Nations and Nationalism 7 (3), 2001, 297±315.

# ASEN 2001

The national question: sociological

re¯ections on nation and nationalism
ANDREW THOMPSON
School of Humanities, University of Glamorgan, Treforest CF37 1DL

RALPH FEVRE
School of Social Science, Cardiff University, 50 Park Place, Cardiff CF1 3AT

ABSTRACT. The sociology of nation, national identity and nationalism has long
been the subject of benign neglect. After examining the few positive contributions
made by classical writers, we attempt to explain why the contribution of classical
theory to the field is unreliable. In common with others we find that, for all that
classical theory might treat the prominence of nation, national identity and nation-
alism as a passing phase, it in fact takes the existence of all three as givens to such an
extent that they and their effects become invisible. But the sociology of nation and
nationalism reached a turning point with the publication of Elie Kedourie's influential
work in 1960. We explain the effect of this work on later writers, especially Ernest
Gellner and Anthony Smith, and survey the work of these and other contributors to
the field with an eye to their differences and similarities. We identify various stages in
the development of the sociology of nation and nationalism, culminating in the most
recent stage in which the significance of the subjective aspects of nationalism has
received increased attention. We think there is room for a multiplicity of approaches to
the subject and stress its central significance to sociology. We explain why nation,
national identity and nationalism are certainly not in decline and suggest where the
most fruitful lines of inquiry lie for future research.

Introduction

This article summarises and explains the main developments in the sociology
of nation, nationality and nationalism. In the ®rst section of the paper, which
deals with classical social theory, our explanation must cope as much with the
silence of sociology as with any positive contribution. In the second, more
contemporary, section of the paper we try to explain why this branch of
sociology has remained isolated from the main body of sociological theory.
We then ask whether, while the sociology of nation and nationalism may
be engaged in healthy interdisciplinary work elsewhere, its isolation from the
mainstream has nevertheless harmed sociology. At the end of the article
we appeal for an end to this isolation, yet we do not make our argument on
298 Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre

the basis of the extreme events being endured in the Balkans (for example),
but rather in the more familiar concerns of mainstream sociology. We argue
that nation and nationality should be numbered amongst the fundamental
organising categories used to construct identities, narratives and meanings,
and, ultimately, to underpin the actions that determine the character of social,
economic and political life.

The quiescence of classical theory

The list of classical theorists that subsequent commentators (for example,

Guibernau 1996; James 1996; Smith 1983) think neglected to theorise nation
and nationalism includes Marx, Fustel de Coulanges, Renan, Treitschke,
Weber, Durkheim, Simmel and Cooley. For Guibernau (1996: 43) the main
omissions are the identity-conferring aspect of nationality, the distinction
between nation and nation-state, the social movements needed to bring about
the realisation of nationalist political goals, and nationalisms' (cultural)
homogenising effects. The classical theorists neglected to build a (systematic)
theory of the nation, but it is nevertheless possible to identify three distinct
kinds of positive contribution made by classical theory.
First, classical theory frequently furnished later theorists with concepts and
perspectives even when the classical theorists concerned were not consciously
trying to theorise nation and nationalism (see, for example, Mestrovic 1992
and 1997, Thompson et al. 1999 and Fevre et al. 1997 (see below)). Secondly,
the study of classical texts sometimes `reveals a tacit interest in important
aspects of the whole field of ``nationalist phenomena'', usually cloaked behind
other concerns, but able to provide illumination and cues for theories' (Smith,
1983: 20; see also James 1996: 86±8). This is probably what scholars have
in mind when they identify the influence of Durkheim and Weber on later
theorists such as Gellner (Anderson 1992; Smith 1983) and indeed Smith
(James 1996).
The third category is occupied by those fragments of classical theory that
were specifically written with nation or nationalism (or perhaps a closely
related subject such as ethnic feeling) in mind. These underdeveloped frag-
ments have made a contribution to the sociology of nation and nationalism
that is too often ignored. To illustrate this point we will include a neglected
contribution from Marxist theory and an underdeveloped contribution from
Weber within our summary of the fragments that are generally acknowledged
in writing on nation or nationalism and classical theory.
Marx, Renan and Treitschke can all be credited with dismissing a natural-
istic fallacy of nationality and establishing nation as a proper subject of
sociological inquiry (Guibernau 1996; Thom 1990). With this insight came the
idea that nation was not settled or permanent even though people might
believe otherwise, just as they might have deep convictions about the natural
provenance of nations (Guibernau 1996: 11). Some classical theorists also
Sociological re¯ections on nation and nationalism 299

considered that these convictions and their associated sentiments were also
of interest to sociology. In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim
acknowledged that the submission of `one's idea of patriotism, or of indi-
vidual dignity' to `cold dry analysis' would revolt some minds. Nevertheless,
Durkheim was adamant that patriotism should not be exempt from scientific
inquiry (1964a: 32±3) and it was in The Rules that Durkheim made `the space
for a theory of the nation' (James 1996: 92).
Apart from a brief passage in Weber's Economy and Society (1968: 921±6),
it is Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1976 [1912]) that
receives the most credit from contemporary commentators (including Gellner
and Collins) for contributing to the sociology of nation and nationalism. All
of these writers observe how Durkheim is aware that what he has to say about
the effects of ritual and symbol on solidarity applies as much to national
rituals and symbols as to religious ones. Smith (1983: 28) also emphasises the
role of ritual in imposing community where there is heterogeneity. Indeed
Smith (ibid.: 29) ± who even finds a forerunner of the ethnic origin of nations
in The Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim 1964b [1893]) ± says the ideas
in Elementary Forms fit nations and nationalism better than religion: they
`bear directly on the functions of nationalism for an ethnic community con-
scious of its identity' (Smith 1983: 30).
Guibernau says Marx simply saw nationalism as a reflection of bourgeois
interests (1996: 13) and Szporluk (1988) shows how Marx found in Friedrich
List the personification of nationalist ideology cloaking bourgeois interest.
But Szporluk asserts that Marx did not understand that nationalism could be
`more than an intellectual or political current' and bring about change in `the
actual social reality' (1988: 75). While this might be true of The Communist
Manifesto or The German Ideology (see below), things are not quite so simple in
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx 1934 [1852]), a text which
the secondary literature generally fails to consider. Here Marx uses a multi-
plicity of classes ± determined by their different relationships to property ± to
explain the events surrounding the accession to the presidency of the Republic
in 1848 of Napoleon's nephew. These classes have different views and feelings:
Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an
entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of
thought and views of life. (Marx 1934: 38±9)

Amongst the small-holding peasants ± who formed the eventual class-base for
Louis Bonaparte's state ± this superstructure took on the nationalist
character of the (once-revolutionary) ideology of bygone days. The peasants
had bene®ted from the revolution against feudalism because it gave them
their own holdings, and they supported Louis Bonaparte because they
believed he would help them retain this property (cf. Barrington Moore 1966).
Of course, for Marx material circumstances determine how faithfully any
ideology serves a class's interests, and the peasants, who were isolated from
each other, were not well served by armed nationalism.1 Nevertheless, Louis
300 Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre

depended on the support he gained by their adherence to this ideology

because `the state power is not suspended in midair' (Marx 1934: 108).
When we turn to Weber we find that Perry Anderson is able to uncover some
evidence in fragments of Weber's theory of a view that is close to Benedict
Anderson on nationality as fatality, and hence the ultimate guide to action
where all else has failed (1992: 195±7). On the other hand, Martin Albrow
claims that Weber was able `to identify the sources of nationalism' (1990: 7),
where Perry Anderson expresses the more conventional view when he says that
Weber's failure to theorise nationalism was his `central omission' (1992: 204).
Along with all the other commentators, Albrow and Anderson base their
final judgements of Weber on a brief passage in Economy and Society (1968:
921±6). In Guibernau's opinion (1996: 32), the aspects of this passage that are
worth praising are the way in which Weber draws our attention to the
`subjective character' of ethnic group (and nation), the way a political
community can make people feel they are like each other and belong to
something together, and the strong emotional character of ethnic solidarity.
Smith (1983: 32±3) notes what Weber has to say about the superior or
irreplaceable culture values preserved through the cultivation of the
community's individuality (and difference) and the necessity for political
action which can create belief in common ancestry (and so on). Smith is
ultimately disappointed with Weber because of his `basic ``political''
approach' (1983: 33), which makes the aspirations to statehood central.
At the point where the passage in Economy and Society breaks off we are
forced to rely on literal fragments, a few notes made by Weber. Smith (1983:
33) thinks these notes `indicate that Weber intended to deal with the idea and
development of the national state in history' and he then ends his discussion
of Weber in this fashion:

_ the bearers of the concept of the state like bureaucrats and of®cers, and the artists,
teachers and writers who are the `speci®c bearers of culture and the idea of the nation',
need each other, despite their competing claims. (Smith 1983: 33)

The material to which Smith alludes here may hold some underutilised con-
ceptual value for the sociology of nation and nationalism.
In the discussion of ideology in The Eighteenth Brumaire Marx (1934 [1852])
makes the point that ideas may be self-serving, yet, at the same time, may be
honestly held to be of universal benefit. Gellner makes a very similar point in
Nations and Nationalism (Gellner 1983: 61), but the inspiration for this insight
is almost certainly Weber. Weber's theory-in-embryo contains some under-
used ideas about the relationship between cultural values and material
interests amongst those who pursue nationalist goals. Significant cultural
difference or peculiarity does not underpin nationality, nevertheless Weber
claims that nationalists value very small or imagined cultural differences (on
ethnicity, see also Weber 1968: 390) because they believe that a mission has
been given to the nation by Providence. To take on this mission may well mean
cultivating their peculiarity, the proof of distinctiveness to which Gellner refers
Sociological re¯ections on nation and nationalism 301

and which provides the justification for being a separate, even unique, nation.
In this way the Providential mission becomes a culture mission to be pursued
by a group of intellectuals (see also Guibernau 1996: 33):
The signi®cance of the `nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the
irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only
through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group. It therefore goes without
saying that, just as those who wield power in the polity invoke the idea of the state,
the intellectuals, as we shall tentatively call those who usurp leadership in a
Kulturgemeinschaft (that is, within a group of people who by virtue of their peculiarity
have access to certain products that are considered `culture goods'), are speci®cally
predestined to propagate the `national' idea. This happens when those culture agents
2
_ (Weber 1968: 925±6 ).
Again it is suggested that Weber's continued emphasis on power relations
makes the idea less useful than it might otherwise be. If intellectuals' pre-
destination can be explained by `the fact that the power and prestige interests
of intellectuals, amongst others, are bound up with the preservation of
cultural values and the cultivation of the speci®city of cultural association'
this unhappily leaves aside `[i]ntellectual work as a materially abstract prac-
tice, and the nation as a form of abstract social relations' (James, 1996: 98).
James is interested in the conditions that make intellectual work per se
possible, but for Weber the `prestige interests of intellectuals' are a particular
example of the meanings of the actions taken by status groups discussed
elsewhere in Economy and Society. Fevre et al. (1997) have latterly utilised
Weber's theory of class, status and party in an analysis of nationalism.
Indeed, Collins has suggested that Weber was moving towards the position
that nations themselves could be seen as something like big status groups
which were founded in economic interest with an eye to power and prestige
(Collins 1986).
We now turn to the explanation of classical theory's contribution and its
lacunae: on the one hand, classical theory considered that national identity
would soon lose its significance, and ultimately disappear, while, on the other
hand, classical theorists wrote (and behaved) as if the assumption of a
national identity (by states as well as individuals) was something as necessary
and natural as drawing breath.
Marx and Durkheim thought nationalism would have to be transcended
(Guibernau 1996: 41). Indeed, The Communist Manifesto (1848) claims that in
his day-to-day existence the proletarian has already accomplished this
transcendence:
modern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in
France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character.
(Marx and Engels 1967: 92; see also The German Ideology (Marx and Engels 1976 [1846])
Taking his inspiration from the Manifesto's evocative phrase `all that is solid
melts into air', James reminds us how Marx's times gave him the idea that he
ought to be exposing the `real' reality underneath appearances. Nationalism
302 Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre

was an ideology, a false representation of the real, and Marx's aim was to
draw back such veils in order to reveal the really real. Durkheim can also be
read in this way when he exposes our `illusions' concerning social facts (James
1996: 69).
Given that James thinks (with some reason) that the nation-state had not
yet been consolidated when Marx and Engels were writing, one arrives at the
following conclusion:
it was unlikely that Marx and Engels would spend time theorising the reasons why the
nation-state continued to frame people's lives. In bald terms, for Marx and Engels the
nation-state in its modern form had become antiquated before it could ossify. (James
1996: 70).

Because Marx was continually searching for more abstract categories of

explanation, `the nation could be taken for granted as an historically natural
form of association and, at the same time, be conceived as passing into
history, melting into air' (James 1996: 80). But the consequences of this
perfectly understandable outcome are lamentable (and recall James's earlier
remarks about Weber and his neglect of `the nation as a form of abstract
social relations'):
If it is right to say that the nation is experienced as a concrete and condensed relation
between real people (despite the fact they never meet as-a-community except via
materially abstracted, extended relations), then Marx's seeing through the veil of this
subjectivity was a profound insight. But it had for Marx the effect of blinding him to
the fact that the national subjectivity of the concrete, drawing upon the ontological
level of the face-to-face, was integral to the intersection of more abstract levels of
social integration. (James 1996: 80)

Seeing through the veil lays bare the ¯imsy foundations of nation and
nationality but then (even while Marx is pointing out how novel the modern
state is) leaves them untheorised and taken for granted. This is one of the
reasons why James concludes that in Marxist theory `the nation disappeared
into its own prominence' (1996: 81).
Guibernau (1996: 29, 41) shows how Durkheim saw the morality associ-
ated with nationality as a stage on the way to higher, European or human
aims. The nation simply allows us to benefit from an approximation of
human aims. Guibernau dismisses Durkheim's announcement of the death of
specific, localised patriotism as premature, though `it is obviously true that
the global perception of the world we experience today opens the path
towards ``human ideals'' and radically transforms both the objectives and
content of nationalism' (Guibernau 1996: 31).
So classical theory neglected nation and nationalism because they were
sojourners, not permanent residents in modernity. But yet, at the same time,
nation and nationality were taken for granted:
_ although nationality is said to be `already dead', Marx and Engels effectively take
the nation for granted, treating it as a long-run, post-tribal form of association. They
Sociological re¯ections on nation and nationalism 303

use the term `nation' as equally applicable to polities from the Phoenicians to the
Germans both before and after uni®cation under Prussia. (James 1996: 59)

We have seen above that Durkheim used the taken-for-granted nature of

patriotism to good effect when introducing his readers to the proper subject-
matter of sociology, but there is more to add:
Moreover in later life, his belief in the need for new social gospels and rites also
focused on patriotism, in order to cement professional groups and give warmth and a
greater feeling of proximity to an otherwise remote State. National regeneration, along
with professional ethics, was required to combat excessive individualism and the
anomie of modern industrial societies. (Smith 1983: 31)

James concludes that:

though using an opposing method, Weber is all the time looking through a common
cultural-intellectual prism with Durkheim. And from all the refracted possibilities,
they both conclude by focusing on the same source of political salvation ± national
unity. (1996: 96)

Because they could no longer trust in any reality, thinkers could no longer
seriously search for the `really' real under the veil. Like Mestrovic (1992),
James is keen to draw out the signi®cance of the ®n de sieÁcle spirit for
Durkheim, but he also does the same for Weber (James 1996: 101). Like
Treitschke, Weber saw nation as the most important feature in society
(Guibernau 1996: 4) but James reminds us that Weber was critical of
Treitschke for confusing fact and value, and tells us that we have to be careful
about the way in which Weber thought he could reason out the priority he
wanted to give to the nation state as `the ultimate ``power value'''. Weber
wanted to tell us there could be no veri®able, deductive argument for this
conclusion (James 1996: 95) and so, ®nally, we turn to the effect of Weber's
own nationalism, as expressed in the Freiburg inaugural lecture (Weber 1989
[1895]) for example.
For Albrow, Weber's is a `transcendent' cultural nationalism (Guibernau
considers this a fairer description of Weber's views after the War (1996: 34)),
while Smith thinks that Weber finds in nationalism an antidote to `the
soulless and mechanical rationalisation which threatened to engulf the world'
(1983: 33). Perry Anderson agrees that nationalism was Weber's practical
solution to disenchantment (1992: 197; see also James 1996: 96±102). There is
general agreement about the debilitating effects of Weber's own nationalism
on his theoretical effort but James makes an interesting contribution by
suggesting how Weber's theoretical insight shaped his nationalist priorities
(James 1996: 90).
The way in which classical theory both dismissed nation and nationality
and held them so close as to frequently remove them entirely from the
theorist's view forces us towards the position adopted by Smith (1983: 26).
Excepting Weber (because of his methodological individualism), classical
theory was engaged in the same enterprise as nationalism: it was concerned
304 Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre

with the evolution of society and with working out the laws of social order
and change. This is why nations and nationalism are taken as given,
and why the study of society was always ipso facto the study of the nation, which was
never disentangled as a separate dimension or issue. It would also help to explain the
popularity of `methodological nationalism', in which basic social data are always
collected and evaluated in terms of large-scale entities called `nation-states'. (Smith
1983: 26)
Sociology shared nationalism's assumptions and so failed to notice its
`historical peculiarity' (ibid.: 26).

The development of the sociology of nationalism

If the tumultuous events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
did not provide suf®cient stimulus for a systematic sociological analysis of the
nation and nationalism, the impact of two World Wars did, however, do
much to direct the attention of scholars towards these issues. For the most
part, however, it was historians and international relations scholars, not
sociologists, who emerged as the most prominent and proli®c contributors to
discussions of nationalism. During the inter-war years North American
historians such as Hayes (1931) and, in the early post-World War II years,
Snyder (1954) and Shafer (1955 and 1972), provided encyclopaedic surveys of
the differing forms of nationalism found across the globe and throughout
history, while in Western Europe Cobban (1969 [1944]) and Carr (1945)
similarly directed attention towards nationalism.
Why these historians should emerge as the leading commentators in this
field, rather than figures such as Durkheim and Weber, whose lives, earlier,
had been so directly touched by the politics of nationalism, is not easy to
discern precisely. Certainly, it was not because the latter two writers had no
intellectual interest in nationalism. The personal sense of bitterness arising
from Prussia's victory over France in 1871 was a pivotal influence in shaping
Durkheim's research,3 while Weber had been greatly influenced by post-
unification nationalism in Germany (Thom 1990; Guibernau 1997). The
increased prominence of nationalism in the post-war period is, however, a
major factor in altering the conditions of the intellectual environment. With
the collapse of empires across Europe, in the period after 1917/18, the
principles of the nation-state and of national self-determination moved to the
centre of the international political imagination. It was against this backdrop
of political change that writers such as Hayes and, later, Carr, Cobban and
Snyder, among others, undertook their explorations of nationalism.
Today, the reception given to these early scholars of nationalism is mixed.
Hobsbawm (1990) explains that his essential reading list of works on nation-
alism would not `deserve to contain much from the age of those who have
been called the ``twin founding fathers'' of the academic study of nationalism:
Sociological re¯ections on nation and nationalism 305

Carlton B. Hayes and Hans Kohn' (1990: 3). Introducing his revised edition
of Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1991) comments that the
additions made to the literature since the early 1980s `have, by their historical
reach and theoretical power, made largely obsolete the traditional literature
on the subject' (1991: xii). Smith (1996 and 1998) is more generous in
acknowledging the contribution of this early generation of scholars of
nationalism, although he too is critical both of the respective assessments of
writers such as Snyder, Kohn and Shafer and the absence of general
theoretical models.
It would, however, be quite incorrect to argue that all of these earlier
writers can be comfortably dismissed in the same way. Ernest Gellner cites
Edward Carr as a significant source of inspiration for his own work (Gellner
1995), notably in Carr's account of the rise and spread of nationalism.
Moreover, the reason why we suggest that the works of these early writers, in
spite of their designation as historians and international relations scholars,
can be regarded as constituting the first period of a sociological study of
nationalism, is that they take recourse to a range of sociological factors in
accounting for the rise of nationalisms. For example, Kohn's classifications
of `eastern' and `western' nationalisms point to the impact of the relative
strength of national bourgeoisies (1955; see also Smith 1998). Carr, alter-
natively, explains the rise of nationalisms with reference to the emergence of a
bureaucratic state, the establishment of citizenship and the social impact of
democratising processes, as well as the growth of universal education.
The second main period begins with the theoretical model explaining the
rise and spread of nationalism in Kedourie's Nationalism (1960). Explaining
the rise of nationalism by drawing, inter alia, on factors such as institutional
change, conflicts over social values, status frustration and inter-generational
conflict, Kedourie's analysis is rich in sociological content. For those who
went on to transform sociological research on nationalism, especially Gellner
and, later, Anthony Smith, this was a turning point in work in this area.
Kedourie's argument that the nation and nationalism are `inventions' of the
modern period is a key text in what Hutchinson (1994) has labelled the
`modernist' school of studies of nationalism. For many writers, however, it
is Gellner's short essay on nationalism in Thought and Change (1964) that
is regarded as marking the genesis of the modern sociology of nationalism
(Nairn 1997; McCrone 1998). There has been some debate about the devel-
opment from this early study to his subsequent thoughts on this subject, but,
in a general sense, the central theme of his original essay resonates in his later
work. For Gellner, nationalism emerges as a by-product of a modern social
order in which `culture', rather than `structure', determines an individual's
place in a changing world.4 An industrial economy is marked by a division of
labour that distinguishes it from earlier, traditional forms; individuals must
now be able to move to jobs, as well as between them. Such a situation is
made possible by the creation of a state-organised education, and this `generic
training' (Gellner 1983: 27) provides individuals with their passports to full
306 Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre

citizenship as it allows them to participate in economic and social life.

Consequently, the changes ushered in by economic expansion alter existing
forms of identity and loyalty. Between Kedourie and Gellner there are
marked differences of approach, but their respective attempts to demonstrate
that the origins of the nation can be traced back to general patterns of social
change occurring in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and no
further, did much to establish a more sociologically informed approach to the
study of nationalism. In contrast to the earlier studies, in the works of these
writers we are provided with broad sociological frameworks within which to
interpret the development of particular nationalisms.
With the exception of occasional forays from Gellner, it was Anthony
Smith, a former Ph.D. student of Gellner, who, until the mid-1980s, was one of
the few writers who persisted with the task of exploring the sociological
dimensions of nationalism. To this end, Smith's studies represent, by and
large, the sole contributions to general sociological theory during the inter-
vening period (1971, 1973, 1976 and 1979). Smith continued to be one of the
leading figures in what we have framed the third main stage in the devel-
opment of sociology of nationalism, beginning in the mid-1980s. The first half
of the 1980s saw the publication of what have come to be viewed as seminal
texts in the field: Armstrong's Nations Before Nationalism (1982); Breuilly's
Nationalism and the State (1982); Anderson's hugely influential Imagined
Communities (1983); Gellner's Nations and Nationalism (1983); and Smith's
The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986). Especially among the latter three writers,
and in spite of the quite considerable differences in approach, there is a
common emphasis on asking why people should come to view themselves as
belonging to nations, how this sense of attachment is produced and repro-
duced, and why people perceive their attachment to their nations as so natural
and so important. Thus, whether it is Anderson inquiring into the way in
which, through representational media, people are able to imagine themselves
as belonging to a national community, or Gellner asking how it is that two
people will come to regard each other as belonging to the same nation (Gellner
1983: 7), within these studies sociological questions occupy centre stage.
The work of Smith differs from that of Anderson and Gellner in that, in
contrast to the latter two, he argues that the origin of modern nations and
nationalism is located not in the development of print-capitalism (as
Anderson argues) or the rise of industrialism (as Gellner posits), but is to
be found in the links between these modern units and earlier, pre-modern
ethnic populations.5 Smith acknowledges that there are important differences
between, on the one hand, modern nations and nationalisms and, on the
other, these pre-modern ethnic populations, or ethnie, to use his preferred
term, but he nevertheless insists that the latter are crucial for the formation of
the former. Also vitally important are the ethno-histories, the folk tales, the
symbols, and broader sense of cultural ancestry and collective memory, which
are associated with the ethnie (Smith 1984 and 1991). Smith explains the
social significance of nationalism in a number of ways: a desire for security
Sociological re¯ections on nation and nationalism 307

and rootedness; the anthropological impact of collectively rehearsing the

social practices of nationalism; and the need for dignity and respect. Overall,
however, Smith is concerned to show us that the reason why nationalism will
not, for the foreseeable future, dissipate is because it is an ideology that is
profoundly sociological. As he has argued: `the myths, memories, symbols,
and ceremonies of nationalism provide the sole basis for such social cohe-
sion and political action as modern societies, with their often heterogeneous
social and ethnic composition, can muster' (Smith 1995: 155).
The fourth, and most recent, stage in the development of the sociological
study of nationalism also emphasises the significance of the subjective aspects
of nationalism, but with writers such as Billig (1995), Brubaker (1996),
Calhoun (1997) and Yuval-Davis (1997), among others, the influence of
developments in social theory has taken this work in a different direction to
that of Anderson, Gellner and Smith. We identify three principal differences
between the works of the former and those of the latter. In the first instance,
and in marked contrast to the latter, the former do not develop general
sociological models of the historical development of nationalism, although
the works of Calhoun and Yuval-Davis do contain an element of historical
sociology.6 In a period in which criticism of, or awareness of the problems of,
`grand narratives' is a staple of much social theory, it is not surprising that
some recent writers should instead draw on the canons of deconstructionism,
postmodernism and critical theory. This change of approach is notably
evident in Rogers Brubaker's `eventful' account of nationalism (1996), in
which he distinguishes his work from what he terms the `developmental'
approach of writers such as Anderson, Gellner and Smith.
A second distinguishing feature of the writers in this most recent period of
research is the emphasis on unpacking the differences and discontinuities that
the discourse of nationalism obscures. Thus, writers such as Walby (1996) and
Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) draw our attention to the neglect of questions of
gender in studies of nationalism, pointing to the way in which, as a conse-
quence of this neglect, there has been scant acknowledgement of how dis-
courses of nation and nationalism are gendered. More broadly, there has been
a shift towards deconstructing the way in which nationalist discourse
represents the nation as a unified, culturally homogeneous community, as in
Calhoun's critique of `naturalizing notions of ethnicity and nation' (1995:
273). Brubaker's (1996) study of the recent history of nationalisms in Eastern
Europe and the territories of the former Soviet Union similarly explores how
particular representations of the nation are being institutionalised as part of a
process of nation-state building. In this way, then, these writers encourage us
to be aware of the dangers of reifying the nation, of writing of the nation as if
it is a homogeneous community, and instead prompt us to busy ourselves
with unravelling the different histories and the different ways of speaking of
the same national identity.
A third feature that distinguishes the work of these recent writers is that
there is less emphasis on seeking to explain nationalism in terms of a force
308 Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre

which meets some kind of basic human requirements. Instead, writers such as
Calhoun, Billig and Brubaker examine how nationalism as a discourse, an
ideology or a practice, represents the world as being naturally divided into
nations. Thus, whereas Smith's sociological account of the subjective dimen-
sions of nationalism underlines the way in which nationalism satisfies people's
`needs for cultural fulfilment, rootedness, security and fraternity' (Smith 1995:
159), Brubaker, on the other hand, is concerned to show us how public and
private life is `nationalised' and how, then, an awareness of national identity
is stimulated. Whereas Smith explains how nations cannot be invented com-
pletely from scratch because to strike a popular resonance there must be
something that appears as an authentic link to the past, Brubaker, on the
contrary, demonstrates that the reason why people think of themselves as
national is due to the manner in which nationhood and ethnic nationality are
institutionalised. In comparison, then, Smith and Brubaker are speaking
different sociological languages.
The import of contemporary social theories has, in our minds, radicalised
sociological discussions of nationalism. To this end, the debate has been
pushed in a new direction, just as when more explicitly sociological
approaches began to offer a different perspective to those of the historians
and the international relations scholars in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Moreover, the cross-fertilisation of ideas between sociology, cultural theory
and linguistics has prompted critical introspection in relation to some of the
most fundamental concepts used by sociologists, such as that of `society'.
Billig's Banal Nationalism (1995), with its questioning of sociological
`common sense', is indicative of the way in which the latter development is
feeding into discussions of nationalism.7
Smith has, however, criticised the recent turn in sociological studies of
nationalism, arguing that while writers influenced by this approach have
helped advance our understanding of identities in `plural Western societies'
(Smith 1998: 225), the absence of an historical framework nevertheless means
that their accounts can only ever be partial. In this sense, for Smith this most
recent stage in the development of this field of sociological inquiry does not
advance our general understanding of nationalism. In particular, Smith
maintains that without the kind of general theory as is found in his own
work, or that of Gellner, the more partial accounts will always have to rely on
the work of the `grand narrativists' of nationalism. This is, to a degree, a fair
point, for in Banal Nationalism, for example, Billig makes considerable use of
the different theories of the historical rise of nationalism but does not engage
in any kind of critical way with them. It is unlikely, however, that Billig would
offer any apology for the omission of a strong narrative component to his
argument. Billig writes about nationalisms without really being concerned
about what factors precipitated their rise; for him it is enough to state that
nationalism is a significantly powerful force in modern societies, and is, then,
a worthy object of study.8 Billig, in much the same manner as Calhoun and
Brubaker, is interested in narrativist accounts of history, but in the sense of a
Sociological re¯ections on nation and nationalism 309

device for managing and structuring a publicly rendered national memory,

not in the sociological sense as understood by Smith and Gellner.
Our position on this matter is that the sociology of nationalism must be
broad enough to be able to accommodate both kinds of studies. We acknow-
ledge Smith's stress on the need for a strong historical sociological tradition in
the study of nationalism, but we do not accept his view that those working
under the influence of contemporary social theory `illuminate a corner of the
broader canvas only to leave the rest of it in untraversed darkness' (Smith
1998: 220). Writers such as Smith, along with others such as Gellner and
Guibernau, have contributed much to our understanding of the sociology of
nationalism, but we are of the opinion that if we wish to understand why
nationalism will be with us for a considerable time to come then it is necessary
that we pay greater attention to Billig's `banal' and Brubaker's `eventful'
processes. Too often commentators have cast nationalism as a waning force,
only to be surprised, again, at its durability; focusing the sociological
imagination more closely on the social relations of nationalism should enable
us to explore just how significant the concept of nation is for making sense of
our relations with others and why, then, it is much too early to speak of the
end of nationalism.

Nationalism and the sociological imagination

The continuing signi®cance of nationalism, and the attendant principle of

national self-determination, has repeatedly left many commentators surprised
and exasperated. Thus, Anthony Smith, commenting on the `ethnic renais-
sance' in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, writes that `such develop-
ments _ surprised many who predicted the early demise of nationalism'
(1979: 152). Similar views are opined in conjunction with the `resurgence
of nationalism' in central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the territories
of the former USSR; as Charles Kupchan, introducing a collection of essays
by leading commentators on the subject, remarks: `Nationalism is back _
Scholars and policymakers alike are scrambling to understand where this new
wave of nationalism has come from and how best to react to it' (1995: 1).
There have been those who have warned against complacency with regard to
nationalism (Cobban 1969 [1944]; Smith 1979; Anderson 1991 [1983]; Connor
1994), but for many the response has been: `why?'
Up to the 1970s a mixture of wishful thinking, faith in `modernisation
theory' and, as Connor (1994) suggests, a liberal dash of neglect with regard
to the history of the development of nationalism, helps partly to explain this
sense of surprise. After Karl Deutsch (1966), modernisation theory held that
urbanisation, industrialisation, the spread of the rewards from economic
growth, the establishment of communications, education and transport
systems would facilitate the process of `nation-building' and thus overcome
the problems of ethnic divisions within the territory of the national state.
310 Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre

Conflicts within independent territories in Africa and Asia, however,

throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, gradually exposed the flaws of
modernisation theory. Growing levels of popular support for nationalisms in
Brittany, Quebec, Scotland and Wales, among other regions, from the 1960s
onwards, highlighted, moreover, that even within the most advanced
industrialised societies strong ethnic divisions not only persisted, but were
capable of thriving. The fortunes of political parties such as the Scottish
National Party or the Parti QueÂbeÂcois have waxed and waned in the
intervening period, and thus it became acceptable, once again, to think of
nationalism as a declining, or even spent, force.
Today, of course, we are living through a period in which nationalism is,
again, to the fore of the political agenda in many parts of the world. The
political changes witnessed over the last decade, and the growing discussion
of globalisation, have, not surprisingly, served to keep attention focused on
nationalism. In particular, it is the question of how we are to understand the
current prominence of nationalism that has exercised the minds of many of
those involved in this discussion. Yet again, however, many commentators
concur that, as widespread as this recent rise to prominence of nationalism is,
its significance is not to be overstated. Hobsbawm (1990), for example,
foresees no place in a future world dominated by transnational relations for
the nation-state or nationalism; indeed, he argues that throughout the course
of the latter half of the twentieth century the principle of national self-
determination and the idea of the nation-state have progressively ceased to
mean anything of any substance in the current economic environment.
Elsewhere, Touraine gives vent to similar sentiments when he writes that
`there has been a violent break between modernisation and nationalism for a
long time' (1995: 137).
Without wishing to suggest that nationalism is somehow a permanent
feature of modern societies, it is our view that it is rash to dismiss nationalism
as a phenomenon past its peak. Other sociologists have similarly stressed the
need for caution in this respect. Echoing sentiments expressed by a number of
sociologists, Hutchinson remarks that the success of nationalism is, in large
part, due to the way in which the world-view that nationalism as an ideology
represents provides `new direction at times when established identities and
institutions are shaken by geopolitical, economic or cultural challenges'
(Hutchinson 1994: 196). Smith provides a more vociferous defence of the
nation in the face of what he terms a `rootless, cosmopolitan culture' (1995:
22), when he writes that a `global culture seems unable to offer the qualities of
collective faith, dignity and hope that only a ``religion surrogate'' _ can
provide' (ibid.: 160). This idea, that nationalism continues to reach the parts
of the human experience that no other ideologies can reach, has almost passed
into the realm of sociological convention, even among those who proclaim
that globalisation is the harbinger of the end of nationalism.
To a degree we do not wish to take issue with this explanation of the
continuing significance of nationalism. As we suggested earlier, we are of the
Sociological re¯ections on nation and nationalism 311

opinion that there are, quite simply, different ways of talking, in a socio-
logical manner, about nationalism. The approach we have just touched on,
which holds that a major part of the allure of nationalism is that it provides
answers to the `life-and-death' questions, is represented by writers as different
in their specific views as Anderson (1991) and Smith (1995). This way of
speaking about nations, nationalisms, and national identities is similar in
form to those approaches in which writers, such as Guibernau, explain the
significance of a `common culture' and of how individuals `receive' the culture
of the society into which they are born (Guibernau 1996: 75). Nationalism is a
phenomenon associated with events of remarkable magnitude, and it is one
that, as such, has relevance for discussions about larger sociological issues,
such as collective identity, cultural cohesion and social solidarity. To this
extent, therefore, it is not surprising that discussions of the sociological
dimensions of nationalism will involve explorations of how they relate to
larger questions of social order, stability and cohesion, and of the implica-
tions, in turn, for the individual. In this way, some contemporary sociologists
continue to plough a furrow first worked by Emile Durkheim.
If this represents one distinct sociological manner of thinking about
nationalism, we have in mind another which is more resonant of Weber's
theme of interpretive sociology, but which is rather more closely associated
with the traditions of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology. The
rationale for pressing for a more practically oriented sociological approach to
nationalism is simple: concepts of nation are recurrently and routinely
employed by people in making sense of their social environment and to this
end it is important that we understand more about the ways in which these
concepts are used. At one level it is sufficient to explain how individuals are
socialised into `their culture' and how they are inculcated with the values of
their nation, yet, at another, we need to know more about the ways in which
individuals, as practical agents, make sense of what their culture means to
them, as well as how they negotiate the differences between their culture
and that of another nation and what this may mean in terms of how they
locate themselves in relation to others. Moreover, at one level it is acceptable
to write of how nationalism answers concerns about the contingency of
human life and of the way in which nationalism contributes to the mainten-
ance of social cohesion, yet it is also evident that concepts of nation inform
issues of a rather less abstract manner, such as how we comprehend the
behaviour of others when we travel abroad, how we understand humour, or
how people involved in international business account for different national
ways of doing business in terms of differences between national cultures.
The kinds of studies we have mind, then, do not conform to the vision of a
sociology of nationalism as mapped out, for example, by Anthony Smith.
They are informed by some of the more traditional canons of the sociological
imagination, as we have suggested, but they are also influenced by the
arguments of those who themselves have been influenced by certain aspects
of contemporary social theory. There is clearly a place for the kind of
312 Andrew Thompson and Ralph Fevre

sociological models that explore the historical rise of nationalism, as well as

those which paint a picture (to employ Smith's metaphor of the sociologist of
nationalism at work) of nationalism using broad brush strokes, but there must
also be a place for those studies that take a closer look at nationalism and
national identity.

Conclusion

By comparison with some other key areas of the discipline, sociologists of

nationalism have inherited relatively little by way of a legacy from the
`classical' theorists (James 1996: 84). Indeed, with some exceptions, soci-
ologists were largely silent on this issue until the 1960s. Even here, aside from
the personal links between writers such as Kedourie, Gellner and Smith,9
there is little sense that sociologists recognised the subject of nations and
nationalisms as worthy of serious attention. As Michael Billig (1995) explains,
a glance at some of the standard sociological textbooks reveals that even now,
in spite of the political signi®cance of nationalism, there is little discussion of
it. When one thinks about the key concepts of sociological theory ± `class',
`gender', `race', `family' and, most signi®cantly, `society' ± it is remarkable,
given the impact of nationalisms in profoundly shaping the history of the
twentieth century, that sociologists should have, until recently, been so silent
on the concept of `nation'.
Billig's argument that sociologists have conventionally had a very
restricted view of what constitutes nationalism, goes some distance to
explaining this silence. As he argues: `if sociological nets are for catching slices
of social life, then the net, which sociologists have marked ``nationalism'', is a
remarkably small one: and it seems to be used primarily for catching exotic,
rare and often violent specimens' (1995: 43). In this way, then, sociologists,
most especially in Western Europe, have been guilty of viewing nationalism as
something that happens to other people. Linked to this idea is the sense that,
unlike other concepts of `family', `race' or `gender', the concept of `nation',
especially when used in conjunction with `nationalism', is not regarded as
being a phenomenon that is universal in a sociological manner.
The work of writers such as Gellner and Smith have done much to
demonstrate that nationalism is as central to our discussions of underlying
structural change, as other issues such as education or technology. More
recent sociological work, such as that of Billig and Calhoun, has gone further
in prompting us, as sociologists, to direct our attentions inwards towards the
national societies in which we live and practise. In the latter stages of this
article we have argued that the sociological dimensions of nationalism and
national identities need to be drawn out further still. In doing so we have
suggested that the concept of `nation', as much as other fundamental socio-
logical categories, is a basic social tool used by humans in giving meaning to
their social world. As with these other social categories, then, categories of
Sociological re¯ections on nation and nationalism 313

`nation' and `national identity' are important components of how we con-

ceptualise social order and how we perceive the differences between our
society and others as ordered. An understanding of some of the basic, routine,
but tremendously important, ways in which this concept, and its related ideas,
are utilised has been largely absent from our understanding of nationalism. It
should be the task of sociologists to bring it into view.

Notes

1 `The army was the point d'honneur of the small-holding peasants, it was they themselves
transformed into heroes, defending their new possessions against the outer world, glorifying their
recently won nationhood, plundering and revolutionising the world. The uniform was their own
state dress; war was their poetry; the smallholding, extended and rounded off in imagination, was
their fatherland, and patriotism the ideal form of their sense of property' (Marx 1934: 114).
2 Here the manuscript breaks off; Gerth and Mills 1948 have a different translation of this
passage.
3 Richter argues that `Durkheim's life and thought take on added signi®cance when they are
related to the events of the Third Republic' (1960: 172).
4 See Gellner (1987) for a discussion of this theme.
5 Similar arguments can be found in the works of other writers (Armstrong 1982; Connor 1994;
Llobera 1994), but Smith is the writer most readily associated with this particular approach.
6 Calhoun (1995), for example, in an essay in which he examines the relationship between
nationalism and democracy, outlines the historical signi®cance of the discourse of nationalism
and the development of democratic government since the late eighteenth century.
7 Billig is a social psychologist, but Banal Nationalism is informed by a range of ideas from
sociological and social theory.
8 In the opening chapter of Banal Nationalism, Billig provides a brief tour-de-horizon of some of
the main theories of the rise of the nation-state and nationalism, but concludes his survey by
arguing that `whatever may have been the reasons for the emergence of the nation-state, there is
no doubting its success' (1995: 23).
9 Kedourie and Gellner were colleagues in the LSE, while Smith was a Ph.D. student of Gellner.

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