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THE BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU

Reference:

A. MAFSC COMD 4EX 1, EX WIRA GAGAH GENERAL INSTRUCTION.

B. PBB (Mal) 100 Malaysian Armed Forces Staff Manual Volume 1- Service Writing

(Provisional).

INTRODUCTION

1. After the surrender of Japanese during World War II, the Viet Minh, under Ho Chi

Minh’s leadership, contested the return of the French to Indo-China. The Japanese

victories of 1941-42 had dispelled the myth of western invincibility. Because the French

had not shared in the campaigns, which eventually defeated Japan, their prestige had

suffered.

2. The year 1946 started with the hope of a negotiated peace, but ended in violence.

After the Viet Minh won a clear majority in the National Assembly elections, it was

obvious the France would have to negotiate with, or to fight, the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam, and its new president, Ho Chi Minh. Promising negotiations held in Paris

between Ho and Jean Sainteny in March 1946, considered the prospect of Vietminh

control over Tonkin and phase-out French Government in Annam and Cochin China

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within French’s Indochinese Federation. But Admiral Geoges Thierry d’Argenlieu, the

French High Commissioner, ordered returning French forces to continue their

‘pacification’ efforts in the south to wipe out Viet Minh influence in the two regions.

3. Between 1945 and 1954, the French had totally deployed more than 250,000

French Union Forces, plus another 100,000 soldiers of the national armies of the

‘Associated States’ (Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam), aim to defeat the Viet Minh. The

French high command hoped to wipe out the Viet Minh insurgency in a single bold

stroke. To capture top Viet Minh leaders inside their jungle hideouts, the French launched

an ambitious plan code-name Operation LEA in October 1947 and managed to storm Ho

Chin Minh’s Viet Bac headquarters and captured vast stores of arms, food and material.

However, in a defensive manoeuvre often repeated, Ho’s entire top command and 40,000

Viet Minh slipped through the French pincer movement and went into the jungle. Thus

began the French military’s search for a conventional set-piece battle against Ho’s elusive

guerrillas. This is starting point of first Vietnam War between the French and Viet Minh.

The war with the French colonial forces soon became serious and both sides suffered

punishing defeats. The French felt they had superior firepower if they could ever force

the Viet Minh to stand and fight, but their inability to deal a crushing blow to the

supposedly backward Communist forces was both frustrating and humiliating. The

French and Viet Minh manoeuvre in Indochina during winter 1953-54 are shown at

Annex A.

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4. The war prolonged until in late 1953, the French commander-in-chief, General

Henri Navarre, again sought an opportunity to snare Viet Minh, with an eye towards

improving French negotiating position at a future settlement. General Navarre ordered the

investment of Dien Bien Phu to block an expected Viet Minh invasion of Laos. His

intention was to force Viet Minh to hurl his main-force unit into an elaborate ‘killing

zone.’

5. Why Dien Bien Phu was important? It is important to examine the origins of Dien

Bien Phu in the thinking of the French High Command and to state the evolution of the

plan, which led to the stationing of 16,000 troops there. Dien Bien Phu is situated in a

valley amongst an ankle of mountains over 150 miles across where there is a tendency to

think of it as simply an insignificant isolated village among thousands of others with no

great strategic importance and to think that therefore the French were stupid to commit

such large numbers to the defence of a post which could not exercise much influence over

the course of the war.

AIM

6. The aim of this paper is to critically stimulate and analyse the Battle of Dien Bien

Phu.

SCOPE

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7. The scope of this paper is as follows:

a. Background.

b. The Battle.

c. The Aftermath.

d. Analysis.

e. Conclusion.

BACKGROUND

8. Earlier, Dien Bien Phu had been taken out from the French hands in late 1952 by

General Giap 316 Division whom, with 148th Independent Regiment, had forced their

way through from the Red River. The French Commander in Chief, General Raoul Salan,

regarded this loss as serious, largely because of the access routes into Laos, which were

now under Viet Minh control. On 30 Dec 1952, he issued Directive No. 40 ordering a

counter attack for 10 Jan 1953 and stating:

“ The reoccupation of Dien Bien Phu must constitute in the fourth coming period

the first step for the regaining of control of the T’ai country for the elimination of

the Viet Minh from the area west of the Black River”.

9. Before General Salan was relieved by General Navarre he stressed the importance

of Dien Bien Phu in two memorandums to the Minister for Associated States, Jean

Letourneau. General Navarre assembled his regional commanders in Saigon on 16 June

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1953, and expounded his formula for inflicting the maximum damage on the Viet Minh in

the coming campaign season. His plan consisted of five points:

a. Reconstruction of the Expeditionary Force during a period of restrained

activity.

b. A major participation action in the Red River Delta.

c. The destruction of the Viet Minh in the Southern Highlands by means of

Operation ATLANTE.

d. Prevention of Viet Minh offensives by smashing them before they were

launched.

e. A quest for a major set piece battle, attacking Giap’s rice granaries,

reserves of men and finally the main Viet Minh battle force.

10. At this stage, Dien Bien Phu did not feature prominently in Navarre’s plan and it

seems likely that he had no formed intention of giving effect to Salan’s Directive No. 40.

However, General Rene Cogny (GOC 2nd Infantry Division) suggested to General

Navarre that it would be a good idea to set up a base or mooring point for carrying

guerrilla warfare into Giap’s rear should he decide to renew his drive on Laos. A natural

location for this mooring point would be Dien Bien Phu.

11. The plan was to establish a major French base of operations, complete with

airfield, at Dien Bien Phu. Attacks would then be launched against Viet Minh supply

routes known to crisscross the area, hoping to lure the enemy into a major attack on the

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heavily fortified French positions. But this concept was fatally flawed by several

assumptions that were to result in catastrophe for the French, they did not believe the Viet

Minh would be able to marshal a well equipped, well disciplined army many times the

size of the French garrison in the area; they don’t believed that the Viet Minh would be

able to position superior artillery and major anti aircraft weapons in the heavily jangled

hills of the area; and they relied far too heavily on their ability to re-supply and support

an isolated military force by air.

12. On 20 Nov 1953, work began on the defensive positions and strong points as an

outer ring of defences namely; Anne-Marie, Beatrice, Claudine, Dominique, Elaine,

Francoise, Gabriele, Huguette and farther to the south and relatively isolated, Isabelle.

The troop built up at that time was three battalions of 2,100 paratroopers and an

additional 4500 in the weeks that followed. The Viet Minh on the other hand had the 148th

Regiment of the Viet Minh Army and the 316th Division consisting of three Infantry

Regiments and an Artillery Regiment.

13. While General Navarre and his colleagues had been making elaborate and

ambitious plans, General Giap and the Viet Minh High Command had been taking stock

of their own situation. At the end of the 1952/1953 campaign seasons, Giap’s forces were

scattered over Tonkin and northern Laos, remote from their main bases, short of supplies

and exhausted after months of fighting across over 100 miles of jungle and mountain

country. It had certainly been successful campaigns with which the French had been

forced out of Tonkin and northern Laos, but Giap had to plan his reaction to a possible

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French attempt to regain some of this country, while at the same time avoid being drawn

into a major action, which would divert his own strategy from its course. It was clear that

Giap’s operational plan calls for a complete wipe out at all costs the whole enemy force at

Dien Bien Phu.

14. It was unfortunate for the French that Navarre did not see the vulnerability of the

Viet Minh held territory close to the delta. Giap decided to take a chance on the security

of his rear areas in order to force the French out into the more remote areas where they

were at the disadvantages.

15. When Giap first learned of the French had landed several battalions of troops at

Dien Bien Phu on 20 Nov 1953, he stated that the first problem he had to resolve was

whether to place a small force around the French to contain the garrison while his main

force was left free for mobile operations, or to make a direct attack with the bulk of his

main force on the Dien Bien Phu garrison and leave the diversionary offensives to local

forces. Dien Bien Phu was obviously the main feature of the French strategy for the

coming months and so they had much to loose by a defeat there. Giap’s preliminary

moves to Dien Bien Phu can best be seen in the map as per Annex B.

16. The strength comparison between the French and Viet Minh forces are shown at

the table below:

FRENCH VIET MINH

6 X Infantry Battalion 316th Division

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One Regiment Artillery 308th Division

One Company of Engineer 312th Division Heavy

Total: 16,000 men 351th Div

24 X 105 mm medium Howitzer 57th Regiment

4 X 155 mm heavy Howitzer 148th Regiment

24 X heavy Mortar 6 X Regiment Artillery

10 X tanks One Regiment Engineer

Total: 64,000 men

100 X 105 mm Howitzer

50 X 75 mm Howitzer

30 X heavy Mortar

50 x 37 mm AAG

17. The most striking feature of the tactical dispositions of the opposing forces was

that the Viet Minh were up on the hill-sides, overlooking and dominating the French who

were down in the valley. One French theory justifying a battle under these conditions was

that since the crest of the hill line was so far away the Viet Minh would have to expose

themselves on the forward slopes of these hills, where the French could see both them

and any Arty pieces which they attempted to use. In practice this theory proved

particularly empty.

THE BATTLE

18. This idea and Navarre’s concept of the role of Dien Bien Phu had been hardening

throughout the following months. The mooring point idea was given away completely in

four of a fortified camp from which a pitched defensive battle could be fought. Navarre’s

directive to General Rene Cogny forecasts the time table of the battle several weeks

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would elapse while the Viet Minh were moving their forces into position then would

come a reconnaissance phase of from six to ten days and finally the assaults which would

last several days and which must end with the failure of the Viet Minh offensive.

19. French patrols began raiding out from Dien Bien Phu in December but by end of

January, Viet Minh ambushes restricted them to the valley of their base. By early

February, Viet Minh troops and the only serviceable road ringed the entire valley, Route

41(the only route lead to the area) awas blocked. The French Air Force did its best to

interdict the Viet Minh supply routes from Hoah Binh and Yen Bay. Its attempt to block a

road with a massive bombardment failed because the Viet Minh engineers cut a bypass

for the porters, bicyclists and trucks. French efforts to spread the attack throughout the

length of the routes failed because nowhere was it possible to achieve sufficient

concentration. The Viet Minh logistic system was flexible enough to keep up flow of

supplies.

20. General Giap’s task was to reduce the northern outposts before mounting a major

assault on the main defences round the airstrip. Probing attacks began on 11 March and

early in the morning of the 13th, preceded by a furious bombardment from all his guns,

which caved in the defences, Giap launched his first major attack against Beatrice.

Concentrating a division against a battalion, the strong point was overwhelmed. Two days

later the same fate befell Gabrielle. A counter-attack force merely succeeded in bringing

off the survivors. The French artillery had been severely mauled in its open pits and its

overconfident commander committed suicide. Anne-Marie, designed to keep the Viet

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Minh at arm’s length from the airstrip, fell on the night of 17 th March. There was now a

lull period during which the Viet Minh sapped their way forward to enclose the main

positions with a continuous trench system, adjusted their artillery and bombarded the

airstrip to make it unusable.

21. The French dropped another three more parachute battalions to reinforce de

Castries after the first phase of the Viet Minh attack. While the reinforcements were

valuable they did not alter the force ratio. Some 16,000 French Union troops faced

49,500 Viet Minh. A further 31,500 Viet Minh were involved in the delivery of supplies.

22. The second phase opened twelve days later against the main position in a series of

overlapping attacks. All the artillery was concentrated in turn for divisional attacks on

Dominique by 312 Division on the 30th Mar, on Huguette by 308 Division on 1 April and

on Elaine by 316 Division on 3rd April, In the south 57 Brigade of 304 Division attacked

Isabelle on the 3rd April, as well in order to interfere with the mutual artillery support

between the positions. As soon as General de Castries committed his reserves to counter-

attack or reinforce on strong point, Giap switched his attack to another direction.

However, apart from the loss of Francoise and half the airfield the French managed to

prevent any major inroads. The Viet Minh suffered such heavy casualties that Giap was

forced to call off his attacks and to use his political officers to launch a massive

indoctrination campaign to restore his soldiers’ morale.

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23. In place of massive assaults Giap resorts to eighteenth century siege methods,

sapping his way forward into French positions from all sides under cover of a massive

and accurate bombardment. French air support was unable to make an impression on the

Viet Minh trenches and in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire the Air Force’s losses began

to mount. As the perimeter grew smaller and the Viet Minh pushed their anti-aircraft guns

closer in, air supply became more difficult. About 30% of the airdrops fell into Viet Minh

hands. With the onset of the rains in March and the monsoon in earnest in April the

French trenches in Claudine and Dominique become flooded. Another parachute battalion

was dropped into the garrison on the night of 11/12 April. General de Castries desperate

for reinforcements that over 600 volunteers, none with parachute training’ from all the

races in the French Union, were dropped in as individual battle casualty replacements.

24. During the last few days of April, Giap allowed his men a few day rest prior to a

final major effort to gain a victory before discussions on Indo-China opened at Geneva on

8th May. During that time the French made an attempt to take the press pressure off the

garrison and help it to break out. Plan ‘Xenophon’ and ‘Ariane’ were modified, because

there was insufficient air transport to supply a relief force with more than 45 tons a day

after the commitment of 150 tons a day for Dien Bien Phu had been met. The supply

situation became more serious on 2 May when the French and American civilian pilots

flying the bulk of the C119s refused to continue unless covered by fighter-ground attack

flak suppression sorties. The relief force operation, renamed ‘Condor’, failed well short

of Dien Bien Phu and the garrison’s last slim chance of breaking out to the south

disappeared.

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25. On 1 May, Giap attacked the perimeter on all sides and maintained the pressure

for a week. On the night of 2/3 May, Cogny committed the last parachute battalion from

his Airborne Reserve. During the next few days the Viet Minh gradually crumbled the

position. The aircrew and aircraft to provide close air support and air supply gradually

melted away under the attrition of the Viet Minh anti-aircraft guns. On 7 May, De

Castries surrendered and Isabelle gave up the next day. The French at Dien Bien Phu

defence layout and Viet Minh attacking approach are best shown at Annex C.

THE AFTERMATH

26. The France garrison at Dien Bien Phu fell, culminating an operation, which lasted

209 days. The last 54 days, the garrison was actually under constant attack. When the

Viet Minh finally overran the French positions, the French had suffered 2200 killed and

over 6000 wounded. More than 6000 unwounded French soldiers were taken prisoner,

but fewer than half those captured survived prison camp. It is difficult to estimate Viet

Minh casualties, although it is clear that they lost well over 10,000 killed and 20,000

wounded during the campaign.

27. For the French, Dien Bien Phu was the straw that broke the camel's back. Two

months later, on 20 July 1954, a formal cease-fire between the French and Viet Minh was

negotiated at Geneva. This cease-fire was never advanced beyond a military truce, and

the lack of a political settlement left the door open for the next Indochina war. In fact, the

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Viet Minh left Geneva convinced that they had been double-crossed. They believed the

Chinese forced them to accept a partition of Vietnam rather than a unified Vietnam under

their control. The victory on the battlefield was lost at Geneva as far as the Viet Minh

were concerned; however, they did not give up on their goal of unifying Vietnam.

ANALYSIS

28. The Viet Minh defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu in a set-piece battle, which,

in essence, amounted to beating the French at their own game. The shock of this defeat

reverberated throughout the western world. As French senior military officers stated

twelve years after the defeat, "Dien Bien Phu has become an acronym or shorthand

symbol for defeat of the West by the East, for the triumph of primitive.... Dien Bien Phu

resulted in severe political consequences. The French defeat was indeed an utter disaster

for both France and America who, by 1954, was underwriting 80% of French

expenditures in Indochina. Given the unfavourable developments resulting from this

defeat, the causes of the French loss warrant further examination.

29. Dien Bien Phu can be analysed through the use of the principles of war. Through

our analysis, the French has violated some of the principles of war at every level of war-

strategic, operational, and tactical at Dien Bien Phu. These violations contributed

significantly to the French defeat.

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30. The first principle of war is the selection and maintenance of aim. The French

aim or objective at Dien Bien Phu was neither clearly defined nor attainable. General

Navarre's instructions prior to the airborne landing at Dien Bien Phu (Operation Castor)

were to adjust his operations to his means. French authorities in France did not learn of

the launching of Operation Castor until six hours after it started. Strategic guidance was

issued to General Navarre, but Operation Castor certainly was not designed to fulfil that

guidance. The French government by this point in the long war was interested in

stabilizing the situation in Vietnam so that peace talks could begin. A military victory was

no longer the objective as the French sought an honourable way out of the war through

negotiation. General Navarre was aware of this; nevertheless, he under took Operation

Castor despite the lack of a clear mandate for this sort of operation. French operational

objectives for Operation Castor included covering Laos, establishing a supply point for

friendly guerrilla operations, and defeating the Viet Minh in a set-piece battle. There was

no clear strategic objective for Operation Castor. The only possible attainable objective

was the set-piece battle, and the French did not properly prepare for this eventuality.

31. The Viet Minh aim or objectives, in contrast to the French, were clear, consistent,

and certainly attainable. Giap's objective was to destroy the French garrison at Dien Bien

Phu. Furthermore, the Central Committee, to whom Giap reported, fully supported Giap's

plans. At the strategic level the Viet Minh were anxious to gain a spectacular military

victory, which would make the French negotiate on Ho Chi Minh's terms. At the

operational level Giap realized that the French depended completely on aerial re-supply

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and aerial fire support. Giap had identified the French's critical vulnerability. Therefore,

his first priority was the early destruction or neutralization of French air power. The Viet

Minh were also looking for a set-piece battle, and they were determined not to let the

French slip away this time.

32. The second principle of war is the offensive action. Operation Castor started on

20 November 1953 with five French battalions parachuting into Dien Bien Phu. At this

point the French had seized the initiative. However, any hopes of remaining on the

offensive ended quickly. By early December French troops found it tough going beyond

the valley floor. Offensively, actions were soon limited to air support, patrols, and local

counterattacks. General Navarre started exploring withdraws plans in January 1954, but a

breakout was evaluated as suicidal. No significant attempt to break out of Dien Bien Phu

was ever made. By 13 March 1954 the attack on Dien Bien Phu had begun, and the

offensive was forever lost to the Viet Minh. Giap, on the other hand, was able to dictate

the time and place of engagements virtually throughout the operation. This time Giap did

not rush in with human wave attacks as the French had hoped. He took time to mass his

forces, bring in fire support, secure his own lines of communication, and lay formal siege

to the French garrison. The first major assault by the Viet Minh came a full three months

into the operation. The French had given Giap the offensive, and he gladly accepted it

and used it to his advantage.

33. The next two principles of war are cooperation and concentration of force will

be discussed together. Strategically, the forces squaring off at Dien Bien Phu approached

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mass from two completely different perspectives. The French simply were not willing to

pay the price to field a large force in Indochina. As early as 1950, the French Parliament

passed a law restricting the use of draftees to French homeland territories, which

precluded their use in Indochina. The average size of the French Expeditionary Corps in

Indochina hovered around 150,000 troops, which was insufficient to achieve strategic

mass. In contrast, the Viet Minh practiced the different ways. All men and women were

expected to do their part for the war against the French. All available resources were

mobilised to support the Viet Minh Armed Forces. By 1954 the Viet Minh had organised,

trained and equipped six regular divisions in addition to their territorial irregulars. At the

operational level the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu numbered about 13,000, or less

than 10% of French forces in Indochina.

34. The French intended to use superior firepower and technology to defeat the

numerically superior Viet Minh. In fact, General Navarre saw Operation ‘Atlante’ as his

main effort and Dien Bien Phu as an economy of force operation. General Navarre did

not believe that Dien Bien Phu would be a decisive operation despite solid intelligence

confirming that the Viet Minh were massing there. The Viet Minh massed four divisions,

totalling more than 50,000 men, at Dien Bien Phu. At the same time Giap tied up French

forces and prevented them from responding in strength at Dien Bien Phu by staging

diversionary actions around the country. Giap was able to successfully concentrate his

forces at the decisive time and place while he skilfully employed supporting operations

aimed at deceiving the French. French intelligence saw through this plan; however,

General Navarre took no action.

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35. The French spread their forces at Dien Bien Phu in a series of strong points. Over

one-third of French forces in the valley were positioned at Isabelle, the southernmost

strong point in the valley. This position was seven kilometres from the nearest friendly

strong point and cannot provide mutual support to the rest of the garrison. Because of this

wide dispersal of French forces, the Viet Minh were able to concentrate forces to achieve

absolute superiority at any one French strong point. In addition, the French also lacked a

dedicated reserve at Dien Bien Phu. This poor situation was further exacerbated by the

fact that no full dress rehearsal for a counterattack was ever conducted. At every level of

war the French seem to have violated the principle of cooperation and concentration of

force while the Viet Minh did just the opposite. If Dien Bien Phu is viewed as an

economy of force action for the French, then what became of the main effort? Operation

‘Atlante’, after some initial success, quickly bogged down into a series of Viet Minh

ambushes on French convoys. The French eventually terminated Operation ‘Atlante’ with

no tangible gains while Dien Bien Phu was lost.

36. The next principle is flexibility. Strategically, the French government maintained

loose control of operations in Indochina leaving much to the discretion of the on-scene

commander. As already discussed the government had taken steps, which limited their

flexibility. Once it became clear that Dien Bien Phu was going to be lost without some

sort of action, the French did not possess the strategic mobility necessary to influence the

outcome. France then turned to America, a country who did possess the flexibility to

change the course of events at Dien Bien Phu. America declined to help after some

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interesting political activities, and the fate of Dien Bien Phu was sealed. The Viet Minh

displayed strategic flexibility in their response to the French assault on Dien Bien Phu.

Plans to deal with the assault were quickly developed by Giap and approved by Ho's

Central Committee. At the operational level the Viet Minh, much to the surprise of

French commanders, achieved mobility unprecedented in they’re past operations. The

Viet Minh were able to concentrate their forces in a position, which put the French at

great disadvantage. First, the Viet Minh surrounded Dien Bien Phu within a month of the

original French assault. From then on the Viet Minh were able to dictate the pace of the

operation. Viet Minh tactical maneuvers were slow and methodical. Once they initiated

the attack on Dien Bien Phu, 54 days passed before the French surrendered France's

operational mobility depended on air assets. The French employed their air to attack Viet

Minh lines of communication leading to Dien Bien Phu. Air was to prevent any

significant enemy build-up in the area thereby securing the French forces at Dien Bien

Phu. French air was completely unsuccessful in preventing an enemy build-up of

supplies, heavy artillery, and combat forces. General Navarre could have introduced

additional forces into Dien Bien Phu via airborne assault; however, he did not. As a

result, France gained no advantage from her superior operational mobility assets.

37. The last two principles involved were security and surprise. The French were

lacking in both of these areas at Dien Bien Phu. Only three days after the start of

Operation Castor French newspapers ran headlines of the parachute assault, quoting

General Cogny as saying, "This is not a raid as at Long Son, but the beginning of an

offensive”. The Viet Minh never publicised their operations (especially while they were

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ongoing). Some of the biggest blunders made by the French at Dien Bien Phu can be

traced to surprise. Operationally, the French were repeatedly surprised. The capital error

at Dien Bien Phu was the underestimation of the enemy's capabilities. General Navarre

refused to believe many things about his enemy. Navarre rejected the notion that the Viet

Minh could dominate his men with artillery deployed on the hills above Dien Bien Phu.

He failed to anticipate that Giap's howitzers would close the airstrip at Dien Bien Phu

making re-supply difficult and evacuation of the wounded and withdrawal of troops

impossible. Navarre's map reconnaissance did not reveal a valley floor with thick

underbrush and deep mud during the spring monsoons, which would negate armoured

sweeps. There were other surprises in store for the French. Not only were they surprised

to be out numbered and outgunned by the enemy artillery, but they were also shocked by

their inability to destroy enemy artillery. In spite of his good intelligence, General

Navarre was taken completely by surprise when the Vietminh fielded four divisions with

heavy supporting artillery around the valley soon after the French landed. The Viet Minh

were not surprised beyond the initial assault, except perhaps by the French remaining in

the valley. This was a pleasant surprise for the Viet Minh because they were hoping that

the French would do just that. Tactically, the French could not gain much from security or

surprise as the Viet Minh could readily observe French moves along the valley floor. The

rugged terrain surrounding Dien Bien Phu offered sanctuary to the Viet Minh from

observation and fires by the French.

38. The Lessons Learnt. There are some lessons, which could be earned from

the battle of Dien Bien Phu that are as follow:

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a. Never underestimate your enemy capabilities.

b. The important of selection of ground in tactical operation.

c. External influence and support always important for any guerrilla warfare.

d. The important of psychology war.

e. Never neglected an important of intelligence in any battle.

f. Always well plans and prepare for any battles.

g. Good command and leadership can boots the confidence and morale of the

troops.

h. The important of use of ground when employ a artillery.

i. The unity of command plays a key success in any battle.

j. Always prepare clear, complicated and concise order to ensue through

understanding.

k. Material inferiority in front of the enemy is not serious. What is more

important is the mobilisation of people. The people must be a great ocean in

which the enemy will drown itself.

39. American military men have criticised the French strategy in Indochina as

‘lacking in aggressiveness, defensive and of doubtful value’. A four-star general once

said:’ The French haven’t won a war since Napoleon. What can we learn from them?’ Did

the Americans learn much from the French experience? According to Sir Robert

Thompson, ‘the French experience in Indochina was almost totally written off and

disregarded.’ Other experience observers agree.

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CONCLUSION

40. Dien Bien Phu suggested that the Viet Minh, in that terrain, probably had the best

infantry in the world, among the best generals, the best logistic support and the best fifth-

column preparation. They bring their heavy guns down from the heights about Dien Bien

Phu and dig them right in, beautifully camouflaged against aviation, in strong point in the

saucer plain within easy and lethal range of French camp. Who could have thought that

so everyday and triumphantly respectable a thing as a bicycle could be so militarily

decisive? And of course that was why there had been so fantastically many thefts of

bicycles in Hanoi and the main towns before Dien Bien Phu- for a man or woman

pushing a bicycle could travel the narrowest path, carrying on it fifty or a hundred kilos

of rice or shells or parts of a disassembled howitzer.

41. In order to win the battle, Giap had to make a number of important decisions,

which had they been poor, could have raised his casualty level and consumption of

supplies sufficiently to leave the outcome a stalemate. This result at the time of the

Geneva conference would have been most harmful to Viet Minh standing throughout the

world and could have led to hardening of popular attitudes in France for and additional

period of war.

42. In this battle, Giap had faithfully observed Mao Tse-Tung’s advice on

concentration of effort. ‘In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two,

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three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy’s strength), encircle the

enemy force completely, strike to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape

from the net.’ He had encouraged the French to disperse their forces with diversions,

which did not detract from the strength of his field army. In contrast, the French had

locked up their best mobile troops in the distant garrison, where they could neither be

supported, relieved nor adequately supplied. They had undertaken an insufficient

concentration of force in the wrong place.

Jun 2003

HISHAMUDDIN BIN ZAHRULLAYALI

Mej
SSG 9 Leader

Annexes:

A. The French and Viet Minh Manoeuvre in Indochina During Winter 1953-54.

B. Viet Minh Preliminary Moves to Dien Bien Phu.

C. The French at Dien Bien Phu Defence Layout and Viet Minh Attacking Approach.

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