Under Rule 111

Solidum v People

Facts:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days
after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag
attached to the side of his body.

On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a
pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by
Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included
Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During
the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two
weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians.

On July 19, 2004, the RTC and CA rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and ordering her to
indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo,
for damages.

Issue:
Whether Ospital ng Maynila shall be held jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum with
regard to indemnification for damages

Ruling:
No. The judgment was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is
puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly
and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The judgment
rendered against Ospital ng Maynila void was the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to
be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this
fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.

Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would
be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng
Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation “engaged in any kind of industry.” The
term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that
employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a
public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for
profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee
but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against
Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was
unsatisfied due to him being insolvent.

Castillo v Salvador

Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) with
respect only to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted
of the crime of Estafa.

The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code. While, petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged in
real estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed
by Salvador and his brother, Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance business.

As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she trusted him very
much as he even acted as a father to her children while her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to
embark on the remittance business. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit
derived from the business would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in
charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the
operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business.

The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as
capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to
respondent Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However,
the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days.
When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money
was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the
money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

Respondent’s defense that he and petitioner became close friends and eventually fell in love and
had an affair. They traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw how popular he
was among the Filipino domestic helpers, which led her to suggest a remittance business.
Although hesitant, he has friends with such business. He denied that petitioner gave him
US$10,000.00 when he went to Hong Kong and Bangkok. After he came back from the United
States, petitioner had asked him and his brother Ramon for a meeting. During the meeting,
petitioner brought up the money remittance business, but Ramon told her that they should make a
study of it first. He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a money remittance business in
Pasay City. Upon the advice of Roy, respondent and petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to
Palau. He denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that it was petitioner who
paid for the plane tickets. After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western Union at the
First World Center in Makati City. Ramon, petitioner and her mother went to Hong Kong to
register the business, while he took care of petitioner’s children here. He and Ramon went back
to Hong Kong but denied having received the amount of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then
admitted receipt of the amount of P100, 000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to Charlie
Chau as payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, which Chau had duly
acknowledged. He denied Enrico’s testimony that petitioner gave him the amount of
US$100,000.00 in his mother’s house. He claimed that no remittance business was started in
Hong Kong as they had no license, equipment, personnel and money to operate the same. Upon
his return to the Philippines, petitioner never asked him about the business, as she never gave
him such amount. He intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong Kong again to buy
some goods for the latter’s boutique. He admitted that he loved petitioner and her children very
much as there was a time when petitioner’s finances were short; he gave her P600, 000.00 for the
enrollment of her children in very expensive schools. It is also not true that he and Ramon
initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips

Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that even if the Court
Of Appeals decided to acquit him it should have at least retained the award of damages to the
petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON the award of damages or the civil aspect be retained.

RULING:

The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability
ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule
111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is “for the same act or omission.

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, “that a person is
innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the
elements of Estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution’s primary witness herself could not even establish
clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that
she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a
remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the
weakness of her submissions.

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National
Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence”
or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.

In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the
CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short
period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed
to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered
no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s
claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the
way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the
alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had
been swindled.

The petition for the award of damages is denied.

Under Rule 112

Fenequito v Vergara

Facts:
On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila
(representing Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito, Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro H.
Rodriquez. On April 23, 2004, Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on
Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC issued an order granting the said motion. Upon appeal
by the public prosecutor, however, the RTC set aside the MeTC’s order and directed the latter to
trial. Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal before the CA, which subsequent ruled that the RTC’s
assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and was therefore not appealable. Hence, the instant
petition for review.

Issue:
WON RTC’s decision was interlocutory and can be appealed.

RULING:
RTC’s decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be appealed.
One of the grounds for the CA’s outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.’s petition for review was
because of the latter’s failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
to the petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly
comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The rationale for this strict attitude is
not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities the orderly disposition of
appealed cases.
But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the Court still finds no cogent
reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito et al. erroneously
assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An order
is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done
upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that which dispose of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined.
Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the court
a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear
that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left
something more to be done on its merits.

Burgundy Realty v Reyes

 Respondent Josefa Reyes offered her services to herein petitioner as its real estate agent in
buying parcels of land situated in Calamba, Laguna for the purpose of developing it into a golf
course. Reyes made not that at least 10 of her clients, all of them lot owners, are willing to sell to
herein petitioners. Convinced that here representations were reputable, petitioner corporation
ordered the released of the amount of P23, 423,327.50 in her favor for the purpose of buying the
land. However, such was not the case as Reyes converted and misappropriated the money given
by petitioner to her personal use, instead of buying the land.
When the petitioners knew of the matter, they sent a formal letter of demand to Reyes for the
return of the full sum of P23, 423,327.50. But such efforts did not yield results despite her receipt
of such demand. As a result, petitioners filed a complaint of Estafa before the Assistant City
Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City. After a preliminary investigation was made, the assistant
Prosecutor of Makati then filed information for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the RTC
of Makati. Respondent, contested said resolution by the assistant prosecutor, claiming that there
is no sufficient evidence to prove such, before the DOJ Secretary, but it was dismissed by the
State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuno. Later, the Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration and was
granted, wherein Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales issued a Resolution graning the petition for
review. Pettioner then filed a motion for reconsideration first to the DOJ, then later to the CA,
both of which were denied. The CA sustained the DOJ finding that the”element of
misappropriation or conversion is wanting...and that if the accused is able to satisfactorily
explain her failure to produce the thing delivered in trust , he may not be liable for estafa.”.
Hence, petitioners assailed this decision in this court.

ISSUE:
Whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well- founded belief that the estafa has been
committed by respondent should be held for trial.

RULING:

According to the court, it must be committed to memory that the finding of probable cause
was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether a crime has
been committed; and whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. The public prosecutor, in preliminary investigations, merely determines whether there is
probable cause. On the other hand, it does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not
present at this stage, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Evidences of both parties need not be
exhausted during this period of the case. There is, by rules of procedure, a trial to allow the
reception of evidence wherein both parties can substantiate their respective claims. In this case,
as the court finds it in the review of the records, it showed that investigating prosecutor was right
in finding that all the elements of the crime of estafa existed. Therefore, the petition was granted
and the Resolutions of the CA was reversed and set aside.

Under Rule 113

Luz v People
FACTS:

 On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer
saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a
motorcycle without a helmet; this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle, he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the
place is almost in front of the said sub-station.

 He was alerted of the accused’s uneasy movement and thus asked to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket, as the latter
may have a weapon inside it; the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like
tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1)
Swiss knife; upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; after the accused opened the container, he noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it; and upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table
which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

 The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are positive of methampethamine
hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

 Upon a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful
arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or
charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.

ISSUE:

Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist, pursuant to a routine traffic stop can be considered a formal arrest.

RULING:

There was no valid arrest. When the petitioner was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, by the fact itself (ipso
facto) and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an
intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid arrest, the
warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed:

(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

 (ii) search of evidence in “plain view;”
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.

None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.