law requires that the accused’s dereliction, besides being without justification,
must be for the purpose of (a) obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor
of an interested party or (b) discriminating against another interested party. The
severity of the penalty imposed by the law leaves no doubt that the legislative intent is to
consider this element to be indispensable. In this case, there was no sufficient proof that
the accused‘s failure to act was motivated by any gain or benefit for himself.

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People vs Henry Go, G.R. No. 168539
Zapanta, Arvin

FACTS:
Herein respondent President and Chairman of PIATCO was charged for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 in conspiracy with Secretary Enrile, who was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution. They enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium! PIATCO, substantially amended the Concession Agreement, the
Public Utility Revenues, covering the construction of NAIA III as well as the liability of
PIATCO to the Government when the former will be in default, which terms are favorable
to PIATCO and disadvantage to the Government of the Philippines. Respondent
contends that the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in
the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.

ISSUES:
A. Whether or not the case filed against a private individual, who conspired with a
Public Officer in violation of RA 3019 shall prosper notwithstanding the death
of the latter
B. Whether or not the Sandigan Bayan has jurisdiction over the case charged to
the private individual
RULING:
A. Yes, it is only the deceased’s criminal liability that extinguishes, not the crime
nor it removed the basis of charge of conspiracy between a private and a public
employee. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. It is settled that private
persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, if found guilty, held
liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.

B. No, as a general rule, the Sandigan Bayan has jurisdiction over private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the said public officers. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can
no longer be done. It does not follow that the SB is already divested of its
jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To
rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no
longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as
the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Footnote:

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

a. that the accused is a public officer;


b. that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
c. that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

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Nava vs Palattao, G.R. No. 160211
Abayon, Alvan King P.

FACTS:
Nava, upon the release of the allotment by the DECS, Region XI to its Division Offices for
the improvement of the nationalized high schools in the region, persuaded his 7 division
superintendents to rather use the money to purchase science educational facilities. The
purchase, however, was not done through a public bidding pursuant to Circular No. 85-
55, but rather through an overpriced negotiation which resulted to a monetary loss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nava should be convicted of violating Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.
3019

RULING:
Yes. To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be
proven that 1) the accused is a public officer; 2) he entered into a contract or transaction
on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. Petitioner is a public officer, who approved the
transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The
said loss, however, is due to the overpriced negotiation and not the lack of a public
bidding, since the latter does not result to a manifest and gross disadvantage.

Caballero vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 137355-58


Abutazil, Sittie Alyssa B.

FACTS:
During Caballero’s incumbency as municipal mayor in 1993, the Municipality of Manukan,
conducted committee hearings which required the purchase of materials for use therefor
and catering services for the meals and snacks of the participants. For the purpose, a
public bidding was held, during which awards were made to the lowest bidder, namely,
Genty General Merchandise for the supply of materials, and GP’s Food Catering Services
for the supply of meals and snacks. Both entities were admittedly owned and operated
by the mayor’s wife, Theresa Caballero. Thereafter, a letter-complaint was filed charging
Mayor Caballero and his wife Theresa, Municipal Treasurer Semie Torres and Municipal
Accountant Nerita Cuento for violating Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The letter-complaint charged the municipal
officials for allowing their offices to be used as a tool to unlawfully secure benefits to favor
the mayor and his wife in connection with the supply of materials and meals by Theresa
Caballero’s businesses, i.e., GP’s Food Catering Services and Genty General
Merchandise.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the facts alleged and charged in the information constitute the offense
defined in Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019

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RULING:
No. 3rd requisite is not present. Under settled jurisprudence, the following elements need
to be proven in order to constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019: (1) The
accused is a public officer; which they are. (2) He has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction; even if these entities were
registered in his wife’s name and not in his own name, still Mayor Caballero would have
a direct interest thereon. (3) He either (a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with such interest, or (b) is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by any law; the undisputed facts of the case negate any showing that
Mayor Caballero had, in his capacity as mayor, used his influence, power and authority
in the award of the two (2) contracts to his wife’s business entities. He did not ask nor did
he demand the members of the Committee on Awards to award the respective contracts
for the supply of meals and materials to GP’s Food Catering Services and Genty General
Merchandise.

Teves vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154182


Advincula, Don Victorio IV

FACTS:
Edgar Teves, Mayor of Valencia, Negros Occidental and his wife Teresita Teves were
charged of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice
Act. The accused, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions
and conspiring with his wife, issued a license in favor of Daniel Teves to operate Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center in which Edgar Taves have a direct financial or pecuniary
interest therein, considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and
operated by him and a wife Teresita.

ISSUE: Whether or not Edgar Teves is guilty of the crime under Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law

RULING:

First Mode:
No. Under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, it is only the Sangguniang Bayan that has
the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of
cockpits. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official
capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the
information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Second Mode:
Yes. The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then
mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. Hence, his interest in
the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC
of 1991.

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People vs Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558
Amar, Angelene Aries P.

FACTS:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public
officer, being then the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by
taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or
influence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total
value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy
three pesos and seventeen centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of overt or
criminal acts, or similar schemes or means.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of Plunder under Republic Act No. 7080

RULING:
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the elements of plunder as follows:
(a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time of the commission of the
acts charged in the Amended Information was the President of the Republic of the
Philippines;
(b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, who was granted
immunity from suit by the Office of the Ombudsman, and with the participation of other
persons named by prosecution witnesses in the course of the trial of this case, in
amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth as follows:
(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from "jueteng", a form of
illegal gambling, during the period beginning November 1998 to August 2000
in the aggregate amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Million Two Hundred
Ninety One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00) of which was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation; and
(ii) by a series consisting of two (2) acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to
purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and collecting or receiving
commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of One Hundred
Eighty-Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which
was deposited in the Jose Velarde account.

However, for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward
S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders
their ACQUITTAL.

(CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests – 1SR) 13


Ejercito vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95
Amistad, Ryan James N.

FACTS:
The Special Prosecution Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a request for issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum directing the President of Export and Industry Bank or his/her
authorized representative to produce documents namely, Trust Account and Savings
Account belonging to petitioner. Sandiganbayan granted both requests and subpoenas
were accordingly issued. Petitioner now assisted by his counsel filed two separate
motions to quash the two subpoenas issued claiming that his bank accounts are covered
by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the
exceptions stated therein. The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the
prosecution in the case may not be allowed to make use of the information.
Sandiganbayan denied both motions and the consequent motions for reconsideration of
petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Trust and Savings Accounts of petitioner is still protected by
the Bank Secrecy Law

RULING:
No, The protection afforded by the law is not absolute, there being recognized exceptions
thereto, to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The plunder case now pending with the
Sandiganbayan necessarily involves an inquiry into the whereabouts of the amount
purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph Estrada. The subject matter of
the litigation cannot be limited to the latter’s bank accounts, but must include those
accounts to which the money was alleged to have been transferred to. The Trust Account
and Savings Account in the name of petitioner fall under this description and must thus
be part of the subject matter of the litigation.

Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965


Rizza Jane P. Bandigan

FACTS:
In connection with the impeachment proceedings against former President Joseph
Estrada, five criminal complaints were filed against him and other conspirators. One of
the information filed was for the crime of plunder under R.A. 7080 and among the
respondents was petitioner Jinggoy. He contends, among others, that there was no
probable cause in holding him liable, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in
illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required
in R.A. 7080

(CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests – 1SR) 14


ISSUES:
a) Whether or not Jinggoy may be charged with Plunder even if he was only allegedly
involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal
acts"
b) Whether or not Jinggoy acted in conspiracy with former President Estrada in
committing the crime of plunder

RULING:
a) Yes. The allegation in the information is that petitioner Jinggoy received or
collected money from illegal gambling "on several instances", meaning he
committed the predicate act in series. Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention, it
cannot be said that he was charged with the commission of only one act,
considering the phrase "several instances". As held in Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
(2001), "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances". "Series"
refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d)
of RA 7080. "Combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two
different predicate acts in any of said items.

b) Yes. The presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves


two structures: (1) the so-called “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy, in which there is a
single person or group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the “spokes”); and (2) the “chain” conspiracy, usually involving
the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer,
and then retailer and consumer.

In the case at bar, it appears similar to a “wheel” conspiracy. The hub is former President
Estrada while the spokes are all the accused and the rim that encloses the spokes is the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, which is the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

People vs. Revilla, et al., SB-14-CRM-0240


Campaner, Faith Angeli M.

FACTS:
Public Officers Sen. Revilla, Jr. and Cambe conspired with Napoles, Lim, and De Asis to
unlawfully acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P224,512,500.00 by repeatedly
receiving from Napoles and De Asis commissions in consideration of Revilla Jr.'s
endorsement to government agencies of Napoles' non-government organizations which
became the recipients of Revilla, Jr.'s PDAF projects. These duly-funded projects turned
out to be ghosts or fictitious, enabling Napoles to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds and
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipinos and the country. Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles were charged with the crime of Plunder.

(CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests – 1SR) 15


ISSUE: Whether or not the accused, in conspiracy with one another, committed the
crime of plunder

RULING:
Yes. Plunder has the following elements:
a) The offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members
of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
b) He amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) hereof; and
c) The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated
or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

THE FIRST ELEMENT. Accused Napoles is a private individual charged in conspiracy


with accused Revilla and Cambe. As provided in Section 2 of RA 7080, "[a]ny person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense."

THE SECOND ELEMENT. The separate and individual acts of accused Revilla, Cambe
and Napoles convincingly appear to have facilitated the amassing, accumulation, and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth by accused Revilla. It is immaterial whether or not the
prosecution has presented evidence that accused Cambe and Napoles by themselves
have likewise amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at
least P50 Million each. It is sufficient that the prosecution has established that accused
Revilla and accused Cambe have conspired with one another, and with accused Napoles
in the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 million.

THE THIRD ELEMENT. The prosecution has so far strongly proven the amount of
P103,000,000.00 which is the total amount received by accused Cambe for Revilla, to
which Luy, Sula and Suñas have testified to their personal knowledge.

GMA vs People, G.R. No. 220598


Casia, Lorraine Patricia S.

FACTS:
The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President GMA and PCSO
Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas, and other public officers for conspiracy to commit
plunder. Implied conspiracy was provided in the Information stating that they connived,
conspired and confederated with one another and criminally amassed
PHP365,997,915.00 worth of ill-gotten wealth by raiding the public treasury.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution properly alleged and sufficiently established the
existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and other public officers

(CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests – 1SR) 16


RULING:
No. The Court held in Estrada vs Sandiganbayan that the gravamen of the conspiracy
charge is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for
the President. In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of plunder
- that any or all of the accused public officials, particularly Arroyo, had acquired ill-gotten
wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00. The information contained nothing that averred her
commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to
commit plunder. No sufficient incriminatory evidence was found by the Court.

Enrile vs People, G.R. No. 213455


Cuartero, Charmaine E.

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against
Enrile, et.al before the Sandiganbayan (SB), for allegedly amassing ill-gotten wealth
amounting to PHP 172,834,500.00 from 2004-2010. In response, Enrile filed two motions:
(1) motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause; and (2)
an ad cautelam motion for bail. He also filed a supplemental opposition to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information. Both motions were denied by the
SB. It then ordered for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for plunder against Enrile.

Before his arraignment, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars, which was also denied.
Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and alleges that he was
left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of plunder had been.

ISSUE: Is there a need to determine whether the ill-gotten wealth in a crime of plunder
committed in connivance or in a conspiracy had been acquired by one, by two, or all of
the accused?

RULING:
NO. Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other
persons, and the Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes
conspired with one another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John
Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an essential element of the
offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been
acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of
ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as
the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million.

Conspiracy in this case is not charged as a crime but only as a means of committing a
crime. It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in
either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts

(CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests – 1SR) 17


constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would
know what is intended, and with such precision as the nature of the crime charged will
admit, to enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts.

Garcia vs People, G.R. No. 170122


Datukon, Kevin G.

FACTS:
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F.
Garcia, his wife and children had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to RA 1379, filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) a petition
for the forfeiture of those properties. Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to
the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with plunder. The plunder charge
covered substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases. The Garcias
moved for the transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case contending
that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249. The SB denied the motion for the
reason that the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the criminal case of plunder. The Garcias filed another motion to
quash Forfeiture I on the grounds that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid
possible double jeopardy entanglements and that being incompatible, the forfeiture law
was impliedly repealed by the plunder law with automatic forfeiture mechanism.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be charged with forfeiture as well as plunder

RULING:
Yes, the accused may be charged with forfeiture as well as plunder. Petitioner claims that
the inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary to obviate possible
double jeopardy entanglements. Petitioner's claim respecting forfeiture being absorbed
by the plunder case is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption
being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability
ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB, the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise
from the commission of a criminal offense. Such liability is based on a statute that
safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. Forfeiture
cases and the plunder case have separate causes of action; the former is civil in nature
while the latter is criminal.

As a second point, a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action
separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of
plunder absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be
established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine under RA 1379 is
the disproportion of respondent's properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary
to prove how he acquired said properties. Proceedings under RA 1379 are civil in nature.
One who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense.

(CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests – 1SR) 18

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