Villavicienco v. Lukban 9.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the
March 25, 1919 | J. Malcolm | Liberty of Abode
PETITIONER: Zacarias Villavicienco, et al.
RESPONDENT: Justo Lukban, et al.
SUMMARY: Mayor Lukban deported 170 prostitutes from Manila to Davao.
Friends and relatives of the prostitutes applied for writ of habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to present the
prostitutes but not all of them showed up. The issue is whether or not the
respondent Mayor has the power to order the deportation of prostitutes to Davao.
The SC held no since there is no law authorizing such. In fact, there is a penal law
punishing such.
DOCTRINE: There is no law that authorizes the Mayor to force a citizen to
change his domicile. In fact, there is a penal law punishing such.
FACTS: (Didn’t include discussion re writ of habeas corpus and contempt of court)
1. The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute,
which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
2. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined
to their houses in the district by the police.
3. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,
Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the
coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a
guard of soldiers.
4. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to
orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of
Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates
into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival.
5. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police
station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined
for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from
that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation.
6. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the
night of October 25.
7. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales,
provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo.
8. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case,
had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been
expelled from the city of Manila.
deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court.
10. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, prayed
that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper
parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First
Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control,
and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the
city of Manila.
11. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the
persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December
2, 1918.
12. Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at
their own expense. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none
of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by
the respondents.
ISSUES:
1. WON Mayor Lukban has the power to order the deportation of
prostitutes to Davao – NO
RULING: In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas
corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo,
and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within
five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of
Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of
January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
RATIO:
1. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints
at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that
city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite
their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On
the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person
to change his residence.
Torres, J., dissenting:
 1. When the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they assumed, were
obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen but by the mayor of
the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and
social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken, availing himself
of the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose of
protecting the immense majority of the population from the social evils and
diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have
been producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true center
for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom.
2. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of
prostitution and the change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor
did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which guarantees the
liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the women
petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the
exercise of which they have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the
free practice of their shameful profession.
Araullo, J., dissenting in part:
1. Basically, he said that the Mayor disobeyed the court orders, which caused
damage to the prostitutes as well as delay in the resolution of the case so a
higher penalty should have been imposed instead.
2. I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there
should be imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred
pesos (P500), and all the costs should be charged against him.
Marcos vs. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211| September 15, 1989| Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel
Petitioners: Ferdinand Marcos et. al.
Respondents: Honorable Raul Manglapus et.al.
Summary:
Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into
exile. Aquino’s ascenssion into the presidency has been
challenged by different failed coup attempts and plots of some of
the Marcoses and their loyalists. In Marcos’ deathbed, he wished
to return to the Philippines to die. However, President Aquino
barred their return as they pose threat to national interest and
welfare.
The Court ruled that the President did not act arbitrarily when she
barred the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. This is based on
the President’s residual power and the circumstances during the
case wherein the country was only on its way to recovery from
Martial Law. Also, the right invoked by the petitioners is not
specifically guaranteed under the Bill of rights, though it may well
be considered as a generally accepted principle of international
law which is a part of the law of the land. They are not absolute
nor inflexible, they admit of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests.
Doctrine: The right to return to one’s country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed under the Bill of rights, though it
may well be considered as a generally accepted principle of
international law which is a part of the law of the land.
Facts:
1. Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via
the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile to Hawaii.
2. In his deathbed, he wished to return to the Philippines to die. However,
Corazon Aquino, who was declared President of the Republic under a
revolutionary government, barred him and his family from travelling back to
the country.
3. Mrs. Aquino considered the dire consequences to the nation of Marcos’
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various
directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward.
4. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Courts to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and his immediate family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return of the remains
of Mr. Marcos along with the members of his family.
a. The petitioner’s case is founded on the following provisions in the Bill
of Rights:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
b. Other Contentions:
i. The President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. The right to
 travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, but there must be legislation to that effect.
ii. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
iii. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (order public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.
5. The respondents contend primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights, citing Article II
a. Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military, or civil service.
b. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy.
And the decision of other countries to ban deposed dictators like Cuba
(Fulgencio Batista).
Issue:
1. W/N, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines –
YES
2. W/N the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return -NO
Ruling: WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. The president, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated
residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and
in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
a. The President can exercise Commander-in-Chief powers in
order to keep the peace and maintain public order and
security even in the absence of an emergency.
b. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers
in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to
the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds
of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is
not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
2. The President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
a. It is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be
the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back as the court
recognizes the present realities that the country is besieged from within.
b. The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed under the Bill of rights, which only treats
liberty of abode and the right to travel. However, it may well be
considered as a generally accepted principle of international law which
is a part of the law of the land.
c. The constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners are not
absolute nor inflexible, they admit of limits and must be adjusted to
the requirements of equally important public interests.
d. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of
the economy attributed to the Marcoses. The President has determined
that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total
economic collapse.
Note: “This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of
political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short
space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.”
Fernan, C.J. Concurring
Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not
derived solely from a particular constitutional clause or article or from an
express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law. History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded
to the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and
imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers:
"residual," "inherent," “ moral," "implied," "aggregate," "emergency."
whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must
if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out
effectively and efficiently. It is in this context that the power of the President
to allow or disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be
viewed. By reason of its impact on national peace and order in these admittedly
critical times, said question cannot be withdrawn from the competence of the
Executive Branch to decide.
Gutierrez, J., Dissenting
 The issue as to the propriety of the President’s decision to prohibit
the Marcoses from returning is not a political question. there must be
in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or
Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or
prohibit for a political question to exist. The respondents failed to
any provision in the constitution which vests the determination of the
question raised to the Court solely in the President.
 The right to return home should not be differentiated from the right
to go abroad or to move around the Philippines. The right to come
home must be preferred than any right to travel. The framers of the
Constitution not only re-enacted but strengthened the declaration of
the right to travel as it was the right violated by Marcos with regard
to Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other
"undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that
unfortunate period. The Court's decision in this case sets back the
gains that our country has achieved in terms of human rights,
especially human rights for those whom we do not like or those who
are against us.
Cruz, J. Dissenting
 Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to
the Philippines against the prohibitions of the government then,
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and the liberty of abode
that his adversary invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the
Constitution to all individuals, including the patriot and the homesick
and the prodigal son returning, and tyrants and charlatans and
scoundrels of every stripe.
 The government failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos
dead or alive would pose a threat to the national security as it had
alleged. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on
mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without
any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions.
Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that
there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's
return. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court
after that hearing.
Paras, J. Dissenting
 There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen
and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, he has the right to return to his
own country except only if prevented by the demands of national
safety and national security.
 Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this danger. They are bereft
of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation. True,
there is some danger but there is no showing as to the extent.
Padilla, J. Dissenting
  With or without restricting legislation, the interest of national
security, public safety or public health can justify and even require
restrictions on the right to travel, and that the clause "as may be
provided by law" contained in Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution merely declares a constitutional leave or permission for
Congress to enact laws that may restrict the right to travel in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health. The
power of the State, in particular cases, to restrict travel of its citizens
finds abundant support in the police power of the state which may be
exercised to preserve and maintain government as well as promote
the general welfare of the greatest number of people. This power is,
however, cannot be absolute and unlimited under all circumstances,
much less, can it be arbitrary and irrational.
 The apprehensions on national security or public safety appear to be
more speculative than real, obsessive rather than factual. Also, if
such worries turns into reality, the military authorities and the
Filipino people are ready to handle such problems.
Sarmiento, J. Dissenting
 There is only one right involved here, whether under municipal or
international law: the right of travel, whether within one's own
country, or to another, and the right to return thereto. The
Constitution itself makes no distinctions; thus, no one should make a
distinction.
 The implied powers of the Chief Executive must yield to the
paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. The constitution only mentioned
limits as prescribed by law or upon lawful order of the court as
exceptions to the right to travel or liberty of abode and of changing
the same Had the Constitution intended a third exception, that is, by
Presidential initiative, it could have specifically said so.
 The determination of whether Marcos’ return poses a threat to
national security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive, the
Court itself must not only be satisfied that the threat is not only clear
but also present.
YAP v. CA June 6, 2001 | Gonzaga-Reyes, J. | Liberty of abode and Right to travel
PETITIONERS: Francisco Yap Jr. a.k.a Edwin Yap
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
SUMMARY: Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for
misappropriating amounts equivalent to Php 5,000,000. After the records of the case
were transmitted to the CA, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA
granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of Php
5,000,000 on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor
of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to
be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be
with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of
the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA,
by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He
also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and
travel. The issue in this case is whether or not the condition required to post bail
violates the petitioner’s right of liberty of abode and travel. The Court held that the
right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner,
are not absolute rights. The order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes
such lawful order as contemplated by Sec. 6, Art. III of 1987 Constitution. The
condition imposed by the CA is simply consistent with the nature and function of a
bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence.
DOCTRINE: The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines are not
absolute rights as stated in Sec. 6, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
1. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to Php 5,500,000, petitioner was
convicted of estafa by the RTC of Pasig City. He filed a notice of appeal, and
moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier
in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the RTC.
2. At the CA, petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of
Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion,
the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the
amount of Php 5,500,000 and be required to secure a certification or guaranty
from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and
that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.
 However, petitioner contends that the proposed bail of Php 5,500,000 was
violative of his right against excessive bail.
3. The CA granted the motion and upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor
General.1 A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the
amount of bail fixed but was denied. Hence, this current petition.
4. Petitioner contends that the CA unduly restricted his constitutional liberty of
abode and travel in imposing that he secure “a certification/guaranty from the
Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he
will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court”. However, the
Solicitor General advanced that all that the CA requires is notice in case of
change of address; it does not in any way impair petitioner’s right to change
abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence during the
pendency of the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the condition required to post bail violates the petitioner’s
right of liberty of abode and travel. - NO
RULING: The petition is partially granted. Petitioner’s bail pending appeal is reduced
from Php 5,500,000 to Php 200,000. In all other respects, the resolutions of the CA
are affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights as stated in Sec. 6, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution2.
2. In this case, the order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by
the CA is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is
to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition
will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely
1 The following are the conditions in allowing petitioner to post bail:
1. He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident
therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with
prior notice to the court;
2. The Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a
hold departure order against accused-appellant; and
3. The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of
Court for safekeeping until the court orders its return;
required to inform the court in case he does so.
3. Moreover, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents
him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which
issued the order. In fact, the petition submits that “the holddeparture order against
petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape. Thus, to require
him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is
already unnecessary.”
Additional information: Whether the proposed bail of Php 5,500,000 was violative
of petitioner’s right against excessive bail.
1. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution.
The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,
is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right
to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano, this Court made the pronouncement that
it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should
the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by
imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.
2. Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts
to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
c) Penalty for the offense charged;
d) Character and reputation of the accused;
e) Age and health of the accused;
f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
h) Forfeiture of other bail;
i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
3. In this case, appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure
against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order
and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence
and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case
4. Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-
appellant’s bail bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate arrest and confinement
in jail.
2 The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
 is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at Php
5,500,000 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of
petitioner’s right to bail.
4. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil
liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, Php 5,500,000) is to permit
the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that
accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await
the judgment of the appellate court.
5. The Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of
Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not binding
upon the courts, “merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of the
Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the enforcement of
criminal laws.” Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but
should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the
administration of criminal justice. This notwithstanding, the Court is not
precluded from imposing in petitioner’s case an amount higher than Php 40,000
(based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase
is dictated by the circumstances.
LEGASPI V. CSC (RICA)
MAY 29, 1987| Cortes, J. |
PETITIONER: Valentin L. Legaspi
RESPONDENTS: Civil Service Commission
SUMMARY: Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission information
regarding the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed in the Health
Department of Cebu City. Legaspi’s request was denied by the CSC. Legaspi now
prays for the issuance of a mandamus to compel the CSC to disclose the
information . CSC says that petitioners have no standing in the case which means
that the mandamus would have to fail. The SC said that since what is being
asserted here by the petitioners is a public right, it is sufficient that petitioners be
citizens to have legal standing. With regard to the information, the SC held that
the information must be of (1) public interest or concern and (2) must not be
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In this case,
the SC held that since this is with regard to public office, it involves public trust
and hence, public interest. Respondent failed to cite any law that exempts the
information requested by the petitioners. The SC also notes that the results of the
passers of the Civil Service exam are released publicly. Hence, there is nothing
secret about the eligibility.
DOCTRINE: The right to information is a public right and any citizen can have
legal standing to assert the right. The right to information is not absolute. The
information requested must be of public concern or interest and must not be
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
FACTS:
1. Legaspi had requested information from the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
2. These government employees (Sibonghanoy and Agas) had allegedly
presented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
exam.
3. CSC denied Legaspi’s request. So Legaspi prays for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent to disclose said information. He claims
that his right to information of the eligibilities of the employees is guaranteed
by the Constitution and that he has no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy.
ISSUES:
1) WoN a writ of mandamus is in order – YES
2) WoN CSC’s denial of his request constitutes a violation of his Constitutional right
– YES
a. WoN petitioners have standing to sue – Yes
b. WoN CSC has a ministerial duty to furnish the petitioner with the
information the petitioner seeks - Partly
RULING: Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the
position of sanitarian and to confirm or deny the eligibility of the two employees.
RATIO:
1. These constitutional provisions are self-executing and they supply the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed. But what the
Legislature may provide are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest. The right and duty under Art III sec 7 have become operative
and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter, therefore the
right may be properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding.
2. A petition for mandamus is instituted by a party aggrieved. The petitioner
must be an aggrieved party in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right
to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.
a. In this case, petitioner has anchored this case on his right
of the people to information on matters of public concern. This is a
public right.
b. When it is a public right involved, the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty and the people are regarded
 as the real party in interest. They need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result. It is sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
c. A citizen is part of the general public which possesses the
right. Petioner, being a citizen, is clothed with personality to seek
redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.
3. The New Charter expressly mandates the duty of the State and its agents to
afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition,
government research date used as basis for policy development, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law. For the information to be
disclosed it must be: information of public concern (with reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of the
information) and must not be exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
a. the authority to regulate the manner of examining public
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. Only the
legislature may impose the prohibition. Its authority to regulate is to
be exercised solely to the end that (1) damage to or loss of public
records may be avoided, (2) undue interference with the duties of
said agencies may be prevented, and (3) that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured. (placed this
here just in case)
b. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of proof to show that the information requested is not of
public concern. There is no rigid test to determine if it is of public
concern. It eludes exact definition and embraces a broad spectrum.
For the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter
is of interest or importance as it relates to or affects the public. In
this case, the information sought is the truth of the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligible for the
positions.
c. Public office is a public trust. It is a legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied by persons who are eligible. Public officers
are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibility.
4. The information sought is within the ambit of constitutional guarantee. But
the constitutional guarantee is not absolute. It has exemptions.
a. respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service
Law which would limit the petitioner’s right to know who are, and
who are not, civil service eligible.
b. The Court also takes note that those who pass the civil
service exam, the results are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one’s civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed.
VALMONTE v BELMONTE, JR. (Ram)
February 13, 1989 | Cortes, J. | Right to Information of GSIS Loans
PETITIONER: RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL
CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ,
REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN “NINO” ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO
and ROLANDO FADUL
RESPONDENTS: FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.
SUMMARY: Petitioner Valmonte, a lawyer and member of the media, wrote a letter to
the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting the following:
(1) List of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa (belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban) who were able to secure clean loans of Php 2 million each
immediately before the February 7 election through the intercession/guaranty of the First
Lady Imelda Marcos; (2) Certified true copies of the documents evidencing the respective
loans and; (3) Allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
GSIS then General Manager Feliciano Belmonte refused to prepare the list and denied the
access invoking procedural concerns, the confidentiality relationship between GSIS and
the borrowers, right to privacy and the performance of propriety function. The issue in this
case is WoN Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents
sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. The SC held that the
petitioners have a right to information regarding the 2nd and 3rd request as these are a matter
of public concern and there is no law granting GSIS confidentiality with regard to
documents. The funds of the GSIS assume a public character. It is therefore the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.
DOCTRINE: The right to information is not absolute. People’s right to information is
limited to (1) Matters of public concern and (2) Information sought must not be among
those excluded by law. *NOTE: These are the requisites before a Mandamus may be
issued regarding the right to information.
However, the Constitution does not accord citizens a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern. Only access to official records is permitted
because otherwise, citizens can unduly burden the agencies with the preparation of their
requested lists or summaries.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Valmonte, a lawyer and member of the media, wrote a letter to the
respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting the
following:
a. List of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa
(belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban) who were able to secure clean
loans of Php 2 million each immediately before the February 7 election
through the intercession/guaranty of the First Lady Imelda Marcos
b. Certified true copies of the documents evidencing the respective loans
c. Allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information
2. In his letter, Valmonte stresses the premise on the provision of the Freedom
Constitution regarding the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern (at that time it was stated in Art. IV, Sec. 6).
3. Belmonte sought the help of the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS because he
 thought that it contained serious legal implications. Mr Meynardo A. Tiro declined
Valmonte’s request in letter saying:
a. A confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it, whoever they may be;
b. That the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality;
c. And that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality
unless so ordered by the courts.
4. On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy
General Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to
receive a reply, they are now considering themselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue their desired objective in pursuance of public
interest.
5. Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General.
Petitioners filed a consolidated reply.
6. In his comment, respondent raised the following contentions:
a. Principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies - Procedural objection
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
i. Actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the
Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners.
ii. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not
exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.
b. Constitutional Right to Information
i. Matter of Public Concern - GSIS cannot reveal such information
as there is a confidential relationship that exist between the GSIS
and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be.
ii. Right to Information vs. Right to Privacy – He further contends
that in view of the right to privacy, which is equally protected by
the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents, evidencing
loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit
of the right to information. Loan transactions are private in nature
iii. GSIS is a governmental corporation performing proprietary
functions – outside the coverage of the people’s right to access to
official records.
ISSUES: WoN Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents
sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the respondent General
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access
to documents and records evidencing loans granted to members of the former Batasang
Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to time and manner
of inspection, not incompatible with the decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO
ORDERED.
RATIO:
Principle of Exhaustion of Administrative remedies
1. Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be
allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress available under the law.
2. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless
the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum.
3. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled
exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved
4. In the case at bar, the issue raised is a purely legal question, as it requires the
interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information. Hence, the
petitioners have a cause of action.
Constitutional Right to Information
1. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by
the people to the state. Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the
limits of the authority conferred by the people.
2. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the role of
the citizens in governmental decision-making as well as in checking the abuse in
government.
3. Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
People’s right to information is limited to:
a. Matters of public concern
b. Information sought must not be among those excluded by law
4. Meaning of “public interest” and “public concern”
a. Legaspi case - Subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine on a case by case basis.
5. Matter of public concern:
a. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter.
b. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
i. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977 provide for
annual appropriations for to pay for contributions, premiums,
interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government,
as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the
Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
c. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent
rules and regulations.
d. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these
funds are managed properly with end in view of maximizing the
benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.
6. Information sought must not be among those excluded by law:
a. There is no law granting GSIS confidentiality with regard to documents
b. Right to Information v. Right to Privacy
i. There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is constitutionally
protected.
ii. In the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, the right to privacy
 belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public
and the government agencies like the GSIS.
iii. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like
the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since
the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings
and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no
such ground for relief.
iv. Neither can the GSIS through its General manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers.
v. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked
only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
c. GSIS is a governmental corporation performing proprietary functions
i. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government
Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government,
WHETHER carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some
business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to the
people.
ii. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising
proprietary function would NOT justify the exclusion of
transactions from the coverage and scope of right to information.
iii. Intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
included government owned and controlled corporations and a
transaction entered into by then is within the coverage of the State
policy of full public disclosure.
Decision on the Requests of Valmonte
1. Allows the 2nd and 3rd request, but denied the 1st request.
2. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to “access to official records,” the Constitution does not accord them a right
to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
3. Only access to official records is permitted because otherwise, citizens can unduly
burden the agencies with the preparation of their requested lists or summaries
4. Petitioners failed to meet the standard that there is a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and imperative duty to perform the act required.
Sereno v. Committee (steph)
February 1, 2016 | Bersamin, J. | Constitutional guarantee to information is confined
to matters of public concern.
FACTS:
1. CTRM of NEDA had a meeting with PGMA. They recommended to her the
2. APMP requested the minutes of the said meeting because they wanted to know
PETITIONER: Mario Jose E. Sereno, executive director of the Association of
Petrochemmical Manufacturers of the Philippines Inc. (APMP) note;
petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related
materials.
RESPONDENTS: Committee on Trade and Related Matters (CTRM) of
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
SUMMARY: APMP, the main industry association in the petrochemical
industry, petitioned for a mandamus with the RTC to summon the minutes of the
meeting between CTRM and PGMA in 2005. The meeting concerned tariff rates,
which would greatly affect the petrochemical industry’s profits and growth.
Petitioners invoked their Constitutional right of access to information on matters
of public concern, however CTRM refused, stating that the minutes of that
meeting are exempt from this guarantee because it was a closed-door Cabinet
meeting concerning foreign affairs, trade, and policy making. The issue is
whether or not CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to disclose the minutes
to APMP. The Supreme Court ruled that the minutes of that particular meeting
are indeed exempt, because it concerned sensitive matters that the government
has a right to protect and keep private in order to ensure the continued free
expression and exchange of ideas of those involved in the meeting.
DOCTRINE: 2 requisites for writ of mandamus:
• information sought must be in relation to matters of public
concern or public interest (left to courts to determine on a case to
case basis)
• it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee
• In case of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency
concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to be
obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from
the coverage of the constitutional guarantee.
lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and
certain plastic products, reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff rates
on products covered by EO 161.
the reason behind this move of the government. (note: lifting the suspension of
the tariff reduction schedule not only brought significant losses to the
petrochemical industry that undermined the industry’s long-term viability and
 survival, but also allegedly conflicted with policy directives designed to support
and develop an integrated petrochemical industry.) CTRM denied this request,
stating that it was a closed door cabinet meeting and therefore considered
privileged information. (authority: Section 3 e, Rule IV of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
3. APMP invoked their Constitutional right of access to information on matters of
public concern. CTRM still refused.
4. APMP petitioned for mandamus in the RTC. RTC dismissed petition for
mandamus.
5. RTC banked their decision on the following:
Sec. 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information,
records and documents to any requesting public except if:
xxx x
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of
established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or
settled policy or jurisprudence;
(d) such information, record or document comprises drafts or decisions, orders,
rulings, policies, memoranda, etc.
xxx x
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.·In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx x essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information.·Public officials and
employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to
the public either:
6. The RTC declared that CTRM is an advisory body composed of various
department heads or secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and
inter-agency communications, and that the record of the communications
of such body falls under the category of privileged information because
of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect public interest.
ISSUE: WON the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the
petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on
the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the
State’s policy of full public disclosure— NO!
RULING: The dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed.
RATIO:
i. Constitutional guarantee of the right to information of matteres of public
concern complements State’s policy of full public disclosure in all
transactions involving public interest. This also ensures transparency in
policy-making and operations transparency, and safeguarding the exercise
by the people of freedom of expression.
ii. However, this right is not absolute.
iii. 2 requisites for writ of mandamus:
• information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern
or public interest (left to courts to determine on a case to case basis)
• it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee
i. First requisite: The petrochemical industry is one of the major movers of
economic growth and investment in the country, hence it is a matter of public
concern.
ii. Second requisite: minutes sought is from a closed-door Cabinet meeting
dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade, and policy-making, so
EXEMPT. These meetings were directly related to the exercise of the
sovereign prerogative of the President as Head of State in the conduct of
foreign affairs and the regulation of trade. (authority of CTRM as advisory
body of the President and NEDA is in EO 230 1987. see bullet points below
for specific jobs of CTRM under NEDA)
• (i) Advise the President and the NEDA Board on tariff and related matters,
and on the effects on the country of various international developments;
• (ii) Coordinate agency positions and recommend national positions for
international economic negotiations;
• (iii) Recommend to the President a continuous rationalization program for
the country’s tariff structure. (underlining supplied)
• Chavez v. Public Estates Authority: “A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.”
• Almonte v. Vasquez: “A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.”
• Every claim of exemption is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly
against the claim of confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege as a cause for
exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted by
specifying the grounds for the exemption.
• In case of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency
concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to be
obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from the
coverage of the constitutional guarantee.
• What should determine whether or not information was within the ambit of the
exception from the people’s right to access to information was not the composition
of the body, but the nature of the information sought to be accessed.

Manila Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Laguio Jr. (Armand)
August 6, 1991 | Narvasa J. | Art 3 Sec 8
PETITIONER: MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION et al.
RESPONDENTS: THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR., in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila et al.
1. SUMMARY:
There were mass actions by 800 Public School Teachers which was
caused by the alleged failure of authorities to act upon the teacher’s
grievances such as the immediate payment of due chalk , clothing
allowances, 13th month pay arising from the salary standardization law,
and a few others more.
Even on September 17, 1990, the mass actions continued which was a
Monday and a school day. Some of the teachers who participated in the
mass actions did not hold classes that day. The secretary of education
filed cases against those teachers who participated in the mass actions on
the grounds of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of
Civil Service Law, absence without official leave and the likes and
placed them on a 90-day preventive suspension period. The issue is WoN
employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and
holding strikes. The court held that employees in the public (civil)
service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike,
although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress
for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate
with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such
working conditions as are not fixed by law.Public school teachers have
the right to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but NOT during
class hours, for then this would be a strike, which is illegal for them.
DOCTRINE:
Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector,
do not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to self-
organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment
terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed
by law.
FACTS:
1. The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called
"mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990
to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
again been brought to the latter's attention.
2. The subject of the petitions: immediate payment of due chalk, clothing
allowances, 13th month pay for 1989 arising from the implementation of the
Salary Standardization Law, the recall of DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing
the oversizing of classes and overloading of teachers pursuant to the cost-
cutting measures of the government,etc.
3. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other cities and
municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS premises
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the
granting of demands. No response was made by the respondent Secretary of
Education, despite the demonstration, so the petitioners began the ongoing
protest mass actions on September, 17,1990.
4. September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day.
There is no question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action
did not conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in
G.R. No. 95590, they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning
whence they proceeded to the National Office of DECS. The mass actions
continued into the week despite the return to work directive, with more
teachers joining in the days that followed.
5. Based on reports submitted by the principals of the various public schools in
Metro Manila, the respondent Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio
administrative complaints against the teachers who had taken part in the mass
actions and defied the return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law,
absence without official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day preventive
suspension.
6. Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445 had filed
with the Manila RTC a petition for prohibition, declaratory relief and
preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain the implementation of the
return-to-work order of September 17, 1990 and the suspension or dismissal
of any teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order null and
void.RTC rendered judgment declaring the assailed return-to-work order
 valid and binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. G.R. No.
95590 is a parallel original proceeding which was consolidated with G.R.
No. 95445.
7. The petitioners filed an appeal to the CSC. They claim that they are such
parties although not individually so named in the petition in said case, being
among those referred to in its title as "other similarly situated public school
teachers too numerous to be impleaded"CSC denied the petition.
ISSUES:
WoN employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and
holding strikes – YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any
appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the CSC on
the matters complained of.
RATIO:
1. The Court held that the resolution stating that “3) that from the pleaded and
admitted facts, these "mass actions" were to all intents and purposes a
strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence
from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons;” , that the court has not since been presented
with any consideration of law or established fact that would impair the
validity of these postulates or preclude continued reliance thereon for the
purpose of resolving the present petitions on their merits.
2. Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do
not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to self-
organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms
and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law. Public
school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for redress of
grievances but NOT during class hours, for then this would be a strike, which
is illegal for them
3. The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners have a
right to strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons,
nor whether or not there was in fact such a strike, it being equally evident
from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute about this.
What therefore, is brought before the Court is the question of whether or not
any rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the Constitution
as it applies to administrative proceedings were violated in the initiation,
conduct, or disposition of the investigations complained of.
4. There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue
and resolving it in these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this
Court in the exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious
reason that it is one of fact.
5. The petitions and subsequent pleadings of the petitioners allege the following
facts: (a) that teachers were dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of
their principals and without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the
return-to-work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify the particular
charges or offenses allegedly committed; (c) that some teachers were not
furnished sworn complaints, and others were suspended without any formal
charges; (d) that teachers who attempted to return within a reasonable time
after notice of the return-to-work order were not accepted back; and similar
allegations.
6. These are however denied and disputed by the public respondents, who set
forth their own version: (a) Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No.
95590 admit engaging in a strike (referred by semantic interplay as
"concerted activity" or "mass action") directed against public respondent
Cariño beginning September 17, 1990; (b) The striking teachers were given a
period of five days to file their Answers in line with Sec. 8, Rule III of Rules
on Administrative Disciplinary Cases; (c) Many of the striking teachers
refused to appear at the hearings but preferred to submit their case on the
basis of their answers.
7. This Court finds that the facts regarding the denial of due process would
turn are still in issue, actively controverted, hence not yet established.
8. The petitioners cannot-as it seems they have done lump together into what
amounts to a class action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own
peculiar set of facts, and expect a ruling that would justly and correctly
resolve each and everyone of those cases upon little more than general
allegations, frontally disputed as already pointed out, of incidents supposedly
"representative" of each case or group of cases.
9. This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court,
especially when numerous parties desparately situated as far as the facts are
concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization of
what should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. The
petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings
but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein.
DISSENTING OPINIONS
J Gutierrez:
The suspensions meted against the teachers were cruel, arbitrary and punitive
and beyond the allowable 90 day period which amounts to denial of
substantive due process.
Although the SSS Ruling remains good law, what was involved here was not
the right to strike, but the right of the teachers to peaceful assembly, to free
speech, and to petition the governement for redress of grievances.
J. Cruz
The teachers should be ordered reinstated in the meantime pending their
administrative investigations. They should not be indefinetely suspended.
The SSS Ruling should not be used as an excuse by the government to ignore
the legitimate complaints of its employees.
Just because teachers are governed by Civil Service laws, it does not mean
that they should be deprived of their rights to free speech and to peaceably
assemble. He also said that the prohibition against strikes made by
government employees must be reexamined.
J. Feliciano
The prohibition on strikes is not statutory in nature but is only administrative
and regulatory in character. The Constitution itself is silent on the matter and
thus it could not be made an absolute rule. The Court failed to balance the
rights and interests of the teachers and the effective maintenance of
government.
J. Padilla
There is a violation of procedural due prcoess. The dismissals and
suspensions were handed out in rapid succession characterized by
arbitrariness and undue haste.
The court also dismissed the case because it supposedly involved a question
of fact, but proceeded to declare that the strike was illegal which could not be
doneonly if the facts were duly considered.
J. Sarmiento
There was a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DECS, and the
court should not shirk based on the handy excuse that it is not a trier of facts.
The issue of WoN there was due process or arbitrariness in handing out the
suspensions and dismissals of the teachers must be resolved before the court.
Padcom Condo. Corp v Ortigas Center association
Ellijah Ong
May 9, 2002 | Davide, Jr, J. | Freedom to not join associations
PETITIONER: PADCOM condo corporation
RESPONDENTS: Ortigas Center Association, Inc
SUMMARY:
Padcom owns and manages a building in the Ortigas center area. It was originally
acquired by OCLP by TDC. Under the original deed of sale, there was a provision
for automatic membership to an association. 1982, the Ortigas center association
was created. The association was requesting monthly payments from its members.
Padcom owed the association 639, 961. They were given repeated demands, asked
for extensions and even made a new scheme of payment. Trial court sided with
Padcom and CA reversed their decision. Padcom contested the automatic
membership as a violation of its right to (and not to) association. The court said
that the Padcom was never forced to join the association. It could have avoided
the membership by not buying the property. It was not forced to buy the property
and bought it with the conditions that were stated in its deed of sale. It voluntarily
agreed to bound by the conditions, and thus to join an association.
DOCTRINE:
The freedom to not associate is not violated by automatic membership in a
property contract. A buyer acquires a property with knowledge of the conditions
that it’s subject to, thus voluntarily associating.
FACTS:
1. Padcom Condominium Corporation (Padcom) owns and manages the
Padcom building located in Emeral Avenue, Ortigas Center. The land was
originally acquired by another company under a deed of sale. The deed said
that the transferee and its successor in interest must become members of an
ossociation for realty owners and long term lessees in the area.
2. 1982, Ortigas Center Association (association) was organized. It sought the
collection of membership dues in the amount of 2,724.40 a month. Padcom
owed the association 639, 961.47, representing membership dues.
3. The letters between the parties through the years showed repeated demand
for payment, request of extension of payment, and even a settlement scheme
proposed by Padcom in 1990.
4. Since Padcom couldn’t pay, the association filed a complaint for collection
of sum of money before the trial court. The trial court granted Padcom’s
motion to dismiss. The CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision.
5. CA justified by saying that they became members automatically from the
annotation in the transfer certificate. The membership was also evident since
Padcom was part of its list of bona fide members, Padcom’s president was
one of the association’s incorporators, and Padcom received demands of
payment, made extensions and even proposed a new scheme of payment.
6. Hence this petition, where Padcom raises the sole issue of whether it can be
compelled to join the association pursuant to the provision on automatic
membership appearing in the deed of sale and the transfer certificate.
7. Padcoms contentions: It cannot be compelled to be a member. When they
bought the land, the association was not yet formed. The provision was
merely anticipatory and still subject to the the formulation of implementing
rules. They add that the association’s by laws state an application for
membership.
8. Association cites the Deed of sale which state the automatic membership for
the owners of lots in the Ortigas center and their successor’s in interest. The
application for memberships are merely formalities and can be dispensed.
ISSUES:
1. Can Padcom be compelled to join an association by virtue of the
automatic membership.
RULING:
RATIO:
1. On the issue of freedom of association: The automatic membership clause is
a not a violation of its freedom of association. Padcom was never forced to
join the association. It could have avoided such membership by not buying
the land from TDC (the corporation that owned the land before). Nobody
forced it to buy the land when it bought the building with the annotation of
the condition or lien on the Certificate of Title therof and accepted the Deed.
Padcom voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the condition, and thus
to join the association.
2. On other unrelated issues. Under the torrens systems, liens and claims of
whatever character except those mentioned by law, existing against the land
bind the holder of the title and the whole world. When TDC bought the land,
they bound themselves to the provision on automatic membership as shown
by the deed of sale. The annotation was likewise annotated in the transfer
certificate. Those liens and claims are inseparable from the property as a right
in rem, a burden on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists
notwithstanding a change of ownership.
3. On contention of the need of application. It doesn’t apply to long term lessee
as long as they own the property. Their membership will end if they stop
owning the property. No application is necessary.
4. Also barred by principle of estoppel. (I guess since they accepted the
demands and even for extensions and all that)
Republic vs de Castellvi (Mel)
August 15, 1974 | Zaldivar, J. | Requisites of Taking of property
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Carmen M. Vda. De Castellvi, et al.
SUMMARY: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
entered into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year
basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because
of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were
erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding
against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings
for the land in question. The trial court held that the “taking” of the properties under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case. Thus, it ruled that
the Republic must pay P10 per square meter of the lands as just compensation (1959 market
value). The Republic, however, argues that the “taking” shoud be reckoned from the year
1947 by virtue of the lease agreement. The SC held the 1959 market value should be the
basis as not all the requisites of a valid taking of property were met.
DOCTRINE: Requisites of a valid taking of property for purposes of eminent domain:
1) The expropriator must enter a private property;
2) The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period
3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property
FACTS:
1. In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
entered into a lease agreement with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis over a
land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Foridablanca, Pampanga.
2. The Philippine Air Force had occupied Castellvi’s property since 1947 under
a contract of lease.
3. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused.
4. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of
the contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter
that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property
in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the
general public
5. A follow-up letter was sent and later, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano,
Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for
the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and
other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already
established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the
acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be
recommended to the President
6. Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the
land
7. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these
expropriation proceedings in 1959, and, the Republic was placed in
possession of the lands on August 10, 1959.
8. The trial court held that the “taking” of the properties under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case (1959). It ruled that
the Republic must pay P10 per square meter of the lands as just
 compensation.
9. The Republic, however, arguest that the “taking” shoud be reckoned from the
year 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement.
ISSUE:
2. WON the 1947 market value should be the basis for the just compensation?
– NO. The 1959 market value should be the basis. The SC modified the
compensation to the fair market value of P5.00 per square meter.
RATIO:
1. In American Jurisprudence, on the subject of “Eminent Domain”, we read the
definition of “taking” as follows:
 “Taking under the power of eminent domain may be defined
generally as entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal
authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof ."'
2. Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be
present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain:
A. The expropriator must enter a private property;
B. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period
C. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority;
D. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and
E. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property
3. In the case at bar, only requisites A, C and D are present.
A. The expropriator must enter a private property (PRESENT)
 This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of
the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession
of the property of Castellvi.
B. The entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period (NOT PRESENT)
 Momentary means lasting but a moment; of but a moment’s
duration. Momentary when applied to possession or occupancy of
real property should mean “a limited period”—not indefinite or
permanent.
 The lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year
to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and
considered transitory.
 The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the
entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although
renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By
express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition
as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP.
 It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land
permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this intention cannot prevail over the clear and
express terms of the lease contract.
 If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy
permanently Castellvi’s property, why was the contract of lease
entered into on year-to-year basis? Why was the lease agreement
renewed from year to year?
C. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority (PRESENT)
 This circumstance in the „taking‰ may be considered as
present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the
Castellvi property as lessee.
D. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected (PRESENT)
 It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being
devoted to public use is present because the property was used
by the air force of the AFP.
E. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property (NOT PRESENT)
 In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property
and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal
of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in
the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the
property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated.
 Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment
of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and
had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the
time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June
26, 1959.
4. It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvi’s property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Additional info:
We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the taking
of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: 1) that the entrance and
occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2)
that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and
deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
US vs. CAUSBY (328 US 256)
1946 May 27 | J. Douglas | Military airplanes
PETITIONER: United States
RESPONDENT: Thomas Lee Causby et al
SUMMARY: Causby owned a chicken farm and a dwelling house near an airport
outside of Greensboro, North Carolina used by the US military. According to Causby,
noise from the airport frightened the chickens due to the loud noises when the aircrafts
passed over the property. The chicken farm production had to stop because 150 chickens
were killed by flying into walls  from fright. Based on these facts, the Court of Claims
found that respondents’ property had depreciated in value and that US had taken an
easement over the property in the amount of $2000. Based on the ancient common law
doctrine, Causby argued that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in
this airspace, the government had confiscated his property without compensation. On
the other hand, the US argued that the Air Commerce Act of 1926 provides that the US
has complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space. The United States
concludes that when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical
invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. The
issue is whether or not the flying of planes over the chicken farm constitutes a violation
of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court ruled in the affirmative but
rejecting the application of the common law doctrine. It held that if the landowner is to
have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches
of the enveloping atmosphere. Given the damage caused by the particularly low,
frequent flights over the farm, the Court held that the government had violated Causby’s
rights and he was entitled to compensation.
DOCTRINE: Without defining the specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the
land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if it led to a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.
FACTS:
1. Causby owns a property near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina on
which has a dwelling house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of
the airport was 2,220 feet from Causby’s property, and the glide path passed over
the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn,
and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is
pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with
provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the
national emergency, whichever is earlier.
3An easement is a non-possessory right to use and/or enter onto the real property of
another without possessing it.
2. The direction of the prevailing wind determines when a particular runway is used.
The north-west-southeast runway in question is used about four per cent of the time
in taking off and about seven per cent of the time in landing. The four-motored
heavy bombers and other planes of heavier types frequently passed over the
property in question. Those planes come close enough at times to appear barely to
miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow
the old leaves off. (This part is to emphasize na !@#$%^& dude ang baba talaga)
3. As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many
as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from
fright . The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell
off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial
chicken farm. Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family
has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane
accidents on respondents' property, there have been several accidents near the
airport and close to respondents' place. Causby filed a complaint invoking the
ancient doctrine at common law which states that ownership of the land extended
to the periphery of the universe.
4. On the basis of these facts, the Court of Claims held that the property had
depreciated in value and that the US had taken an easement 3 over the property in
the amount of $2000.
5. The US filed a petition for a writ of certiorari arguing that the Air Commerce Act
of 1926 which provides that the US has complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the airspace over the country. The United States concludes that
when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical invasion
of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. It says that
at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of
authorized air navigation. Any damages are said to be merely consequential for
which no compensation may be obtained under the Fifth Amendment.
ISSUE: WON the frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over Causby’s
property at low altitudes constitutes a violation of the Takings Clause as provided by
the Fifth Amendment? Yes, it does. Causby is entitled to a just compensation
subject to the findings of the Court of Claims as to the amount of easement to be
awarded.
RULING: The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims
so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with this opinion.
RATIO:
1. Common sense revolts at the idea that ownership of the land is extended to the
periphery of the universe. The air is a public highway as declared by Congress. To
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously
interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into
private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
2. Despite the non-applicability of the common law doctrine, the Court still ruled in
favor of Causby by holding that if, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the
 flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or
complete. It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the property lawfully on the land or water beneath.' Our holding that there was an
surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it. The measure of the value invasion of respondents' property is thus not inconsistent with the local law
of the property taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain. governing a landowner's claim to the immediate reaches of the superadjacent
3. Though it would be only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if airspace.
permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee 8. The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public
interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are. Flights
surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as
irrelevant. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land—that is to say, his to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
beneficial ownership of it—would be destroyed. It would not be a case of land.
incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance.
4. In this case, enjoyment and use of the land are not completely destroyed. But that Dissent: J. Black
1. The Court's opinion seems to indicate that the mere flying of planes through the
does not seem to be controlling. The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a
column of air directly above respondents' land does not constitute a 'taking'.
valuable factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential
Consequently, it appears to be noise and glare, to the extent and under the
section to a wheat field. Some value would remain. But the use of the airspace
circumstances shown here, which make the government a seizer of private
immediately above the land would limit the utility of the land and cause a
property. But the allegation of noise and glare resulting in damages, constitutes at
diminution in its value.
best an action in tort where there might be recovery if the noise and light
5. Airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the landowner is to have full
constituted a nuisance, a violation of a statute, or were the result of negligence.
enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of
2. There has been no taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because of
the enveloping atmosphere. The landowner owns at least as much of the space
the modern nature of the airplane. The noise of newer, larger, and more powerful
above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land. The fact that
planes may grow louder and louder and disturb people more and more. But the
he does not occupy it in a physical sense—by the erection of buildings and the
solution of the problems precipitated by these technological advances and new
like—is not material. The flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not
ways of living cannot come about through the application of rigid Constitutional
touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional
restraints formulated and enforced by the courts.
entry upon it. The reason is that there would be an intrusion so immediate and
direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit
his exploitation of it. While the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that
stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in
somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light Penn Central Transportation v NYC
and air is used. June 26, 1987| Brennan, J.| Taking
6. The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that
continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We PETITIONER: Penn Central Transporatation
think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that RESPONDENTS: New York City
invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface. It is the
character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long SUMMARY: In 1965, herein respondent, New York City, enacted the
as the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a “Landmarks Preservation Law” to enable the city to designate certain
taking.
buildings and neighborhoods as historical landmarks. Petitioner Penn Central
Transportation Co. (Penn Central) owned Grand Central Terminal in New
7. While the meaning of 'property' as used in the Fifth Amendment was a federal
York City which was designated as a historical landmark under the law. In
question, 'it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law.' If we look
1968, to increase its income, Penn Central leased the airspace above Grand
to North Carolina law, we reach the same result. Sovereignty in the airspace rests
Central Terminal for fifty years to UGP Properties, Inc. Penn Central
in the State 'except where granted to and assumed by the United States.' The flight
expected the lease to provide it with millions of dollars of additional income
of aircraft is lawful 'unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then
every year. Penn Central and UGP then submitted two proposals for building
existing use to which the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is put
designs to the New York City Commission and applied for permission to
construct an office building above Grand Central Terminal. However, the
Commission denied their request on the grounds that Grand Central Terminal
was a historical landmark. Penn Central brought suit in New York Supreme
Court against New York City alleging that the City Commission’s application
of the Landmarks Preservation Law which denied its rights to build an office
building above Grand Central Terminal and receive revenue from the
building constituted a taking of the company’s property without just
compensation as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The New
York Supreme Court granted an injunction to Penn Central, but did not
provide damages. The state court of appeals reversed, holding that the
Landmarks Preservation Law furthered an important public purpose. Penn
Central appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The issue is WoN the Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to Grand
Central Terminal constitute a taking. NO
The SC held that it does not constitute a taking because it does not impede
existing uses or prevent a reasonable return on investment. The restrictions
imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare
and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but
also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal
site proper but also other properties.
DOCTRINE: If the restriction is reasonable and related to a legitimate
public interest, then it does not result in a taking. Diminution in property
value alone does not establish a taking.
FACTS
 In 1965, NYC adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law to enable the city to
designate certain buildings and neighborhoods as historical landmarks.
o After a building is designated a landmark, there are restrictions upon
a property owner's options concerning use of the landmark site.
o The Landmarks Preservation Commission must approve in advance
any proposal to alter the exterior architectural features.
 In 1968, to increase its income, Penn Central entered into a 50-year
lease and sublease agreement with Properties, Inc. (UGP), a United
Kingdom corporation. Under the terms of the agreement, UGP was to
construct a multistory office building above the Terminal.
 Penn Central expected the lease to provide it with millions of dollars of
additional income every year. Appellants UGP and Penn Central then applied
to the Commission for permission to construct an office building atop the
Terminal. Penn Central and UGP then submitted two proposals for building
designs to the New York City Commission. After lengthy hearings, the
Commission denied this request on the grounds that Grand Central Terminal
was a historical landmark.
o The first plan (Breuer I) was rejected since the Commission thought
it would look silly to balance a 55-story building atop an 8-story
history landmark.
o The second plan (Breuer II Revised)was also rejected since it would
strip off the exterior architectural features of the terminal.
 Penn Central brought suit in New York Supreme Court against New York
City alleging that the City Commission’s application of the Landmarks
Preservation Law which denied its rights to build an office building above
Grand Central Terminal and receive revenue from the building constituted a
taking of the company’s property without just compensation as required by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
 The New York Supreme Court granted an injunction to Penn Central, but did
not provide damages. The state court of appeals reversed, holding that the
Landmarks Preservation Law furthered an important public purpose. Penn
Central appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
ISSUE
WoN the Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to Grand Central Terminal
constitute a taking. - NO
RULING
The Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to Grand Central Terminal does not
constitute a taking because it does not impede existing uses or prevent a reasonable
return on investment.
RATIO
 Rule – Taking
o A use restriction on real property may constitute a "taking" if
not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose.
o A use restriction on real property may constitute a "taking" if it
has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the
property.
 The New York City's Landmarks Law has not effected a "taking" of
appellants' property. The restrictions imposed are substantially related
to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable
beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants
opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but
also other properties.
 There is no set formula for determining when a taking occurs. However,
the Court has recognized several factors that have particular
significance.
o The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant.
o The extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations.
o If the taking can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government.
 The government can, however, execute laws or programs that adversely
affect recognized economic values.
o Even if economic harm is present, it is not a taking if it did not
interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the
reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute property for
Fifth amendment purposes.
o When the state has reasonably concluded that the public welfare
would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of
land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or
adversely affected recognized real property interests.
o In Miller v. Schoene, Court concluded that the state had not
exceeded its powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class
of property without compensation in order to save another which
was of greater value to the public.
o In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, Court upheld ruling that prohibited
operation of brickyard since it was inconsistent with neighboring
uses.
o In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, Court held that a use restriction may
constitute a taking if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of
a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact upon
the owner's use of the property.
o In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Court said that a state statute
that substantially furthers an important public policy may so
frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a
taking.
 The airspace surrounding a parcel of land cannot be considered a separate
parcel for purposes of taking.
o Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated.
 The fact that the law has a more severe impact on some landowners than
on others does not in itself mean that the law effects a taking.
 The law does not interfere with any of the present uses of the terminal.
 Additionally, Penn Central might still be able to build some sort of building
on top that would be approved; it just might not be able to be 50-stories high
Dissenting Opinion - Judge Rehnquist
 The law imposes on Penn Central a substantial cost and no benefit except for
the honor of the designation of a landmark.
 Two key words in the Takings Clause need to be examined.
o Property
 Valuable property rights have been destroyed here.
 The property has been subjected to a nonconsensual
servitude not borne by any neighboring or similar
properties.
o Taken
 NYC has taken/destroyed substantial property rights from
Penn Central.
 There are two exceptions where the destruction of property rights does not
constitute a taking.
1. The government may take property to prevent the property owner
from using his property to injure others. The question is really one
of nuisance and whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the
safety, health, or welfare of others. Here, NYC is not prohibiting a
nuisance.
2. The government may prohibit a use if the prohibition applies over a
broad cross section of land and secures an average reciprocity of
advantage. This is why zoning regulations are not takings. Here, a
multimillion dollar loss is imposed on Penn Central and is not offset
by any benefits flowing from preservation of the 400 buildings in
NYC.
OSG v. Ayala
September 18, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Eminent Domain v. Police Power
PETITIONER: The Office of the Solicitor-General
RESPONDENTS: Ayala Land Incorporated, Robinsons Land
Corporation, Shangri-La Plaza Corporation And Sm Prime Holdings, Inc.,
SUMMARY: Respondents herein are operators of shopping malls in
various locations in Metro Manila that have parking facilities (inside the
main buildings, in separate buildings and/or in adjacent lots solely
provided for parking use). The respondents are also the one which
 maintains the parking spaces and in turn, they collect parking fees subject
to their imposed parking rates. The Senate Committee on Trade and
Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint
investigation to inquire on the legality of the parking fees and to find out
the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates. More importantly, to
determine the legality of the policy of the shopping malls denying liability
in cases of theft, robbery or carnapping by invoking the waiver clause at
the back of the parking tickets. After the public hearings, the Senate
Committees jointly concluded that the collection parking fee is contrary
to the National Building Code and that the reasonable interpretation of the
code is that the parking spaces are for free; thus, the Committee
recommended that the Office of the Solicitor General should institute the
necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to
enforce the penal sanctions of the National Building Code. The court
affirmed the previous decision that the respondents are not obliged to
provide free parking spaces. There is no pertaining provision in the
National Building Code that expressly provides the same. The law is clear
and unequivocal that it needs no further interpretation, it only provides for
measurement requirements of the parking spaces. The OSG cannot rely
on their invoked provisions; they even failed to consider the substantial
differences and legal backgrounds on the jurisprudence they are insisting.
DOCTRINE: When there is a taking or confiscation of private property
for public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but another
of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain.
FACTS:
1. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala
Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza
Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime)
could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to
their patrons and the general public.
2. The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the
collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to National
Building Code and figuratively speaking, the Code has “expropriated”
the land for parking.
3. Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would be
against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to
the State’s policy of protecting the interest of consumers. Moreover,
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for
the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code,
including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations
thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This is not being strictly
followed as the LGUs are tasked to discharge the regulatory powers
of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.
4. As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor
General should institute the action to enjoin the collction of parking
fees and enforce the sanctions for violation of National Building Code;
2) DTI pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce the provisions of Code
relative to parking; and 3) Congress should amend and update the
National Building Code to prohibit the collection of parking fees and
its waiver of liability.
5. CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the
following grounds: 1) OSG did not fail to exhaust administrative
remedies and that an administrative review is not a condition
precedent to judicial relief where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be
done; 2) the validity of National Building Code IRR cannot be
proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and the controversy could
be settled on other grounds without touching the issue of validity since
the courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a
law; and 3) Section 803 of National Building Code and Rule XIX of
IRR are clear that they are only intended to control the occupancy of
areas and structures, and in the absence of provision of law,
respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces free of
charge.
6. As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for
Review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are
not obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.
2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees
is a valid exercise of the police power of State.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated
14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming
in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
RATIO:
 1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the
respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found
no merit in the OSG’s petition:
Sec 803 of National Building Code.
Percentage of Site Occupancy states that maximum site occupancy shall be
governed by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the
use, area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the
local zoning requirements and in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary.
RULE XIX – PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing
for maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading
space requirements shall be observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements
for specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4
meters by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by
6.00 meters for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be
computed at a minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall
be drawn to scale and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans
and specified whether or not parking accommodations, are attendant-managed.
(See Section 2 for computation of parking requirements).
xxxx
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center – 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid
exercise of the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control
the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with
it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this
case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.”
Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are
regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and
all-compassing governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and
property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It
looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only
as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political
society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory
fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so,
it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons
who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over
the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities,
they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically.
Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action
of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic
reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the
ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to
justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the
collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the
public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting
respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the
bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power
to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the
power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does
not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few
cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the
State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers,
namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner.

Sumulong vs. Guerrero (Villavicencio)
September 30, 1987 | Cortes, J. | Expropriation for Housing
Petitioner: Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing
Respondent: Hon. Buenaventura Guerrero and National Housing Authority
Summary: National Housing Authority filed a complaint for expropriation for the
parcels of land of Sumulong and Balaoing pursuant to PD 1224 and for the purpose
of providing housing facilities to low-salaried government officials. Petitioners
are assailing the constitutionality of PD 1224 for violating due process of law,
expropriating lands not for public use, and for failure in providing for just
compensation. The Supreme Court held that socialized housing is considered for
public use that would be a valid cause of expropriation. However, the provisions
of PD 1224 on just compensation and due process violate the Constitution. There
is no just compensation because of the decree does not take into consideration all
that is required, such as surroundings, improvements, and capabilities, in
determining the value. PD 1224 violates due process as it does not allow the owner
to question the valuation.
Doctrine: Public use, requirement for the exercise of eminent domain, is a flexible
and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
The public character of housing measures does not change because units in
housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy
prescribed qualifications. It is not possible to provide housing for all at once.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of taking. It means
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts and condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements, and capabilities should be
considered.
Facts:
1. National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of
parcels of land approx. 25 hectares, including the lots of Sumulong and
Balaoing. The lands were valued at 1 PESO per sqm pursuant to President
Decrees prescribing the valuation for expropriation proceedings. With this,
NHA deposited the amount of 158, 980 pesos, as the market value for the 25
hectares, with the Philippine National Bank.
2. The lands are being expropriated by NHA for the expansion of Bagong
Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried
government officials.
3. Petittioners are challenging the orders of Judge Guerrero with regard to
expropriation and the compensation that he acted with grave abuse of
discretion and the petitioners are also assailing the constitutionality of PD
1224.
4. Petitioners argue that PD 1224 is unconstitutional for violating due process
of law: the Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size,
socialized housing is not a public purpose, violates procedural due process as
it allows immediate taking without giving the owner a day in court, unjust
and unfair valuations, and deprives the court to determine just compensation.
Issue: W/N “Socialized Housing” falls under “public use” – Yes
W/N expropriation is confined to landed estates - No
W/N the provisions on just compensation and due process violate the Constitution -
Yes
Held: WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17, 1978 and June
28, 1978 issuing the writ of possession on the basis of the market value appearing
therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. Let this case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the compensation
the petitioners are entitled to be paid. No costs.
Ratio:
Public Use
1. Petitioners contend that socialized housing is not public use because it will
benefit only a handful of people.
2. PD 1224 defined socialized housing as the construction of dwelling units for
the middle and lower class members of our society.
3. Public use, requirement for the exercise of eminent domain, is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
4. Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes provided that the Constitution defined
public use in 2 cases: 1) expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small
lots for resale at cost to individuals 2) transfer of utilities and other private
enterprises to the government.
5. The said case also provides that at present, whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
6. Urban renewal or redevelopment and construction of low-cost housing is
recognized as public use by the Constitution (Art II, Sec 9, and Art XIII, Sec
9).
7. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in
housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy
prescribed qualifications. It is not possible to provide housing for all at once.
Size of Property
1. Petitioners contend that PD 1224 would allow the taking of any private land,
regardless of size. They say that there are vast areas of land in Rizal that are
owned by few landlords. It is surprising to include their lots.
2. JM Tuason Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration: expropriation is not
confined to landed estates.
 3. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which
petitioners herein failed to prove, the Court will give due weight and leave
NHA’s choice undisturbed.
Just Compensation
1. The provisions on just compensation are similar in other PDs. And, these
were already ruled in previous cases.
2. Export Processing Zone Authority case: basic unfairness of the decrees is
apparent. The values given are usually uniform for very wide areas.
Individual differences are not taken into account. The value of land is based
on generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, and other crops.
Buildings are described in terms of only 2-3 classes of building materials and
estimate of areas are more often inaccurate. Tax values cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation. And, owners should not estopped to
question the valuation.
3. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts and
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements, and
capabilities should be considered.
Due Process
1. The constitutionality of the procedure in PD 1224 was already decided by
previous cases.
2. Export Processing Zone Authority case: it violates due process to deny the
owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in tax documents is unfair
or wrong.
3. Requisites before issuance of writ of possession, Ignacio case, 1) must be a
Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, 2) provisional
determination of just compensation by court, 3) deposit
Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis (Casey)
December 21, 1973 | J. Quiason | City Charter grants power to City of Manila to acquire
lands in it for people in Manila + public use in eminent domain has flexible concept
PETITIONER: Philppine Columbian Association
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Domingo D. Panis as Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 41, Hon. Ricardo Diaz, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27, the CITY OF MANILA, ANTONIO GONZALES, JR., KARLO
BUTIONG, et al
SUMMARY: Phil Columbian Assn instituted ejectment proceedings against
respondents who are actual occupants of a parcel of land owned by petitioners.
MeTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and this was affirmed by RTC,
CA, and SC. Phil Columbian Assn filed a motion for execution of judgment + writ
of demolition in view of the aforementioned decision. City of Manila filed with
RTC Manila a complaint for the expropriation of the said parcel of land subject to
ejectment proceedings. Petitioner argued that the City of Manila had no power to
expropriate private land and that the City’s expropriation was not for public use
and welfare and is also politically motivated (there is also a P2M deposit but check
Fact #6(a)(iv)).
The SC held that under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (RA 409), the
City has general powers over its territorial jurisdiction + power of eminent
domain. Essentially, they can acquire lands in the city and subdivide it into homes
for bona fide tenants/occupants and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the
city
DOCTRINE: Public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a
flexible concept influenced by changing conditions. This includes a broader notion
of indirect public benefit/advantage, including urban land reform and housing.
That only a few could benefit from RA 409 does not diminish its public use
character. Expropriation is also not any more confined to vast tracts of land and
landed estates.
FACTS:
1. Phil. Columbian Association is a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation
engaged in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its
members (located in Paco, Manila) and they also own a land adjacent to their
office and facilities (4,842.90 sq. m) which they also own
2. Respondents are actual occupants of a parcel of land while Antonio Gonzales
Jr. and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City of Manila
3. 1982: Phil. Columbian Assn. instituted ejectment proceedings against
respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court
a. Rendered judgment ordering respondents to vacate lot and pay
reasonable compensation therefor
b. Affirmed by RTC, CA, and SC in another case
4. Phil. Columbian Assn. filed before Metropolitan Trial Court a motion for
execution of judgment (which was granted 1990) and also a writ of
demolition
5. Respondents filed with the RTC Manila a petition for injunction and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and TRO against the granting of said
motion for execution of judgment and writ of demolition
6. City of Manila also filed a complaint with RTC Manila (different branch) for
the expropriation of the said parcel of land (4842.90 sq m) subject to
ejectment proceedings
a. Phil Columbian Assn filed a motion to dismiss alleging that City of
Manila:
i. Had no power to expropriate private land
ii. Expropriation not for public use and welfare
iii. Expropriation is politically motivated
iv. Deposit of P2M in the City of Manila (deposit with PNB)
representing the provisional value of land was insufficient
 and was made following PD 1533 (Note: PD 1533 was
already declared unconstitutional)
b. RTC denied motion to dismiss and entered an order of
condemnation declaring that the expropriation proceeding was
properly instituted in accordance with law; also ordered both parties
to submit names of nominees as commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the land in question
c. issued writ of possession (this was also filed ex parte earlier by City
of Manila) and also dismissed the MR by Phil Columbian Assn
7. CA also denied Phil Columbian Assn’s petition assailing RTC orders
ISSUES:
1. WoN expropriation was for public use – YES
2. WoN City of Manila has power to expropriate private property – YES
RULING:
Petition denied for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. Revised Charter of the City of Manila (RA 409) grants City of Manila
general powers over its territorial jurisdiction + power of eminent
domain
a. General powers: “… and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease,
convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the general
interest of the city, condemn private property for public use, contract
and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend
to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers
hereinafter conferred (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Emphasis supplied)”
b. Sec 100: authorizes City of Manila to undertake urban land reform;
“… authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide
the same into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residents,
giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said
lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees.
For the purpose of this section, the city may raise the necessary
funds by appropriations of general funds, by securing loans or by
issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through
expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval
of the President…”
2. Essentially, City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has express
power to acquire lands in the City and subdivide lands into home lots for sale
to bona fide tenants/occupants and to laborers and low-salaried employees of
the city
3. That only a few could benefit from it does not diminish its public use
character
4. Expropriation not any more confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates
5. Public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible
concept, influenced by changing conditions
a. Includes broader notion of indirect public benefit/advantage,
including urban land reform and housing
6. As to the P2M representing provisional value
a. Not only fixed by the court, but was also accepted by both parties
b. Petitioner still agreed to said valuation and is therefore estopped
from questioning it
c. Valuation is merely provisional, meaning there is a 2 nd stage to be
had in order to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid
the landowner
City of Manila vs. Estrada
September 9, 1913 |Trent, J. | Just Compensation
PETITIONER: The City of Manila
RESPONDENTS: Balbina Estrada Y Sarmiento, minor only heiress of
Concepcion Sarmiento, deceased, and Ariston Estrada, personally, and as
administrator
SUMMARY:
This is an extended opinion setting forth the reasons for its judgment regarding
the just compensation of Estrada regarding their land affected by the
expropriation by the city of Manila for the new market in the district of Paco.
The Court rendered P10/m2 to be just compensation for the land based on the
ground that the great preponderance of the evidence submitted to the
commissioners showed that P10/m2 was just compensation for the land taken, and
that the court has the authority under the Code of Civil Proceudre to revise the
report of the commissioners when the amount awarded is grossly inadequate or
grossly excessive.
DOCTRINE:
General rule: the market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which
the owner of condemned property is entitled under the law.
The Court has the power to revise the just compensation set by appointed
commissioners.
FACTS:
1. The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its
improvements for the new market, at that time, being erected in the district
of Paco.
2. Respondents filed a complaint regarding the expropriation.
3. Two of the commissioners, joined in a majority report, fixing the value of
the land at P20 / m2. They based their decision on the following:
a. Ariston Estrada (one of the respondents) compared the previous sale of a
land (Clarke land at P19.85/ m2) with same or similar conditions and
 circumstances to the case of the Estrada land and estimated the land to
be worth P25 m2. Also, he said that he offered to pay P15/ m2 for any
parcel of land in the vicinity as well located as the condemned land.
b. Real estate brokers, George Sellner and Enrique Briaz, estimated the
price of the Estrada land at P10/m2 based upon the prices obtained for
land in the open market in the vicinity.
c. Mr. Powell, of the Internal Revenue Bureau, testified that the Estrada
land was appraised for taxation at P6 per square meter; that prior to 1911
it had been appraised at about P4 per square meter.
d. The president of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila based his
testimony on the parcel of land of Clarke in the same area as the Estrada
land which was expropriated. The city desires only 353.21 m2 out of
1399.03 m2 which will result to a consequential damage making the
apparent price of the 353.21 m2 P7,002.05, or P19.85/ m2.
4. The dissenting commissioner set the value of the land at P10/m2
5. The lower court confirmed the majority report as to the improvements, but
reduced the price of the land from P20 / m2, as fixed by the majority report,
to P15 / m2. The lower court held it just and equitable to take as a
compromise between the two conflicting majority and minority opinions of
the three commissioners the average of the two prices they have fixed per
square meter for the land in question, P20 and P10, respectively, fixing
upon P15/ m2.
6. Motions for a new trial were made by both parties but were denied by the
court. Both parties appealed from that part of the decision fixing the value
of the land at P15 / m2.
7. The record was therefore elevated to this court for a review of the evidence
and assigned errors of the parties. This court held that P10 / m2 was just
compensation for the land, and rendered its decision accordingly.
8. This is an extended opinion setting forth the reasons for its judgment in the
case
ISSUES:
1. WoN P10/ m2 is a just compensation for Estrada for the land taken by the City
of Manila from him - YES
RULING:
After a careful examination of the entire record in this case and the law applicable to
the questions raised therein, we are of the opinion that P10 per square meter is a just
compensation for the land taken. Without prejudice to filing a more extended opinion
in which our reasons will be set forth in full, judgment will be entered accordingly,
without costs. So ordered.
RATIO:
1) The preponderance of the evidence submitted to the commissioners showed
that P10 / m2 was just compensation for the land taken.
a. Determination of the market value of the land
i. It is the fair value of the property as between one who wants to
purchase and one who wants to sell it.
ii. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surrounding, its improvements and capabilities, may be shown
and considered in estimating its value.
iii. Admissible evidence for the valuation of condemned land
1. Prices paid for other lands in the vicinity - Evidence of sale
of land in the neighborhood is competent on an inquiry as
to the value of land, and if the purchases or sales were
made by the party against whom the evidence was offered
it might stand as an admission. But such testimony is
received only upon the idea that there is substantial
similarity between the properties.
a. Exception: Neighboring parcels of land under eminent
domain proceedings.
iv. Inadmissible evidence
1. Offers of the land condemned
a. The reception of this type of evidence would multiply
the issues upon questions of damages to an extent not
to be tolerated by court aiming to practically
administer justice between litigants due to the many
circumstances that has to be considered in doing so
b. Estrada claimed that that he offered to pay P15/ m2 for
any parcel of land in the vicinity as well located as the
condemned land. This was improper evidence and
should not have been considered by the
commissioners.
b. Evidences which lead to the Court’s decision to set the P10/ m2 as
a just compensation for the Estrada land
i. The testimony of the two real estate agents, Brias and Sellner,
which was based upon a sale of similarly situated land made
only thirty days previous to the date of the hearing.
ii. Assessment of the property for taxation, at P6 per square meter.
iii. No witnesses other than Estrada were called who could confirm
the higher valuation or even testify to an intermediate price.
iv. The price of P10 per square meter is 66 per cent greater than
that obtained for land on the opposite side of the estero, and this
difference would seem amply sufficient to compensate for the
more favored location of the condemned land
2) The court has the power to revise the report of the commissioners when the
amount awarded is grossly inadequate and excessive.
a. Definitions
i. Compensation - an equivalent for the value of the land (property)
taken
 ii. Just - used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;" to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property
taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
iii. Just Compensation - a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained.
b. Section 244 of the Rules of Court: The commissioners shall assess the
value of property taken and used, and shall also assess the
consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the
owners.
i. "To assess" is to perform a judicial act. The commissioners'
power is limited to assessing the value and to determining the
amount of the damages.
ii. The value and damages awarded must be a just compensation
and no more and no less. And in fixing these amounts, the
commissioners are not to act ad libitum (at one’s pleasure).
They have to discharge their function according to well
established rules and form their judgment upon correct legal
principles.
c. Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "Upon the filing of such
report in court, the court shall, upon hearing, accept the same and
render judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may
recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or
it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may
accept the report in part and reject it in part, and may make such final
order and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential
to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just
compensation for the land so taken; and the judgment shall require
payment of the sum awarded as provided in the next section before the
plaintiff can enter upon the ground and appropriate it to the public use."
i. This provision gave the Court the power to review the
assessment of the commissioner.
ii. The judgment of the court is rendered after a consideration of
the commissioners' report and the exceptions thereto submitted
upon the hearing of the report. By this judgment the court may
a) accept the commissioners' report unreservedly; b) it may
return the report for additional facts or it may set the report
aside and appoint new commissioners; or c) it may accept the
report in part and reject it in part, and "make such final order
and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the
defendant just compensation for the land so taken."
iii. When may the court, with propriety, overrule the award of the
commissioners in whole or in part and substitute its own
valuation of the condemned property? The court is permitted to
act upon the commissioners' report in one of several ways, at its
own discretion.
d. In the case at bar, after examination of the evidences presented, the
Court accepted the report of the commissioner in part and rejected it in
part. The findings regarding the improvement of the subject property
was found to be accurate but the awards as fixed at P15/ m2 by the
majority of the commissioners and the trial court was grossly excessive.
The Court found P10 / m2 to be just compensation for the land taken.
The Court had the authority to do so as stated in the Code of Civil
Procedure.
SAN ROQUE REALTY V. REPUBLIC
7 September 2007 | Nachura, J. | Payment of Just Compensation
PETITIONER: San Roque Realty and Development Corporation
RESPONDENTS: Republic of The Philippines (through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines
SUMMARY: The state was assailing the alleged claim of San Roque Realty over
the subject land. The state was saying that it was able to secure the ownership of
the said parcels of land through the decision of the CFI of Cebu for the
expropriation proceedings they instituted. However, San Roque was saying that
there was no payment of just compensation to the owners, the state was not able
to annotate a lien to the titles of the said parcels of land, and that San Roque was
an innocent purchaser of these lands.
DOCTRINE:
Republic’s failure to pay the just compensation precluded the perfection of its title
over the lot in question. In fact, the court even went further and recognized the
right of the unpaid owner to recover the property within five years from the
decision of the expropriation court the expropriator fails to effect payment of just
compensation
Eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The
payment of just compensation is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the
state’s sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe renders the taking
ineffectual notwithstanding the avowed public purposed.
FACTS:
 The subject parcels of lands are located in Cebu City and was originally
owned by Ismael Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza
 On September 1938, subject parcels of land together with 17 other lands,
were subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then
Commonwealth of the Philippines
 On October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initia deposit of 9,500.00
as pre-condition for the entry of the lands sought to be expropriated.
 May 1940, decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However,
the title of the subject parcels of land was not transferred to the government
 Eventually, the land was subdivided and its old title was cancelled and new
titles were issued by the Register of deeds of Cebu.
 The two parcels covered by the new titles were acquired by the defendant and
the defendant begun constructing townhouses on the subject parcels of land
 On February 1996, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines filed the present case
alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938
decision in the expropriation case and the new titles issued were null and
void. It argued that the defendant had no right to possess the subject
properties because it is not the lawful owner
 Meanwhile defendant San Roque realty claimed that it was a buyer in good
faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was
initiated by the executive branch without legislative approval. Also it alleged
that the expropriation was never consummated because the government did
not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation
 Plaintiff, RP contended that the said parcel of land which was originally a
private property was brought to a condemnation proceedings against the
owners before the Court of First instance of Cebu for the purpose of
expropriation was to carry out the development program of the Philippine
Army as provided in the National defense act (to be used as military
reservation and others)
 When the government was asked to post the initial deposit, the complied and
deposited the amount to the Philippine National Bank credited to the
Provincial treasurer and the said amount was subsequently disbursed in full
but due to the destruction of vouchers, journals and cash book in the office of
the Provincial treasurer during the world war, the names of the payees could
not be reasonably ascertained
 Judge Martinez issued a decision in favor of the government and fixing the
just compensation thereof
 The defendant, San Roque’s predecessors, interposed and exception and
notice of intention of appeal and filed their corresponding bond. This said
action prevented the plaintiff to start using the expropriated properties
devoting to military use.
 The plaintiff shows that the reason why they want to make the subject land
to a military reservation was because 1.) the historical account of the National
Historical Commission with respecting to the subject land 2.) testimonial
accounts 3.) the remnants of the Lahug airport particularly the runway
originally devoted to military airport
 The plaintiff also mentioned that the defendant corporation secured
certificate of titles to prejudice the plaintiff and thus null and void
 San Roque alleged that the subject parcels of land have been covered by the
torrens system and the transactions involving expropriation should have been
registered and annotated on the transfer certificates
 The defendat also alleged that the government never secured a title in its name
and never actually took possession of subject parcels of land from the date of
the decision up to the time the case was brought to this court despite the fact
that the defendant is within viewing and walking distance from the camp
where it introduced developments on the said other parts of the lot
 San Roque reiterates that it was an innocent purchaser for value and therefore
entitled to protection given by the law and has every right to rely on the
correctness of the certificates
 RTC rendered a decision dismissing the Republic’s complaint and upholding
San Roque’s ownership over the subject properties as supported by its actual
possession and its unqualified title.
 CA reversed the RTC decision on the finding that the appeal from CFI
decision in the expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners
of the subject properties and thus the expropriation in favor of the government
became final and binding

ISSUES:
RULING:
CA decision was reversed. RTC decision REINSTATED. It was San Roque
Realty who rightfully owns the subject properties
RATIO:
 Republic’s bare contention and assumption cannot defeat San Roque’s
apparent ownership over the subject properties.
 By the very admission of the republic, there was no record of payment of
compensation to the land owners
 In Republic v. Lim, it was emphasized that no piece of land can be finally
and irrevocably taken from unwilling owner until compensation is paid.
Without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer from the
landowner to the expropriator.
 Thus it was ruled that Republic’s failure to pay the just compensation
precluded the perfection of its title over the lot in question. In fact, the court
even went further and recognized the right of the unpaid owner to recover the
property within five years from the decision of the expropriation court the
expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation
 Eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator.
The payment of just compensation is an indispensable requisite for the
exercise of the state’s sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe
renders the taking ineffectual notwithstanding the avowed public purposed.
 To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to
expropriate is the ride roughshod private rights
 The state failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of
just compensation and receipt thereby of property owners
 The court mentions that if the state was able to compensate the owners they
should have cancelled the titles or at least annotated a lien in favor of the
 government.
 The state also did not comply with the registration requirement under the
Code of Civil procedure in providing a certified copy of the judgment to the
office of the registrar of deeds for the province in which the estate is situated
 From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to
cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the
decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to
register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for fiftysix (56)
years.
 The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions. One exception is when the strict application of the rule will
defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public such as the
Torrens system.
 The court also reiterated that San Roque was a buyer in good faith because
it should be imputed with constructive knowledge, or at least sufficiently
warned that the Republic had claims over the property in view of
indications that the subject land belonged to a military reservation
 Finally, there is a recent development that has sealed the fate of the
Republic in its claim of ownership over the
 subject properties. This is the passage of Republic Act No. 9443 (RA 9443),
entitled "AN ACT CONFIRMING AND DECLARING, SUBJECT TO
CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, THE VALIDITY OF EXISTING TRANSFER
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AND RECONSTITUTED CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE COVERING THE BANILAD FRIAR LANDS ESTATE,
FACTS:
SITUATED IN THE FIRST DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF CEBU."52 The
law confirms and declares valid all existing TCTs and Reconstituted
Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province
and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate.53
Thus, by legislative fiat, SRRDC’s titles covering Lot Nos. 933B3 and
933B4 must be recognized as valid and subsisting.
 In fine, we hold that the operative facts in the case at bar, to wit: (1) the
incomplete expropriation of Lot No. 933 in view of Republic’s failure to
prove payment in full of just compensation; (2) the registration under the
Torrens system of the subject properties in the name of SRRDC and its
predecessors in interest; (3) the estoppel and laches of the Republic for 56
years; (4) the status of SRRDC as an innocent purchaser for value; and (5)
the passage of R.A. No. 9443, all warrant the reversal of the CA Decision.
REPUBLIC V. BPI (Mayumi)
September 11, 2013 | Carpio, J. |
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways
RESPONDENTS: Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
SUMMARY:
DPWH expropriated lots belonging to BPI and Villanueva. This was processed
through an expropriation proceeding with the RTC granting the payment of
P40,000 per square meter. BPI thereafter filed for a motion for a partial new trial
claiming that the building located in the land to be expropriated was not included
in the first proceeding. DPWH contends this saying (1) that the period to file has
already lapse, and (2) the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building
is unfounded and without legal basis. The SC ruled that firstly, it was within the
proper period when BPI filed for a partial new trial. Secondly, that the additional
just compensation should be given to BPI for the building. No actual taking of the
remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential
damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot
of private respondent suffers from an impairment or decrease in value,
consequential damages may be awarded to private respondent.
DOCTRINE:
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to
take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and
payment of just compensation. The State’s power of eminent domain is limited
by the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
9. On February 12, 1998, the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) filed with the RTC a case for expropriation against portions of the
properties of BPI and of Bayani Villanueva. This property can be found in
Pamplona, Las Piñas City.
10. DPWH needed 281 square meters of BPI’s lot, and 177 square meters from
Villanueva’s lot for the the construction of the Zapote-Alabang Fly-Over.
11. Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the expropriation. Hence, the trial
court constituted a Board of Commissioners to determine the just
compensation.
12. In the Board’s report dated September 29, 1998, they recommended that
amount of P40,000 per square meter as the fair market value. On November
25, 1998, the trial court in its Decision set the fair market value at P40,000
per square meter.
a. BPI
 i. Awarded: P11,240,000
ii. DPWH deposited: P632,250
iii. Remaining amount: P10,607,750
b. Villanueva
i. Awarded: P7,080,000
ii. DPWH deposited: P2,655,000
iii. Remaining amount: P4,425,000
13. The trial court rendered a judgment that the Republic of the Philippines as
represented by DPWH to pay BPI and Villanueva the remaining money
(a.iii and b.iii)
14. The acting branch clerk issued a certification stating that the decision dated
December 25 of the trial court is final, executory, and unappeasable
considering that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to file any Notice
of Appeal or Motion for Reconsideration.
15. Meanwhile, BPI filed on December 16, 1998 a Motion for Partial New Trial
to determine the just compensation of its building, which was not included
in the December 25 Decision.
a. BPI claimed that its motion was timely filed since it received a
copy of the Decision on December 1, 1998.
b. The trial court granted partial new trial.
16. In the Partial New Trial:
a. Republic’s (petitioner) counsel failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing despite notice.
b. RTC allowed BPI to present its evidence ex-parte.
c. On the same day, trial court also appointed as commissioner the
Officer-In-Charge of the trial court, Leticia Agbayani. She was
ordered by the court to conduct an ocular inspection of the
building.
d. September 10, 1999: the trial court held that just compensation for
the building was due and ordered Republic to pay BPI P2,633,000.
17. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said decision on the ground that
the proceeding fixing the just compensation of the building is null and void
for not complying with the mandatory procedure set forth in Sections 5 to 8
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
a. Motion for reconsideration was granted by the RTC, and ordered
that the September 10 decision be set aside.
b. BPI filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was
substantial compliance with the Rules –Denied.
18. September 19, 2000: the trial court appointed Atty. Morante, the branch
clerk of court, as the chairman of the Board of Commissioners.
19. The RTC gave petitioner and BPI ten days to submit their respective
nominees and their oaths of office.
20. September 28, 2000: BPI nominated Roland Savellano, and submitted his
oath of office.
21. October 13, 2000: Instead of submitted its nominee, petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion objecting to the propriety of paying just
compensation for BPI’s building and praying that BPI’s claim for additional
just compensation be denied.
22. Petitioner claimed that the building was never taken by the government. To
support its claim, a letter addressed to the Solicitor General was attached.
The letter mentions how the original plan which affected the building was
not implemented. The area was reduced to avoid costly structure of the
bank.
23. Respondent claimed that:
a. It was not aware that the original plan was not implemented
b. It received no correspondence from the DPWH except for a letter
which stated that “adjustment of the RROW limit of our project
along this section is not possible”
c. Even “if a 3-meter setback is observed, only 75% of the old
building could be utilized x x x [and] cutting the support system of
the building x x x would affect the building’s structural integrity.”
24. May 7, 2001: RTC denied Petitioner’s motion and ruled that the demolition
of the old building of BPI can be construed as a consequential damage
suffered by BPI as a result of the expropriation. Petitioner was thus ordered
to submit its nominee to the Board of Commissioners.
25. Petitioner nominated Romulo C. Gervacio (Gervacio), the Officer-In-
Charge of the City Assessor’s Office in Las Piñas City.
26. The Board thus constituted, the trial court ordered the Commissioners to
submit their recommendation.
27. Savellano recommended P2,633,000 based on the appraisal conducted by an
independent professional business and property consultant.
28. Gervaco recommended P1,905,600 based on the market value indicated on
the tax declaration of said building.
29. The Commissioner’s Report presented both recommendations. The RTC
adopted Gervaco’s recommendation as just compensation for the building
of BPI.
30. Petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The CA affirmed RTC decision.
31. Thus, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the trial court’s Decision dated 25 November 1998 had become final
and executory before BPI filed its motion for partial new trial –NO
2. WoN the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building is
unfounded and without legal basis –NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of
Appeals’ Decision dated 14 September 2011 and Resolution dated 06 August 2012 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79843.
RATIO:
 Additional Just Compensation for the Building
1. Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take
private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and
payment of just compensation.
2. The State’s power of eminent domain is limited by the constitutional mandate
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
3. General rule: just compensation to which the owner of the condemned
property is entitled to is the market value.
a. Modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. The
owner will be entitled to recover the (1) compensation for the
portion actually taken; and (2) consequential damage, if any, to the
remaining part of the property
4. Petitioner contends that BPI’s building was “never taken” by petitioner
5. Republic v. CA and Reyes: No actual taking of the remaining portion of the
real property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a result of
the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot of private respondent
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may
be awarded to private respondent.
Other issues: Motion for partial new trial
1. Petitioner: trial court’s Decision dated 25 November 1998 had already
become final and executory
2. Respondent: motion for partial new trial filed on 16 December 1998 was
timely filed because it received a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998.
3. SC: A careful review of the record shows the absence of any proof that the
Decision of 25 November 1998 was served upon BPI. Hence, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that absent any proof of service to BPI of the Decision,
the period of 15 days within which to file its motion for partial new trial did
not begin to run against BPI.
NPC v Manalastas (Armand)
January 27, 2016 | Peralta J. | Art 3 Sec 9 Just Compensation
2. PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: ELIZABETH MANALASTAS and BEA CASTILLO
SUMMARY:
Petitioner, a government-owned and controlled corporation involved in the
development of hydro-electric generation of power and production of electricity,
and the construction, operation and maintenance of power plants, transmission
lines, power stations and substations, on respondents' parcel of land affecting an
area of 26,919 square meters. Petitioner entered said land without the knowledge
or consent of respondents, without properly initiating expropriation proceedings,
and without any compensation to respondents-landowners. Because of said
transmission lines, respondents alleged that they could no longer use their land
as part of a subdivision project as originally intended, which ultimately caused
financial loss to their family. Thus, respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner and its officers with the Regional Trial Court. Respondents demanded
the removal of the power lines and its accessories and payment of damages, or in
the alternative, payment of the fair market value of the affected areas totalling
26,000 square meters of respondents' land at P800.00 per square meter. RTC
issued a Decision ordering defendant NAPOCOR to pay plaintiffs the amount of
P92,827,351.00, by way of just compensation and to pay an Attorney's fees.On
appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that the RTC erred in factoring the
devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair market value of
respondents' land. Petitioners maintain that such inclusion of the inflation rate in
arriving at the value of just compensation has no legal basis. None of the parties
contest the finding that the fair market value of the property at the time of taking
was Php170.00 per square meter. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment with
modification, reducing the award to P1,678,908.00. The CA ruled that petitioner
could no longer assail the valuation that petitioner itself recommended, the same
being a judicial admission.
DOCTRINE:
Just Compensation
The formula for determination of just compensation to landowners does not
include the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is properly accounted for through
payment of interest on the amount due to the landowner, and through the award
of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in cases where there was irregularity
in the taking of property
3. Estoppel inoperative against Government
Estoppel generally finds no application against the State when it acts to rectify
mistakes, errors, irregularities, or illegal acts, of its officials and agents,
irrespective of rank. This ensures efficient conduct of the affairs of the State
without any hindrance on the part of the government from implementing laws
and regulations, despite prior mistakes or even illegal acts of its agents shackling
government operations and allowing others, some by malice, to profit from
official error or misbehavior.
FACTS:
8. Sometime in 1977 to 1978, petitioner, a government-owned and controlled
corporation involved in the development of hydro-electric generation of
power and production of electricity, and the construction, operation and
maintenance of power plants, transmission lines, power stations and
substations, among others, constructed a 230 KV transmission line for the
Naga-Tiwi line and a 69 KV transmission line for the Naga-Tinambac line on
respondents' parcel of land covered by TCT No. 26263, affecting an area of
26,919 square meters.
9. Petitioner entered said land without the knowledge or consent of respondents,
without properly initiating expropriation proceedings, and without any
compensation to respondents-landowners.
10. Because of said transmission lines, respondents alleged that they could no
longer use their land as part of a subdivision project as originally intended,
which ultimately caused financial loss to their family.
11. In July 2000, respondents (plaintiffs below, who were then joined by their
mother, Celedonia, and brother, Mariano; Celedonia and Mariano are no
longer impleaded as parties in this petition as the CA Decision has attained
finality as to them) filed a complaint against petitioner and its officers with
the RTC of Naga City.
12. Respondents demanded the removal of the power lines and its accessories
and payment of damages, or in the alternative, payment of the fair market
value of the affected areas totalling 26,000 square meters of respondents'
land at P800.00 per square meters
13. RTC rendered a decision in favor of defendants and ordered NAPOCOR P92
million pesos worth of just compensation.
14. On appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that the RTC erred in factoring
the devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair market value of
respondents' land.
15. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment with modification, reducing the award
to Celedonia and Enrico Mariano (respondents' co-plaintiffs below) to
P1,678,908.00. The CA ruled that petitioner could no longer assail the
valuation that petitioner itself recommended, the same being a judicial
admission. Moreover, the CA pointed out that taking an inconsistent position
on appeal cannot be allowed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the inflation factor should be included in the computation for just
compensation
2. WoN the determination of just compensation is a judicial function (and
therefore are not bound to a party’s formulation of the just compensation)
3. WoN the award of P83 million will unjustly enrich the respondents.
RULING:
Tbe petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 89366 is MODIFIED, such that petitioner is adjudged liable to PAY
JUST COMPENSATION to respondents at the rate of Php170.00 per square
meter, subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
the time of taking in 1978 up to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, six percent (6%)
per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction, pursuant to Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas – Monetary Board Circular No. 799
RATIO:
1. It should be noted that in Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, et al. v. Spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson, the Court stressed
that "just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that
is controlling for purposes of compensation." In such case, the court said:
“the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for
appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss
sustained by the landowner, with due consideration of the circumstances
availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept of just
compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.
Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately bears the
cost of expropriation.”
2. Accordingly, in the Apo case, we held that the rationale for imposing the
interest is to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have
made had they been proprerly compensated for their properties at the time of
the taking.
In Republic v CA, the court ruled that: “if property is taken for public use
before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation
is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place
the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was
in before the taking occurred. “
3. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective
forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.
4. The foregoing clearly dictates that valuation of the land for purposes of
determining just compensation should not include the inflation rate of the
Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of expropriated
land is sufficiently recompensed through payment of interest on the market
value of the land as of the time of taking from the landowner.1âwphi1
It is the courts, not the litigants, who decide on the proper interpretation or
application of the law and, thus, only the courts may determine the rightful
 compensation in accordance with the law and evidence presented by the
parties. It is incongruous for the court below to uphold a proposition merely
because it was recommended by a party, despite the same being
erroneous. Estoppel generally finds no application against the State when
it acts to rectify mistakes, errors, irregularities, or illegal acts, of its
officials and agents, irrespective of rank. (Secretary of Finance v. Oro
Maura Shipping Lines)
5. To recapitulate, the formula for determination of just compensation to
landowners does not include the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is
properly accounted for through payment of interest on the amount due to the
landowner, and through the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
in cases where there was irregularity in the taking of property.
De Knecht v Bautista
Oct. 30, 1980 | Fernandez, J. | expropriation
PETITIONER: Cristina De Knecht
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Pedro JL. Bautista, as Judge presiding over Branch III
of the Court of First Instance of the Republic of the Philippines
SUMMARY: Christina de Knecht is challenging as arbitrary the decision to
change the route to be covered by the Manila – Coastal Road project. Originally,
the plan was that said road would pass along Cuneta Avenue. For “social impact”
reasons, however, it was decided that the same will pass through Fernando Rein
and Del Pan streets, which are lined with houses. Correspondingly, the
government filed a complaint for expropriation against owners of said houses.
Christina de Knecht is one of said owners. Thus, she is now challenging this
choice as arbitrary and erroneous. SC agreed. It is doubtful whether the extension
of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground of social impact.
The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the
extension are mostly motels. Furthermore, the DPWH study recommended the
Cuneta Avenue route and thus it is odd why all of a sudden the route was changed
to Fernando Rein and Del Pan. While Congress has the power to designate
particular property to be taken, it is still a judicial question whether or not the
exercise of such power was capricious or arbitrary. There is no question as to the
right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use
upon the payment of just compensation.
DOCTRINE: Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution (1973) of the Philippines
provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." However, the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily'
choose what private property should be taken.
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Cristina de Knecht
against the Honorable Pedro JL. Bautista who issued an order in the lower court
with regard to a complaint for expropriation that affects properties along the
Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, including De Knecht’s house.
2. According to petitioner, 10 years ago, the government proposed the Manila –
Coastal Road Project which included the extension of EDSA to Roxas Blvd.
through Cuneta Ave. (a straight route considering the direction of EDSA).
3. Then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public Highways directed
the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue temporary or permanent permits for
the construction and/or improvement of buildings and other structures located
within the proposed extension through Cuneta Avenue.
4. However, shortly thereafter, the Department of Public Highways decided to
make the proposed extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets
which are lined with old substantial houses.
5. Upon learning of the changed the owners of the residential houses that would be
affected, the herein petitioner being one of them, filed a petition directed to Pres.
Marcos asking him to order the adoption of the original plan.
6. Marcos, in response, directed Minister Aquino to explain the change within 24
hours and later referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission for
investigation and recommendation.
7. The Settlements Commission submitted a report recommending the reversion
of the extension of EDSA to the original plan passing through Cuneta
Avenue.
8. However, the Ministry of Public Highways insisted on implementing the plan to
make the extension of EDSA go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
9. Feb. 1979: gov’t filed before the sala of herein respondent Judge Bautista a
complaint for expropriation against the owners of the houses standing along
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
10. The petitioner assails the choice of the Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets route
on the following grounds:
a. The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme
or reason. The condemnor may not choose any property it wants.
b. Where the legislature has delegated a power of eminent do-main, the
question of the necessity for taking a particular fine for the intended
improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee power subject
however to review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross
abuse of discretion.
c. The choice of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or
capriciousness and due process determination as to whether or not the
proposed location was proper in terms of the public interests.
d. Even the claim of respondent's Secretary Baltazar Aquino that there
would be a saving of P2 million under his new plan must be reviewed
for it bears no relation to the site of the proposed EDSA extension.
i. As envisioned by the government, the EDSA extension would
be linked to the Cavite Expressway.
 ii. Logically then, the proposed extension must point to the south
and not detour to the north.
e. Also, the equal protection of the law must be accorded, not on to the
motel owners along Cuneta (Fisher) Avenue, but also to the owners of
solid and substantial homes and quality residential lands occupied for
generations.
11. On the other hand, respondents defend the change by reason of the following:
a. There was no sudden change of plan in the selection of the site of the
EDSA Extension to Roxas Blvd. As a matter of fact, those who were to
be adversely affected by the construction of the EDSA Extension to
Roxas Boulevard along Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets were duly
notified of such proposed project. (Note: but petitioner herein is not one
of those notified)
b. It be conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward and outward
(from the city center while the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line
follows northward and inward direction). Nonetheless, both lines,
Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet
satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are both
acceptable.
c. In selecting the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line the Government
did not do so because it wanted to save the motel located along Cuneta
Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the social impact factor or
problem involved.
ISSUES:
WON the Court can inquire into the necessity or propriety of the “taking” of private
property - YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted.
The order of June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter
upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the
respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No.
7001-P, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos,
etc." except to dismiss said case.
RATIO:
1. There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take
private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation based
on the provision of Sec. 2, Art. IV, 1973 Consti. Still, it is recognized that the
government may not capriciously or arbitrarily' choose what private property
should be taken.
2. J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure: failure to meet tile-exacting standard
of due process would likewise constitute a valid objection to the exercise of this
congressional power.
3. It is obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due
process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness; it is the
antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state
power to act in an impressive manner. With due recognition then of the power of
Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof
may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a
judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party
adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal
protection clause will not allow.
4. In the instant case:
a. It is a fact that the Department of Public Highways originally establish
the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue.
b. It is to be presumed that the Department of Public Highways made
studies before deciding on Cuneta Avenue.
c. It is indeed odd why suddenly the proposed extension of EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard was changed to go through Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets.
d. It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can
be objected to on the ground of social impact.
e. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by
the extension are mostly motels.
5. Besides, the Human Settlements Commission, after considering the factors of
functionality, social impact, and cost, recommended the Cuneta Avenue line
(Line 1) instead of the Fernando Rein – Del Pan line (Line 2).
6. Functionality: This issue has to do with the physical design of a highway,
inclusive of engineering factors and management consideration.
7. (Line) Systematically and diagramatically, Line 1 is straighter than Line 2.
8. (Length) Line 2 is 3 meters longer. 50,000 vehicles will traverse these extra three
meters on a daily basis. Not good for traffic.
9. (Contour) Line 1 is definitely the contour conforming alignment to EDSA while
Line 2 affords a greater radius of unnatural curvature as it hooks slightly
northward before finally joining with Roxas Boulevard.
10. (Crossroads) From the of highway design, it is imperative to have interchanges as
far apart as possible to avoid traffic from slow down in negotiating the slope on
the interchanges. Up north would be the future Buendia Avenue- Roxas Boulevard
Interchange. Consequently, Line 1 which is farther away from Buendia Avenue
than Line 2 is the better alignment.
11. Social impact: (in this regard social impact is greater in Line 1)
a. No. of property owners: Line 1 = 73; Line 2 = 49.
b. Incidence of non-resident owner: Line 1 = 34.3%; Line 2 = 63.3%
c. No. of actually affected residents: Line 1 = 547; Line 2 = 290
12. Cost: Contrary to the Php2M difference averred by Sec. Aquino, the right- of-
way acquisition cost difference factor of the two alignments is only P269,196. (A
little bit more expensive if Line 1 – but Court says, negligible difference)
13. The Human Settlement Commission, in choosing Line 1 over Line 2, made a
choice between people on one hand and progress and development on the other.
It chose the latter (yes  progress and dev’t over people).
14. The Hearing Board is not unmindful that progress and development are
carried out by the State precisely and ultimately for the benefit of its people
and therefore, recommends the reverend of the extension project to alignment 1.
 Furthermore, it issued “binding and absolute preconditions” as recommendations,
to wit:
a. a self sufficient community or human settlement complete with
infrastructure capture market, school, church and industries for
employment should be set up to enable the affected residents of alignment
1 to maintain, their present social and economic standing
b. prompt payment of fair and just compensation through the negotiated sale
approach
c. that the Department of Public Highways conduct public hearings before
undertaking on future expropriations of private properties for public use.
15. Thus, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets as the line
through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas
Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval and benefits as
may be provided by law. (Sec. 3, Art XIII)
Manotok v. NHA
May 21, 1987 | Guitierrez, Jr., J. | Just Compensation in Eminent Domain
PETITIONER: Elisa Manotok, Patricia Tiongson, married
to Cayetano Tiongson, Pacita Go married to
Eduardo Go, Roberto Laperal III, Miguel Sison, Philip Manotok, Maria Teresa
Manotok, Jose Clemente Manotok, Ramon Severino Manotok, Jose Maria
Manotok and Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr., assisted by their father and judicial
guardian, Jesus Manotok, Milagros Manotok, Ignacio Manotok, Jr., Felisa
Manotok, Maryann Manotok, Michael Manotok, Fausto Manotok, Severino
Manotok III, and Jesus Manotok
RESPONDENTS: National Housing Authority, Republic of the Philippines
SUMMARY: The President issued the challenged P.D. Nos. 1669 which provides
for the expropriation of the property known as the ''Tambunting Estate" and 1670
which declared the Sunog-Apog area expropriated. Petitioners contend that they
were denied of due process and of their right to just compensation. The Court
found P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right to due
process of law, failing to provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which
the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties
or the reasonableness of the just compensation.
DOCTRINE: The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the
provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its
exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is
sought to be enforced. In the exercise of its sovereign right the State is not subject
to any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution which are: (1) the
taking must be for a public use; (2) the payment of just compensation must be
made; and (3), due process must be observed in the taking.
4 5
Check end of digest for content of Section 1 and 6.
Basis of eminent domain is necessity of a public character. A necessity must exist
for the taking of private property for the proposed uses and purposes.
The value for compensation of the property should be fixed at the time of its
taking.
FACTS:
1. The President issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 555 instituting a
nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program (SIR). On the same
date, the President also issued LOI No. 557, adopting slum improvement as
a national housing policy.
2. In compliance with LOI No. 555, the Governor of Metro Manila issued, EO
677 adopting the Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which
included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog
area in its priority list for a zonal improvement program (ZIP) because the
findings of the representative of the City of Manila and the National Housing
Authority (NHA) described these as blighted communities.
3. A fire razed almost the entire Tambunting Estate. Following the calamity, the
President and the Metro Manila Governor made public announcement that
the national government would acquire the property for the fire victims. The
President also designated the NHA to negotiate with the owners of the
property for the acquisition of the same. However it did not materialize as the
negotiations for the purchase of the property failed.
4. The President issued Proclamation No. 1810 declaring all sites identified by
the Metro Manila local governments and approved by the Ministry of Human
Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were among the sites included.
The President then issued the challenged Presidential Decrees Nos. 16694
and 16705 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-
Apog area expropriated.
5. Now there are 2 petitions before the court. The 1st one challenges the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1669 which provides for the expropriation of the
property known as the ''Tambunting Estate" and the 2 nd challenges the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1670 which provides for the expropriation of the
property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog.
6. In both cases, the petitioners maintain that the two decrees are
unconstitutional because:
(1) They deprived the petitioners of their properties without due process of
law.
(2) The petitioners were denied to their right to just compensation.
Check end of digest for content of Section 1 and 6.
 -determination of just compensation should not have been vested solely
with the City Assessor and that a maximum or fixed amount of
compensation should not have been imposed by the said decrees.
-by providing for the max amount of just compensation and by directing the
City Assessor to take into consideration the alleged existing conditions
(“improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is
squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the
expropriation costs") of the properties in question the City Assessor is
forced to accept, as actual and existing conditions of the property, the
foregoing statements in the decrees when in fact the Sunog-Apog area has
been subdivided into subdivision lots and leased to the occupants thereof
under contracts of lease, making them lessees and not squatters
(3) The petitioners' right to equal protection of the law was violated.
(4) The decrees are vague, defective, and patently erroneous.
(5) The petitioners' properties are not proper subjects for expropriation
considering their location and other relevant circumstances.
7. The Government through the Solicitor General contends that the power of
eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature itself or the
President through his lawmaking prerogatives exercises this power, the
public use and public necessity of the expropriation, and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature, and the courts must respect the
decision of the lawmaking body, unless the legislative decision is clearly and
evidently arbitrary, unreasonable, and devoid of logic and reason; and that all
that is required is that just compensation be determined with due process of
law which does not necessarily entail judicial process. The only reason why
the determination appeared unilateral was because said petitioners did not
actually state any valuation in their sworn declaration of true market value of
their respective properties.
ISSUES:
3. WON the decrees are constitutional? –NO, they are violative of the due
process clause.
4. WON compensation provided by the Government is just as the Constitution
provides? –NO
5. WON determination of just compensation entails the need for judicial
processes? –YES
RULING: The petitions in G.R. No. 55166 and G.R. No. 55167 are GRANTED in
that PD 1669 and 1670 respectively proclaiming the Tambunting Estate and the Estero
de Sunog-Apog area expropriated, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore null and void ab initio.
RATIO:
5. The SC finds P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right
to due process of law, failing the test of constitutionality. They do not by
themselves provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the
petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties
or the reasonableness of the just compensation.
6. The challenged decrees are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and the
powers given to the respondent NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is
summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree
without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever.
The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon
the signing of the decree. No deposit before taking is required under the
decree. There is no provision for any interests to be paid on the unpaid
installments spread out over a period of five years. Not only are the owners
given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, plead their side,
or question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but the decisions,
rulings, orders, or resolutions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond
the reach of judicial review. An appeal may be made to the Office of the
President but the courts are completely enjoined from any inquiry or
participation whatsoever in the expropriation of the subdivision or its
incidents.
7. The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions
in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in
order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to
be enforced. In the exercise of its sovereign right the State is not subject to
any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution which are: (1)
the taking must be for a public use; (2) the payment of just compensation
must be made; and (3), due process must be observed in the taking.
8. The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime a specific
decree or law orders the expropriation of somebody's property and provides
its own peculiar manner of taking the same. Neither should the courts adopt
a handsoff policy just because the public use has been ordained as existing
by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and determined
beforehand by a statute. Although due process does not always necessarily
demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law, it still mandates some
form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard
are given to the owner to protect his property rights. When it is alleged that
in the taking of a person's property, his right to due process of law has been
violated, the courts will have to step in and probe into such an alleged
violation.
9. The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is necessity. A
necessity must exist for the taking of private property for the proposed uses
and purposes but accepted the fact that modern decisions do not call for
absolute necessity. It is enough if the condemnor can show a reasonable or
practical necessity, which varies with the time and peculiar circumstances of
 each case.
In the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to why the
properties involved were singled out for expropriation through decrees or
what necessity impelled the particular choices or selections. The decrees
show no reasons whatsoever for the choice of the properties as housing
projects.
10. The legislature may not take the property of one citizen and transfer it to
another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not
thereby promoted. The Government still has to prove that expropriation of
commercial purposes would be “public use” under the constitution.
There is no showing how the President arrived at the conclusion that the
Sunog-Apog area is a blighted community. There is no showing for a need to
demolish the existing valuable improvements in order to upgrade Sunog-
Apog.
11. Pursuant to P.D. 1533, the basis of the just compensation is the market value
of the propert “prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate
Government Office to acquire property.”
In these petitions, the max amount of compensation was imposed by the
decrees and the amounts were only a little more than the assessed value of
the properties in 1978 when according to the government it decided to acquire
the said properties. This deprives the petitioners of the opportunity to prove
a higher value since the actual taking occurred in 1980 when the decrees
where promulgated. The max amounts provided for in the decrees transgress
the petitioners’ right to just compensation and should not be binding for it
fails to reflect the value of the property and considering other factors. The
value for compensation of the property should be fixed at the time of its
taking.
C.J. Teehankee Concurring:
- I concurred with the tenuous majority's ruling there setting aside the lower court's
ruling granting therein petitioner-appellee's petition to prohibit respondents-appellees
from instituting proceedings for expropriation of the "Tatalon Estate" as specifically
authorized by R.A. 2616, with the result that the expropriation proceedings could then
be properly filed but subject to such proper and valid objections and defenses to the
action as petitionerowner may raise.
-I dissented from the majority insofar as it held that the constitutional power of
Congress for the expropriation of lands is wellnigh all embracing and forecloses the
courts from inquiring into the necessity for the taking of the property. Does not the
need for a more serious scrutiny as to the power of Congress to single out a particular
piece of property for expropriation, acknowledged in the main opinion, call for judicial
scrutiny, with all the acts in, as to the need for the expropriation for full opportunity to
dispute the legislative appraisal of the matter?
P.D. No. 1669
Sec 1: The real properties known as the Tambunting of Manila with an area of
52,688.70 square meters, more or less are hereby declared expropriated. The NHA is
designated administrator of the National Government with authority to immediately
take possession, control, disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated
properties and their improvements and shall evolve and implement a comprehensive
development plan for the condemned properties.
Sec 6: Notwithstanding any provision of law or decree to the contrary and for the
purpose of expropriating this property pegged at the market value determined by the
City Assessor pursuant to P. D. No. 76, as amended, particularly by P.D. No. 1533
which is in force and in effect at the time of the issuance of this decree. In assessing
the market value, the City Assessor shall consider existing conditions in the area
notably, that no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is
squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the
expropriation cost. Subject to the foregoing, the just compensation for the above
property should not exceed a maximum of P17,000,000 which shall be payable to the
owners within a period of 5 years in 5 equal installments.
P.D. No. 1670
Sec 1: The real property along the Estero de SunogApog in
Tondo, Manila formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc., with an area of 72,428.6
square meters, more or less, is hereby declared expropriated. The NHA is designated
administrator of the National Government with authority to immediately take
possession, control and disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated
properties and their improvements and shall evolve and implement a comprehensive
development plan for the condemned properties.
Sec 6: Notwithstanding any provision of law or decree to the contrary and for the
purpose of expropriating this property pegged at the market value determined by the
City Assessor by P. D. No. 1533 which is in force and in effect at the time of the
issuance of this decree. In assessing the market value, the City Assessor shall consider
existing conditions in the area notably, that no improvement has been undertaken on
the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should
considerably depress the expropriation cost. Subject to the foregoing, the just
compensation for the above property should not exceed a maximum of P8,000,000.00
, which shall be payable to the owners within a period of 5 years in 5 equal installment.
Republic v De Knecht
Feb 12. 1990 | Gancayco, J. | how to expropriate land
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Cristina de Knecht and the Court of Appeals
SUMMARY: Republic wanted to extend EDSA to Roxas blvd and also construct
 an outfall for flood waters. Along the planned extension route is De Knecht’s
property who does not want to sell her property. Lower court granted writ of
possession of said property to Petitioner after it deposited the required amount.
De Knecht filed a case titled De Knecht v Bautista which she won in 1980. Court
cited social impact factor making expropriation of the land arbitrary. 1983,
Batasang Pambansa Passed BP340 expropriating said property. Lower Court
granted Petitioner’s petition of dismissing expropriation proceeding citing said
law. SC affirmed said ruling stating that since residents have moved already the
social impact factor which was the basis in De Knecht v Bautista have already
disappeared making the expropriation proceedings not arbitrary anymore. The
court also said that expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner
not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owner but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislation.
DOCTRINE: Previous ruling is no obstacle to the legislative arm to assess
present circumstances as to propriety of expropriation and thereafter enacting
legislation. Thus, previous ruling must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.
FACTS:
12. In relation with De Knecht v Bautista Case - This case involves the case De
Knecht v Bautista (same De Knecht). After the court ruled in favour of De
Knecht in 1980, the Batasang Pambansa passed BP blg 340 in Feb 17, 1983
expropriating the land of De Knecht thereby superseding the 1979 decision
13. This case involve the extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard (to ease traffic)
and the construction of EDSA outfall (to solve the flood problem in the area)
14. February 20, 1979 – Republic Filed expropriation proceeding in the CFI Rizal in
Pasay City expropriating lands, including De Knecht’s, along the planned
extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard
15. After making the required deposit in June ’79, on the 14 th of June 1979 lower
court issued a writ of possession to the Republic and created a three man
committee to determine just compensation for the lands involved
16. 10-30-80 SC decided in favor of respondent in a case filed by the latter against
the writ of possession issued by the lower court in 1979 and against the
expropriation of her lands
a. Court ruled: “choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets (along which
de Knecht’s property is located) as the line through which the EDSA
should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not
receive judicial approval
b. Based on recommendation of Human Settlement commission choosing
Cuneta Street since it is mostly composed of motel establishments
rather than residential minimizing social impact
17. In 1983, Republic filed motion to dismiss the expropriation action citing BP blg.
340 expropriating same properties for same purpose, which the lower court
granted
18. Respondent appealed to CA which the latter granted citing the 10-30-80
decision which the latter said to be the law between the parties.
19. This prompted the Republic to appeal to SC
ISSUES:
Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgement of this
court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation
1) W/N the enactment of BP 340 is the proper ground for the dismissal of the
expropriation case
- HELD: YES, CA’s decision overturned
2) W/N the DPWH’s choice of land to be expropriated is still an issue under the
circumstances, said choice having been supplanted by the legislature’s choice
- HELD: NO, choice proper already, most residents moved already
making the social impact factor issue in De Knecht v Bautista moot
3) W/N the law of the case theory should be applied to the case at bar
- HELD: NO, it is right of the petitioner to expropriate private lands
for public use
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 28, 1988 and its resolution dated
March 9, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order of Branch III
of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasay City in Civil Case No. 7001-P
dated September 2, 1983 is hereby reinstated without pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
16. “ true that said final judgment of this court on the subject becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take
private properties for public use upon the payment of just compensation is so
provided in the Constitution and our laws”
17. Expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by
voluntary negotiation with the land owner but also by taking appropriate
court action or by legislation
a. Republic acquired through negotiated purchase about 80% to 85%
of the lands involved
b. Only 10-15% which petitioner cannot negotiate through sales
agreement (de Knecht 5%)
18. DPWH’s Choice - Social impact factor cited by the Human settlement
commission has disappeared already
a. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated.
b. Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to the project
that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also
minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area
19. BP 340: Effectively superseded the decision in De Knecht v Bautista
a. Primary reason because of disappearance of social impact factor
mentioned above
b. Q: So if residents have not yet moved, would the court’s decision be the
same???(probably not? see also concurring opinion)
20. Said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the government in thereafter
making its own independent assessment of the circumstance then prevailing as to
the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and
thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this in this case.
21. Expropriation’s Public Use:
a. Easing traffic congestion in the Baclaran and outlying areas
b. Controlling flood by the construction of the outlet for the Estero Tripa
de Gallina (which drains the area of Marikina, Pasay, Manila and
Paranaque)
c. Completing the Manila Flood and Control and Drainage Project

Cruz, J. Concurring Opinion

1. BP 340 not a legislative reversal of De Knecht v Bautista (which was decided
under a different set of facts)
a. Supervening events have changed the factual basis justifying the
enactment of the statute
2. We are sustaining the legislation because we ourselves have found that under the
changed situation, the present expropriation is no longer arbitrary