THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

150762
COVERDALE ABARQUEZ y EVANGELISTA,Petitioner,
- versus -
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision[2] and the 7 November 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 21450. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 (trial court) in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-135055-56. The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista (Abarquez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055.

The Charge

The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide in two Informations,[5] as follows:
Criminal Case No. 94-135055

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y
VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93-129891 and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one RICARDO
QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at the back, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Criminal Case No. 94-135056

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y
VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila under Crim. Case No. 93-129892 and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide directly by
overt acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left arm, but the said
accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon said JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI is only slight and not fatal.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly.

The Version of the Prosecution

On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz[8] (Paz), Ricardo Quejong (Quejong) and their friends were in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose
St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyets son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to go home. Boyet
Tong, Abarquezs son Bardie and Sonito Masula (Masula) joined Paz and Quejong. They proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St.

Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyets house, Alberto Almojuela also known as Bitoy (Almojuela), a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as
Dale, were likewise drinking liquor in front of Almojuelas house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main road, Almojuela and his companions
blocked their path.

Almojuela asked Paz, Are you brave? Paz replied, Why? Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but
sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez, What is our atraso, we were going home, why
did you block our way? Abarquez answered, Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na.

Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him.
Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and found him already
bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit
of San Jose St. to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, You left your companion already wounded!

When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions
brought Quejong to the UST Hospital. They next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the incident. However, there was nobody in the precinct. With
Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to the WPD General Headquarters to report the incident. At the WPD General Headquarters, they learned that Quejong
died at the UST Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. The medico-legal certificate showed that Paz
sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his left forearm.

About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad (SPO1 Vidad) was at the WPD Homicide Division, his station received a call from the UST Hospital informing them of
the death of Quejong. SPO1 Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue and investigated the incident. They learned that Almojuela, assisted by
Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn statements by Paz and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide and
frustrated homicide and prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.

Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to one SPO4 Soriano at Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to
the WPD Homicide Division.

Dr. Antonio Rebosa[9] (Dr. Rebosa), a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital, conducted the post-mortem examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa
reported that Quejong sustained two stab wounds and suffered from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds to the heart and left lung.
According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument probably caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa also reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and contusions on the
right upper body, the wrist and on the lower extremities.
The Version of the Defense

Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence at 3363 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m., Almojuelas wife informed
him that the group of Paz was challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded to Almojuelas house. Almojuelas house
was about twenty meters away from Abarquezs house. When he arrived at Almojuelas house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled by
Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuelas waist and boxing him at the stomach. Masula was near Almojuelas head holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a
chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted at the group to stop. The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the air. Still, the group did
not heed Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and Masula scampered away.

Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from smoking marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house while Abarquez
went home. On his way home, Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego (Lego) advised him to report the
incident to the police. They all proceeded to Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the incident to the desk officer. The desk officer told them that a person had
been stabbed. When Abarquez reached their house, he saw policemen and media men with their barangay chairman. He informed them that he had just
reported the incident. Upon the request of SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez then went to the police station to shed light on the incident.

Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter informed him that there was marijuana smoke coming to their window. He went outside to
look for the source of the smoke and saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to move away as there were children
inside the house. He was on his way back to the house when Quejong tried to strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez
shouting, Tumigil na kayo. Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away.

Winfred Evangelista[10] (Evangelista) testified that he was resting in front of his house when he heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz and Quejong were
quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to interfere. Abarquez was forced to fire a
warning shot and the persons involved in the commotion ran away.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision[11] dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the
prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be convicted as a principal in
the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed
Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the accused, Coverdale Abarquez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide only
as accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
In Criminal Case No. 94-135056, the accused is hereby acquitted.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Abarquez appealed the trial courts Decision before the Court of Appeals.

In its Decision[13] of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in giving more
credence to the testimony of Paz. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela in fatally stabbing
Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected Abarquezs allegation that he was merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties.

In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,[14] the Court of Appeals denied Abarquezs motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

The issues[15] Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;
2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

Abarquez alleges that the prosecutions evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice. He
further alleges that there was a misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion based entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the credibility of the witnesses against him.

The Ruling of This Court

The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to
consider certain facts of substance and value, which if considered, might affect the result of the case.[16] This case is an exception to the rule.

Concurrence in Criminal Design

Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts.[17]

Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and
concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are
not indispensable to the commission of the crime.[18] Mere commission of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough.[19] Thus:

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended
to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation.[20]
Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime
charged.[21]

Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the
shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:

q. And what happened in the exchange of words or altercations between Bitoy and Ricardo Quejong?
a. They grappled with each other, sir.
q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did you do, if any?
a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.
q. And how this Dale hold you?
a. He held my two shoulders, sir.

PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:
I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the accused holding both shoulders, your Honor.
q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what happened next, if any?
a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)
q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the course of grappling, if any?
You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what happened in the course of grappling? (sic)
a. They fell to the ground, sir.
q. After that what happened next, if any?

a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the hold of Dale and I approach the two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was trying to pull
him, sir. (sic)
q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic)
a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir.
q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky or Ricardo? (sic)
a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches including the handle).
q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you were trying to free yourself from the hold Dale Abarquez, Pinagalitan kayo, in what
way or manner did Dale Abarquez reprimanded you? (sic)
a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)[22]
xxx xxx xxx
q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct?
a. Yes, sir.
q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Quejong, is it not?[23]
a. They were just arguing, sir.
[q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both shoulders by the accused [C]overdale Abarquez?
a. Yes, sir.
q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not?
a. Yes, sir on my side.
q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from further quarrelling you, is it not?
a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir.
q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by Abarquez?

ATTY. GASCON:
Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the witness while the witness act as the accused demonstrating holding both hands of
interpreter preventing the witness and saying Joey tumigil ka na, joey tumigil ka na.

COURT:
q. How many times?
a. Twice, Your Honor.

ATTY. GASCON:
The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because you were trying to attack Bitoy, is it not?
a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic)
q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you Joey tumigal ka na, Joey tumigil ka na. What would be the reason?
a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop.

COURT:
Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy when the accused tried to hold you and prevent you?
a. Yes, sir.
q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not pacifying you but to stop you from helping the victim?

a. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez uttered was Joey, tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na, is it not?
a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na.[24]

Pazs testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuelas criminal design. Tumigil literally means stop. Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz
from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to
Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquezs action as an attempt to
prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted
that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping
Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquezs act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to
Almojuela.

In People v. Fabros, [25] the Court explained:

To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice
must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design.
xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the (principals) criminal design did not automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance,
by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principals criminal intent.

Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified that Abarquezs son Bardie, who was one of Pazs companions, was the
one trying to pacify Almojuela. The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this when it stated that while Abarquez was holding Paz, his son Bardie was
pacifying Almojuela.[26]

The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in not extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This,
however, does not necessarily show concurrence in Almojuelas criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he left his wounded
companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejongs injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.

When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Thus:

Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a
fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. Every
vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework, the
prosecution must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than
sufficient.[27]

We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the
party having the burden of proof loses.[28] Hence:

xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does
not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.[29]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and 7 November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21450, which affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT
Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 139177, August 11, 2003 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ALVIN VILLANUEVA, APPELLANT.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

For automatic review is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, stationed in Agoo, La Union, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity,
P600,000 for actual damages and P1,000,000 for lost earnings.

The information that charged appellant for the offense alleged:

That on or about the 16th day of November, 1996, in the Municipality of Rosario, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and being then armed with a knife, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said knife one OTO-LEO BINAY-AN BRABANTE from behind, inflicting three (3) stab wounds upon the
latter, one of which penetrated his heart, which directly resulted to (sic) his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Forthwith, trial on the merits ensued. While the prosecution was adducing its evidence, appellant
escaped from detention on October 9, 1997. The lower court thus proceeded with the trial of the case in absentia in accordance with Section 14(2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.

The facts follow.

On November 15, 1996, at around 12 midnight, Marife Brabante was attending to her duties as cashier of the Highlander Store owned by her mother, Rita
Binay-an, at Barangay Saitan, Camp 1, Rosario, La Union. She was assisted by Cheryl Dapiaoen and George Bautista. They were about to close the store when
appellant, together with a certain Jerry, Teddy and an unidentified person, arrived. They occupied one of the tables and started drinking the liquor which they
brought with them. Appellant then asked Marife if they could stay until 5:00 a.m. but Marife refused since they were unruly. When the group was about to
leave, Cheryl asked appellant to pay the amount of P35 as cover charge. At this point, appellant became angry and threw two bottles of gin on the floor.
Marife's brother, Orland, who was sleeping in one of the rooms of the store, was awakened by the noise. He went out and told appellant not to create trouble.
But appellant shoved him and left with a warning that he would return to kill somebody. Appellant got on his tricycle and bumped the door of the store while
his companions threw rocks at it.

Meanwhile, Marife's other brother, Otoleo, got up from his bed and asked Cheryl to go with him to buy balut at the nearby Seven Star Store, which was only
eight meters away from their store. After 30 minutes, appellant returned to Highlander Store with a knife. He walked past Marife and told her that she was not
the one he was going to kill. Appellant went toward the Seven Star Store where Otoleo and Cheryl were then buying balut. Upon reaching the store, appellant
suddenly stabbed Otoleo at the back. The victim turned to face appellant but the latter again stabbed him twice on the left armpit. Otoleo fell to the ground
and appellant ran away. Marife, who was outside the Highlander Store, rushed to the bloodied body of her brother and hugged him. She brought the victim to
the Rosario District Hospital in Rosario, La Union where he was declared dead on arrival.

Dr. Godofredo Garcia of the Rosario District Hospital, La Union conducted a post mortem examination on the cadaver of Otoleo and prepared his findings and
the death certificate showing the following:
Rigor mortis, stabbed (sic) wound, 2 cm. arm, clavicular area (L), 3 inches deep 2 cm. arm posterior aspect (L), axilla 2 inches; penetrating wound thru the 5th
intercostal space, anterior axillary line with hemothorax (L) lung with clotted blood; penetrating wound, lung (L), pericardial sac with hematoma, penetrating
(L) auricle and ventricle.[3]
Rita Binay-an, mother of the victim and owner of the Highlander Store, testified on the civil aspect of the case. She claimed to have spent the amount of
P600,000 in connection with the death of her son. According to Rita, Otoleo was a second lieutenant in the Philippine Marines at the time of his death.

As earlier noted, appellant escaped from prison before the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence. Hence, he was deemed to have
waived his right to present his evidence to dispute the charge.[4]

After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on November 20, 1997 convicting appellant of the offense charged:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the accused ALVIN VILLANUEVA is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of MURDER as charged in the
Information. He is hereby sentenced to DEATH, and to pay P50,000.00 for the death of the victim, indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P600,000.00 actual damages, P1,000,000.00 in loss of earning and to pay the cost of the proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[5]
In his Brief, appellant insists that the trial court erred:

I
IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE AND HIGHLY INCONSISTENT, IF NOT CONFLICTING, TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
ANENT THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION.

II

IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

III

IN CONVICTING HIM OF MURDER SINCE THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY, EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND NIGHTTIME ARE WANTING AND IN
ERRONEOUSLY CONSIDERING FURTHER THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ESCAPE AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, THUS THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON HIM
MUST BE ACCORDINGLY REDUCED.[6]
We shall jointly discuss the assigned errors since they are interrelated.

Appellant questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses Marife Brabante and Cheryl Dapiaoen as their testimonies were patently inconsistent and
conflicting on material details. Appellant points out the following inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of Marife and Cheryl:

(1) Marife first testified that appellant and his group arrived at the Highlander Store at around 12 midnight[7] but later on declared that they arrived at around
12:45 a.m.[8]

(2) Marife stated on direct examination that her brother, Orland, did not go out of his room when appellant became unruly.[9] On cross-examination,
however, she admitted that Orland went out of his room.[10]
(3) Marife averred that appellant had three companions when he entered the Highlander Store.[11] On the other hand, Cheryl testified that appellant had four
companions at that time.[12]

(4) Marife insisted that appellant's companions were nearby and laughing when he stabbed Otoleo.[13] This was contrary to Cheryl's testimony that
appellant's companions were merely observing the incident .[14]

(5) Marife claimed that she rushed to help her brother, Otoleo, when he fell down,[15] while Cheryl declared that she had to call Marife to inform her that
Otoleo was stabbed by appellant.[16]

While the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses differed in some respects, the aforementioned inconsistencies and discrepancies referred to collateral
and minor matters. The details cited by appellant such as the exact time of their arrival at the store, the number of companions he had at the time he entered
the store and the demeanor of his companions when he stabbed Otoleo, are all insignificant and inconsequential considering that they had nothing to do with
the main scope of the inquiry -- the murder allegedly committed by appellant. Further, a miscalculation of time is too flimsy a reason to discredit a witness,
especially where the exact hour is not an essential element of the offense, as in this case. Likewise, since several months had passed before Marife and Cheryl
recounted their story before the trial court, it was impossible for them to have a total recall of the incident.

Indeed, neither inconsistencies on trivial matters nor innocent lapses affect the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their declarations. On the contrary,
they may even be considered badges of truth on material points in the testimony.[17] The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and calibrated in their
entirety and not in truncated portions or isolated passages.[18] In the instant case, the testimonies of Marife and Cheryl were clearly consistent vis-a-vis the
substantial aspects of the crime, i.e., the identification of appellant as the perpetrator of Otoleo's death and the manner by which the crime was committed.

Although it is incumbent on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, to justify acquittal based on such ground, the
doubt should relate to the facts constitutive of the crime charged.[19] Discrepancies should touch on significant matters crucial to the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Conversely, inconsistencies in details irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.[20] Besides, as held in numerous
decisions, when there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution is moved by improper motives, such witness is entitled to full faith and
credit.[21] Certainly, Marife and Cheryl, in identifying appellant as the assailant, had no other motive than to seek justice for the death of Otoleo.

It should also be noted that the testimonies of Marife and Cheryl were corroborated on material points by the expert testimony of Dr. Garcia who conducted
the post mortem examination on the body of Otoleo Brabante. He declared:
PROECUTOR CATBAGAN:
Q: And what was your finding in the person of the victim?
A:
Post mortem examination reveals that the victim is already rigor mortis. There is stabbed (sic) wound in the arm, clavicular area left armpit. And the most fatal
wound is in the armpit. The penetrating wound entering the heart and the lungs. There is a presence of clotted blood in the left lung. And the pericardial sac
with hematoma, the cause of heart cardiac, left uricle and ventricle.
Q: How many wounds were there, doctor?
A: There were three wounds.
Q: And how deep are those wounds?
A: The two wounds in the left is 3 inches deep and the left axillary penetrating and almost left the heart and fatal wound. So that caused the death.
Q: Could you determine by those wounds what was the weapon used?
A: Sharp bladed weapon, sir.

COURT
Q: Is it bladed?
A: Yes, sharp pointed bladed weapon, sir.

PROSECUTOR CATBAGAN:
Q: By the location of the wounds, could you determine the position of the assailant at the time he hit the victim?
A:
The assailant is at the back because of the posterior arm, while this axilla, the fatal wound is on the side. So when the assailant is raising hand he thrust and
injured him at the side. Supposing the assailant is right handed the possibility is in front or on the side.[22]

Clearly, the physical evidence amply reinforced the testimonies of Marife and Cheryl that appellant stabbed Otoleo with a hunting knife, once at the back and
twice at the side. Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent testimony of the truth and rates high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[23]

The case of the prosecution was greatly strengthened by appellant's escape from confinement during trial and by his failure to turn himself in despite
subsequent conviction by the trial court. It was only on November 2, 1998, one year after the trial court had promulgated its decision, when appellant was
finally recaptured.[24] It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence of guilt and culpability, and, when unexplained, flight is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.[25] It must be stressed nonetheless that appellant's conviction in this case was premised not on
this legal inference alone but on the overwhelming evidence presented against him. The witnesses' positive identification of appellant and narration of the
circumstances of the victim's death were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the physician who examined the victim's body, and by the autopsy
report. These considerations convince the Court beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.

The trial court, in imposing the death penalty on appellant, found that treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime attended the commission of the crime.
It also considered appellant's escape from detention as an aggravating circumstance.

The court a quo properly appreciated treachery against appellant which qualified the crime to murder, as evidenced by the salient parts of Marife's testimony,
thus:
COURT:
Q: Did you see Alvin Villanueva was armed when he approached you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is that arm or what kind of arm is that?
A: Rambo knife, sir.
Q: Can you describe this Rambo knife?
A: The length is long, like this (Witness demonstrating the length more than a foot and bladed knife).

ATTY. SAN JUAN:

Q: So when you saw them running towards your brother, what happened next?
A: He suddenly stabbed him at the back, sir.
Q: What else happened?
A: And he also stabbed at the left armpit.

COURT:
Q:
Demonstrate how? (Witness going down from the witness stand and demonstrate (sic) how the accused stabbed Otoleo Brabante. Witness thrusting the
knife).
A:
Then Alvin Villanueva stabbed Otoleo at the back with his right hand. Then the brother turned to face the assailant and the assailant thrust the victim at the
left armpit.[26]
It was clearly established that appellant attacked the victim suddenly, without warning and from behind, and when the unarmed victim tried to face appellant,
the latter stabbed him again twice on his left armpit, thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare for his defense or enable him to offer the least
resistance to the sudden assault. Treachery exists when the means, method or manner of attack employed by the accused assures no risk to himself from any
defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might take.[27]

We do not, however, agree with the trial court that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime in this case. The qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation must be established with equal certainty and clearness as the criminal act itself. It must be based on external acts which are evident,
not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning. In this case, no sufficient evidence exists to show that the requisites of evident premeditation
were present, to wit: (a) the time when the offender decided to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he held on to his determination to
commit it; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and for his
conscience to overcome the resolution of his will after he decided to hearken to its warnings.[28] This circumstance cannot be appreciated against appellant as
no evidence was adduced to show that the killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. There was no proof that, when appellant
went to the Highlander Store, he already had plans to kill Otoleo. Neither was there any evidence of the time when the intent to commit the crime was
engendered in the mind of appellant. Likewise, the time interval of 30 minutes between the altercation at the Highlander Store and the actual assault on
Otoleo was too brief to have enabled appellant to ponder over the consequences of his intended act.

The trial court also erred in appreciating nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. At the outset, it should be noted that the circumstance of nighttime was
not alleged in the information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. And even if alleged, nighttime cannot properly
be considered in this case because, although the crime was committed late at night, there was no evidence that nighttime facilitated the commission of the
crime, or that it was specially sought by the offender to ensure the commission thereof, or that the offender took advantage of it for impunity.[29] The record
does not show that appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness when he assaulted Otoleo Brabante. The prosecution established no more than the
simple fact that the crime was committed at night.

Moreover, the lower court improperly considered appellant's escape from detention as an aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive[30] and flight is certainly not one of those specified in said article.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. Inasmuch as the crime was not
attended by any aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon appellant must be the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.[31]

The award of P50,000 as civil indemnity should be upheld without need of proof, the same being in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence and the policy of
the Court.[32]

However, we do not find the grant of P600,000 for actual damages to be properly substantiated by evidence. The trial court based its award mainly on the
testimony of the victim's mother and on the submitted list of expenses allegedly incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of the victim. The
award of actual damages may not be made on the basis alone of a handwritten enumeration of the supposed expenses incurred.

The recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo[33] allows the grant of temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 if there is no evidence of burial and funeral
expenses. This is in lieu of actual damages as it would be unfair for the victim's heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that
they cannot produce any receipts. We also ruled there that temperate and actual damages are mutually exclusive in that both may not be awarded at the
same time, hence, no temperate damages may be granted if actual damages have already been granted.

In the present case, only the amount of P13,100 was supported by receipts.[34] Ordinarily, this is all Otoleo Brabante's heirs should be entitled to by way of
actual damages. However, we find this anomalous and unfair because the victim's heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages to the extent of
P13,100 only, would be in a worse situation than, say, those who might have presented no receipts at all but would now be entitled to P25,000 temperate
damages.

We therefore rule that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, as in this case, the award of temperate damages
for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven exceeds P25,000, then temperate
damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.

Likewise, we cannot sustain the grant of P1,000,000 for loss of earnings. No document whatsoever was submitted to support such an award. The
indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven.[35] In this case, Rita Binay-an, mother of the
victim, merely declared that her son was a second lieutenant in the Philippine Marines but gave no statement of her son's monthly salary. Thus, the trial court
simply presumed the amount of Otoleo's earnings. Since the prosecution did not present any evidence of the current income of the victim, the indemnity for
lost earnings was speculative and must be rejected.

Moral damages cannot also be awarded because no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, was presented by the prosecution to support it. As to exemplary
damages, the law is clear that they can be recovered in criminal cases only when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances,[36]
none of which was present in this case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Alvin Villanueva is found guilty of murder and is accordingly
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as temperate
damages. The award for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and
Tinga, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108772. January 14, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLLY OBELLO y PROQUITO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The appreciation of and the weight accorded to the testimony of witnesses are better left to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose findings will not be
disturbed on appeal, unless the defense shows that he has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if properly considered, may affect the
result of the case.

The Case

This principle is used by the Court in resolving this appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, in Crim. Case No. Q-91-
24295 finding Rolly Obello y Proquito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

In an Information[2] dated September 16, 1991, Accused-appellant Rolando Obello y Proquito and John Doe were charged with murder allegedly committed as
follows:[3]

That on or about the 1st day of September 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of DANILO DE
CLARO Y INFANTE, by then and there stabbing him on the chest, thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause
of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Accused John Doe, who was identified during the preliminary investigation as Antonio Go, was at large. Hence, only appellant was arraigned and brought to
trial. At the arraignment[4] on January 6, 1992, appellant, with the assistance of a counsel de oficio,[5] pleaded not guilty.[6] Trial ensued in due course. On
August 26, 1992, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, which disposed as follows:[7]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused Rolly Obello y Proquito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attendant to the commission
of the crime, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law; to pay the heirs
of Danilo de Claro the sum of P50,000.00 plus the amount of P6,000.00 representing funeral expenses without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and, to pay the costs.

In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal was filed directly with this Court.[8]

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Appellees Brief presented the prosecutions version of the facts, as follows:[9]

Sometime in [sic] September 1, 1991 at around 4:00 p.m. Ricardo de la Cruz was playing mahjongg [sic] together with four (4) others in the store of a certain
May at Riverside Street, Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 8, 14). Suddenly, he heard people shouting outside (TSN, de
la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 8, 14). Immediately, Ricardo rushed outside of the store and saw Rolly Obello holding Danilo de Claro by his two (2) arms and a
certain Antonio Go (Tony) who came from the back of Rolly suddenly stabbed Danilo on the abdomen with a fan knife (tsn, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 8, 14-
15). After stabbing Danilo, Tony and Rolly ran away (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, p. 9).

Ricardo chased them, picked up a stone and when he was about to throw the stone, Rolly stopped him and said: Buda (Ricardos nickname), hinde katalo yan
(referring to Tony) (TSN, de la Cruz, February 4, 1992, pp. 9-10, 15). Ricardo desisted from throwing the stone, then Tony and Rolly boarded a jeep and speed
[sic] away (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 10, 15).

As soon as the two fled, Ricardo returned to Danilo to help him. When Ricardo lifted Danilo, he noticed that blood was oozing from Danilos chest, so he
inserted his finger on the stab wound to stop the flow of blood but the same proved to be futile (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, p. 10). Danilo said: Buda, take
care of me, and then pushed Ricardo and he (Danilo) fell to the ground (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, p. 10).

Ricardo together with Danilo de Claro, Jr. carried Danilo and brought him to the hospital. At the hospital, they were informed by the attending physician that
Danilo suffered three (3) stab wounds which caused his death (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 10-11).

However, of the three (3) stab wounds suffered by Danilo, Ricardo only witnessed Tony deliver his last stab blow which hit Danilos abdomen (TSN, de la Cruz,
Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 8, 15).

Version of the Defense

The trial court narrated appellants version of the incident, viz.:[10]

Accused Rolly Obellos defense is denial. He testified that on September 1, 1991 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, he was in the house of Aling Aida at
Riverside St., Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City watching the game of mahjong. The persons playing mahjong were his wife, his brother, Ricardo dela Cruz
and the latters wife. While he was watching mahjong, carrying his daughter, he heard Antonio Go and Danilo de Claro saying words to each other and when he
came out, he saw that both were holding knives. He tried to stop them by using his left hand but when he failed, he went back to the place where mahjong
was played and asked for help. When he returned, he saw that Danilo de Claro was already lying facing the ground. He told Ricardo dela Cruz to look for the
brothers of Danilo de Claro or the family because he did not see who killed him. Ricardo dela Cruz testified against him because he (Ricardo) was mauled by
the brothers of Danilo de Claro in front of him at his place of work in Angono, Rizal. The three (3) brothers of Danilo de Claro, Ricardo dela Cruz and three (3)
policemen went to his place of work because they were looking for Antonio Go. The policemen brought him to Station 5 inside the COA Compound. The
following day he was brought to the Fiscals Office (TSN, pp. 2-7, May 18, 1992). On cross examination, he testified that the other persons who were present at
the place where the mahjong was played were Marlene and Darmo. When he heard the shouts he went out because he heard that Antonio Go was one of the
antagonists. Danilo de Claro was his friend and they used to play basketball. When he went out he was carrying his six (6) months old daughter and he saw that
Antonio Go and Danilo de Claro were both holding knives, so he stayed at the middle and tried to pacify them. He faced Danilo de Claro because he was the
one who was very furious. When he failed to pacify both, he went back to the place where mahjong was being played and when he returned after about ten
(10) minutes, Danilo de Claro was already lying face down.

The Trial Courts Ruling

In convicting appellant, the trial court relied on the testimony of Eyewitness Ricardo dela Cruz which was corroborated by the medical findings showing the
nature and the location of the wounds inflicted on the victim. The trial court also disbelieved appellants contention that he was carrying his six-month old child
at that time and that he merely tried to pacify the victim and Antonio Go. The trial court held that said claim was against ordinary instincts and promptings of
human nature.

The trial court also appreciated conspiracy between appellant and Antonio Go. The trial court ruled that the killing of Danilo de Claro was committed in such a
way that he was not in a position to defend himself[,] for when he was being stabbed by Antonio Go, his hands were held by Rolly Obello which was the reason
why all the wounds were in front of the body. Moreover, Danilo de Claro was unarmed. Without expressly stating so, the trial court in effect held that the
killling was qualified by treachery.

The Issues

In his Brief, appellant imputes to the trial court the following errors:[11]

1. The court a quo erred in holding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

2. The court a quo erred in giving credence to the testimony of Ricardo dela Cruz.

3. The court a quo erred in disregarding the testimony of the accused.

In the main, appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious.

First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses

Prosecution Witness Ricardo dela Cruz testified that appellant held the two arms of Victim Danilo de Claro, while a certain Antonio Tony Go came from
appellants back and fatally stabbed the victim in the abdomen. Ricardo testified: [12]

Q While playing madyong at the place of May, was there anything unusual incident [sic] that happened?
A Yes, there was, sir.
Q What was that?
A People suddenly shouted, sir.
Q What did you do upon hearing the shouts, if you did anything?
A I rush[ed] out, sir.
Q While you were outside, what did you see, if any?
A Rolly was holding Danilo de Claro by his two (2) arms and I saw Tony Go went at [sic] the back of Rolly then suddenly stabbed Danilo de Claro on the
abdomen.
Q Mr. Witness, how far were you standing from the place of the stabbing incident?
A At about two (2) arms feet [sic], sir.
Q What kind of instrument was use [sic] by Tony Go in stabbing Danilo de Claro?
A 29 inches pan [sic] knife, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q When you were in the hospital, what happened, if any?

A The Doctor informed us that he have [sic] three (3) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, you testified a while ago that you saw Tony Go stab Danilo de Claro in the chest and then you said now that the Doctor told you that Danilo de
Claro sustained three (3) stabbed wounds, why did you say that he has only one (1) stab wound?
A I only say one (1), sir. I did not see the other stabbed [sic].
Q Mr. Witness, do you know what is the reason why accused Tony Go and Rolly stab Danilo de Claro.

xxxxxxxxx

ATTY. SISON
Q Mr. Witness, you said that you were playing madyong at the place of May, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q This place of May a residential one or is it a store?
A A store, sir.
Q And you were inside the place of May?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many people were there?
A Four (4), sir.
Q You said that you were inside at the residence of May, upon hearing the shouts of the people outside how far were you from the door, from the residence of
May?
A I was leaning at the door, sir.
Q Were you standing?
A I was standing, sir.
Q How long a time did you from the place where you was leaning, up to the time you went outside?
A One (1) minute, sir.
Q Upon going out from the residence of May, what did you notice?
A When I went out of the door of May, I saw already the incident, sir.
Q Were there no people outside?
A Plenty but no one would like to testify, sir.
Q What you saw was the incident when Tony Go, whent [sic] at the back of Danny and stab him?

FISCAL LEE
Misleading, Your Honor, he came from the back of Rolly.

COURT:
He came from the back of Rolly not Danny, while Rolly was holding Danny.

ATTY. SISON
Q So do I get it from you Mr. Witness, that what you saw was Tony Go came from the back of Rolly and stab Danny at the stomach?
A Yes sir, on the left side.
Q And that you did not see the incident prior to this?
A What I saw was the last stabbed before they run, sir.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of dela Cruz and in disregarding his own testimony.[13] We disagree. It is
doctrinal that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of a witness and, thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth. Such assessment is generally binding on this Court,
except when the same has been reached arbitrarily or when the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could have affected the result of the case.[14] We have examined the records of this case and the arguments raised by appellant,
but we find no reason to apply these exceptions.

Between a positive and categorical testimony on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. Indeed, the testimony of a single
witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even of murder. Testimonies are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, a finding of
guilt may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness when the trial court finds such testimony positive and credible.[15]

Appellant also alleges inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on the following matters: (1) the date when dela Cruz executed his affidavit
and (2) the identities of the persons who brought the victim to the hospital.

Appellant contends that the testimony of Ricardo de la Cruz was merely an afterthought, a result of the manipulation of either the police or the heirs of the
deceased.[16] While Ricardo testified that he executed an affidavit on September 1, 1991 at the police station, said affidavit was in fact dated September 15,
1991, as affirmed by the investigating officer, Pat. Sotero Basilio, who investigated him on that day. Within a period of fourteen days from September 1, 1991
to September 14, 1991, Ricardo could have made a statement and identified appellant as a conspirator. Hence, appellant surmises that the statement was
executed only on September 15, 1991, when it became apparent that the police could not apprehend Antonio Go.

Appellant also contends that the prosecution account is inconsistent in respect to the persons who brought the victim to the hospital. In his affidavit dated
September 15, 1991, Nestor Cruz averred that he did so, but he failed to mention that he had companion(s). Ricardo dela Cruz testified, however, that Danilo
de Claro, Jr., the victims brother, accompanied him in bringing the victim to the hospital. Witness Lourdes Faigane testified also that the victims brother
brought the victim to the hospital, but she did not mention Ricardo de la Cruz.[17]

Appellants contentions do not persuade. The alleged discrepancies in dela Cruz testimony may be attributed to his inability to recall correctly the date of his
interview with the police and of the execution of his sworn statement. It is entirely possible that the police talked to Ricardo on September 1, 1991, but that he
executed his sworn statement on September 15, 1991. This slight error is not unlikely considering that Witness dela Cruz is unlettered, as admitted by
appellant.[18]

Likewise, the alleged inconsistencies regarding the identity of the person or persons who brought the deceased to the hospital do not discredit the account of
the prosecution. Lourdes Faiganes[19] testimony that the victim was brought to the hospital by his brother is not necessarily inconsistent with Ricardos
testimony that he and the brother did so. The testimony of Faigane did not purport to be a complete enumeration of the persons who brought her brother to
the hospital. Hence, while she averred that the victims brother brought the victim to the hospital, this does not necessarily mean that he alone did so. Besides,
Lourdes testimony was not based on her own personal knowledge since she was not physically present at that time. Furthermore, Nestor Cruzs affidavit
stating that he and the victims brother brought the victim to the hospital is worthless as evidence, because Nestor did not testify in open court. His affidavit is
therefore hearsay and has no probative value. It cannot prevail over the clear, direct and straightforward testimony of dela Cruz that he and Danilo de Claro,
Jr. brought the victim to the hospital.

In any event, the alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and not to the basic elements of the crime. They do not cast doubt on the identification of
appellant as the assailant. Hence, they cannot impair the credibility of Witness dela Cruz. Such minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and
candor,[20] for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[21]

Second Issue: Conspiracy

Appellant denies that he conspired with Antonio Go in the killing of Danilo de Claro, citing the following:

1. Although he was carrying a child, he tried to pacify Antonio Go and Danilo de Claro. When they did not heed him, he left his child with his wife and sought
the assistance of others.

2. While he was seeking the assistance of others, Antoni[o] Go was able to deliver three stabs or thrust[s] which hit Danilo de Claro, and when he went out he
saw the latter already fallen to the ground.

3. In spite of the three (3) stab wounds sustained by Danilo, Ricardo dela Cruz only saw Antonio Go stab Danilo de Claro once.

4. Ricardo testified that Antonio Go came from behind or from the back of accused Rolly Obello, before he stabbed the deceased. If such position was correct,
appellant may not have been aware, much more conspire with Antonio Go, when the latter made the last thrust because appellant was not facing Antonio Go.

5. The trial court failed to consider the possibility that appellant could have been trying to help Danilo de Claro stand after being stabbed twice, and when he
saw Antonio Go stab the deceased the last time, he was caught [by] surprise and suddenly ran away.[22]

The above circumstances do not disprove conspiracy. Based on the facts proven by the prosecution, appellant is liable for the crime as a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, paragraph (3) of the Revised Penal Code.

The first two circumstances were sufficiently refuted by the trial court, which held that it was inconceivable for a father carrying a six-month old child to risk
his childs life only to placate two armed and warring friends. As a father who is expected to take ordinary care of his concerns,[23] appellant would not risk the
life of his child or his own for said reason.

Furthermore, the fact that appellant held the deceased when the latter was assaulted by Antonio Go constitutes direct participation in the commission of the
crime.[24] It is true that there is no evidence on record of a previous agreement between the accused to kill Victim Danilo de Claro, and that no witness
testified to having seen or heard the accused conspire. However, it is a well-settled rule that conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of a prior
agreement. It is sufficient that the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, that they had the same purpose or common design,
and that they were united in its execution.[25] In this case, after appellant held the two arms of the victim, Tony Go went behind appellant and stabbed the
victim. Appellants act effectively rendered the victim incapable of defending himself against his assailant. Such act amounted to an indispensable cooperation
without which the crime would not have been accomplished. Thus, appellant is not merely a conspirator but a principal by indispensable cooperation.[26] As
has been ruled in People vs. Montealegre:[27]
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert,
with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victims hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and
defending himself. While it is true that the accused-appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having
prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of
the Revised Penal Code.

As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: (1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

Appellants conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime, as testified to by Witness dela Cruz, unquestionably shows that appellant and Tony
Go were one in their criminal purpose and design to kill Danilo. Dela Cruz testified that appellant held both arms of Danilo before and until Tony Go inflicted
the fatal blow. After Tony Go stabbed Danilo for the third and last time, appellant immediately released the victim. The two malefactors then ran away and
boarded a jeep.[28]

Because conspiracy has been established, it is unnecessary to pinpoint who among the accused inflicted the fatal blow. All the conspirators are liable as
principals regardless of the extent and the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.[29]

Lastly, appellant also contends that the trial court failed to consider the possibility that he could have been trying to help Danilo de Claro stand after being
stabbed twice, and when he saw Antonio Go stab the deceased the last time, he was caught [by] surprise and suddenly ran away. This defense is speculative
and is not supported by the testimony of appellant. He merely testified that he was inside Mays store playing mahjong when he heard a commotion; that he
went out and saw Tony Go and Danilo de Claro about to fight; and that he tried in vain to pacify the two.[30] Nothing in his testimony supports his present
theory that he held the arms of Danilo to help the latter stand up and not to hinder any defense which Danilo might put up. Besides, he fails to explain why he
fled with the assailant instead of helping the victim after the stabbing incident. Verily, his action validates the dictum that flight is the product of guilt.
Appellants unexplained flight is a clear indicium of his participation and complicity in the slaying of Danilo.[31]

Damages

The trial court ordered the payment of indemnity of fifty thousand pesos and reimbursement of six thousand pesos for funeral expenses. We sustain the
award of indemnity, but we delete the reimbursement for funeral expenses for lack of factual support. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 is
automatically granted to the heirs of the victim without need of any evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime.[32] The amount of funeral
expenses, however, must be proven by competent evidence, e.g. receipts. It cannot rest on the bare allegation of the heirs of the offended party, as in this
case.[33]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of funeral expenses is hereby DELETED. Costs against
appellant.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113470. March 26, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO, MANUEL, VERGEL Y PASCUAL, and six (6) JOHN DOEs, accused. DANILO
CORBES Y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL Y PASCUAL, accused-appellants.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL appeal from the decision dated 27 December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br.
124, finding them guilty as principals by conspiracy of the crime of robbery with homicide under par. 1, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua plus damages.[1]

The antecedents: At about nine o'clock in the morning of 17 November 1990 six (6) armed men entered the premises of the Caloocan Consortium Corporation
at No. 305 Cordero Street, Caloocan City, and took away from the establishment P169,000.00 in cash and P4,500.00 from Mateo Figuracion, an employee
therein. They also took with them the .38 calibre revolver of security guard Timoteo Palicpic whom they shot to death. The malefactors then ran towards 8th
Avenue where Daniel Corbes and Manuel Vergel had parked their getaway vehicle, a blue passenger jeep. They then sped away.

That same day, Manuel Vergel went to the Caloocan Police Station and reported the incident. He claimed that the robbers used his passenger jeep in fleeing
from the Caloocan Consortium Corporation, but he denied any previous knowledge of the robbery or of any intentional participation therein. However, upon
further interrogation by P/Cpl Daniel G. Del Rosario, Supervisor of the Dayshift Investigation Section, Caloocan City Investigation Division, Vergel retracted his
earlier statements and pointed to Danilo Corbes who together with the other accused allegedly planned the robbery and convinced him to drive for them.[2]
When apprehended and brought to the police station, Corbes in turn pointed to a certain "Benny" as the brains behind the crime.[3]

Corbes, Vergel and six (6) John Does (still at large) were charged as principals by conspiracy. On the witness stand Vergel however diverged from his earlier
story and insisted that the jeep he was driving was merely hired by Corbes and Benny on the pretext of hauling scrap metal from Caloocan City. As soon as he
parked his jeep along 8th Avenue, Benny alighted from the jeep leaving him with Corbes. Vergel maintained that at that time he knew nothing of the robbery
being perpetrated at the Caloocan Consortium Corporation and that he became aware of it only when Benny came back from the direction of Cordero Street
about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes later with several armed men who boarded the jeep and threatened him with bodily harm if he would not start its
engine and drive. So he did as they ordered. After the men alighted at 9th Avenue, he proceeded to the house of Avelino Vergel, the owner of the jeep, and
together they went to the Caloocan City Police Station to report the matter.

Daniel Corbes likewise professed innocence. Although he admitted having approached Vergel, he contended that he did so only to accommodate Benny who
had sought his help in looking for a jeep for hire. Being the Vice-President of DAMATA (Damayan ng Maralitang Tahanan), a neighborhood association in Letre,
Malabon, he accompanied Benny to Sangandaan and there waited for Vergel who agreed to have the jeep he was driving hired for a fee of P250.00. Then
together with Vergel and Benny he left for Caloocan City allegedly upon Vergel's invitation.

The trial court rejected the pretensions of Corbes and Vergel; instead, it convicted the two (2) accused on the basis of the eyewitness account of Elena San Jose
whose testimony established their participation in the robbery as lookout and driver, respectively.

Specifically, Elena San Jose testified that while she was rocking her baby to sleep in the veranda of her house at 8th Avenue she noticed a blue-colored jeep
parked about three (3) meters away. Vergel was at the driver's seat. She saw Vergel alight several times from the jeep ostensibly to inspect its engine and
other parts as if something was wrong with them, while Vergel's companion whom she identified as Corbes walked to and fro along 8th Avenue up to the
corner of Cordero Street. Half an hour later Elena saw four (4) men in a jolly mood approaching and shouting "Yahoo! Yahoo!" from the direction of Cordero
Street. They immediately boarded the jeep as Vergel hurried them up: "Dalian n'yo, baka tayo mahuli!" The vehicle then drove away in the direction of F.
Roxas Street.[4]

The court a quo accorded evidentiary weight to the testimony of Dante Despida, owner of the Gulf-Pacific Security Agency, Inc., who testified that on 19
November 1990 Vergel and Corbes admitted to him inside the Caloocan Police Station that they participated in the robbery holdup as driver of the getaway
vehicle and as lookout, respectively. Thus, Vergel and Corbes were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay jointly and
severally, (a) the amount of cash stolen, (b) the value of the .38 cal. revolver taken, and (c) P50,000.00 as consequential damages to the heirs of Timoteo
Palicpic.

Appellants contend in this appeal that conspiracy was not sufficiently proved since it cannot be inferred solely from their mere presence at the crime scene. In
additon, Vergel disparages the testimony of Elena San Jose as being rehearsed and replete with inconsistencies, while that of Dante Despida relative to the oral
confessions allegedly made to him inside the Caloocan Police Station as unworthy of belief considering that he had no business inside the detention cell since
he was not even a police investigator, and considering further that he was the uncle[5] of security guard Timoteo Palicpic who was gunned down during the
robbery.

We sustain the claim of appellants that the evidence failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law to establish conspiracy which jurisprudence dictates
must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself.[6] No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.[7]

In the instant case, no conclusive proof was presented that appellant Manuel Vergel conspired with the other accused to commit robbery. What is indubitable
is that he was approached by Corbes who was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle and was persuaded to act as driver in fetching the group from the venue of
the robbery. Vergel's feigned ignorance of any prior knowledge of the robbery is negated by his remark, "Dalian n'yo, baka tayo mahuli!" made to the robbers
as they were boarding the jeep. Such utterance, which indicates knowledge of the criminal design of the malefactors, coupled with his act of driving for the
robbers, makes appellant Vergel guilty as an accomplice, i.e., one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally
therewith by an act which even if not rendered the crime would be committed just the same.[8] In one case,[9] we held that the driver of the taxicab, knowing
that his co-accused were going to commit robbery per mitted them to use his taxicab in going to the place where the robbery was committed, is an
accomplice.

As regards appellant Danilo Corbes, there is similarly a lack of adequate evidence of conspiracy. The evidence merely points out that Corbes looked for a jeep
to be used as getaway vehicle of the robbers and, to that end, he intentionally sought out and convinced Manuel Vergel to act as driver. Moreover, he went
with Vergel and Benny to Caloocan City where the robbery was staged. We have also held that the liability of one whose participation was limited to looking
for a banca and providing one to a gang of bank robbers,[10] or one who went with the actual perpetrators of a crime without conspiring with them, is only
that of an accomplice.[11] Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as principal
or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of liability, that of a mere accomplice.[12] Besides, in several cases wherein the Court
confirmed the existence of conspiracy, some accused were held liable as mere accomplices only because their role in the commission of the crime was not
indispensable; in other words, minor.[13] Courts sometimes draw the inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from concerted acts in the
consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered. To reiterate, in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to
the milder form of responsibility.[14]

Furthermore, we reduce appellants' liability to the crime of robbery only. It was not established by the evidence that the other accused, who are at large, had
agreed to kill if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. On the contrary, the records show that one of the robbers berated the gunman for having
shot the security guard.[15] Therefore, what appellants may be said to have joined was merely the criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices.
Their complicity must accordingly be limited to the robbery, not to the killing of Timoteo Palicpic. Waiting only at the parked jeep at 8th Avenue could not have
given them the opportunity to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery.[16] The Court
had occasion to rule that the jeep driver, who was unaware of the killing perpetrated inside the building as he stayed always near his jeep, could not be
deemed a co-conspirator in the killing of the guards, as the killing was not part of the original plan but arose only during the exigency of the moment.[17]

The penalty for robbery under par. 5, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period
the duration of which is four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. As the robbery was committed by a band under Art. 295 the penalty
should be imposed in its maximum period. Since accused-appellants are found guilty only as accomplices to the robbery in band, the imposable penalty shall
be one degree lower which is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if only for the purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed, the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its medium period or four (4) years two (2) months and
one (1) day of destierro to four (4) months of arresto mayor medium, while the maximum shall be taken from the maximum of the imposable penalty as herein
before stated or four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium. Both accused-appellants having already been detained since 20 November
1990,[18] or more than the maximum of their indeterminate penalty, they should now be immediately released from custody pursuant to B. P. Blg. 85.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL are declared GUILTY
merely as ACCOMPLICES to the crime of robbery and sentenced accordingly to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor medium as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as maximum.

Accused-appellants Danilo Corbes y Olazo and Manuel Vergel y Pascual having already been detained for more than the maximum of their indeterminate
penalty, their immediate release from custody is likewise ordered unless they are held for another lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124809. December 19, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SAUL and ELMER AVENUE, accused-appellants.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] dated November 29, 1995, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15294, affirming the decision[2] dated July 13,
1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 37, in Criminal Cases Nos. 39360 and 39361, finding both appellants Roberto Saul and Elmer Avenue
guilty of the crimes of homicide and frustrated homicide.

The informations filed against the appellants read:

Criminal Case No. 39360

That on or about the 5th day of October 1992, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused Roberto Saul, armed with a
bladed instrument provided by his co-accused Elmer Avenue, conspiring and confederating between themselves, working together and helping one another,
did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and criminally stab John Serojo with the said bladed instrument with which the accused Roberto Saul was wielding
at the time, thereby causing upon the latter stab wound in the abdomen, which resulted in his death few moments thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Criminal Case No. 39361

That on or about the 5th day of October 1992, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused Roberto Saul, armed with a
bladed instrument provided by his co-accused Elmer Avenue, conspiring and confederating between themselves, working together and helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally stab Rodrigo Serojo with the said bladed instrument with which the accused Roberto Saul was wielding at
the time, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wound near the abdomen; thus the accused had performed all the acts of execution which could have
produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of the causes independent of the will of the said
accused, that is by the timely intervention of the third person and medical attention afforded to the said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty to both crimes charged. Trial ensued.

The facts according to the prosecution, on one hand, are as follows:

On the evening of October 5, 1992, in Brgy. Sinikway, Iloilo City, Sipil Delotavo hosted a drinking spree at his house to celebrate his birthday. Among the guests
were the appellants Roberto and Elmer, and the brothers Rodrigo and John Serojo. At about 10:00 oclock while the celebration was in full swing, Rodrigo took
a nap on a long bench. He dozed off immediately. In jest, Roberto, alias Ganzon, slapped him on the face. Rodrigo awakened and instinctively threw an empty
whiskey bottle at Roberto. Fortunately, the bottle did not hit the latter as it was parried by one of their companions. Instead, it hit a boy named Danny.
Obviously irked, Roberto and Elmer left the house in a huff. Moments later, Rodrigo told his younger brother John that they were also going home.
Accompanied by Sidney Sindin, one of the guests, the brothers left. Just outside the gate, the trio saw Roberto and Elmer standing a few meters away. As they
approached the pair, Sidney saw Elmer hand a knife to Roberto, who in turn suddenly stabbed John. John fell and pleaded with Sidney to take him to the
hospital. While Sidney was bent over John, he looked at the direction where Rodrigo was and saw that Roberto was likewise stabbing Rodrigo. Sidney hurriedly
ran to the house of the Serojos and informed the mother about the incident. Thereafter, he got a pedicab and drove back to the scene. He noticed that the
Serojo brothers were no longer there. A sister of the Serojos asked him to look for Rodrigo. He found the latter lying wounded on the pavement at the plaza.
He brought him to the hospital. On their way, they caught up with the jeep where John was, and together, the brothers were taken to St. Pauls Hospital in
Iloilo City. John was pronounced dead on arrival while Rodrigo survived.

On the other hand, the defense presented the following version of the incident.

At around 11:00 P.M., October 5, 1992, during a drinking spree, Sipil Delotavo, the celebrant, played a joke on Rodrigo Serojo, who was asleep on a wooden
bench near the table where the others were gathered. Sipil threw a fishhead at Rodrigos face. The latter was awakened and simply mumbled words of
warning, then went back to sleep. Sipil threw another fishhead at Rodrigos face. Rodrigo retaliated and threw an empty whiskey bottle at Roberto, hitting and
wounding the latter on the head. Roberto covered his bleeding wound with his left hand but Rodrigos brother, John, suddenly ran towards him and started
punching him in the stomach. Helpless, all Roberto could do was lean on the wall. At this point, Elmer intervened and separated the two. Elmer told Roberto to
run, which the latter did. However, John chased Roberto. Sensing trouble, Elmer followed the two and upon reaching the gate of the compound, he saw John
delivering fist blows at Roberto. He also noticed a certain Nestor Eufan standing nearby, looking at the hapless Roberto. Elmer then placed himself between
John and Roberto and tried to stop John. John just brushed him aside and at that moment, he saw Rodrigo break an empty long-neck whiskey bottle. He
handed Roberto a knife he claimed he picked from the table in Sipils house. Roberto took the knife and tried to run, but John, armed with a knife drawn from
his hip, chased Roberto. Rodrigo with the broken bottle in hand, also ran after John and Roberto. At this point, Elmer and Nestor left the scene in haste.

A few meters away, John caught up with Roberto, grabbed him by the jacket and lunged at the latter with a knife. Roberto parried the knife with his hand,
resulting to a wound between the ring and the middle fingers of his left hand. Cornered, Roberto stabbed John in the stomach. Roberto then saw Rodrigo
about to strike him with the broken whiskey bottle, so he also stabbed Rodrigo. Thereafter, he ran home.

The following morning, at about 9:00 oclock, Roberto had his wound treated and later in the afternoon, he surrendered to the police.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment [5] as follows:

WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, this Court finds the accused ROBERTO SAUL and ELMER AVENUE, in Criminal Case No. 39360 GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE, and are hereby both sentenced to an Indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as
Minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum;

In Criminal Case No. 39361, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and are hereby both sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional as Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as
Maximum.

Both accused are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, John Serojo, the amount of P50,000.00; actual damages for the victim Rodrigo Serojo in the
amount of P20,000.00, and to pay the costs.[6]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision, with the sole modification such that the penalty imposed in Crim. Case No. 39360 is EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as Minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as Maximum.[7]

Appellants come to this Court seeking reversal or modification of the RTC and CA decisions. They allege that the Court of Appeals erred,

A. IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT WAS RODRIGO SEROJO AND JOHN SEROJO WHO WERE THE UNLAWFUL AGGRESSORS, CONSIDERING THAT, THEY WERE THE ONES
EVEN CHASING RODRIGO SAUL;

B. IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED, ROBERTO SAUL, ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN HE STABBED RODRIGO SEROJO AND JOHN SEROJO;

C. IN HOLDING THE OTHER ACCUSED ELMER AVENUE, LIABLE AS PRINCIPAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF CONSPIRACY; and

D. IN NOT CREDITING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON THE PART OF ROBERTO SAUL, WHEN HE SURRENDERED TO THE
POLICE AUTHORITIES.

Three issues require resolution by this Court: (1) whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense is present; (2) whether or not there was conspiracy
between the appellants; and (3) Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of appellant Roberto Saul.

Considering that accounts of the events leading to the alleged crimes are contradictory, the resolution of the first issue essentially hinges on a review of the
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts.

Appellants claim that the victims were the unlawful aggressors in this case. They say that Rodrigo Serojo vented his anger at appellant Roberto Saul, despite
the fact that it was not Roberto who played the prank at Rodrigo. They add that although John Serojo saw that it was Sipil Delotavo who threw the fishhead at
his brother, still John attacked Roberto with his fists. Appellants contend that the brothers Serojo chased appellant Roberto, with the obvious intention of
hurting him further, forcing Roberto to act in self-defense by stabbing the Serojos.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the unlawful aggressor in this case was appellant Roberto Saul, who purposely waited
for the Serojo brothers to come out to inflict harm upon them because appellants felt aggrieved at the bottle-throwing incident at the party. The OSG
contends that by the time the Serojo brothers left the party, they had no intention of inflicting any harm on appellants and in fact did not expect to see the
latter waiting by the gate, as Roberto had already left ahead of them.

After a careful examination of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution as well as those of the defense, we find appellants version less than
convincing. According to the defense, it was Sipil Delotavo who played a prank on Rodrigo, and Rodrigo saw him do it. If so, then Rodrigo had no reason to be
angry with Roberto. The defense also claim that Rodrigos brother, John witnessed all that had transpired and knew Roberto had no hand in disturbing his
brothers sleep. If so, why did John punch Roberto? According to the defense, Roberto did not fight back and was even against the wall.[8] Again, if true, why
did John act the way he did, to the extent of hitting Roberto? Appellants action belie the defenses version of events. It is not logical for the two brothers to be
angry with the appellants for no apparent reason. Testimonies for appellants defense lack the ring of truth. Evidence should first be believable and logical
before it could be accorded any weight.[9]

For a plea of self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[10]

Unlawful aggression is the essential and primary element of self-defense. Its presence is a condition sine qua non if it is to be successfully invoked. It must be
positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the defendants life in danger and forced him to inflict more or less
reasonable means to resist the said attack.[11]

In this case, appellants Roberto Saul and Elmer Avenue waited for the brothers Serojo outside of the gate of Sipil Delotavos house. Any hostility shown by
Rodrigo against Roberto inside the house had already ceased by then. There was no more aggression on Rodrigos part, to speak of. By that time also, Roberto
was no longer in any danger. Granting that only two minutes[12] have elapsed since the alleged bottle throwing incident within that interval of time, when the
appellants stepped out already, the alleged aggression by the victims must have already ceased. There is no unlawful aggression when the peril to ones life,
limb or right is neither actual nor imminent.[13] Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.[14] Moreover, if the
person attacked allowed some time to lapse after he suffered the injury, such would not constitute self-defense but an act of revenge.[15]

The second requisite of self-defense presupposes the existence of unlawful aggression which is either imminent or actual,[16] and depends upon the nature
and extent of the aggression.[17] The means employed by the person making a defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression. As observed by the trial court, the use of a knife against an unarmed attacker is not reasonable nor proper.[18] More so in this case where it has
been established that in fact, no unlawful aggression came from the victims. Thus, we are lead to conclude that having initiated the attack on the victims,
appellants could not convincingly claim they were sufficiently provoked by the victims. In fact, there was no provocation at all surrounding the actual knife
attack by appellants against the Serojos.

Well-entrenched is the rule that one who invokes self-defense admits authorship of the killing, thus the burden shifts to that person to establish the justifying
circumstance with clear and convincing evidence.[19] One who pleads it must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution, for even if the latters evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after he has admitted the killing.[20] Here appellants failed to discharge said
burden. They have not shown clearly and convincingly that they acted in self-defense when they stabbed their victims.

Coming now to the issue of conspiracy, appellant Elmer Avenue denies that he and Roberto Saul conspired to kill the Serojo brothers. Elmer insists he
instinctively handed the knife to Roberto so the latter could defend himself. If at all, there was an offense committed, he avers that his participation was only
as an accomplice.

For conspiracy to exist, the participants must agree to the commission of the felony and decide to commit it, which agreement may be deduced from the
mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts that point to joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
intent.[21] The conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself.[22]

In the cases where this Court held that persons who provided the weapon used in the commission of the crime are co-conspirators,[23] the other
contemporaneous acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime showed that the accused acted in unison for a common purpose.
The circumstances in the present case, in our view, showed no such commonality of purpose.

Although the knife used by Roberto belonged to Elmer, his handing the knife to Roberto was not by itself an act of conspiracy. Nothing in the records shows
that the two had a preconceived plan to commit the crime.[24] It will be recalled that here the fray started because of a practical joke pulled on one of the
victims, Rodrigo Serojo. There is no proof on record that appellant Elmer Avenue was motivated by the criminal design similarly entertained by Roberto Saul at
the same time. In a string of cases,[25] we said that the milder form of responsibility should be attributed to the appellants in case of doubt. Thus, we are
constrained to agree with appellant Elmer Avenues assertion that his participation was only that of an accomplice in the offenses committed.
Did appellant Roberto Saul voluntarily surrender such that it may mitigate his liability? For voluntary surrender to mitigate the offense, the following elements
must be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be
voluntary.[26] A surrender, to be voluntary must be spontaneous, i.e. there must be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses in capturing him.[27] We are unable to agree with the CAs finding that
Robertos surrender was not voluntary simply because he surrendered only in the afternoon of the day following the crime and only after he presented himself
to the NBI that same morning, implying that his surrender was a mere afterthought.[28] For voluntary surrender to mitigate an offense, it is not required that
the accused surrender at the first opportunity. For as long the aforementioned requisites are met, voluntary surrender can be appreciated. Roberto Saul
presented himself to the NBI in the morning and in the afternoon of that same day, gave himself up. He was not apprehended nor forced to surrender. In our
view, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should count in his favor.

With regard to the civil aspects of the criminal cases, modifications are in order. The trial court awarded P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of John
Serojo, but only P20,000 as actual damages for the victim Rodrigo Serojo.[29] The amount of P50,000 awarded to the heirs of John Serojo as civil indemnity is
proper, without need of proof other than the fact of victims death.[30] However, the amount of P48,512.66 representing medical and funeral expenses on the
victim John Serojo, was duly admitted by the defense in the course of the trial and should be awarded as actual damages.[31] Likewise, the amount of P20,000
awarded by the trial court as actual damages for the victim Rodrigo Serojo should be increased to P34,448.40 representing his medical expenses.[32]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

In Criminal Case No. 39360, appellant ROBERTO SAUL is found GUILTY as principal in the crime of homicide for the wrongful death of John Serojo as defined
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. With the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

Appellant ELMER AVENUE is GUILTY as an accomplice in the crime of homicide and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

Appellants are also ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim John Serojo the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P48,512.66 as actual
damages.

In Criminal Case No. 39361, appellant ROBERTO SAUL is found GUILTY as principal of the crime of frustrated homicide on the life of Rodrigo Serojo with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from five (5) years of Prision Correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as maximum.

Appellant ELMER AVENUE is found GUILTY as an accomplice in the crime of frustrated homicide and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as
maximum.

Appellants are also ordered to pay jointly and severally Rodrigo Serojo the amount of P34,448.40 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133489 & 143970. January 15, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONALD a.k.a ROLAND GARCIA y FLORES,* RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES, ROTCHEL LARIBA y DEMICILLO,
and GERRY B. VALLER, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 accused-appellants Ronald a.k.a Roland Garcia y Flores, Rodante Rogel y Rosales, Rotchel Lariba y Demicillo and Gerry B. Valler,
along with a certain Jimmy Muit, were charged with and convicted of kidnapping for ransom and were sentenced each to death, except aforementioned Jimmy
Muit who has remained at large, for obvious reasons, and to indemnify their victim Romualdo Tioleco P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.[1]

In a related case, Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050, which was decided jointly with Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049, accused-appellants Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel
were also found guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and each sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00 plus the costs.[2] No notice of appeal[3] was filed in this criminal case; nonetheless, for reasons herein below stated, we take cognizance of the
case.

Atty. Romualdo Tioleco was jogging alone at Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, at about 5:30 oclock in the morning of 5 October 1996.[4] He was
heading towards 4th Avenue when he noticed a blue car parked at the corner of this street.[5] As he was about to cross 4th Avenue, the car lurched towards
him and stopped.[6] Two (2) men quickly alighted from the car.[7] One of them pointed a gun at Atty. Tioleco while the other hit his back and pushed him into
the back seat of the car.[8] Once inside, he saw two (2) other men, one on the drivers seat and the other on the back seat directly behind the driver.[9] He
found out later the identities of the driver whom he undoubtedly recognized during the abduction to be accused-appellant Gerry Valler, and of the other
person on the passenger seat behind Valler as accused-appellant Roland Ronald Garcia.[10] He described the man who disembarked from the car and who
pushed him inside to be 55 or 56 in height, medium built, and the other, who threatened him with a gun, at 54 or 55 in height, dark complexioned and medium
built although heftier than the other.[11] These two (2) persons have since the commission of the crime have remained at large.

While inside the car Atty. Tioleco was made to crouch on the leg room.[12] As it sped towards a destination then unknown to the victim, the men on board
feigned to be military men and pestered him with the accusation of being a drug pusher and the threat of detention at Camp Crame.[13] As they were
psyching him down, they started putting blindfold on [him] and packaging tape on [his]face and handcuffed [him] on the back of [his] body.[14] His eyeglasses
were taken off when they were putting blindfold on [him] x x x.[15] Then they divested him of his other personal belongings, e.g., his keys, wristwatch, etc.[16]

The car cruised for thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes.[17] When it finally stopped, Atty. Tioleco was told to alight, led to a house and then into a room.[18]
He remained blindfolded and handcuffed throughout his ordeal and made to lie down on a wooden bed.[19] During his captivity, one of the kidnappers
approached him and told him that he would be released for a ransom of P2 million[20] although the victim bargained for an amount between P50,000.00 and
P100,000.00 which according to him was all he could afford. While still under detention, one of his abductors told him that they had mistaken him for a
Chinese national and promised his release without ransom.[21] But he was just being taken for a ride since the kidnappers had already begun contacting his
sister Floriana Tioleco.

Floriana was at her office when her mother called up about her brothers kidnapping.[22] Floriana hurried home to receive a phone call from a person who
introduced himself as Larry Villanueva demanding P3 million for Atty. Tiolecos ransom.[23] Several other calls to Floriana were made during the day and in one
of those calls the ransom was reduced to P2 million.[24] Around 7:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, 5 October 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Ronaldo Mendoza of
the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) arrived at Florianas house to monitor her brothers kidnapping upon the request of her friends.[25] Floriana
received the following day about eight (8) phone calls from the kidnappers still demanding P2 million for her brothers safe release.[26]

By the end of the day on 7 October 1996 Floriana was able to raise only P71,000.00,[27] which she relayed to the kidnappers when they called her up.[28]
They finally agreed to set her brother free upon payment of this amount, which was short of the original demand.[29] The pay-off was scheduled that same
day at around 8:00 oclock in the evening at Timog Avenue corner Scout Tuazon in Quezon City near the Lighthaus and Burger Machine.[30] Upon instruction of
P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, Floriana together with only two (2) female friends proceeded to this meeting place.[31] They reached there at 8:40 oclock in the evening
and waited for the kidnappers until about 10:30 or 11:00 o clock that evening.[32]

Meanwhile, P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza relayed the information about the pay-off and other relevant facts to P/Chief Insp. Gilberto Cruz at the PACC
headquarters.[33] With the information from P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, P/Chief Insp. Cruz, together with P/Chief Insps. Winnie Quidato and Paul Tucay with P/Sr.
Insp. Nilo Pagtalunan, immediately went to Timog Avenue corner scout Tuazon near the Lighthaus and Burger Machine in Quezon City.[34] They surveyed this
site and saw a blue Toyota Corona with three (3) persons on board suspiciously stopping about five (5) meters from Floriana and her friends and remaining
there for almost two (2) hours.[35]

Floriana and her friends left the pay-off site after waiting for two (2) hours more or less;[36] so did the blue Toyota Corona almost simultaneously.[37] No
payment of ransom took place.[38]3P/Chief Insp. Cruz then ordered P/Chief Insps. Quidato and Tucay and their subordinates to tail this car which they did all
the way to the De Vega Compound at Dahlia Street in Fairview, Quezon City.[39] This compound consisted of one bungalow house and was enclosed by a
concrete wall and a steel gate for ingress and egress.[40] They posted themselves thirty (30) to forty (40) meters from the compound to reconnoiter the
place.[41] Meanwhile, the kidnappers explained in a phone call to Floriana that they had aborted the pay-off on account of their belief that her two (2)
companions at the meeting place were police officers.[42] But she assured them that her escorts were just her friends.[43]

At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of 8 October 1996 Floriana received a call from the kidnappers at her house[44] who wanted to set another schedule
for the payment of the ransom money an hour later or at 2:00 oclock.[45] This time the rendezvous would be in front of McDonalds fastfood at Magsaysay
Boulevard in Sta. Mesa, Manila.[46] She was told by the kidnappers that a man would go near her and whisper Romy to whom she would then hand over the
ransom money. Floriana agreed to the proposal. With her two (2) friends, she rushed to the place and brought with her the P71,000.00.[47] About this time,
the same blue Toyota Corona seen at the first pay-off point left the De Vega Compound in Fairview.[48] A team of PACC operatives under P/Chief Insp. Cruz
again stationed themselves in the vicinity of McDonalds.[49]

Floriana arrived at the McDonalds restaurant and waited for a few minutes.[50] Not long after, the blue Toyota Corona was spotted patrolling the area.[51]
The blue car stopped and, after dropping off a man, immediately left the place. The man approached Floriana and whispered Romy to her.[52] She handed the
money to him who took it.[53] Floriana identified this man during the trial as accused-appellant Roland (Ronald) Garcia.[54]

The PACC operatives tried to follow the blue car but were prevented by traffic.[55] They were however able to catch up and arrest Garcia who was in
possession of the ransom money in the amount of P71,000.00.[56] They brought him inside their police car and there apprised him of his custodial rights.[57]
Garcia informed the PACC operatives that Atty. Tioleco was being detained inside the De Vega compound in Fairview.[58] With this information, P/Chief Insp.
Cruz ordered P/Chief Insps. Tucay and Quidato who had been posted near the compound to rescue the victim.[59]

The two (2) PACC officers, together with their respective teams, entered the compound and surged into the bungalow house where they saw two (2) men
inside the living room.[60] As one of the PACC teams was about to arrest the two (2) men, the latter ran towards a room in the house where they were about
to grab a .38 cal. revolver without serial number loaded with six (6) rounds of ammunitions and a .357 cal. revolver with six (6) live ammunitions.[61] The other
PACC team searched the house for Atty. Tioleco and found him in the other room.[62] The two (2) men were arrested and informed of their custodial rights.
They were identified in due time as accused-appellants Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba.[63]

P/Chief Insp. Cruz arrived at the De Vega compound[64] and coordinated with the proper barangay authorities.[65] While the PACC operatives were
completing their rescue and arrest operations, the house phone rang.[66] Accused-appellant Rogel answered the call upon the instruction of P/Chief Insp.
Cruz.[67] Rogel identified the caller to be accused-appellant Valler who was then driving towards the De Vega compound.[68] In the same phone call, Valler
also talked with accused-appellant Garcia to inquire about the ransom money.[69]

Then a blue Toyota Corona arrived at the De Vega compound.[70] Valler alighted from the car and shouted at the occupants of the house to open the gate.[71]
Suspicious this time, however, he went back to his car to flee.[72] But the PACC operatives pursued his car, eventually subduing and arresting him.[73] The
operations at the De Vega Compound ended at 8:30 in the evening and the PACC operatives, together with Atty. Tioleco and the accused-appellants, left the
De Vega compound and returned to their headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City.[74] The ransom money was returned intact to Atty. Tioleco.[75]

When arraigned, accused-appellants Ronald Roland Garcia, Rodante Rogel, Rotchel Lariba and Gerry Valler pleaded not guilty to the charge of kidnapping for
ransom in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049, although during the trial Garcia admitted complicity in the abduction of Atty. Tioleco and in the receipt of the ransom
money from the victims sister Floriana.[76] In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba
also pleaded not guilty.[77]

During the trial, Gerry Valler denied being part of the kidnapping for ransom and asserted that he was at the De Vega compound where he was arrested on 8
October 1996 solely to pay for the fighting cocks he had bought from one Jimmy Muit, alleged owner of the compound.[78] Accused Ronald Garcia, despite his
admission to the crime, nevertheless disowned any role in planning the crime or knowing the other accused-appellants since his cohorts were allegedly Jimmy
Muit and two (2) others known to him only as Tisoy and Tony.[79] He also alleged that it was Jimmy Muits red Toyota car that was used in the crime.[80]
Explaining their presence at the De Vega compound at the time they were arrested, Rogel claimed that he was employed as a helper for breeding cocks in this
compound[81] while Laribas defense focused on an alleged prior agreement for him to repair Jimmy Muits car.[82]

Accused-appellants filed separate appellants briefs. In the brief submitted by the Public Attorneys Office in behalf of accused-appellants Garcia, Rogel and
Lariba, they argue that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was not committed since Atty. Tioleco was released from detention by means of the rescue
operation conducted by the PACC operatives and the ransom money subsequently recovered.[83] They conclude that their criminal liability should only be for
slight illegal detention under Art. 268, of The Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants Rogel and Lariba further assert that they could not be held guilty of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition since neither was in complete control of the firearms and ammunition that were recovered when they were
arrested and no evidence was offered to prove responsibility for the presence of firearms and ammunition inside the room.[84]

The brief filed for accused-appellant Gerry B. Valler asserts the same defense he made at the trial that he was at the De Vega compound only to pay his debts
to Jimmy Muit,[85] arguing that Atty. Tioleco did not have the opportunity to really recognize him so that his identification as the driver of the car was tainted
by police suggestion, and that P/Chief Insp. Cruz testimony is allegedly replete with inconsistencies that negate his credibility.[86]

Encapsulated, the issues herein focun on (a) the ransom as element of the crime under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended; (b) the sufficiency of
the prosecution evidence to prove kidnapping for ransom; (c) the degree of responsibility of each accused-appellant for kidnapping for ransom; and, (d) the
liability for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under RA 8294, amending PD 1866.

First. We do not find any quantum of merit in the contention that kidnapping for ransom is committed only when the victim is released as a result of the
payment of ransom. In People v. Salimbago[87] we ruled -

No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the
victims freedom. In municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or
persons, a payment that releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. It is
enough if the crime was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. Considering therefore, that the kidnapping was committed for such purpose, it is not
necessary that one or any of the four circumstances be present.

So the gist of the crime, as aptly stated in American jurisprudence from which was derived the crime of kidnapping for ransom,[88] is not the forcible or secret
confinement, imprisonment, inveiglement, or kidnapping without lawful authority, but x x x the felonious act of so doing with intent to hold for a ransom the
person so kidnapped, confined, imprisoned, inveigled, etc.[89]

It is obvious that once that intent is present, as in the case at bar, kidnapping for ransom is already committed. Any other interpretation of the role of ransom,
particularly the one advanced by accused-appellants, is certainly absurd since it ironically penalizes rescue efforts of kidnap victims by law enforcers and in
turn rewards kidnappers for the success of police efforts in such rescue operations. Moreover, our jurisprudence is replete with cases, e.g., People v. Chua
Huy,[90] People v. Ocampo[91] and People v. Pingol,[92] wherein botched ransom payments and effective recovery of the victim did not deter us from finding
culpability for kidnapping for ransom.

Second. Issues of sufficiency of evidence are resolved by reference to findings of the trial court that are entitled to the highest respect on appeal in the
absence of any clear and overwhelming showing that the trial court neglected, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance affecting the result of the case.[93] Bearing this elementary principle in mind, we find enough evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
cooperation of all accused-appellants in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco.

Truly incriminating is the judicial confession of accused-appellant Garcia of his participation in the commission of the crime. He admitted that he took part in
actually depriving Atty. Tioleco of his liberty[94] and in securing the ransom payment from Floriana Tioleco.[95] He could not have been following mechanically
the orders of an alleged mastermind, as he claims, since by his own admission he was neither threatened, forced or intimidated to do so[96] nor mentally
impaired to resist the orders.[97] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he is presumed to be in full possession of his faculties and conscience to resist
and not to do evil.

We cannot also give credence to Garcias asseveration that the persons still at large were his co-conspirators. This posture is a crude attempt to muddle the
case as discerned by the trial court from his demeanor when he testified -

Because he had been caught in flagrante delicto, Roland Garcia admitted his participation in the crime charged. From his testimony, however, there appears a
veiled attempt to shield Gerry Valler from conviction. First, Garcia claimed that the car they used was reddish in color (TSN, October 20, 1997, pp. 9, 19 & 20).
Then he added that the owner of the car was Jimmy Muit and not Gerry Valler (TSN, October 20, 1997, p. 9). Next, he said that there was no conspiracy and he
did not know then Gerry Valler, Rodante Rogel and Rogel Lariba until they were placed together in Camp Crame (Ibid., p. 22).

The Court however cannot simply accept this part of his story. To begin with, his repeated reference to the color of the car as reddish is quite suspicious. He
conspicuously stressed the color of the car in three (3) instances without being asked. The transcripts of the notes bear out the following:

ATTY. MALLABO: Did you use any vehicle while you were there at Gilmore Street?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of vehicle was that?
A: Jimmys car, a Toyota, somewhat reddish in color x x x x
Q: By the way, what car did you use when you were roaming around Quezon City on October 6 in the evening?
A: Jimmys car, which was somewhat red in color. Reddish.
Q: And what car did you use the following day when you took the bag? The same car?
A: The same car, the Toyota car which was somewhat reddish in color.

Such a clear attempt to mislead and deceive the Court with such unsolicited replies cannot succeed. On October 8, 1996, in the vicinity of McDonalds, he was
seen alighting from the blue Toyota Corona (TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 28-32). As earlier pointed out, the blue Toyota Corona car is owned by Gerry Valler who
was the one driving it in the afternoon of the same day to the De Vega compound (TSN, April 28, 1997, pp. 64-67; and November 10, 1997, pp. 22-28). Gerry
Valler was also identified by Atty. Tioleco as the driver of the dark blue car used in his abduction (TSN, April 10, 1997, pp. 10-11; and TSN, April 14, 1997, pp.
21-27).[98]

Accused-appellant Vallers profession of innocence also deserves no consideration. Various circumstances indubitably link him to the crime. For one, he was
positively identified by Atty. Tioleco to be the driver of the dark blue Toyota car used in the abduction on 5 October 1997, which car was seen again twice
during the occasions for ransom payment. This was followed by a telephone call made by Valler to the house where Atty. Tioleco was being detained and in
fact talked with accused-appellant Rogel to tell him that he was coming over[99] and with accused-appellant Garcia to ask from him about the ransom
supposedly earlier collected.[100] Given the overwhelming picture of his complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defense that he was only trying
to pay his debts to Jimmy Muit when he was arrested.

We find nothing substantive in Vallers attempt to discredit the victims positive identification of him on the trifling observation that Atty. Tioleco was too
confused at the time of his abduction to recognize accused-appellants physical features accurately. It is truly evident from the testimony of Atty. Tioleco that
his vision and composure were not impaired by fear or shock at the time of his abduction and that he had the opportunity to see vividly and remember
unerringly Vallers face -

Q: Where were these two unidentified men positioned inside the car?
A: One of them was at the drivers seat and the other one was immediately behind the drivers seat.
Q: Now, could you please describe to this honorable court the person who was seated on the drivers seat?
A: He has a dark complexion, medium built and short hair at that time.
Q: If you see that person again will you be able to identify him sir?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And if hes present in the courtroom will you be able to point to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At this juncture your honor we would like to request with the courts permission the witness be allowed to step down from the witness stand and approach
the person just described and tap him on his shoulder.

COURT INTERPRETER: Witness stepping down from the witness stand and approached the person he had just described and tapped him on his shoulder and
who when asked to identify himself he gave his name as Gerry Valler.[101]

Even on cross-examination, Atty. Tioleco was steadfast in his reference to Gerry Valler -
Q: What stage was that when your eyeglasses were grabbed by these persons inside the car?
A: That was after the other accused entered the vehicle and the car zoomed away, that was when they were putting a blindfold on me, that was the time when
they started removing my eyeglasses, sir x x x x[102]
Q: So when you were inside the car, you had difficulty seeing things inside the car because you were not wearing your eyeglasses?
A: No, sir, that is not correct, because they were close, so I can see them x x x x[103]
Q: And as a matter of fact, it was the PACC operatives who informed you that the person being brought in was also one of the suspects, am I correct?
A: That is not correct, sir. They said that, but I know that is one of the suspects because he was the person who was driving the vehicle at the time I got
kidnapped. So I know him.
Q: So you saw him at the time you were kidnapped that is why you were able to identify him when he was ushered in?
A: When he was brought into the kitchen I saw him. When I saw him, I knew he was one of the suspects.
Q: When you saw him, he was in handcuffs?
A: Yes, sir, that is correct.
Q: You were informed that his name is Gerry Valler?
A: When he went inside the house and the kitchen, they started interviews, that is where I learned his name, Gerry Valler x x x x[104]
Q: But I thought that when you were pushed inside the car, you were pushed head first, how can you easily describe this person driving the vehcile and the
person whom you now identified as Roland Garcia?
A: Even if they pushed my head, there was an opportunity for me to see the face of the accused.[105]

As we held in People v. Candelario,[106] it is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their assailants and the manner
in which the craven acts are committed. There is no reason to disbelieve Atty. Tioelecos claim that he saw the faces of his abductors considering that they
brazenly perpetrated the crime in broad daylight without donning masks to hide their faces. Besides, there was ample opportunity for him to discern their
features from the time two (2) of his kidnappers approached and forced him into their car and once inside saw the other two (2), including Gerry Valler, long
enough to recall them until he was blindfolded.

The victims identification of accused-appellant Valler is not any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention Vallers name in his affidavit. It is well-settled that
affidavits are incomplete and inaccurate involving as they do mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigators questions.[107] As the
victim himself explained -

Q: Now, in Question No. 5 and I quote x x x Why did you not identify here the name of the driver as one Gerry Valler?

A: Because they never asked me the name. They just asked me to narrate what happened. Had they asked me the name, I could have mentioned the
name.[108]

In light of the positive identification by the victim of accused-appellant Valler, the latters denial must fall absolutely. Clearly, positive identification of the
accused where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over his
defense.[109] When there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused
or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[110]

Finally, we do not see any merit in Vallers enumeration of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of P/Chief Insp. Gilbert Cruz concerning (a) the time and
place of meeting between the PACC operatives and Floriana Tioleco; (b) the schedule of the first and second ransom pay-offs; (c) the number of Floriana
Tiolecos companions during the aborted first pay-off; (d) the number of occupants in the blue Toyota car; and, (e) the PACC operatives recognition of Floriana
Tioleco during the ransom payments. This is an argument that clutches at straws. For one, the purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations
of time or number, hence, the reference thereto by the witness would understandably vary. Furthermore, they are too minor to warrant the reversal of the
judgment of conviction. They do not affect the truth of the testimonies of witnesses nor do they discredit their positive identification of accused-appellants.
On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen rather than diminish the prosecutions case as they erase suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and
negate any misgiving that the same was perjured.[111]

We also do not believe that accused-appellants Rogel and Lariba are innocent bystanders in this case. It taxes the mind to believe Rogels defense that as a
caretaker of the place where Atty. Tioleco was detained, he observed nothing unusual about this incident. An innocent man would have immediately reported
such dastardly act to the authorities and refused to sit idly by, but a guilty person in contrast would have behaved otherwise as Rogel did.[112]

Accused-appellant Laribas defense is similarly incredible. He joins Gerry Valler in proclaiming that he too was allegedly at the wrong place at the wrong time
for the wrong reason of just wanting to tune up the car of Jimmy Muit. But for all these assertions, he failed to produce satisfactory evidence that he was
indeed there to repair such car. Of all the days he could have discharged his work, he chose to proceed on 8 October 1997 when the kidnapping was in full
swing. There was even no car to repair on the date that he showed up. Like the submission of Rogel, Laribas defense falls completely flat for he could have so
easily observed the kidnapping of Atty. Tioleco that was taking place in the house of Jimmy Muit.

In sum, accused-appellants cannot rely upon the familiar phrase reasonable doubt for their acquittal. As demonstrated by the fastiduous references of Valler
to alleged inconsistencies of P/Chief Insp. Cruz, not all possible doubt is reasonable since in the nature of things everything relating to human affairs is open to
some imaginary dilemma. As we have said in People v. Ramos,[113] it is not such a doubt as any man may start by questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a
doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony, for it is possible always to question any conclusion derived from testimony. Reasonable
doubt must arise from the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence, and it should pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. Accused-
appellants have not shown the presence of such fatal defects in this case. Clearly, all the elements and qualifying circumstances to warrant conviction for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention have been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third. We go into the criminal liability of each accused-appellant. There is no doubt that Gerry Valler and Ronald Garcia are principals by direct participation
and co-conspirators in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco. Their respective participation in perpetrating the crime cannot be denied. As regards their
liability as co-conspirators, we find the same to have also been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it for which liability is joint.[114] Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct
evidence as the felonious covenant itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the commission of the crime disclosing a
common understanding between them relative to its commission.[115] The acts of Valler and Garcia in coordinating the abduction, collection of ransom and
detention of their victim indubitably prove such conspiracy.

Lariba and Rogel were caught inside the house where Atty. Tioleco was detained. P/Chief Insp. Paul Tucay testified on their involvement -

Q: Okey, when you stormed the place, do you know where these two men were?
A: The two men were seated at the sala during that time, sir.
Q: They were seated at the sala when you entered the place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after entering the gate?
A: We announced that we were police officers of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.
Q: Do you know what happened with these two men during that time?
A: They were caught by surprise and they were about to run to the first room.
Q: What happened when these two men who were at the living room or at the sala, when they ran to the first room?
A: We surprised them and cornered them in that room.
Q: What about the team of Major Quidato, where did they proceed?
A: Major Quidatos team proceeded to the second room where Atty. Tioleco was being kept.
Q: According to you, you gave chase to these two men who were earlier in the sala and they ran upon your announcement that you were police officers?
A: When we cornered them in that room, they were about to grab the two revolvers loaded with six (6) rounds of ammunitions.
Q: Where were these revolvers placed, Mr. Witness?
A: They were placed on top of a cabinet, which, when you enter in the room, is placed on the right side of the room.
Q: How many revolvers were you able to recover?
A: There were two revolvers.
Q: And can you please describe these revolvers to this Honorable Court?
A: Yes, sir x x x x The revolvers confiscated on that raid are one (1) .38 caliber revolver without serial number loaded with 6 rounds of ammunition, live ammo,
one .357 also loaded with 6 rounds of live ammunitions.[116]

Correlating the above testimony with the other evidence, it is clear that at the time Lariba and Rogel were caught, Atty. Tioleco had already been rendered
immobile with his eyes blindfolded and his hands handcuffed. No evidence exists that he could have gone elsewhere or escaped. At the precise moment of
their apprehension, accused-appellants Lariba and Rogel were unarmed although guns inside one of the rooms of the house were available for their use and
possession.

Assessing these established circumstances in the manner most favorable to Lariba and Rogel, we conclude that they were merely guarding the house for the
purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating the successful denouement to the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim, as
shown by the availability of arms and ammunition to them. They thus cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts by means of
which they aided or facilitated the execution of the crime but without any indispensable act for its accomplishment. Under Art. 18 of The Revised Penal Code,
they are mere accomplices.

In People v. De Vera[117] we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner -

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention
because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and
only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do
not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a
crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.

In the instant case, we cannot deny knowledge on the part of Lariba and Rogel that Valler and Garcia had kidnapped Atty. Tioleco for the purpose of extorting
ransom and their cooperation to pursue such crime. But these facts without more do not make them co-conspirators since knowledge of and participation in
the criminal act are also inherent elements of an accomplice.[118] Further, there is no evidence indubitably proving that Lariba and Rogel themselves
participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. As the evidence stands, they were caught just guarding the house for the purpose of either helping the
other accused-appellants in facilitating the success of the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim as shown by the availability of arms and
ammunition to them. These items contrast starkly with the tried and true facts against Valler and Garcia that point to them as the agents ab initio of the design
to kidnap Atty. Tioleco and extort ransom from his family.

Significantly, the crime could have been accomplished even without the participation of Lariba and Rogel. As stated above, the victim had been rendered
immobile by Valler and Garcia before the latter established contacts with Floriana Tioleco and demanded ransom. The participation of Lariba and Rogel was
thus hardly indispensable. As we have held in Garcia v. CA, in some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a
malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character.[119]
At any rate, where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking and doubt created as to whether the accused acted as principal or
accomplice, the balance tips for the milder form of criminal liability of an accomplice.[120]

We are not unaware of the ruling in People v. Licayan that conspiracy can be deduced from the acts of the accused-appellants and their co-accused which
show a concerted action and community of interest. By guarding Co and Manaysay and preventing their escape, accused-appellants exhibited not only their
knowledge of the criminal design of their co-conspirators but also their participation in its execution.[121] But the instant case is different. Considering the
roles played by Lariba and Rogel in the execution of the crime and the state the victim was in during the detention, it cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt
that these accused-appellants were in a real sense detaining Atty. Tioleco and preventing his escape. The governing case law is People v. Chua Huy[122] where
we ruled -

The defendants statements to the police discarded, the participation of the other appellants in the crime consisted in guarding the detained men to keep them
from escaping. This participation was simultaneous with the commission of the crime if not with its commencement nor previous thereto. As detention is an
essential element of the crime charged, as its name, definition and graduation of the penalty therefor imply, the crime was still in being when Lorenzo Uy, Tan
Si Kee, Ang Uh Ang, William Hao and Young Kiat took a hand in it. However, we are not satisfied from the circumstances of the case that the help given by
these accused was indispensable to the end proposed. Our opinion is that these defendants are responsible as accomplices only.

Fourth. In the beginning, we noted that neither Lariba nor Rogel who were both convicted of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in Crim. Case No.
Q-96-68049 filed a notice of appeal in accordance with established procedures, although the records show that accused-appellant Gerry Valler needlessly did
so exclusively in his behalf.[123] But in light of the enactment of RA 8294 amending PD 1866 effective 6 July 1997,[124] and our ruling in People v.
Ladjaalam[125] followed in Evangelista v. Siztoza,[126] we nonetheless review this conviction to give effect to Art. 22 of The Revised Penal Code mandating in
the interest of justice the retroactive application of penal statutes that are favorable to the accused who is not a habitual criminal.[127]

In Ladjaalam we ruled that if another crime was committed by the accused he could not be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under RA 8294
amending PD 1866 -

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor x x x x

The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence,
before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:

Sec. 1. - Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered
firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms
but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two
or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat,
such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company,
corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person
or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.

x x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a
separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the
crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance x x x x The law
is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the
intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph.
Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates accused-appellants x x x of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a
penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second, it is only prision correccional. Indeed, an accused
may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical
injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294 the wisdom of which is not subject
to review by this Court.[128]

Accordingly, we are constrained to dismiss Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 and set aside the judgment of conviction therein since accused-appellants Rotchel
Lariba and Rodante Rogel cannot be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions there being another crime - kidnapping for ransom - which
they were perpetrating at the same time.

In fine, we affirm the conviction of Gerry Valler and Ronald Roland Garcia as principals and Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel as accomplices for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. This Court is compelled to impose the supreme penalty of death on Valler and Garcia as mandated by Art.
267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.
The penalty imposable on Lariba and Rogel as accomplices is reclusion perpetua, the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for the crime committed
pursuant to Art. 52 in relation to Art. 61, par. (1), of the Code. We however set aside the judgment in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 convicting Lariba and Rogel of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in light of the foregoing discussion.

As regards the moral damages against accused-appellants to be paid by them in solidum, we find the amount of P200,000.00 to be reasonable compensation
for the ignominy and sufferings Atty. Tioleco and his family endured due to accused-appellants inhumane act of detaining him in blindfold and handcuffs and
mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological ordeal which
constitute the bases for moral damages under the Civil Code[129] is too obvious to require still the recital thereof at the trial through the superfluity of a
testimonial charade.

Following our finding that only Gerry Valler and Ronald Roland Garcia are principals by direct participation and conspirators while Rotchel Lariba and Rodante
Rogel are accomplices, we apportion their respective responsibilities for the amount adjudged as moral damages to be paid by them solidarily within their
respective class and subsidiarily for the others.[130] Thus, the principals, accused-appellants Ronald Roland Garcia and Gerry Valler, shall pay their victim Atty.
Romualdo Tioleco P150,000.00 for moral damages and the accomplices P50,000.00 for moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 (G.R. No. 133489) accused-appellants RONALD ROLAND GARCIA y
FLORES and GERRY B. VALLER are declared guilty as PRINCIPALS of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and are sentenced each to death, while
accused-appellants RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA y DEMICILLO are convicted as ACCOMPLICES and are ordered to serve the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law for the same crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. Accused-appellants are
further ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, with the principals being solidarily liable for P150,000.00 of this amount and subsidiarily
for the civil liability of the accomplices, and the accomplices being solidarily liable for P50,000.00 for moral damages and subsidiarily for the civil liability of the
principals.

Finally, in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 (G.R. No. 143970) the Decision of the court a quo convicting RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA y
DEMICILLO of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is REVERSED and SET ASIDE in light of the enactment of RA 8294 and our rulings in People v.
Ladjaalam[131] and Evangelista v. Siztoza.[132]

Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to
the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power. Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez,
and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80130 August 19, 1991
BENJAMIN ABEJUELA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 16, 1987 which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VII of Palo, Leyte, dated January 11, 1984, convicting him as an accomplice in the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 172 thereof.1

The facts of this case are uncontroverted.

Petitioner Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of hand tractors and other agricultural equipment, had a savings
deposit with Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch. Sometime in April or May 1978, petitioner was befriended by Glicerio Balo, Jr., an employee of Banco Filipino in
the same Tacloban Branch. On several occasions, petitioner Abejuela and Balo would dine together, go to nightclubs or have drinking sprees.2 They became
close friends. Balo even became the godfather of Abejuela's daughter.3 Moreover, Balo offered Abejuela financial assistance in the latter's welding business,
claiming that he was expecting a large sum of money out of the insurance policy of his late father.

On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela's welding shop to borrow the latter's passbook. Abejuela was surprised and thought that it was not possible for Balo
to use his passbook. Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be the proceeds of his father's insurance policy. He wanted to deposit the checks in
Abejuela's account with Banco Filipino. Abejuela then suggested that Balo open his own account. However, Balo explained that he was prohibited from
opening an account with Banco Filipino since he was employed with that bank as a savings bookkeeper. Abejuela advised Balo to open an account instead with
another bank but Balo insisted that he wanted the checks deposited with Banco Filipino so that he could facilitate their immediate encashment as well as avail
himself of some privileges. Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing wrong in allowing him to use his passbook and even reassured Abejuela that he
would accompany him to the bank to make the deposit.

Accepting Balo's explanations and assurances Abejuela entrusted his passbook to Balo. On August 8,1978, Balo returned Abejuela's passbook where a deposit
in the amount of P20,000.00 was already reflected. Once again, Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing wrong with the deposit, and stated that he just
deposited one of his checks. On the same, day Balo requested Abejuela himself to withdraw, in the former's behalf, money from his account with Banco
Filipino. Again with assurances from Balo, Abejuela reluctantly agreed. He went to Banco Filipino and withdrew the amount of P15,000.00 which he gave to
Balo at a restaurant called Felisa's Cafe.

Balo's practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela's passbook continued for quite some time. During the month of August 1978, the account
of Abejuela with Banco Filipino reflected a total deposits of P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of P175,607.96.

In the meantime, Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, payable within 90 days from August 9, 1978. But feeling apprehensive over Balo's constant use of
his passbook, Abejuela decided to pay his loan on August 31, 1978 by borrowing P10,000.00 from his father and taking the other P10,000.00 from his business
profits.4 Abejuela also closed his account with Banco Filipino by surrendering his passbook and withdrawing the balance of his deposit.

Thereafter, the bank's accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy between the interest reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger
balance. The interest bookkeeper could not locate the posting reconciliation and the proof reconciliation. He also notice that Account No. 6701-0160 in the
name of Benjamin Abejuela reflected four (4) large deposits on various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978, totaling P176,145.25, but the deposits
slips thereof could not be located.

After further examination of the bank records, the manager, accountant and interest bookkeeper were convinced that the irregularities were caused by Balo
who was the savings bookkeeper at that time and who had access to Abejuela savings account ledger. They concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the
ledger, by posting the fictitious deposits after banking hours when the posting machine was already closed and cleared by the bank accountant.

The bank officials confronted Balo, who feigned ignorance and initially denied the accusations, but later admitted having posted the false deposits. Petitioner
Abejuela was also implicated because he was the owner of the passbook used by Balo in accomplishing his fraudulent scheme. On December 5,1978, an
information was filed against Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela for the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.5 Separately
arraigned, both pleaded "not guilt to the crime charged6 Trial followed.

On May 29, 1979, acting on an application by Banco Filipino, the trial court issued an order of preliminary attachment against all the properties of accused
Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela not exceeding P176,145.25 in value, the amount allegedly embezzled or misappropriated. On September 4,1979, the
Deputy Sheriff of Palo, Leyte, filed a return of service and submitted an inventory of the goods taken from the two accused and which goods were placed in
the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. While the refrigerator and television set taken from the residence of Abejuela would not command a good
pace on account of their poor condition, the goods seized from Balo were appraised at P62,295.00.7

In the meantime, accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. was reportedly killed by members of the New People's Army in the mountains of Mati Balangkayan Eastern Samar,
on suspicion that he was a PC informer and a collaborator. This information came from a rattan gatherer and former NPA member whose testimony before the
court a quo was never impeached. Consequently, on February 25, 1981, the trial court dismissed the case against Glicerio Balo, Jr., pursuant to Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, but without prejudice to a civil action for recovery of damages arising from the offense which may be instituted by Banco Filipino and
without prejudice also to the reinstatement of the instant criminal action in the event the accused would turn out to be alive.8 On September 7, 1981, Banco
Filipino filed a motion praying for the forfeiture in its favor of the goods seized from the accused which were in the custody of the National Bureau of
investigation. On November 5, 1981, the trial court, thru District Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, granted the motion and ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation to deliver the seized goods to Banco Filipino. In addition, the bank was authorized to withdraw the savings deposit of Glicerio Balo, Jr. for
eventual reversion to said bank.9

Thereafter, trial continued with respect to petitioner Abejuela. On January 11, 1984, the lower court adjudged petitioner Abejuela guilty. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Benjamin Abejuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
a commercial document under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 172 thereof and as the amount involved is more than P22,000 he
is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than fifteen (15) years, three months and 11 days to not more than sixteen (16) years, eight
months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, to indemnify Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch, in the sum of One Hundred Seventy Six Thousand One Hundred Forty
Five Pesos and Twenty Five Centavos (P 176,145.25), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one half of the costs.
On May 29, 1979, the court issued a writ of preliminary attachment of the properties of defendants Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela. This Attachment
is hereby made permanent.10

Abejuela appealed to the Court of Appeals. On September 16, 1987, the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.11 A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated October 7, 1987. Hence the instant appeal.

Petitioner Abejuela contends that the Appellate Court erred in not acquitting him for the following reasons:

(1) Accused-petitioner has no knowledge of the criminal intent of his co-accused, Glicerio Balo, Jr., hence, there being no conspiracy, be cannot be
convicted as principal, neither as accomplice, nor did he benefit from the effects of the crime, hence, he cannot be convicted even as an accessory.

(2) The lending of the accused-petitioner of his passbook was made in good faith, and after he was deceived by co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. that it is
necessary because as employee of Banco Filipino he cannot deposit in the said hank

(3) The presumption of innocence and the 'equipoise rule' apply in favor of accused-petitioner.12

Respondents, in their comment, maintain that petitioner Abejuela had knowledge of the fraudulent acts of Glicerio Balo, Jr. They asseverate that petitioner is
an intelligent individual who can take care of his concerns, considering that he is a businessman who finished third (3rd) year college (commerce).13

Respondent also point out that Abejuela should not only have been convicted as an accomplice but as a principal by indispensable cooperation, because
without the withdrawal slips which he executed allegedly in spite of his many doubts and apprehensions, Glicerio Balo, Jr. could not have succeeded in his
scheme.

Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that he had no knowledge at all of the fraudulent machinations of Balo, and that his act of lending his passbook was done
in good faith.

After carefully weighing the arguments of both parties as well as taking into consideration the evidence on record, we are inclined to believe that petitioner
Abejuela was completely unaware of the malevolent scheme of Balo. From Balo's own admissions, it was he who deceived Abejuela through sweet talk,
assurances, drinking sprees and parties and cajoled him into giving in to his requests. Furthermore, during that time, nobody would have questioned Balo's
source of money and since he had a perfect alibi, i.e. the insurance proceeds of his later father. When Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be his
father's insurance proceeds, Abejuela was hoodwinked into believing that Balo indeed had money. Balo's request to borrow Abejuela's passbook in order to
facilitate the encashment of the checks seemed reasonable enough, considering that they were close friends and "compadres", Abejuela's acquiescence to
Balo's overtures is understandable.

Furthermore, the court takes judicial notice of the practice of banks in allowing anybody to deposit in an account even without the owner's passbook, as long
as the account number is known. Thus, even without Abejuela's passbook, the false deposits could still have been posted by Balo in the savings account ledger
of Abejuela. After all, the ledger is the record of the bank reflecting the transactions of the depositor, while the passbook is the record of the depositor. More
often than not, it is the ledger which is more accurate and up-to-date. This is the reason why depositors have their passbooks updated for unrecorded
transactions like interests, checks deposited beyond clearance cut-off time and bank charges.

In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution clearly points at Balo as the one who had posted the bogus deposits in Abejuela's ledger. He was also the
one who wisely manipulated petitioner Abejuela in order that the fictitious deposits could be placed at his Balo disposal, Thus, when Balo requested Abejuela
to withdraw the amount he had earlier placed in the latter's account, Abejuela had no choice but to give in. He actually believed that the money was really
owned by Balo and he did not want Balo to think that he was interested in it. Thus, the prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Abejuela had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme of Balo. The most that could be attributed to Abejuela was his negligence in lending his passbook and his
utter gullibility.

Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal in this case, (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice
in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense
by previous or simultaneous acts. However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or intentionally, which assistance
cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the offense intended to be committed.

In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been held that knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal is indispensable in order to hold a person
liable as an accomplice. Thus:

It appearing that the accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused rode did not actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of
robbery but only furnished the means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with knowledge of the said criminal design, he is not guilty as principal
of the crime of robbery with homicide but is an accomplice therein.14

There is no evidence that appellant had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot, therefore,
be considered as a principal. But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went
inside the store to rob and kill, appellant effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.15

It is axiomatic that in criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary before a judgment of conviction can be rendered.1âwphi1 Not an iota
of doubt must cloud the Court's mind. A conviction of a criminal offense must be based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere assumptions.16

In the light of the facts and the evidence on record, we believe that the guilt of petitioner Abejuela has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt for
which reason he must be acquitted. The question that must be resolved now is the effect of Abejuela's acquittal on his civil liability.

The Rules provide: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and
in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered."17

We decree the acquittal of Abejuela because we seriously doubt whether he had knowledge of the plan of Balo to defraud Banco Filipino by means of posting
false deposits and withdrawing these later. Because of this doubt, however, his exoneration will not extinguish his civil liability. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the same is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases, or where the court has
expressly declared that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature.18

In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr.,19 we declared:

.1s1

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone
to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of s own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law.

It has been satisfactorily established that Banco Filipino suffered damage in the amount of P176,145.25 representing the fictitious deposits posted by Glicerio
Balo, Jr. and systematically withdrawn through the passbook of petitioner Abejuela. Although Abejuela, was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of
Balo, he nevertheless unwittingly contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting his passbook to Balo and by signing the withdrawal
slips. Abejuela failed to exercise prudence and care. Therefore, he must be held civilly accountable.

WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, Benjamin Abejuela is hereby ACQUITTED of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
However, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Leyte on May 29, 1979 against petitioner's properties and those of his co-
accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their civil obligation in the amount of P176,145.25 and which was subsequently made permanent by the said court stands.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., concur in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life imprisonment, with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased
Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the accused the namely,
Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no
certificate nor any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged with parricide.

Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their
house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had been
strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two
(2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made
Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship
was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the
child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than
three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday
night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went down
the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down;
but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo
that someday he would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to
wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned
by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when
accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".

Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in
the kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants. As
they were barely 3-4 meters from the place where the child was in the "batalan", she heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not discern
what they were saying. She was able to recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the kitchen through the open "batalan" and she knows
them well for they are all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them almost everytime. She noted that the appellants had long guns at the time. Their
meeting did not last long, after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an
avocado tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child caged her parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his
daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon
ate supper alone, and as soon as she was through she again called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby
watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then climbed the stairs of the "batalan"
carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise
time, but when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call for help and I will kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the
scene, going towards the east.

The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside and
questioned her, and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal the
matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim,
Bernardo, autopsy on which was performed in his own house by the Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours after death; burial
took place on the same day. The victim's brother who came from Manila arrived one day after the burial followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra
where she resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the Identities of the killers of her father because she was afraid of her own mother, was somehow
able to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter executed on August 5,
1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of the information for murder against the herein five (5) appellants.

On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with Bernardo, was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She
has a sister in Manila and two (2) brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending her
monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she was still single up to the time of her husband's violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After
their marriage, they moved to and resided in her husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3) carabaos and two (2) horses, which
Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5 meters away from the house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they
never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his own mother who wanted
that Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo never did, and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me alone".
Her in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On his
part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not give him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She never left
their conjugal home for any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-law, and if she ever did leave the house to go to other places they were only
during those times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips, she was sometimes
accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to
Bangued in the morning and always rode back with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the weapons carrier is owned by a resident
of Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos
and horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the
matter to his policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the
latter's home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit relationship had never existed between them.

Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house cooking their food for supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were with
her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a plow. He had to make the plow at that time of the night because at daytime he worked
as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as the food was ready, she and the children moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for
supper, and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him to the kitchen when suddenly they heard more
than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming from near their "batalan". They were all so terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did not
know yet at that precise time that her husband was shot, as she and the children were still in the other room on their way to the kitchen, about three (3)
meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain, and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms. She did not
see the killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was in her arms when the first group of people who responded to
their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of police, some members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even advised Teresa not to
carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6) months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation of the
surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot prints on the ground some meters away from the "batalan". He also found some bullet holes on the
southern walls of said "batalan" and on the nothern wallings of the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to relay the information about the death of
her husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's mother and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then
residing, as they have left their house in Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to till there in a case with the natives
called Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and after Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their
house, they conducted an investigation, but she did not give them any information relative to the Identity of the persons who shot her husband because she
did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from
Manila, and after the usual nine (9) days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her
mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes to grind against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their custody, they had forced the said child
to testify against her. She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies during his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some people over the
land they work on.

Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being
a policeman of the place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the latter attended the
cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do
with the said killing. On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date of said killing, but he was one of the
persons who was called upon by the chief of police of the place to accompany him in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The other two
appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and
had been staying in her house for a long time. They were sleeping when the chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who was then municipal
secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did not join them, but continued sleeping. They never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan,
which is about 250-300 meters away from the place of the killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.

After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution and defense, We have no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of June 24,
1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting inconspiracy with each other
gunned down Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the supper table in their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing the
offense by the witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father nearby. They were all known to her, for they were all
residents of Sobosob and she used to see them often before that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her father after they had
climbed the stairs of the "batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if she called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even
before the four appellants went up the "batalan", they already fired shots from downstairs.

We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent
quarrel during which he slapped her several times. She went to seek the help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their town, who
went to the vicinity of their house and challenged her father to come down, but the latter refused because the former was a policeman and was armed. And
so, Talingdan left after shouting to her father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."

We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous relationship between her mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related
earlier above. So also her testimony that in the morning following the quarrel between her father and her mother and the threat made by Talingdan to the
former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock, she saw all the herein four male accused-appellants meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters
away from their house, near where she was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard one of them ask "Could (sic) he elude a bullet?",
We have our doubts, however, as to whether or not her mother did say to her in shoving her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your father we will kill
him." If it were true that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she again saw the
said appellants on the very night in question shortly before the shooting talking together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms. Moreover,
it is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a manner.

Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We have carefully reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they committed the said offense in conspiracy with each
other, with evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating circumstance has been proven.

Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital contradictions and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of
patently unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the witness varied on cross-
examination the exact time of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was
shot; (2) whether it was before or after seeing her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23, 1967, that she went to wash
clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having
seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and cold-bloodedly shooting her father to death.

Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal of
the Solicitor General:

Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of Corazon Bagabag by pointing out five supposed unnatural declarations in her
testimony; First, she said that her father, appeared unconcerned when she informed him of the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed by
the prosecuting fiscal the witness does not know then "the mentality of her father" (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared
that the accused conversed that Saturday night preceding the day the crime charged was committed in a lighted place although there was a place which was
unlighted in the same premises. But this only proves that the accused were too engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of whether the place where they
were talking was lighted or not, and unmindful even of the risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did not fire their
guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire, however, since they were privies to the same criminal design, would this alter their culpability? Should the
witness Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely stating an observation on her part which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also declared that
only three bullets from the guns of the four male accused found their mark on the body of her father. But would this not merely prove that not all the accused
were good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her father was still able to talk after he was shot yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared that his death was
instantaneous It is respectfully submitted, however, that the doctor's opinion could yield to the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag in this regard without
in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus viewed, there are no evident badges of falsehood in
the whole breadth and length of Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)

Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her father, if it were not basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was
hardly thirteen (13) years old when she testified, an age when according to Moore, a child , is, as a rule, but little influenced by the suggestion of others"
because "he has already got some principles, lying is distasteful to him, because he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he
never loses an opportunity of being right in what he affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation has been offered why she would
attribute the assault on her father to three other men, aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother, were she merely making-up her
account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been shown.

Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His Honor pointed out that said "testimony, both direct and cross,
would show that she was constant, firm and steady in her answers to questions directed to her." We have Ourselves read said testimony and We are
convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the witness. We cannot, therefore, share appellants' apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the
grave imputation of a mother's infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing of her husband, would if consistently impressed in the mind of their
child, constitute a vicious poison enough to make the child, right or wrong, a willing instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We feel
Corazon was too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother in the manner the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole
testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain
throughout her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long cross-interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event
she had described. We reject the possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as she did.

The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit serious consideration. Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that the
following refutations of the Solicitor General are well taken:

Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the distance between the assailants and the deceased
could have been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were fired. But the appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first shot was fired,
the gunman was about 3-½ meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968), which disproves the theory of the defense that the killers fired
from a stonepile under an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away from the deceased's house. Appellants also insist that the Court a quo ignored the
testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks on the southern walling of the house of
the deceased, as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however, made the following apt observations
on the testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:

This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate the crime after the deceased had already been buried; that he investigated the
widow as well as the surroundings of the house where the deceased was shot. He found empty shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He stated that the
'batalan' of the house of the deceased has a siding of about 1-½ meters high and that he saw bullet holes on the top portion of the wall directly pointing to the
open door of the 'batalan' of the house of the deceased. When the court asked the witness what could have been the position of the assailant in shooting the
deceased, he stated that the assailant might have been standing. The assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the top portion of the sidings of the
'batalan' because the 'batalan' is only 1-½ meters high, and further, when asked as to the level of the ground in relation to the top sidings of the 'batalan,' he
answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is true, it is impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the
'batalan,' hence, the testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of no consequence and without merit. The court is puzzled to find a PC corporal testifying
for the defense in this case, which case was filed by another PC sergeant belonging to the same unit and assigned in the same province of Abra (pp. 324- 325,
rec.).

As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it to state that no testimony has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said
shells to the bullets that were fired during the shooting incident. Surmises in this respect surely would not overcome the positive testimony of Corazon
Bagabag that the accused shot her father as they came up the 'batalan' of their house. (Pp. 11-12, People's Brief.)

At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene of the crime when it happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered by
the trial court, but it was properly brushed aside as untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof is made, which goes to show that in the mind of the defense
itself,. it cannot be successfully maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on it. Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the apt
pertinent ratiocination of His Honor in reference thereto thus:

This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand firmly in the face of a positive and unwavering testimony of the prosecution
witness who pointed out to the accused as the authors of the crime. This is so because, first, according to the three accused — Bides, Tobias and Berras — they
were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only 250 meters away from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the sake of
argument, but without admitting, that they were already sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon Bagabag clearly stated that her
father was gunned down at sunset which is approximately between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have
committed the crime and went home to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of the crime. According to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs.
Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the victim. Second, the three accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs. Bayongan,
the owner of the house where they slept that night to corroborate or bolster their defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense of alibi, stated that on June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of
Sallapadan to Bangued, together with policeman Cresencio Martinez for the purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued They started in Sallapadan in the early
morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived in Bangued the same day. According to him, he went to accompany the mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued
Cathedral and after conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor Banawa near the Filoil Station at
Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the mayor until after they went home to Sallapadan on June 26th.

This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned anytime on the evening of June 22 or anytime before the commission of the
offense to Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th at sunset, then returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to Sallapadan on
the 26th.

The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have been accompanied by witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As a
matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who accompanied
the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not the mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the
testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?

Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the Cursillo Movement, was presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On
the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at the St.
Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact, Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on
October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen in his 'Guide Book' where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears because they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the
Parish of Bangued.

(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the testimony of accused Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)

Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We find that
she is not as wholly innocent in law as she appears to the Counsel of the People. It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in
the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of 'actual cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his
death. If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is
required for her conviction as a conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that way.

True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, sue cannot have the same liability as her
co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and preparation
thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown
that she masterminded it either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain surmise, suspicion and
conjecture, not really includible. After all, she had been having her own unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his
complete elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo
had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for all her faults was
just to slap her.

But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to
the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from
Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa
did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell
this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information
given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less
passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her
cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as
an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.

As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder qualified by treachery. It being obvious that appellants deliberately chose
nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery to
insure success in attaining their malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the
threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday evening just before the
actual shooting. In other words, they had motive Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for his paramour, Teresa and enough time to meditate, and desist, if they
were not resolved to proceed with their objective. Finally, they committed the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.

In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by treachery, and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances
of evident premeditation and that the offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no alternative under the law but to impose
upon them the capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.

WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides
of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to
be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory
penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Barredo, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Antonio, Fernando, JJ., took no part.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139179. April 3, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WILFREDO TOLENTINO y ESPERAT and JONATHAN FABROS y CASTRO, accused.
JONATHAN FABROS y CASTRO, appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire records to review. The appellate court may pass upon every circumstance favorable to the accused. In the
present case, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. Neither was it able to show that appellant was an
accomplice or accessory. Hence, he must be acquitted on reasonable ground.

The Case

Jonathan Fabros y Castro appeals the May 27, 1999 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 17) in Criminal Case No. 13698,
finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Wilfredo Tolentino and Jonathan Fabros guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and taking into
consideration the aggravating circumstance of dwelling (morada) without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences the
above-named accused separately to suffer the penalty of [r]eclusion [p]erpetua, to pay separately the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to indemnify the said heirs [in] the sum of P15,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs.[2]

The Information, dated March 2, 1996, charged appellant as follows:

That on or about February 28, 1996, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a piece of wood and knife, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, by means of treachery and
evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there without any warning, assault, attack and stab with the use of said weapons that they were
armed with, at the person of HERNAN SAGARIO y CUESTA, thereby inflicting mortal wounds on the different parts of the latters body which directly caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

That the commission of the above-stated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances, to wit:

1. Abuse of superior strength; and

2. Dwelling.[3]

With the assistance of counsel,[4] appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on June 7, 1996.[5] After due trial, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecutions version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General as follows:[6]

On February 28, 1996 around 7:30 in the evening, appellant and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca,
Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what was it all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his
house located just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheilas stepfather.
Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free Sheilas mother - appellants aunt - of the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed
Merwin to go back to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to
go home and wait for Hernan.

Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying. Meanwhile, appellant, together with
Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room. Moments later, Wilfredo with a 2x2 piece of wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed
Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, without saying a word, immediately walloped Hernan on the right side
of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring
Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried
Hernan towards the creek about seven meters away from the house.

Upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped and moved closer to the water. At this juncture, Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of
the body causing the latters instant death. After throwing the victims lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left.

The post-mortem examination on the victims cadaver disclosed that the cause of his death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage
secondary to [a] stab wound penetrating the chest. (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant, on the other hand, presented the following version of the facts:[7]

Accused Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as the one who killed Hernan Sagario.
Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also fingered the former as the killer of Sagario.

Relying on his lone testimony and corroborating the testimony of prosecution witness Sheila Guilayan, accused Fabros narrated that he is a resident of
Luyuhan, Pasonanca, particularly in the house of his auntie Amparo Guilayan (the common-law wife of Hernan Sagario), together with his cousins Merwin
Ledesma and Sheila Guilayan.

On 28 February 1996, at around 7:00 p.m., he returned home to Luyahan after his work at Astoria Hotel as a waiter. Sheila was at home when he arrived.
Shortly thereafter, their neighbor, accused Tolentino, came over and called for Sheila. Sh[ei]la stood up and went to the house of Tolentino, leaving behind
Fabros and Merwin Ledesma. After a while, he and Ledesma heard Sheila crying and the two went to the house of Tolentino. At the house of Tolentino, Fabros
and Ledesma asked Sheila why she cried. [She] disclosed Tolentinos plan to kill her stepfather Hernan Sagario. When asked for his motive to kill Hernan
Sagario, Tolentino merely reasoned that he just wanted to help their auntie Amparo get rid of her problems. When they expressed apprehension [about] being
implicated and tried to prevent Tolentino from pursuing his plan, the latter told them not to worry; for he will take care.
When Tolentino saw their uncle Hernan coming towards the house, he ordered them to go home and they obeyed. As he arrived, Hernan ordered Fabros to
boil water. Afterwards, Hernan went out of the house to buy Ovaltine. When Hernan returned, Tolentino approached him and they talked for about two
minutes. Afterwards, Tolentino went to his house while their uncle Hernan told him (Fabros) to check if the water was already boiling. Jonathan went to the
kitchen while their uncle placed the rice he brought in a container. At that instance, Jonathan heard the sound pok, and saw Tolentino holding a piece of wood
(2 x 2). Then, he saw his uncle f[a]ll down slowly, his chest hitting the corner edge of a table. Tolentino approached his uncle and kicked him. Then he ordered
Fabros to come near him and carry Hernan by his feet. Afraid that Tolentino will hit him with the piece of wood, Fabros held his uncle by the feet while
Tolentino pulled Hernan by the shirt and he just followed Tolentino. Tolentino brought Hernan near the river. When Jonathan noticed that his uncle regained
consciousness, he ran away towards a banana plantation and from there he saw Tolentino [stab] Sagario on the chest. After stabbing the victim, Tolentino
pushed and waded him into the water. Scared, Jonathan ran home. About twenty minutes later, Tolentino arrived and with thumbs up sign, he said, Okey na!.
Jonathan also observed that there was blood on the shoulder of Tolentino. The latter then called the three (3) and warned them that if they will tell other
people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed whatever Tolentino told them.

By reason of fear of Tolentinos threat, Jonathan told the police that he did not know what happened. On 01 March 1996, however, he was arrested for the
death of Hernan Sagario on account of an information received by the police identifying him as the assailant. He was brought to the Sta. Maria Police Station
and thereat he was told by the police that if he will not admit, they will show him the witness, which the police later did by showing to him his co-accused
Tolentino. On seeing Tolentino, he declared that he (Tolentino) was the one who killed the victim.

However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial courts decision had become final and executory on his part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently conscience-stricken,
executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario and retracted his testimony implicating accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros.
His affidavit is herein reproduced as follows:

I, WILFREDO TOLENTINO y ESPERAT, 65 years old, widower, Filipino, a convicted prisoner with the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state:

That I was convicted for the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 13698 entitled The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Wilfredo Tolentino y Esperat
and Jonathan Fabros y Castro, accused, which Decision was promulgated on May 30, 1999 and ha[s] become final;

That of the four years I have been in prison, I have contemplated on the consequences of my acts and have been conscience stricken causing me sleepless
nights and deep pity [for] my co-accused Jonathan Fabros whom I have wrongfully imputed to be the killer of the victim Hernan Sagario y Cuesta. As he
appealed the Decision, [maybe] I still have the chance to rectify the wrong I have done to him and tell the Honorable Court what actually happened [o]n the
night of February 28, 1996, as hereunder narrated;

That I had known Hernan Sagario earlier in 1994 when he was still a security guard and he attempted to shoot me with his service firearm and although we had
amicably settled the matter between us, when he came to be my neighbor, I would remember that incident and my old grudge against him would be
rekindled;

That earlier that night of February 28, 1996, I came home quite drunk [after] my drinking spree with my relatives across the river and one of the topics we
discussed was about the incident when Hernan Sagario attempted to shoot me. As I recalled that incident, my old grudge against him resurfaced and I resolved
right then and there to take my revenge on Hernan. So when he came home and he was in the kitchen, I took hold of a piece of wood and hit him with it and
when he fell down unconscious, I dragged his body outside of the house, ordering Jonathan Fabros who was then in the kitchen to help me carry the body of
Hernan outside or else he would also become my victim. Jonathan unwillingly assisted me carry the body of Hernan outside and upon my direction, we
dragged the body of Hernan towards the river where to finish him off, I stabbed [him] in the chest and pushed him down into the water to hide his body. For
his part, Jonathan left me when the body reached the river;

That after [the] killing, I threatened Jonathan Fabros, Neneng (the daughter of Hernans live-in-partner) and Weng-weng, a cousin of Neneng and Jonathan[,]
never to report the incident to any one or else they could become my next victim;

That during the investigation of the killing, I pointed to Jonathan as the killer of Hernan, thinking that I would not be implicated. Even when I was also charged
for the killing, I was confident that I would be acquitted if I would point to Jonathan as the killer. During the trial of the case, I bribed Jonathan and even gave
P20,000.00 to a middle man to effect the pay off but Jonathan returned the money to me saying he could not admit what he did not commit;

That my conscience ha[d] been greatly troubled by denying Jonathan his future by [my] own evil acts and by this affidavit hopes to correct the wrongs I had
done to Jonathan Fabros;

That I am executing this affidavit [to] attest to the truth of the foregoing narration of facts and to appeal to the Court authorities to rectify the wrongs I had
done to Jonathan Fabros and I am willing to testify in court o[n] these statements narrated.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court held that the prosecutions evidence positively identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the person who had hit the victim with a piece of wood and later
stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant manifested his approval of the killing and the concurrence of his acts with those of the other
accused.[8] Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a co-conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the murder.

Hence, this appeal.[9]

The Issue

In his Brief, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:

The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting herein Accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros of the crime charged notwithstanding the categorical statement of
Prosecution Witness Sheila Guilayan that it was Accused Wilfredo Tolentino who actually killed the victim, Hernan Sagario.

II

The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding Wilfredo Tolentinos categorical admission of guilt [of] the crime charged.[10]

The errors boil down to the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.

This Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious; appellant should be acquitted.

Main Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

The RTC held that the assistance of appellant in bringing the body of the victim from the house to the river bank where the latter was allegedly stabbed to
death positively showed that the former had conspired in the commission of the crime.[11] In its abbreviated nine-page Brief, the Office of the Solicitor
General agrees that conspiracy has been duly proven. On the other hand, appellant argues that his fleeting participation in helping carry the victims body to
the river bank did not indicate unity of purpose or design. We agree with him.

An appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case to review. This implies that the Court may pass upon every circumstance favorable to the accused. In
People v. Manambit,[12] the Court explained thus:

Indeed, the Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just disposition of the case. It is a matter of justice that the two other appellants be exonerated of the charges. This we do because an appeal in
a criminal action opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall
be considered.[13]

No Conspiracy

Even the Office of the Solicitor General admits that appellant did not directly kill the victim. It, however, urges us to convict him on the basis of conspiracy.

In theory, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[14] To prove
conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the
commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon.[15] Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all.[16]

Well-settled is the rule that the existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed.[17] Quite the contrary, the evidence for it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt.[18] As this Court has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures.[19] Prior agreement or
assent is usually inferred from the acts of the accused showing concerted action, common design and objective, actual cooperation, and concurrence of
sentiments or community of interests.[20] Mere presence at the scene of the crime or even knowledge of the plan or acquiescence thereto are not sufficient
grounds to hold a person liable as a conspirator.[21] Therefore, the task in every case is to determine whether the particular acts established by the requisite
quantum of proof reasonably yield that inference.[22]

In the case before us, we agree that the culpability of Tolentino was clearly established, but we are also convinced that the evidence fails to show the
culpability of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.[23] Because, unquestionably, the latter did not personally inflict any of the fatal flows, he can be held liable
as a principal, only if conspiracy is proven.[24] To recall, Sheila Guilayan, the prosecution eyewitness, narrated the circumstances surrounding the killing of
Hernan Sagario as follows:

Q On February 28, this year, 1996, at around 7:30 oclock in the evening, can you still remember where were you?
A Yes, I could still remember, I was in our house.
Q You were in your house, are you referring to your house in Pasonanca, Luyahan?
A Yes.
Q Can you also remember who were with you in that evening of February 28, 1996 in your house at Pasonanca, Luyahan?
A Yes, I can still remember, my companions were Jonathan Fabros and Melwin Ledesma.

xxxxxxxxx

Q And you said while you were in the sala sitting down, writing, there was an incident that transpired, will you please tell us what transpired?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
That will ask for narration, what transpired?

COURT:
Be more specific on that.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q What happened?
A I was called by Tolentino and he requested me to go to their house.
Q You are referring to Wilfredo Tolentino?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Leading, Your Honor.

COURT:
Sustained.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q What did you do after you were called by this Tolentino?
A So I went with him to their house.
Q Where is his house?
A Just beside our house or near our house.

COURT:
Q Where was Tolentino when he called you to go with him?
A He was by the door of our house although he was still outside but he was at the door of our house when he called me.

COURT:
Continue.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q And you said you went with him to his house, now what happened there in his house?
A There in their house he told me just to keep quiet because he [was] going to kill my step-father.
Q And what did you do next after he told you about that?
A After he told me that I cried and I told him not to do that because we will be implicated.
Q What else did you do aside from crying and telling him not to do it because we will be implicated, what else did you do?
A Well, I just cried until my two cousins heard me and they, the two, also went to the house of Tolentino.
Q While your two cousins were already in the house of Tolentino, what happened next?
A My cousins asked me why I was crying.
Q And then?
A They asked Tolentino why I was crying.
Q What did you do next?
A I just cried and kept on telling him not to do it because we will be implicated and also my mother [was] not [t]here.
Q And how about Tolentino, what did he do?
A Well, he again told me just not to tell it to anybody because if I [was] going to tell it to anybody, he will also kill us.
Q How about your two cousins, what did they do?
A My cousins also told him not to do it because they said they [were] the only persons [t]here and for sure we will be implicated.
Q And thereafter, what happened next?
A Tolentino said he will just take care.
Q So what happened next after that?
A And then Tolentino asked Melwin Ledesma to get the bolo of my stepfather in our house.
Q And what did your cousin Melwin Ledesma do after he was ordered by Tolentino to get the bolo?
A Then Melwin Ledesma went to the house and got the bolo and brought the same to the house of Tolentino.
Q And after bringing the bolo to the house of Tolentino, what happened next?
A Then when my step-father was on his way to our house, Tolentino told us to go home.[25]
Q What happened next after you said your step-father went out to buy ovaltine?
A Then several minutes thereafter my stepfather again arrived in our house then he got inside the house and he went directly to the kitchen.
Q And what did your step-father do?
A After that he transferred the rice he brought which was placed on a plastic cellophane to another plastic container.
Q And what else happened?
A And then after that Tolentino entered our house and went directly to the kitchen and there he hit my step-father.
Q And what instrument did Tolentino use in hitting your step-father?
A A piece of wood.
Q Will you please describe this piece of wood?
A A round piece of wood.
Q How about the length of this piece of wood?
A (Witness extended her both hands to demonstrate the length which when measured gave us twenty inches in length).
Q You said it was a round piece of wood, can you more or less tell us the diameter of this piece of wood?
A (Witness again made a circle to demonstrate the diameter which [was] three and a half inches x x x).

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q And where was your step-father hit by that piece of wood used by Tolentino?
A He was hit on the right side of his neck x x x extending to his right jaw.
Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court your particular position when you saw Tolentino hit with the piece of wood your step-father?
A I was in a sitting position in the sala but you know in our house even if you are seated in the sala you can see the kitchen from there.
Q Before you saw that, where did Tolentino come from?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Witness is incompetent, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
If she knows, Your Honor.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
She was seated in the sala, how can [she] know?

COURT:
According to her she went home and she was in the sala. If she went to the sala, probably she will know. If she knows she may answer.

A I did not know where he came from but I just saw him getting inside our house and [going] directly to the kitchen.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q When you saw Tolentino hit your step-father, where was your step-father facing?
A He was facing forward while Tolentino came from behind him.
Q And what happened next after your step-father was hit by that piece of wood used by Tolentino?
A After he was hit he fell [face] down x x x, he fell down first on the table and after that to the ground. From the table he continued to fall to the ground.
Q And while your step-father was already on the ground, what if any did Tolentino do?
A Then when my step-father was already at the cemented pavement Tolentino stepped on his head several times.
Q And then what happened next?
A After that I cried but he told me to keep quiet because if I [was] not going to keep quiet he will also kill us.
Q After that, what happened?
A And then he asked my cousins to help him to bring the body of my step-father outside of the house.
Q And then?
A Then they brought my step-father outside of the house and Tolentino held him on the collar of his shirt and my cousins held him on his feet.
Q And while already outside the house, towards what direction did they bring your step-father?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Witness is incompetent, we object, Your Honor.

COURT:
Sustained.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q What else happened after you saw your cousins Jonathan Fabros and Tolentino carrying your step-father?

ATTY. FABIAN:
Objection, Your Honor, there was no mention of any Jonathan Fabros in her testimony.

COURT:
Cousin only.

ATTY. FABIAN:
Yes, Your Honor, cousin only, no mention of Jonathan Fabros.

COURT
I do not know if it was cousin or cousins.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
I heard cousins, Your Honor.

COURT:
Cousins, with S. She may answer. Yes, according to her it was only her cousins who were with her.

ATTY. FABIAN:
I heard the name Jonathan Fabros being mentioned by the prosecution, Your Honor.

COURT:
That is why I told the prosecutor to change it to cousins.

ATTY. FABIAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
A It was only Jonathan and Tolentino who carried him.
Q So what happened next after you saw them carrying your step-father?
A They brought my step-father to the creek.
Q How far is this sapa or creek from your house?
A Maybe from here (witness again by the use of the witness stand as reference point, pointed to the fourth bench from the front,) about 6.5 meters, because
from the witness stand to the main door is measured 7.5 meters, so if it is from here, it is only 6.5 meters.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
That is about 7 to 8 meters.

COURT:
That is about 7 meters already from the witness stand to the fourth bench, more or less 7 meters.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q This sapa or creek that you are referring to, please describe to this Honorable Court this creek which according to you is only 7 meters more or less away
from your house?
A This is a wide creek.
Q And what else did you see?
A Well, since it was clear from our house although I stayed inside our house and since the walling of our house, the portion of this is made of screen, I saw
Tolentino when they were carrying my step-father in the act of stabbing my step-father (witness demonstrated as if she was holding something and thrust[ing
it] forward).
Q What else did you see?
A And then after that, I only saw Tolentino [place] the body of my step-father on the water and there I did not see my cousin anymore.
Q And then what transpired next?
A Then a few minutes thereafter my cousin returned to the house.
Q And what did you do when your cousin returned to the house?
A And then when he arrived home I just cried and I told him, because his nickname is Nonong, so I said: Nonong, we will be really implicated and he said
nothing and instead he just went to his previous position and sat down.
Q How about the other cousin of yours Melwin Ledesma, where was he?
A He was also beside me and he was embracing me from behind.
Q What happened next?
A Then another few minutes after, Tolentino arrived in our house.
Q And when he arrived at your house, what did he do?
A And then there inside our house he flashed a thumbs up and he said it is already okey.
Q What else did he do?
A Then he approached me and told me not to report [t]his incident because if I [was] going to report [it] he [was] going to kill me.
Q And that particular time when he arrived at your house, what if any did you notice from his person, this Tolentino?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Leading, Your Honor.

COURT:
Sustained.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
What if any have you noticed from Tolentino?

COURT:
Will you please be more specific with your question.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
At the time when Tolentino arrived at your house and told you okey na, with thumbs up, that particular time, what if any have you noticed on his person?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
It is [a] very general question, Your Honor.

COURT:
Anything she noticed, she may answer.
A I noticed that his shortpants was wet and there [were] bloodstains on his shirt.[26]

The above testimony shows that Tolentino attacked Hernan Sagario. The assault was carried out without the participation of appellant,[27] who did not
personally hit or stab the victim, but only subsequently helped carry the latter from the house to the nearby creek.[28] Nothing in the testimony conveyed a
coordinated action, concerted purpose or community of design to commit the criminal act.[29] It must be emphasized that Tolentinos plan to kill the victim
was concocted in the absence of appellant.[30] The latters participation, as shown by the foregoing testimony, was made when the decision to kill was already
a fait accompli.[31]

Further, conspiracy cannot be inferred from the overt acts of appellant.[32] He did nothing to assist Tolentino in the actual commission of the murder.[33]
Neither did the former bear any weapon, much less use one to inflict injury on the victim.[34] In fact, appellant, showing clearly his lack of support for the
criminal intent of Tolentino, even tried to prevent the latter from hacking the victim, according to the eyewitness.[35]

Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder.[36]
Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.[37]

Because of the lack of a united purpose, appellant cannot be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation.[38] Absent a conspiracy, his responsibility,
as well as that of his co-accused, is individual -- not collective -- and each is to be punished only for his own separate acts.[39]

Not an Accomplice

Neither can appellant be convicted as an accomplice. Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who, not being included in
Article 17,[40] cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. To be convicted as an accomplice, it is necessary that the accused
be aware of the criminal intent of the principal and then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution
of the crime.[41]

To consider a person an accomplice in the commission of the offense, the following must concur: (1) community of design -- knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, one concurs therein; (b) cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of
supplying material and moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (c) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.[42]

To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the criminal act.[43] In other words, the principal and the
accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end.[44] Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal
design.[45]

In the case before us, appellant did not concur in or lend support to the nefarious intent of Tolentino.[46] The mere fact that the former had prior knowledge
of the latters criminal design did not automatically make him an accomplice.[47] This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principals
criminal intent.[48]

That appellant helped Tolentino carry the victim from the house to the creek did not necessarily demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose or
action.[49] Quite the contrary, the formers attempt to dissuade the latter from killing Sagario was attested to by the prosecution witness.[50] With the
nominal role appellant played in the drama that had been thrust upon him, we cannot declare that he was an accomplice in the crime charged.[51]

Not an Accessory Either

Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory either. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the commission
of the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1)
profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known
to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of
the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes.[52]

Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the crime or of the effects or the instruments thereof must have
been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime.[53] That, precisely, is wanting in the present case.[54]

In his testimony,[55] appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the
victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the charge.[56] Verily, he adequately explained his conduct
prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life.[57] It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from
assisting the victim if to do so would put the formers life in peril.[58]

Thus, in People v. Verzola,[59] we explained as follows:

x x x. It must be noted that Josefina testified that she helped her co-appellant bring the body of the deceased down the stairs because of fear. Even if she
assisted her co-appellant without duress, simply assisting Verzola in bringing the body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for
anyone to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to conceal or destroy the body of the crime, the effects or instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the
discovery of the crime.[60]

The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[61] Thus, he must be acquitted.[62]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. He is ordered RELEASED from custody
immediately, unless legally held for another cause. In this regard, the director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court his compliance
with this Decision within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

EN BANC
[G.R. No.134847. December 6, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee, vs. RUBY MARIANO y LARA and RUTH MARIANO y LARA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Heinous crimes are grievous, odious and hateful offenses which, by reason of their inherent wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity, are repugnant to
the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.[1] To this genre belong the acts charged in the instant case -
a bizarre and nauseating tale of outrageous cruelty and brutality. The Court is now called upon to determine whether the accused are responsible therefor.

Driven by grinding poverty in her home province and lured by the prospect of a lucrative employment in the big city, Michelle Priol, then only sixteen (16), left
home for Manila in January 1996 to work as a domestic help. Soon enough Michelle found herself hired at the household of the sisters Ruth Mariano and Ruby
Mariano in Bambang, Pasig City.

Jenny Priol, Michelle's older sister, testified that she often visited Michelle at the Mariano.residence. However, whenever she would visit Michelle, she and her
sister could not freely talk as Ruth and Ruby were always hovering about.[2] Apparently unhappy with the manner she was allowed to visit Michelle - they
being constantly watched by the Mariano sisters and denied their privacy - Jenny never went to her sister again after her last visit in November 1996.[3]
Sometime afterwards, Ruth and Ruby brought Michelle to her sister Jenny to complain to her that their rice cooker no longer functioned and heaped the
blame on Michelle. On that occasion Jenny noticed that Michelle's hair was unevenly cut to the scalp. When asked what happened, Michelle told her that it
was Ruby who gave her the ugly haircut.[4] Concerned with the condition of her sister, Jenny confronted Ruby. But the latter angrily replied: "Why are you so
bold to ask me that question; why don't you ask your sister!"[5] Jenny then told Ruby that she was going to take her sister back from them but the furious
Ruby hurriedly left with Ruth, taking Michelle with them. That was the last time Jenny saw her younger sister alive.

On 17 August 1997 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, SPO2 Edgardo Hernandez of the Pasig Police Station received an anonymous call reporting that a
woman was seen in Bambang, Pasig City, carrying a rectangular box with a human leg protruding. The caller further informed SPO2 Hernandez that the woman
then placed the box inside the compartment of a car bearing plate number UPR-561.[6] On the basis of this information SPO2 Hernandez together with SPO1
Ruben Fidelino immediately conducted a "stake-out and surveillance operation" in the vicinity of Bambang as reported. After a couple of minutes, the police
officers spotted two (2) women boarding a car with the reported plate number. They turned out to be accused-appellants Ruth Mariano y Lara and Ruby
Mariano y Lara.[7] The vehicle was owned and driven by Ruby. The law enforcers, riding in their patrol car with SPO1 Fidelino on the wheels, followed the
vehicle. But the women, perhaps sensing that they were being trailed, drove fast. Alarmed by the suspects' reaction to their presence, the policemen sounded
their siren. After a brief chase, the officers overtook the suspects' vehicle and blocked its path. SPO2 Hernandez and SPO1 Fidelino alighted, from their patrol
car and introduced themselves as police officers. They ordered Ruth and Ruby to alight from their vehicle.[8]

The lawmen then announced that they would be conducting a visual search of the luggage compartment of the vehicle. Initially, Ruby refused saying that only
dirty clothes were in the compartment but later relented the police officers insisted.[9] Upon opening the compartment, SPO2 Hernandez was greeted by a
putrid odor emanating from a decomposing body inside the box. Ruth and Ruby identified the body as that of their maid Michelle Priol.[10] Ruth and Ruby
were then arrested and taken to the Pasig Police Station. Their vehicle was driven to the station by SPO2 Hernandez.

Senior Police Inspector Emmanuel L. Aranas, Medico-legal Officer of the PNP Crime laboratory, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Michelle. The result
was appalling and beyond belief. The body was found to be poorly nourished and already in a state of decomposition. The skin and underlying soft tissues on
the chest appeared to have been gnawed by rats apparently attracted to the exposed scalded flesh resulting from the repeated splashing of boiling water, and
that the victim had died two (2) to three (3) days prior to the autopsy. The autopsy findings were: (a) healed and healing lacerated wounds on the upper lip
caused by hard blunt object or fist blows healed lacerated wound on the lower lip; (c) multiple lacerated swelling wounds on the right and left ear; (d) two (2)
healing wounds on the left illiac region; and, (e) the cause of death was multiple traumatic wounds, and first and second degree scalding burns on the head,
trunk, upper and lower extremeties comprising about 72% of the body surface, caused by hot liquid within the range of boiling point inflicted at various times
prior to the death of the victim.[11]

With the foregoing findings, Ruth and Ruby were charged with murder. Ruth denied the charge claiming that the victim "died because she got sick, and not
because I mauled her."[12] Nevertheless, by her own narration and admission during the trial, Ruth described in lurid details what really happened to Michelle.
According to Ruth, Michelle was kind, industrious and respectful at first. However, sometime November 1996 she and her sister Ruby caught Michelle stealing
money and jewelry from their bedroom. Thus, they brought her to the police but later desisted from prosecuting Michelle when she pleaded for a second
chance and promised that she would not do it again.[13] After that incident, Michelle's attitude changed completely. Ruth claimed that she often caught her
stealing money from them and destroying the appliances whenever she cleaned the house, and that whenever she scolded Michelle she would answer back,
triggering a fight between them.[14]

Ruth confessed in her testimony that she doused boiling water on Michelle several times whenever she was angry.[15] In those occasions, according to her,
they were quarrelling and Michelle would fight back.[16] Ruth further said that only by pouring boiling water on Michelle could she (Ruth) "pacify her (and
stop her) from fighting back."[17]

Ruth likewise admitted having pulled Michelle's hair and banged her head (inuumpog ang ulo),[18] and that in the month of July 1997 alone they fought at
least six (6) times. She added that she was remorseful afterwards for what she had done and treated Michelle's seared flesh with antibiotics and washed her
wounds with guava leaves. As if explaining the fresh-looking wounds on the body of Michelle, Ruth said that Michelle sometimes scratched her wounds
thereby removing the scabs and exposing the fresh wounds. But by August 1997 Michelle lost her appetite and her condition started to deteriorate. Not long
thereafter, she died. Ruth further testified, that when she was about to wake Michelle up in the morning of 17 August 1997 she discovered Michelle's body
already bent and flexed forward (nakabaluktot) lying in bed, lifeless.[19] So she panicked and hurriedly placed the body in a box, which she then loaded inside
the luggage compartment of Ruby's car. According to Ruth, she was afraid that her 74-year old mother who was suffering from a heart ailment would see the
body, thus she concealed the corpse in the trunk of the vehicle.[20] When Ruby arrived that evening, Ruth met her at the gate of their house and told her that
she had a problem. Ruth then asked Ruby to drive and promised to tell her about it on the way. It was then that they were apprehended by elements of the
Pasig Police force.

On 22 June 1998 Ruth arid Ruby were convicted of murder by the trial court. Accordingly, Ruth was sentenced to death while Ruby was found guilty as an
accomplice and sentenced to reclusion temporal. The trial court explained its Decision -

With such evidence on record, there is no doubt that Ruth was responsible for the death of Michelle Priol and the killing was aggravated with (sic) cruelty
making it a crime of murder. Splashing boiling water six (6) times a month, even when the previous injuries were not yet healed, is cruelty of the highest order.
Splashing boiling water while the previous scalding burns were not yet healed was deliberately done. Such act was inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim. Ruth Mariano admitted this in her oral testimony and in her counter-affidavit x x x x therefore, Ruth Mariano should be held to answer for the crime of
murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code x x x x

As to the liability of Ruby Mariano, the evidence appears to be circumstantial. [She] knew of the death of Michelle Priol prior to the time her body was put in a
box and loaded in the car x x x x she [was] living with Ruth in the same apartment and as such, that place is not too big not to see or know that a member of
the household is (sic) dead.
Moreover, as admitted by Ruth Mariano in her testimony in Court that she poured boiling water on Michelle Priol six (6) times a month. That alone must have
been known to Ruby Mariano. For her failure to prevent Ruth from pouring boiling water on Michelle Priol, which according to Dr. Aranas was the cause of
Priol's death, that constitute cooperation on her part in killing Michelle Priol.

All the foregoing circumstances taken together constitute violation of Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, Ruby Mariano is liable as an accomplice.

Considering that the act of putting the cadaver of victim Michelle Priol in a box and loading it in the baggage compartment of a car is an outraging act, or, an
act of scoffing at her person or corpse which is an aggravating circumstance coupled with evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength,
the fact that the accused Ruth Mariano is a big buxom matured woman while the victim Priol was a slim teenager, such aggravating circumstances, and there
being no mitigating circumstance, the imposition of the death penalty would be proper as against accused Ruth Mariano y Lara.[21]

Hence, this automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

The errors assigned by accused-appellants in their brief may be subsumed under the basic contention that the trial court erred in convicting them as principal
and accomplice to the crime of murder notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution evidence was grossly insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

Aware that the life of a human being is here at stake, we have carefully examined every piece of evidence on record as well as the arguments raised by
accused-appellants in their pleadings no matter how specious and ridiculous they may appear to be, but we fail to find any compelling reason to overturn the
findings of fact and conclusions of the court a quo, except as may be stated hereunder.

First, on the criminal liability of Ruth Mariano. The defense at once crumbles in the face of accused-appellant's own admission in open court that she employed
violence on Michelle, dousing her with boiling water and battering her into insensibility in the course of their supposed quarrels. She virtually painted in her
testimony a harrowing portrait of the barbaric episode culminating in the death of the victim, thus -

A: Whenever I scolded her, she became angry and told me that I'm (sic) not the one who is (sic) paying her salary and I am (sic) "masungit."
Q: And what else transpired, if any?
A: We have (sic) exchanges of word and that started our quarrel.
Q: When you said quarrel, what do you mean quarrel, just by exchanging words or what? You have any physical contact?
A: We were engaged in physical fight.
Q: What else happened, if any?
A: If she fought back and I'm (sic) being hurt and if I'm (sic) already angry, I splashed (nasasabuyan) her with boiling water x x x x[22]
Q: When for the first time did you have any occasion of splashing hot water on the person of Priol?
A: July 1997.
Q: When was the second time?
A: I cannot remember.
Q: Also in the month of July?
A: Every time she fought against me.
Q: When was the third time?
A: I cannot remember anymore.
Q: More or less, how many times did you splash her with hot water?

COURT: Hot or boiling water?

PROSECUTOR LEONARDO: Boiling water.

A: Twice (2x) x x x x[23]
Q: You splashed her frontally?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Facing each other?
A: Yes, Ma'am xxxx
Q: She does not run away when you saw her holding the airpot?
A: When I splashed her she told me, that is (sic) enough, I will (sic) not fight anymore.[24]
Q: Just answer my question.
A: No, your honor.
Q: She waits (sic) until you poured the boiling water on her?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: And when she tried to pull your hair, what do you do?
A: I pulled her hair also and sometimes banged (inuumpog) her head.[25]

Accused-appellant's brutality was confirmed by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas who concluded in his autopsy report that the cause of death of the victim was
"multiple traumatic wounds, and first and second degree scalding burns covering 72% of the body surface," which were the very same injuries accused-
appellant admitted she had inflicted on the victim. Dr. Aranas testified -

Q: And after conducting the examination, what was the cause of death that you found?
A: Well, the cause of death Ma'am, is the multiple traumatic injuries, as well as the scalding burns, first to second degree recovering 72% of the surface area.
Q: Combined together?
A: Yes, your honor. All these are contributory to the death of the deceased.[26]

These medical findings when combined with accused-appellant's judicial admission, certainly wove a tight web of evidence as to accused-appellant's
culpability. They clearly established her guilt to a moral certainty, for which she could not escape punishment.

Accused-appellant however, by way of avoidance, maintains that she did not kill the victim, insisting that the latter "died because she got sick, and not because
I mauled her."

The Court is not persuaded. It is evident that the death of the victim was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the injuries she sustained in the hands
of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano. The wounds inflicted on the victim were of extremely dangerous nature, i.e., calculated to destroy life, although they did
not immediately result in the victim's death. A person is to be held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of her own acts. If she
inflicts wounds of such gravity as to put the life of the victim in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of her felonious and wicked acts, it does not alter
the nature nor diminish the criminality of the acts to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Es que es causa de la causa es causa del
mal causado. He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Accused-appellant further asserts that (a) her acts of'pouring boiling water on Michelle were accidental; (b) she was unaware of the effects or danger of
pouring boiling water on a human being; and, (c) she treated the wounds and burns of the victim with antibiotics (Bactrim Forte) and washed it with guava
leaves until she got well.

The artificiality of these assertions is self-evident. They are but fabrications to explain away the numerous mortal wounds of the victim. As to the alleged
accidental pouring of boiling water, the physical evidence shows that the victim suffered first and second degree scalding burns covering 72% of the body
surface, caused by accused-appellant's repeated acts of pouring boiling water on the victim while they were allegedly embroiled in a quarrel. Clearly, the sheer
number, and severe nature and extent of the wounds suffered by the victim attest to their deliberate infliction.

As regards her claim that she was unaware of the effects or danger of pouring boiling water on a human being, accused-appellant must have seen how the
boiling water she poured the first time on Michelle seered the flesh of the victim, permanently disfiguring her body even as she agonized in pain. Accused-
appellant, who was thirty-four (34) years old then, was not shown to be a person of diminutive intelligence as not to realize the lethal effects of repeatedly
dousing boiling water on a human being. Neither can we attach any importance to her pretension that she administered antibiotics and herbal medicine on
the burns of Michelle until she recuperated, for it is contrary to the findings of Dr. Aranas who observed that there was no evidence of medical intervention
notwithstanding the character and number of the victim's injuries.[27]

To compound accused-appellant Ruth Mariano's woes, her confessed act of putting the lifeless body of Michelle in a box and loading it in the luggage
compartment of a car is obviously inconsistent with her profession of innocence. As observed by the Solicitor General, to which we agree, "an innocent person
would have lost no time in reporting to the police her discovery, right in her own house, of the death of a household member instead of taking pains in
concealing it."[28]

Quite obviously, accused appellant exceeded the limits of her credibility, as she was plainly incredible. Her attempts to lessen the impression of sadism and
viciousness of her crime only assault the intelligence of this Court. We are not that naive and gullible as the defense perhaps thought.

Second, on the complicity of accused-appellant Ruby Mariano. There is no solid evidence on record effectively linking accused-appellant Ruby Mariano to the
gruesome killing of Michelle Priol. There is no showing that she ever laid hands on the deceased nor was she ever seen helping her sister Ruth on those
occasions when Ruth reportedly manhandled Michelle, nor was there any positive act of assent or cooperation on her part with Ruth ever satisfactorily
established or proved by the prosecution. All that can be gathered from evidence are: (a) Ruth and Ruby were staying with Michelle in the same apartment,
together with their 74-year old mother and Ruby's children; (b) the victim had been dead for two (2) to three (3) days when placed in the car; and, (c) Ruby
owns the vehicle where the body of the victim was concealed and was in fact driving the vehicle when the police intercepted them and found the body of
Michelle in the trunk of their vehicle. While these circumstances strongly indicate that Ruby had knowledge of what her sister Ruth did to Michelle, they are
too insufficient to support a finding that Ruby had something to do with the crime so that she should likewise be answerable. With her nominal role, we
cannot conscientiously declare that Ruby was a principal or even an accomplice in the crime. The presumption of innocence in her favor has not been
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

We cannot agree with the Solicitor General that Ruby should have been convicted as an accessory after the fact -

x x x x since her act of driving the car where the corpse of Michelle was hidden, her resistance to stop the car when chased by the police and to immediately
open the luggage compartment as requested by the police, her act of lying to the police by claiming that the box in the compartment contained only dirty
clothes, and her refusal to open said box sufficiently indicate knowledge of the crime and assistance to Ruth Mariano in concealing the corpus delicti to
prevent its discovery.

Accused-appellant Ruby Mariano is the sister of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano. As such, their relationship exempts appellant Ruby Mariano from criminal
liability under Art. 20 of The Revised Penal Code -

Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with
the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the preceding article (underscoring supplied).

The reason for exemption is obvious; it is based on ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of one's name, which compels one to conceal crimes
committed by relatives so near as those mentioned in the above-quoted article. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit accused-appellant Ruby Mariano.

Third, the crime committed by accused-appellant Ruth Mariano was evidently murder, the killing of the victim being qualified by cruelty. The autopsy report of
Dr. Aranas abundantly shows irrefutable evidence of cruelty -

FINDINGS: Poorly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, in the beginning stage of decomposition. Embalmed. The skin and underlying soft tissues on the
chest gnawed by small animals. HEAD, TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES: Healed lacerated wound, upper lip, measuring 1 by 0.7 cm., 1.5 cm., right of the anterior
midline; Healing lacerated wound, upper lip, measuring .07 by .3 cm., left of the anterior midline; Healed lacerated wound, non-coaptated, lower lip,
measuring 1 by 1 cm., just left of the anterior midline; Multiple lacerated wounds, right ear, with multiple contusions and swelling; Multiple lacerated wounds,
left ear, with multiple contusions and swelling.

CONCLUSION: Cause of death is multiple traumatic injuries and scalding burns, 1st and 2nd degrees, 72% of the body surface area.

The wounds and scalding burns listed in the autopsy report were inflicted at different times but did not immediately result in death, as some of the wounds
were still in the process of healing at the time of the autopsy. This clearly suggests that the victim was still alive even after those injuries were sadistically and
inhumanly inflicted on her. The nature and extent of those injuries undoubtedly caused terrible sufferings on the victim for a long period of time resulting in a
slow, painful death. Explaining his medical findings on the cadaver of the victim, Dr. Aranas testified -

Q: In such a situation where there are several injuries, would you tell the Court how long after the infliction of those injuries will the victim die?
A: Well, your Honor, there is evidence of a slow regression of the physical condition of the deceased, so, the moment that injuries were inflicted on her a few
days or may be a week prior to death, there is already a regression of the body of the deceased considering the presence or the observation of a collapsed lung
and the presence of yellowish fluid on the lungs. This only means that there was already a slow regression on the physical condition.

COURT: In a layman's language, what do you mean by slow regression?

A: Well, your Honor, there is an evidence of the process of weakening of the system of the body and slowing down the function of the vital organs of the
deceased.
Q: In other words, you would like to tell the Court that the victim has suffered for a long time before she actually died?
A: Precisely, your Honor.
Q: Can you tell the Court, with the injuries that you have found in the body of the victim, how long did that victim suffer before she died?
A: Well, your Honor, there are healed wounds and these would have been inflicted a week or more prior to the death; and there are healing wounds and these
were inflicted within a week prior to the death; there were fresh wounds which were inflicted may be a few hours or day prior to the death. So, she has been
suffering for quite a long time prior to the death.[29]
Indeed, to the trained eye of medico-legal specialists, the inanimate remains of the dead give an eloquent testimony of their own, and that is true even of the
young victim, Michelle, who in life could not have been as articulate. The test in appreciating cruelty, as a qualifying circumstance is whether the accused
deliberately augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's sufferings or outrage, or
scoffed at his person or corpse.[30] The prosecution evidence surmounted this test beyond any peradventure of doubt.

We also find that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength aggravated the killing of the victim. There was gross physical disparity between the age, built
and strength of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano viz-a-viz the victim Michelle. The former is a big and burly matured woman in her thirties, several inches taller
than the victim, and "who could subdue her [victim] even without a weapon."[31] While the latter was merely a teenager, five (5) feet tall, slim and poorly
nourished and weighed less than 100 pounds according to Dr. Aranas.[32] The records also show that accused-appellant Ruth Mariano pulled the victim's hair,
banged her head, and repeatedly doused boiling water on her. On those occasions, the victim was not shown to be equipped with reasonable means of
defense. Abuse of superior strength depends upon the age, size and strength of the parties. To take advantage of superior strength is to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[33]

Abuse of superior strength is a generic aggravating circumstance which is capable of being proved and taken into consideration in imposing the sentence, even
if it was not alleged in the information. The evidence of its existence merely forms part of the proof of the actual commission of the offense and does not
violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

We are not in accord with the trial court, however, in appreciating evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance. The essential elements of evident
premeditation are: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his
determination; and, (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.[34] These requisites must be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.[35] In the instant case, the records are bereft of any evidence to show the nature of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano's planning and preparation
to slay her victim, or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Evident premeditation must be based on external facts which are evident, not
merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning. Mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical or probable they might be, would not be
enough to sustain a finding of this aggravating circumstance.[36]

Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 6, RA 7659, punishes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. The presence of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength warrants the imposition of the higher penalty of death on accused-appellant Ruth Mariano in accordance with Art.
63 of The Revised Penal Code.[37] In addition, the same accused-appellant should be made to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 for civil indemnity,
comformably with prevailing jurisprudence,[38] P35,000.00 for actual damages, and P300,000.00 for moral damages. Moreover, since there is present an
aggravating circumstance, and considering the peculiar circumstances of this case, an award of P50,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.

Finally, we cannot write finis to this case without expressing our abhorrence to the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Accused-appellant Ruth
Mariano's atrocious character, which transfixes the soul with such horror and revulsion, truly merits the severest condemnation of this Court. By her savagery
and ruthlessness - by a woman to another woman - she forfeits her rightful place in civilized society. Michelle, even in death, is entitled no less to the full
measure of justice as any other victim of a gruesome and senseless killing.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 22 June 1998 is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Ruth Mariano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER qualified by extreme cruelty and is sentenced to DEATH. She is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of victim Michelle Priol y Beronio the
following amounts: P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P35,000.00 for actual damages, P300,000.00 for moral damages, another P50,000.00 for exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs.

As for accused-appellant Ruby Mariano, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt her guilt as an accomplice in the
commission of the said crime. Neither can she be held liable as an accessory after the fact, as she is exempt from criminal liability by reason of her relationship
with her co-accused pursuant to Art. 20 of The Revised Penal Code. Consequently, she is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and her immediate release from
custody is ordered unless she is being detained for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to report to this Court the action taken
hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the view that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional,
nevertheless, bow to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed. In
accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659, amending Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.