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I. Title Page & Abstract

Populism and the Decreased Relevance of Median Voter Theorem

POLS 400

Madison Miller

Mary Baldwin College


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Abstract

Miller, Madison. Bachelor of Arts (Political Science), December 2018, Mary Baldwin

University, Staunton, Virginia.

Populism is a complicated and ill-understood phenomenon, with even researchers admitting that

the body of research that exists to explore it can at times appear muddy and contradictory.

Research has, however, suggested that, although they often take media and political elites by

surprise, populist insurgencies exist in correlation to periods of increased political partisanship

and high economic inequality. This paper served as a precursory exploration into the relationship

between populism and these two correlating factors and its author hoped that such exploration

would help to make populist campaigns more predictable, or that, failing that, would go onto

invite further exploration of the subject, so that in the eventual future populist victories can be

understood via framework, rather than being perceived as odd outliers, given that they have

happened too many times, historically, to truly be outliers.

KEYWORDS: populism, populist campaigns, populist candidates, political partisanship,

political polarization, economic instability, income inequality, economic concerns, American

populism, 2016 election, history of American populism, historical analysis of American

populism.
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II. Introduction

 research topic, research questions, and hypothesis

Madison Miller

Mary Baldwin University


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The median voter theorem, which postulates that, in order to have the best chance of

winning, candidates should refrain from taking extreme positions on either end of the political

spectrum, has long been entrenched in the so-called political school of thought. Why, then, might

the political process sometimes give rise to populist candidates, who appeal to the more extreme

factions of their parties? Synonyms for the word populist include majority and mainstream, so

could it be, then, that perhaps extremism is becoming more widespread? If yes, then what factors

might play a role? Hypothetically, one might expect to see a link between increased political

partisanship and a surge in popularity for populist candidates or, and one might expect for this

link to be even more pronounced: a link between economic instability or inequality and a surge

in popularity for populist candidates. Therefore, if economic instability/inequality is the driving

force for a populist preference, then in times of high instability/inequality, there will be an

increased number of populist candidates. A hypothesis that is, perhaps, fittingly economic in and

of itself, as demand of a thing (in this case populist candidates) will then incentivize an increase

in supply.

As stated before, in the case of political partisanship, if it is particularly high, then one

might also reasonably expect to see a similar increase in populist candidates, as a natural result

of this trend — although a cause and effect relationship between partisanship and populism is

harder to suggest because, while increased partisanship may very well cause populism, a rise in

more polarizing populist rhetoric might similarly be an influencing factor in why one might see

periods of increased political polarization. Therefore, in this second example, one might be left

to wonder which factor is chicken and which is egg (or, in less figurative terms: which is

independent and dependent variable), it is still a useful relationship to explore, even if potential

patterns remain less clear, as it provides some necessary background and context on an
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environment in which populism might thrive.

As for the logic of this as a hypothesis, should one continue to conceptualize political

competition as a sort of free market, it is probable then to assume that an increase in polarized

sentiment among American voters might cause an increased demand for bold, populist rhetoric

that is unashamed in its potential divisiveness and, therefore, an increased supply might be

provided by trend savvy politicians as a result; however, it is also equally as possible that the

supply might already exist for other reasons (economic ones, for example) and that, as this so-

called increased supply of populist candidates is presented to the public, the public is therefore

convinced into becoming more polarized itself; similarly to how, in capitalist societies, increased

supply of a product leads to an increased need to sell it and, therefore, to advertise it.

In this way, coverage given to candidates by the media can be seen as a sort of free

political advertising. Under normal circumstances, populists are not especially likely to be given

coverage by the mainstream media (or at least not favorable coverage that does not immediately

dismiss them, something that is an important distinction to make, as novel things are typically

the exact sort of thins perceived as newsworthy and populist candidates are generally regarded

by the establishment as a sort of novelty), or at least not equal coverage to more seemingly

conventional political candidates, as they are not likely to be taken as seriously. Should the so-

called ‘political market’ become flooded with them, however, the media will be forced to take

them more seriously as a glaring trend, one that is likely to be perceived as a break from the

norm, according to conventional wisdom, is much harder to ignore.

This is a particularly important factor to consider as it would help to explain some

otherwise perplexing trends during the 2016 election cycle. Why, for example, did the press

devote so much attention to Donald Trump if they did not expect him to be a serious contender?
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Perhaps because it made for an unexpected and therefore intriguing political narrative that the

Republicans should have a bombastic, outsider candidate (Donald Trump) at the same time that

the Democratic Party saw its own outsider candidate (Bernie Sanders) step into the arena of

presidential-hopefuls. Many have caused the press, since the 2016 election, of inadvertently

magnifying Trump’s popularity and gaining him more support, by the disproportionate coverage

they gave to a candidate that, by their own estimation and according to both the polls and

conventional political wisdom, was not likely to be competitive.

According to Zeynep Tufekci, associate professor at the University of North Carolina

School of Information and Library Science, who was quoted in an article by Politico Magazine,

“The problem is both structural and ethical. For starters, media are clustered, and prone to

herding. Not only did this cause them to underestimate Trump’s election chances, but they

continue to miss the dynamics of polarization in this country, and what that means for politics.”

This appears to be true and it makes sense; after all, the high levels of political polarization being

seen in America in recent years, but especially 2016 onward (much like Trump and Sanders’

initial willingness to run, which startled the press and provoked speculative investigation)

seemingly defies conventional wisdom.

Tufekci goes onto add that “Pundits and many journalists also remain attracted to horse-

race stories that resemble fiction (stumble in the second act! comeback in the third act!), which

causes them to miss real dynamics because they are too busy fitting their reporting into

interesting narrative structures. This also does a disservice to journalists’ remaining essential

role: telling the rest of us about important questions of policy and substance that we cannot easily

access, investigate or absorb on our own.” This is in line with the assertion offered earlier that

the press concerns itself with political narrative. After all, psychologists have long posited that
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juxtaposition and/or fusion help to establish memories. In this way, human brains are wired to

look for connections between ideas. Therefore, stories that parallel one another engage interest

and attention in a way that disparate data sets and seemingly unconnected polls do not,

incentivizing journalists to frame politics in this narrative format, since their job is such that they

need to appeal to the public’s attention in order to generate enough revenue to stay in business.

This is because high readership or viewership, rather, as the case may likewise be, influences

advertisers to buy advertisements on a given news platform (be they print advertisements,

televised advertisements, those on on-line editions of newspapers and magazines, or radio

advertisements). Additionally, many newspapers in particular still operate on a subscription

format, meaning that they rely on the ability of their journalists to engage the interest of their

audience enough to where they are happy to stay subscribed to their product, thereby providing a

regular source of revenue.

“What’s more,” according to Tufecki, is that “many journalists still practice ‘access

journalism’—which is futile. Thanks to social media and partisan cable channels, politicians now

easily have their own access to audiences. The old style of access journalism often amounts to

little more than reporters being subjected to spin by the insiders. But even after the election,

process and inside-the-White House stories continue to interest journalists (and a large section of

the so-called chattering classes) disproportionate to those stories’ political or policy importance.”

This is in line with recent criticisms that it is the press itself that is responsible for inadvertently

providing Trump with an audience, though it is worth noting, of course, that said criticisms are

inherently leading or biased ones in that they assume an anti-Trump stance, framing that this is a

bad, unintentional effect of the media’s 2016 coverage. Still, despite the biased roots of this

criticism, it does check out that, even in their attempts to mock and discredit his endeavors, the
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press gave Trump free publicity, helping to get news of his campaign out there, making the

public more aware of it, and thereby legitimizing his message by giving it attention and air time.

As for why it is that all of these relevant and recent events are notable and the hypotheses

and theories that might potentially explain them, therefore, worthy of study: the median voter

theorem, after all, assumes that the views most palatable to the majority will be those to the

political center, tempered either with caveats or compromises made as concessions to the other

side, in an effort to maintain broad appeal and reach out across the political aisle. Recently,

however, it has been said that America is perhaps more polarized than ever before or, at least,

that it is becoming increasingly polarized. Still, according to the median voter theorem, these

candidates should not stand a chance, yet occasionally there will be a populist that rises up

through the system, shocking pundits. Perhaps this is because, in times of increased polarization,

the median voter theorem is no longer applicable or, in an effort to avoid too broad a

generalization, less applicable. In such times, therefore, it might be a theory best left in the

toolbox. Political theorists should find reassurance, however, in the fact that they can always

come back to it later, in less polarized times where it is likely to prove a more useful framework

once again. Theory does have its use, after all.

That said, though it can be useful in certain cases, an over-reliance on theory is unwise.

According to an article written on behalf of the Washington Post by Daniel Dreznera, professor

of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University,

towards the end of the 2016 presidential primaries, “. . . social science theories are, by their

nature, reflexive. They try to explain human behavior, but humans can, in turn, read about these

theories and adapt to them. We know from reporting on how both parties are attempting to better

use data to reach voters that Republicans have paid close attention to political science theories
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about campaigns. If GOP decision-makers read these analyses [ones that said he had no chance]

about Trump, they might have concluded that they did not need to do anything to stop him,

because he would inevitably fail anyway.” This is interesting because, while it is generally

regarded as favorable to rely on previously established theory to make rational political decisions

and calculations, one should be wary of being driven by theory to inaction or stagnation. After

all, since theory is reflexive, it should be no surprise that, in hindsight, events might seem

inevitable. While they are still unfolding, however, one must be careful not to make such

logically fallacious guarantees.

Driving the point home, Drezner went onto say, “Trump is winning because no

significant Republican coalition seriously tried to oppose him when there was still time for it to

work. And the reason no powerful Republican coalition emerged to stop him is that the GOP

believed all the analysts who said Trump had no chance. In other words, the political science

theories predicting that someone like Trump was highly unlikely to win a major-party

nomination were so widely believed that they turned out to refute themselves.” Should one trust

in the accuracy of this analysis, it suggests that should candidates just lie in wait of expected

trends, their passive attitudes might make them lose out on whatever boons for which they were

hoping in the first place.

In this way, being aware of political science trends can be just as much of a disadvantage

as it is an advantage, since theory does not always serve as a particularly effective prediction

model. Just as one should be wary of leaving things to fate, one should be wary of leaving things

to theory. While one should use theoretical framework to try maximizing their advantages where

they can, there are so many variables within a given election year or campaign that one needs to
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be taking decisive action, as well, not simply hoping for theory to carry one through.
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III. Literature Review

 summary of theoretical literature

Madison Miller

Mary Baldwin University


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Political polarization is on the rise in the United States. As for what this means, political

polarization is when an individual's stance on a given issue, policy, or person is closely linked to,

rather than deviating from, their identification with a particular political party or ideology. When

most people think of polarization, they think of two poles, placed far away from one another,

which is not a wholly inaccurate comparison. As people’s views align more closely with either

liberal or conservative ideology, their opinions tend to become more entrenched. In this way,

political thought is a spectrum: with more moderate or centrist views existing in the middle, and

more polarized views existing on opposite sides of one another.

Yet, in The Polarized Public, author Alan Abramowitz writes that, according to the

theory of elite polarization, which is “represented prominently by political scientist Morris

Fiorina and his coauthors”, in the United States “polarization . . . is almost exclusively an elite

phenomenon” (Abramowitz, 5). Under this theory, it is argued that ordinary citizens “are turned

off by the relatively extreme positions of both parties” and more Americans consider themselves

independents and choose to stay home on election day, as a result of increased polarization

between the elites of both parties (Abramowitz, 6). This theory is appealing, Abramowitz goes

onto write, because it saves the large majority of Americans from having to take responsibility

for the dysfunctional state of our political system.

Abramowitz mentions further that this theory is related to the “well-known median voter

theorem”, which was popularized in the book An Economic Theory of Democracy by Anthony

Downs. Under the median voter theorem, “in a centrist electorate, politicians seeking to win

elections should adopt centrist positions” and “taking extreme positions in a centrist electorate

would appear to be a recipe for political oblivion” (Abramowitz, 7). Consequently, “even if

candidates were forced to adopt relatively extreme positions to appeal to their parties’ primary
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voters, one would expect them to move back toward the center during the general election

campaign”, continues Abramowitz. Historically, this has been the case, and Abramowitz offers

the unsuccessful presidential campaigns of the too extreme Barry Goldwater and George

McGovern as examples.

As Abramowitz goes onto write, while proponents of the theory of elite polarization

sometimes make “broad generalizations about the low level of ideological sophistication of the

American public”, this “ignores the enormous diversity that exists within the public with regard

to political engagement”. He also notes that “while many Americans have little or no interest in

politics”, “ignore news”, and “rarely vote or participate in politics”, many others care greatly,

“follow news closely”, “vote regularly”, and participate in other forms of engagement.

Regarding polarization in particular, though there have been historic periods of high

polarization, the degree to which polarization occurs is not fixed and America has not always

been highly polarized. In fact, in Politics, Parties, & Elections in America, political scientist

Brian Schaffner wrote that “polls conducted during the 1990s revealed that a majority of

Americans preferred to have the Presidency and Congress controlled by different parties; 40

percent would like to have candidates run without party labels; and only 8 percent said that a

candidate’s party was most important to them when choosing a president” (Schaffner, 18).

He also notes that the public remains skeptical of parties even today, though parties have

become “durable institutions” in “an environment never entirely hospitable to their presence”

(Schaffner, 18). Populist candidates, by and large, tend to be considered political outsiders.

Perhaps this public distrust for political parties is one of the reasons why perceived outsiders

might be preferred to more known party loyalists, even in a time of high polarization, where

people themselves tend to be more loyal to their respective parties. It might also help that
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populist candidates, while often outsiders, are not particularly known for their moderate

messaging. Although the party elites who subscribe to the well-known median voter theorem

mentioned above often regard and brand them as radicals, so-called populists tend to be very

aware of what it is that the public wants to hear, and often espouse rhetoric expressing concern

for the working class in order to cultivate mass appeal. In a time where people are less likely to

hear out and subscribe to ideas from the other side of the political chasm, they become more

susceptible to extreme messaging within their own party.


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IV. Research Design

 data sources, research methods, types of analysis

Madison Miller

Mary Baldwin University


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Data Sources

The data collected within this study consists of a mix of both quantitative and qualitative

data.

The qualitative data is primarily comprised of a literature review, case studies, which

include both historic and more current campaigns and elections, with a particular focus

places on the most recent 2016 election.

The quantitative data consists of the graphs and charts embedded throughout the text, i.e.

data that can be measured numerically.

Research Methods

Research proved to be longitudinal in nature, given that its focus on populism old and

new meant that, by its very nature, it involved repeated observation of the same variables

over a long period of time.

Additionally, research largely fell into a correlational design because, while a relationship

between variables (i.e. partisanship and economic inequality and their potential links to

populism) was able to be explored, data collection was largely observational and correlation

was determined, but one cannot say confidently that proof of true cause and effect was

determined. Therefore, the existing research here serves as an invitation to further research.

Types of Analysis

Observational and Historical Analysis: case studies and comparisons of historical trends

inherently fall under this type of analysis. As for what observational analysis means, it is

essentially a type of correlational or non-experimental research in which an ongoing behavior

is observed. In this case, said “behavior” is populist phenomenon.

Where the quantitative data provided is concerned, data sets were chosen to for their
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relevance to issues that were found to be linked to populism during the proses of historical

analysis. As for the type of analysis for which this data was used, it was largely descriptive

analysis where the data was summarized to back up a point with which it seemed to correlate.
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V. Data Analysis | pt. 1

 history, background, and modern-day parallels

Madison Miller

Mary Baldwin University


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Though often associated with Progressive ideals, populism as a philosophy is not

necessarily associated with solely Conservatism or Progressivism. Either party, Democrats or

Conservatives, can successfully capitalize on populist rhetoric. “In the last eighty years, populists

have been identified as Proto-Progressives, backward-looking Conservatives, quasi-Marxists,

and radical Republicans. The source of all this confusion is the Populists themselves, who

frequently disagreed on policy specifics even as they concurred in their broader social analyses,”

writes Nathan Jessen, author of Populism and Imperialism: Politics, Culture, and Foreign Policy

in the American West, 1890-1900 (Jessen, 10).

Other experts on populism also agree that the term does not denote party affiliation. Cas

Mudde and Cristóbal Kaltwasser, co-authors of “Populism: A Very Short Introduction”, write

that the term has become something of a buzzword in the twenty-first century. Additionally, they

state that it “. . . is used to describe left-wing parties in Latin America, right-wing challenger

parties in Europe, and both left-wing and right-wing presidential candidates in the United States”

(Mudde and Kaltwasser, 1). This illustrates the consensus on the fact that populism is a broad

term, able to be applied to all sides of the political aisle. This consensus applies to little else

going forward, however, where the subject of populism is concerned.

In fact, Kaltwasser and Mudde insist that populism is a “contested concept”, stating that

“different contributors define populism, among others, as an ideology, a movement, and a

syndrome” and that “. . . in different world regions populism tends to be equated, and sometimes

conflated, with quite distinct phenomena” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2). In other words, the label

of populism is often used to describe phenomenon for which there are already terms, making for

murky and overlapping definitions. As for the specific nature of this phenomena, Mudde and

Kaltwasser clarify that, in Europe, it tends to be anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiments—


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much like the ones espoused by Donald Trump in the United States — and that it tends to be

associated with clientelism and economic mismanagement in Latin America.

In explanation of this confusion, they continue, on the very same page, writing that “. . .

populism is a definition seldom claimed by people or organizations themselves. Instead, it is

ascribed to others, most often with a negative connotation” and that “as populism cannot claim a

defining text or a proto-typical case, academics and journalists alike use the term to denote very

diverse phenomena.” This is interesting when applied to an Americanist view of populism, as it

explains the debate over whether or not U.S. candidates past and president can be classed as

populist ones. It also explains the reason that candidates with backing from the more extreme and

mobilized wings of their parties adopt the more politically neutral terms of, for example,

progressive and tea party candidates, instead of calling themselves populists. It makes sense that

they would want to distance themselves from a term that both has a negative connotation and

fails to distinguish them from one another.

Further still, just like theories exist to try and explain the phenomenon of political

polarization, Mudde and Kaltwasser outline several theories that attempt to define populism. Of

these theories, only a few are often applied to the United States. The popular agency approach is

one of them, and it is commonly used by historians within the United States, as well as authors of

volumes on the original North American Populists, or adherents of the early Populist Party.

Those who subscribe to this approach consider “. . . populism to mean a democratic way of life

built through popular engagement in politics” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 3). This means that this

definition of populism is largely devoid of the censure with which some of the other definitions

treat the term. In fact, according to Mudde and Kaltwasser, this approach even goes so far as to

consider populism to be “. . .a positive force for the mobilization of the (common) people and for
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the development of a communitarian model of democracy.” This is an important context to apply

when looking at populism through a historical perspective.

The socioeconomic approach is another, more negative view of populism. While,

according to Mudde and Kaltwasser, it has fallen out of use in an international context and in

most social sciences—due to changing behavior of populist candidates outside of the United

States, particularly in Latin America, where Populists have begun to subscribe to neoliberal

economic theory—it is still currently in use among economists and journalists in the United

States. As Mudde and Kaltwasser go onto write, “Economists such as Rudiger Dornbusch and

Jeffery Sachs have understood populism primarily as a type of irresponsible economic policy,

characterized by a first period of massive spending financed by foreign debt and followed by a

second period marked by hyperinflation and the implementation of harsh economic adjustments”

(Mudde and Kaltwasser, 3-4). They go onto write that “in a more popular form ‘populist

economics’ refers to a political program that is considered irresponsible because it involves too

much redistribution of wealth and government spending”. This theory is interesting because it is

easy to see it in motion. As a modern example, Bernie Sanders was a so called populist candidate

who, regardless of whether or not it was true, was accused by the right of advocating for too

much redistribution, despite the large base of supporters he attracted in his bid for the

Democratic nomination. Additionally, William Jennings Bryan, a historic populist candidate, had

his free silver plan characterized successfully by William McKinley as economically

irresponsible.

Also relevant to American politics is the ideational approach to populism, which

conceives populism “as a discourse, an ideology, or a worldview”, despite Mudde and

Kaltwasser’s admission that populism is perhaps a normative term, and has been used
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successfully in Western Europe,as well as Eastern Europe and the Americas (Mudde and

Kaltwasser, 5). This ideational approach, they continue, was born out of an attempt to create a

definition for populism that was able to “accurately capture the core of all major past and present

manifestations of populism, while still precise enough to exclude clearly nonpopulist

phenomena.” As for what this characterization of populism looks like, it is, of course, fairly

general, rather than overly specific. Those who subscribe to the ideational theory recognize that

when it comes to populism scholars agree on little but for the fact that “all forms of populism

include some kind of appeal to ‘the people’ and a denunciation of ‘the elite’. Accordingly . . .

populism always involves a critique of the establishment and an adulation of the common

people” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 5-6). Mudde and Kaltwasser then go onto describe populism as

a “thin-centered ideology” that allows for “malleability”; this means that it has a “restricted

morphology, which necessarily appears attached to—and sometimes is even assimilated into—

other ideologies.”

According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, a final and as of yet unnamed approach to

populism, popular within both the field of communication studies and the media’s reflections on

populism, considers it to be “a folkloric style of politics, which leaders and parties employ to

mobilize the masses.” Through this lens, populism is seen as “amateurish and unprofessional

political behavior that aims to maximize media attention and popular support” through which

“by disrespecting the language of manners, populist actors are able to present themselves not

only as different and novel, but also as courageous leaders who stand with ‘the people’ in

opposition to ‘the elite’” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 4). This seems to explain well Donald

Trump’s rally against political correctness and the media attention he was able to gain with his

more outlandish and boisterous comments, and why it is that the strategy seemed to work.
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Finally, in the book “Populism and Elitism” by Jeffrey Bell, populism is described, more

succinctly, as existing in a sort of binary opposition to elitism. He writes that, “populism is

optimism about people’s ability to make decisions about their lives. Elitism is optimism about

the decision-making ability of one or more elites, acting on behalf of other people. Populism

implies pessimism about an elite’s ability to make decisions for the people affected. Elitism

implies pessimism about the people’s ability to make decisions affecting themselves” (Bell, 3).

What is notable about this definition is that it presents elitism and populism as two contrasting

forces, without making any sort of normative judgments as to which is best. Much like the

majority of Republicans and Democrats both want what is best for the country but disagree,

when pressed, on the specifics of just what exactly will better the country, it is important to bear

in mind that the majority of populists and elitists within the United States both likely genuinely

believe that their school of thought is the one that will prove the most beneficial.

As for history, in the United States, populism as an ideology rose out of the origins of the

Populist party, and according to the book Populism: It’s Rise and Fall by William Peffer, “the

first effective movement toward the formation of the populist party was begin in Kansas”

(Peffer, 36). The populist party formally organized in 1892 and, according to Peffer, this

movement was born out of the economic concerns of rural Kansas farmers, whose pocketbooks

were hit hard with exorbitant rates of interest, excessive railroad charges, and the depreciation of

values; this resulted in people feeling as though their rights had been violated and change had to

be made.

On the other hand, Harry Watson, a professor at the University of North Carolina who

wrote the article entitled “Andrew Jackson, America’s Original Anti-Establishment Candidate”

for the Smithsonian Magazine, disagrees. Though there was no formal Populist Party yet, making
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the term populist perhaps a little anachronistic when applied to Andrew Jackson, Watson credits

Jackson, president from 1829 to 1837, with “making the populist style a major force in National

politics”. Without this early example of populism in the United States, which rendered it a

familiar concept instead of a foreign one, the Populist Party that came later might have struggled

to build up the momentum it did.

As for Jackson himself, he was born into poverty, only to become a successful Tennessee

lawyer and rising politician by 1812. The fact that Jackson’s wealth made him one of the very

elites he criticized did not go unnoticed by Watson, but more important than his actual economic

and social status was the fact that Jackson was able to brand himself as populist, regardless.

Watson is careful to make the distinction that although Jackson attained status later on in life, he

was not Harvard educated, nor was he born into privilege the way that some of his

contemporaries were: say, for example, John Quincy Adams, to whom he lost the presidential

election in 1824.

As a result, Jackson did not act with the same refinement of other politicians, and it was

his more common manners that made him relatable to the people. Indeed, when he was finally

elected to the presidency in 1829, he invited the common people into the White House, throwing

a wild party that resulted in property damage — an unprecedented act and one that has, wisely,

never again been repeated. The decision was a controversial one, even back in 1829, and the

move was heavily criticized by other elites, who thought it a degeneration to the respectability of

the presidential office. It is worth noting, too, that said elites only ever came to — at best —

begrudgingly accept Jackson, as he was determined to upend a political system over which they

maintained what was, at least for themselves, a comfortable amount of control.

Where the theories of populism as outlined earlier are concerned, this tension is in
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accordance with the framework of populism adopted by the field of communications studies,

which postulates that populists are, essentially, a sort of opposition party in their own right and

that conflict with perceived elites appeals to the general public. That said, this is far from the

only factor that helped to cultivate Jackson’s populist image. He was also a known war hero,

something that bolstered his favor with the people, and following his loss in 1824, he ran a

successful presidential campaign in 1828, with a motto that was “The will of the people”,

making clear his Democratic and, yes, even populist leanings.

It is also worth noting that Jackson’s aforementioned loss in 1824 was not the result of

unpopularity with the people, but rather constitutional mechanics, making him truly a populist in

the way that someone who lacked the support of the people might not have been considered. In

fact, during the election of 1824, restrictive voting laws meant that voter turnout was low.

According to Steve Inskeep, who wrote the article “Donald Trump and the Legacy of Andrew

Jackson” for the Atlantic, this was true even among white males, the target demographic of the

time, and a base for which Jackson later strove to expand voting rights, so as to get more white

males participating in politics—particularly, the less elite ones. Therefore, while Jackson won by

a plurality, he did not win by a true majority and Congress was able to award Adams the

presidency. This action by Congress was referred to by Jackson’s supporters as a “corrupt

bargain”, as they accused Henry Clay, Speaker of the House at the time, of throwing the vote in

return for a promise from Adams to name him Secretary of State.

It was also seen as a decision that undermined the will of the people, and interestingly

enough, though one event occurred on the national level and the other within a party, this mirrors

the way that many Bernie Sanders supporters felt when Hillary Clinton was named the

Democratic Nominee following a contested convention in the 2016 election cycle, most
POLS THESIS, MILLER 26

especially given the announcement by Donna Brazile that eventually followed that the Clinton

campaign maintained financial control over the Democratic Party, even preceding the primaries.

While the outrage that followed Brazile’s announcement is recent and still growing, so it is

unclear if it will give way to the sentiment that Bernie Sanders is owed the Democratic

nomination in 2020, in Jackson’s more historical case, the perception that he had been robbed

both mobilized and energized his base, and Jackson was able to secure himself the presidency.

As for the sort of actions that might be seen from a populist president, Jackson serves as a

good example in a way that few other candidates do, as populists, at least historically, tend to be

most successful at attaining local office, but to fall short of being elected president when they

attempt it. As noted before, populism is in many ways volatile, and this trend is further proof of

how it can be a liability just as much as it can be an asset, depending on the circumstances, or the

demographic receiving a candidate’s rhetoric. Despite this, Jackson was actually able to ascend

to the presidency, and set an agenda full of populist policies, despite a contentious relationship

with Congress that caused him to exercise his veto power frequently and, consequently, to be

characterized as a King in a critical political cartoon by an unknown artist, which depicted him

as trampling on the constitution:


POLS THESIS, MILLER 27

SOURCE: Republished by KQED INC.

Many of the media mediums of today did not exist during Jackson’s time, and giving

speeches was seen as beneath candidates, so Jackson made innovative use of existing media

outlets to sway public opinion and the necessary majority to his side: particularly newspapers,

which Inskeep writes were “growing in number and importance”. Inskeep goes on to add that

Jackson also “personally involved himself in news coverage”, “counted newspaper editors

among his closest advisors”, and even made sure a pro-Jackson newspaper was established in

Washington when he took office. To draw another comparison to current events, which Inskeep

does in his article, this is reminiscent of the relationships Donald Trump cultivated with Steve

Bannon, a founding member of Breitbart News and former Chief White House Strategist, Sean

Hannity, a political commentator and talk show host to whom Trump has reportedly turned for

advice, and Joe Scarborough and Mika Brzezinski, with whom he was on friendly terms and

from whom he received mostly favorable press, prior to a falling out during which he was
POLS THESIS, MILLER 28

accused of having attempted to blackmail them.

While in office, Jackson also targeted the Bank of the United States (the historical

counterpart to today’s Federal Reserve), by pulling federal money from their budget, in a bid to

ensure that they would fail. While this move drew heavy criticism from elites, true to populist

form, Jackson’s finger was perhaps on the pulse of the people here, as Watson noted that many

of Jackson’s reasons for wanting to do away with the Bank of the United States remain enduring

criticisms, sounding very much like the modern-day conspiracy theories regarding the Federal

Reserve. To this end, Watson writes that “Jackson was also sure the Bank made dubious loans

and campaign contributions to influence politicians and editors and even to buy elections”. So,

while Jackson sought to influence public opinion via his interactions with the press, he was also

influenced by it, taking stances that would be politically popular with the general public, albeit

not the other office holding elites. This allowed him to argue that he had the best interest of the

public at heart, and to appear as though he was standing up for the so-called little guy in

Washington.

Additionally, for all that Jackson claimed to detest elites, according to Inskeep, “he did

not clear out Washington elites so much as bring a new coalition of elites to power: New York

politicians and Pennsylvania businessmen allied with Southern slaveholders. Jackson tended to

their special interests. He also used political patronage to stuff the government with Jackson

loyalists.” Historians today turn to this action with a critical eye, characterizing it as a style of

political appointment called the spoils system, based off of the oft quoted phrase “to the victor

belongs the spoils”, which is apt as it was actually coined by New York Senator William L.

Marcy, in reference to Andrew Jackson’s presidential victory.

Yet, whatever the impact of Jackson’s actions, his intentions might not have been so
POLS THESIS, MILLER 29

wholly straightforward, as according to Watson, Jackson had a “policy of ‘rotation in office’”

and claimed to earnestly believe that he was reforming the government. He also proclaimed that

“no one owned an office for life and that ‘men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves’

for government service” Watson went on.

There is further proof of the relevance of a historic figure like Andrew Jackson to today’s

political landscape, writes Inskeep, in the fact that “there is something Jacksonian both in

Trump’s promise to ‘drain the swamp’ of Washington and his early moves to refill the swamp

with wealthy friends, loyal supporters, and family members.” Therefore, even if one is not

inclined to give Jackson the benefit of the doubt in assuming that his appointments were not

intentionally corrupt — or even corrupt, at all — the takeaway should be that, despite claims that

much of Trump’s behavior is unprecedented, there is historical precedence for Trump’s more

nepotistic behavior, recorded with censure though it may have been.

Finally, under Jackson, the danger inherent in populism for the desires of a majority,

downtrodden though it may be, to be met at the expense of an even more marginalized minority

are exemplified. Not only did Jackson instill in office slaveholding elites, like himself, he was

also responsible for forcing Native Americans away from their homes and onto the trail of tears,

a decision which was the direct cause of the deaths of an estimated 4,000 Cherokee people. This

was done to further Western Expansion, something that became a goal of Jackson’s due, at least

partly, to the fact that his supporters wanted free land on the frontier. In Watson’s words,

Jackson had “no qualms about African-American bondage and deep hostility to abolitionism. He

ignored the early movement for women’s rights, and his infamous policy of Indian removal

partly stemmed from demands by his’ base’ for plentiful free land”. This illustrates the means

through which populism can quickly become oppressive, even while doing the most good for the
POLS THESIS, MILLER 30

largest amount of people.

Therefore, though it never won him the presidency, it was a long in motion tide of

populist change that later carried William Jennings Bryan to victory in his 1890 congressional

race for the the Nebraska seat, and again to reelection in 1892, notes a History.com article, the

online presence for the History Channel. In Congress, Bryan became a leader among free silver

Democrats and was respected for his rousing speeches. One such speech was his stirring Cross of

Gold speech, delivered at the 1896 Democratic National Convention. His speech favored free

silver and thereby captured for him the presidential nomination, both of the Democrats and the

populist party, which backed the Democrats during this election cycle. The populist view at the

time was that the government should protect individuals and the democratic process against

monopolistic corporations.

Despite this support from within his own base, Bryan lost to William McKinley. Due to

Bryan’s radicalism, this is to be expected, at least within the framework of the theories of elite

polarization and the median voter theorem, as outlined in chapter one. Even so, according to

“The Triumph of William McKinley”, a historical text by Karl Rove, the true reason Bryan lost

is not nearly so broad. Instead of merely a failure to adhere to this more general theory, Rove

postulates that William Jennings Bryan lost for eight reasons—which are paraphrased below—

that were specific to the time and place in which he ran (Rove, 365-375).

The first of these reasons was that the campaign of McKinley — who was Bryan’s

Republican opponent — was based on sound money and protection, both of which were big

issues during this election. The two candidates’ positions on these issues were fundamentally

different, and the people preferred McKinley’s stances. Secondly, he challenged Bryan’s stance

on free silver, making a convincing argument that free silver would actually harm Americans,
POLS THESIS, MILLER 31

especially laborers.

McKinley was also a different kind of Republican who realized that his party must

broaden and modernize its appeal, and this realization shaped how he went about campaigning,

thereby working in his favor. Furthermore, McKinley ran a stronger campaign due to the fact

that he broadened the electoral battlefield, something he would not have done had he not had the

aforementioned realization, meaning that reasons three and four for Bryan’s loss and McKinley’s

success go hand in hand. More specifically, “the number of people to be reached, educated, and

convinced was much larger than in any national campaign in the history of the country” (Rove,

369).

Additionally, while Bryan is the candidate remembered as a populist, McKinley ran as an

outsider to his own party, allowing him to undercut the traditional role played by party bosses.

Linked to this was the fact that McKinley was seen as a candidate of change, lessening the

populist distinction between him and Bryan. McKinley also ran as a unifier, adopting the

language of national reconciliation, whereas Bryan’s views were divisive. Finally, McKinley

maximized turn out among the party’s traditional followers. To do this, he targeted swing or non-

voters, and pushed his own message in the face of an opponent’s attacks.

George Wallace is another notable populist candidate from the past and, like Bryan, he

never became president, although he did serve three terms as governor of Alabama, and was first

gentleman of Alabama for a year and a half after running his wife as a surrogate candidate due to

term limits outlined in the Alabama constitution. His wife died of cancer while in office, which

marked the end of his tenure as first gentleman. He also ran twice for the presidency, disrupting

the political process, though he lost both times. He did not expect to win the presidency, at least

not the second time he ran for national office, but was hoping to secure enough of the vote as an
POLS THESIS, MILLER 32

Independent to keep either of the two major parties from winning, something that, ultimately, did

not happen. The first time he ran, he ran as a Democrat, but his racist, segregationist views were

not popular nationwide, despite polling well in Alabama, and he dropped out of the race. He did

allow for this action to benefit Alabama Republicans, however, sacrificing his own presidential

ambitions to allow a direct Republican challenge to incumbent Lyndon Baines Johnson

Wallace was arguably both a racist and a segregationist, and apparently his racist and

segregationist positions also branded him a populist, as Wallace was able to use his

segregationist views to pander to the white majority of Alabama voters. As put by Stephan

Lesher, author of the book George Wallace: American Populist, Wallace could emphasize with

“the deeply embedded sense of tribulation, victimization, isolation, and poverty to which the

South and its people had been heir since the Civil War” (Lesher, 1). Other historians concur.

According to Lloyd Rohler, author of the book George Wallace: Conservative Populist, in his

1964 campaign, Wallace “gained the support of many voters threatened by the social changes

that were developing in the early part of the decade and that would accelerate throughout the

1960s. With his plain-folks appeal, he spoke to the fears of the factory worker about loss of

seniority, the quality of schooling for children, the safety of the neighborhood, and the loss of

respect for traditional values of hard work, religion, and patriotism.”

Wallace’s rhetoric drew upon concern for the loss of local control to large organizations

far removed from the people themselves. Wallace played on the feeling of many of his

supporters that they were powerless and that decisions affecting their lives were being made by

people far distant from them and their experiences. The Wallace campaign consisted of two

closely related strategies: (1) demonize the federal government and (2) sharpen class and racial

antagonism by arguing that the political economy is a zero-sum game in which gains by one
POLS THESIS, MILLER 33

group come at the expense of others.

As for Wallace’s relevance, Trump has also taken up the argument that the political

economy is a zero-sum game, except this time it is immigrants who have been scapegoated, as

opposed to African Americans. It is an argument that has appealed with the low-educated sector

of the work force. This is because, though economic research shows that immigrants are actually

a boon to the economy and often go on to be innovators and job creators, as shown in the chart

below, immigration does not come without its costs:

SOURCE: National Venture Capital Association

The costs of immigration are namely felt by the low educated sector of the

workforce, hence Trump’s success in appealing to this demographic. This is due to the
POLS THESIS, MILLER 34

fact that the jobs most often taken by immigrants, particularly those who are

undocumented are for jobs that do not require certifications, leading to increased

competition for such positions. This trend is verified by the chart below:

SOURCE: CNN Business

In sum, there is much that can be learned about populism and how it functions in

the United States by looking at historical examples. In Fact, Donald Trump is reported by

Time Magazine as having referred to Jackson as “an amazing figure in American history

— very unique so many ways” and he also hung a portrait of Andrew Jackson in the Oval

Office, as evidenced in the photograph below:


POLS THESIS, MILLER 35

SOURCE: EnviroNews

This indicates that the campaigns run by historical populist candidates might even

serve as a sort of template or ‘political how-to’ for the politically calculating. Either way,

they certainly make for interesting parallels to modern day populist figures, both helping

one to understand and contextualize them and indicating that perhaps there are trends of

both policy and rhetoric that are inherent in the populist phenomenon.
POLS THESIS, MILLER 36

V. Continued | Data Analysis pt. 2

 the Present Day

Madison Miller

Mary Baldwin University


POLS THESIS, MILLER 37

A factor unique to the political landscape of 2018 is the fact that not only one but two

populist candidates rose up through the primaries of each of the major two parties, amassing appeal

with voters from each of their respective parties. Although Bernie Sanders did not win the

Democratic nomination, he rose up further through the primaries than was expected and, as

mentioned before, after his loss, there were Democrats who refused to support Hillary Clinton, in

part because her views did not meet their tests of progressive ideological purity — a problem with

her own base that plagued her throughout the election. Similarly, Donald Trump was not

considered a serious contender in the Republican primaries until he won the nomination, and even

then, few predicted that he would win the presidency. This seems to indicate that the country was

in a particularly populist mood during the 2016 election cycle.

Indeed, despite established the established political theory of elite polarization seeming to

assert the contrary, there is an argument to be made that it was not extremism that alienated

Hillary Clinton from her base, but centrism. A segment of her base preferred the opposing

Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders, as he successfully billed himself as more progressive. The

fact that party elites refused to take him seriously and tried to brand him a radical, playing up the

fact that he was a registered independent, did not matter as much as it ought to have, as there was

a large segment of the Democratic base that wanted a candidate who leaned farther to the left.

Hillary Clinton argued that this distinction between the two of them was unfair, and tried to court

favor with these voters, but she could only do it to such a degree, as she felt as though she had to

continue to adhere to the tradition of offering a centrist message during the general election, per

the constraints of the median voter theorem.

In particular, the voters in this more polarized segment of Clinton's leftist base seemed to

be of the more informed voter type that Abramowitz mentions in his critique of elite polarization
POLS THESIS, MILLER 38

theory, as they were aware of this longstanding strategy of returning to more centrist rhetoric

during the general election and harped on instances of perceived stance changes by Clinton on

past issues, a phenomenon colloquially referred to as ‘flip flopping’. Displeased with this, a

portion of Democrats even went so far as to refuse to vote for her in the general election, either

by abstaining from voting altogether or by defying all expectations of party loyalty and voting

for Donald Trump or a third-party candidate, something that hurt Clinton’s numbers within her

own base.

While it is still a matter of some debate whether or not this was the deciding factor that

ultimately cost Clinton the election, analysts agree that it least had a modest effect and that, at a

minimum, it certainly did not help matters. In fact, according to Nate Cohn, who analyzed data

on behalf of the New York Times, “overall, almost one in four of President Obama’s 2012 white

working-class supporters defected from the Democrats in 2016, either supporting Mr. Trump or

voting for a third-party candidate.” It is also true that some Democrats did not vote at all, not just

supposition, as confirmed by a post-election poll from SurveyMonkey:


POLS THESIS, MILLER 39

Additionally, Republican candidates do not seem to be moving toward the center of the

political spectrum in the general election anymore, although Democrats have largely stuck with

this strategy, at least for the time being. Perhaps the Republican party is onto something, as

initial polling during the 2016 election cycle indicated that the more extreme Bernie Sanders

polled better than Hillary Clinton against Donald Trump, not just among Democrats but also

Republicans. In fact, this was true in both March and May, according to aggregate comparisons

of polling data collected by PolitiFact:


POLS THESIS, MILLER 40

SOURCE: POLITIFACT
POLS THESIS, MILLER 41

SOURCE: POLITIFACT

From the above samples, only one February poll collected by Public Policy

Polling suggested that Clinton fared better against Trump than Sanders and only by a +3

margin. The weak +3 margin is notable because, out of all the other polls in Politifact’s

aggregate that didn’t go to Trump (minus one where Sanders also fared better by small

margin of +3), Sanders fared better than Clinton by a margin of +4 or more. In five cases

out of the aggregate’s total fifteen, Sanders even fared better by a margin of +10 or more,
POLS THESIS, MILLER 42

meaning that he fared better at this much higher margin by a rate of 33.33 percent. In the

same vein, and perhaps even more notably, Sanders consistently polled better than

Clinton against Trump, not only polling better than Trump but doing so at a higher

margin than Clinton in all but two cases, meaning that, according to this polling sample,

he fared better than Clinton against Trump at a rate of 86.67 percent.

Strikingly, only two polls from this set predicted a Trump win. While much can

be made of this, in regards to the inaccuracy of the 2016 polls, Sanders still outperformed

Clinton in both instances, with one Fox News poll even predicting that Trump would beat

Clinton by +3, but that a Trump and Sanders race would end with Sanders prevailing

over Trump by +4, giving Sanders a +7 advantage over Clinton. A poll conducted as a

joint venture between USA Today and Suffolk University also predicted a Trump win,

this time over both candidates, although Sanders had less ground to cover than Clinton in

endeavoring to make up this difference, as this poll predicted a Trump win by +2 over

Clinton and a more competitive +1 over Sanders.

The fact that the more populist candidate out of the two polled better than the

centrist candidate against another arguably populist candidate (or at least one who

dressed his messaging in familiar populist rhetoric, as whether or not Trump is truly a

populist remains a subject of political debate) suggests, as Abramowitz postulates, “that

the general election voters are themselves more polarized than in the past.” This is at

odds with the theory of elite polarization and its assertion that the political elites are the

ones who are responsible for adopting strong, polarized opinions, and therefore

accountable for creating gridlock and allowing for less compromise. Instead, it seems to

support the theory of mass polarization, which hypothesizes that not just the elites have
POLS THESIS, MILLER 43

become more polarized, but the wider public, as well.

Economic concerns are hugely relevant to United Sates politics, as well, with

many voters voting on the behalf of candidates who embrace policies that they feel are in

their financial best interest. Therefore, perhaps this is one explanation as to why so-called

populist candidates most often concern themselves with the issues of income inequality

and economic policy and have, historically, espoused rhetoric in support of a common

middle class or a so-called ‘working man’s interest’. After all, the very rich might hold

the highest shares of the wealth present day, but they make up a small percentage of the

overall population. For candidates courting the popular vote, their rhetoric should have

broad appeal, so tailoring it to the top 1% would not prove to be a wise political

calculation.

It is bearing this in mind, then, that one should consider the fact that present day

economic data shows that, within the United States, the very rich are getting richer, while

the middle and working class are not making the same gains. Indeed, an analysis of

federal tax data by the University of California and Berkeley economist Emmanuel Saez,

which was published by the Washington Center for Equitable Growth in July of 2016,

shows evidence of this very trend. Americans still haven't regained the ground that was

lost in the economic downturn that came in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, or so

goes Saez’s interpretation of the data.

Saez also found that the top one percent of income-earners have been and

continue to outperform the rest of American families. Though those within the bottom 99

percent made gains, as well, at a growth rate of 3.9 percent, the richest workers enjoyed

income gains of 7.7 percent in the year of 2015, the year prior to the most recent 2016
POLS THESIS, MILLER 44

election, in which populist candidates polled better than centrists, with the supposed more

politically palatable “moderate” even losing out in the general election:

Perhaps, then, the increasing focus during the 2016 election cycle on so-called populist

issues like affordable, accessible healthcare and movements to increase minimum wage was

drummed up by a disenchanted working class that has grown tired of being outperformed.

One can draw similar conclusions about the current economic state of things from Pew

Research Data, as well. For example, between the years of 1983 and 2013, only those in upper-
POLS THESIS, MILLER 45

income brackets have seen substantial economic gains:

As one might expect, then, economic issues were seen by some Americans as the most

important issue of 2016:

Although not a majority, the 21 percent of Americans who viewed financial issues as the

United States’ most pressing problem during the 2016 election cycle was not an insubstantial

chunk of the voter base. Candidates who accused those with seemingly extreme economic policy

propositions of radicalism were, then, perhaps themselves not being shrewd in failing to give this
POLS THESIS, MILLER 46

sector of the population the attention that an increasingly unhappy middle and working class felt

that it deserved.
POLS THESIS, MILLER 47

VI. Implications and Conclusion

 summarization and discussion of significance of results

Madison Miller

Mary Baldwin University


POLS THESIS, MILLER 48

In sum, there is substantial evidence to establish that increased partisanship and economic

inequality each independently correlate with populism, indicating that, perhaps, under the right

conditions, populism is not so rare or extraordinary a phenomenon as the dominant, popular

political science theories might otherwise suggest.

While the link between these concepts remains as of yet, just that, a link, the correlation

seems to invite further research into its nature and source, particularly given that there is so much

confusion still surrounding the 2016 election. Perhaps its outcome could be better contextualized

if a better theoretical framework existed to explain the driving factors behind populism and,

certainly, the conventional wisdom seems to have failed, at least in 2016. Therefore, perhaps

populism is a subject that is better studied further, rather than written off as fringe.

It seems worthy of further study, in any event, given that the factors with which it

correlated in 2016 have yet to be addressed and do not seem in danger of disappearing. Already,

during the recent 2018 midterms, there were local populist candidates elected into office:

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, for example, an organizer for Sanders’ 2016 campaign. Perhaps even

more notable, however, is the case of Richard Ojeda, a populist Democrat who lost the house

race in West Virginia, but who has now announced a bid for the presidency. Like Trump, Ojeda

is new to politics and, as was similar to the case of Sanders upon his initial announcement that he

was running for Presidential Office, he has not yet achieved widespread name recognition. Yet, it

may be unwise to write him off just yet, just as it was unwise to write off Sanders and Trump so

early on into things. Should America’s populist mood last, the way the Ojeda’s newfound bid for

the presidency seems to indicate it might, populism might not be just a worthy subject of study,

but a prudent one.


POLS THESIS, MILLER 49

VII. Bibliography

Madison Miller

Mary Baldwin University


POLS THESIS, MILLER 50

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Possible.” The Washington Post.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/26/the-real-reason-donald-trump-

is-winning-no-one-thought-it-was-possible/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7e49bae8d29c.

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