RAMON D. VILLANUEVA JR.

JD-1B

Alvero vs. Dizon [GR L-342, 4 May 1946]

En Banc, de Joya (J): 4 concur, 4 acting justices concur

Facts: On 12 February 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States Army,
accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio S. Alvero under arrest, having been
suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal.
On or about 4 October 1945, Alvero was accused of treason, in criminal case 3 of the People's Court; after
which, on 1 December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers allegedly seized and taken
from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the prosecution presented certain
papers and documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition was denied. At the trial
of the case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and documents, which were admitted
as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits. On 26 February 1946, the judges issued an order
denying the petition for the return of the documents, and admitted as competent evidence the documents
presented by the prosecution. On the same date that said order was issued, denying the petition for the return
of said documents, Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said order, which was also denied. Alvero filed a
petition for certiorari with injunction with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alvero’s home can be used as
evidence against the latter.

Held: The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest Alvero, as a collaborationist suspect,
and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is
unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws
and Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers in
the possession of prisoners of war; and also under the proclamation, dated 29 December 1944, issued by Gen.
Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States Army, declaring his purpose to remove
certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the
allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, when
apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in
restraint for the duration of the war. The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit the Government from taking advantage of
unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of state law. Herein, as the soldiers of the
United States Army, that took and seized certain papers and documents from the residence of Alvero, were not
acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those
papers and documents came into the possession of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government,
through the Office of the CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers and
documents, as evidence for the prosecution against Alvero, at the trial of his case for treason, before the
People's Court, cannot now be legally attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and
seizures, or on any other constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in
similar cases. (See Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United States, 275 U. S., 310.)
People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991]

Third Division, Bidin (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4
gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the
contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment

and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's
representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau
of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom.
Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams
of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting
a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried
marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took
charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said
effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address
was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation
to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State.

Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere
presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search
and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not
search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there
is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971]
En Banc, Villamor (J): 7 concur, 1 filed a separate concurring opinion to which 1 concurs, 1 concurs in result

Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and
Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to
the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera's letter-request; an application
for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De
Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed;
and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a
certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De
Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already
been taken. The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter,
the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. The Judge signed de Leon's application for search warrant
and Logronio's deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days
later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices
of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporation's lawyers protested the search on the
ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents
nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the
corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the
search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction
be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be
ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney's fees. After
hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search
warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. The
corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office.

Held: The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court
impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding
that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of the
corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said
corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices
and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill case and
the present case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices
documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the
corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a
petitioner. On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal examination
conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The Judge did not ask either
of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there
was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer's
readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the
oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. Second, the search
warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct
offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and

Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53
(withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business
or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales,
business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification
the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income
Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the
search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to
defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used
therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could
possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.

Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967]

Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I.
Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court
of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued,
on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks,
and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the
said persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme
Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme
Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June
1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.

Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants that allowed seizure of
documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and other places besides their residences.

Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that,
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. No warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The
warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill,
et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the corporate officers and the corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the documents, papers, and
things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups,
namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of Stonehill, et.
al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al.
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of
said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. With respect
to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962 Resolution
of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court on
the documents, papers and things seized in the residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors from using
them in evidence against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for the search of 3 residences
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences is
made permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the 29 places, offices and other
premises.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984]

En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano ̃ , Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City],
issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months
following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of
the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-
022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue: Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the
issuance of search warrants.

Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended" is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the
search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.

People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]

En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as
Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different from the boats
ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men
led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred
with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed, the
male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked
towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued
side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing
the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid
introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog,
and later in Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then
resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The man apparently
understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the
man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the man
and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man
of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from
the man, Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the
meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.
The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional
rights." When the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and
merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to
the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory
examination. In the meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector
and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29
plastic packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative examination established
the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua was in
violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At
his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking
interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the
RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to acquire
one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags
belong to his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock when
they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and
hand movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led
by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the
police inspected opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7
kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the
RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's
watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the
police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with
immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause."

Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly
ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely
corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle
which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures,
however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the
defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested
and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers
from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated
mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when
apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and
other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he
attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not constitute "probable cause."
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the
time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious
bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There
was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug
on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that
the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically
mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be denominated as
incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest
and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown.
From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as
evidence, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient,
feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction.

People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]

En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur

Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person
was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle
passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the
pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ "Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior
to 8 August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00
a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the
team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and
SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged
pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a
"trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina
as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon was
left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were accosted. The police officers then ordered the
"trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina. Subsequently,
SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied,
"Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December
1996, the accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the
marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court rendered the
decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their arrest, and the seizure
of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.

Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable
cause. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to
a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest
which must precede the search. Still, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made — the process cannot be reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that
would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will
settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the
"suspicion" of the arresting officers that Mula and Molina were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement
which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it
not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or
otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge
of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of validity on the arrest
effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against them.
People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001]

Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmarinĩ as, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon
City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that
the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search
warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of
about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant.
The police operatives knocked on Salanguit’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house,
apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing
the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They
found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box
also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana
wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them to
Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a
laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77
grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams
and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of
Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q- 95-
64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision,
convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8,
respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of
arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds that (1)
the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground
that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly
seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the employment of unnecessary force by the police
in the execution of the warrant.

Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of “drug
paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.”

Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia."
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only
if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was
presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from
Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable
cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view
doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or
in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after
the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid.
Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.

G.R. No. 140946 September 13, 2004

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc for alleged violation of Section 29 of
Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC (unfair competition).

Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the
description stated in the search warrants.

Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and
that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same time denied
their motion for reconsideration.
According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant after examining the NBI agent and the computer
technician who visited Maxicorp.

Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999.

The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive
evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt
NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel
Diaz."

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not there’s a probable cause on the part of CA to quash the search warrants issued by RTC
2. Whether or not respondent violated the intellectual property right of the petitioner.

RULING:

According to the SC the offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair
competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent
Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate
several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related
to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.

Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief
that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper."Thus, probable cause for a search
warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.

The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient
to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp
engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and
Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises,
they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, 24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a
full-blown trial.

No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
determination exists.25 Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. 26 Thus, it was
improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent
Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners’ software
occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer
unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’ software.

The Supreme Court held:

“xxx No provision of the law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be
seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains
valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently
described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.”

In addition the Highest Court stated:

“xxx The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all
evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, all items seized under paragraph © after search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, f, should be returned to Maxico

Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Zabala [GR L-44723, 31 August 1987]

En Banc, Bidin (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining Company filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap
iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against
Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by
Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for
preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated 26 August 1974
recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against Garrido and Alapan on a finding of
prima facie case which resolution was approved by Fiscal Ilustre. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration
of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated 14 October 1974. On 29
October 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Norte an Information
dated 17 October 1987 (Criminal Case 821), charging Garrido aand Alapan with the crime of Attempted Theft.
In a letter dated 22 October 1974, Garrido and Alapan requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the
Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated 26 August 1974 and 14 October 1974. On 6 November
1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "elevate entire records PFO
Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review." On 6 March
1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal
case. The Company sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the
same in a letter dated 11 June 1975. A motion to dismiss dated 16 September 1975 was then filed by the
Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against
Garrido and Alapan and set the case for trial on 25 February 1976. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration
of the court's ruling but in an Order dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise
denied. Trial of the case was reset to 23 April 1976. Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the CFI
of Albay and Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte. On
19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court in an order dated 23 April 1976. Whereupon, Fiscal Zabala manifested that he would
not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, the Company filed
a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute the case if the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of
prima facie case by the fiscal.

Held: If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal
of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute
the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue
appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private
prosecutor subject to his direction and control. Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should
proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide the
merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of
Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of
the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification
for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should he addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter
if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Paderanga vs. Drilon [GR 96080, 19 April 1991]

En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur

Facts: On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog
City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and
Richard Doe, for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato
Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter 87- 2-244. Only
Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe
Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then. In an amended
information filed on 6 October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas,"
was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for
Roxas, Paderanga filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to
Nullify the Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial court in an order dated 9 January 1989, denied the
omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support
of his defense." In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas
implicated Atty. Paderanga in the commission of the crime charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro
City inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary investigation against Paderanga at the instance of
the latter's counsel, per his resolution dated 7 July 1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice,
dated 24 July 1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor
to continue the preliminary investigation against Paderanga. In a resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation against Paderanga, directed the amendment of the previously amended information to include
and implead Paderanga as one of the accused therein. Paderanga moved for reconsideration, contending that
the preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was
deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the
determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by Gingoyon in
his order dated 29 January 1990. From the aforesaid resolution and order, Paderanga filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum,
and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed, attaching
thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated 20 June 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of 30 March
1990 wherein he implicated Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the Department of Justice, through
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648 dismissing the said petition for review. His motion
for reconsideration having been likewise denied, Paderanga then filed the petition for mandamus and
prohibition before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient justification to hold
Paderangato a tedious and prolonged public trial.

Held: A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The
quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well
founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for
the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial,
and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in
jeopardy. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule
is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile,
et al. cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f)
When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it
is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance; and (j) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied. A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case,
however, will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80806, 5 October 1989]

En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 10 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 on leave

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau,
Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers,
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in
public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several
officers and members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was
"Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December 1983, Pita filed a case for
injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco
Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and or restrain
Bagatsing, Cabrera and their agents from confiscating his magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per
se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of
the press. On 12 December 1983, Pita filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order
against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiffs "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending
hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing's pronouncement to continue the
Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the temporary restraining order on 14 December 1983. On 5 January
1984, Pita filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, raising the
issue as to "whether or not the defendants, and or their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize
plaintiff's magazine before any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not." The
restraining order lapsed on 3 January 1984, Pita filed an urgent motion for issuance of another restraining
order, which was opposed by Bagatsing on the ground that issuance of a second restraining order would
violate the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 11 January 1983, providing for the Interim Rules Relative to
the Implementation of Batas Pambansa 129, which provides that a temporary restraining order shall be
effective only for 20 days from date of its issuance. On 11 January 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting
the case for hearing on 16 January 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the
publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine' alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and or burned by the defendants, are
obscence per se or not." On 3 February 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the
motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Likewise, the Appellate
Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the
right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications; and that the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, or
search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure. Pita filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as a result of an anti-smut campaign.

Held: The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing and Cabrera have shown the required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all,
they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The fact that the former
Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process.
Presidential Decrees 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves,
authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin
presidential issuances, from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down
procedures for implementation. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial
warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. The Court finds greater reason to
reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the present
case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a political case,
because speech is speech, whether political or "obscene." Although the Court is not ruling out warrantless
searches, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a
crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party,
under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code. There is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought
to be "punished". Further, to say that the Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut
campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been
committed, is to make the Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. Thus, the court mae a resume, to
wit: (1) The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order; (2) The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
"obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference
and action; (3) The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion. (4) If, in the opinion of the court,
probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for; (5) The proper suit is then brought in the
court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; and (6) Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate
court may assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene." The Court states, however, that
"these do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against
abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the Revised Penal code."
Abdula vs. Guiani [GR 118821, 18 February 2000]

Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder (IS 94-1361) was filed before the Criminal Investigation
Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula and 6
other persons in connection with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6 other persons the total amount
of P200,000.00 for the death of Dimalen. Acting on this complaint, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao,
Salick U. Panda, in a Resolution dated 22 August 1994, dismissed the charges of murder against the Abdulas
and 5 other respondents on a finding that there was no prima facie case for murder against them. Prosecutor
Panda, however, recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents, a
certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution, an information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan
Mama before the sala of Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated 13 September 1994, the Judge ordered that
the case (Criminal Case 2332), be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In this Order,
the judge noted that although there were 8 respondents in the murder case, the information filed with the court
"charged only 1 of the 8 respondents in the name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required
under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at
such a conclusion." As such, the judge reasons, the trial court cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan
Mama. Upon the return of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it
was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation. In addition to the
evidence presented during the initial investigation of the murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses were
submitted to support the charge of murder against the Abdulas and the other respondents in the murder
complaint. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a re-filing of the murder charge and pursuant to law,
issued subpoena to the respondents named therein. On 6 December 1994, the Abdulas submitted and filed
their joint counter-affidavits. After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28
December 1994, found a prima facie case for murder against the Abdulas and 3 other respondents. He thus
recommended the filing of charges against the Abdulas, as principals by inducement, and against the 3 others,
as principals by direct participation. Likewise in this 28 December 1994 Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor
Salick U. Panda, who conducted the earlier preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a notation
stating that he was inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor to dispose of
the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that the case was previously handled by him and that
the victim was the father-in-law of his son. On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December
1994 was filed against the Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of Judge Guiani. This information was signed by
investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was likewise made on the information by Provincial
Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason for his inhibition. The following day, the judge issued a warrant
for the arrest of the Abdulas. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, the Abdulas filed on 4 January
1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion,
the Abdulas argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that
the information was prematurely filed and that the Abdulas intended to file a petition for review with the
Department of Justice. A petition for review was filed by the Abdulas with the Department of Justice on 11
January 1995. Despite said filing, the judge did not act upon the Abdulas' pending Motion to Set Aside the
Warrant of Arrest. The Abdulas filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the judge may rely upon the findings of the prosecutor in determining probable cause in the
issuance of search or arrest warrant.

Held: The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally," a requirement which
does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the
intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under
previous Constitutions. Herein, the Judge admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no
reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary
investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the
information filed." The statement is an admission that the Judge relied solely and completely on the
certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and
issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendations.
He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own. Clearly, the
judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the
investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null
and void.
PEOPLE V MAMARIL
GR 147607
January 22, 2004

Facts:
 SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the
family residence of appellant Mamaril. During the search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of
suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the
property seized and certified that the house was properly searched, which was signed by the appellant and the
barangay officials who witnessed the search.
 The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens positive for the presence of marijuana.
Moreover, the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same.
 Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent’s house, and that he was at his parent’s house when the
search was conducted only because he visited his mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of Property
Seized for the first time during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on the certification that the house
was properly search was his.

Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant

Ruling:
 Yes. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause.
 Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
 In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
o The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally
o The examination must be under oath
o The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers
 The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into writing his examination of the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search
warrant.
 When the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on the available records kept in their office, he was only
able to present before the court the application for search warrant and supporting affidavits. Neither transcript of
the proceedings of a searching question and answer nor the sworn statements of the complainant and his
 witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing was
presented. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient.
 Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine the existence
and non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record, rendering
the search warrant invalid.
 No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid
warrant. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence
against appellant.

Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin [GR 45950, 20 June 1938]

First Division, Laurel (J): 6 concur

Facts: On 10 November 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice
of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person,
house or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts,
documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon an
affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe and he does
believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria, Tarlac, certain
books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is
contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a
captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria, Tarlac and, after
showing the search warrant to the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's
presence who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records
and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt
therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time
by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who
subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de
Garcia for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through
counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents seized. On January 7, and, by
motion, on 4 June 1937, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the
6 criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution of 5 October 1937, Judge
Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion of June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant
was illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part. A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied
by order of 3 January 1938. Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.

Issue: Whether the lack of personal examination of witnesses renders the warrant void.

Held: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant
to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized. These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference
to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to
deliver the same to the corresponding court. Herein, the existence of probable cause was determined not by
the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent
Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if
any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that
the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered
to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal
and used by him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time the warrant was
issued there was no case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was issued
primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of
the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to
resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is,
as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937]

First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an
affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas,
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a
moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit,
the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but
upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date, issued
the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez's house at any time of
the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be
disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and took possession of the following
articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books,
4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of
copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of
copra, 2 packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and
other papers, many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory
notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search for
and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated his protest below the
inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not
been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a
motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately
to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of
contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order directing Siongco
to deposit all the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of 5
days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On 10 June, Attorney
Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said
month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of 30
days for the necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring agent Siongco forthwith
to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to
present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner
filed a petition alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date
together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that
an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be
declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On
September 10, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and
that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the
chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2 days from the
date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory should not be returned to
Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the
reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an
investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by Alvarez. On October 10, said official again
filed another motion alleging that he needed 60 days to examine the documents and papers seized, which are
designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying
that he be granted said period of 60 days. In an order of October 16, the court granted him the period of 60
days to investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the search warrant as well as the order
authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside,
and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit
of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to
serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information
secured from a person whom he considered reliable, and that it is illegal as it was not supported by other
affidavits aside from that made by the applicant.

Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that
there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be
based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given
by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to
God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit,
which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the
search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not
require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders 58 provides
that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not
personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it
is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the
facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is
necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent
who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720, 26 March 1984]

Second Division, de Castro (J): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
"selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case,
he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc
replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the
records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion
was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact
that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case
is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the
records. Mata's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme
Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be
invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all
the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on
the matter.

Issue: Whether the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Held: Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence
or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that
his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December 1989]

En Banc, Padilla (J): 14 concur

Facts: On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division
(ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33,
presided over by Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, an application for the
issuance of a search warrant (Search Warrant 87-14) for violation of Presidential Decree 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Nemesio E. Prudente." On the same day,
the Judge issued the Search Warrant, commanding Dimagmaliw "to make an immediate search at any time in
the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the
Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of
the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith
seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit: (a) M 16 Armalites with ammunition; (b)
.38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols; (c) explosives and hand grenades; and (d) assorted weapons with
ammunitions." On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some
200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo
Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander. In his affidavit, dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a
member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr.
Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with 3 live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with
old newspapers. On 6 November 1987, Prudente moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the
complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the
basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of
searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the
search warrant was issued in violation of Circular 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to
allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. On 9 March 1988, the
Judge issued an order, denying Prudente's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Prudente's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in the order dated 20 April 1988. Prudente filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration
of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were sufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.

Held: The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This probable cause
must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and
not based on mere hearsay. Thus, for a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is
to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense,and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. Herein, in his application for search
warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his
control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and
found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that,
as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources"
that the holders of the said firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the
applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis
for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other
sources or persons. While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw
stated that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and custody
the firearms and explosives described in the application, and that he found it to be a fact, yet there is nothing in
the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information acquired by him as
to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there
had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and
answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the
application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition
were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-76649-51, 19 August 1988]

Facts: In a letter-complaint dated 26 August 1985, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought
the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection
with the NBI's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets
all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape
form which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree 49 (Decree on the Protection of Intellectual
Property). Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the film corporation and subsequently filed 3 applications for search warrants against the video
outlets owned by Eduardo M. Barreto, Raul Sagullo, and Fortune Ledesma. The applications were
consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 132. On 4 September 1985, the
lower court issued the desired search warrants, describing the articles sought to be seized as"(c) Television
sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipments and other
machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the above-
mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.". Armed with
the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the film corporation's agents, raided the video outlets and seized
the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with Barreto, et. al. Acting on a
motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by Barreto, et. al., the lower court issued an
order dated 8 October 1985, lifting the 3 search warrants issued earlier against them by the court, due to the
failure of the NBI to deliver the articles to the Court, and thus ordered the return of the articles to their
respective owners. The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the film corporation in its order
dated 2 January 1986. The film corporation filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the
orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed. The 20th Century Fox Film Corporation filed the petition
for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the inclusion of certain articles of property which are usually connected to legitimate business,
and not involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws, renders the warrant to be
unreasonable.

Held: Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in
a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these
articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily
involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles
without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes
the search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In
fact, this actually happened in the present case. Although the applications and warrants themselves covered
certain articles of property usually found in a video store, the Court believes that the search party should have
confined themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence constitutive of infringement of copyright
laws or the piracy of intellectual property, but not to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to,
a legitimate business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of copyright laws. So that a
television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax tapes, video cassette cleaners video cassette
recorders as reflected in the Returns of Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged in the
video tape industry, and which could not be the subject of seizure. The applicant and his agents therefore
exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate personal property usually found in a video cassette store
or business establishment. The search and seizure is unreasonable.

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano [GR L-69803, 8 October 1985]

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in the result, 1 took no part, 1 reserves his vote

Facts: Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case SMC-
1-1 before Special Military Commission 1, and also one of the accused of Subversion in Criminal Case MC-25-
113 of Military Commission 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al."
She was then still at large. At around 9:00 a.m. on August 6, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied
for a Search Warrant from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of Aguilar-
Roque, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground
house of the CPP/NPA." Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Dona ̃ Andrea cases. At
11:30 a.m., Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia D. Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at
the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a
warrant of arrest had previously been issued against Nolasco. At 12:00 noon on the same day, elements of the
CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. Willie C. Tolentino, a person then in charge
of the premises, was arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest. The searching
party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes,
making 431 items in all. On August 10, Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino, were charged before the
Quezon City Fiscal's Office upon complaint filed by the CSG against the former for "Subversion/Rebellion
and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. On August 13, the City Fiscal filed an Information for
Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-Roque,
et. al. before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding. On
August 16, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the City Fiscal, praying that Aguilar-Roque and
Nolasco be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16. On September 10, the CSG
submitted an Amended Return in the Search Warrant case praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to
retain the seized 431 documents and articles, "in connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila
Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court." On December 13, Judge Pano ̃ admitted
the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying
the case against respondent." A day before that, Aguilar-Roque, et. al. filed a Motion to Suppress, praying that
such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the
Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on 7 January 1985 on the ground that the
validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the other case, apparently unaware of the Order issued by
Judge Pano ̃ on December 13. Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque, and Tolentino filed the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by RTC Judge Pano ̃ ; (2) his
Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC
Judge Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et. al.'s Motion to Suppress.

Issue: Whether the description of the personalities to be seized in the search warrant is too general to render
the warrant void.
Held: The disputed Search Warrant (80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as "Documents, papers
and other records of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National
Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support
money from foreign or local sources." It is at once evident that the Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of
personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It
does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to
the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the
officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. Search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant
and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be
ordered returned to Aguilar-Roque. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126,
Rules of Court, is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a
person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises
where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated
that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the
extent of the place or premises which may be searched". Considering that Aguilar-Roque has been charged
with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a
considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the
search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, the Court was of the opinion that, in her
respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible
effective results in the interest of public order. Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained
by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to Aguilar-Roque to object to
their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission 1 to return to her any all irrelevant documents and
articles.
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142295, PARDO, J

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly,
sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms
without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the PNP Firearms and
Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a certification stating that per
records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said certificationthe
police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the house of appellant.
Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the
residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio
Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers
introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search
warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search
of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45
(Exhibits B and H) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in the
room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition
(Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce
any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.

For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other items
seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the
manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking permission.
Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search. However, after trial the
trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.

HELD:

The Supreme Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals and ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the
charge of violation of P. D. No. 1866.

Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for
being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding

In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of
petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal.

True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter,
inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object." 52 Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain
view" is justified when there is:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are.

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]

Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC Command put up a
checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They stopped and
checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a cream-colored Ford
Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by
Conway Omaweng and had no passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to inspect the
vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling
bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the
vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng consented to. When they
opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized
substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was
marijuana. The Constables thereafter boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report
the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence custodian. The
PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the
substance contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or
marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September
1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the
court declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause against
Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of Section 47
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After his motion for
reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng
did not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23
December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March 1991, the trial
court promulgated its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4,
Article II of RA 6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily
agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the PC Constable (Layung)
was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he chose not to testify on his own behalf.
Omaweng waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a
search or consents to have it made in his person or premises. He is precluded from later complaining thereof
right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41 packages of drugs were found, it
behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure.
People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998]

En Banc, Martinez (J): 12 concur

Facts: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance by the Police Operatives
from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of
confidential and intelligence reports received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street,
Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug trade.
On 17 June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain quantity of drugs
that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the operatives, together with the informer
proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3 vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North
Cemetery and waited for the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulay’s vehicle at 3:00 am. The operatives
tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and Jose Abad Santos Avenue, where they
accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable
Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of
suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The team seized the
suspected contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3 suspects were brought to the police
headquarters at DEU-WPDC for investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the
NBI for laboratory analysis to determine their chemical composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated
stuff were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The defense, however, contends that the 3
accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulay’s house to get the things
of his child allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on
'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they were detained. On 12 July
1994, an Information was filed with the RTC Manila (Branch 35) indicting Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet,"
Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" for having violated Section
4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3 accused pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3
March 1995, the lower court found the appellants guilty as charged and were sentenced to death and a fine of
P10 million.

Issue: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure, due to waiver
on their part.

Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos
@ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily
submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure. They never protested when the
police officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles, nor when
they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation
and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof The right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly." Further,
they effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure by their voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in
the trial.
People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990]

Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command Office in Olongapo City and
reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling marijuana at the
corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using marked money. The
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where appellant was selling cigarettes, and
arrested the latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out the contents of her wallet.
The four marked five-peso bills used in the test buys were found among her possessions and were confiscated
after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos’ stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a
trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares she was selling. Ramos was
thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos executed a statement confessing to her crimes which
she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal. The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to be marijuana. The
defense contends however that she assented to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives for investigation,
after search of her buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She claimed that she
was forced to affix her signature on the four 5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same
money which was used to buy marijuana from her, but which she insists was her money being saved for the
rentals. She was later brought to the Fiscal’s Office after investigation, where she signed a document. She
claimed she was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation, neither during the time she signed the
document at the Fiscal’s Office. Two informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991)
and the other for possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTC Olongapo City (Branch 73)
found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA 6425 and
sentenced her to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was likewise found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425 and was sentenced to life
imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought reversal of the decisions with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash can, where illegal drugs
were found, under her control.

Held: The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table where her legitimate wares
were being sold. Ramos he was the only person who had access to the trash can. The same was under her
immediate physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can under the table to the
exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy
and control of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual possession. In criminal law,
possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to
distribute may be constructive as well as actual. It is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion
and control over the contraband. These requirements are present in the situation described, where the
prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the stall owned by Ramos. In fact, the NARCOM
agents who conducted the search testified that they had to ask Ramps to stand so that they could look inside
the trash can under Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in such a way that it was difficult for another
person to use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her customers. Therefore, the twenty
sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is
correct.

People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]

Third Division, Feliciano (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C.
Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as
and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and
seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon
reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C
[Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found
out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton was but nobody
answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited
Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of the carton containing
marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros
denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to
Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as
amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of
Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.

Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving vehicle, resulting to
his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.

Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be
inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant must be
obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain
exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may
lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not
being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out warrantless
searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are
neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the
vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense. The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a
judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a
package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine
National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana
would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or
"tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the country
on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his
passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had received
confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the record that any circumstance which constituted or could
have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by
Barros. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-
as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao),
simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable cause. Further, The accused is not to be
presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply
because he failed to object." To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into
his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. As the constitutional quaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally non- permissible and
invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana — should therefore not
have been admitted in evidence against Barros.

Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992]

En Banc, Paras (J): 12 concur

Facts: Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wife residing in Davao City. When Veroy was
promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June 1988, he
and his family transferred to Quezon City. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to 2
houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The
Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soquilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other
expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the
key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access
in case of an emergency. On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP
raided Veroy’s house in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of
rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house
since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Permission was requested by phone
to Ma. Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition that the search be conducted in the presence of Major
Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at the Veroy’s house to conduct the search
pursuant to the authority granted by Ma. Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine
containing 7 live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in the children’s room. 3 half-full jute
sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the
children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted clothing, a small black
bag containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a
telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's
bedroom. Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made. The case was referred for preliminary
investigation to the Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for
Davao City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a resolution dated 6 August 1990, the
Fiscal recommended the filing of an Information against the Veroys for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August 1990, an Information for the
said offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC Davao City). No bail
was recommended by the prosecution. The fiscal’s resolution was received by the Veroys on 13 August 1990.
The latter filed a motion for bail on the same day which was denied for being premature, as they have not been
arrested yet. The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, but who refused to receive them o
the ground that his office has not received copies of their warrants of arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August
1990, the Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for various ailments brought about or aggravated by
the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted
their request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat. Upon
arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed a motion for hospital confinement,
which was denied. The court ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on
the merits. At the conclusion thereof, the court issued a second order denying their motion for reconsideration.
The Veroys were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition remained erratic. Gen.
Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had issued a directive for their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to
Camp Crame on the basis of the 2 October 1990 Order. They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the
order of the trial court, unless otherwise restrained by the court. The Veroys filed the petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition.

Issue: Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining thereat the presence of alleged
“rebel soldiers” include the authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However,
the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the
recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing). The necessity of the permission obtained from
Ma. Luisa underlines the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the need of a search warrant to enter the house. The
permission granted by was for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers.
The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The
police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. Warrantless searches were declared
illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The items
taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions instituted against them. The offense of illegal possession of
firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive
is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply
because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the Veroys in the criminal action against them
for illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala
prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the
knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.