G.R. No.

197802, November 11, 2015

ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR VENUS ARAIN, M.D. DBA ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, Petitioners, v.NATRAPHARM, INC.,
Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
 NATRAPHARM, INC. is an all-Filipino pharmaceutical company which manufactures and sells a medicine bearing the generic name "CITICOLINE," under
its registered trademark "ZYNAPSE," which is indicated for heart and stroke patients.
With its registration, the trademark "ZYNAPSE" enjoys protection for a term of 10 years from September 24, 2007, and has also obtained from the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) all necessary permits and licenses.
Allegedly unknown to respondent, since 2003 or even as early as 2001, petitioners have been selling a medicine bearing the generic name
"CARBAMAZEPINE," an anti-convulsant indicated for epilepsy, under the brand name "ZYNAPS," which trademark is however not registered with the
IPO.
Respondent sent petitioners a cease-and-desist demand letter, which petitioners refused to heed, claiming that they had prior use of the name
"ZYNAPS."
 Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for trademark infringement for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines (IPC), with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, for the reason that neither party is, at this point, entitled to any injunctive solace.
Plaintiff, while admittedly the holder of a registered trademark under the IPC, may not invoke ascendancy or superiority of its CTR [certificate of
trademark registration] over the CPR [certificate of product registration of the BFAD] of the defendants, as the latter certificate is, in the Court's
opinion, evidence of its "prior use".
CA, in its April 18, 2011 Decision,granted the Petition for Certiorari,permanently ENJOINING defendants-respondentsfrom manufacturing, importing,
distributing, selling and/or advertising for sale, or otherwise using in commerce, the anti-convulsant drug CARBAMAZEPINE under the brand name
and mark "ZYNAPS."
On December 2, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision on the merits of the case. It found petitioners liable to respondent for damages. Moreover, it
enjoined the petitioners from using "ZYNAPS" and ordered all materials related to it be disposed outside the channel of commerce or destroyed
without compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA may order a permanent injunction in deciding a petition for certiorari against the denial of an application for a preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC?
HELD: NO
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both preliminary and permanent injunction. Section 1, Rule 58 provides for the definition of preliminary
injunction:
SECTION 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts . It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Rule defines a permanent injunction in this wise:
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or
continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated.
By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, forms part of the judgment on the merits and it can only be properly
ordered only on final judgment. A permanent injunction may thus be granted after a trial or hearing on the merits of the case and a decree granting or
refusing an injunction should not be entered until after a hearing on the merits where a verified answer containing denials is filed or where no answer is
required, or a rule to show cause is equivalent to an answer.
As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident; because an
ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the decision in the main petition.
Here, this Court is being asked to determine whether the CA erred by issuing a permanent injunction in a case which questioned the propriety of the
denial of an ancillary writ. But with the RTC's December 2, 2011 Decision on the case for "Injunction, Trademark Infringement, Damages and
Destruction," the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered moot and academic. We note that the case brought to the CA on a petition for
certiorari merely involved the RTC's denial of respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, a mere ancillary writ. Since a decision on the
merits has already been rendered and which includes in its disposition a permanent injunction, the proper remedy is an appeal36 from the decision in the
main case.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for being moot and academic.
G.R. No. 144755. June 8, 2005
SPOUSES ELISEO F. ESTARES and ROSENDA P. ESTARES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DAMASO HERRERA as Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna PROMINENT LENDING & CREDIT CORPORATION, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA and Sheriff IV ARNEL G.
MAGAT, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
On May 21, 1999, petitioner Spouses Eliseo F. Estares and Rosenda P. Estares (Estares spouses for brevity) filed a complaint for Damages and
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction against private respondent Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) before the Regional Trial Court,
Laguna, alleging thatthey obtained a loan from PLCC for P800,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage over a 363-square meter parcel of land with
improvements situated in the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna; the promissory note and the real estate mortgage were falsified because they affixed
their signatures on two blank documents; the monthly interest of 3.5% and 3% penalty on each delayed monthly interest are different from the 18%
interest per annum to which they agreed to; for failure to pay their obligation despite repeated demands, PLCC filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna; and on June 8, 1999, the Sheriff sent a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the Estares spouses.
Accordingly, the Estares spouses sought to declare as null and void the promissory note and the real estate mortgage for not reflecting their true
agreement. In the interim, they prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin PLCC from taking
possession of the mortgaged property and proceeding with the extrajudicial sale scheduled on July 13, 1999 at 10:00 a.m.
On July 12, 1999, the trial court issued a TRO in favor of the Estares spouses. The parties subsequently agreed to maintain the status quo until August
20, 1999.
At the hearing on the Estares spouses application for a writ of preliminary injunction, they did not question PLCC in writing why they only received
P637,000.00; when they received the Statement of Account, they did not question the figures appearing therein; when they received PLCCs demand
letter, they went to the formers office not to question the loans terms and conditions but merely to request for extension of three months to pay their
obligation.
In opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, PLCC presented its manager, Rey Arambulo, who testified that the Estares spouses
were duly apprised of the terms and conditions of the loan, including the rate of interest, penalties and other charges, in accordance with the Truth in
Lending Act or Republic Act No. 3765.
On August 18, 1999, the trial court denied the Estares spouses application for a writ of preliminary injunction, holding that the latter failed to establish
the facts necessary for an injunction to issue.
Estares spouses filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion upon the trial court order
which denied their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
 Without giving due course to the petition, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution requiring the PLCC to file its comment to the petition. The action on
the Estares spouses application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction was deferred and held in abeyance until after receipt of the comment.
With no restraining order enjoining him, Sheriff Magat conducted an auction sale on January 5, 2000, with PLCC as highest bidder for P1,500,000.00.
On April 17, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
Estares spouses application for a writ of preliminary injunction since the latter failed to prove the requisites for the issuance thereof.
 Estares spouses filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
WON the Estares spouses were able to establish their right to injunctive relief.
HELD: NO
In any event, we find that this petition must still be dismissed as the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition.
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
of compensation. The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order before the case can
be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.
The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence
of their right to be protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of such right. To be entitled to an injunctive
writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard compensation.
In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only
question the amount thereof. Their property is by their own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the loan, which was
secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily
left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. As such, a trial courts’ decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not be set aside on appeal
unless the court abused its discretion. In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and
make a record of the factors relevant to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors,
clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.
In the present case, the Estares spouses clearly failed to prove that they have a right protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are
violative of said right. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioners petition for certiorari.
CASE DIGEST 5: RULE 57 – PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (NATURE OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT)
NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., INC., VS SPOUSES GARCIA, G.R. No. 203240, March 18, 2015
FACTS OF THE CASE:
 Petitioner Northern Islands Co., Inc. filed a Complaint with application for a writ of preliminary attachment, before the RTC against
respondents. It alleged that: (a) from March to July 2004, PETITIONER caused the delivery to respondents of various appliances in the aggregate amount
of P8,040,825.17; (b) the goods were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio Lines, Inc., and were accepted in good order and condition by
respondents’ representatives; (c) the parties agreed that the goods delivered were payable within 120 days, and that the unpaid amounts would earn
interest at a rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum; (d) however, the VALUE OF THE GOODS were not paid by respondents despite repeated
demands; and (e) respondentsfraudulently asserted that petitioner had no proof that they had indeed received the quantity of the subject goods.
 In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary attachment, PETITIONER posted a bond, through Visayan Surety and Insurance
Corporation, in the amount of 8,040,825.17. On November 7, 2005, the RTCissued the writ sought for.
 RESPONDENTS filed on November 11, 2001, an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Proper Pleading and Motion for Discovery
(Production and Inspection) (November 11, 2001 Motion), asking the RTC to allow them to photocopy and personally examine the original invoices,
delivery cargo receipts, and bills of lading attached to the Amended Complaint, claiming that they could not “come up with an intelligent answer” without
being presented with the originals of such documents.
 Thereafter, RESPONDENTS filed a Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, alleging that the attachment previously ordered by the RTC
exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that the estimated value of the attached properties, including the garnished bank accounts, as assessed by their
appraiser, Gaudioso W. Lapaz (Lapaz), amounted to P17,273,409.73, while the attachment bond is only in the amount of P8,040,825.17.
 RTC denied the Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, finding that the appraisal made by Lapaz was not reflective of the true valuation of the
properties, adding too that the bond posted by petitioner stands as sufficient security for whatever damages respondents may sustain by reason of the
attachment. On the other hand, the RTC granted the Motion for Discovery in accordance with Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. However, no production or
inspection was conducted on July 10, 2006 as the RTC directed since respondents received the copy of the above order only on July 11, 2006.
 CA partly granted the certiorari petition of respondents. It held that: (a) on the ISSUE OF ATTACHMENT, trial by commissioners under Rule 32
of the Rules of Court was proper so that the parties may finally settle their conflicting valuations; and (b) on the MATTER OF DISCOVERY, petitioner
could not be compelled to produce the originals sought by respondents for inspection since they were not in the former’s possession.
ISSUE:1. Whether or not the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after petitioner appealed the decision in the Main
Case, and thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA; YES
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the appointment of a commissioner and the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment found by said
commissioner.YES
RULING:
 In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC’s September 21, 2011 Decision resolving the Main Case through the timely
filing of its Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011, together with the payment of the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, in an Order dated January 25,
2012, had actually confirmed this fact, and thereby ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA. WITH THE RTC’S LOSS OF JURISDICTION
OVER THE MAIN CASEnecessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over all matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the PROPRIETY OF CONDUCTING A
TRIAL BY COMMISSIONERS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE EXCESSIVENESS OF THE SUBJECT PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT , being a mere ancillary
matter to the Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
 Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, the Court, in view of the nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that the ATTACHMENT
ITSELFcannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal actionbecause the attachment was only an incident of such action ,
viz.:ATTACHMENT is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement
of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.
 It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claiminstituted by the plaintiff against the
defendant. BEING MERELY ANCILLARY TO A PRINCIPAL PROCEEDING, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of
the writ can no longer be justified.
 The consequence is that WHERE THE MAIN ACTION IS APPEALED, the attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that action ,
is also considered appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo . The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action
independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action.
 That being said, it is now unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised herein. In fine, the petition is granted and the assailed CA rulings are
set aside.
 G.R. No. 184666, June 27, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MEGA PACIFIC ESOLUTIONS, INC., WILLY U. YU, BONNIE S. YU, ENRIQUE T. TANSIPEK, ROSITA Y.
TANSIPEK, PEDRO O. TAN, JOHNSON W. FONG, BERNARD I. FONG, AND *LAURIANO A. BARRIOS, Respondents.

FACTS:

1. Republic Act No. 8436 authorized the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the May 1998 elections. However, the automated
system failed to materialize and votes were canvassed manually during the 1998 and the 2001 elections.
2. For the 2004 elections, the COMELEC again attempted to implement the automated election system. For this purpose, it invited bidders to
apply for the procurement of supplies, equipment, and services.
3. Respondent MPEI, as lead company, purportedly formed a joint venture - known as the Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) - together with We Solv,
SK C & C, ePLDT, Election.com and Oracle. Subsequently, MPEI, on behalf of MPC, submitted its bid proposal to COMELEC.
4. After due assessment, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) recommended that the project be awarded to MPC. The COMELEC favorably acted
on the recommendation and issued Resolution No. 6074, which awarded the automation project to MPC.
5. Despite the award to MPC, the COMELEC and MPEI executed on 2 June 2003 the Automated Counting and Canvassing Project Contract
(automation contract)5 for the aggregate amount of P1,248,949,088.
6. MPEI agreed to supply and deliver 1,991 units of ACMs and such other equipment and materials necessary for the computerized electoral
system in the 2004 elections. Pursuant to the automation contract, MPEI delivered 1,991 ACMs to the COMELEC. The latter, for its part, made
partial payments to MPEI in the aggregate amount of P1.05 billion.
7. This Court in its 2004 Decision declared the contract null and void. 6 We held that the COMELEC committed a clear violation of law and
jurisprudence, as well as a reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure.
8. All in all, Comelec subverted the essence of public bidding: to give the public an opportunity for fair competition and a clear basis for a precise
comparison of bids.

THE INSTANT CASE

Complaint for Damages filed by respondents with the RTC Makati and petitioner's Answer with Counterclaim, with an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment, from which the instant case arose
9. Upon the finality of the declaration of nullity of the automation contract, respondent MPEI filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC
Makati, arguing that, notwithstanding the nullification of the automation contract, the COMELEC was still bound to pay the amount of
P200,165,681.89. This amount represented the difference between the value of the ACMs and the support services delivered on one hand, and
on the other, the payment previously made by the COMELEC.
10. By way of a counterclaim, petitioner demanded from respondents the return of the payments made pursuant to the automation contract. 26 It
argued that individual respondents, being the incorporators of MPEI, likewise ought to be impleaded and held accountable for MPEI's
liabilities. The creation of MPC was, after all, merely an ingenious scheme to feign eligibility to bid.
11. Pursuant to Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of MPEI and individual respondents. The application was grounded upon the fraudulent misrepresentation of respondents as to
their eligibility to participate in the bidding for the COMELEC automation project and the failure of the ACMs to comply with mandatory
technical requirements.
12. The trial court denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, 29 ruling that there was an absence of factual allegations
as to how the fraud was actually committed.
13. The trial court further ruled that the allegations of fraud on the part of MPEI were not supported by the COMELEC, the office in charge of
conducting the bidding for the election automation contract. It was likewise held that there was no evidence that respondents harbored a
preconceived plan not to comply with the obligation; neither was there any evidence that MPEI's corporate fiction was used to perpetrate
fraud. Thus, it found no sufficient basis to pierce the veil of corporate fiction or to cause the attachment of the properties owned by individual
respondents.
14. Petitioner moved to set aside the trial court's Order denying the writ of attachment, 30 but its motion was denied.
15. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.
16. The CA in its First Decision32 reversed and set aside the trial court's Orders and ruled that there was sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of
attachment in favor of petitioner.
17. The appellate court explained that the averments of petitioner in support of the latter's application actually reflected pertinent conclusions
reached by this Court in its 2004 Decision. It held that the trial court erred in disregarding the following findings of fact, which remained
unaltered and unreversed: (1) COMELEC bidding rules provided that the eligibility and capacity of a bidder may be proved through financial
documents including, among others, audited financial statements for the last three years; (2) MPEI was incorporated only on 27 February
2003, or 11 days prior to the bidding itself; (3) in an attempt to disguise its ineligibility, MPEI participated in the bidding as lead company of
MPC, a putative consortium, and submitted the incorporation papers and financial statements of the members of the consortium; and (4) no
proof of the joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the members of
the purported consortium was ever submitted to the COMELEC.
18. According to the CA, the foregoing were glaring indicia or badges of fraud, which entitled petitioner to the issuance of the writ.
19. Respondents moved for reconsideration 36 of the First Decision of the CA.
20. The CA reconsidered its First Decision 37 and directed the remand of the case to the RTC Makati for the reception of evidence of allegations of
fraud and to determine whether attachment should necessarily issue.
21. The CA explained in its Amended Decision that respondents could not be considered to have fostered a fraudulent intent to dishonor their
obligation, since they had delivered 1,991 units of ACMs.
22. Petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition, 45 arguing that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the trial court for the reception of
evidence to determine the presence of fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether a writ of preliminary attachment may be issued against the properties of individual respondents, considering that they were not
parties to the 2004 case.

HELD:
The Petition is meritorious. A writ of preliminary attachment should issue in favor of petitioner over the properties of respondents MPEI, Willy Yu (Willy)
and the remaining individual respondents, namely: Bonnie S. Yu (Bonnie), Enrique T. Tansipek (Enrique), Rosita Y. Tansipek (Rosita), Pedro O. Tan
(Pedro), Johnson W. Fong (Johnson), Bernard I. Fong (Bernard), and Lauriano Barrios (Lauriano). The bases for the writ are the following:

1. Fraud on the part of respondent MPEI was sufficiently established by the factual findings of this Court in its 2004 Decision and subsequent
pronouncements.
2. A writ of preliminary attachment may issue over the properties of the individual respondents using the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.

3. The factual findings of this Court that have become final cannot be modified or altered, much less reversed, and are controlling in the instant
case.

4. The delivery of 1,991 units of ACMs does not negate fraud on the part of respondents MPEI and Willy.

5. Estoppel does not lie against the state when it acts to rectify mistakes, errors or illegal acts of its officials and agents.

6. The findings of the Ombudsman are not controlling in the instant case.

A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or
properties of the defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured
by the attaching creditor against the defendant. 61 The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that the defendant may not dispose of the
property attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former.

The purpose and function of an attachment or garnishment is twofold. First, it seizes upon property of an alleged debtor in advance of final judgment and
holds it subject to appropriation, thereby preventing the loss or dissipation of the property through fraud or other means. Second, it subjects the property
of the debtor to the payment of a creditor's claim, in those cases in which personal service upon the debtor cannot be obtained. 63 This remedy is meant to
secure a contingent lien on the defendant's property until the plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have the property applied
to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases in which the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the
jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.

Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court

Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper
party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

x xxx

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in
the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
For a writ of preliminary attachment to issue under the above-quoted rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud.

Metro, Inc. v. Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc., To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced
the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the
debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. x xx.
The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot
be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. (Emphasis supplied)

An amendment to the Rules of Court added the phrase "in the performance thereof" to include within the scope of the grounds for issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment those instances relating to fraud in the performance of the obligation.

In the case at bar, petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating the commission of fraud by respondent MPEI in the execution of the
automation contract in the two ways:

A. Respondent MPEI had perpetrated a scheme against petitioner to secure the automation contract by using MPC as supposed bidder and
eventually succeeding in signing the automation contract as MPEI alone, an entity which was ineligible to bid in the first place.

B. Fraud on the part of respondent MPEI was further shown by the fact that despite the failure of its ACMs to pass the tests conducted by the DOST,
respondent still acceded to being awarded the automation contract.
February 10, 2016
G.R. No. 174462
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (POTC), PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION
(PHILCOMSAT), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (3rd Division), REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Respondents.

Facts:

On 14 March 1986, then PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz issued a letter directing Officer-In-Charge Carlos M. Ferrales to:

a. Sequester and immediately take over POTC and PHILCO MS AT among others, and
b. To freeze all 'withdrawals, transfers and/or remittances under any type of deposit accounts, trust accounts or placements.
POTC is a private corporation, which is a main stockholder of PHILCOMSAT, a government-owned and controlled corporation.

On 22 July 1987, the OSG filed a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting and Restitution, and Damages, against officials of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT. As alleged in the Complaint, through clever schemes, the wealth that should go to the coffers of the government, which should be deemed
acquired for the benefit of the Republic, went to the officials of the corporation in their own individual accounts-some, however, through conduits or
corporations.

On 1 March 1991, POTC and PHILCOMSAT filed separate complaints for Injunction with the Sandiganbayan against the Republic to nullify and lift the
sequestration order for failure to file the necessary judicial action against them within the period prescribed by the Constitution and to enjoin the PCGG
from interfering with their management and operation, which the Sandiganbayan granted on 4 December 1991.On 23 January 1995, the Resolution was
reversed.

The POTC also filed a complaint for Mandamus against the Republic to compel the PCGG to return POTC's Stock and Transfer Book and Stock Certificate
Booklets. On 13 May 1993, the Sandiganbayan granted the Mandamus.On 28 June 1996, Atty. PotencianoIlusorio (Ilusorio), one of the officials of the
petitioner, entered into a Compromise Agreement with the Republic which was approved by the Sandiganbayan

In a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan directed the Corporate Secretary of POTC to issue within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the corresponding Stock
Certificate of the government. Pursuant to the Order, 4,727 or 34.9% shares of stock of POTC were transferred in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Aggrieved, the PCGG, MLDC, and IRC filed petitions before this Court to nullify the Order of the Sandiganbayan approving the Compromise Agreement,
which this Courtdeclared valid.

POTC and PHILCOMSAT filed an Omnibus Motion dated 28 February 2005, which sought to nullify and/or discharge the continued sequestration of POTC
and PHILCOMSAT and to declare null and void the PCGG Memorandum to the BSP dated 24 October 2000.The Sandiganbayan denied POTC and
PHILCOMSAT’s motion. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution18 dated 2 August 2006.

ISSUE:

W/N the continued sequestration of POTC and PHILCOMSAT is valid.

HELD:

NO. Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that if no judicial action has been filed within six (6) months after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the writ of sequestration shall automatically be lifted. In the case at bar, there was no judicial action filed against POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
There has never been any appropriate judicial action for reconveyance or recovery ever instituted by the Republic against POTC and PHILCOMSAT.

Sequestration is akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment, or receivership. Similarly, in attachment, the property of the defendant is
seized as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or lost intentionally or otherwise,
pending litigation. The sequestered properties are placed under the control of the PCGG, subject to the final determination of whether the property was in
truth ill-gotten.

The ultimate purpose of sequestration is to recover the sequestered properties in favor of the government in case they turn out to be ill-gotten. This
function to dispose of the property is reserved to the Sandiganbayan. Until the Sandiganbayan determines whether the property was in truth and in fact
"ill- gotten", the sequestration shall subsist. In case of a finding that the sequestered properties are ill-gotten, the property shall be returned to the lawful
owner, to the people, through the government; otherwise, the sequestered property shall be returned to the previous owner.

In the case at bar, the 34.9% ownership of the sequestered property has been finally adjudged; the ultimate purpose of sequestration was already
accomplished when the ownership thereof was adjudged to the government by this Court in Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the said
shares in the ownership of the sequestered properties have reverted to the Government.
G.R. No. 205875 June 30, 2015

LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., now known as WI-TRIBE TELECOMS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC., Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208916

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioner,

vs.
ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (Atlocom) is a grantee of a legislative franchise under R.A. No. 8605.4 On October 8, 2003, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued an Order in NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC), granting ATLOCOM WIRELESS SYSTEM,
INC. a Provisional Authority (PA) to install, operate and maintain a Multi-Point Multi-Channel Distribution System [MMDS] in METRO MANILA, subject to
the assignment of frequency by the Frequency Management Division of NTC. The PA shall be valid for a period of eighteen (18)months, or until April 8,
2005. On April 5, 2004, Atlocom thru its counsel requested for "an extension of the PA. On August 23, 2005, NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. (MC)
06-08-200511 re-allocating the bands for broadband wireless access for fixed, nomadic and mobile networks.

On December 23, 2008, NTC denied Atlocom's motion for extension of PA, citing the re-allocation of MMDS frequencies for Broadband Wireless Access in
accordance with MC 06-08-2005 and the unavailability of other alternative frequencies. On September 8, 2009, Atlocom filed in the RTC a Petition to
enjoin the implementation of MC 06-08-2005 and reinstate the frequencies of Atlocom.

Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (LBNI), also a grantee of a legislative franchise (R.A. No. 1553, as amended by R.A. No. 4154), and holder of a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to operate a radio communications network, was allowed to intervene in the case, joining the
defendant NTC in opposing Atlocom's claims. Pursuant to MC 06-08-2005, frequency bands 2535-2545 MHz and 2565-2595 MHz were re-allocated and
assigned to LBNI, which covered the 2572-2596 MHz being claimed by Atlocom as allegedly assigned to it.

The RTC, after due hearing, issued an Order denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction. Atlocom filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was likewise denied by the RTC under Order dated March 21, 2011. The CA denied Atlocom's prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and its alternative prayer for a provisional mandatory injunction. However, the CA ruled in favor of Atlocom
and reversed the RTC's denial of application for preliminary injunction.

LBNI filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Ad Cautelam Offer to File Counter-Bond and Addendum to Motion for Reconsideration with Ad Cautelam
Offer to File Counter-Bond. NTC also filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied these motions.

LBNI filed its petition (G.R. No. 205875) in this Court on April 22, 2013. Acting on LBNI's motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, we issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA, conditioned
upon LBNI's posting of a cash bond in the sum of P300,000.00.

ISSUES

W/N Atlocom complied with the requisites for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction;

HELD:

NO. The following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue: (1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right
to be protected, that is, a right in esse; (2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

A right to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. An injunction is not a remedy
to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act
which does not give rise to a cause of action.

There was no document evidencing that the frequencies alleged by Atlocom to be their’s were actually assigned to them by the FMD. There is likewise
nothing in the records to suggest that NTC "unreasonably" withheld or delayed authority to use such frequencies identified for Atlocom.

From the evidence on record, no clear, actual and existing right to the subject frequencies or to the extension of PA had been shown by Atlocom.
Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC in denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
implementation of MC 06-08-2005 insofar as the use of the re-allocated frequencies claimed by Atlocom. The CA thus seriously erred in reversing the RTC
and holding that Atlocom was entitled to injunctive relief due to alleged violation of its right by the NTC.

Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the
applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the
party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed
by the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining
order. Two conditions must concur: first, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage
to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counterbond.

The CA gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of MC 06-08-2005 in the absence of a
clear legal right on the part of Atlocom.

The resolution of the issue on LBNI's eligibility thus has no bearing on whether Atlocom has the right to be granted a frequency allocation for Broadband
Wireless Access by the NTC. The constitutional issue raised by the respondent may be raised and resolved in proper cases when necessary in the future.
G.R. No. 206808-09, September 07, 2016
LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION FOR PROGRESS (LEAP), MELANIO B. CUCHAPIN II, GREARDO* G. PERU, ROLAND S.
CABAHUG, GLORIA P. VELASQUEZ, ERLINDA G. VILLANUEVA, TEODORO M. REYNOSO, FERNANDO L. NICANDRO, JOSEPHINE P. SIMENE, LAMBERTO R.
RIVERA, REYNALDO M. VIDA, and RUCTICO** B. TUTOL, Petitioners, v. LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA) and DEPA

The facts of the case are as follows:

In 2004, the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enacted Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279. Under the said E.O., all concerned government agencies and
instrumentalities of the water supply and sewerage sector, which includes, among others, the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), were directed to pursue
and implement reform objectives and policies. The said E.O. particularly provided for the rationalization of LWUA's organizational structure and operations.

On April 13, 2005, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 421,6 specifying LWUA's core functions and providing for shifts in its policy direction, functions, programs,
activities and strategies. Cognizant of the effect of the rationalization of the functions of LWUA, the E.O. gave affected LWUA personnel the option to either remain or
retire, or be separated from government service.

Pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 421, then LWUA Administrator Lorenzo Zamora came up with Task Force 421 and its Action Team. The said Task Force was
charged, among others, with the duty of preparing the LWUA's staffing pattern and the corresponding plantilla positions therein as directed by E.O. No. 421. The
Action Team, on the other hand, was given the responsibility of reporting to the Task Force and assisting it in the execution of its duties and responsibilities. Among
the appointed members of the Action Team was herein petitioner Melanio Cuchapin II, who was then the Chairperson of petitioner LWUA Employees' Association
for Progress (LEAP). Subsequently, Task Force 421 was able to come up with a staffing pattern, consisting of 467 plantilla positions which it submitted to the LWUA
Board of Trustees for approval.

On April 18, 2006, the LWUA Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 69 which approved the staffing pattern proposed by Task Force 421. Thereafter, the
approved staffing pattern was submitted to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for review and approval. DBM approved 447 plantilla positions out
of the 467 proposed positions. Twenty (20) positions were excluded from the plantilla.

On October 18, 2006, LWUA issued Office Ordered the immediate implementation of the following: (a) posting of the DBM-approved staffing pattern; (b) finalization
by the Staffing Committee of the staffing guidelines to be submitted to the Management and the Board of Trustees for approval; and (c) finalization by the Task
Analysis Committee of the job descriptions under the rationalized LWUA structure.

On October 19, 2006, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction with the RTC of Quezon City. Alleging that LWUA and DBM acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting and implementing the reorganization plan of
LWUA, petitioners prayed that LWUA and DBM be restrained from implementing the following: (1) DBM-approved staffing pattern; (2) Resolution No. 69 of the
LWUA Board of Trustees, and (3) E.O. Nos. 279, 366 and 421, on the ground that petitioners will suffer injustice and sustain irreparable injury as 233 LWUA
employees face immediate and outright dismissal from service.

Respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the petitioners' prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction.

After hearing, the RTC issued its assailed Order7 granting petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining the respondents
from enforcing and effecting the assailed questioned DBM-Approved Staffing Pattern.

LWUA and DBM then filed separate special civil actions for certiorari with the CA questioning the subject RTC Order and Resolution. These petitions were
subsequently consolidated.

On August 28, 2012, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

The respondents raised the issue that the dismissal of petitioners' principal action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with the RTC results in the
automatic dissolution of the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction issued by the same court.

The Court agrees with respondents.

A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency
or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.20 It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of
action in itself. The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere
incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.21 Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may
be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final
judgment in the case.

It is well settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard.23 It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or
threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on
the merits of the case.24 It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.

Indubitably, in the present case, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the RTC based on its finding that there was a need to protect petitioners' rights to
security of tenure during the pendency of the principal action. After trial, however, the lower court found, among others, that, in questioning the constitutionality of
E.O. Nos. 279, 366 and 421 as well as Resolution No. 69 of the LWUA Board of Trustees, petitioners failed to establish the existence of an actual case or controversy
which is ripe for judicial determination. Thus, the RTC dismissed the principal action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

The principal action having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC is deemed lifted, its
purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal from the main case notwithstanding.26 In this regard, this Court's ruling in the case of Unionbank
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals27 is instructive, to wit:
x x x "a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the
restraining order or temporary injunction," regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal
therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2012 and January 15, 2013, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 100482 and 100662 are AFFIRMED.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES - versus - HEIRS OF SEVERINO LISTANA,

The Facts

Listana owned a 246.0561-hectare parcel of land in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon. Listana voluntarily sold the property to the government, through the
Department of Agrarian Reform, under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the
amount of just compensation for the property.the DARAB set the amount at P10,956,963.25 and ordered petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to
pay Listana the same.

The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued a writ of execution ordering Land Bank Manager and Agrarian Operations Center Head Alex
A. Lorayes to pay Listana P10,956,963.25. Lorayes refused. Thus, Listana filed with the PARAD a motion for contempt against Lorayes.

LBP filed with the Regional Trial Court, a petition for judicial determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP challenged the
amount set by the DARAB and prayed that the amount be fixed at P5,871,689.03.

The PARAD granted Listanas motion for contempt. The PARAD cited Lorayes for indirect contempt and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with
the DARABs Decision.

The SAC dismissed LBPs petition for judicial determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP appealed .

The PARAD ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution, ordering LBP to pay Listana P10,956,963.25. The PARAD issued a warrant of arrest against
Lorayes.

LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD from implementing
the warrant of arrest against Lorayes. The RTC enjoined the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final determination of the amount
of just compensation for the property.

Listana filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari . The Court of Appeals set aside Orders of the RTC.

LBP filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr., the Court set
aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Orders of the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending
final determination of the amount of just compensation for the property.

The Court declared void all proceedings that stemmed from Listanas motion for contempt.

LBP filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash bond.

The RTCs Ruling

The RTC denied LBPs motion to withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash bond.

LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari .

The Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals dismissed LBPs petition and affirmed in toto the RTC's Orders.

Issue

LBP raises as issue that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the withdrawal of the P5,644,773.02 cash bond.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Order of the RTC clearly states that the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB x x x is enjoined x x x from enforcing its order of arrest
against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC upon the posting of a cash bond by Land Bank. Thus, LBP cannot
withdraw the bond pending final determination of the amount of just compensation for the property.

The DARAB set the amount of just compensation for the property at P10,956,963.25 and ordered LBP to pay Listana the amount. On 18 June 1999, the
PARAD issued a writ of execution ordering Lorayes to pay Listana the amount. Lorayes refused and, later, LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction
with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction. Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
may be granted only when:

xxxx

(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the
requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.

As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the P5,644,773.02 bond shall answer for the damages Listana may sustain if the courts finally uphold the
P10,956,963.25 just compensation set by the DARAB. In Republic v. Caguioa,16 the Court held that, The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the
defendant against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is
usually conditioned accordingly.

In any event, the Court has reinstated the Order of the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final determination of
the amount of just compensation for the property. Consequently, LBP cannot withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash bond which is a condition for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.
20. G.R. No. 190134, July 08, 2015
SPOUSES ROGELIO AND SHIRLEY T. LIM, AGUSAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FIRST CONSOLIDATED
BANK
PERALTA, J.

Facts: Petitioner obtained several loans from respondent First Consolidated Bank (private respondent bank) and executed several real estate mortgages
and chattel mortgage as security. Petitioners were unable to pay some of the loans, hence private respondent bank filed for an application for foreclosure
of the mortgages.

Petitioners filed an action for revocation and annulment of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage with plea for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction with the RTC. They alleged that Agusan Institute of Technology had already fully paid its obligation with
private respondent Bank if the latter did not charge exorbitant and excessive interests and penalties and that the total payments they tendered
constituted overpayments to the loan.

RTC: Issued the writ ordering private respondent Bank to desist from foreclosing the said contracts of mortgage. After trial on the merits, RTC lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction and ruled in favor of private respondent Bank.

CA: Denied petitioners' appeal with prayer for the issuance "of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Issues: Whether or not the CA should grant the writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling: No. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by verified
application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant be-fore the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.

To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial, and that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia: A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative
remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ
in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise
unless it is issued immediately.

Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo: Injunctive relief is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed
under any standard of compensation. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injuction is that the court may
thereby prevent a threatened or continuous injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. A
writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity, or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and
existing substantial rights.

In the present Case, CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' application for preliminary injunction and TRO. As aptly held by
the CA, it neither appears from the facts shown by the TRO application that' great or irreparable injury would result to petitioners before the matter can
be heard, nor did they show any clear and positive right to be entitled to the protection of the ancillary relief of TRO as they only claim that their debts
would have been paid had respondent bank not impose astronomical interests on its loans.
[ I.P.I. No. 16-241-CA-J, Nov 29, 2016 ]

CLEMENTE F. ATOC v. EDGARDO A. CAMELLO

FACTS:

William G. Guillani filed a complaint for grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 6713 against Oscar S. Moreno
(Moreno) and Glenn C. Banñ ez (Banñ ez), in their capacity as City Mayor and Officer-in-charge Treasurer, respectively, of the Local Government Unit of
Cagayan de Oro City, before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (OMB).

In its decision, the OMB found Moreno and Banñ ez administratively guilty of grave misconduct. Consequently, OMB furnished the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) copy of the decision for implementation of the order of dismissal against Moreno and Banñ ez.

In order to stay the implementation of the OMB decision, Moreno and Banñ ez filed their respective Petitions for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI). DILG then served a copy of the decision on Moreno.

Incumbent Vice Mayor Caesar Ian Acenas and Councilor Candy Darimbang were sworn in office and assumed the positions of City Mayor and Vice Mayor
of Cagayan de Oro City, respectively.

CA issued a resolution granting Moreno and Banñ ez's prayer for issuance of a TRO. The TRO which is effective for a period of 60 days, unless sooner
revoked, enjoined the DILG, its officers and agents and all persons acting under them, from enforcing, implementing and effecting the OMB decision which
dismissed Moreno and Banñ ez from the service.

On 17 November 2015, the DILG filed a Manifestation informing the CA that as of 6:12 in the evening of 12 November 2015, it has already implemented
the OMB decision dismissing Moreno and Banñ ez from the service. The DILG averred that it was only on 13 November 2015 at around 7:32 in the evening
that it received a copy of the CA resolution granting the TRO.

On the same date, the DILG filed a second pleading denominated as Manifestation with Urgent Motion for Clarification. The motion seeks to clarify as to
who should be recognized as Mayor of Cagayan de Oro City considering that the department received the' CA Resolution on the granting of the TRO a day
after the OMB decision was served and implemented against Moreno.

On 18 November 2015, the CA issued a resolution clarifying the validity and enforceability of the TRO it earlier issued. The CA ratiocinated that:
In the instant case, the last actual, peaceable and uncontested condition before the DILG the assailed Ombudsman Decision is petitioner Oscar
Moreno sitting as the elected Cagayan de Oro City Mayor and Glenn Banñ ez as the Officer-in-Charge of the City Treasurer's Office. Therefore, that
is the situation sought to be upheld by the TRO pending the resolution of the injunction. The status existing at the time the present petition was
filed before this [c]ourt was that the mayor and the officer-in-charge of the City Treasurer's office were herein [Moreno and Banñ ez]. That
precisely is the status referred to in a TRO taking into account the litany of decisions defining how a TRO operates. To construe otherwise
would counter settled jurisprudence. In fact, the DILG has correctly understood and captured the concept and essence of a restraining order. x
xx[10]

On 11 January 2016,[12] the CA, through Associate Justice Camello as ponente with the concurrence of Associate Justices Badelles and Atal-Panñ o, issued a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction to be effective throughout the pendency of the action unless elsewhere revoked or modified, enjoining and preventing the
respondent DILG, its officers, agents, and/or any person assisting it or acting for and in its behalf, from enforcing and implementing the 14 August 2015
decision of the OMB.

Claiming that he was aggrieved by the resolutions issued by the CA in the subject cases, complainant, filed a verified complaint against the respondent
associate justices of the CA who issued the latest resolution praying that they be disbarred and their names be deleted as members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP).

SC required the respondent associate justices to comment on the complaint.

In compliance with the Court's directive, the respondent associate justices submitted their Joint Comment.

They reported that not so long after the CA issued the TRO dated 13 November 2015 on the subject case, complainant charged the members of the Special
22nd Division of the CA, which was then composed of Justices Camello, Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (Justice-in-charge), and Pablito A. Perez, with gross
ignorance of the law, gross violation of attorney's oath, gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, gross violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, gross violation of professional ethics, gross violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, grave abuse of authority, gross misconduct, manifest
partiality, and violation of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint was docketed as I.P.I. No. 16-238-CA-J (Re: Verified Complaint of Clemente F. Atoc).

They further reported that when the CA upgraded the provisional remedy of TRO to a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on 11 January 2016, complainant
hastily recycled his previous complaint against Justices Camello, Henri Jean Paul B. Inting and Pablito A. Perez and accused this time the members of the
Special 22nd Division, now composed of herein respondent Justices Camello, Badelles and Atal-Panñ o, of the exact violations, based on the exact same
circumstances, and raising the exact same issues. They noted that complainant even recycled in the subsequent complaint his original Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Complainant certified that he' has not filed any complaint involving the same issue/issues before the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, any tribunal or agency, when he knows for a fact that I.P.I. No. 16-238-CA-J is still pending.

The respondent associate justices thus iterate the same plea for the dismissal of the utterly baseless complaint and adopts in regard to the instant suit of
complainant, the very same comment on complainant's complaint in I.P.I. No. 16-238-CA-J.

The respondent justices submit that case law has been consistent in its caveat that where judicial relief is still available, whether it be ordinary or extra-
ordinary remedy, resort to administrative complaint is not allowed. They maintain that the preclusive principle that bars parties to a pending suit from
by-passing judicial remedies by resorting to administrative suits against judges applies even more to complainant who is not even a party or privy, but a
total stranger to the pending petitions before the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the charges against the Justices proper. NO

HELD:
At the outset, it is clear that the assailed resolutions were issued by respondent Associate Justices in the proper exercise of their judicial functions. As
such, these are not subject to administrative disciplinary action. Other than complainant's bare allegations, there were no evidence presented to show any
wrong-doings or bad faith on the part of respondent associate justices. We have settled the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from
mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an
injustice on his or her part. Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their performance of duty in good faith.

To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, it must be shown that in the issuance of the assailed resolutions, the justices have committed an error that
was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. In the instant case, it was shown that the justices based their findings on existing facts and jurisprudence.
There was no proof presented to show that they were moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate the law and extend favor to a party. In fact, their
findings were thoroughly discussed in the ratio decidendi of the resolution.

In assailing the resolutions issued by the CA, complainant failed to realize that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. If a party disagrees with
a ruling of the court, assuming these were incorrect, there are judicial remedies available to them under the Rules of Court. As a matter of public policy, a
judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.

Moreover, we have explained that administrative complaints against magistrates cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded
to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they
cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been resolved with finality. Here, it is evident that the
parties aggrieved by the resolution can avail or may have already availed of other judicial remedies. Quite significant is the fact that the instant
administrative complaint was filed by someone who is not a party or privy to the case. As correctly noted by the respondent justices in their Joint-
Comment, Atoc did not even disclose the capacity in which he brings the present administrative complaint.
[ G.R. No. 189026, November 09, 2016 ]

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH TELEPHONE CORP., PETITIONER, VS. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T) and respondent Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) entered into an Agreement for the
interconnection of their telecommunication facilities. The Agreement provided for the interconnection of Smart's Cellular Mobile Telephone System
(CMTS), Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) and Paging services with PT&T's LEC service. Starting 1999, however, PT&T had difficulty meeting its financial
obligations to Smart. Thus, the parties amended the Agreement, which extended the payment period and allowed PT&T to settle its obligations on
installment basis. The amended Agreement also specified, among others, that Smart's access charge to PT&T would increase from P1.00 to P2.00 once
PT&T's unpaid balance reaches P4 Million and that PT&T's access charge to Smart would be reduced from P8.69 to P6.50. Upon full payment, PT&T's
access charge would be further reduced to P4.50.

Smart sent a letter informing PT&T that it increased the access charge. HoweverPT&T sent a letter to Smart claiming that the latter overcharged PT&T on
outbound calls to Smart's CMTS. PT&T cited the NTC resolution in a separate dispute between Smart and Digitel, where the NTC ultimately disallowed the
access charges imposed by Smart for being discriminatory and less favorable than terms offered to other public telecommunication entities (PTEs).
Accordingly, PT&T demanded a refund

Thereafter, PT&T filed a letter-complaint with the NTC raising the issue that the access charges imposed by Smart were allegedly "discriminatory and not
in conformity with those of other carriers.

NTC: Ordered Smart and PT&T to attend mediation conferences in order to thresh out the issues. After the mediation efforts failed, the NTC directed the
parties to file their respective pleadings, after which it would consider the case submitted for resolution. But before the parties were able to submit the
pleadings, Smart filed a complaint with the Regional Trial against PT&T alleging that PT&T was in breach of its contractual obligation

RTC: Issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Smart. It reasoned that allowing the NTC to proceed and adjudicate access charges would violate
Smart's contractual rights. It also denied PT&T's motion to dismiss, finding that the nature of the civil case was incapable of pecuniary estimation which
squarely falls within its jurisdiction. It added that the NTC has no jurisdiction to adjudicate breaches of contract and award damages.

CA: Held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion and, consequently, denied the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the RTC proper.

HELD:

Under Rule 58, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court where the action is pending may grant the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction. Generally, trial courts have the ancillary jurisdiction to issue writs of preliminary injunction in cases falling within its jurisdiction, including
civil actions that are incapable of pecuniary estimation and claims for sum of money exceeding P400, 000.00, among others. There are, however,
exceptions to this rule, such as when Congress, in the exercise of its power to apportion jurisdiction, restricts the authority of regular courts to issue
injunctive reliefs. For example, the Labor Code prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving or arising from labor disputes.[44] Similarly,
Republic Act No. 8975 (RA 8975) provides that no court, other than the Supreme Court, may issue provisional injunctive reliefs which would adversely
affect the expeditious implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects.[46] Another well-recognized exception is that courts could
not interfere with the judgments, orders, or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. This rule of non-interference applies not only to
courts of law having equal rank but also to quasi-judicial agencies statutorily at par with such courts.

The NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 546 (EO 546), promulgated on July 23, 1979. It assumed the functions formerly assigned to the
Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau and was placed under the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Public
Works. Meanwhile, the Board of Communications previously exercised the authority which originally pertained to the Public Service Commission
(PSC).Under Executive Order No. 125, issued in January 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and
Communications.

In view of the legislative history of the NTC, it is clear that Congress intended NTC, in respect of its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions, to be co-equal
with regional trial courts. Hence, the RTC cannot interfere with the NTC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers without breaching the rule of non-
interference with tribunals of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. In this case, the NTC was already in the process of resolving the issue of whether the
access charges stipulated in the Agreement were fair and equitable pursuant to its mandate under RA 7925 when the RTC issued the assailed writ of
preliminary injunction. Mediation conferences had been conducted and, failing to arrive at a settlement, the NTC had ordered the parties to submit their
respective pleadings. Simply put, the NTC had already assumed jurisdiction over the issue involving access charges. Undeniably, the RTC exceeded its
jurisdiction when it restrained the NTC from exercising its statutory authority over the dispute.
CASE 33

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR
ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner ConchitaCarpio Morales, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to
0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for
six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further enjoined
the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.

The Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation
report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special
Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation
of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of
the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction
Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required publication and the
lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15,
2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28 (5)
P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the
release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36
(3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,43 and approved
the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's
for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;47 and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co.
(MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.49

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication
on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).50 Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the OMB Cases,
requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015,
the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the
pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that: (a)
the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had
attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the
disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from
public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them
access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to
the OMB Cases filed against them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary
Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by MariconAusan, a member of Binay,
Jr.'s staff.

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II
were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City
Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him
moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt
presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive
relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and
that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would
undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG National
Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to
personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati
Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Penñ a, Jr. (Penñ a, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.

Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were
all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively
charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension
order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the
Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration
of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay,
Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental petition for contempt75 (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the
Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order.

In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily
giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing of oral
arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80

The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the
CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to
file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay,
Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the
Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's
directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.

In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to
review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay,
Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in
determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order.87 In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that
the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is
clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a
condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to
comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be removed from
office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal
from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt.

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which
further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it
found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati
condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this
regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments
on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor
based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although
the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-
election.97 To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24,
2013.98

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this
Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing
preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have
been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts
subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100
On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file their respective
memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the
following day.

Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment on the
Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda.106 Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its
Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum,
consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position."108 In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded,
among others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution

Five (5) issues were discussed in this case, namely:

1. Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy;

2. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject matter jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition;

3. Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(“WPI”) enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;

4. Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI; and

5. Whether the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt was improper or illegal.

RULING

First Issue, the SC ruled that the Ombudsman’s petition falls under the exceptions that a prior motion for reconsideration must be filed, citing the case of
Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, 5 June 2013, which held as follows: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable ; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved . (Emphasis supplied on the grounds
relied on by the SC in this case, in ruling that no motion for reconsideration was needed.

Second Issue, the discussion revolved around Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770), more particularly its
2nd Paragraph states:

“Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this
Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal orapplication for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question
of law.”

Now the SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in the landmark case of
Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn, held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect of increasing
theappellatejurisdiction of the SC without its advice and concurrence, inviolation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. This tells us that lawyers
should always be wary of reading RA 6770 since case law has affected itso much – maybe it’s time to update it.

Interestingly, the SC mentioned the Senate deliberations cited by the Ombudsman, in the crafting of RA 6770. It quoted the exchanges between Senators
JovitoSalonga, Edgardo Angara, TeofistoGuingona, Jr., and Neptali Gonzales, which merely led the SC to be suspicious on whether said Senators were
talking about Sec. 14, RA 6670, or some other provision. In other words, while the throwback was appreciatedby the SC, the discussions were not really
useful in this case.

Regardless, the SC still ruled thatthe remedy of Binay, Jr. – the filing of petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to assail the
Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order – was valid, citing the cases of Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong , G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and
Dagan v.Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, 19 November 2013. It’s just sad that the sorry end of Second Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770 came as
collateral damage in this case. The SC justified its taking up this issue on its own motion, or ex meromotu, which it canrightfully do, since it is, after all, the
SC.

Third Issue is where it starts to become more interesting.Here, the Ombudsman’s history was discussed, citing heavily from the case of Gonzales III v.
Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014 (hereinafter referred to as “Gonzales”). You can imagine the Ombudsman smiling from
ear to ear while reading this portion, but this form of flattery should lead one to be suspicious.

What can be picked up from the Gonzales case is that the Office of the Ombudsman’s independence covers thefollowing: (1) it is the creation of the
Constitution; (2) it enjoys fiscalautonomy; and (3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control. Onthis basis, the SC held that the Ombudsman
was meant to be protected frompolitical harassment and pressure, to free it from the “insidious tentacles of politics.” (Oh, what imagery does this give.)
Since the SC is apolitical, then Gonzales should not be interpreted toshield the Ombudsman from the judicial review power of the courts. After all, there is
no politics in the judiciary, right?

After the Ombudsman, it is now the SC’s turn to give an exhaustive recap of its own history. Starting from the definition of Judicial Power, the SC went on
the discuss its expanded scope ofjudicial review enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, then the evolution of itsrule-making
authority in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice , 361 Phil. 73 (1999). The SC pointed out that Congress, in relation to RA 6770, has no authority to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and rules allowing the issuance of an injunction form part of the court’s inherent
power, which (now, citing foreign case law) enable the judiciary to accomplish itsconstitutionally mandated functions.

The SC ruled that Congress’ passing of the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, which prohibits the issuance of an injunction, is an encroachment of the
SC’s rule-making authority. An injunction, after all, is merely a provisional and auxiliary relief to preserve rights in esse. However, the SC noted that it has
not consented to this as it has not issued rules of procedure through an administrative circular. Thus, pending deliberation, the SC declared the First
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective, “until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.”
Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly bruised. To sum it up: The Second Paragraph was declared unconstitutional, and the First Paragraph was now
deemed ineffective. As such,the CA was held to have correctly issued the injunctive relief in enjoining thepreventive suspension against Binay, Jr.

Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine was taken up. To go right at it, the SC abandoned the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not
act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so based on good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in nature.

In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was a jurisprudential creation that originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which was
decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, and the SC resorted to American authorities.
The SC stated what appears the sole basis forthecondonation doctrine in Pascual, to wit:

The weight of authorities x xx seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to
which we fully subscribe.

As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for the condonation doctrine, except that “it seems to incline” towards American
authorities. On this regard, the SC made its own investigation, and found that there was really no established weight ofauthorities in the United States
(“US”). In fact, 17 States in the US have already abandoned the condonation doctrine, as pointed out by the Ombudsman. The SC went on to adopt the
findings of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the caveat that said cases are merely “guides of interpretation.”

Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is that it was able to convince the SC not to adhere to stare decisis, thereby enriching
Philippine jurisprudence on this matter. This is important, as its effects are far-reaching, since we now have additional basis to petition the abandonment
of old ineffective case laws. For this moment of glory, allow us to quote directly from the case, viz:

Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual,and carried over in numerous cases after, can be
held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged
in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its application. In other
words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the Ombudsman correctly
points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within
which it thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, ‘[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide.'
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a
1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls
for Pascual’s judicious re-examination.”

The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to enumerate the notable cases that applied Pascual, which included cases issued under the 1987
Constitution. Pascual was tested under existing laws, to see if there exists legislation to support Pascual, e.g. 1987 Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code, Code of Conductand Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Local Government Code of 1991, and Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in Civil Service. The SC ruled:

"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is
actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under
the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense,and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction tosupport the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v.
Orbos to apply to administrative offenses: xxx …"

The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC would remove this defense oft-times used
by elected officials, of which the SC was aware of, as it made mention of the databrought forward by the Ombudsman, to wit:

“To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that ‘for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon
Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground on condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
alleged misconduct – involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct – were placed beyond the reach of
the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial powers.’ Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not
evade review.”

The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to comment directed to the Ombudsman was illegal, was refused to be resolved on the ground there are
no contempt proceedings yet. It is the claim of the Ombudsman that since she was an impeachable officer, she could be subjected to contempt. However,
no due course has been given to the contempt action, thus, the Ombudsman’s claim was premature.
CASE 32

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 201073, February 10, 2016

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. Petitioner, v. PAL EMPLOYEES SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision dated September 13, 20111 and the Resolution dated March 13, 20122 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82098, CA-G.R. CR No. 28341, and CA-G.R. CR No. 28655, which affirmed with modification the Consolidated
Decision dated November 6, 20023 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118, Pasay City in Civil Case Nos. 97-1026 and 00-0016.

FactS

Respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) is a private non-stock corporation, the principal purposes
of which are "(t)o promote and cultivate the habit of thrift and saving among its members; and to that end, to receive moneys on deposits from said
members; (t)o loan said deposits to members when in need.

With the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3779 (Savings and Loan Association Law), PESALA submitted the necessary requirements to the
BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) so that PESALA will be authorized to operate as a savings and loan association. Among the documents required by and
submitted to the BSP was a Certification dated June 20, 1969 issued by Mr. Claro C. Gloria, then Vice President for Industrial Relations of PAL, to the effect
that PAL sanctions and supports the systems and operations of the PESALA; and that it allows and implements an arrangement whereby the PESALA
collects-loan repayments, capital contributions, and deposits from its members by payroll deduction through the facilities of PAL. The said Certification
reads

This is to certify that the Philippine Air Lines, Inc.:

Sanctions and supports the systems and operations of the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA);

Allows and implements an arrangement whereby the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association collects loan repayments, capital contributions, and
deposits from its members by payroll deduction through the facilities of PAL;

Has loaned to the PESALA specific office space to enable it to carry on its normal business until such time as it will have already acquired its own office;
and

Authorizes the Association to conduct business within the PAL office space loaned to the Association, Monday through Friday, from 8:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.,
and 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M.

On January 28, 1972, the BSP issued to PESALA Certificate of Authority No. C-062.6 Since then and until the filing of the present case before the trial
court, PAL religiously complied with its arrangement with PESALA to carry-out the payroll deductions of the loan repayments, capital contributions, and
deposits of PESALA members.

The controversy began on July 11, 1997, when PESALA received from Atty. Jose C. Blanco (Blanco), then PAL Labor Affairs Officer-in-Charge, a Letter8
informing it that PAL shall implement a maximum 40% salary deduction on all its Philippine-based employees effective August 1, 1997. The Letter stated
that, as all present Philippine-based collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) contain this maximum 40% salary deduction provision and to prevent "zero
net pay" situations, PAL was going to strictly enforce said provision.

Foreseeing difficulties, PESALA estimated that if the 40% ceiling will be implemented, "then only around 8% (P19,200,000.00) of the total monthly
payroll of P240,000,000.00 due to PESALA will be collected by PAL. The balance of around P48,000,000.00 will have to be collected directly by plaintiff
PESALA from its members who number around 13,000 and who have different offices nationwide."9 PESALA claimed that this scenario is highly possible
as PESALA was only ninth in the priority order of payroll deductions.10 In the obtaining circumstances, PESALA's computation showed that "(t)here will
remain an uncollected amount of P38,400,000.00 monthly for which plaintiff will suffer loss of interest income of around P3,840,000.00 monthly."

Antecedent Proceedings

On August 6, 1997, PESALA filed a Complaint12 for Specific Performance, Damages or Declaratory Relief with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Injunction before the RTC of Pasay City, and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1026. The Complaint prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff most respectfully prays that:

1. Upon the filing of this Complaint, a temporary restraining order be issued prohibiting defendants or any of their representatives from implementing the
40% limitation on the salary deductions as stated in the Jose C. Blanco's letter dated July 11, 1997 on the deductions pertaining to the loan repayments,
capital contributions and deposits authorized by the PESALA members which will be remitted to PESALA and to order defendants to maintain status quo
ante litem and to strictly enforce the aforesaid payroll deductions in favor of PESALA;

2. After notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the defendants preventing the latter from committing the aforesaid acts
under the preceding paragraph upon such bond as this Honorable Court may equitably and reasonably fix and to strictly enforce the payroll deductions in
favor of PESALA during the pendency of the case;

3. After trial and hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:

Making the preliminary injunction permanent with respect to the acts stated in paragraph 1 of the prayer; and
Ordering defendants to pay to PESALA the amount of P3,840,000.00 monthly as damages reckoned from the time PAL starts applying the 40% maximum
deductions on the PESALA deductions; and

Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P250,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as appearance fee per appearance
as well as the costs of litigation.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed.

In the Order dated August 11, 1997, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) prohibiting PAL and its representatives from implementing the
maximum 40% salary deduction, to wit:

In order to preserve the status quo between the parties pending resolution on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction included in
the complaint, a Temporary Restraining Order is hereby issued enjoining/prohibiting defendants or any of their representatives from
enforcing/implementing the maximum 40% salary deduction on the Philippine based PAL employees as stated in the letter of defendant Jose C. Blanco
dated July 11, 1997, on the deductions pertaining to the loan repayments, capital contributions and deposits authorized by the PESALA members which
will be remitted to PESALA.

PAL, however, was not able to comply with the TRO for the August 1-15, 1997 payroll as it allegedly received a copy of the said TRO after the
corresponding payroll was already prepared. As the TRO was not complied with, only P3,672,051.52 was remitted by PAL to PESALA instead of the usual
P28,500,000.00.

After a finding that the alleged CBA provision on the maximum 40% deduction was applicable only to union dues, and as the PESALA deductions were
duly authorized by the member-employees, the RTC granted the injunctive writ prayed for by PESALA, enjoining PAL, Blanco, and all other persons or
officials acting under them from implementing the maximum 40% limitation on salary deductions, and ordering PAL to strictly enforce the payroll
deductions in favor of PESALA until further orders from the court. The Order dated September 3, 1997 states:

In view of all the foregoing, finding merit in the herein injunctive prayer, the same is GRANTED. Let therefore, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued,
enjoining the defendants Philippine Airlines and Jose Blanco, and all other persons or officials acting under them from implementing the 40% limitation
on the salary deductions as stated in the letter of defendant Jose C. Blanco dated July 11, 1997, pertaining to the loan repayments, capital contributions
and deposits authorized by the PESALA members which will be remitted to PESALA and to maintain the status quo ante litem and to strictly enforce the
payroll deductions in favor of plaintiff PESALA until further order from this Court, upon plaintiffs posting of a credible injunction bond in the amount of
One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

PAL failed to comply with the terms of the Order dated September 3, 1997. For the pay period of September 1-15, 1997, the deduction advice given by
PESALA was for P31,870,194.45 but only P27,209,088.24 was deducted, leaving a balance of P4,661,106.21. For the pay period of September 16-30, 1997,
the deduction advice was for P31,678,265.85 but only P27,755,336.75 was deducted, leaving a balance of P3,922,929.10. For the pay period of October 1-
15, 1997, the deduction advice was for P31,366,866.24 but only P27,668,179.53 was deducted, leaving a balance of P3,698,686.71. For the pay period of
October 16-31, 1997, the deduction advice was for P31,074,983.79 but only P27,887,935.13 was deducted, leaving a balance of P3,187,048.66. For the
pay period of November 1-15, 1997, the deduction advice was for P31,062,541.02 but only P27,897,703.61 was deducted, leaving a balance of
P3,164,837.41. For the pay period of November 16-30, 1997, the deduction advice was for P31,306,925.06 but only P28,476,282.37 was deducted, leaving
a balance of P2,830,642.69. For the pay period of December 1-15, 1997, the deduction advice was for P31,468,236.78 but only P28,363,695.00 was
deducted, leaving a balance of P3,104,541.78. For the pay period of December 16-31, 1997, the deduction advice was for P31,258,380.50 but only
P27,387,361.59 was deducted, leaving a balance of P3,871,018.91. For the pay period of January 1-15, 1998, the deduction advice was for P31,304,373.14
but only P25,382,534.85 was deducted, leaving a balance of P5,921,838.29. For the pay period of January 16-30, 1998, the deduction advice was for
P31,687,242.52 but only P27,190,730.72 was deducted, leaving a balance of P4,496,511.80. For the pay period of February 1-15, 1998, the deduction
advice was for P31,919,262.26 but only P26,269,660.41 was deducted, leaving a balance of P5,649,601.85.17 Thus, from September 1, 1997 to February
15, 1998, a balance of P44,488,760.4118 was incurred.

In an Order dated March 11, 1998, the RTC ordered PAL to remit to PESALA the amount of P44,488,716.41, to wit:

WHEREFORE, and based on the foregoing considerations, finding the motion of the plaintiff to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. Defendants
are hereby ordered to remit to the plaintiff PESALA the total undeducted amount of P44,488,716.41 which corresponds to pay periods from September
1997 to February 15, 1998, and to cause the deductions in full in the succeeding pay periods in accordance with the deduction advice of the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

In the meantime, PAL was placed under receivership on June 23, 1998. Thus, in the Order dated July 1, 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) prohibited PAL from paying any amounts in respect of any liabilities incurred prior to June 23, 1998 and declared all claims for payment against
PAL suspended.

In defense, PAL claimed that PESALA never filed any claims with the Rehabilitation Receiver of PAL nor with the SEC that is why it was unable to comply
with the RTC's Order dated March 11, 1998.

During the hearing held on December 4, 1998, however, then PAL's counsel, Atty. Emmanuel Pena, and Blanco assured the Court that: (1) PAL will
regularly remit to PESALA the full amount per pay period that is due to the latter, and (2) PAL will pay PESALA the balance of P44,488.716.41 by January
1999. These assurances were embodied in the Order dated December 4, 1998.

Despite said assurances, PAL still failed to make good its word. On January 17, 2000, PESALA filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt against Blanco, Mr.
Avelino L. Zapanta (then PAL President), and Mr. Andrew L. Huang (then PAL Senior Vice President-Finance and Chief Financial Officer) before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-0016, and consolidated with Civil Case No. 97-1026.

In the Decision dated November 6, 2002, the RTC made the writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued as permanent, thus ordering PAL and its officials
to strictly comply with and implement the arrangement between the parties whereby PAL deducts from the salaries of PESALA members through payroll
deductions the loan repayments, capital contributions and deposits of said members, and to remit the same to PESALA. The RTC also declared Blanco,
Zapanta, and Huang guilty of indirect contempt and ordered them to remit or turn-over to PESALA the amount of P44,488,716.41 within three days from
receipt of the Decision, otherwise their arrest and detention shall be ordered immediately. The dispositive of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff/petitioner and against defendants/respondents:
Ordering the defendants and all other officials, persons or agents acting under them to strictly comply with and implement the arrangement between the
parties whereby defendants deduct from the salaries of the members of PESALA through payroll deductions the loan repayments, capital contributions
and deposits of said members and to remit the same to plaintiff immediately giving full priority to plaintiffs deduction as contained in the
ClarificatoryOrder dated May 19, 2000;

Making the writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued as permanent;

Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees of P250,000.00;

Declaring the herein respondents Jose C. Blanco, Avelino L. Zapanta in his capacity as President of the Philippine Airlines and Andrew L. Huang, in his
capacity as Senior Vice President-Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Philippine Airlines, Inc., as guilty of indirect contempt for their contemptuous
refusal and failure to comply with the lawful Orders dated March 11, 1998 and December 4, 1998 which have already become final and executory as the
Petition for Certiorari of defendants on the Order of this Court dated March 11, 1998 had been denied by the Court of Appeals per its Entry of Judgment in
CA-G.R. SP 48654 dated May 14, 1999. Hence, respondents are hereby ordered to remit/turn over to plaintiff/petitioner the amount of P44,480,716.41
within three (3) days from receipt hereof otherwise, their arrest and detention shall be ordered immediately.

Ordering the defendants/respondents to pay the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.

On November 11, 2002, PAL, Blanco, Zapanta, and Huang appealed the RTC Decision. The appeal of Civil Case No. 97-1026 was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
82098, while the appeal of Criminal Case No. 00-0016 was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 28341 and CA-G.R. CR No. 28655. These appeals were consolidated.

While the appeals were pending before the Court of Appeals, PESALA moved for the execution of the RTC Order dated March 11, 1998. The RTC issued a
Writ of Execution pending appeal and the consequent Notices of Garnishment. Upon appeal, the Court of the Appeals, as sustained by the Supreme Court,
nullified the Writ of Execution and Notices of Garnishment.

Going back to the case at bar, in the Decision dated September 13, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82098, but granted
the appeals in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 28341 and 28655. It affirmed with modification the RTC Decision in that it upheld the agreement between the parties
whereby PAL deducts from the salaries of PESALA members through payroll deductions the loan repayments, capital contributions and deposits of said
members, as well as the RTC Order directing the remittance of P44,488,716.4126 to PESALA, but it declared Blanco, Zapanta, and Huang not guilty of
indirect contempt. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82098 is DISMISSED while the appeal in CA-G.R. CR. Nos. 28341 and 28655 is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated November 6, 2002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that respondents-appellants Jose C. Blanco, Avelino
L. Zapanta and Andrew L. Huang are held not guilty of indirect contempt. The order for them "to remit/turn over to plaintiff/petitioner the amount of
P44,480,716.41 within three (3) days from receipt" of the November 6, 2002 Decision "otherwise, their arrest and detention shall be ordered
immediately" is REVERSED.

Costs against the Defendants-Appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

I.

W/N The Court of Appeals ruled in a manner contrary to law and the Honorable Court's rulings in De Ysasi v Arceo and Lazo vs. Republic Surety &
Insurance Co. when it sustained the lower court's adjudication of matters that are beyond the issues presented in Civil Case No. 97-1026.

II.

W/N The Court of Appeals ruled in a manner contrary to Article 2055 of the Civil Code and the Honorable Court's rulings when it effectively declared a
contract of guaranty between PAL and the members-debtors of PESALA.

III.

W/N Court of Appeals The ruled in a manner contrary to law when it sustained the imposition of terms, conditions and standards not provided for by
Republic Act No. 8367.

In raising these issues, PAL is essentially contesting the order directing it to pay PESALA the amount of P44,488,716.41, representing the balance between
the deduction advice and the actual deducted amount.

Ruling

PETITION DENIED

PAL contends that its right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC ruling for it to remit to PESALA the amount of P44,
488,716.41, which amount was not specifically prayed for in the Complaint.29 PAL claims that (t)he only amount prayed for by PESALA in its complaint
was the alleged damages of P3,840,000.00 monthly xxx reckoned from the time PAL starts applying the 40% maximum deductions on the PESALA
deductions, which is totally different from the amount of P44,480,716.4130 that the lower court was ordering PAL to pay PESALA. The said amount asked
for by PESALA in its complaint was supposedly for "damages," and not the undeducted amount insisted upon by both the lower court and the Court of
Appeals.

Indeed, a perusal of the prayer in the Complaint shows that PESALA did not specifically pray for the amount of P44,488,716.41 or for any undeducted
amount. But this is understandable because, at the time the Complaint was filed, PAL had yet to effect the maximum 40% deduction policy and as such,
there were yet no undeducted amounts.

The records of the case show, on the other hand, that the undeducted amount of P44,488,716.41 came about because PAL failed to comply with the TRO
and the injunctive writ issued by the RTC. As discussed earlier, the Complaint was filed on August 7, 1997 and as early as August 11, 1997, the RTC already
issued a TRO enjoining PAL from implementing the maximum 40% deduction policy. PAL, however, failed to comply with the TRO. On September 3, 1997,
the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) further enjoining PAL from implementing the maximum 40% deduction policy. Yet again, PAL failed
to comply with the RTC's directive.
PAL cannot hope to gain anything beneficial from its deliberate refusal to comply with the orders and directives of the court. PAL's obstinate disobedience
to the RTC's TRO and WPI led to the disruption of the status quo and to the exposure of PESALA to deficits and losses, for which it should be liable.

In United Coconut Planters Bank v. United Alloy Phils. Corp.,32 the Court, quoting Capitol Medical Center v. Court of Appeals, explained that "(t)he sole
object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard." In Buyco v.
Baraquia,33 we further clarified that a preliminary injunction "is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy
between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy
the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case."

Indeed, an injunction is granted by a court in order to prevent an injury or to stop the furtherance of an injury until the merits of the case can be fully
adjudged. In the case at bar, PAL's defiance of the TRO and the WPI caused PESALA to incur a shortfall in the amount of P44,488,716.41. This shortfall
could have been precluded if only PAL complied with the TRO and the WPI and preserved the status quo. Since such loss was brought about by PAL's non-
compliance with the directives of the RTC, then fair play dictates that PAL should be held liable for its insolence.

In directing PAL to remit to PESALA the amount of P44,488,716.41, PAL additionally argues that the Court of Appeals unilaterally appointed PAL as a
guarantor of the debts of PESALA's members34 because the amount of P44,488,716.41 had not yet been deducted from the salaries of the PESALA
members.

Contrary to PAL's erroneous argument, however, it is liable, not because it is being made a guarantor of the debts of PESALA's members, but because of its
failure to comply with the RTC's directives. Indeed the amount of P44,488,716.41 has not yet been deducted from the salaries of the PESALA members
and, precisely, the reason why such amount has not been deducted is because PAL contravened the RTC's TRO and WPI. PAL is therefore liable, not
because it is being made a guarantor of the debts of PESALA's members, but because its own actions brought forth the loss in the case at bar.

PAL also claims that the RTC erred in granting PESALA a relief not prayed for in the Complaint. It maintains that PESALA cannot be awarded the amount
of P44,488,716.41 as it is not in the nature of damages, which is the only fiscal relief specifically prayed for in the Complaint.

Verily, it is a settled rule that a court cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of that being sought. In Bucal v. Bucal,36 the Court,
reiterating the ruling in DBP v. Teston, explained:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that
allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, the records show that PAL was afforded due notice and an opportunity to be heard with regard to PESALA's claim of P44,488,716.41. In
fact, in explaining the foregoing balance, PAL adverted to the "zero net pay" status of their employees' respective accounts, thus concluding that there is
simply no legal or equitable basis in PESALA's demand for the remittance of the amount claimed to be undeducted.

Moreover, the prayer in the Complaint did state that "(o)ther reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed."38 In Sps. Gutierrez v. Sps.
Valiente, et al.,39 the Court, echoing the ruling in BPI Family Bank v. Buenaventura, held that;

(T)he general prayer is broad enough to "justify extension of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought." Even without the
prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The
court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs
equitable and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. (Emphasis supplied.)

Undeniably, PESALA's claim of P44,488,716.41 is a necessary consequence of the action it filed against PAL. As said claim was duly heard and proven
during trial, with PAL being afforded the opportunity to contest it, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in granting such claim.

It is also worth mentioning that PAL, through its then counsel Atty. Emmanuel Pena and then Labor Affairs OIC Atty. Jose C. Blanco, acknowledged its
liability to PESALA in the amount of P44,488,716.41. In open court, during the hearing held on December 4, 1998, Atty. Pena and Atty. Blanco assured
that: (1) PAL will regularly remit to PESALA the full amount per pay period that is due to the latter; and (2) PAL will likewise pay PESALA the balance of
the previously undeducted amount of P44,488,716.41 by January 1999. These assurances are transcribed in the Order dated December 4, 1998 of the
RTC.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Even if viewed as an offer of compromise, which is generally inadmissible in evidence against the offeror in civil cases, PAL's acknowledgment of its
liability to PESALA in the amount of P44,488,716.41 falls under one of the exceptions to the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.

In Tan v. Rodil,41 the Court, citing the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co., held that if there is neither an expressed nor implied denial of
liability, but during the course of negotiations the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff, then such offer of the defendant can be taken in
evidence against him.

In the case at bar, PAL admitted the amount of P44,488,716.41 without an expressed nor implied denial of liability. This admission, coupled with an
assurance of payment, binds PAL.

In addition, the Court finds that an award of interest is in order. In Nacar v. Gallery Frames,42 the Court clarified that:

When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to
run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.

As further elucidated by the Court in Nacar, when the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, a legal interest at the
rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed, counted from the time of finality until full satisfaction of the judgment, as this interim period is deemed an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

On a last note, we herein clarify that the Court's directive for PAL to remit to PESALA the amount of P44,488,716.41 does not preclude PAL from seeking
due reimbursement from the members of PESALA whose accounts were not accordingly deducted. As explained earlier, the Court is not holding PAL as a
guarantor of the debts of these PESALA members; thus, PAL can rightfully claim the principal amount of P44,488,716.41 from these concerned PESALA
members.
This clarification is in consonance with the principle against unjust enrichment. In Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Inc., et al. v. Margallo,43 we defined
unjust enrichment as follows:

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefitted, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense
of or with damages to another. The main objective of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at the expense of another.
It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's expense.
One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on a contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict, or any
other provision of law. (Emphasis supplied.)

As the amount of P44,488,716.41 is actually comprised of loans of certain PESALA members which were not duly deducted from their respective salaries,
then fair play dictates that these PESALA members should pay the remaining balances of their loans and reimburse PAL. The interests herein adjudged by
the Court, however, are for the account of PAL, as it was PAL's disobedience of the RTC's directives that brought forth the said principal amount.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) is ordered to REMIT to PAL
Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) the principal amount of P44,488,716.41, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum computed
from March 11, 1998 until fully remitted, without prejudice to the right of PAL to be reimbursed the principal amount by the concerned PESALA
members.
 R.A. No. 8975

Nerwin Industries Corporation vs. PNOC – Energy Development Corporation

and Ester R. Guerzon, Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee 669 SCRA 173
Facts:

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to bid for its IPB-80 contract for the supply and delivery of
about 60,000 pieces of woodpoles and 20,000 pieces of crossarms for the country’s Rural Electrification Project. On October 2000, NEA’s Administrator
recommended to NEA’s Board of Directors the approval of award to Nerwin Industries Corporation on account of the following: a.) Nerwin is the lowest
complying and responsive bidder; b.) the price difference between Nerwin’s bid and that of the second highest bidder is deemed substantial and
extremely advantageous to the government ($1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms); and c.) the bidder and manufacturer are
capable of supplying the woodpoles specified in the bid documents based on pre-award inspection conducted.

However, in December 2000, NEA’s Board of Directors passed a resolution reducing by 50% the material requirements for the project. In turn,
it resolved the award of the contract at a reduced number to herein petitioner Nerwin. Petitioner protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the
same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder. Finding a way to nullify the results of a previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of the
Government Corporate Counsel, who upheld the eligibility and qualification of petitioner. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other
bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction,
which injunction application was granted by the RTC in Civil Case 01102000. In the interim, respondent (PNOC) issued a Requisition or an invitation to
bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification project (O-Ilaw project). Upon learning of such issuance, petitioner filed a civil action
(Civil Case 03106921) in the RTC in Manila alleging that said Requisition was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB-80 to another
bidding, and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondent’s proposed bidding for the wooden poles.

Respondents averred that the complaint showed no cause of action and violated the rule that government infrastructure projects cannot be
subjected to TROs, seeking the dismissal of Civil Case 03106921. However, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case 03106921.

Respondents appealed the case to the CA in a special civil action for certiorari, alleging that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that petitioner had been entitled to the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction despite the
express prohibition from the law and from the SC; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring
respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondent’s counsel from representing them. The CA granted the petition of herein respondents.

Issues:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of RA 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions, except if issued by the SC, on government projects;

Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of RA 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary
injunction but not injunction as a final remedy; and

Held:

The petition fails. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction and in issuing
a preliminary injunction through the assailed order. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975. Sections 3 and 4 of RA 8975 states:

Section 3. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

xxx

b.) bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government xxx

xxx

Section 4. Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof
is void and of no force and effect.

Respondent Judge could not have legally declared herein respondent in default because, in the first place, he should not have given due course
to herein petitioner’s complaint for injunction. Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant
disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanction.

A preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the
pendency of the case. It is issued only when a.) the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded; b.) the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right;
and c.) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a
right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of
an act prohibited by statute. A preliminary injunction is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8975

AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF GOVERNMENT

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS FROM ISSUING TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUCTIONS,
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - Article XII, Section 6 of the Constitution states that the use of property
bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Towards this end,
the State shall ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government
infrastructure projects to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs
and to immediately enjoy the social and economic benefits therefrom.
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. -
(a) “National government projects” shall refer to all c urrent and future national government
infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by
government-owned and- controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and
other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of
equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance,
improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
(b) “Service contracts” shall refer to infrastructure contracts entered into by any department, offfice
or agency of the national government with private entities and nongovernment organizations for
services related or incidental to the functions and operations of the department, office or agency
concerned.

Sec. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. - No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national
government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2
hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or
project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including
but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving
such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which
bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a
rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing
laws.

Sec. 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.

Sec. 5. Designation of Regional Trial Courts. - The Supreme Court may designate regional trial courts to
act as commissioners with the sole function of receiving facts of the case involving acquisition, clearance
and development of right-of-way for government infrastructure projects. The designated regional trial
court shall within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the referral, forward its findings of facts to
the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

Sec. 6. Penal Sanction. - In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she may incur under existing
laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least
sixty (60) days without pay.

Sec. 7. Issuance of Permits. - Upon payment in cash of the necessary fees levied under Republic Act No.
7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the governor of the
province or mayor of a highly-urbanized city shall immediately issue the necessary permit to extract sand,
gravel and other quarry resources needed in government projects. The issuance of said permit shall
consider environmental laws, land use ordinances and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government
Code relating to environment.
Sec. 8. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, other parts
or provisions hereof not affected thereby shall continue to be of full force and effect.

Sec. 9. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 and Republic
Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or lparts thereof inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Sec. 10. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: November 7, 2000.