‘Mejoff vs.

Director of Prisons

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This case may be assigned in Constitutional Law subjects.

FACTS:

Petitioner: Boris Mejoff, a Russian national brought to the Philippines as a secret operative by the Japanese during the
Japanese Occupation

Yet another petition for habeas corpus (i.e. this was not the first case filed by Mejoff)

First petition denied by SC on July 30, 1949

[Now that we’re done with that, let’s go back to the story…]

Upon the liberation of the Philippines, Mejoff was arrested as a spy by the US Army Counter-Intelligence Corps

The People’s Court ordered Mejoff’s release, but the Deportation Board then found out that he had no travel documents
and referred the matter to the immigration authorities

The Immigration Board declared Mejoff an illegal alien, having illegally entered the Philippines in 1944, without inspection
or admission by immigration officials, and ordered that he be deported to Russia come the first available transport

Mejoff was then under custody, having been arrested on March 18, 1948

Repeated failures to ship Mejoff to Russia

Mejoff was moved to Bilibid where he has been confined for give or take two years; “no ship or country would take him”,
says the decision

ISSUE:

WON Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation

RULING:

The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the
laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of
nationality

Sec. 3, Art. II of the 1935 Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the Nation,” which means that the incorporation doctrine holds sway here

The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights proclaims the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as
applied to all human beings, stating that “all human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights” (Art. 1); that
“everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status”
(Art. 2); that “every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law” (Art. 8); that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile” (Art. 9 ), etc.

The writ of habeas corpus will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these
terms: that the petitioner shall be placed under reasonable surveillance c/o the immigration authorities or their agents in
such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him
Kuroda v. Jalandoni Digest
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese
forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes
and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order
68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the
jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law
in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in
accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in
accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva
Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military
or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of
war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are
wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent
nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people
have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not
governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.
 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
SEPTEMBER 12, 2018

Facts:

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No.
1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R.
Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). Later, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned “Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.” The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with
other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized firearms, jewelry, and land titles.

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (“RA No. 1379”) against
Ramas. The complaint was amended to include Elizabeth Dimaano, the alleged mistress of Ramas, as co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion
to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of
his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.” The Amended Complaint
prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because there was an illegal search
and seizure of the items confiscated, among others.

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure “on March 3,
1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.” Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative
at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were “taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.” Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February
1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had
already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies
and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

Issue:

Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal

Held:
The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were NOT legal.

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3
dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.“ The
resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except
treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void
all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by
mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill
of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no
Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

The protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remained in effect during the interregnum.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR and the UDHR,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good
faith compliance with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires each signatory
State “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the present ICCPR.” Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”

The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the UDHR did not intend it as a legally binding document, being
only a UDHR, the Court has interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights
of individuals under the UDHR.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the ICCPR or the UDHR is another matter and is
not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the UDHR as part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the ICCPR. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution.
As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and
orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional
Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers
entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers
were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The
directives and orders should not have also violated the ICCPR or the UDHR. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a
judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to
the items specifically described in the warrant.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe
these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize
these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding
team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must
be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the
lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold
these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
VIDENCE CASE DIGESTS SENATOR ESTRADA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January 2015 Quantum
of proof necessary in preliminary investigations Prof. Ramon S. Esguerra
OCTOBER 2, 2017

Facts:

Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints
for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be
Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and
to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman).” The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

Issue:

What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?

Held:

First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits
of his co-respondents. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by
Sen. Estrada in his Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the
rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence
now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of
the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and
the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of
a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no
compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid
down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is
greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence
which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the
prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in
administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence”
which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial
evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay
evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the
quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to
substantial evidence of guilt.
Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994

Facts :

Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case" on vendors of North
EDSA.
Constitutional Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.
Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic
freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to
public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment
and social services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity...Because they are
inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate
and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or administration of
the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the
government.
Summary: Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (GR 100150, 5 January
1994)
Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights
[GR 100150, 5 January 1994]
En Banc, Vitug (J): 12 concur
Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive
Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was
sent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and members of the North Edsa Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July
1990) within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo,
et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12
July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang
Salaysay) with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon, Carlos Quimpo, Carlito
Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing
Simon, et. al. "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR. On
the basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular
inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al. carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing materials
and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." A
motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990
hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990
had yet to be resolved, and likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. In an Order, dated
25 September 1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1
March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to
dismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al.
filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning the
extent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited from further hearing and
investigating CHR Case 90 —1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
Issue: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the “order to desist” against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.’s
stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHR
order.
Held: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human
Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that
the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations; such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment
of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings
and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely
been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within
the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that what
are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the
land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical
that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its is
not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining herein, the
Court not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of
Fermo, et. al. can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised
against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or
who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a
semantic interplay for a restraining order) herein, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from
an adjudicative power that it does not possess. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission
on Human Rights, "The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that
were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aid
services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights
and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."
 PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO,
ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to
express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out
that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may
result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if
they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.

Issue:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

Held:

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space
to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and
of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are
absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed.”
David v. Arroyo

May 24, 2018

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Powers of the President.

David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven consolidated
petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the former. it is
alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws,
laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the
military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

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David v. Arroyo
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all
plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-
Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later
still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis,
was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA
issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-
Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such
is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power,
take care power and take over power.

ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of
which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance
of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected
to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP
1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and
‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’
Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President
may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been
met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative
powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the
authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the
carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without
any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of
national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise
needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:

1 There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling
out power of the president by the president.
Cecilia Zulueta, Petitioner,vs.Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin, Respondents.
Facts
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. OnMarch 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took
certainpossessions and documents belonging to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence forthe suit Cecilia filed against
her husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC ofManila which rendered a decision declaring him as
“the capital/exclusive owner of the
pro
perties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress.
”The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was
made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were
enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional TrialCourt. Hence this petition.Petitioner
contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving the samedocuments were admissible as evidence.
Issue
Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissibleas evidence.
Held
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence[to be] inviolable”
is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the co
nstitutionalprovision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,as prescribed by law.”
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.
Zulueta v. CA (G.R. No. 107383)
FACTS

Cecilia Zulueta ransacked the clinic of her husband, Dr. Alfredo Martin, to obtain
evidences about his infidelity. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ordered the
return of the documents to the private respondent.

ISSUE

Whether or not the documents and papers in question be admissable as evidence in

wife’s alleged infidelity of the husband.

RULING

No. The law insure absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other duribg the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is denied for lack of merit.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA
699 (1996)
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except

upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice.

HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition
in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.
People vs Marti Case Digest
October 26, 2012

People vs Marti
By maechmedina

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

LawPhil’s Full text

link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jan1991/gr_81561_1991.htm
l

FACTS:

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the
booth of the “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped
packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the
packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain
dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.

The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting
in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE:

Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule

Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a

defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in
Mercado vs People’s Court.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government
without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted.
FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the
NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused / appellant.

CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof

BILL OF RIGHTS

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy,

protection against whom, protection against the STATE.

SEPARATE FILE IN DLOAD

 Oposa vs Factoran
Legal Standing: Common and General Interest

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR

G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993
OPOSA et al, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.

Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent,
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous
commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners
request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

• Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

• Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails
and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.

Issues:

• Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
• Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
• Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

• The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified
in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court.
According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil
case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this
conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations.
3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
• The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that
the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than
any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.

• The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If
he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into
every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace
or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein .
2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead
as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)
Posted by taxcasesdigest on Tuesday, July 14, 2009

Labels: constitutional law, corporation, general warrant, search and seizure

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally,
and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences
of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were
subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and
seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29,
1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general
warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized.
The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous
tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of
the corporation.
Stonehill vs Diokno DIGEST
DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

Stonehill vs Diokno

20 SCRA 383

Facts:

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners

herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the
subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,”
or “used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is
described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their
issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general
warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those
found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the
corporation.
Held: No.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action
to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each
of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure ispurely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
[G.R. No.
141463. August 6,
2002 VICTOR
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Facts:
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seeking the
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JudgeVivencio
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'ot ()* in andang
+ora! ,ue-on Cit#
which is ad.acent
tocertain portions of
'ot /0/ of the Piedad
1states! registered
in the name of
2erminigilda Pedro
−
2erminigilda sold
the lots to 3ariano
'ising! registered
them in the name of
3%B% 'ising Realt#
and
subdividedthem
into smaller lots%
Petitioners! spouses
Victor and 2onorata
4r5uiola! purchased
a portion of this 'ot
/0/6A67
−
8n 9*(*! Pura
&alaw 'edesma
led Civil Case
against
2erminigilda Pedro
and 3ariano 'ising
for
allegedl#encroachi
ng upon 'ot ()*%
;uring the pendenc
# of the
action! andang +o
ra
;evelopment Corpo
rationreplaced
Pura &alaw
'edesma as plainti"
b# virtue of an
assignment of 'ot
()* rial continued
for threedecades%
−
4n August 79!
9**9! the trial court
nall# ad.udged
defendants Pedro
and 'ising .ointl#
and severall# liable
forencroaching on
plainti"s land and
ordered to remove
the house the#
constructed on the
land the#
wereoccup#ing%
−
4n April 7! 9**)!
petitioners received
a +pecial 4rder to
remove! at their
e$pense! all
constructions!
includingbarbed
wires and fences!
which defendants
constructed on
plainti"s propert#!
within fteen <9=>
da#s fromnotice
otherwise! this
Court will issue
a writ of demolition
against them%
−
Petitioners
led with the CA
a petition
for prohibition
with pra#er
for a restraining or
der and
preliminar#in.uncti
on alleging that
the# bought the
sub.ect parcel of
land in good faith
and for value!
hence! the#
wereparties in
interest% +ince
the# were not
impleaded in Civil
Case! the writ of
demolition issued
in
connectiontherewit
h cannot be
enforced against
them because to do
so would amount to
deprivation of
propert#
withoutdue process
of law%
−
CA dismissed the
petition as well as
the motion for
reconsideration!
ruling that
petitioners were
consideredprivies
who derived their
rights from 'ising b#
virtue of the sale and
could be reached b#
the e$ecution order
inCivil CaseFirst
8ssue: ?hether the
alias writ of
e$ecution ma# be
enforced against
petitioners6Petition
ers submit that
3edina Case@@@
is not controlling
since 3edina
markedl# di"ers
from the present
case onma.or
points%
o

iming
of ac5uisition
of sub.ect propert#
 3edina ac5uired p
rior commencemen
t
and conclusion of ca
se!while present
case! petitioners
ac5uired before the
commencement of
Civil Case
o
Basis of Right over
the disputed land
of the predecessor
s6in6interest 6 8n
3edina based on i
tulo deComposicio
n Con 1l 1stado
issued b# the
+panish
overnment! while
petitioners based
on full# recogni-
ed orrens title%
o

8n 3edina merel#
relied on the title of
her
predecessor6in6int
erest and ta$
declarations to
prove her
allegedownership of
the land! while
petitioners ac5uired
the registered title in
their own names!
while the
petitioner68n sale
of a parcel of land
under the orrens
s#stem! person
dealing with the
registered
propert# need not
gobe#ond the
certi cate of title as
he can rel# solel#
on the title
and annotations on
the title%+econd
8ssue: ?hether
petitioners were
innocent
purchasers for
value and builders
in good faith6Bu#er
in good faith 6 bu#s
the propert#
of another without
notice that some
other person has a
right to
or interestin
such propert#%6Bu
#er for value if he
pa#s a full and fair
price at the time of
the purchase or
before he has notice
of the claim
orinterest of some
other person in the
propert#%6;etermi
nation of whether
one is a bu#er
in good faith is
a factual issue
which generall# is
outside the
province of this
e$cept if CA failed
to take into account
certain relevant
facts which! if
properl#
considered! would
.ustif# adi"erent
conclusion%6CA
failed to consider
that petitioners
purchased the
sub.ect land in 9*(
from 3ariano 'ising
and the civil
casecommenced
sometime in
9*(*% Petitioners
could reasonabl#
rel# on 3ariano
'isings Certi cate of
 itle which atthe
time of purchase
was still free from
an# third part#
claim% 2ence!
petitioners are
bu#ers in good faith
andfor
value%6Builder in
good faith 6 one
who builds with the
belief that the land
he is building on is
his! and is ignorant
of an#defect or Daw
in his title%
Petitioner spouses
ac5uired the land
without knowledge
of an# defect in the
title of 3ariano
'ising% 8t was onl#
in 9**)! when
the sheri" of ,ue-on
Cit# tried to
e$ecute the
.udgment in Civil
Casewhich cannot
serve as notice of
such adverse claim
to petitioners since
the# were not
impleaded therein
asparties%6Petition
ers have rights
over the sub.ect
propert# and hence
the# are proper
parties in interest in
an# case!
hencethe# should
have been
impleaded in civil
case%6Failure to
implead proper
parties in interest!
the# cannot be
reached b# decision
as no man shall be
a"ected b#an#
proceeding to
which he is a
stranger who did
not have his da# in
court% 4nl# real
parties in interest in
anaction are bound
b# the .udgment
ORQUIOLA vs TANDANG SORA DEV’T CORP.
FACTS:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma
was t
he registered owner of Lot 689in TandangSora, Quezon
City,
adjacent to Lot 707
-
Aand 707
-
B registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro
.
In
1964,
Pedro
sold Lot 707
-
A and 707
-
B to Mariano Lising
who
subdivided them into smaller lots.
A
portion of Lot 707
-
A
-
2
was
sold to
petitioners
Sps.
Victor and HonorataOrquiola.
In
1969,
Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q
-
12918, with the Regional Trial
Court
(RTC)
of Quezon Cit
y against Pedro and
Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot
689.
T
he
RTC
ruled against
Pedro and Lising
.
T
he Deputy Sheriff of
Quezon
City
directed Sps. Orquiola
, through an
alias
writ of execution, to remove the house they
constructed on the land they were occupying.
To prohibit
the RTC
from issuing a writ of demolition and the sheriff from
implementing the
alias
writ of execution,
Sps. Orquiola
filed with the Court of Appeals
(CA)
a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction
.
Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value,
hence, they were parti
es in interest. Since t
hey were not impleaded in the case
, the writ of
demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so
would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
The CA
dismissed the petition.
It held that as buyers and successors
-
in
-
interest of
Lising, petitioners were considered privies who
derived their rights from Lising
by virtue of
the sale and could be
reached by the execution order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not t
he
alias
writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners.
(2) Whether or not petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.
Facts. Hill (Plaintiff), his wife, and five children were held hostage in their suburban Philadelphia
home by three escaped convicts. Plaintiff and his family were released without any harm but the
story made the front pages of the newspapers. Plaintiffs then moved to Connecticut. Time, Inc.
(Defendant) published an article that told of a new Broadway thriller, The Desperate Hours. The
article said Plaintiff and his family rose in heroism in the time of crisis. The article included
pictures of scenes from the play that was to be reenacted in Plaintiff’s Philadelphia home.
Plaintiff sued under Sections 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights Law; Defendant’s publication of
the issues gave the impression that the play was true when in fact it did not accurately recount
Plaintiff’s actual experience and Defendant knew the article was false and untrue. Defendant
answered that the article was a subject of a legitimate news article. The trial judge denied
Defendant’s motion to dismiss and the j
ury awarded Plaintiff $50,000 in actual damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue. Does a publication of a false report on a matter of public interest need only meet the New
York Times test of actual malice to permit recovery in a lawsuit for false light?

Brief Fact Summary. Defendants published an article and reenacted a play about
Plaintiff and his family being held hostage. The article and play were false, but were
portrayed by Defendant to be the truth. Plaintiff sued Defendant for false light.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Defendants published an article and reenacted a play about
Plaintiff and his family being held hostage. The article and play were false, but were
portrayed by Defendant to be the truth. Plaintiff sued Defendant for false light.
Citation. 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196, 1976 U.S.

Brief Fact Summary. Striking union members picketed in front of a retail store that was
located within a shopping mall. The general manager of the mall threatened the picketers
with arrest for trespassing if they would not leave.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a
town and, therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Facts. Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the
nine retail locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb
Shopping Center, owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). After the picketers had
been marching for about half an hour, the general manager of the shopping center
threatened to have the strikers arrested if they did not leave.

Issue. Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the
public?

Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board case brief

Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board case brief summary
424 U.S. 507 (1976)

CASE SYNOPSIS
Petitioner owner challenged a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which enforced respondent National Labor Relations Board's (Board) order preventing the owner from
interfering with the union members' right to picket inside the owner's private shopping mall. The owner
contended that free speech considerations were inapplicable in an analysis under the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 et seq.

CASE FACTS
An owner of a private shopping mall informed the employees of one of his tenants that they would be
arrested for trespass if they continued to picket inside the mall. The union filed an unfair labor
practice against the owner under § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a)(1), of the National Labor Relations Act
(Act), 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 et seq.

DISCUSSION
The court held that it was error for the Board to consider competing constitutional and property right
considerations in its application of the Act. The court held that the case that the Board relied on was
overruled by another case. Thus, the general counsel had no duty to prove that other locations for the
protest that were less intrusive upon the owner's property rights were either unavailable or ineffective.
The court held that the striking union members had no First Amendment right to enter the mall for the
purpose of advertising their strike against one of the stores therein.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals was vacated and the case was remanded to be considered under
the statutory criteria of the National Labor Relations Act, and not the criteria of the First Amendment.
JMM Promotion and Management
vs Court of Appeals
November 22, 2010
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Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing
artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and
train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the
secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record
Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation
of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated
the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual
rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of
EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As
the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests
upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does
not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of
Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of
Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of
performing artists to “high risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment
further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening
performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of
employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the
room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Bernardo vs NLRC DIGEST
DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

Bernardo vs NLRC

GR 122917 07/03/99

Facts:

Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods

from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters
and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment
Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because
their task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served
merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming
regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only
as “special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the
regular complement of the Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under
Article 80 of the Labor Code.
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held:

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall
be trained for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine
whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the
contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for
a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the
contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56
handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of
them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the
handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their
tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts
show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or
unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that
a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of
employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta
provides:
“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be
denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled
employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and
the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or
allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes
the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta
accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered
by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement
of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee
has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”
“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the
nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the
job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely
intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to
such activity, and while such activity exists.”
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56
handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of
them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the
handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their
tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts
show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or
unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable
to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them,
petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.
Petition granted
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend
to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions o
f theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace
to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
 INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v.
QUISUMBING
333 SCRA 13
G.R. No. 128845
June 1, 2000
FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local
hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to
explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires
perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental
Law)
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the

residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must
be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,

Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in
general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––

Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state
will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water
to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––
It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean -
up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In
case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned
shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred
in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible
for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident,
as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific
pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “con
tinuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would
not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in

the rules of procedure for environmental cases.

20 days – Temporary restraining order