Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.

188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A.
9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly,
the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986,
Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the
population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in
Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos
has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for
being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required
by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation
with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional
Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the
following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel
V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared
official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated
whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case,
the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among
districts.

MONTEJO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 118702 16 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the
annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity of
representation. Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District of the province.

For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the
population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:

Census 1990 Census 1994

First District 303, 349 178, 688
Second District 272, 167 156, 462
Third District 214, 499 125, 763
Fourth District 269, 347 155, 995
Fifth District 309, 148 181, 242
ISSUES:

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

HELD/RULING:

The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the
Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor

adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission

wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a district to another
district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one. Minor adjustments
does not allow the change in allocations per district.
It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is
then annulled and set aside. The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is
denied.

Herrera vs COMELEC

Facts:

In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have
the province subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial
Election Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal officials,
barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested
parties. A consensus was reached in favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-
1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to
Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva
Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.

The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:

1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?

Held:

COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

Ratio:

1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous
and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or
touching along boundaries often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows
that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. As
required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and
represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members.
Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts
for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras,
being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the
number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters. The
districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

Mancenido v. CA
 G.R. NO. 118605(April 12, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioners, who are public school teachers, filed a case against the provincial
officials to compel them to pay their claims for unpaid salary increases. In this petition for
review on certiorari, they argue that the CA erred in recognizing the authority of the
council of the provincial officials to file a notice of appeal.

HELD: The SC held that in resolving whether a local government official may secure the
services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the
nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered. In view of the damages
sought in the case at bar which, if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents
could not be deemed to be improperly represented by private counsel.

RAMOS vs CA
Not yet

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL

vs.
COURT OFAPPEALSREGALADO,
J.:
Facts: Atty. Felix E. Mendiola served as counsel for the Municipality of Pililia in a
collection suit for unpaid business taxes, storage permit fee, mayor’s permit fee,
sanitary inspection fee, and the cost of the suit against private respondent
Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC). The municipality won in the trial court,
and when PPC elevated the case to the Supreme Court, the SC affirmed the aforesaid
judgment. The judgment became final and executory and the records were
remanded to the trial court for execution. In connection with the execution of said
judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the
examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and
1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing business tax. Defendant corporation
filed a manifestation that Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum
of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the
Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim documents executed by
said mayor. The RTC denied the municipality's motion for examination and
execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment had already been satisfied.
It was when the case was only when the case was brought before to the CA that
respondent PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent
petitioner municipality.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private
counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a
similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or
municipal legal officer.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Mendiola can represent the Municipality of Pilila

Held
: No. The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority
to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. Section
1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in

litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality
or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original
jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or
municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the
interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are
opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council. Only
the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.

The fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case
must appear on record.

In the case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the
appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law. The submission of
Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to apply to situations where the
provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal
to represent the municipality is not a legal justification. A fiscal cannot refuse to
perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath
of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council
should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place
of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.

It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola, was even raised
by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion for
execution of his lien, which was filed by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal in behalf of said municipality. The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private
respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to
represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of his representation can be
questioned at any stage of theoi proceedings. Also, even assuming that the
representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said
authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter,
through the municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into
a compromise agreement with PPC.

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and ENGR. RAMIR J THOMPSON, Petitioners

vs.

FULGENCIO DACARA Sr, Respondent

G.R No. 150304, JUNE 15, 2005

Panganiban, J.:
FACTS: Sometime on February 28, 1988, Dacara Jr’s car turned turtle after it
rammed against a pile of earth/ street diggings at Matahimik Street, Quezon City,
which was then repaired by the Quezon City Government. As a result, Dacara Jr.
allegedly sustained bodily injuries and his vehicle was extensively damaged.
Fulgencio Dacara Sr, in behalf of his minor son, filed a claim for damages against
the Local Government of Quezon City and Engr. Ramir J. Thompson before the
RTC. The LGU contended that the fault is on the driver, since the LGU have out
up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU is liable. The petitioners
appealed to the higher court but the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of the
RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Engr Ramir Thompson and the Quezon City
Government be held liable for damages due to the injuries suffered
by Dacara Jr?

HELD:

Yes. The negligence of Engr Ramir J Thompson as an instrumentality of the

Quezon City Government is the proximate cause of the injuries and damage to
property suffered by Fulgencio Dacara’s (respondent) son, which make the LGU
subsidiarily liable for the damage incurred. The petitioner’s claim that they were
not negligent insisting that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to
alert the public of the roadside construction, but none were presented , gave a
more substantial support to the report of the policeman who responded to the
scene of incident that no precautionary signs were found on the said place of
incident. Thus, the LGU and Engr Ramir J Thompson as its instrumentality were
held negligent in the execise of their functions where as capsulized under Article
2189 of the New Civil Code that Local Government and its employees should be
responsible not only for the maintenance roads/ streets but also for the safety of
the public. Hence, compensatory damages was awarded to the respondent.

SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,

vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN,
MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL
(NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO,
 represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL
MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED
BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 163609 [November 27, 2008]

FACTS:

On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board

the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality
of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed
the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General
Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision
sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication
that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin
sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6)
days after the accident.

ISSUE:

MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the
driver assigned to him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.

RULING:

1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality.

That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the
accident is of no moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s
employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming
arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to
Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England
Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render
one the employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner.
There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used
that will make him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere
passenger at the time of the accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged
in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is
illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court
held that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them
the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only
be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimantthe right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct
employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and
severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third
persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said
vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of
record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third
persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for
the consequences incident to its operation.
The petition is DENIED.

Osmena case

Facts:
The City of Cebu was to play host to the 1994 Palarong Pambansa (Palaro). In
preparation for the games, the City engaged the services of WT Construction, Inc.
(WTCI) and Dakay Construction and Development Company (DCDC) to construct
and renovate the Cebu City Sports Complex. Osmeña, then city mayor, was
authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) of Cebu to represent the
City and to execute the construction contracts.

Osmeña issued a total of 20 Change/Extra Work Orders. These Change/Extra

Work Orders were not covered by any Supplemental Agreement, nor was
there a prior authorization from the Sanggunian . Nevertheless, the work
proceeded on account of the "extreme urgency and need to have a suitable
venue for the Palaro." 4 The Palaro was successfully held at the Cebu City
Sports Complex during the first six months of 1994.

WTCI and DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they performed in the
construction and renovation of the sports complex. A Sanggunian member,
Councilor Augustus Young, sponsored a resolution authorizing Osmeña to
execute the supplemental agreements with WTCI and DCDC to cover the extra
work performed, but the other Sanggunian members refused to pass the
resolution.

Thus, the extra work completed by WTCI and DCDC was not covered by the
necessary appropriation to effect payment, prompting them to file two separate
collection cases. The RTC found the claims meritorious, and ordered the City to pay
for the extra work performed. The RTC likewise awarded damages, litigation
expenses and attorney's fees.

During post-audit, the City Auditor issued two notices disallowing the
payment of litigation expenses, damages, and attorney's fees to WTCI and
DCDC. The City Auditor held Osmeña, the members of the Sanggunian, and the
City Administrator liable for the P2,514,255.40 and P102,015.00 awarded to
WTCI and DCDC, respectively, as damages, attorney's fees, and interest
charges. These amounts, the City Auditor concluded, were unnecessary
expenses for which the public officers should be held liable in their personal
capacities pursuant to the law.

Later, It declared that the payment of the amounts awarded as damages and
attorney's fees should solely be Osmeña's liability, as it was him who ordered
the change or extra work orders without the supplemental agreement
required by law, or the prior authorization from the Sanggunian .

Issue:
Whether or not Osmena should be personally held liable for the damages and
attorney’s fees.

Ruling:
Section 103 of PD 1445 declares that "[e]xpenditures of government funds or
uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the o􀁉cial or employee found to be directly responsible therefor."
Notably,
the public o􀁉cial's personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government
funds
was made in violation of law.

None of these officials voiced any

objection to the lack of a prior authorization from the Sanggunian or a
supplemental
agreement. "[a]s the projects had been completed, accepted and
used by the [City of Cebu]," the RTC ruled that there is "no necessity of
[executing] a
supplemental agreement." 24 Indeed, as we declared in Mario R. Melchor v.
COA , 25 a
supplemental agreement to cover change or extra work orders is not always
mandatory, since the law adopts the permissive word "may."

we 􀁉nd it "unjust to order the petitioner to shoulder the

expenditure when the government had already received and accepted
bene􀁉ts from the
utilization of the [sports complex]," especially considering that the City
incurred no
substantial loss in paying for the additional work and the damages awarded.

Caloocan City vs CA

Facts:
Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) of Caloocan City
passed Ordinance No. 068 s. 1990 authorizing the city mayor, then Mayor
Macario
Asistio, Jr. to negotiate and enter into a contract of sale of the patrimonial
property of
the city and thereafter Mayor Asistio, on behalf of Caloocan City, and Jose C.
Go of Ever Gotesco (Gotesco), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
aforementioned
property.