TRANSITION PROGRAMMES AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA

OBI, EMEKA ANTHONY PhD***

Introduction

The general acceptance by the military that their intervention in politics is an aberration
has made virtually all past military administrations in Nigeria with the exception of that of Gen.
Ironsi and Gen. Buhari to initiate transition programmes. These programmes were supposed to
signal their intention of handling over power to democratically elected governments. The simple
truth is that the military by training and orientation are not well equipped for governance. They
are masters of war and as such are not well suited for peace time governance. Most
importantly, the command structure of the military is not suited for the drag and pull involved in
politics. In line with this, Obikeze, Obi and Iwuoha (2016) have argued that:

The logic of military disengagement is based on the fact that no matter how long the
military may have been in power in any country, it is still clear to everybody that it is an
aberration. They are not suited for political leadership both by their training and
orientation. This is why military rule is never accepted no matter how well they try in
government. For most people therefore, military rule symbolizes the failure of the state
(p.199).

The military's unsuitability for governance made Ake (1996),to posit that:

It must be noted that the military despite their apparent failure in government most
times do not willingly disengage from politics, rather, they bow to pressure from the
people and even the international community who are no longer very comfortable with
the military. it is only in few instances that the military could be said to have willingly
handed over power without any external prompting.

Nnoli (1994) argues that by 1970s virtually all the independent regimes in sub-saharan
Africa were either military or one party states. Thus, the repressive nature of these regimes led
to mass revolts against them which eventually quickened the democratization process. More
succinctly he argues that:

They were intolerant of the opposition, disrespectful of fundamental freedoms and

therefore, took repressive political actions. The discontent of the people arising from
the deterioration of their already intolerable socioeconomic condition was held down
with an iron hand by these regimes. The result was a crisis of democracy. The people
were hemmed in and immobilized. Communities were pitted against others in a vicious
attempt at divide and rule. Political opponents were sometimes physically liquidated.

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 Political repression was sustained by force and political manipulations.........Thus
beginning from 1989, democratization pressures erupted into various forms of mass
protests (p.1).

The democratization process usually kicks off with a transition programme which is the
concern of this chapter. We are going to look at transition programmes in Nigeria starting with
the Gen. Yakubu Gowon regime and ending with the last programme which is that of Gen.
Abdusalami Abubakar.

Transition Programmes in Nigeria

It would be very apt at this point to first of all conceptualize transitions in order to put
the study in proper perspective. The concept of transition in the African and Latin American
context according to Olagunju,Jinadu and Oyovbaire (1993), is a specific generic reference to
the cycle of democratisation, authoritarian or one-party rule and of redemocratisation that has
characterised the politics of many countries in the two continents since the 1960s.On the other
hand, Onuoha and Fadakinte (2002) differentiate between transitions as a process of a transfer
of power from the military to elected representatives and transition politics. According to them,
transition politics refers to “the totality of the design by the military to seize political power,
retain the power so far it is feasible, convenient, and it has the capacity to do so”(p.2). More
extensively they argue that:

What ever delays, defaults, changes, crises and conflicts, cases of “hidden agenda” or
other difficulties during the transition period, whether intended by the actors or not,
were political, and were exploited or manipulated somehow to strengthen the military
hold on political power. This is because in most of the cases, each of the phenomena
perfected a future trick and manoeuvre, and justified, and was employed to justify the
extended period of yet another “transition”.The scenarios which enabled the military to
stay so long in power and hold a country as large and complex as Nigeria under military
rule for so long, where the military in far smaller countries could not succeed,
demonstrates the amazing “successful manifestations of transition politics( in
Nigeria)(pp,2-3).

What the above indicates is that transition politics more or less was a tool crafted by the
military for extended stay in power. In other words, the programmes were merely put in place
to legitimize military rule and also keep the civilians busy. While this is true of the Gowon,
Babangida and Abacha transition politics, the Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo and Abubakar
programmes can be said to be real transitions.

Before looking at the various programmes, it would be in order here to look at the
general patterns of transitions. According to Bennet & Kirke-Green (1978) in Obikeze, Obi and
Iwuoha (2016), there are five patterns of military disengagement. First is the personality
transformation. This is the type where a military head of State transforms into a civilian and
continues in power. Africa is replete with examples of such transformations; Togo, Burkina-Faso,
Ghana etc. This was what Abacha tried to do before he was stopped by providence. The most

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recent case is that of Guei of Cote D'ivore who transformed and contested elections but lost and
made attempts to manipulate the results before he was sacked by the people.

Second, is the orderly transition without legitimizing elections. This normally happens
when the military that is leaving power decides to hand over power to those who were
excluded from power in the previous civilian government. The military government may
therefore seem to have intervened basically to help the opposition into power. The case of the
exclusion of members of Nkrumah's CPP in Ghana by the National Liberation Council (NLC) and
favouring the Kofo Busia led Progress Party (PP) is a good example.

The third pattern is scheduled disengagement with legitimizing elections after short
military rule. One can see the case of Dahomey where Col. Soglo intervened late in 1963 and
returned power to civilians after general elections in January 1964. Though he intervened again
in 1965 and was overthrown in 1967 by a group of young officers who decided not to exceed six
months in office before handing over to civilians. Abudulsalami Abubakar's regime in Nigeria
falls under this category.

The fourth type is scheduled disengagement with legitimizing elections after long period
of military rule. Nigeria is a classic case of this type from 1966-79 and from 1983-1999.

The fifth and final type according to Benneth is disorderly transition when a military
regime is forced either by internal pressures from the military or from the people to abandon
governance. In 1964 the military regime of General Ibrahim Abbou was forced to leave power
by the combined onslaught of street demonstrators backed by junior military officers. The
Babangida handover of 1993 can be placed under this category. This is because, he was forced
to 'step-aside' without organising elections after he annulled the June 12 elections.

GEN. YAKUBU GOWON'S TRANSITION POLITICS

The Nigerian Civil War which started in 1967 ended in January 1970. At the end of the
war, the Gen Gowon government launched the programme of Reconstruction, Reconciliation
and Rehabilitation (The three Rs). In his independence day broadcast in october 1970, Gen.
Gowon announced a nine point programme that would end with hand over to a democratically
elected government in 1976.

THE NINE POINT PROGRAMME

i. The reorganization of the Armed Forces;

ii. The implementation of the National Development plan and the repair of the damages of
the war;

iii. The eradication of corruption in our national life;

iv. The settlement of the question of the creation of more states;

v. The preparation and adoption of a new constitution;

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vi. The introduction of a new revenue allocation formula;

vii. Conducting a national population census;

viii. The organization of genuinely national political parties;

ix. The organization of elections and installation of popularly elected governments in the
states and in the centre.

Though the Nine-point programme was articulated by the Gowon administration, it

could not actually carry it out properly. The National census it carried out was marred with
regularities and the results were trailed by protests. It could not fight corruption because most
of the top members of the regime were terribly corrupt. As the government realized that it
could not accomplish the programmes it set for itself before the 1976 terminal date, General
Gowon announced on 1st Oct. 1974 that the 1976 date was no longer feasible.

Majority of Nigerians were not happy with this announcement, as they were happily
and eagerly looking forward to the end of the inept and corrupt regime. However, on the 29th
of July 1975, the regime was booted out of power in a bloodless coup d'etat. Brigadier and later
General Murtala Mohammed became the new Head of State. The new regime abrogated the
Nine-point Programme and then introduced its own transition programme which was expected
to last for four years.

MURTALA/OBASANJO TRANSITION PROGRAMME

The new Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed On the 1st of October 1975, a few
months after assuming office, announced a five stage programme that would lead to the
handover of power to an elected President on October 1, 1979. On the 4th of October 1975
the government inaugurated a 50-man Constitution Drafting Committee with Chief F.R.A.
Williams as the Chairman. It must be noted that one of the nominees, Chief Obafemi Awolowo
declined serving on the Committee, on the grounds that he needed time to organize his party in
anticipation of a return to civilian rule, and the military government did not replace him,
thereby making it a 49-man Committee. The Committee submitted its report in less than one
year, on the 14th of September 1976 to General Olusegun Obasanjo who replaced the Head of
State, Murtala Mohammed who was assassinated on the13th of February 1976 in a failed coup
attempt led by Col. B.S. Dimka.

The Head of State, Gen Olusegun Obasanjo established the Federal Electoral
Commission (FEDECO) on November 15th 1976 with Mr. Michael Ani as Chairman. The
Commission was charged with the responsibility of organizing elections both for the federal and
state elective positions.

A Constituent Assembly with Justice Udo Udoma as Chairman was inaugurated on

September 11 1977. It was charged with the responsibility of examining the Draft Constitution.
It presented the Draft Constitution to the Head of State on 29th August 1978. The Constitution
was ratified by the Supreme Military Council (S.MC.). The federal government dissolved the
Assembly on 20th September 1978. A day after, the Head of State, General Obasanjo signed and

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enacted the Constitution into law through Decree NO. 25 of 21st September 1978,while also
lifting the ban on party politics same day.It must be noted that this ban had been in place since
1966 when the military intervened in politics, a period of about thirteen years. To show that
politicians were already too eager to kick start their trade, immediately, the ban on party
politics was lifted , political activities took off in ernest, with the annoucement of the births of
many parties. At the end,17 parties were able to beat the FEDECO deadline for submission of
applications. At the end of it's screening exercise, the electoral body approved five parties
namely - the National Party of Nigeria (N.P.N.), The Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N.), The Nigerian
Peoples Party (NPP), the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) and the Peoples Redemption
Party (PRP). These five parties contested the elections. The elections which were held on a
weekly basis, were held in this order-Senatorial Elections - July 7 1979, House of
Representatives - July 14 1979, House of Assembly-July 21,1979, Gubernatorial - July 28 1979,
Presidential Elections (two weeks interval) August 11, 1979.

At the end of the presidential elections, Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN was announced
winner because in the opinion of FEDECO he satisfied the provisions of Section 34A Subsection
(1) (c) (1) of the Electoral Decree NO. 73 of 1977. The results were however contested by Chief
Obafemi Awolowo of the UPN based on the interpretation of 2/3 of nineteen states. He
challenged the result at both the Presidential Election Tribunal and the Supreme Court and lost.
Consequently, Shagari was sworn in as the first Executive President of Nigeria, thus bringing to
an end thirteen years of military rule marked by three regimes, four Heads of State, a thirty
months civil war, an oil boom and the assassination of two Heads of State. It marked the
beginning of yet another experiment in democratic rule in Africa’s most populous country.

THE BABANGIDA TRANSITION POLITICS

The Babangida transition politics with the benefit of hindsight was from the very
beginning programmed to fail or at best produce Alhaji Ibrahim Babangida as civilian President.
In this case, it would have still been deemed to have failed since it did not transit to anywhere.
The programme still remains the longest, most elaborate, most deceitful and most expensive
transition in the country's chequered history. Some critics maintain that it is the longest and
most expensive transition in the whole world. Well, in the absence of a global data on
transitions we cannot substantiate this allegation. The duration and manipulations inherent in
the programme made Nigerians to accuse Babangida of harbouring a hidden agenda early in the
day, which he blatantly denied but which later proved to be true.

The detailed programme kicked-off in 1986 and was billed to terminate in 1990 but was
later shifted to 1992 and subsequently to 1993. Let us now take a look at the transition time
table as it was published by the government, and cited in Okoye (1991).

3RD Quarter-1987;

Establishment of the Directorate of Social Mobilization;

Establishment of a National Electoral Commission;

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Establishment of a Constitution Drafting Committee.

4TH Quarter -1987:

Elections into the local governments on non-party basis.

1ST Quarter- 1988:

Establishment of National Population Commission; Establishment of Code of Conduct Tribunal;

Establishment of Constituent Assembly; Inauguration of National Revenue Mobilization
Commission

2ND Quarter -1988

Termination of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

3RD Quarter- 1 988;

Consolidation of gains of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

1ST Quarter-1989:

Promulgation of a new Constitution/Release of New Fiscal arrangements.

2ND Quarter-1989:

Lift of ban on party politics.

3RD Quarter-1989:

Announcement of two recognized registered political parties

.4TH Quarter-1989:

Registration of two political parties and the release of their constitutions and manifestoes

1ST Quarter- 1990:

(a) Printing and distribution of parties' Constitutions and Manifestoes; Readiness of party
offices - national, states, local governments and wards.

(b) Translation and printing of constitutions and manifestoes into major languages by the
state governments.

(c) Appointment of administrative staff for - Federal, States, Local Governments and Wards.

(d) Public enlightenment on manifestoes and constitutions.

(e) Training of federal and states Administrative Secretaries.

(f) Training of Administrative Secretaries at local Government level.

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(g) Training of registration officers at ward level.

(h) Provision of stationery (registers, forms, membership cards).

(I) Registration of party members begins.

(J) Public enlightenment on manifestos and constitutions continues.

2ND Quarter 1990

(a) Registration of party members continues.

(b) Public enlightenment on manifestoes and constitutions continues.

(c) Registration of party members ends.

(d) Public enlightenment on manifestoes and constitutions to continue.

(e) Party congress/convention at (a) ward level, (b) local government level.

3RD Quarter-1990;

(a) Party congress/convention at (a) state level, (b) national level.

(b) Workshop for newly elected party executives to be organized by the Centre for
Democratic Studies.

(c) Handing over of party offices to party officials.

(d) Submission of final draft of party manifestoes and constitutions to the Armed Forces
Ruling Council by the political parties.

(e) Armed Forces Ruling Councils' final approval of party manifestoes and constitutions.

(f) Preparation of Local Government elections.

(g) Electioneering campaigns.

4TH Quarter-1990

Electioneering campaigns continue, Local Government elections.

1ST Quarter-1991

Inauguration of Local Government Councils, Nation-wide census.

2ND Quarter-1991 Census.

3RD Quarter-1991

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State executives and legislative elections. Inauguration of State Chief Executives and State
Legislative Houses.

1ST and 2ND Quarters - 1992

Elections into Federal Legislatures and convening of National Assembly.

3RD and 4TH Quarters 1992

Swearing -in- of New President and the final disengagement by the Armed Forces.

Since the government was interested in enthroning a new social order, it felt the best
way to achieve this was by excluding all those who have held high political offices in the past.
The new order was thus meant for 'new breeds'. The government through the "Participation in
Politics and Elections (prohibition) Decree No 25 of 1987” banned four categories of people
from taking part in the elections. They were as follows:

CATEGORY ONE;

(a) All those politicians who held political offices from 1st October1960, to 15th January
1966, and from 1st October 1979, to 31 st December 1983, and who were subsequently
indicted and found guilty of offences or misdeeds by any Tribunal, Assets' Special Investigation
Panel, Judicial Commission or Administrative Enquiry;

(b) All persons who served as Secretaries to Federal and State Governments, Permanent
Secretaries, Judges, Chairmen and members of Federal and State Boards of Statutory
Corporations and State-owned Companies or on the Governing Boards of Educational
institutions as well as all other public officers who had been found guilty of misdeeds by any
Panel, Tribunal, Judicial Commission or Administrative Enquiry between 1st October, 1960 to
the end of the transitional period;

(c) All Military and police personnel who held offices during the period 15th January, 1966
to the end of the transitional period and who were removed from office or dismissed from
service, or who were or are hereafter found guilty of corruption or other misdeeds or indicted
by various Courts Martial, Tribunals, Assets Investigation Panels and Administrative and Judicial
Inquiries at both Federal and State levels;

(d) All those persons who may not have held any public office but who have been indicted
by various Panels, Tribunals and Commissions of Enquiry for corrupting public office holders;
and

(e) All persons in both the public and private sectors who have been or will be dismissed
from office or any employment during the period 1st October 1960 to the end of the
transitional period.

(f) All legislators or persons including those elected into Senate, House of Representatives,
House of Assembly of Regions or States from January 1960 to the end of the transition period
who either collectively or individually have been liable or indicted and found guilty of acts of
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unjust enrichment, corruption, fraud, embezzlement of public funds, election malpractice's or
contributed in one way or the other to the economic adversity of the nation or such persons
who exercised corruptive influence on public office holders.

CATEGORY TWO:

This category includes people disqualified from vying for any elective office or holding
any political party office mainly because of the positions they had occupied in government.
They may not have been found guilty of any offence or misdeeds. The Federal Military
Government considers their disqualification a means of facilitating the emergence of a new
political leadership. Those affected were the holders of the following offices during the periods
1st October, 1960 to 15th January 1966, and 1st October, 1979 to 30th September, 1983. They
include;

(a) President;

(b) Prime Minister;

(c) Vice-President;

(d) Regional Premier;

(e) State Governor;

(f) State Administrator;

(g) Deputy State Governor;

(h) Minister, Presidential Adviser/Assistant;

(I) Commissioner;

(j) Parliamentary Secretary;

(k) Presidential Liaison Officer;

(1) National Assembly Liaison Officer;

(m) President of the Senate;

(n) Deputy President of the Senate;

(o) Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(p) Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives

(q) Speaker of the Regional/House Assembly;

(r) Chairmen of Committees or Selected Committees of the Senate, House of

Representatives and Regional and State Houses of Assembly;

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(s) Members of the National Executive Committees of all political Parties, and

(t) Members of Regional Working Party/Committees or State Executive Committees of all

Political Parties.

CATEGORY THREE;

Those included in this category are military and police personnel who held or are
currently holding the under-listed public offices from 15th January 1966 to the end of the
transition period,

(a) President/Head of State;

(b) Chief of Staff (Supreme headquarters);

(c) Chief of General Staff;

(d) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(e) Chief of Staff (Army Headquarters);

(f) Head of Navy;

g) Head of the Air Force;

(h) Chief of Air Staff;

(i) Inspector-General of Police;

(j) Military Governors/Administrators; and

(k) Members of the Supreme Military Council and the Armed Forces Ruling Council between
31st December, 1983 and end of the transitional period.

CATEGORY FOUR;

Those included in this category are the chairmen and members of the following Federal
Government Agencies:

(a) the National Electoral Commission;

(b) the National Population Commission;

(c) the Directorate for Social Mobilization;

(d) the Code of Conduct Bureau;

(e) the National Revenue Mobilization Commission; and

(f) the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure.

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 The ban on party politics was lifted on the 3rd of May 1989, paving the way for people
to form political associations that will apply to NEC for registration. Since the government had
already decided on a two party structure for the country, politicians were aware that scaling the
hurdle will be such an onerous task but they still decided to try. To determine the two parties,
NEC imposed very stringent,expensive and almost impossible conditions. The parties were
expected to establish well equipped offices with at least three paid staff in all the 435 local
government areas in the country then. They were to supply 25 membership lists of their parties,
comprising the names, photographs and personal details of at least 200 members from each
local government in the country (total of at least 87,000 individual membership files per party)
to NEC with a registration fee of N50,000. All these must be done within 3 months. This
apparent impossible conditions were put in place to make sure that none of the parties
qualified for registration.

Since Nigerian politicians have a ‘never say die’ spirit, 13 political groups were able to
summit their applications before the deadline. The Babangida drama of the absurd began in
earnest. In a broadcast to the nation on the 6th of October 1989, Babangida said that all the
parties had:

failed to comply with key conditions in the guidelines such as documentation on

members, declaration of assets and liabilities of individual members of the national
executive committees. Most of them (Parties) had operated underground prior to the
lifting of the ban on politics on 3rd of May 1989 ... and had roots in the party politics of
the First and Second Republics. There were very strong indications of wealthy
individuals in the executive committees of the associations that confirm fears that they
were being hijacked by money bags (cited in Obikeze, Obi & Iwuoha 2016,pp.210-211).

Based on the above, all the 13 associations were denied registration, instead the military
decided to form two parties - the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican
Convention (NRC). The first (SDP), leaning a little to the left and the other(NRC), a little to the
right. According to the government, “All members will now be equal founders of either parties
and that no one except government, which is neutral, sponsors the two parties." Many
discerning Nigerian's saw through the farce and raised their voices against this abuse of the
philosophy of political parties. A clear negation of what political parties stood for.

It was in this light that Anthony Enahoro, the tireless social fighter said “My judgment of the
two bodies is that they are military government parastatals being paraded as political parties for
the benefit of the outside world”(cited in Obikeze, Obi & Iwuoha 2016,p.211).

To General Obasanjo;

Those who call the two government created parties, parastatals are even being
generous. Parastatals at least have effective and accountable chief executives, who can
enforce order and discipline. The same cannot be said of the government created

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 parties. And yet they are the vehicle through which it is hoped that a stable democracy
will be nurtured(cited in Obikeze, Obi & Iwuoha 2016,p.211).

Prof. Claude Ake (1986) in his assessment of the military transition programme asserted that:

It cultivated a politics dissociated from issues, ideology and social forces. It created
political parties abstracted from social realities, parties belonging to everyone in general
and to no one in particular and thus constituted as an anarchy of ambitions... After
many years of discrediting politics, aggressing and humiliating politicians, virtually
everyone is discouraged from politics except those who have a neuropatic attachment
to power or no other means of livelihood or self-esteem.

These barrage of criticisms did not in any way deter Babangida and his cohorts from
marching on. Instead the government continued to convince Nigerians that the end would
justify the means and that sceptics would be put to shame when the programme would come to
the desired conclusion.

The National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced on September 21 1990 that the open
ballot system will be used for the local government elections scheduled for December 8, 1990.
The elections were held as scheduled, while due to the creation of additional 136 new local
government councils in September 1991 another local government elections were held on
November 23, 1991.

Gubernatorial elections were equally held nationwide on December 14, 1991 and the
elected Governors were sworn in, in January 1992. The National Assembly elections were held
on 14th July 1992. What remained was the presidential election, which incidentally, many keen
watchers of the Babangida transition politics had argued would never come to be as the
country’s self styled military President was seen as harbouring a secret agenda of self
succession. The NEC divided the country into six zones for staggered presidential primaries
using the option A4 method, which entailed organizing the primaries through a series of
elections from the ward, local government, and states to the national levels. The primaries took
place between August and September 1992 and as expected were characterised by noticeable
irregularities. The President in reaction to these irregularities and calls by the defeated
candidates, cancelled the primaries and banned the 23 aspirants who took part in the primaries
from taking part in the transition programme. He also went ahead to dissolve the executive
committees of the two parties and appointed caretaker committees in their place. The hand
over date was also extended to August 27 1993, and new primaries were to be organized.

In the new primaries, Babangida's close personal friends, M.K.O. Abiola (SDP) and Bashir
Tofa (NRC) emerged. The presidential elections were finally held on June 12 after some
clandestine attempts by groups like the ABN to stop it. Unfortunately, the election which was
adjudged the freest and most peaceful election in Nigeria's history was annulled by Gen
Babangida on the 23rd of June 1993 for sundry reasons ranging from "Judicial anarchy" to
security reports about the candidates, but apparently in his self succession plot. The transition
which has gulped billions of naira failed. Gen Babangida wanted to organise another
presidential election which apparently would entail yet another postponement of the handover

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date. This time Nigerians told him in very clear terms that they were not ready for another
rigmarole in an endless transition. Even his military constituency told him that his time was up
as they could no longer guarantee his safety. Apparently confused on the way out of this
quagmire which Nigerians labeled the June 12 political impasse, Babangida hurriedly installed
an Interim National Government (ING), headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan and left Aso Rock on
the 26th of August 1993 in a hurry like a defeated General. The master dribbler has dribbled
himself. He had thus ripped the fruits of eight years of deceit and a dubious transition to
nowhere, leaving the flanks open for his long time friend and fellow ‘coupist’, Gen. Sani Abacha
to take over and unleash a reign of terror on Nigerians in a full blown dictatorship.

Perhaps, S.E. Finer had prophesied about Babangida and his transition when he wrote
in his popular book "The Man on Horseback in 1962 that;

Those armed forces that have tried to disengage from politics have had to hasten back
as soon as their quondam political enemies came within sight of regaining power, while
those that have elected to remain and rule have been ejected only by popular revolt, or
by further military revolts of their own malcontents. In most cases the military that have
intervened in politics are in a dilemma: whether their rule be indirect or whether it be
direct, they cannot withdraw from rulership nor can they fully legitimize it. They can
neither stay nor go.

THE ABACHA TRANSITION

General Sani Abacha became the country's Head of State on Nov. 17, 1993, following
the 'resignation' of Chief Ernest Shonekan.Being naturally a taciturn fellow, Nigerians did not
know much about him and that made some to erroneously believe that he would resolve the
June 12 electoral impasse that was tearing the nation apart. Probably his promise that his stay
in office will be brief helped to fuel this impression. However, as events showed his own
interpretation of brief differed from that of most people, as he unleashed a rein of terror on
Nigerians without any plans of leaving power soon.

In order to buy time to consolidate his hold on power, he convened a constitutional

conference in 1994 and said his tenure will be determined by it. The conference initially agreed
that his tenure should end in 1996 but was later manipulated to recant its decision and the
regime was then left to decide an appropriate date for handover to an elected government. He
later drew up a transition that would terminate in 1998 with the election of the President.
Having dismantled all democratic structures he met on ground, he vowed to build a lasting
democracy, the same way his friend Babangida and ally had promised.

A new electoral commission was created by the government with the duty of
registering political parties, since the Babangida created two parties have been banned. The
electoral body, NECON registered five political parties namely; the United Nigeria Congress Party
(UNCP), the Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), the Congress for National Consensus (CNC), the
Grassroot Democratic Movement (GDM) and the National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN).

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 Gen. Abacha’s self -succession plot did not take time to unfold as he did not hide his
intention like his friend Babangida did. It therefore did not take long before it became clear to
virtually everyone that the governments transition was simply a ruse. It was geared towards
producing Abacha as a civilian President. Many government sponsored groups like Youths
Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) suddenly appeared, all begging Abacha to continue in power.
The argument of these groups was that Nigeria would break up if Abacha should hand over, and
therefore he should continue in power till God knows when. The government media outfits
turned full swing into agents of the self-succession bid.

As Nigerians reacted negatively to this theater of absurdities, the government bared it's
fangs on both real and imaginary enemies of the self succession plot. Phony coups were
invented; assassinations, judicial murders, bomb blasts, wanton arrests and detentions became
the order of the day. A full blown dictatorship was unleashed on the country. It was either that
Abacha continued in power or nothing else.

Meanwhile elections into the local governments, state and federal legislatures were held
and manipulated to the benefit of Abacha supporters. It was a selection exercise. Curiously why
all these were going on, the taciturn Kano-born General, said nothing about his ambition to
transform into a civilian President. The country got to the height of absurdity when all the
parties individually chose Abacha as their flag bearers, Nigeria has indeed become a Banana
Republic. It was at the height of the deification of Abacha as the only option for Nigeria that the
man suddenly died and the madness ended.

Interestingly none of those who threatened to commit suicide, if by October 1, 1998

Abacha did not continue as the country's President, did carry out their threat. All who claimed,
that without Abacha the country would grind to a halt or go up in flames recanted and joined
the Abubakar transition. The sycophancy of the Abacha era remains unbeaten in the country's
political history, while the looting and repression of the regime continues to serve as a reminder
to Nigerians that military rule is never a substitute for a civilian government no matter how bad
that civilian government is.

Without doubt, during the Abacha years, the country retrogressed on all developmental
indices. This is simply because there cannot be development without peace. According to Ake
(1996): “A society of beggars, parasites and bandits cannot develop, it cannot know peace or
stability, and it cannot be democratic. It can only gravitate endlessly, as we are doing, in material
poverty and moral regression.”Without any fear of equivocation, the Abacha years were indeed
years of both material poverty and moral regression. It was indeed as the Nobel Laureate Wole
Soyinka described it as the years eaten by the locusts. Clearly the years of waste and
retrogression on virtually all fronts.

ABUBAKAR'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

Abacha’s sudden death on June 8 1998, naturally also brought to an inglorious end his
dubious transition programme. His successor, General Abudusalami Abubakar decided to start
all over again, but this time, with a firm promise that he will not manipulate the programme like
his predecessors ;Babangida and Abacha.

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 Knowing fully well that one of the major problems with the previous transition
programmes was the question of independence of the electoral umpire, he set up a new
electoral commission, with a promise that the body will be independent of the military
government, a veiled reference to Abacha's NEC that was manipulated from Aso Rock. The
body was called the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), with Justice Ephraim
Apata a well respected retired Supreme Court Judge, as Chairman. INEC registered three parties
provincially to take part in the transition programme. These were; the Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP) the All Peoples Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD).

The three political parties took part in the first elections conducted by the body in late
1988, which was the local government elections. These elections, were to be the main yardstick
on which INEC would grant the successful parties full registration. This was based on the
agreement of the parties with INEC, that only parties that win at least 10percent of the votes
cast in the local government elections would be granted full registration. The PDP from this first
elections started showing its strength and spread. This may be because of its origin from the
G34, a group that challenged Abacha when it was very suicidal to do so and the party's national
appeal. Though the AD did not meet up with the above requirement, the military government
had to bend the rules to accommodate it in the transition programme in order not to alienate
the Yoruba people in the scheme of things,considering the fact that the late winner of the
annulled June 12 election Chief M.K.O. Abiola was a Yoruba and there was need to placate
them.

Not comfortable to be beaten by ‘bloody civilians’ the military class that have held the
mantle for the past sixteen years still decided to install one of their own. Thus, a group of
Generals, under the leadership of General Babangida decided to persuade General Obasanjo,
who has been released from prison following his role in the 1995 phanton coup to contest, as
they felt it was time for power shift. Incidentally having accepted the need for a power shift to
the South, the Northern oligarchy felt there was need to find a Southerner that would be
amenable to their manipulation. Obasanjo's credentials based on his subservience to the
oligarchy in his first coming as military Head of State was seen as a good choice. He was
persuaded seemingly against his wish to contest the elections on the platform of the PDP. This
group with their civilian cohorts launched a massive war chest in terms of finance and other
logistics which helped Obasanjo to win the elections. On the 29th of May 1999, Gen Abubakar
made history as he graciously handed over the reins of the Nigeria’s federal government to
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the elected President of Nigeria thus bringing to a long expected
end almost sixteen years of ruinous military rule.

By this singular act, General Abubakar, thus achieved in less than nine months what his
insincere predecessors; Babangida and Abacha could not achieve in 8 years and 5 years
respectively. The lesson from this short but purposeful transition is that, a transition to civilian
rule can be achieved in a very short time only if the handlers have sincerity of purpose. It is
therefore not how long, but how well. This also shows the difference between transition politics
and transition programme already alluded to in this work.

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 It must however be pointed out at this stage that the military should not delude
themselves with the belief that they can bring about democracy because it is not possible. Since
one cannot give what he doesn't have, what the military can do is to at best bring about civilian
rule while the transition to democracy continues. Commenting on why it has been not possible
for the military to engender true democracy in Nigeria, the late icon Prof. Claude Ake had in
1996 said that;

Military rule is not so much the aberration we so often call it, as a negation of what is
uniquely human in the way we relate. The military can never engender democracy
because it is the anti-thesis of democracy in regard to its norms, values, purposes and
structure. The military addresses the extreme and extraordinary while democracy
addresses the routine; the military values discipline and hierarchy, democracy, freedom
and equality: the military is oriented to law and order, democracy to diversity,
contradiction and competition, the method of the military is violent aggression, that of
democracy is persuasion, negotiation and consensus building. Against this background,
it is hardly surprising that the Nigerian military has never succeeded in designing and
implementing a transition to democracy; it is unlikely ever to succeed( cited in Obikeze,
Obi & Iwuoha 2016,p.215).

Interestingly it did not succeed. This assertion may elicit the questions of whether what
Nigeria has now is not democracy and whether Gen. Abubakar did not succeed in his transition
to democracy? Well, Ake equally has the answers to these questions. According to him;

Nigeria democratizes with no separation of power. All powers having been vested in an
imperial presidency. There is hardly any rule of law, no plausible system of justice, no
transparency. The institutions of the state are above the law, civil society is below it,
ordinary people are out of sight, far beyond its protection. The judiciary is dissociated
from justice, and the bureaucracy is oppressive and arbitrary. The Nigerian state like the
colonial state before it turns on the calculus of strength. What is the point of choosing
"democratically" those who will control a state apparatus which is inherently
undemocratic? The state must be transformed structurally before such elections can
become a meaningful exercise in democracy (Ake 1996, pp6-7).

From the above, it is therefore not surprising that most elected officers of the state in
this Republic have failed to live up to expectation because the system they operate is inherently
defective, and being products of a military transition where politics is seen as warfare, they now
see their territories as conquered territories and their people as prisoners of war. What a said
reality. They are Lords of the Manor.

Peharps a proper understanding of what democracy truely is would help assess whether
what is on offer in Nigeria today is democracy. Nnoli (2011) has argued strongly that:

democracy is not and cannot be a once-for all, which may be attained in one fell swoop.
The argument that believes otherwise is a false one. Similarly democracy is not an end
to itself. It is merely an unfolding and unending process toward a better political life. For
example, the mere existence of periodic elections in a multi- party political system does

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 not necessarily indicate the prevalence of democracy. One must examine the effects of
this system on domination, oppression, exploitation, injustice and illegitimacy. The
empirical evidence especially in Africa shows that such political systems live side by side
with these social evils(p.25).

Arising from the above therefore, one may want to ask whether the present
dispensation has brought any significant changes in the asymmetrical power relations between
the Nigerian masses and their rulers and oppressors?.How far have our ‘elected’ officials gone in
addressing the grave injustices and exploitations of the military era on the various groups in
Nigeria?.Have there been any serious attempts by the rulers to build a consensus among
Nigerians on how we want to live together as one people?. Presently, the Buhari led federal
government has unabashedly gone ahead with the most brazen lopsided appointment policy in
Nigeria with utter disregard for the federal character principle and civilized norms of collective
co-existence, to the chagrin of other ethnic nationalities of Nigeria.

As posited by Obikeze, Obi, and Iwuoha (2016),unless the character of the Nigerian
state which is essentially and tendentially oppressive, indifferent to and far removed from the
people is changed, politics will remain what it has always been in Nigeria, a battlefield.
Democracy will also remain a pipe dream for what is happening now by way of democratization
is that “self appointed military or civilian dictators are being replaced by 'elected' dictators”(Ake,
1996,p.6)

There is no doubt that for Nigeria to lay claim to being a democracy, there must be a return
of power to the people. Those who occupy public offices must understand that they hold
power in trust for the people and must therefore be accountable to them. The present situation
where the people are alienated from power and the way it is exercised is the anti-thesis of
democracy. This is because:

A major assumption of democracy is the belief that participation by the people in

running the affairs of the state is crucial for the elimination of domination, oppression,
exploitation, injustice and illegitimacy. The rationale for this belief is simple. No one is
likely to use state power to dominate, oppress, exploit or otherwise impose injustice on
oneself. In this way, state power, is tamed, a critical purpose of democracy. It cannot be
used for evil because no one would wish evil on herself/himself. State power will only be
used for good of all in the society (Nnoli,2011,pp.26-27).

What this implies is that only the first stage of the battle has been won, which is getting
the military as an institution out of power. The second stage which is much more difficult is yet
to start. This stage involves getting the military out of us. The dictatorial and autocratic
tendencies that make our leaders demand complete obedience and subservience instead of
dialogue and consensus which democracy demand, need to be exorcized. It is only when power
is exercised for the people and in the true interest of the people that Nigerians can talk about
practicing democracy. We are yet to see that day.

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REFERENCES

Ake C. (1996). Is Africa democratizing? CASS Monograph, No. 5. Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd.

Dudley B. J. (1982). An introduction to Nigerian government and politics. Lagos: MacMillan.

Finer S, E. (1962). The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics. London: Pall Mall.

Maier K.T. (2000). This house has fallen: Nigeria in crisis. London: Penguin Books.

Nnoli O. (1978). Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers.

Nnoli, O. (1994). Ethnicity and democracy in Africa: The interviewing variables. CASS Occasional
monograph No. 4 Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd.

Nnoli, O. (2011). The struggle for democracy in Nigeria. Enugu: PACREP

Okoye I. K. (1991). Soldiers and politics in Nigeria. Onitsha: Big Ben Publishers

Obikeze, S. O., Obi, E. A. & Iwuoha, V. C. (2016). Government and politics of Nigeria. The
struggle for power in an African state (2nd ed). Onitsha: Bookpoint Educational Ltd.

Olagunju, T. Jinadu, A. & Oyovbaire, S. (1993). Transition to democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993).

Ibadan: Safari Books ( Export) Ltd.

Onuoha, B. & Fadakinte, M.M. (2002). Introduction. In B. Onuoha & M.M. Fadakinte (Eds)
Transition politics in Nigeria 1970-1999. Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd.

***Obi, E.A. (2017). Transition politics and programmes in Nigeria. In E.A. Obi (Ed.). Democracy,
party systems and election administration in Nigeria. Onitsha: Bookpoint
Educational Ltd.

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