RULE 110:

Cases:

1) [G.R. No. L-53373. June 30, 1987.] MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, vs. HON.
LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents ->
Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment
was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater
to the appellate court. The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to
refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review
reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to
move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.  Judge
Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused
then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA.
The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the
Fiscal under orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on
the merits.

HELD: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be
controlled by the complainant. 

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control.
The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of
Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the
fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the
case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of
the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.

2) [G.R. No. L-41213-14. October 5, 1976.] JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN,

LIBRADO SODE, TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO
BARTIDO, petitioners, vs. JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO , in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. -> - Solicitor General Estilito P.
Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko
for respondents.

Estanisloo A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private prosecutors.

- petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in the Criminal Case
People of the Philippines v Jorge Tan, Jr, Cesar Tan, Teofanis Bondoc, Osmundo
Tolentino, Mariano Bartido and Librado Sode for frustrated murder and Double Murder
of the son and uncle of Mayor Inigo Larazzabal.

- Judge Pedro Gallardo made the two life sentences to death penalty allegedly after
meeting with Mayor Larazzabal and receipt of other paraphernalia such as whisky and
wine according to the court stenographer.

- Jan 14, 1976 - SolGen, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his
Comment to the petition. They are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the
rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial
were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice... therefore, they interpose no
objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a
new decision by another trial judge."

- Jan 30, 1976 - private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the
challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.

- Feb 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked
Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter
has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court
and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this
Tribunal”

- private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to
take part in the proceedings, and to adapt a position in contravention to that of the
Solicitor General.

ISSUE: WON private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the
Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter

HELD

1. NO

Ratio Private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position

inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.

Reasoning

- Participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court
in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in
the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To
collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never
intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in
contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.

- Since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural
that the representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution.

> Suarez v Platon: the prosecuting officer "'is the representative not of, an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall he done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty
to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one."

> People v Esquivel: that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay
"before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous
attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence,
to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may
not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the
prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state."

- It is for the purpose of realizing the aforementioned objectives that the prosecution of
offenses is placed under the direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting
officer.

- Role of the private prosecutors is to represent the offended party with respect to the
civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. This civil action
is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly
waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately. Thus, "an offended party

    may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of

offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party The
only exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or
expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which
case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his
interest in its prosecution. in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in the
prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the
direction and control of the prosecuting official."

> Herrero v Diaz: "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by
section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of
the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal."

- the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor
fiscal because, as the promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent the public
prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders,
and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to institute and
prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not or to refrain
from prosecuting it or not, depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion,
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the
offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding.
Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks the
competent Court of First Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal
thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the
commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows
the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not entitled to represent the
People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the
proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the
promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed
upon petition of the promoter fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to
appeal from an order overrruling a complaint or information, which right belongs
exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General
Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal
from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon
petition of the promoter fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of
the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the
above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58.

- from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense
charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the
prosecution of the offense.

- Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal
proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the
Solicitor General", provides:

SECTION 1. Function and Organization, (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. * * * The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government, and as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is
the party.

(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or
commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.

It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent
the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is
subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand
inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving
the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the
provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.

3) [G.R. No. 152644. February 10, 2006.] JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID
and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent. -> Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the
tunnel’s end which caused the tailings to gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a
few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers. The DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of Water
Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),
 Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property. Petitioners moved to quash the
Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were "duplicitous" as the
DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act.

ISSUE: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed
for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property should stand (NO) 

HELD: NO. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges
simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense. A
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule
110). There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with
four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. The filing of several
charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused
for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition
that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. On
petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in
se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot
absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942).
What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what
makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

4) [G.R. No. 202124. April 5, 2016.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, accused-appellant. -> In Criminal Case No. 7698-
G, appellant Ireneo Jugueta was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows: That on
or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½
years of age. That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had
not given provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to
facilitate the commission of the offense.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by
the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of
Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would
have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel
Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and
who are minors, were not hit.

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At
said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on
June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain “Hapon” and Gilbert Estores at the crime
scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no
participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was
not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the
Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel. Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to
appellant.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua
for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of
Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine
Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the
sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims
actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case
No. 7702-G, reads: WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel
Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the
costs of the suit.

Aggrieved by the trial court’s judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30,
2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming appellant’s conviction for the crimes
charged.

The main issue advanced in the Appellant’s Brief deals with the inconsistencies in
Norberto’s testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three
assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun
used to kill Norberto’s children.

The appeal is unmeritorious. The evidence on record fully supports the trial court’s
factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in concert with two other
individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and
his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three
assailants with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their
house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off.

This resolves the appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January
30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case
No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

RULING: The Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial
court to identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion
caused by the trial court’s use of the terms “Double Murder” and “Multiple Attempted
Murder” in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show
that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder
and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder. The facts, as alleged in the Information in
Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2
counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was
not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the
same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and
not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the
Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.

5) [G.R. No. 157472. September 28, 2007.] SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, petitioner, vs .

HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L.
ESCUETA, respondents. -> 

Petitioner was charged with homicide. ã Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty. ã On the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued an
order directingthe trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in
view of theaggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information
which publicrespondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. Prosecutor
entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and instead wrote the word
Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information.The accusatory
portion remained exactly the same as that of the srcinal Information for Homicide, with
the correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from Escuita to Escueta. On the date
scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraignedfor the
crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be
placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had beenterminated
without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner
refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent
entered for him a plea of not guilty. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash which the
respondent judge denied. Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for
Reconsideration. The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the
MR. 

Issue/ Held: W/N the amendment of the information from homicide to murder was
proper. Ratio: Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, the public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information
fromHomicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
 disregard of rank, which is in violation of Section 14 of Rule 110; that under
paragraph3, Article 14 of the RPC, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating
circumstancewhich serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and
does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that
disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial
amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea. Petitioner
confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court with Section 19, Rule 119. The first paragraph of Sec.
14, Rule 110 provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while
the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge. Amendment before
plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed.
 Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to
thenew information. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the
srcinal information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after
the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the
original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy.
On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information
involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the
original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy. Where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is
sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct
and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order. There is identity
between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a
frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense
charged in the first information. An offense may be said to necessarily includeanother
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former constitute thelatter.
An offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. The
change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment
and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. While the amended Information
was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made was in
the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or  preamble of the Information,
with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder. There
was no change in the recital of factsconstituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court.The averments in the amended
Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original
Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to
petitioner. Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in
cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments
do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused
are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would
be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the
accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original
Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of
the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of
petitioner.

RULE 111:

C. Overturning the Maria Clara Doctrine -

****new rape law - [GR nos. 225642-43. January 17, 2018] People of the Philippines vs.
Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho -> 

****old rape law - [G.R. No. L-11991. October 31, 1960] THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORFIRIO TAÑO, ET AL., defendants. PORFIRIO
TAÑO and DIONISIO CANTONG, defendants-appellants -> 

Cases:

1) [G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y
GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and
ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants. ->  On 29 December 1995 an
Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque charging Rogelio
Gomez y Reyes a.k.a. Philip Roger Lacson or Roger Eleazar Gomez with illegal
recruitment in large scale resulting in economic sabotage. The Information alleged that
Rogelio Gomez, without the requisite license or authority from the POEA, recruited
seven (7) individuals, namely, Rebecca M. Talavera, Herminia S.  Antones, Cynthia P.
Castillo, Guillermo D. Gumabon Jr., Dionisio M. de los Reyes, Ramil del
Rosario and Ronnie Agpalo for employment in Japan and charged them placement
fees ranging from P65,000.00 to P160,000.00 each. On 10 January 1996 eight (8)
Informations were also filed before the same court each charging Rogelio Gomez with
estafa. Analiza G. Santos was added to the list of complainants as she also alleged
that she was defrauded by the same accused.  Accused-appelant promised these
applicants various jobs in Japan for placement fees ranging from P65,000.00 to
P160,000.00. Upon handing them their travel documents, the applicants whereupon
discovered that what was given to them by Rogelio Gomez are plane tickets and visa
for China only. Rogelio Gomez however promised that he would soon follow them in
China to issue the ticket and visa for Japan. Upon arrival at China, Gomez did not
arrive until the pocket money of these applicants were gradually depleted, which
made them decide to go home. Upon coming home to Philippines, they learned that
Rogelio was being held at the NBI detention cell as he was facing charges of illegal
recruitment, prompting them to file their separate affidavits of complaint. NBI Special
Investigator III Syrus Aluzan testified that on 23 November 1995 Rebecca M. Talavera
filed an initial pro-forma complaint for illegal recruitment and estafa against Rogelio
Gomez. Upon the filing of the complaint he conducted a verification with the Records
Division of the NBI where he unearthed eight (8) outstanding warrants of arrest against
accused. On 10 December 1995 Rebecca M. Talavera returned to the NBI station to
execute an affidavit of complaint. On the morning of 13 December 1995 agent Aluzan
with elements of the NBI arrested Rogelio Gomez at his home in
Parañaque. Prosecution witness Graciano Ocos, Public Employment Officer of
the POEA, testified that Rogelio was not licensed to recruit workers for Japan. He
also  verified the authenticity of the certification executed by Salome Mendoza,
Manager of the POEA Licensing Branch, that Rogelio Gomez was not authorized
to recruit workers for overseas employment. On 26 September 1997 he was convicted
of illegal recruitment in a large scale and ws also found guilty to estafa. Rogelio Gomez
now appeals the Decision of the RTC arguing that (a) he was unlawfully arrested by
the NBI agents headed by NBI Special Investigator III Syrus Aluzan; (b) the trial court
erred in denying his application for bail after his arraignment; and, (c) the trial court
erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in denying his application for bail after his
arraignment. 

RULING: NO. Regarding the issue of bail, accused-appellant argues that although his

counsel was given the chance to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses at the
bail hearings, he was not given the opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence to disprove
that the evidence of his guilt was strong. In such cases, where the prosecution was not
given the chance to present evidence to prove that the guilt of the accused was strong,
we held that the proper remedy was for him to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. This same principle must apply to cases where the defense was not accorded a
chance to present any rebuttal evidence. When the trial court denied his application for
bail accused-appellant should have filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate
court. Hence, it is also too late for him to question the trial court’s decision of denying
his application 

for bail. Besides, the conviction of accused-appellant undoubtedly proves that the

evidence of guilt against him  was strong.

2) [G.R. No. 122150. March 17, 2003] George (Culhi) Hambon, petitioner, vs. Court
of Appeals and Valentino U. Carantes, respondents. -> Herein respondent filed a
complaint for damages against respondent for the injuries and expenses he sustained
when the latter’s truck bumped him that night of December 9, 1985. However, the
criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed previously
against the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioner’s lack of interest.
Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.
Trial Court rendered decision in favor of petitioner, Court of Appeals reversed the
decision, on the grounds that the Hambon failed to file the civil case. Hence, it is
impliedly instituted with the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal case also
includes the dismissal of the civil case.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION
TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM
THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111,
SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION
BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE
THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE

HELD: quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all
civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have
been instituted with the criminal case....  In other words the right of the injured party to
sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex
delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved
otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal action.

Contrary to private respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate

civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of
procedure.  The requirement is merely procedural in nature.  For that matter the
Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also
civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no
one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be
brought separately.

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment
of the rule explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.

x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil
actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or
simultaneous with the criminal action.

. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to
borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":

‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent

delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute
the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil
Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation
should be dismissed.  With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil
action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein was likewise
dismissed.chan robles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in
toto

3) [G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA -> Rogelio Bayotas, accused and
charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The
Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does
not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in
People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in
the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability.

RULING: The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and
Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only
when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan
further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no party
defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist.
Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the
survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on the
sources of obligations other than delict. In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued
Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only survive if death
came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the
Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex
delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
The Court also gave a summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to
wit: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death
extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act complained of.

4) [G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015] PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY

HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T.
BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. -> 

5) [G.R. No. 163879 July 30, 2014] DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA and
ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents. And [G.R. No. 165805] DR. CLENIO YNZON,
Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA
AND ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents -> Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio
Ynzon prior to the disposition of this case, his criminal liability is extinguished; however,
his civil liability subsists. A separate civil action may be filed either against the
executor/administrator, or the estateof Dr. Ynzon, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same are based. The effect of death, pending appeal of his
conviction of Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities should be in
accordance to People v. Bayotas: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
fromwhich the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law  b)
Contracts c) Quasi-contracts e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued  but only by way of filing a separate civil
action. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/
administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation. 4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitationson the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

*about prejudicial question:

6) [G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988] LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON.
ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ
B. ABAYAN, respondents. -> An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo
Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila.  This was based
on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan.  Before the petitioner’s
arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner
contracted on September 26, 1978.  Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz
consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no
previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping
on June 30, 1978.  Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the
marriage.  Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a
joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code.  Donato
continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon
learning that Donato already previously married.

ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile
and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial
question.

HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case
for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such
marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that
his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy. Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question
shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980
should be sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

7) [G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000] IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent. -> • October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated. January 25, 1996, second
marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis. Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage. After petitioner
sued for bigamy, it’s just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into
the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the
second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of
its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent
was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity
of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)

8) [G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000] ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents. -> FACTS: In 1988, Arthur Te and Lilian
Choa married in civil rites. Although they did not live together, they would usually see
each other. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to their daughter. Thereafter, Arthur stopped
visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted another marriage while still married to Liliana.
Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy case against Te and administrative case for the revocation
of his and his mistress’ engineering license. Te filed a petition for nullity of marriage.
RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy case even the petition for annulment was
pending.

ISSUE: W/N the annulment should be resolved first before the criminal and
administrative case be decided upon.

HELD: NO. Outcome The annulment case had no bearing on Te’s guilt in the bigamy
case. The ground cited by Te for the annulment was for voidable marriage. Hence, he
was still validly married when he committed bigamy.

9) [G.R. No. 159186. June 5, 2009] JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner, vs HON. MONICO G.

CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City;
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO,
Respondents. -> Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for
misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were
transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The
CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on
condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to
the court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a
prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contested the
condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the
same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues: 

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right

against excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right
to travel.

Held: 

1. Right to Bail. The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,

excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose
for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is
charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid
as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot
allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability
which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel. The right to change abode and travel within the
Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights.  Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution states: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
 Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of
Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to
ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that
petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the
court in case he does so.

10) [G.R. No. 186597. June 17, 2015] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUELARAMBULO, JR., Respondents. ->  

RULE 112:

Cases:

1) People vs Molina (GR no. 133917. Feb 19 2001) -> 



2) People vs Aruta (GR no. 120915. Apr 31 1998) -> In the morning of 13 Dec 1988,
the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named “Benjie”
that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would
be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana;
 At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying
a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers;
 NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents;
 When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same
to him;  When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves;  Aruta was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are
being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime.
Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was
merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her
to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect.
The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive
finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there
was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing
a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction
nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently,
there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows
that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful
arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not
be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree”
and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

NOTES: When is a warrantless search allowed?

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;  and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

3) People vs Aminnudin (GR no. 74869. Jul 6 1998) -> The PC (Philippine
Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the accused was on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by
name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him
and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what
were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of
the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue: Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and
seizure is violated

Ruling: The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
rules of court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was
about to be committed or had just been committed. A vessels and aircraft are subject
to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can
be secured. In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9.
His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was certain.
And from the information they have received, they could have persuaded a judge that
there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was
the head of the arresting team had determine on his own authority that a search
warrant was not necessary. The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a
judge and not law enforcement agents.

4) Posadas vs CA (GR no. 89139. Aug 2 1990) -> Members of the Integrated National
Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat.
Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street,
Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to
flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag
of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with
Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the
petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms
and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to
the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were
indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner,
argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a
warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances. In the case at bar, there is
no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis
of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously
and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.



5) People vs Mengote (GR no. 87059. Jun 22 1992) -> a telephone call was by
Western Police district that here were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of
plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They saw two men “looking from side to
side” one of whom is holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were
unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were
then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused was found with a .38
caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion
had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them.

Issue: Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure is violated

Ruling: The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires
that a person be arrested 1 After he has committed or while he is actually committing
or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of
the arrest in question, the accused was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding
his abdomen”. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent requirements have not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in
fact just been committed and that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from
the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.

Rule 113 and Rule 114:

1. People vs. Aruta ->

2. People vs. Aminnudin ->

3. Posadas vs. CA -> 

4. People vs. Mengote

5. People vs. Molina 352 SCRA 174

6. Alejano vs. Cabuay GR No. 160792, Aug. 25, 2005 -> 

A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the
military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident.
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution,
which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the
persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the
detainees are already charged of coup d’etat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case
as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment.

ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is
to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry
reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If,
however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings
terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither
can it substitute for an appeal.

People v. Marra y Zarate, G.R. No. 108494 -> Jimmy Din and Nelson Tandoc were
conversing with each other in front of the hotel owned by Din’s father when a man
passed by on the opposite side of the street waving a dirty sign with his finger. Din and
Tandoc followed until they caught up with the man and demanded an explanation but
they were not given any. They were joined by two other men and a brawl ensued when
Tandoc slapped one of them. The fight ended when their opponents ran away.

When Din and Tando were on their way to the hotel, they men with whom they just had
a fight ran after them which pressed them to hide in the annex of the hotel. After a few
minutes, thinking that there was no longer any danger, Tandoc decided to go home.
However, he was shot by a revolver by a man wearing a security guard’s uniform when
he opened the door. Din witnessed the shooting and was able to take a good look at
the man who fatally shot Tandoc. 

Samuel Marra was identified as the man who shot Tandoc and was approached by
responding policemen while he was eating at an eatery shortly after the incident. A
series of questions were asked, particularly his tour of duty and where his issued
firearm might be. He brought the policemen to his house and showed them his revolver
with five live bullets and an empty shell. Marra denied shooting Tandoc at first but
admitted to the crime and said that he did so in self-defense. He was then taken to the
police station where he was positively identified by Din and was consequentially
detained. 

ISSUE: Whether or not there was violation of rights of suspects under custodial
investigation when policemen asked the appellant questions prior to his arrest. 

RULING: In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he
made the admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such
as statement. He could have refused to answer questions from the very start. The
police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a particular
suspect. Thus, there was no violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution or the
constitutional procedure on custodial investigation. In addition, the law provides that
the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or of any
offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against him and, in
certain circumstances, this admission may be considered as part of the res gestae or
the facts that may be admitted as evidence. The judgment finding accused-appellant
Samuel Marra guilty of the crime of murder was affirmed.