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Breakdown of the 2nd Trump-
Kim Summit: First Take
Carlyle A. Thayer
February 28, 2019

The unexpected breakdown of the second summit meeting between President Donald
Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un may be explained by two main factors. First, it
illustrates the limitations of Donald Trump’s top-down transactional approach to
foreign policy. Second, it illustrates that advanced preparations by both sides were
inadequate and led to unrealistic expectations on the U.S. side.
Ever since President Trump embarked on high-level summitry with North Korea, he
has continually touted his “very special relationship” with his counterpart, Chairman
Kim. Both the first and second summit meetings were carefully choreographed to
highlight the bonding between these two leaders, walks together on stately grounds
and private one-on-one face-to-face meetings. But can we seriously believe that in the
space of a few hours of meetings that the two overcame linguistic and cultural barriers
and really came to know and trust each other?
Prior to the summit, analysts reported that North Korea preferred the top-down
approach because it gave Chairman Kim the aura of respectability. After all, the
Singapore summit was the first time the president of the United States had met with
the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Reportedly, after the
Singapore summit North Korea delayed receiving Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and
held pro forma working meetings with U.S. Special Representative for North Korea
Stephen Biegun. In other words, Chairman Kim thought he could accomplish more in
one-on-one discussions with President Trump than through lower level bilateral
discussions.
The second summit in Hanoi was arranged to duplicate the format of the first summit
in Singapore. The bilateral meetings between Trump and Kim were cordial and
reportedly productive. Discussions at lower level went right up to the eleventh hour.
They were characterized by Pompeo as productive as well. It was publicly announced
that the second summit would conclude with the signing of a joint statement. Two
hours before the final session it was clear than an impasse had been reached in the
extended session and no joint statement was signed.
President Trump and Secretary Pompeo gave a press conference immediately after
the summit ended. Trump stated that the breakdown was basically about sanctions.
Trump also noted, “But at this time we had some options, and at this time we decided
not to do any of the options.”
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Secretary Pompeo noted that although real progress was made North Korea couldn’t
go far enough to satisfy the United States. Pompeo specifically mentioned that it was
not possible for the U.S. to convince their North Korean counterparts to “make a big
step” towards denuclearization. Finally, Pompeo concluded, “Unfortunately, we didn’t
get all the way that ultimately made sense for the United States of America. I think
chairman Kim was hopeful that we would. We asked him to do more. He was
unprepared to do that…”
The crux of the matter was that Chairman Kim’s offer to close down the Yongbyon
nuclear test facility in exchange for the lifting of sanctions was viewed as insufficient
by the U.S.
North Korea has since disputed that Chairman Kim demanded the lifting of all
sanctions in exchange for closing down the Yongbyon nuclear test facilities. Foreign
Minister Ri Jong-ho said North Korea sought the lifting of five of eleven United Nations'
sanctions imposed in 2016-17 that impacted on the livelihood of North Korean people
in return for the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and a written pledge to
permanently end nuclear and long-range missile tests. "The US was not ready to
accept our proposal," Ri stated.
The U.S. requested access to other facilities that North Korea kept secret. South
Korean sources reported that National Security Adviser John Bolton demanded North
Korea disclose its chemical and biological weapons. Trump noted the North Koreans
did not know that the U.S. knew about these facilities. A sticking point of this
magnitude should have been identified in working sessions prior to the summit.
President Trump defended his actions by stating that no deal was better than a bad
deal. This begs the question why a better deal hadn’t been drawn up in the first place.
According to the President’s Press Secretary the meetings between Trump and Kim
were very good and constructive and that the two sides discussed various ways to
denuclearize and “economic driven concepts.” This statement is an example of
Trump’s facile transactional approach to dealing with North Korea – denuclearize
completely in exchange for the opportunity to become an economic powerhouse.
President Trump and his senior officials have jumped on the idea that Vietnam’s
economic success could a model for North Korean to emulate. But history tells us to
be cautious.
In January 1973, the U.S. and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam),
among other parties, singed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the
Peace in Vietnam. Under the terms of this agreement the U.S. agreed to heal the
wounds of war. In February 1973, President Richard Nixon sent a private letter to
Pham Van Dong, the premier of North Vietnam, offering to contribute $3.25 billion of
grant aid over five years to postwar reconstruction and an additional $1-1.5 billion in
other forms of aid. Nixon’s letter proposed the establishment of a bilateral Joint
Economic Commission (JEC) to administer funds for postwar reconstruction. JEC
officials from both sides met in Hanoi.
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Total U.S. funding for North Vietnam roughly equaled the amount of aid that the
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were providing to Hanoi at that time.
These sources of funding were incorporated into a draft of North Vietnam’s Second
Five-Year Plan (1976-80) and would have represented a major lessening of North
Vietnam’s dependency on the Soviet Union.
U.S. financial assistance to North Vietnam’s postwar reconstruction never eventuated
for a variety of reasons. First, it is Congress not the president that authorizes funding
and in the wake of the Watergate scandal Nixon’s private commitment fell by the
wayside. In 1975 the United States charged North Vietnam with violating the 1973
Peace Agreement and withdrew from its obligations. Later, in 1978, when the U.S. and
Vietnam were on the verge of normalization, Congress passed legislation prohibiting
the use of U.S. funds for “war reparations.”
The U.S. and Vietnam normalized relations in July 1995 and signed a bilateral trade
agreement in 2000 but the path to full economic normalization has still not been
realized. The U.S. designates Vietnam as a “non-market economy” thus imposing
economic costs on Vietnam’s exports. The United States has long standing tariffs on
Vietnamese catfish and shrimp, and the Trump Administration has imposed tariffs on
Vietnamese aluminum and steel.
The Trump Administration inserted a “poison pill” into the yet to be ratified United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) permitting a signatory to withdraw if any
of the other signatories signed a free trade agreement with a non-market economy.
This was aimed at China but poses a risk to Vietnam as well. Under the terms of the
2018 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), Vietnam
could be sanctioned for continuing to purchase military equipment and weapons from
designated Russian defence entities.
President Trump’s transactional offer of denuclearization in exchange for opening the
door to North Korea to become an economic power house makes no mention of one
major impediment – North Korea’s appalling record on human rights. Now that the
Democrats control the House this is surely to be an issue. The bipartisan Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) requires the Trump Administration to report on its
reasons for lifting sanctions on North Korea.
The breakdown of the second summit is a setback but not a disaster. Kim promised
Trump that he would not resume ballistic and nuclear testing. Both sides agreed to
continue negotiations at an unspecified future date. Perhaps it is time to give bottom-
up diplomacy by the experts a chance. Trump’s transactional high-level summitry
appears to have run its course for the time being. A third summit in 2020, a U.S.
election year, would appear more about show than substance.
In sum, Trump’s offer of a “bright shinny economic future” for North Korea is a grand
transactional idea that needs to be defined and refined if it has any appeal to
Chairman Kim. Given the track record of U.S.-Vietnam economic relations, Chairman
Kim would be wise to consider whether President Trump can deliver. And U.S.
negotiators need to go back to the drawing board and work out practical step-by-step
measures that would build trust along the protracted path to denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula. President Trump and his advisers need to curb their impatience at
“big steps” and grand bargains. The devil is in the details.
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Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Breakdown of the 2nd Trump-Kim Summit: First
Take,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, February 28, 2019. All background briefs
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
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