PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO MOLERO, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-67842, September 24, 1986

FACTS: Appeal from the decision of the CFI. Molero was charged with rape by daughter in complaint filed in CFI Negros
Oriental. Molero denied the charge, saying he couldn’t have done it because he was already committed in the provincial
jail that time. He also denied the sworn statement he made, saying he’s illiterate. He said he was not informed of his
rights to remain silent and to counsel; that he was not assisted by counsel during investigation. The trial court found
Molero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.

Two complaints were filed in this case:

Date of filing: March 22, 1977 - rape was committed Feb 13, 1976
Date of filing: March 30, 1978 - rape was committed Feb 5, 1976

Molero was arraigned under the first complaint, he pleaded not guilty. During trial, the provincial fiscal filed motion for
leave to amend the complaint due to the discrepancy in the date of the commission of the offense. This was granted.
Molero flied an MR. This was granted thus the trial court set aside the admission of the amended complaint and ordered
the dismissal of the case. The Order also states that “the accused shall not be discharged as there appears a good cause
to detain him in custody to answer for the proper offense pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.” A new
information was filed by the prosecutor. Molero filed motion to quash 2 nd criminal complaint on ground of double
jeopardy. This was denied. He was convicted.

Petitioner’s contention: he was placed in double jeopardy when the instant case was filed and he was brought to trial to
answer for the crime of rape allegedly committed on February 5, 1976. He argues that the dismissal of the first complaint
on ground of variance between allegation and proof amounted to his acquittal, citing People v. Opemia (98 Phil. 698). He
points to the fact that the criminal complaint alleged that he committed the crime of rape on February 13, 1976 and yet
the prosecution’s evidence shows that the alleged crime was committed on February 5, 1976.

ISSUE: Whether Molero was under double jeopardy.

RULING: NO. the order of dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.

It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissing the Criminal Case No. 2148 was without prejudice to the filing
of a new complaint and/or information charging the appellant with the proper offense. The case was not terminated
because the dispositive portion of the order expressly directed the Provincial Fiscal and/or the prosecuting fiscal to file a
new complaint and/or information charging the accused with the proper offense of rape committed on or before February
5, 1976. The case was dismissed for no other reason except to correct the date of the crime from “on or about the 13th
day of February” to “on or about the 5th day of February.” Hence, the provisional dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2148
could not have barred the prosecution of the case against the appellant.

It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissing the Criminal Case No. 2148 was without prejudice to the filing
of a new complaint and/or information charging the appellant with the proper offense. The case was not terminated
because the dispositive portion of the order expressly directed the Provincial Fiscal and/or the prosecuting fiscal to file a
new complaint and/or information charging the accused with the proper offense of rape committed on or before February
5, 1976. The case was dismissed for no other reason except to correct the date of the crime from “on or about the 13th
day of February” to “on or about the 5th day of February.” Hence, the provisional dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2148
could not have barred the prosecution of the case against the appellant.

Petition AFFIRMED with modification; amount of indemnity increased.

People v. Casey
G.R. No. L-30146 | February 24, 1981 | Guerrero, J. Rules of Court Rule 110 Section 14

DOCTRINE
An Amended Information to include a co-accused even after a plea of guilty is valid because it is merely a formal
amendment.

FACTS
o Mar 31 1968 – Joseph Casey alias “Buri” armed with Knife and Ricardo Felix alias “Carding Tuwad” armed with
firearm shot and stabbed Alfredo Valdez with firearm and knife
o Alfredo Valdez was inflicted with Fatal Wounds directly causing Death
o May 22 1968 – Information for Murder against Casey filed with Felix “Still at Large”
o Jun 24 1968 – Casey pleaded Not Guilty to crime charged in complaint upon Arraignment
o Sept 1968 – Felix was arrested and Amended Information was filed to include Felix as accused
o Oct 15, 1968 – Felix pleaded Not Guilty to crime charged in complaint upon Arraignment
o Mercedes Palomo who is Resident of Mahinhin St. San Juan, Rizal testified that
- Heard gunshot from nearby Pool room at 3pm she while at aunt house
- Looked towards Pool room and saw 3 men coming out, 1 being pursued by the 2 others
- Recognized man being pursued as Alfredo Valdez alias “G.I.”
- Not know 2 others but described as short with curly black hair, black complexion while other fair complexion and
was able to point Casey and Felix when asked to identify them
- Saw Casey stab Valdez several times while Felix stood nearby holding gun and fired once
o Policeman Rivera also testified on investigation conducted before Judge Gorgonio involving Casey

- Submitted 2page Sworn Statement where Casey narrated

o Patrolman/Policeman Carritero also testified he was a
o Awakened by noise that somebody was stabbed and shot and saw Valdez when he went out
o Physician Mariano Cueva also testified on the Necropsy Report
Casey Version:
o Casey went to Felix house but did not find him so proceeded to Pool Room a few meters away
o Casey played pool and while playing accidentally bumped Valdez with pool cue (tako)
o Casey apologized but saw Valdez with 6 or 7 men holding pieces of wood when about to leave
o While passing by Valdez brought out a Balisong and lunged on him and was able to get the knife
o He used knife to hit him 2-3 times and claims other companions hit him with wood
Felix Version:
o Felix not see Casey on that day and knew Valdez
o Felix claims saw Valdez alive in a store before left Manila and learned he was dead upon returning
o Joseph Casey alias “Buri” and Ricardo Felix alias “Carding Tuwad” guilty of Murder of Alfredo Valdez
o Imposed Death Penalty + P12k damages to heirs of Valdez

ISSUE
o W/N Court erred in Illegally trying Casey on Amended Information without Arraignment and in finding him guilty
after such Illegal Trial – NO
RULING & RATIO
o Lack of Arraignment under Amended Information is objected to by Casey on ground there is Violation of
Constitutional Right to be Informed of Charge against him
o Rule - There is only violation when Amendment pertains to matters of substance
o In present case – Alterations introduced in Information refer to Inclusion of Felix to charge of Murder
o Not change nature of crime against accused Casey
o Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength are similarly alleged in
both Informations
o No Extenuating Circumstances is alleged in both
o Hence – Amendment is one of form and not of substance and not prejudicial to his rights
o Test to determine whether defendant Prejudiced by Amendment:
- Whether defense under information as it originally stood would be available after amendment
- Whether evidence of defendant would be equally applicable to the Information in one form as in other
o Jurisprudence (US v. DELA CRUZ, US v. ALABAOT, CASTRO v. OZAETA, etc) –
- When Amendment to Information introduced after accused has pleaded Not Guilty
(a) does not change nature of crime alleged,
(b) does not expose accused to charge that would call for higher penalty,
(c) does not affect essence of offense or cause surprise or deprive accused of opportunity to meet new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not substance
- Then Not Prejudicial to accused and not prohibited by Sec 14 of RCP

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court under automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-appellants Joseph
Casey and Ricardo Felix are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without any attending
circumstances and should be sentenced to reclusion temporal in its medium period. But applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, each of the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused are likewise
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfredo Valdez in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00)
jointly and severally, and to pay the costs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO C. REYES

Facts:

Petitioner, by way of certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction, questions as alleged grave abuse of discretion, the
order 1 dated July 10, 1970, of the respondent Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes of the Circuit Criminal Court, 4th Judicial
District, Cabanatuan City) in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170-NE, entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Francisco
Estrella," which denied petitioner's verbal motion for the amendment of the information in said case, by deleting the year
"1969" as alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to put the year "1964 ".

The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Narciso Mananing Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and Melecio
Guevarra of the crime of Qualified Theft. On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Estrella was arraigned, and
he pleaded not guilty During the arraignment, respondent-Judge required his clerk to read the information to Francisco
Estrella. The court interpreter was directed to translate the information into Tagalog for the benefit of the accused. The
prosecution, although represented, made no move to amend the information, if indeed it was really erroneous. From
January 28, 1970, up to May 21, 1970, the latter date being the scheduled trial of the case, the prosecution never moved
to amend the information. On May 21, 1970 when the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence, it verbally
moved that it be allowed to amend the information 9 so as to change the date of the commission of the offense from
"August 1969" to "August 1964." 10 Private respondent Francisco Estrella, having come to the trial court ready to defend
himself from an offense allegedly committed in "August 1969", vigorously objected to the verbal motion.

Issue:
whether or not the respondent Court abused its discretion when it refused an amendment to the information filed in
Criminal Case No. CCC-IV 170-NE, to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense from "August 1969" to
"August 1964", on the ground it would constitute an impairment of the substantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by
the Constitution.

Ruling:

No.

Under Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court, the complaint or information in a criminal case where the accused had been
arraigned and had pleaded, as in this case, may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused.

As to whether or not a sought for amendment of an information to change the time of the alleged commission of crime
from 1969 to 1964 (period of five years) would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused after his arraignment and
plea. What happened in this case is that the petitioner committed a mistake in the placing of the date of the alleged crime
in the information filed. During the arraignment and plea of private respondent Francisco Estrella on January 28, 1970,
the prosecution had all the chances to realize and rectify its mistake. It did not do so. The trial of the accused was set for
May 21, 1970. Petitioner therefore, had more than three months to take steps. Again, it failed to do so. Finally, petitioner
verbally moved to amend the information only at the start of the trial. To permit petitioner to do so would surprise the
accused and prejudice his substantial rights.
PEOPLE VS DONATO

Facts:
Private respondent Rodolfo Salas alias “Commander Bilog” raised publicly and took arms throughout the country against
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government. That from
1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of the aforenamed organizations (NPA and
CPP), in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war
against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence, and other acts in the pursuit of
their unlawful purpose
In a separate petition for habeas corpus (separate case GR 76009) for private respondent Salas was filed with the SC but
was dismissed on the basis of the agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal
custody and will face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-
accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person.
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 public respondent Judge Donato, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted
private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the
additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every
period thereof. (This was challenged by petitioner by alleging that private respondent Salas waived his right to bail in the
separate case mentioned above.)
Issue:
Whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise
bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived.
Held: WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose
Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

Ratio:
1. We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
CUSTODY - "Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the detainer of a
person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and possession of a thing or person."
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual
confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in
view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction
between legal custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction
over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that
Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody.
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term "in custody of
the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction
and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of
the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had unequivocally waived
his right to bail.
PEOPLE VS MOGOL

Facts:
On December 21, 1971 at 7:00 in the evening at Magsaysay District, municipality of Lopez, Province of Quezon Philippine,
private respondent Edgardo Caballas with deliberate intent wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stabbed Ernesto
Sandoval with unidentified knife which caused him to suffer physical injuries.
A criminal complaint was filed against Caballas for the crime of serious physical injuries.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Before the presentation of evidence, the private prosecutor filed an
urgent motion to amend the complaint from serious physical injuries to frustrated murder contending that from the
affidavits of the witnesses, it was shown that the accused had the manifest intention to kill the victim.
On the other hand, the defense filed a memorandum arguing that since the accused had been arraigned, the court can no
longer entertain the motion for amendment of the complaint. The motion was denied. Trial ensued. The court rendered
a decision on November 29, 1972 stating that the case can be amended to frustrated murder because of the evidence
presented.. The case of serious physical injuries was dismissed to give way for the filing of frustrated murder.
On June 6, 1973, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed an information of frustrated with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The court granted the motion.
The Solicitor-General filed a petition for review contending that the granting of the motion to quash filed by the accused
deprived the State his day in court and its duty to prosecute the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint for serious physical injuries against the accused bars the filing of
the information for frustrated murder on the ground of double jeopardy.
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint for serious physical injuries by the respondent judge, valid and legal
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that that in this case,the Order of dismissal issued by the Municipal Court did not actually
terminate or put an end to the prosecution against herein private respondent for the felonious act he was alleged to have
committed. On the contrary, the dispositive portion of said Order expressly directed that the records of the case be
forwarded to the Court of First Instance so that the Office of the Provincial Fiscal could file a complaint for frustrated
murder.
In the instant case, the right of private respondent as an accused to a speedy trial had never been invoked. Nor did the
Municipal Court find that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of private respondent beyond reasonable doubt for in
fact said Court in effect stated that private respondent was guilty, not only of the crime charged of serious physical.
injuries, but of the graver offense of frustrated murder. There is, therefore, no reason why the dismissal Order of the
Municipal Court should be deemed as a judgment of acquittal of the charge for serious physical injuries.
The Supreme Court ruked that respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case for serious physical injuries "to give way to
the filing of a complaint for frustrated murder." For it is the duty of the respondent Judge to render the decision as the
evidence presented warrant under the information as filed for serious physical injuries, and not dismiss the case on his
idea or belief that there was evidence of intent to kill the intended victim. The Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction thereby rendering his Order of November 29, 1972 null and void.
PEOPLE VS MASILANG

FACTS:
Thus, on September 23, 1977, the Actg. City Fiscal of Lucena City, filed an information charging accused-appellants with
kidnapping for ransom with murder. The information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of April, 1975, in the City of Lucena Capital of the Province of Quezon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, with malice aforethought and the deliberate intent to kidnap or in any other manner deprive Vivencio Cadiz of
his liberty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or deprive said Vivencio Cadiz of his liberty for
the purpose of demanding or extorting ransom from his parents by then and there forcibly taking the victim by means of
a motor vehicle to a far away and secluded place in order to better secure the consent of the victim through fear to pay
the ransom, and with certain sense or (sic) impunity and certainty that Vivencio Cadiz, who was then their friend and
acquaintance, may not later testify against them and that no other person may witness the commission of the offense,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together, with malice aforethought and with the deliberate intent to take
the life of Vivencio Cadiz, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously attack the latter with deadly weapon when
enfeebled and unable to defend himself thereby causing the direct and immediate death of said Vivencio Cadiz, and in
furtherance of the plan to demand and extort money, the accused under false and fraudulent representations which they
made to the parents of Vivencio Cadiz, to wit: Leoncio Cadiz and Guadalupe A. Cadiz to the effect that they would release
their son if they would deliver to them the amount of P12,000.00 in exchange of the liberty of their son, and by means of
which representations the aforementioned victims gave and delivered the said amount of P12,000.00 at a place indicated
by the accused, which accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously used to their own personal benefit.

Issue:
w/n the lower court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

No. The above contention does not hold water in the fight of the law and jurisprudence on the matter.

The pertinent proviso of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly says:

Sec. 9. Place of the Commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom
that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction
of the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is
necessary for Identifying the offense charged. (Rule 110)

It should be noted that in this case, the offense cited in the information is kidnapping for ransom with murder. The victim
was kidnapped within Lucena City and at that very moment, the intention became evident that the accused wanted to
detain him for ransom. Any change in their plans is beside the point since the initial execution of their original crime took
place at Lucena City.

But the crime actually committed is not the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, but only the crime of simple murder
qualified by treachery.
PEOPLE VS YABUT

Facts:
On August 1, 1932, appellant Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, hit Sabas Arceo, also
a prisoner in the Bilibid Prison, with a wooden club inflicting upon various physical injuries on different parts of the body
which caused the latter’s death after 24 hours. At the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant was a recidivist,
he having been previously convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final
sentences rendered by a competent tribunal. The Court of First Instance of manila, in punishing the appellant, applied
article 160 of the Revised Penal Code which states that: “Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed
for another previous offense –Penalty—Besides the provision of Rule 5 of Article 62 any person who shall commit a felony
after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall
be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
The appellant advances that the lower court erred in applying Article 160 of the RPC.
The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation of the headnote of article
160 and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new crime
which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not the term “another” in the epigraph of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code applies only in cases where
the new crime is different in character from the former crime for which the defendant is serving the penalty.
Ruling:
No. It is a familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity
nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section for the interpretation of the text especially
where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the
text that follows.

Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense — Penalty. — Besides the
provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy
years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless
by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.

There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies only in cases where the new offense
is different in character from the former offense for which the defendant is serving the penalty.
PEOPLE VS GROSPE

FACTS:
• Respondent-accused Manuel Parulan, is an authorized dealer of SMC. Parulan was charged of 2 crimes:
1) BP 22 – issuing a check for P86, 071.20 in favor of SMC which was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
2) Estafa – P11, 918.80 check in favor of SMC in payment of beer he purchased. Check was also refused.
• The two cases were tried jointly before the RTC of Pampanga. It was stated in the facts that the checks were issued
by the accused on various occasions at the Sales office of SMC at Guiguinto, Bulacan and which checks he handed to SMC
Supervisor in the same municipality.
• Judge Grospe of the RTC of Pampanga dismissed the case because of lack of jurisdiction since the checks were
dishonored by the Planters Development Bank (Bulacan), the drawee bank. Judge Grospe held that the essential elements
of estafa (deceit and damage) were committed in Bulacan, not in Pampanga since the checks were issued in Guiguinto,
Bulacan and were delivered to SMC Supervisor who holds office in the same municipality and subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank at Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
• The people filed a Special Civil Action for certiorari seeking to set aside Judge Grospe’s decision, challenges the
dismissal of 2 criminal cases on the ground of grave abuse of discretion (Rule 65).
• Respondent-accused argued that the dismissal was an acquittal, not reviewable by certiorari.
ISSUE(S): Did the RTC of Pampanga acquire jurisdiction over the two criminal cases?

HELD: YES
RATIO:
Estafa and BP 22 are continuing crimes. However, it is to be noted that the two are different crimes with different
elements. Deceit and damage are two essential elements of Estafa, but not in BP 22, the latter being mala prohibita.

In Estafa cases, although the check was received by the SMC Supervisor in Bulacan that was not the delivery contemplated
by law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take the check as a holder. Said representative
had to forward the check to SMC Regional office in San Fernando, Pampanga which was delivered to the Finance officer
thereat who deposited it at SMC depositary bank in Pampanga as well, where the check was legally issued and delivered.
The delivery of the check is the final act essential to its consummation.

With respect to BP 22 case, the offense punishes the act of making or drawing and issuance of bouncing check on which
there was knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of
the offense, is by itself a continuing offense. With this, the RTC of Pampanga acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information which is controlling.

Buaya vs. Polo
G.R. No. L-75079 ; January 26, 1989
Facts:
Solemnidad Buaya is an insurance agent of private complainant of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation. Private
respondent Buaya, was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding
premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is
required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal
office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account
which showed a shortage. She was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction over
the offense since the collection was done in Cebu City and the offense complained of is purely civil in nature. The
RTC denied the motion to dismiss.

Issues:
1) Whether or not RTC Manila has jurisdiction over the case.
2) Whether of not the offense complained is purely civil in nature, hence warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reiterated that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried. Thus, in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in
criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out
therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed.
The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not
by the findings the court may make after the trial.
Further, Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal — prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the
essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive
in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ."
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of
the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the
offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the
petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private
respondent in Manila.
As to the second issue, the contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that
evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.
Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699

FACTS:
This case is about the venue of a criminal action for written defamation. Mahinan, a lawyer, was the manager since 1973
of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the GSIS. Among his subordinates in that branch office were Agbayani, chief of the
investment unit; Bautista, chief of the production and premium unit; Pascual, officer-in-charge of the legal and claims unit,
and Dugay, an employee of the claims unit.

On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal's office at Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for
written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay. Two days later, the Board of Trustees of the GSIS in its
Resolution considered Mahinan as resigned from the service as of the close of business hours on that date. Mahinan
appealed to the CSC which later directed the GSIS Board of Trustees to reinstate him and it was approved.

On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the CFI an information for libel charging petitioners with
having maliciously made defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in Bambang, Nueva
Vizcaya. Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela on October 6,
1975; Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's
"unusual incident report" of October 3, 1975 enclosing evidence of malversation, and praying for Manihan’s separation
from the service, subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary. According to the information, all those documents
allegedly depicated Mahinan "as an incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of public office, spendthrift of GSIS funds,
inveterate gambler, chronic falsifier', and an unreformed ex-convict”.
The four accused filed a motion to quash. They contended that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding office at Cauayan, Isabela when the
alleged libel was committed and, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense charged comes within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija had no
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the information.
It was denied by the trial court, on the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within the meaning of Article 203 of
the Revised Penal Code since the insurance business of the GSIS is not an inherently governmental function. As such, his
residence, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, and not Cauayan, Isabela, where he had his office, would be the criterion for
determining the venue of the criminal action for libel.

ISSUE: W/N the venue of the criminal action for written defamation filed by Mahinan is Nueva
Vizcaya or Isabela?

There is no issue as to whether Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch manager, he is

unquestionably a public officer.

Applying the foregoing rules, we hold that the proper venue of Mahinan's criminal action for written defamation against
the petitioners is the CFI of Isabela, since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a public official stationed at Cauayan, Isabela
and the alleged libel was committed when he was in the public service.
The criminal action could have been filed also in the Court of First Instance of the province or in the city court of the city
where the libel was printed and first published.
In the instant case, the venue was laid in Nueva Vizcaya. It was alleged in the information that the libel was committed in
Bambang, a town in that province. It was not alleged that at the time the libel was committed Bambang was the actual
residence of complainant Mahinan or that it was the place where the libel was printed and first published or where
Mahinan held his office.
However, the alleged defamatory documents quoted in the information do not justify the filing of the information in the
CFI of Nueva Vizcaya. The Unusual Incident Report indicates Cauayan, Isabela as the place where Mahinan held office, and
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya was not mentioned at all in those alleged defamatory documents.
We hold that the information in this case is defective or deficient because it does not show that the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya,
where it was filed, has jurisdiction to entertain the criminal action for written defamation initiated by Mahinan against
the petitioners and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation.
The allegation in the information that the libel was committed in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya is not sufficient to show that
the CFI of that province has jurisdiction over the case. The alleged libelous documents quoted in the information show
that Nueva Vizcaya is not the proper venue of the criminal action.

HERRERO VS DIAZ

FACT:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the annulment of the resolution of the respondent judge
ordering the reconstitution of the record of criminal case No. 6450 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and prohibiting
him from proceeding with the said criminal case for adultery instituted against the petitioners by complaint of Manuel
Gaspar, one of the respondents herein, during the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioners contend that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in issuing the order in question, because all the
proceedings in said criminal case No. 6450 have been invalidated by the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of
October 23, 1944, and because the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction to continue the proceeding in cases
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila under the so-called Republic of the Philippines; and that the
respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in ordering the reconstitution of said case, not upon petition of the
fiscal as required by Act No. 3110, but upon petition of the attorney for the offended party.

Petitioner’s contention that the attorney for the offended party is not authorized by Act No. 3110 to move for the
reconstitution of the record of the criminal case in question, and that in allowing its reconstitution upon the mere petition
of the private prosecutor the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction, is untenable.

ISSUE:
W/N INTERVENTION OF OFFENDED PARTY OR HIS ATTORNEY IN CRIMINAL ACTION OR IN PROCEEDINGS FOR
RECONSTITUTION OF RECORD

The intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject
to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the directed and control of the fiscal. Taking into consideration that a criminal action for
adultery can only be commenced or recommended by the offended party and not by the fiscal (article 344, Rev. Pen.
Code), and that the petition for reconstitution was filed without objection or with the acquiescence of the city fiscal, it is
evident that the provisions of the law on reconstitution of records have been substantially complied with.
PEOPLE VS CAPISTRANO

Facts:
Jose Capistrano was charged in the justice of the peace court of Tayabas in criminal Case No. 139 with the crime of serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence committed against Trinidad Elento, and in criminal case No. 140 with the crime
of less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence committed against Hermenegilda de los Reyes, arising from the
fact that on July 18, 1950, the jeepney driven by Jose Capistrano, in which Trinidad Elento and Hermenegilda de los Reyes
were riding as passengers, hit a tree while passing along the national road in barrio Isabang, Tayabas, Quezon.

Under date of August 10, 1950, Trinidad Elento filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a civil action for damages
against Juan Reyes, Jr., and Jose Capistrano, the first as owner and operator of the jeepney involved in the accident which
took place on July 18, 1950, and the second as driver of said jeepney, the cause of action being based on the act which is
the subject matter of the two criminal prosecutions.

Issue:
w/n OFFENDED PARTY CANNOT APPEAL WHEN SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR INDEMNITY WAS FILED. —

Ruling:

No. The offended party has no right to appeal from an order dismissing the information, when she has filed a separate
civil action for indemnity arising from the same act covered by the information.

In the present case the dismissal of the information or the criminal action does not affect the right of the offended to
institute or continue the civil action already instituted arising from the offense, because such dismissal or extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil one under Sec. 1 (d) Rule 107, Rules of Court, which reads as
follows: ’(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who
may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.’"