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CASE DIGESTS, POLITICAL LAW

Matibag v. Benipayo (G.R. No.

149036 )
Date: July 13, 2018Author: jaicdn0 Comments

Facts:

Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting

Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a
temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad
interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed
thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the
failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their
appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a
memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to
the Law Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the
right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad
interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
Issue:

(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited

under the Constitution

(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in

character

Ruling: NO.

(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”,
this provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires
the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before
the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad
interimappointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to
give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad
interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution
was to do away with ad interimappointments because the plan was for
Congress to remain in session throughout the year except for a brief 30-day
compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in
essential government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise
to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of
the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of
avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would
result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional
power to make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very
evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the
President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can
choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in
session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending
consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and
assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend
an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify
and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective
appointee or extend an ad interimappointment is a matter within the
prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that power.
This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the
President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not
been shown in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or
next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by
the President.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting
capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power.
A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no
matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional
commissions, including the COMELEC.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners
to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to
make appointments that take effect immediately.
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Related
Mita Pardo De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society (G.R. No. L-48928)In "Case Digests"
Florencio Orendain v. BF Homes (G.R. No. 146313)In "Case Digests"
Francisco Motors Corporation v. CA and Sps. Manuel (G.R. No. 100812)In "Case Digests"

AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTSARTICLE 7 SECTION 16 OF THE PHILIPPINE

CONSTITUTIONG.R. NO. 149036MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO

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THE STUDENT AND THE LAW

the never ending journey of learning the law
CASE DIGESTS, POLITICAL LAW

Matibag v. Benipayo (G.R. No.

149036 )
Date: July 13, 2018Author: jaicdn0 Comments

Facts:

Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting

Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a
temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad
interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed
thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the
failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their
appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a
memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to
the Law Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the
right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad
interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
Issue:

(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited

under the Constitution

(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in

character

Ruling: NO.

(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”,
this provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires
the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before
the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad
interimappointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to
give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad
interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution
was to do away with ad interimappointments because the plan was for
Congress to remain in session throughout the year except for a brief 30-day
compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in
essential government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise
to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of
the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of
avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would
result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional
power to make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very
evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the
President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can
choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in
session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending
consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and
assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend
an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify
and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective
appointee or extend an ad interimappointment is a matter within the
prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that power.
This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the
President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not
been shown in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes

effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or
next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by
the President.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting
capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power.
A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no
matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional
commissions, including the COMELEC.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners
to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to
make appointments that take effect immediately.
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Related
Mita Pardo De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society (G.R. No. L-48928)In "Case Digests"
Florencio Orendain v. BF Homes (G.R. No. 146313)In "Case Digests"
Francisco Motors Corporation v. CA and Sps. Manuel (G.R. No. 100812)In "Case Digests"
 AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTSARTICLE 7 SECTION 16 OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTIONG.R. NO. 149036MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO

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PREVIOUS Previous post:ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima (G.R. NO. 166715)

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CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:14 PM

G.R. No. 86439 April 13 1989 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:

The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the

Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to
the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the
confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers
of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163,
authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA
disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as
Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.

2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim

appointment.

RULING:

1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the

positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of
the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which
are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is
within the authority of President, vested upon her by
Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint
executive officials without confirmation of CoA.

The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of

its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential
appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments
that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments

do not apply to appointments solely for the President to
make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under
the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the
 review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is
why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without the participation
of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim
appointments.

Categories: Constitutional Law 1, G.R. No. 86439

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MENDOZA v. ALLAS

FACTS

Petitioner became part of the Bureau of Customs in 1972, and received promotions until
he became Director III of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service. In 1993, he
was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, while respondent was
temporarily appointed to take his old position. In 1994, a letter was sent to petitioner,
stating that he is terminated from the services of the Bureau of Customs. He filed
a petition for quo warranto against Allas, which the court granted. Allas appealed, but
became moot and academic when Allas was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of
Customs Assessment and Operations. When Mendoza filed for motion for execution of its
decision, it was denied because Godofredo Olores was appointed to take his old position.
CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not a petition for quo warranto extends to the position claimed?

HELD

NO, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use
or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim
is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoythe privilege. A judgment in
quo warranto does not bind the successor in office, even though the successor’s title
comes from the same source. It is always directed to a person, in this case, Allas. Olores
had never become part of the case; hence the decision cannot extend to him.
Since Mendozahas reached the age of retirement, he cannot be reappointed. Neither can
he claim from Allas his back wages, nor compel the Bureau of Customs to pay said back
wages.

.R. # 120193

FACTS:

Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates. Private
Respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor against the
Petitioner.

Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said
Municipality. The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to the COMELEC, which declared Private
Respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned
salary and other emoluments, en masse denominated as actual damages.

Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the
ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial. COMELEC on the other hand,
concluded in justifying that Private Respondent be awarded actual damages, and hold that since
Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is deemed to
have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a Usurper.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner acted as a Usurper?

HELD:
We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially
without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election
thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the
winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in
electoral contests.

We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a “de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office
and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled to the emoluments of the
office.”

aleriano vs. ECC and GSIS, June 8, 2000 GR 136200

Facts:
Celestino Valeriano was employed as a firetruck driver. On the evening of July 3, 1985, after
having dinner with a friend, Valeriano met an accident and was severely injured when the
vehicle he was on collided with another. Valeriano claimed for benefits from the GSIS which the
latter denied for being non-compensable. The ECC and CA sustained the system, reasoning
that the injury resulted not from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment nor
was it work-connected.

Issue: Whether or not the injuries sustained by VAleriano in the collision was compensable.
Ruling:

Valeriano’s injuries were non-compensable.

Valeriano’s contention, citing the Hinoguin and Nitura cases, that the 24-hour doctrine be
applied to his case since the exigency of his job demand it to be so was held untenable by the
Court. The Court did notfind any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a
firetruck driver. Applying the principle laid down in the Alegre case, the 24-hour doctrine is not
meant to embrace all acts and circumstances of an employee though he be on active “on call” duty.
Valeriano was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when
he met the accident. He was also not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck
driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. In fact, he was pursuing
a purely personal and social function when the accident happened. The accident not work-
connected was, therefore, non-compensable.