Pantaleon vs. American Express, May 8, 2009

1/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 587
Notes.—It is not proper to consider an obligation

novated by unimportant modifications which do not alter
its essence. (Idolor vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 399
[2001])
Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in
the place of the original one, may be made even without the
knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without
the consent of the creditor. (Public Estates Authority vs. Uy,
372 SCRA 180 [2001])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 174269. May 8, 2009.*
POLO S. PANTALEON, petitioner, vs. AMERICAN

EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondent.
Credit Cards; Obligations and Contracts; Delay; Mora

Solvendi and Mora Accipiendi; Requisites.—Petitioner correctly
cites that under mora solvendi, the three requisites for a finding
of default are that the obligation is demandable and liquidated;
the debtor delays performance; and the creditor judicially or
extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance. Petitioner
asserts that the Court of Appeals had wrongly applied the
principle of mora accipiendi, which relates to delay on the part of
the obligee in accepting the performance of the obligation by the
obligor. The requisites of mora accipiendi are: an offer of
performance by the debtor who has the required capacity; the
offer must be to comply with the prestation as it should be
performed; and the creditor refuses the performance without just
cause. The error of the appellate court, argues petitioner, is in
relying on the invocation by respondent of “just cause” for the
delay, since while just cause is determinative of mora accipiendi,
it is not so with the case of mora solvendi.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016857c4894fc502a039003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
Same; Same; Same; Generally, the relationship between a credit

card provider and its card holders is that of creditor-debtor, with
the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pantaleon vs. American Express International, Inc.
card company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the

card holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the creditor, a
relationship which takes exception to the general rule that as
between a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the
debtor while the depositor is considered as the creditor.—We can
see the possible source of confusion as to which type of mora to
appreciate. Generally, the relationship between a credit card
provider and its card holders is that of creditor-debtor, with the
card company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the
card holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the creditor. This
relationship already takes exception to the general rule that as
between a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the
debtor while the depositor is considered as the creditor. Petitioner
is asking us, not baselessly, to again shift perspectives and again
see the credit card company as the debtor/obligor, insofar as it has
the obligation to the customer as creditor/obligee to act promptly
on its purchases on credit.
Same; Same; Same; Notwithstanding the popular notion that
credit card purchases are approved “within seconds,” there really
is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long
must it take for a credit card company to approve or disapprove a
customer’s purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon by
the parties, but one hour appears to be an awfully long, patently
unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card
purchase.—Notwithstanding the popular notion that credit card
purchases are approved “within seconds,” there really is no strict,
legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it

take for a credit card company to approve or disapprove a
customer’s purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon
by the parties. Yet this is one of those instances when “you’d know
it when you’d see it,” and one hour appears to be an awfully long,
patently unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a
credit card purchase. It is long enough time for the customer to
walk to a bank a kilometer away, withdraw money over the
counter, and return to the store.
Same; Same; Same; The culpable failure of the credit card
company herein is not the failure to timely approve the
cardholder’s purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act
on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably.—We do not wish
do dispute that respondent has the right, if not the obligation, to
verify whether the credit it is extending upon on a particular
purchase was indeed
553
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 553
contracted by the cardholder, and that the cardholder is within

his means to make such transaction. The culpable failure of
respondent herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioner’s
purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act on the
same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that
respondent’s credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on
hand to make a judgment, we see no reason why respondent could
not have promptly informed petitioner the reason for the delay,
and duly advised him that resolving the same could take some
time. In that way, petitioner would have had informed basis on
whether or not to pursue the transaction at Coster, given the
attending circumstances. Instead, petitioner was left
uncomfortably dangling in the chilly autumn winds in a foreign
land and soon forced to confront the wrath of foreign folk.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Moral
damages avail in cases of breach of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and the court should find that
under the circumstances, such damages are due.—Moral damages
avail in cases of breach of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, and the court should find that under
the circumstances, such damages are due. The findings of the trial
court are ample in establishing the bad faith and unjustified
neglect of respondent, attributable in particular to the “dilly-
dallying” of respondent’s Manila credit authorizer, Edgardo
Jaurique.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Moral damages do not avail to soothe
the plaints of the simply impatient, so this decision should not be
cause for relief for those who time the length of their credit card
transactions with a stopwatch.—It should be emphasized that the
reason why petitioner is entitled to damages is not simply because
respondent incurred delay, but because the delay, for which
culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries
under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are
remunerative. Moral damages do not avail to soothe the plaints of
the simply impatient, so this decision should not be cause for
relief for those who time the length of their credit card
transactions with a stopwatch. The somewhat unusual attending
circumstances to the purchase at Coster—that there was a
deadline for the completion of that purchase by petitioner before
any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling
companions—gave rise to the moral shock,
554
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social

humiliation sustained by the petitioner, as concluded by the RTC.
Those circumstances are fairly unusual, and should not give rise
to a general entitlement for damages under a more mundane set
of facts.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Castillo, Layman, Tan, Pantaleon and San Jose for
petitioner.
Skycap, Salazar, Hernandez and Gambian for
respondent.
TINGA, J.:
The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon, his wife
Julialinda, daughter Anna Regina and son Adrian Roberto,
joined an escorted tour of Western Europe organized by
Trafalgar Tours of Europe, Ltd., in October of 1991. The
tour group arrived in Amsterdam in the afternoon of 25
October 1991, the second to the last day of the tour. As the
group had arrived late in the city, they failed to engage in
any sight-seeing. Instead, it was agreed upon that they
would start early the next day to see the entire city before
ending the tour.
The following day, the last day of the tour, the group
arrived at the Coster Diamond House in Amsterdam
around 10 minutes before 9:00 a.m. The group had agreed
that the visit to Coster should end by 9:30 a.m. to allow
enough time to take in a guided city tour of Amsterdam.
The group was ushered into Coster shortly before 9:00 a.m.,
and listened to a lecture on the art of diamond polishing
that lasted for around ten minutes.1 Afterwards, the group
was led to the store’s showroom to allow them to select
items for purchase. Mrs. Pantaleon had already planned to
purchase even before the tour
_______________
1 Id., at p. 747.
555
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 555

began a 2.5 karat diamond brilliant cut, and she found a

diamond close enough in approximation that she decided to
buy.2 Mrs. Pantaleon also selected for purchase a pendant
and a chain,3 all of which totaled U.S. $13,826.00.
To pay for these purchases, Pantaleon presented his
American Express credit card together with his passport to
the Coster sales clerk. This occurred at around 9:15 a.m., or
15 minutes before the tour group was slated to depart from
the store. The sales clerk took the card’s imprint, and
asked Pantaleon to sign the charge slip. The charge
purchase was then referred electronically to respondent’s

Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m.
Ten minutes later, the store clerk informed Pantaleon
that his AmexCard had not yet been approved. His son,
who had already boarded the tour bus, soon returned to
Coster and informed the other members of the Pantaleon
family that the entire tour group was waiting for them. As
it was already 9:40 a.m., and he was already worried about
further inconveniencing the tour group, Pantaleon asked
the store clerk to cancel the sale. The store manager
though asked plaintiff to wait a few more minutes. After 15
minutes, the store manager informed Pantaleon that
respondent had demanded bank references. Pantaleon
supplied the names of his depositary banks, then
instructed his daughter to return to the bus and apologize
to the tour group for the delay.
At around 10:00 a.m, or around 45 minutes after Pantaleon
had presented his AmexCard, and 30 minutes after the
tour group was supposed to have left the store, Coster
decided to release the items even without respondent’s
approval of the purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned
to the bus. It is alleged that their offers of apology were
met by their tourmates with stony silence.4 The tour
group’s visible irritation
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 748-749.

3 Id., at p. 750.
4 Id., at p. 20.
556

was aggravated when the tour guide announced that the

city tour of Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack of
remaining time, as they had to catch a 3:00 p.m. ferry at
Calais, Belgium to London.5 Mrs. Pantaleon ended up
weeping, while her husband had to take a tranquilizer to
calm his nerves.
It later emerged that Pantaleon’s purchase was first

transmitted for approval to respondent’s Amsterdam office
at 9:20 a.m., Amsterdam time, then referred to
respondent’s Manila office at 9:33 a.m, then finally
approved at 10:19 a.m., Amsterdam time.6 The Approval
Code was transmitted to respondent’s Amsterdam office at
10:38 a.m., several minutes after petitioner had already left
Coster, and 78 minutes from the time the purchases were
electronically transmitted by the jewelry store to
respondent’s Amsterdam office.
After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon
family proceeded to the United States before returning to
Manila on 12 November 1992. While in the United States,
Pantaleon continued to use his AmEx card, several times
without hassle or delay, but with two other incidents
similar to the Amsterdam brouhaha. On 30 October 1991,
Pantaleon purchased golf equipment amounting to US
$1,475.00 using his AmEx card, but he cancelled his credit
card purchase and borrowed money instead from a friend,
after more than 30 minutes had transpired without the
purchase having been approved. On 3 November 1991,
Pantaleon used the card to purchase children’s shoes worth
$87.00 at a store in Boston, and it took 20 minutes before
this transaction was approved by respondent.
On 4 March 1992, after coming back to Manila, Pantaleon
sent a letter7 through counsel to the respondent,
demanding an apology for the “inconvenience, humiliation
and embarrassment he and his family thereby suffered” for
respondent’s
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 20-21.

6 Id., at pp. 21-22; citing defendant’s Exhibits “9-G,” “9-H” and “9-I.”
7 Id., at pp. 330-331.
557
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 557

refusal to provide credit authorization for the

aforementioned purchases.8 In response, respondent sent a
letter dated 24 March 1992,9 stating among others that the
delay in authorizing the purchase from Coster was
attributable to the circumstance that the charged purchase
of US $13,826.00 “was out of the usual charge purchase
pattern established.”10 Since respondent refused to accede
to Pantaleon’s demand for an apology, the aggrieved
cardholder instituted an action for damages with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 145.11
Pantaleon prayed that he be awarded P2,000,000.00, as
moral damages; P500,000.00, as exemplary damages;
P100,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and P50,000.00 as
litigation expenses.12
On 5 August 1996, the Makati City RTC rendered a
decision13 in favor of Pantaleon, awarding him P500,000.00
as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and P85,233.01 as expenses
of litigation. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal, while
Pantaleon moved for partial reconsideration, praying that
the trial court award the increased amount of moral and
exemplary damages he had prayed for.14 The RTC denied
Pantaleon’s motion for partial reconsideration, and
thereafter gave due course to respondent’s Notice of
Appeal.15
On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision16 reversing the award of damages in favor of
Pantaleon,
_______________
8 Id., at p. 331.
9 Id., at pp. 332-333.
10 Id., at p. 332.
11 Docketed as Civil Case No. 92-1665. Id., at pp. 335-340.
12 Id., at p. 339.
13 Penned by Judge Francisco Donato Villanueva; id., at pp. 92-110.
14 Id., at pp. 348-351.
15 Id., at pp. 360-362.
16 Decision penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice E.J.
Asuncion, concurred by Associate Justices J. Mendoza and A. Tayag.
558

holding that respondent had not breached its obligations to

petitioner. Hence, this petition.
The key question is whether respondent, in connection
with the aforementioned transactions, had committed a
breach of its obligations to Pantaleon. In addition,
Pantaleon submits that even assuming that respondent
had not been in breach of its obligations, it still remained
liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The RTC had concluded, based on the testimonial
representations of Pantaleon and respondent’s credit
authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, that the normal approval
time for purchases was “a matter of seconds.” Based on
that standard, respondent had been in clear delay with
respect to the three subject transactions. As it appears, the
Court of Appeals conceded that there had been delay on the
part of respondent in approving the purchases. However, it
made two critical conclusions in favor of respondent. First,
the appellate court ruled that the delay was not attended
by bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. Second, it ruled
that respondent “had exercised diligent efforts to effect the
approval” of the purchases, which were “not in accordance
with the charge pattern” petitioner had established for
himself, as exemplified by the fact that at Coster, he was
“making his very first single charge purchase of
US$13,826,” and “the record of [petitioner]’s past spending
with [respondent] at the time does not favorably support
his ability to pay for such purchase.”17
On the premise that there was an obligation on the part
of respondent “to approve or disapprove with dispatch the
charge purchase,” petitioner argues that the failure to
timely approve or disapprove the purchase constituted
mora solvendi on the part of respondent in the performance
of its obligation. For its part, respondent characterizes the
depiction by petitioner of its obligation to him as “to
approve purchases instantaneously or in a matter of
seconds.”
_______________
17 Rollo, p. 80.
559
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 559

Petitioner correctly cites that under mora solvendi, the

three requisites for a finding of default are that the
obligation is demandable and liquidated; the debtor delays
performance; and the creditor judicially or extrajudicially
requires the debtor’s performance.18 Petitioner asserts that
the Court of Appeals had wrongly applied the principle of
mora accipiendi, which relates to delay on the part of the
obligee in accepting the performance of the obligation by
the obligor. The requisites of mora accipiendi are: an offer
of performance by the debtor who has the required
capacity; the offer must be to comply with the prestation as
it should be performed; and the creditor refuses the
performance without just cause.19 The error of the
appellate court, argues petitioner, is in relying on the
invocation by respondent of “just cause” for the delay, since
while just cause is determinative of mora accipiendi, it is
not so with the case of mora solvendi.
We can see the possible source of confusion as to which
type of mora to appreciate. Generally, the relationship
between a credit card provider and its card holders is that
of creditor-debtor,20 with the card company as the creditor
extending loans and credit to the card holder, who as
debtor is obliged to repay the creditor. This relationship
already takes exception to the general rule that as between
a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor
while the depositor is considered as the creditor.21
Petitioner is asking us, not baselessly, to again shift
perspectives and again see the credit
_______________
18 See, e.g., Selegna Management v. UCPB, G.R. No. 165662, 3 May
2006, 489 SCRA 125.
19 A. Tolentino, IV Civil Code of the Philippines (1991 ed.), at p. 108.

20 See, e.g., Pacific Banking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 72275, 13 November 1991, 203 SCRA 496; Molino v. Security Diners
International Corp., G.R. No. 136780, 16 August 2001, 358 SCRA 363.
21 See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Cabamongan, G.R. No. 146918, 2 May
2006, 488 SCRA 517.
560

card company as the debtor/obligor, insofar as it has the

obligation to the customer as creditor/obligee to act
promptly on its purchases on credit.
Ultimately, petitioner’s perspective appears more
sensible than if we were to still regard respondent as the
creditor in the context of this cause of action. If there was
delay on the part of respondent in its normal role as
creditor to the cardholder, such delay would not have been
in the acceptance of the performance of the debtor’s
obligation (i.e., the repayment of the debt), but it would be
delay in the extension of the credit in the first place. Such
delay would not fall under mora accipiendi, which
contemplates that the obligation of the debtor, such as the
actual purchases on credit, has already been constituted.
Herein, the establishment of the debt itself (purchases on
credit of the jewelry) had not yet been perfected, as it
remained pending the approval or consent of the
respondent credit card company.
Still, in order for us to appreciate that respondent was
in mora solvendi, we will have to first recognize that there
was indeed an obligation on the part of respondent to act
on petitioner’s purchases with “timely dispatch,” or for the
purposes of this case, within a period significantly less than
the one hour it apparently took before the purchase at
Coster was finally approved.
The findings of the trial court, to our mind, amply
established that the tardiness on the part of respondent in
acting on petitioner’s purchase at Coster did constitute
culpable delay on its part in complying with its obligation
to act promptly on its customer’s purchase request,

whether such action be favorable or unfavorable. We quote
the trial court, thus:
“As to the first issue, both parties have testified that normal
approval time for purchases was a matter of seconds.
Plaintiff testified that his personal experience with the use of the
card was that except for the three charge purchases subject of
561
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 561

this case, approvals of his charge purchases were always obtained

in a matter of seconds.
Defendant’s credit authorizer Edgardo Jaurique likewise
testified:
Q. You also testified that on normal occasions, the
normal approval time for charges would be 3 to 4 seconds?
A. Yes, Ma’am.
Both parties likewise presented evidence that the processing
and approval of plaintiff’s charge purchase at the Coster Diamond
House was way beyond the normal approval time of a “matter of
seconds.”
Plaintiff testified that he presented his AmexCard to the sales
clerk at Coster, at 9:15 a.m. and by the time he had to leave the
store at 10:05 a.m., no approval had yet been received. In fact, the
Credit Authorization System (CAS) record of defendant at
Phoenix Amex shows that defendant’s Amsterdam office received
the request to approve plaintiff’s charge purchase at 9:20 a.m.,
Amsterdam time or 01:20, Phoenix time, and that the defendant
relayed its approval to Coster at 10:38 a.m., Amsterdam time, or
2:38, Phoenix time, or a total time lapse of one hour and [18]
minutes. And even then, the approval was conditional as it
directed in computerese [sic] “Positive Identification of Card
holder necessary further charges require bank information due to
high exposure. By Jack Manila.”
The delay in the processing is apparent to be undue as shown
from the frantic successive queries of Amexco Amsterdam which
reads: “US$13,826. Cardmember buying jewels. ID seen. Advise
how long will this take?” They were sent at 01:33, 01:37, 01:40,
01:45, 01:52 and 02:08, all times Phoenix. Manila Amexco could
be unaware of the need for speed in resolving the charge purchase

referred to it, yet it sat on its hand, unconcerned.
x x x
To repeat, the Credit Authorization System (CAS) record on
the Amsterdam transaction shows how Amexco Netherlands
viewed the delay as unusually frustrating. In sequence expressed
in Phoenix time from 01:20 when the charge purchased was
referred for authorization, defendants own record shows:
562

01:22—the authorization is referred to Manila Amexco

01:32—Netherlands gives information that the
identification of the cardmember has been presented and he
is buying jewelries worth US $13,826.
01:33—Netherlands asks “How long will this take?”
02:08—Netherlands is still asking “How long will this
take?”
The Court is convinced that defendants delay constitute[s]
breach of its contractual obligation to act on his use of the card
abroad “with special handling.”22 (Citations omitted)
x x x”
Notwithstanding the popular notion that credit card

purchases are approved “within seconds,” there really is no
strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how
long must it take for a credit card company to approve or
disapprove a customer’s purchase, much less one
specifically contracted upon by the parties. Yet this is one
of those instances when “you’d know it when you’d see it,”
and one hour appears to be an awfully long, patently
unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a
credit card purchase. It is long enough time for the
customer to walk to a bank a kilometer away, withdraw
money over the counter, and return to the store.
Notably, petitioner frames the obligation of respondent
as “to approve or disapprove” the purchase “in timely
dispatch,” and not “to approve the purchase
instantaneously or within seconds.” Certainly, had
respondent disapproved petitioner’s purchase “within
seconds” or within a timely manner, this particular action

would have never seen the light of day. Petitioner and his
family would have returned to the bus without delay—
internally humiliated perhaps over the rejection of his card
—yet spared the shame of being held accountable by newly-
made friends for making them miss the chance to tour the
city of Amsterdam.
_______________
22 Rollo, pp. 97-99.
563
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 563

We do not wish to dispute that respondent has the right,

if not the obligation, to verify whether the credit it is
extending upon on a particular purchase was indeed
contracted by the cardholder, and that the cardholder is
within his means to make such transaction. The culpable
failure of respondent herein is not the failure to timely
approve petitioner’s purchase, but the more elemental
failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or
unfavorably. Even assuming that respondent’s credit
authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a
judgment, we see no reason why respondent could not have
promptly informed petitioner the reason for the delay, and
duly advised him that resolving the same could take some
time. In that way, petitioner would have had informed
basis on whether or not to pursue the transaction at
Coster, given the attending circumstances. Instead,
petitioner was left uncomfortably dangling in the chilly
autumn winds in a foreign land and soon forced to confront
the wrath of foreign folk.
Moral damages avail in cases of breach of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and
the court should find that under the circumstances, such
damages are due. The findings of the trial court are ample
in establishing the bad faith and unjustified neglect of
respondent, attributable in particular to the “dilly-dallying”
of respondent’s Manila credit authorizer, Edgardo

Jaurique.23 Wrote the trial court:
“While it is true that the Cardmembership Agreement, which

defendant prepared, is silent as to the amount of time it should
take defendant to grant authorization for a charge purchase,
defendant acknowledged that the normal time for approval should
only be three to four seconds. Specially so with cards used abroad
which requires “special handling,” meaning with priority.
Otherwise, the object of credit or charge cards would be lost; it
would be so inconvenient to use that buyers and consumers would
be better off carrying bundles of currency or traveller’s checks,
which can be delivered and accepted
_______________
23 Id., at p. 101.
564

quickly. Such right was not accorded to plaintiff in the instances

complained off for reasons known only to defendant at that time.
This, to the Court’s mind, amounts to a wanton and deliberate
refusal to comply with its contractual obligations, or at least
abuse of its rights, under the contract.24
x x x
The delay committed by defendant was clearly attended by
unjustified neglect and bad faith, since it alleges to have
consumed more than one hour to simply go over plaintiff’s past
credit history with defendant, his payment record and his credit
and bank references, when all such data are already stored and
readily available from its computer. This Court also takes note of
the fact that there is nothing in plaintiff’s billing history that
would warrant the imprudent suspension of action by defendant
in processing the purchase. Defendant’s witness Jaurique admits:
Q.—But did you discover that he did not have any
outstanding account?
A.—Nothing in arrears at that time.
Q.—You were well aware of this fact on this very date?
A.—Yes, sir.
Mr. Jaurique further testified that there were no

“delinquencies” in plaintiff’s account.”25
It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is

entitled to damages is not simply because respondent
incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability
lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries under
Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are
remunerative.26 Moral damages do not avail to soothe the
plaints of
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 105-106.

25 Id., at p. 104.
26 “Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shocks,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if
565
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 565

the simply impatient, so this decision should not be cause

for relief for those who time the length of their credit card
transactions with a stopwatch. The somewhat unusual
attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster—that
there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by
petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of
his several traveling companions—gave rise to the moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation sustained by the petitioner, as
concluded by the RTC.27 Those circumstances are fairly
unusual, and should not give rise to a general entitlement
for damages under a more mundane set of facts.
We sustain the amount of moral damages awarded to
petitioner by the RTC. There is no hard-and-fast rule in
determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount
of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its
own peculiar facts, however, it must be commensurate to
the loss or injury suffered.28 Petitioner’s original prayer for

P5,000,000.00 for moral damages is excessive under the
circumstances, and the amount awarded by the trial court
of P500,000.00 in moral damages more seemly.
Likewise, we deem exemplary damages available under
the circumstances, and the amount of P300,000.00
appropriate. There is similarly no cause though to disturb
the determined award of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
and P85,233.01 as expenses of litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
_______________
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or

omission.”
27 See Rollo, p. 107.
28 Mercury Drug v. Baking, G.R. No. 156037, May 25, 2007, 523 SCRA
184, 191.
566

Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 92-1665 is hereby

REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Acting Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,

Leonardo-De Castro** and Brion, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Prospective sureties to credit card applicants

would be well-advised to study carefully the terms of the
agreements prepared by credit card companies before
giving their consent, and pay heed to stipulations that
could lead to onerous effects. (Molino vs. Security Diners
International Corporation, 363 SCRA 358 [2001])
While it is true that a credit card company may have no

control of all the actions of its merchant affiliates, and
should not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect, however,
to give it blanket freedom from liability if its card is
dishonored by any merchant affiliate for any reason.
(Aznar vs. Citibank, N.A. [Philippines], 519 SCRA 287
[2007])
——o0o——
_______________
** Per Special Order No. 619, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro

is hereby designated as additional member of the Second Division in lieu
of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, who is on official leave.
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Pantaleon vs. American Express, May 8, 2009

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1/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 587

Notes.—It is not proper to consider an obligation

G.R. No. 174269. May 8, 2009.*

POLO S. PANTALEON, petitioner, vs. AMERICAN

Credit Cards; Obligations and Contracts; Delay; Mora

Same; Same; Same; Generally, the relationship between a credit

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pantaleon vs. American Express International, Inc.

card company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the

legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it

VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 553

Pantaleon vs. American Express International, Inc.

contracted by the cardholder, and that the cardholder is within

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pantaleon vs. American Express International, Inc.

mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 555

began a 2.5 karat diamond brilliant cut, and she found a

purchase was then referred electronically to respondent’s

2 Id., at pp. 748-749.

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

was aggravated when the tour guide announced that the

It later emerged that Pantaleon’s purchase was first

5 Id., at pp. 20-21.

VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 557

refusal to provide credit authorization for the

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

holding that respondent had not breached its obligations to

VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 559

Petitioner correctly cites that under mora solvendi, the

19 A. Tolentino, IV Civil Code of the Philippines (1991 ed.), at p. 108.

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

card company as the debtor/obligor, insofar as it has the

to act promptly on its customer’s purchase request,

VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 561

this case, approvals of his charge purchases were always obtained

be unaware of the need for speed in resolving the charge purchase

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

01:22—the authorization is referred to Manila Amexco

Notwithstanding the popular notion that credit card

seconds” or within a timely manner, this particular action

22 Rollo, pp. 97-99.

VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 563

We do not wish to dispute that respondent has the right,

of respondent’s Manila credit authorizer, Edgardo

“While it is true that the Cardmembership Agreement, which

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

quickly. Such right was not accorded to plaintiff in the instances

Mr. Jaurique further testified that there were no

It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is

24 Id., at pp. 105-106.

VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 565

the simply impatient, so this decision should not be cause

the loss or injury suffered.28 Petitioner’s original prayer for

they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 92-1665 is hereby

Carpio-Morales (Acting Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

Notes.—Prospective sureties to credit card applicants

While it is true that a credit card company may have no

** Per Special Order No. 619, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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