PARTNERSHIP

1. AGAD VS MABATO, 1968 Eligio Estanislao, Jr. v. Court of Appeals ,REMEDIOS ESTANISLAO, EMILIO
2. ESTANISLAO JR VS CA, 1988 and LEOCADIO SANTIAGO
3. MICHAEL GUY VS ATTY GLENN GACOTT, 2016-PDF

AGENCY
FACTS:
1. SEVILLA VS CA
2. SPS. FERNANDO AND LOURDES VILORIA VS CIA-PDF Petitioner and private respondents are brothers and sisters who are co-owners of
certain lots at the corner of Annapolis and Aurora Blvd., Quezon City which were then
Agad vs Mabato being leased to the Shell Company of the Philippines Limited (SHELL). They agreed
to open and operate a gas station thereat to be known as Estanislao Shell Service
Facts: Petitioner Mauricio Agad claims that he and defendant Severino Mabato are
partners in a fishpond business to which they contributed P1000 each. As managing Station with an initial investment of P15,000.00 to be taken from the advance rentals
partner, Mabato yearly rendered the accounts of the operations of the partnership. due to them from SHELL for the occupancy of the said lots owned in common by
However, for the years 1957-1963, defendant failed to render the accounts despite them.
repeated demands. Petitioner filed a complaint against Mabato to which a copy of the
public instrument evidencing their partnership is attached. Aside from the share of
On May 26, 1966, the parties herein entered into an Additional Agreement with a
profits
proviso that said agreement cancels and supersedes the original
(P14,000) and attorney’s fees (P1000), petitioner prayed for the dissolution of the agreement executed by the co-owners.
partnership and winding up of its affairs. Mabato denied the existence of the
partnership alleging that Agad failed to pay hisP1000 contribution. He then filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action. The lower court dismissed For sometime, the petitioner submitted financial statements regarding the operation of
the complaint finding a failure to state a cause of action predicated upon the theory the business to private respondents, but thereafter petitioner failed to render
that the contract of partnership is null and void, pursuant to Art. 1773 of our Civil subsequent accounting.
Code, because an inventory of the fishpond referred in said instrument had not been
attached thereto. Art. 1771. A partnership may be constituted in any form, except
A demand was made on petitioner:
where immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public
instrument shall be necessary. Art. 1773. A contract of partnership is void, whenever • to render an accounting of the profits;
immovable property is contributed thereto, if inventory of said property is not made, • to execute a public document embodying all the provisions of the partnership
signed by the parties; and attached to the public instrument. agreement;
• to pay the plaintiffs their lawful shares and participation in the net profits of the
Issue: Whether or not immovable property or real rights have been contributed to the
partnership. business.

Held: Based on the copy of the public instrument attached in the complaint, the
ISSUE:
partnership was established to operate a fishpond", and not to "engage in a fishpond
business.” Thus, Mabato’s contention that “it is really inconceivable how a partnership IS A PARTNERSHIP a FORMED WHERE MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY
engaged in the fishpond business could exist without said fishpond property (being) BIND THEMSELVES TO CONTRIBUTE MONEY TO A COMMON FUND WITH
contributed to the partnership” is without merit. Their contributions were limited to THE INTENTION OF DIVIDING THE PROFITS AMONG THEMSELVES?
P1000 each and neither a fishpond nor a real right thereto was contributed to the
partnership. Therefore, Article 1773 of the Civil Code finds no application in the case
HELD:
at bar. Case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
 YES. The Joint Affidavit of April 11, 1966 (Exhibit A), clearly stipulated by the
members of the same family that the P15,000.00 advance rental due to them from
SHELL shall augment their "capital investment" in the operation of the gasoline
station.
other evidence in the record:
⁃ Petitioner submitted to private respondents periodic accounting of the business.
⁃ Petitioner gave a written authority to private respondent Remedios Estanislao, his
sister, to examine and audit the books of their "common business" (aming negosyo).
⁃ Respondent Remedios assisted in the running of the business.
Sevilla vs. CA
of his employer’s business, or otherwise, assume any liability thereof. In the second
place, when the branch office was opened, the same was run by the appellant Sevilla
payable to TWS by any airline for any fare brought in on the effort of Sevilla. Thus, it
cannot be said that Sevilla was under the control of TWS. Sevilla in pursuing the
business, relied on her own capabilities. It is further admitted that Sevilla was not in
the company’s payroll. For her efforts, she retained 4% in commissions from airline
bookings, the remaining 3% going to TWS. Unlike an employee, who earns a fixed
salary, she earned compensation in fluctuating amount depending on her booking
successes. The fact that Sevilla had been designated “branch manager” does not make
her a TWS employee. It appears that Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent herself, and she
acquired an interest in the business entrusted to her. She also had assumed personal
obligation for the operation thereof, holding herself solidary liable for the payment
of rentals. Wherefore, TWS and Canilao are jointly and severally liable to indemnify
the petitioner, Sevilla.

FACTS:

A contract by and between Noguera and Tourist World Service (TWS), represented
by Canilao, wherein TWS leased the premises belonging to Noguera as branch office
of TWS. When the branch office was opened, it was run by appellant Sevilla payable
to TWS by any airline for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Sevilla, 4% was
to go to Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the TWS. Later, TWS was informed
that Sevilla was connected with rival firm, and since the branch office was
losing, TWS considered closing down its office. On January 3, 1962, the contract with
appellee for the use of the branch office premises was terminated and while the
effectivity thereof was January 31, 1962, the appellees no longer used it. Because of
this, Canilao, the secretary of TWS, went over to the branch office, and finding the
premises locked, he padlocked the premises. When neither appellant Sevilla nor any
of his employees could enter, a complaint was filed by the appellants against
the appellees. TWS insisted that Sevilla was a mere employee, being the “branch
manager” of its branch office and that she had no say on the lease executed with
the private respondent, Noguera.

ISSUE:

W/N ER-EE relationship exists between Sevilla and TWS

HELD:

The records show that petitioner, Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private
respondent TWS. In the first place, under the contract of lease, she
had bound herself in solidum as and for rental payments, an arrangement that would
belie claims of a master-servant relationship. That does not make her an employee of
TWS, since a true employee cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance