EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.

Mariano A. Albert for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.

PER CURIAM, J.:

This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No.
2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or
Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.

Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.

Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo
who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.

In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that
the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions
propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio
Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and,
according to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen
was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:

FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS

Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment during his whole 24 hours
daily, that he was not under observation.

The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only
reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.

Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be
intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided
to suffer for it in any manner or form.

His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and
provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.

On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.

What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the
present instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a
Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in
hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr.
Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently
outspoken speeches.

All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in relation to rationalization about
the consequences of his acts.

In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a personality
defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
 Final Diagnosis

Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.

In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by
the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he
committed on the date in question.

THE FACTS

Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective
memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing
of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:

On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political group, has voted for the
defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of
the Com monwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed
in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election
campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his
country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.

After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the night
of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd,
President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and
politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of
the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to
Filipino nationals be adopted.

Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he
thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two
bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or following his
intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but
having encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of
March 10, 1947.

On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in
accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the
occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents
of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:

FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES

I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took me
many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my
duty.

I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either ton
sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.

Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions now
suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.

I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he had
astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future
generations. For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of
eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.

These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters not if
others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my
performance of my said act.
 Hurrah for a free Philippines.

Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.

May God pity on me.

Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting
at Plaza de Miranda.

When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He
buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he
stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the
latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.

General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away
from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and,
covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in
the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was
found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the following day as the result of
mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang.

Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was
one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran
away towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that
exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and
managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion,
placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the
affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he
(Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous
to the explosion.

The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at
1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards
the platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.

During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the same time he tried to justify his action
in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above
and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.

Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in
the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the
Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies
exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.

THE ISSUES

In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first,
"in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty
to be imposed upon the accused"; andfourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt
of public authorities in the commission of crime."

The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when
Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President
Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode,
he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly
explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.

Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He
stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there
were some people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount
to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with
the latter. In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing
them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.

The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall
not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the
Revised Penal Code.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused
to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In
the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should
intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention
of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by
this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)

Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:

Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al
fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero
despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el
estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de
c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse
anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero
debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo
que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio declararsele
responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un
solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo
dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros
articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro
el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.

We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the first
clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two
grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas,
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.

The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court
held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the
defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the
attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into
the account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.

There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him,
thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already
named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.

In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were
directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises,
by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate
allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.

The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at
the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But
we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-
quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)

It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances
hereinabove narrated.

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death
sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such
working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132676. April 4, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE
IBAO, accused-appellants.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The accused might as well have borrowed the famous line of Shakespeare How this world is given to lying![1] - when they impute error
to the trial court for relying on the testimony of a single witness in convicting them of multiple murder complexed with attempted murder for
the death of Florentino Dulay, Norwela Dulay and Nissan Dulay, and the wounding of Noemi Dulay.[2]
The challenged testimony of witness Ruben Meriales follows:[3] On 25 August 1996 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening while he was
watching television with his family his dogs barked. His mother who was apprehensive that their cow might be stolen prodded him to check
the disturbance. To allay her fears he stood up, took his flashlight and trudged the unpaved path towards his cow that was tied to a mango
tree. Then the noise grew louder thus arousing his suspicion that something was really wrong. After transferring his cow nearer to his house,
he went inside the kitchen, stood atop the concrete washbasin, hid himself behind the bamboo slats and peeped outside to observe. The darkness
helped conceal him from outside view while the light from the two (2) bulbs positioned at about three (3) meters from where he stood filtered
through the slats and illumined the surroundings. There was also moon in the sky.
A few minutes later, he saw barangay captain Jaime Carpo together with Warlito Ibao suspiciously stooping near his barn. He knew Jaime
and Warlito very well. Jaime was his uncle and Warlito lived in his neighborhood. Warlito's son Roche was also there; he was standing by the
mango tree. They were all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulay's house which was about a meter to the south from where he was. He
also saw Oscar Ibao, another son of Warlito, striding towards Dulay's hut. As soon as he reached the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near the
wall and hurled something inside. Oscar then scurried off towards the nearby creek with Roche following him. Seconds later, a loud explosion
shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulay's screams broke into the night.
Ruben Meriales, rushed outside. He ran towards Florentino's hut but was deterred by darkness. He returned home to take his flashlight
and raced back to lend aid to Teresita. Inside the hut he was stunned by the terrifying gore that greeted him - a bloodied Florentino cradled in
the arms of his weeping widow, Norwela and Nissan lying side by side on a cot both doused in blood, and a motionless Norma whose head
was oozing with blood.
Realizing the exigency of the situation, he left the crime scene to borrow the jeepney of Brgy. Kagawad Edgardo Marquez for the hapless
victims. The neighbors milling around at once gave up hope on Florentino so that only Norwela, Nissan and Noemi were loaded in the jeepney
and rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On their way, Norwela who had injuries on her chest and lower appendage died. Nissan
who was five (5) years old and the youngest of the victims died later due to "shock from pains" caused by the shrapnel wounds in her left
shoulder, abdomen and lower extremities.[4] Noemi luckily survived. Her attending physician, Dr. Emiliano Subido, testified that Noemi was
semi-conscious and vomiting although ambulatory at the time he examined her. But due to the seriousness of her wounds and the hospital's
lack of facilities she was taken to another hospital in Dagupan City.[5]
In the course of their investigation, the policemen questioned the people who might have witnessed the carnage. Fearful however that the
culprits would return, Ruben Meriales refused to give any statement but intimated to Police Officer Guillermo Osio that he would go to the
police station after the burial.
On 4 September 1996, or a week later, Ruben kept his promise and went to the police station where he gave his statement to Police Officer
Osio. He named Jaime Carpo, Warlito lbao, Oscar lbao and Roche Ibao as the perpetrators of the crime. He further said that Florentino was
killed because he was about to testify against Roche Ibao for the murder of his brother Delfin Meriales. [6]
On 3 October 1996, solely on the basis of Ruben's testimony, a criminal complaint for the murder of Florentino Dulay and his two (2)
daughters Norwela, and Nissan as well as the frustrated murder of his daughter Noemi was filed against Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao
and Roche Ibao. Warrants for their immediate arrest were issued by the municipal circuit trial court.
On 25 October 1996 Jaime Carpo was taken into custody by the police, while Roche Ibao eluded arrest until 9 December 1996 when he
was apprehended by police officers in La Union.With Roche's arrest, Oscar and Warlito realized the futility of hiding and surrendered
themselves to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in La Union.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Ruben, Noemi, Dr. Rosalina O. Victorio, Dr. Emiliano Subido and Police Officers Virgilio dela
Cruz, Jovencio Tapac and Guillermo Osio as witnesses.
Police Officer Osio testified that on the night of 25 August 1996 after receiving a report of an explosion in Brgy. Baligayan, he together
with Police Officers Julius Aurora, Ricardo Lugares and Jovencio Tapac immediately responded. They were able to gather several grenade
shrapnels and a grenade shifting lever from the crime scene. He spoke with the weeping Teresita Dulay who told him that she suspected the
accused of having perpetrated the assault. He likewise conferred with Ruben Meriales who named the same set of suspects and who promised
to give his statement to the police after the funeral.
After speaking with Teresita and Ruben, he summoned his colleagues to go with him to Warlito Ibao's house which was just across the
road. Warlitos house was dark and its front door was locked. He called out but there was no answer. They then proceeded to Oscar's house
which was also padlocked and unoccupied. He went to Roche's house and peeped inside before they left.[7]Against their positive identification
by Ruben, the four (4) accused interposed alibi claiming that they were somewhere else when the Dulay hut was blasted. They likewise assailed
Ruben's testimony for being a fabrication and insisted that he lied to get back at them because Roche was a suspect in the killing of his brother
Delfin Meriales. Jaime and his wife Veronica Carpo were one in testifying that in the evening of 25 August 1995 Jaime was at home in Brgy.
Libsong, a hundred and fifty (150) meters away from the house of the Dulays in Brgy. Baligayan. When he heard the loud explosion, he
summoned his tanods to check whether the blast happened within their barangay. When he learned that the explosion occurred in the
adjoining Brgy. Baligayan, he went home to sleep. Brgy. Baligayan is separated from his barangay by a creek and could be reached in ten (10)
minutes. However, on the night of the incident, the creek was neck deep such that one had to make a detour through a mountainous route for
about thirty (30) minutes to reach Brgy. Baligayan.[8]
Jaime testified that Ruben implicated him because the latter was angry at him. Ruben's grudge supposedly started when Jaime sided with
the Ibaos in the murder case instituted by the Merialeses against Roche for the death of Delfin Meriales. As a matter of fact on 10 December
1996 while he was incarcerated at the Balungao District Jail, Ruben supposedly visited him asking his forgiveness for having named him as
one of the perpetrators of the crime. Ruben subsequently pleaded with him to reveal the names of those responsible but when he claimed
ignorance, Ruben left in a huff.
Warlito, Oscar and Roche Ibao testified that on the night of the explosion their family was having a farewell party for the family's only
girl Maribel Ibao who was leaving for Hongkong.They heard the blast but they did not bother to check. They denied having heard the police
officers call for them an hour after the explosion. Roche further asserted that he did not have a house in Brgy. Baligayan as reported because
he lived with his parents-in-law in Brgy. Libsong. However, on the night of the blast, he slept at his parents' house as all of his siblings and
their families were there. He only learned of the bloodbath the following morning when they went home to his in-laws. His wife Jovelyn
corroborated his testimony in the same manner that Remedios supported the story of her husband Warlito. [9]
In convicting Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of the multiple murder of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay
and the attempted murder of Noemi Dulay the trial Court gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben.[10] It accepted his straightforward testimony
and ruled that "at no instance throughout the twin testimonies of Meriales did the Court notice a twitch of falsehood on his lips."[11] Accordingly,
in accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code the trial court imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty
of death and ordered them to solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased as well as Noemi Dulay in the amount of P600,000.00.[12]
Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. After the filing of briefs, the accused filed an Addendum to Appellant's
Brief urging that the favorable results of their lie detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records. [13]
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological changes, capable of being monitored by sensors
attached to his body, when he is not telling the truth.The Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it
has not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception.[14]
The explosion by means of a hand grenade on the night of 25 August 1996 resulting in the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay
and in the wounding of Noemi Dulay is an admitted fact. The identity of the perpetrators, as tenaciously questioned by the accused, depends
upon the credibility of Ruben Meriales.
 In this appeal, accused-appellants challenge the veracity of the testimony of Ruben Meriales primarily on two (2) grounds: first, Ruben's
testimony in court is different from and is contradictory to his affidavit of 4 October 1996; and second, Ruben is not a disinterested witness
because he has a grudge against the Ibaos. Consistent with giving due deference to the observations of the trial court on credibility of witnesses,
we agree with the court a quo when it believed Ruben Meriales more than the defense witnesses. [15] Indeed, the trial court is best equipped to
make an assessment of witnesses, and its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless it has overlooked, misunderstood or
disregarded important facts,[16] which is not true in the present case.
The twin arguments therefore raised by accused-appellants against the testimony of Ruben Meriales are devoid of merit. A scrutiny of
the records reveals that his testimony is not inconsistent with his affidavit of 4 October 1996 inasmuch as the former merely supplied the details
of the event which the latter failed to disclose. But assuming that there was any inconsistency, it is settled that whenever an affidavit contradicts
a testimony given in court the latter commands greater respect. [17] Such inconsistency is unimportant and would not even discredit a fallible
witness.[18] The mere fact that Ruben admitted harboring resentment against the Ibaos for the murder of his brother Delfin does not confirm
that he fabricated his story. His frankness in admitting his resentment against the Ibaos should even be considered in his favor.[19] There is
likewise nothing unnatural in Ruben's attitude of concealing himself behind the kitchen wall instead of warning the Dulays of the looming
danger to their lives. It is a well-known fact that persons react differently to different situations - there may be some who will respond violently
to an impending danger while there may be others who will simply assume a cravenly demeanor. In this case, Ruben was ruled by his fear
rather than by his reason, but for this alone, his credibility should not be doubted.
Apropos Jaime's imputation that Ruben had admitted to him while in jail that he lied in his testimony, we find this accusation farcical as
nothing was ever offered in support thereof. The lone corroborative testimony, which was that of Roche, does not inspire belief since Roche
himself admitted overhearing the conversation while Jaime together with other prisoners was constructing a hut outside of his cell at about
three (3) meters away. As correctly hinted by the prosecution, the noise generated by the construction made it unlikely for Roche to hear
conversations three (3) meters away.[20]
The defense proffered by the accused is alibi. But this is futile. By his own admission, Jaime was only a hundred and fifty (150) meters
away from the scene of the crime. In fact, it would only take him thirty (30) minutes, at the most, to be at the place of the Dulays.
More so for the Ibaos who acknowledged that they were having a party just a stone's throw away from the crime scene at the time of the
explosion. Curiously though, if they were indeed reveling inside their house on that fateful night, then we cannot comprehend why they did
not go out to investigate after hearing the blast. Besides, it was rather strange for the Ibaos not to have joined their neighbors who had
instantaneously milled outside to view the mayhem. Their conduct indeed betrayed them.
Further, the immediate flight and tarriance of the Ibaos to La Union until Roche's arrest cannot but demonstrate their guilt and desire to
evade prosecution.[21]
The trial court also correctly ruled that accused-appellants conspired in perpetrating the offense charged. From the detailed account of
Ruben, Jaime and Warlito positioned themselves near the hay barn while Roche casually stood by the mango tree. As observed by the trial
court, the presence of Jaime, Warlito and Roche inescapably gave encouragement and a sense of security to Oscar, the group's preceptor. Surely,
the latter was emboldened to commit the crime knowing that his co-conspirators were not far behind.
Under the doctrine enunciated in People v. Tayo,[22] the crime committed may otherwise be more approriately denominated as murder
qualified by explosion rather than by treachery.However, since it was treachery that is alleged in the Information and appreciated by the trial
court, the explosion of the grenade which resulted in the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, and the wounding of Noemi can only be
multiple murder complexed with attempted murder.[23] The crime committed against Noemi Dulay was correctly denominated by the trial court
as attempted murder considering that none of her injuries was fatal. Her attending physician even made conflicting statements in the assessment
of her wounds, to wit: although he said that Noemi could have died from the shrapnel wound in her head, he specifically ruled out the possibility
of "intercerebral hemorrhage" [24] and despite the seriousness of the possible complications of her injuries she would suffer from physical
incapacity for only ten (10) to fourteen (14) days.
As none of her wounds was severe as to cause her death, accused-appellants not having performed all the acts of execution that would
have brought it about, the crime is only attempted murder. [25]
Since the three (3) murders and attempted murder were produced by a single act, namely, the explosion caused by the hurling of a grenade
into the bedroom of the Dulays, the case comes under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code on complex crimes. Article 48 provides that the
penalty for the more serious crime, which in the present case is reclusion perpetua to death, should be applied in its maximum period. As the
crime was complexed, the death penalty was properly imposed by the trial court.
At this point, we take exception to the court a quo's award of damages in the "negotiated amount of P600,00.00." It appears that under
the auspices of the trial court counsel for the defense entered into an oral compromise with the public prosecutor, which was subsequently
ratified by the private complainant, limiting the amount of civil liability to P600,000.00. We note the discourse between the court and the
counsel for both parties regarding the award.
PROS. CORPUZ: x x x x (W)e would like to enter into stipulation the civil aspect of the case.
COURT: Are the accused confident that they could be acquitted in this case? Atty Sanglay?
ATTY. SANGLAY: I think so, your Honor.
COURT: What about Atty. Rafael?
 ATTY. RAFAEL: We are confident, your Honor.
COURT: All right. So you can easily stipulate. First of all, how much do you want Fiscal?
PROS. CORPUZ: P1,282,740.00, your Honor x x x x
COURT: x x x x Agree gentlemen of the defense?
ATTY. SANGLAY: P600,000.00, your Honor.
COURT: Do you agree Fiscal?
PROS. CORPUZ: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: All right so P600,000.00 is the agreed liquidated amount in case of conviction without necessarily having to interpret this
stipulation as admission of guilt on the part of any of the accused. All right so we will dispense with the testimony on the civil
aspect x x x x
COURT: x x x x Are you the private complainant in this case?
TERESITA DULAY: Yes, sir.
COURT: If the accused get convicted and I will hold them severally liable for you of damages in the liquidated sum of P600,000.00 as
agreed upon by the counsel, will you be satisfied? x x x x
TERESITA: Yes, sir.
COURT: So let that be of record. Will you sign the note so that there will be evidence.
(At this juncture private complainant Teresita Dulay affixed her signature at the bottom right margin of the stenographic notes page 2
hereof).[26]
Article 1878 of the Civil Code and Sec. 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court set forth the attorney's power to compromise. Under Art.
1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary "to compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to
appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired." On the other hand, Sec.
23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto
made in writing, and in taking appeal, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure, but they cannot, without special authority, compromise
their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of their clients' claims but the full amount in cash."
The requirements under both provisions are met when there is a clear mandate expressly given, by the principal to his lawyer specifically
authorizing the performance of an act.[27] It has not escaped our attention that in the present case counsel for both parties had no special power
of attorney from their clients to enter into a compromise. However, insofar as Teresita was concerned, she was apprised of the agreement and
in fact had signed her name as instructed by the court, thereby tacitly ratifying the same. As for accused-appellants, the aforecited dialogue
between the court and counsel does not show that they were ever consulted regarding the proposed settlement. In the absence of a special
power of attorney given by accused-appellants to their counsel, the latter can neither bind nor compromise his clients' civil
liability. Consequently, since Atty. Sanglay and Atty. Rafael had no specific power to compromise the civil liability of all accused-appellants,
its approval by the trial court which did not take the precautionary measures to ensure the protection of the right of accused-appellants not to
be deprived of their property without due process of law, could not legalize it. For being violative of existing law and jurisprudence, the
settlement should not be given force and effect.
In light of the foregoing, the award of damages must be set aside and a new one entered with all the circumstances of the case in mind. For
the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay, civil indemnity at P50,000.00 each or a total amount of P50,000.00 is awarded to their
heirs. This is in addition to the award of moral damages at an aggregate amount of P150,000.00 for their emotional and mental anguish. With
respect to Noemi, an indemnity of P30,000.00 would be just and proper. All taken, an award of P330,000.00 is granted.
Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional;
nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be
accordingly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellants JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO
and ROCHE IBAO GUILTY of the complex crime ofmultiple murder with attempted murder and sentencing them to the supreme penalty of
death is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they are ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, all
surnamed Dulay, P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each death or an aggregate amount of P300,00.00. In
addition, accused-appellants are ordered to pay Noemi Dulay P30,000.00 as indemnity for her attempted murder. Costs against accused-
appellants.
In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659, amending Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and
Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four (4) cases identically
read:

"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.

Contrary to Law."[1]
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:

"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained by Jorge
Siriban, Jr., caused his death.

That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito Raquepo; which would have produced the
crime of Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will."[2]
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:

"In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 17th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby,
under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.

This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely:
(1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andles Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused
Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence
of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued firearm.

Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased
Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo
Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP
Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.

At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit
arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Lorclo Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the
Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar
Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was
seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the
west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection
conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.

At about ten(10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation,
shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of
the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing
through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs.
Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a
distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling
him 'what is that happened again Mario.' Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain peace and
order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the
cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco 'Mario relax ka
lang' 'Mario keep calm.' They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta
grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge
Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to adequate medical
treatment.

There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano injured on his right
forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints."[3]
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is as follows:

"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena
located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load
of ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving thereat at
about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena to make some observations and found out that there were
several persons inside the said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were seen in different places
and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to why the said persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his
impressions that if they did not have the authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surely have confiscated the same from
them. It was his belief then that they may have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the maintenance of peace
and order in the cockpit, Accused thus seated himself at the lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena
on March 22, 1987.

At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of the
Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and
order in the cockpit and that his presence must be known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in
the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of
gun fire coming from different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his M-14
rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt.
Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo
told him to relax lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said persons. Accused
however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from
accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That
because of such incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame
on him. The following morning, accused surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of
the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he
surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo." [4]
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In giving
credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found that:

"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense cannot agree on what actually transpired that night of
March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject victims. For, while the
prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but
somebody else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the cockpit arena.

In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. 'Where there are directly conflicting versions of the same
incident, the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances which can be used as valuable tools in
evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony for after all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial
evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25,
1974, 61 SCRA 180).

Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio
Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito
Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3) eyewitnesses
in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo,
Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As well
stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco
stood up from his seat at the lower front row and in port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and
his group at the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt.
Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen
who was then ten (10) meters away from the accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well-lighted at that time.

Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena by
INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling 'what is that
happened again Mario,' while the latter told him 'Mario relax ka lang keep calm.' After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the possession of
the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding
Officer, as corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of,
hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo." [5]
The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken
from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was already empty.
The court a quo said further:
"ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine that time?
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
Q: Do you have the magazine now?
A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?
A: Yes, sir, I examined it.
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?
A: No live bullets, sir. "(TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990 session, stenographer L. Tamayo).
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:
"PROSECUTOR ATAL:
Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no
live ammunitions in the magazine?
A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.
Q: How many bullets in all?
A: Twenty, sir.
Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?
A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer
L. Tamayo).

MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the cockpit arena (Exh. 'R' & 'R-1', pp. 157-158, record).
ATTY. ARIOLA:
Q: Showing to you Exh. 'R', do you know whose picture is this?
A: Picture of spent shells.
Q: How about Exh. 'R-1', do you know what is this?
A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).

Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused, is the fact that he was really arrested and not that he
voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. 'S', p. 188, record).

Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. 'T', p.
187, record).
The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP
Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and convincing, in regard to
the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).

Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the
accused rushing outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and automatic gunfire inside the
cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their
corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved reasonable leads to
the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA
92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his innocence LIESon
the accused, as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort
to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions
where concealment is highly probable, and to require direct testimony would in many cases result infreeing criminals and would deny the
proper protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).

As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that accused
Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged and thus be held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in this case is
overwhelming, coming no less from accused's brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule
that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5[M], Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court).

Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even as it does not inspire confidence, hence, the same
deserves no credence.

The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims with the
group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, in relation to where
the accused was, the front row, in much lower elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot afore-said victims, as
maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2, inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola.

The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio
Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up from his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola
who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it could
have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then
facing south, face to face with the accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot wounds
inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his
left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward.

In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side of his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right
base of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and his lower back
as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2,
the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet
ricocheted.

It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back rests
and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused must have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on the cemented back rests and
seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets
RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the
same is not too high so as to obviate the possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the
accused stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on his face and right abdomen must
have been caused by the debris of the said cemented railguard which was hit by the bullets.

In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence adduced is overwhelming and even the defense admits that
Siriban died due to gunshot wounds inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh. 'K').

The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution witnesses, there being no competent evidence presented for
them to falsely testify against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and positively identified.

All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in the shooting to death of the deceased
victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the wounding of
Benito Raquepo."[6]
The dispositive part of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario
Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317
(Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a
complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased victims
Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,00.00 subject to the lien
herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola,
the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate
docket fees, in case of successful collection, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.

2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one(1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4) months, one (1) day
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death
indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of
the appropriate docket fees in case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. 'K' and 'K-2') the corpus delicti, presently deposited with 117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit
to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the
rules.

4. The accused to pay the costs.

5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987),
provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be
credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs.
Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).

SO ORDERED."[7] (Underscoring ours)

Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present appeal on the following grounds:
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by Benito
Raquepo.
(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant Tabaco.
The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility
of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal,[8] unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.[9] The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman,[10]thus:

"In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having
the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply.
The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to
distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only
the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict."[11]
After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of
the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his
companions.
1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March 22,
1989, categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction
hitting the ex-mayor and his companions.
Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:
"COURT:
Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?
A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
ATTY ARRIOLA:
Q: Who was that 'he' you are referring to?
A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come from?
A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
A: I had to seek shelter, sir.
Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: He was hit, sir.
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if you know?
A: M-14, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to Regunton?
A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.
Q: Was that all you gathered?
A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Three (3) shots, sir.
Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?
A: Successive, sir.
Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right side?
A: None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first heard gun shot, will you please describe the stands
(position) of the accused?
A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth (port) arm position).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?
A: He fired the gun, sir.
Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?
A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you returned, what did you see?
A: I saw two dead persons, sir.
Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?
A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?
A: Less than a meter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as you mentioned?
A: They have similarity, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your companions?
A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.
Q: Where were you facing?
A: We were facing south the arena.
Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?
A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
Q: From what direction?
A: Infront of us, sir.
Q: Where was he, was he in your front?
A: He was in the first row of seats.
Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?
A: Somebody was killed, sir.
Q: Who was that?
A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?
A: Many, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in succession or automatic?
A: Automatic, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?
A: An army man, sir.
Q: How long have you been employed with the army?
A: Five (5) years, sir.
Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with M-14 being fired?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you say that these gun shots you heard were fired
from M-14 rifle?
A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.
Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
A: I was outside the cockpit, sir."[12]
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat downward, is it not?
A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.
Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?
A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?
A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.
Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun report, did you notice if he had a gun with him?
A: He passed by our back, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was shot?
A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.
Q: You mean to say the first gun report?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir." [13]
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:
"ATTY. ARRIOLA
Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of the cockpit?
A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How were they arranged?
A: In rows, step by step, sir.
COURT:
Q: How many rows?
A: Four rows, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.
Q: And how about you?
A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.
Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the place where you stayed?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?
A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember if there was untoward incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?
A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm?
A: M-14, sir.
Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
A: Because I saw it, sir.
Q: What did you do also?
A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also wounded.
Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to him?
A: When I was wounded he also said, 'uncle I was also wounded.'
Q: What did you tell when he told you that?
A: I told him, 'you seek cover also my son'.
Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?
A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of Mayor Arreola?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir." [14]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the accused Mario Tabaco?
A: Before the shooting, sir.
Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the first time prior to the shooting incident?
A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.
Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario Tabaco?
A: He sat on the first row of the seats.
Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.
COURT:
Q: How far?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part o the cockpit?
A: A little to the west, sir.
Q: And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the cockpit?
A: We were on the northwest.
Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of you?
A: A little bit west of us, sir.
Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late Arreola on the northwest when you according
to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what
you mean?
A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario
Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit arena?
A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario Tabaco considering that you were right behind
the late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your direct examination you immediately sought cover?
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor Arreola was dead already?
A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.
Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir, in our place.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?
A: In our place, sir.
Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?
A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that he was also hit.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: You don't know the person who shot him?
 A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
Q: You do not know the person who shot him?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir." [15]
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and his
companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident
is as follows:
"PROSECUTOR ABAD:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?
A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?
A: Inside the cockpit, sir.
Q: Where were you also?
A: I was at the stairs, sir.
Q: When you saw him what happened if any?
A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I got down, sir.
Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?
A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.
Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to hide myself, sir." [16]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun went off and that's the time I took cover, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside." [17]
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the abovenamed eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the
accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses
and the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses
of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare denial and explanation.[18]
Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there is
no evidence and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption was
that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[19]
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth when they testified that it was accused-
appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the
cadaver of Ex-Mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the Ex-Mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level as
the Ex-Mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher level as the point of entry was higher than the point
of exit. Appellant states that he was seated at the first row which was the lowest while the Ex-Mayor and his companions were seated at the
fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is untenable.
 Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of the slanted bleachers of the cockpit
arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at them.[20]
The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been
inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point of entry higher than the point
of exit because he must have already been lying down when his wound was inflicted. [21]
Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal
wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito
Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at
the left side of the gate of the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. While he was on his
way inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the accused "Mario relax ka lang",
after which the accused pointed his gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco, grabbed
the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also
saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters away from his left side, was hit at his testicles.
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He
testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant
rushing out from the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit arena. He was then about
one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing
at the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said:
"Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun
position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused appellant
squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take
away the gun from accused-appellant.
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not as lucky.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have
been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without merit.
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun from port arm position to horizontal
position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo.[22]
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim
of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it
might produce, is equivalent to criminal intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the consequences thereof for, in accordance
with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been
imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial
court explained the single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:

"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been prosecuted under only one Information.

The law provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

'When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48,
Revised Penal Code).'

Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act
constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily means for committing
the other (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which should have been otherwise, as the
shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been prosecuted under one information, involving four (4) murder victims.
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning
continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted
two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas,
97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.

Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say -- as the deaths of Oscar Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco,
(People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty --- is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder, the
killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending
themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but
as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4)
murders. (People vs. Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989).

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and
the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the
more serious offense. The more serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is 17
years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that
should be imposed, and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum,
to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.

It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. 'K', SN No. 1492932, 'K-2' magazine of M-14 and Exh. 'L' Memo Receipt of M-14
issued to Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so
powerful that the bullets can penetrate even more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according to
witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena,
and causing wounds on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. 'R' and 'R-1')."[23]
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court
holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire
and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous(emphasis ours)"[24] does not hold water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama[25] (not People vs. Dama,
as cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas,[26] and People vs. Pineda.[27]

The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there
was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act
produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in
killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-
machine gun.[28] He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered from
Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling
enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in
People vs. Desierto[29]. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the
M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:

"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the five persons who were killed by
appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused
of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of
time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims,
corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those
resulting from every singe act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of
seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated
homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the
tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion offenses." (emphasis ours)
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its
special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the
act of pressing the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.[30]
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda.[31] True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But
that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually
several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized
the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes."[32] Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first
half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."[33] (emphasis
supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person,
felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of
all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo[34]we held that:

"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex
crime, are committed."
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas[35] is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies
when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond
a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes.
The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences
of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts of
Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with frustrated homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ.,concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 126114. May 11, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY SABREDO y GARBO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44, dated May 13, 1996, in Criminal Case
No. 7454, imposing the penalty of death on accused-appellant, Jimmy Sabredo y Garbo, for the complex crime of abduction with rape of
complainant Judeliza Sabredo. Edpsc

The facts of this case on record are as follows:

Appellant is the uncle of complainant. He is the younger brother of her father. In 1993, Jimmy arrived from Masbate to reside with Judeliza's
family in Cagtagong, Caguyong, Borbon, Cebu, where he stayed with them for more than a year.

On June 27, 1994, Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point,
to the highway where he made her board a truck for Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife
under cover of his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer, Masbate. Thence he brought her to Estampar,
Cataingan, Masbate, where they stayed at the house of Conchita Tipnit. Conchita was Jimmy's sister and Judeliza's aunt, though aunt and
niece did not know each other. In Estampar, Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy, who severely mauled her until she lost
consciousness. Scedp

Suspecting that Conchita would report the matter to the police, Jimmy took Judeliza by jeepney to Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. They stayed with
Roberto Sabredo, his nephew and Judeliza's first cousin. The two cousins, however, had not met before and Jimmy was able to pass her off
as his wife. They stayed in Cagba from June 29 to July 5, 1994, with Jimmy closely guarding Judeliza. Calrspped

On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted Judeliza. He covered her mouth to prevent her from
shouting. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted three fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza screamed and cried
for help. Their host, Roberto, was awakened but could not do anything to assist her. Later, Jimmy struck Judeliza with a piece of wood,
rendering her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to the house of his sister, Nilda Polloso, also at Cagba.

Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan condition and offered her medicine. Catching Jimmy in the act of boiling water, she asked what it
was for and was told that it would be poured over Judeliza to finish her off. Nilda, however, stopped him. On July 8, 1994, Judeliza
recovered sufficiently from her injuries. Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal. That same day, while Jimmy was
sleeping, Nilda managed to take away from him the blade, made of stainless steel, which he had used in the rape of Judeliza. After the initial
police investigation, Judeliza was brought to Masbate Provincial Hospital, where she was confined for four days. The medico-legal officer,
Dr. Artemio Capellan, examined her. Sccalr

On August 11, 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate filed an information for forcible abduction with rape, which alleged:

"That on or about June 27, 1994, and days thereafter from sitio Caglagang, barangay Caguyong, Burbon, Cebu the said
accused with force and intimidation and against the consent of complainant Judeliza E. Sabredo abduct the latter to sitio
Cagba, barangay Tugbo, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this court
and on (sic) the house of one auntie Nilda, accused with a bolo did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse of (sic) said Judeliza E. Sabredo on the night of July 4, 1994, against her will and consent.

"Contrary to law."[1]

At the arraignment, Jimmy, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued. Calrsc

Jimmy admitted having sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed that they were lovers and had been
engaging in sexual intimacies for three months before running away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after Judeliza had revealed
to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They then lived together as husband and wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked her
but claimed that he got mad at her after she confided that she really was his niece, contrary to what she earlier told him. He likewise admitted
having pinched the victim's vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship. He claimed the instant case was filed
against him because of the maltreatment she received. Appellant likewise admitted that he was facing another rape case before Branch 45 of
the same court, which a certain Juanita Turing had filed against him in 1992. He, however, denied having fled to Cebu to escape prosecution
for said case. Sppedsc

The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous and his defense untenable. Choosing to believe the prosecution, the trial
judge convicted appellant, and sentenced him thus:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape under Article 48 in relation to Article[s] 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code and is meted the extreme
penalty of death.

"The accused is likewise ordered to pay Judeliza Sabredo the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way
of moral damages.

"SO ORDERED."

Before us, on automatic review of the case, appellant assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS EVALUATION OF THE HONESTY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, IN EFFECT GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION THAN THAT OF THE DEFENSE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

In sum, the issues for resolution now concern the credibility of the testimony of the offended party; the correctness of appellant's conviction
for forcible abduction with rape, and the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty on him. Sdjad

Appellant submits that Judeliza was neither a reliable nor credible witness since both the information and her affidavit[2] showed that the
rape took place in Nilda's residence, while on direct examination, Judeliza testified that she was raped at Roberto's house. He claims these
inconsistencies cast doubt on Judeliza's credibility.

However, we have previously held that some discrepancies between the affidavit and the testimony of the witness in open court do not
necessarily impair credibility of the testimony, for affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack
of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.[3] Note that here both the affidavit and the testimony of complainant in open court are
consistent as to the fact that Jimmy raped her while he threatened her with a deadly weapon on July 4, 1994. Her sworn affidavit and her
testimony in open court establish the basic elements of rape. These are: the commission of sexual intercourse, by the accused against
complainant, with the use of force and intimidation, without her consent and against her will. Suffice it to stress that the trial court found that
the accused abducted his niece by force, mauled and maltreated her repeatedly, instilling fear in her, dragged her to different places and any
house he pleased, and ravished her on the night of July 4, 1994. Whether the house belonged to Nilda or Roberto, both of whom they had
stayed with, is not here crucial, for the houses are both in Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate.

Here, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of complainant's testimony is entitled to great weight, absent any showing that some facts
were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case. [4] We find no reason to overturn the trial court's detailed
evaluation of the evidence for both the prosecution and the defense. Complainant Judeliza's testimony was given in a straightforward, clear,
and convincing manner, which remained consistent even under cross-examination. The trial court found her testimony believable and
convincing, while appellant's version of events incredible and outrageous. Moreover, as testified by the medico-legal officer, he found that
her body bore evidences of physical and sexual assault. Appellant's bare denial could not prevail over said positive evidence.

Appellant next insists that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was consensual, since they were sweethearts. A "sweetheart defense"
should be substantiated by some documentary and/or other evidence of the relationship. [5] In this case, there is no showing of mementos, love
letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete proof of a romantic nature. Besides, as observed by the trial judge, it is contrary to human experience
that a naive rural lass like Judeliza, barely nineteen years old, would willingly consent to be her uncle's paramour. Nor, would he if he were
indeed her sweetheart maltreat her repeatedly for no justifiable cause, without over-straining our credulity. Misact

Was appellant's conviction by the trial court for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape correct? The elements of forcible
abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is against her
will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that the victim was forcibly taken at
knifepoint from Borbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her
off as his "wife". That appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having carnal knowledge of private
complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. While it may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as
defined and penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. We note that while the information sufficiently alleges the forcible taking of complainant
from Cebu to Masbate, the same fails to allege "lewd designs." When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is
charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of
forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape. [6] When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the
purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction.[7] Hence, the crime committed by
appellant is simple rape only. Acctmis

The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But
where the rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion
perpetua to death. The use of the bladed weapon already qualified the rape.[8]Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the crucial factor
in determining whether appellant should be meted the death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the
commission of the crime.[9] A perusal of the record shows that none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by the prosecution. Where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Newmiso

In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was his niece, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.
Section 11 (1) of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made to apply in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time the rape was committed,
private complainant was already more than eighteen years of age. [10] Second, the information did not allege that offender and offended party
were relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven circumstances in R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the
automatic imposition of the death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such should be alleged in the information
to be appreciated as such.[11] In view of the failure of the information to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation could not be
taken into account in considering the penalty to be imposed. For these reasons, the sentence on appellant should only be reclusion
perpetua. Jjlex

We note that the trial court did not award any indemnity ex delicto, which current jurisprudence has fixed at P50,000.00. Accordingly,
appellant is further sentenced to indemnify private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 for the rape he committed against her. As to
moral damages, we find the trial court's award of P50,000.00 in her favor duly supported by evidence on record and is in order. Misjuris

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 7454, is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant Jimmy Sabredo y Garbo is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape only as defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty imposed on him is hereby REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to
indemnify the victim, Judeliza Sabredo y Espinosa, in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity, and to
pay her FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages. Costs against appellant. Jurissc

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., no part. Did not participate in the deliberations.

Purisima, J., on leave.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93485 June 27, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

PEDRO CEDENIO Y RASONABLE, FELIPE ANTIPOLO Y MISA, and JURITO AMARGA Y BAHI-AN, accused-
appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Bartolome P. Leus and Lilian Doris S. Alejo for accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The silence of the slumbering night was suddenly shattered by wailing cries for help. A sheet of fire raged, its crimson
brightness overwhelming the velvet darkness enshrouding the sleepy barangay as it enveloped the lair of
a mandadaut, 1 the flames only fading away with the first blush of dawn. As the smoke thinned and the ashes settled, the
debris yielded five (5) fatalities among them a 22-day old female infant. Unlike the other victims, she did not sustain any
stab or hack wound. She could have died of suffocation if not of burning.

Bonifacio Palomas recounts that on 26 November 1986, at about ten-thirty in the evening, he was roused from his sleep
by bangs and slams and what sounded like women’s desperate cries for help coming from the direction of a neighbor’s
house some thirty (30) meters away. It was Hilario Dorio’s house on fire. Peeping through his window, Palomas saw
around seven (7) persons, among them appellants Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo, emerge from the
house of Dorio that was afire. The blaze was so bright he was able to recognize them. They were wielding unsheathed
bolos. Afraid, Palomas remained home. The following morning, he narrated to Romeo, son of Hilario Dorio, what he
witnessed the night before. Then he went with the younger Dorio to the rubble and saw the charred bodies of his father,
Hilario Dorio, his mother Flora, his sister Maria, his niece Dioscora, and his maternal grandmother Nicanora Tabanao,
said to be a family of sorcerers in the village.2

Policarpio Apostadero was resting at around ten-thirty that fateful evening when he heard dogs barking. Thinking that a
carabao may have gone astray, he went out of his house and headed for the cornfield. On his way, he noticed some thirty
(30) meters away that the house of Hilario Dorio was on fire. From where he stood, he also saw people running out of the
burning house. As the fierce fire illumed the surroundings, he recognized three (3) of them as his neighbors Pedro
Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo. When they drew nearer, he saw them holding bolos stained with blood so he
retreated home. The next morning, he went to the burned house, joined the people already milling around, and saw the
seared bodies of the five (5) members of the Dorio household.3

Albino Calunod, Sr., Barangay Captain of Gandingan, Pangantucan, Bukidnon, also narrated that on 27 November 1986,
at around seven o’clock in the morning, he was informed by Cristituto Gajo that the Dorio residence was gutted by fire the
night before and that five (5) members of the Dorio family then occupying the house were burned to death. He thus
proceeded to the scene and found the house razed to the ground. The five (5) bodies retrieved from the site were those of
Hilario Dorio with wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost severed; Maria
Dorio with wounds in the neck and left nipple; Nicanora Tabanao with a wound in the stomach; and, infant Dioscora Dorio
with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.4
Perfecto Antifuesto implicated Pedro Cedenio to the heinous crime. Antifuesto said that on 26 November 1986, at around
seven o’clock in the evening, he was awakened by Cedenio who borrowed his bolo. At around three o’clock the following
morning, Pito Panla-an woke him up to return the bolo earlier borrowed by Cedenio. It was placed in its scabbard and left
leaning against the wall below the window. When Panla-an left, Antifuesto got his bolo and found bloodstains on its
handle. Upon unsheathing it, he discovered fresh blood on its blade. Thirty (30) minutes later, Cedenio arrived and
appeased him, ". . . do not worry, if this incident reaches the court I will answer (for) everything."5

Although it appears that around nine (9) persons were involved in the commission of the felony,6 only three (3) were
convicted by the trial court.7 Thus on 16 March 1990, it found Pedro Cedenio, Felipe Antipolo and Jurito Amarga guilty of
"Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 (amending the law
on Arson)" 8 and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. On 4 April 1990, they filed their notice of appeal.

Appellants now argue that there is no direct and positive evidence showing that they killed the victims and burned their
house. The fact that prosecution witnesses saw them coming out of the burning house cannot by itself sustain the
conviction as this lone circumstance is capable of several interpretations. If witnesses indeed saw them there, that must
be the time when they (appellants) were trying to save the burning house and its occupants. They likewise contend that
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are contrary to human experience and should not inspire credence. Thus the
claim of witness Antifuesto that his bolo was borrowed and later returned with bloodstains is highly improbable for it is
unnatural for criminals to openly bare the instruments used in perpetrating a crime.

Finally, appellants maintain that their denial and alibi should prevail over the insufficient evidence of the prosecution. In
asserting their innocence, they allege that they were in the area because of their moral obligation to save life and
property. Hence, appellant Cedenio claimed that he cut up banana trunks and hurled them into the fire while appellant
Antipolo gathered soil and threw it into the blaze. While witnesses might have indeed seen them (appellants) coming out
of the burning house, that was probably after they (appellants) checked on and tried to save the occupants of the house.

We are far from persuaded. While we cannot affirm the findings of the trial court that accused-appellants are guilty of
"Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613" as there is no
such offense, we nevertheless find them guilty of as many crimes as are alleged in the Information and proven by the
evidence.

It is settled that there is no complex crime of arson with homicide. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites
Groizard —

. . . when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house and that objective is
attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that
end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender
is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the
resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.9

. . . in the classification of crimes committed by fire, attention must be given to the intention of the author.
When fire is used with intent to kill a . . . person who may be in shelter, and that objective is secured, the
crime is . . . murder. Murder or homicide in a juridical sense would exist if the killing were the objective of
the malefactor and the burning of the building was resorted only as the means of accomplishing his
purpose. The rule is otherwise when arson is itself the end and death is a mere consequence. The crime
in such a case would be arson only, absorbing the homicide. 10

Except for the imposable penalty, the rule has not changed. Accordingly, if death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply arson although the imposable penalty as provided in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613, which expressly
repealed Arts. 320 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code, is now reclusion perpetua to death. If the objective of the
offender is to kill and arson is resorted to as the means to accomplish the crime, the offender can be charged with murder
only. But if the objective is to kill—and in fact the offender has already done so—and arson is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson.

Consequently, in (People v. Paterno)11 where the defendants killed a Japanese spy and his wife, and thereafter set the
victims’ house afire with their lifeless bodies inside and their three-day old infant who perished in the fire, we found the
accused guilty of murder for the killing and of arson for burning the house with the resulting death to the infant. In (People
v. Basay) 12 we said that where the house was burned to conceal the stabbing and hacking, separate crimes of murder
and arson were committed.
The Information in this case however, although erroneously charging the crime of "Arson with Multiple Murder," clearly
charges appellants with six (6) distinct criminal acts. It accuses them of "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack(ing),
assault(ing) and stab(bing) Hilario G. Dorio, Nicanora G. Tabanao, Maria T. Dorio, Dioscora T. Dorio and Flora T. Dorio,
inflicting on their persons multiple mortal wounds . . . (and) set(ting) on fire and burn(ing) the house of the victims . .
." 13 Since appellants failed to move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges or object thereto at
any other time, the defect has been waived, and thus the trial court may validly render judgment against them for as many
crimes as were alleged.14 In order to sustain a conviction for as many offenses as are alleged, it is elementary that all the
allegations must be proven with moral certainty. Hence, considering that the Information alleges that appellants burned
the house of the victims and killed them with treachery and (evident) premeditation, both the arson and the multiple
murder must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

We accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We see no reason to depart from the conclusion of
the trial court that it was "morally convinced that the three accused are all guilty . . . . 15 The court a quo had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses thus its findings are given great weight and respect.

Palomas, Apostadero and Antifuesto are disinterested witnesses and there is not a shiver of evidence to indicate that they
are suborned witnesses. In fact, the records show that witness Antifuesto even lent his bolo to appellant Cedenio so that
the former could not have had a grudge against the latter, otherwise, he would not have lent his bolo. 16 Absent the most
compelling reason or motive, it is inconceivable why the prosecution witnesses would openly and publicly lie or concoct a
story which would send three innocent men to jail. 17 Where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on the
part of prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and
credence. 18

While the prosecution witnesses did not see the actual killing of the victims and the burning of the house, we have
repeatedly ruled that guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 19 Thus in (People v. Adriano) 20 and (People v.
Galendez) 21 we ruled that there can be a conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven
form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.

This is another lucid illustration of a case where a conviction can be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
First, appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness Antifuesto at around seven o’clock in the evening. Second, Cedenio
together with appellants Antipolo and Amarga were positively identified as brandishing their bloodstained bolos while
rushing out of the victims’ burning house around ten-thirty that same evening. Third, Antifuesto’s bolo was returned to him
at around three o’clock the following morning after appellants were seen outside the victims’ burning house. Fourth, the
bolo had bloodstains when it was returned. Fifth, Cedenio called on Antifuesto at three-thirty that same morning to
appease the latter and assure him not to worry because " . . . if this incident reaches the court, I will answer (for)
everything." 22 Sixth, when retrieved from the burned house, the bodies of the victims bore stab and hack wounds. For
sure, these circumstances "form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the
accused as the perpetrators of the crime." 23

We disagree with appellants’ submission that the testimony of prosecution witness Antifuesto is not in accord with human
nature. On the contrary, his testimony that the bolo was returned to him with bloodstains is worthy of belief. Appellants
never thought that Antifuesto would testify against them. Thus, appellant Cedenio borrowed Antifuesto’s bolo and after its
return even mollified him.

In fine, we believe that when appellants were seen in the vicinity of the burning house, they were not there to save lives
and property but rather to escape from the locus criminis and avoid being made to answer for the consequences of their
wicked act. In other words, they were not there to save the lives and valuables of the victims but to save their own. We
are convinced that appellants conspired to inflict fatal blows on the victims which cost their lives and thereafter set their
house on fire to conceal the dastardly deed.24 Conspiracy, as we said, may be inferred from the acts of the accused when
such acts point to a joint purpose or design. 25

From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked and stabbed to death, appellants set the
house afire to hide their gruesome act. This is the only logical conclusion for the burning of the house. For, appellants and
some six (6) others, all bolo-wielding, have already inflicted fatal wounds on the victims, save for the 22-day old infant. If
their objective was merely to kill the victims then there would be no reason for them to burn the victims’ abode. On the
other hand, if their objective was merely arson, they would not have attacked the victims with their bolos.
We however cannot consider the qualifying circumstance of treachery. For treachery to be appreciated, there must be
proof that at the time of the attack, the victims were not in a position to defend themselves and that the offenders
consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, method or form of attack which they employed to ensure the
accomplishment of their purpose with impunity. 26 There is no proof of such fact in the instant case; neither is there any
testimony on how the attack was actually carried out. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the
aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victims began and developed, it can in no way be
established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by treachery. 27 For, the rule is settled that treachery
cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. 28 Hence,
when the manner of the attack is not proven, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt and the crime should
be considered homicide only, 29 absent any other circumstance which would qualify the killing.

Nevertheless, we qualify the killing to murder on account of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be
considered, it must affirmatively appear from the overt acts of the accused that they definitely resolved to commit the
offense; that they coolly and dispassionately reflected on the means of carrying their resolution into execution and on the
consequences of their criminal design; and, that an appreciable length of time elapsed as to expect an aroused
conscience to otherwise relent and desist from the accomplishment of the intended crime. 30 These, the prosecution
established.

The fact alone that appellants burned the victims’ house after inflicting fatal wounds on them already suggests that they
clung to their determination to commit the crime. The circumstance that appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness
Antifuesto and later placated the latter when his bolo was returned to him already bloodstained strongly indicates that
appellants pondered on the means of executing the crime and on the consequences of their criminal design. Since
appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo at around seven o’clock in the evening and the crime was committed around ten
o’clock that same evening, certainly, there was sufficient interval of time within which to reflect upon the consequences of
the crime they planned to commit.

The death certificates of victims Hilario Dorio, Flora Dorio, Maria Dorio and Nicanora Tabanao state as cause of death
"incised wounds" which could definitely be caused by a bolo, while the infant’s death was due to "burns." Hence,
appellants should be held responsible only for the murder of the four (4) victims who sustained fatal hack and stab
wounds. They cannot be convicted of homicide for the death of the infant who died presumably of suffocation or
incineration but of arson resulting in death, as defined in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613.

Considering that the prosecution was able to show with moral certainty that the killing of the four (4) victims was attended
with evident premeditation and the burning was done to disguise the murder, appellants are guilty of arson and four (4)
counts of murder, each count aggravated by dwelling which, while not alleged in the Information, was sufficiently proven
during the trial.

The penalty prescribed by law for murder if committed with evident premeditation is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, 31 while for arson where death results, it is reclusion perpetua to death. 32 Since the murder was attended
by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, with no mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty against appellants is
death for each of the four (4) counts of murder they committed. However, considering that the death penalty was
prescribed at the time appellants committed the crime, their sentence should be reduced to four (4) terms of reclusion
perpetua. For the arson where death resulted, appellants should be sentenced to a separate term of reclusion perpetua.

Furthermore, it appearing from the records that the heirs of the deceased did not waive nor reserve their right to institute a
civil action, nor did they institute a civil action prior to the criminal action, the civil action prior to the criminal action, the
civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the instant criminal action. 33Consistently therefore with
prevailing jurisprudence, appellants are jointly and severally liable to the heirs of the victims in the amount of P50,000.00
for every death even without proof of pecuniary loss.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. Appellants PEDRO CEDENIO, FELIPE ANTIPOLO and
JURITO AMARGA are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of murder and another crime of arson.
Consequently, appellants are sentenced each to four (4) terms of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Hilario Dorio, Flora
Dorio, Maria Dorio and Nicanora Tabanao, and another reclusion perpetua for arson for the burning of the house which
resulted in the death of infant Dioscora Dorio, to be served successively in accordance with Art. 70 of The Revised Penal
Code. In addition, appellants are jointly and severally held liable to the heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of
each victim.

SO ORDERED.
 Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 78432-33 February 9, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO CALDITO and BENJAMIN BEBEDOR, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ramon A. Gonzales and Manuel B. Imbong for defendants-appellants.

FELICIANO, J.:

The accused, Benjamin Bebedor and Rolando Caldito, are before us on appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 39, Manila, convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing each of them
to reclusion perpetua.

Appellants were accused in Criminal Case No. R-82-8125 in an information which read as follows:

The undersigned accuses ROLANDO CALDITO and BENJAMIN BEBEDOR of the crime of murder committed as
follows:

That on or about December 29, 1975, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to kin and by means of treachery and taking
advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one ERNESTO BIDAURE, by then and there shooting him several times on the body with
their .38 cal. revolvers, thereby inflicting upon the said Ernesto Bidaure mortal wounds on the head which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death moments thereafter.

Contrary to law. 1

The appellants were also both charged in an information in Criminal Case No. R-82-2126, which, except for the name of the victim, Rodrigo
Carado, Jr., was cast in terms identical with those of the first information, quoted above.

After accused had both entered a plea of not guilty, they were tried jointly. In the course of presentation of evidence by the prosecution, a fire
broke out on the fourth floor of the Manila City Hall on 19 November 1981, destroying, among other things, the records of Criminal Cases
Nos. R-82-2145 and R-82-2126, as well as the real evidence, such as the guns and spent bullets, which the prosecution had submitted. The
records were reconstituted after the fire and the cases tried anew. After the prosecution rested, the defense manifested that the former had
failed to establish the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused waived presentment of evidence on their own behalf and
submitted the cases for resolution upon filing of their memorandum. 2

The trial court rendered a decision on 24 February 1986 finding both accused guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds both accused, Rolando Caldito and Benjamin
Bebedor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and there being neither generic mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance in attendance, conformably sentences each accused to life imprisonment; to imdemnify the heirs of Ernesto
Bidaure and Rodrigo Carado Jr. P40,000 pesos each and to pay the cost of the proceedings.

The period of preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused shall be deducted from their term of imprisonment in
pursuance of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

xxxxxxxxx

SO ORDERED.
Appellants, in their Brief, made the following assignment of errors:

I. the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

II. the trial court erred in finding that there was treachery; if accused are guilty at all, it can only be of homicide not
murder.

From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:

In the evening of December 29, 1975, the accused, both privates in the Philippine Army, together with three (3) other persons (Danilo Esta,
Nestor R. Dimas and Herve Tabo), were drinking beer at the Bonino Beerhouse located at 745 Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They had
with them at their table four (4) waitresses of the Beerhouse, and consumed at least one (1) case of beer. In the early morning hours of the
succeeding day, 30 December 1975, at approximately 2:00 a.m., PC/Sgt. Ernesto Bidaure, Rodrigo Carado, Jr., Ship Capt. Alfonso Luzareta
and Roger Luzareta arrived in the same Beerhouse to eat and sat down on a table opposite that occupied by the accused. The two (2) tables
were separated by the main aisle of the Beerhouse, about two and a half (2-1/2) arm's length in width. A waitress approached Sgt. Bidaure's
group and informed them that their orders for food and drinks could no longer be served because the establishment was about to close. The
Floor Manager of the Beerhouse, Mr. Claudio Gregorio, also approached Sgt. Bidaure's group reiterating that they were about to close. Ship
Capt. Luzareta replied that they would simply look for another restaurant.

As the group of Sgt. Bidaure was about to depart, accused Bebedor suddenly shouted, "Alam ko isa lang ang may baril diyan." Sgt. Bidaure
replied "Bakit?" Without further ado, appellants stood up and drew their.38 caliber handguns pointing them at Sgt. Bidaure's group. Accused
Bebedor fired first; accused Caldito fired "almost simultaneously." 3 Sgt. Bidaure was hit by the first shots but managed to draw his .45
caliber pistol and to fire back. Sgt. Bidaure failed, however, to hit either of the accused and the latter continued firing at Bidaure's group
discharging approximately eight (8) shots. Sgt. Bidaure and Carado, Jr. fell to the floor critically wounded. Ship Capt. Luzareta was also
wounded while Roger Luzareta, who had managed to duck under the table, survived unscathed. Carado and the Luzaretas were unarmed.
After the firing, the two (2) accused ran down the stairs and fled; their three (3) companions had already scampered away the moment the
firing began. The Luzaretas brought Sgt. Bidaure and Carado to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. There, Bidaure and Carado died of their
gunshot wounds. 4

The accused and their three (3) companions were arrested within a few hours after the bloody incident by the Philippine Constabulary
Metropolitan Command and turned over to the Intelligence and Investigation Group in Camp Crame. In Camp Crame, on the same day, i.e.,
30 December 1975, accused Bebedor was identified by three (3) of the waitresses who had sat on their table—i.e., Ligaya de Leon, Helen de
la Cruz and Betty Tolete—and as well by Roger Luzareta.

Paraffin tests were carried out on the same day in the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory upon the accused Bebedor and Caldito and
on their three (3) companions. The tests showed that both Bebedor and Caldito had gunpowder residues on their hands while none of the
three (3) persons showed traces of gunpowder on their hands. The PC Crime Laboratory also carried out micro-chemical examination of two
(2) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolvers belonging to the two (2) accused. The examination showed that the two (2) revolvers had been
recently fired.

Dr. Angelo Singian, former Chief, Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police District, conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Ernesto
Bidaure and Rodrigo Carado, Jr., upon request of the police authorities. Dr. Singian testified that the immediate cause of the death of Sgt.
Bidaure was a "gunshot wound on the left posterior arm through the shoulder, re-entering the left occipital bone, fracturing the skull and
lacerating the brain." 5 This slug was recovered from Sgt. Bidaure's head. In respect of Rodrigo Carado, Jr., Dr. Singian testified that the
cause of death was the infliction of "four (4) gunshot wounds one a richocette (sic) with one perforating lacerating the lung, heart, diaphragm
and liver." 6 One slug and fragments of another were recovered from Carado's body.

During the trial, Roger Luzareta positively identified accused Bebedor as having fired first at Bidaure and without provocation. 7 He also
testified that accused Caldito fired his gun "almost simultaneously" with Bebedor at Bidaure's group—

Q. When Bebedor fired his gun, will you please tell us what did Caldito do?

A. He also fired.

Q. In what direction?

A. Toward us.

Q. How about Bebedor after he hit Ernesto Bidaure, what did he do?

A. I don't remember, just I heard are sounds of shots.

 Q. What did you do when Bebedor fired his gun and you saw Ernesto Bidaure was hit?

A. I covered myself under the table.

x x x x x x xxx

Q. When Caldito also fired his gun, what happened to Carado, Jr.?

A. He was hit.

Q. Do you know whose gun hit Carado?

A. I don't know.

x x x x x x xxx

Q. Do you know how many times Bebedor fired his gun?

A. Four to five times.

Q. How about Caldito?

A. I cannot remember. 8

Roger Luzareta's testimony indicates that after Bebedor's first shot, events moved swiftly and furiously. Considering that Roger Luzareta was
in the group being fired upon, it is understandable that his perception of subsequent events became less than crystal clear. In any case, Roger
Luzareta was subjected to intense cross-examination by counsel for the two (2) accused. Luzareta, however, stuck to his description of the
initial stages of the shooting and to his identification of the two (2) accused as the gunmen who had slain Bidaure and Carado. Claudio
Gregorio, Floor Manager of the Bonino Beerhouse, also testified and his testimony corroborated that of Roger Luzareta:

Q. Where were you when you heard Bebedor say: only one has a gun, did you retreat . . .

Court:

Q: Where were you when you heard this?

A: I was beside Capt. Luzareta.

Q: So you were with Capt. Luzareta?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Then all of a sudden you heard first the gun fire.

A: Yes, sir.

Court:

Q: Before the firing you said that you were talking to Captain Luzareta?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So, you were on the side?

A: I was standing in front of the table of Bidaure.

Fiscal:

Q: What is the distance between the table of the group of Luzareta and the table of the two accused?
 A: 2-1/2 arm's length.

Q: Do you remember who called you?

A: Captain Luzareta.

Q: Did you approach him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did he tell you?

A: I was asked by him if they were allowed to drink and I told them that we were closed and he told me
that they will transfer to another restaurant.

Q: What was the answer of Capt. Luzareta when you told him that Bonino Restaurant is already closed?

A: He said they will transfer to another restaurant.

Q: After telling you that they will transfer to another restaurant what transpired, if any?

A: Somebody from the table of Bebedor told 'Alam ko isa lang ang baril diyan.'

Q: When you heard somebody from the group of the two accused that there was only one man carrying a
gun, what happened?

A: When I heard that, I look backward at the table of Bebedor.

Q: What did you see?

A: I saw Bebedor and Caldito drew their gun.

Q: What where their position when they drew their gun?

A: They were standing.

Q: Why do you know when the accused fired their gun, it was pointed to group of Luzareta and Bidaure?

A: Because of the man who uttered the word, 'I know that there is only one carrying gun.' I saw Bebedor
stood up and fire his gun and at the same time, I ducked on the cement floor but I tried to look at the
table of Bebedor and Caldito.

Court:

Q: Who fired the first shot?

A: Bebedor and Caldito fired the first shots.

Q: Simultaneously?

A: Yes, sir.9

Although under cross-examination, some inconsistencies in the testimony of Claudio Gregorio developed in respect of the acts of Sgt.
Bidaure after the shooting started 10 and in respect of what he (Claudio Gregorio) did at the height of the firing, Claudio Gregorio remained
certain and categorical in identifying the accused Bebedor and Caldito as the aggressors who had carried out an unprovoked and deadly
attack upon Sgt. Bidaure's group.

The trial court evidently found the testimonies of Roger Luzareta and Claudio Gregorio to be credible narrations of the shooting in the
Bonino Beerhouse, and the two (2) to be credible witnesses. The trial court held the testimony of the two (2), corroborated by the testimony
of the medico-legal and forensic chemistry experts, as sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt. We have examined carefully the record of the
case and we find no reason to disagree with this conclusion of the trial court. The firmly established rule is that the findings of the trial court
as to the credibility of witnesses "are accorded much respect, if not indeed conclusive effect, save only in those exceptional instances where
they are clearly shown to be arbitrary." 11 The fact that witness Roger Luzareta had not previously known either of the accused personally
made his Identification more believable. No reason was adduced by the defense why Roger Luzareta should falsely accuse Bebedor and
Caldito of firing upon their group. It cannot be presumed that Roger Luzareta would, knowing that the penalty for murder is life
imprisonment, denounce the accused falsely and without cause.

We turn to the second assignment of error. The accused urge that the trial court was in error in finding the presence of treachery. The trial
court found treachery basically in view of the suddenness with which the accused attacked the victims and the unprovoked nature of that
attack. 12

In People v. Manalo,13 the court stressed that:

[T]reachery cannot be presumed. It must be proven as conclusively as the act of killing itself. The fact that the fatal
wounds were found at the back of the deceased does not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery. Such a finding must be
drawn more or less logically from hypothetical facts. This Court has ruled that the suddenness of an attack is not, of itself,
enough to constitute treachery when the method of killing does not positively show that the assailant thereby knowingly
intended to ensure the accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself from any defense which the victim might put
up. (People v. Carsano, 95 SCRA 146 [1980]; People v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 185 [1976]; People v. Satone, 74 SCRA 106
[1976]). In other words, to sustain a finding of treachery, the means, method or form of attack must be shown to have been
deliberately adopted by the appellant (People v. Bongo, 55 SCRA 547 [1974]). 14

We agree with the Solicitor General that here there was no sufficient showing by the prosecution of treachery on the part of the two (2)
accused. The hostile taunt of Bebedor ('Alam ko isa lang ang may baril diyan') was uttered prior to the attack and served to warn (however
briefly) Sgt. Bidaure and Carado and their companions of a possible impending assault. The circumstance that Sgt. Bidaure was able to reply,
albeit no more than two (2) syllables (Bakit?), coupled with the fact that Bidaure had managed to pull out his own revolver and apparently
(this in not absolutely clear) to fire a shot before he collapsed to the floor, suggest that there was a brief interval before the firing actually
commenced and that the victims (at least one of them) had probably not been totally deprived of the means to defend themselves. We hold
that there was an insufficient showing of treachery and that accordingly, the offense committed cannot be regarded as having been qualified
from homicide to murder.

There is no question, upon the other hand, that the trial court correctly found the presence of conspiracy in the instant case. There was no
showing of a pre-agreement between the accused Bebedor and Caldito to wait in ambush for the victims. However, there is equally no
question that Bebedor and Caldito acted in concert in standing up and firing their pistols almost simultaneously and in continuing so to fire at
the victims and their group. In view of the principle that, were conspiracy is shown, 'the act of one is the act of all, each of the two (2)
accused here may be held guilty of two (2) homicides.

The defense strenuously argues, however, that there was no evidence to show which of the two (2) accused Bebedor or Caldito had actually
fatally shot Sgt. Bidaure; neither was there evidence to show which of the said accused Caldito or Bebedor had in fact shot and killed
Carado, Jr. The absence of such kind of evidence would, in the opinion of the Court, lead not to the conclusion (as the accused contend) that
the guilt of the accused had not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. It would, rather, lead to consideration of the question of whether the
accused had committed two (2) distinct crimes of homicide or whether they had committed (as suggested by the Solicitor General) the
complex crime (more precisely, the delito compuesto) of double homicide under the first clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 provides:

Penalty for Complex Crimes.—When a single act constitutes two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period. (Emphasis supplied)

The technical question that must be addressed now is whether there was here a single act which constituted two (2) crimes of homicide and
which case the penalty appropriate for a complex crime must be imposed, or whether, in contrast, there existed here distinct acts constituting
two (2) separate crimes of homicide, in which case two (2) penalties are imposable for two (2) distinct homicides. The principle involved is
simple enough; its application in respect of particular facts is frequently a matter for debate.

The classic example of a single act constituting two (2) homicides is, of course, that of a single bullet successively killing two (2) victims.
This textbook instance is not, however, present here. The bullet which killed Sgt. Bidaure was recovered from his head. Similarly, as noted
earlier, Rodrigo Carado Jr. suffered four (4) gunshot wounds one of which involved a bullet penetrating and lacerating four (4) organs—the
lung, heart, diaphragm and liver—the slug ultimately lodging in the right flank of his abdomen, from where it was recovered. There were
here two (2) offenders and two (2) victims. The logical possibilities are thus limited in number: (1) Bebedor could in fact have shot and
killed Sgt. Bidaure (or Carado, Jr.), while Caldito was fatally wounding Carado, Jr. (or Sgt. Bidaure); or (2) Bebedor could have shot and
killed both Sgt. Bidaure and Carado, Jr. successively, i.e., with different shots; or (3) Caldito could have successively and fatally hit Sgt.
Bidaure and Carado, Jr. Whichever scenario had actually materialized, the accused performed separate and distinct acts which, of course,
were animated by a common criminal intent—to slay Sgt. Bidaure and the other members of his group. Since Bebedor and Caldito had acted
in concert with each other, which of them had in fact fatally wounded Sgt. Bidaure and Carado, Jr. becomes unimportant. The fiscal
expressly recognized the above facts when he filed two (2) separate informations charging in each information both Bebedor and Caldito for
having shot and killed Bidaure (in one information) and Carado, Jr. (in the other). We believe and so hold that under this set of
circumstances, each of the accused Bebedor and Caldito must be held guilty of two (2) distinct crimes of homicide, rather than the complex
crime of double homicide.

The Solicitor General cited People V. Lawas, et al. 15 In Lawas, the accused and other members of the Home Guard commenced firing at a
large group of Maranaos at a signal from Lawas, and continued firing until Lawas gave a ceasefire signal. About fifty (50) Maranaos died in
the slaughter. In holding the accused guilty of multiple homicide, the Court said:

One last question involves the determination of the number of crimes for which each of the appellants may be found guilty,
whether each one should be considered as having committed as many crimes as there were persons who were killed, or
only for one complex crime of multiple homicide. The information is for multiple murder, and no inference can be made
therefrom, that the accused are being charged of as many offenses as there were victims. Then the evidence positively
shows that the killing was the result of a single impulse, which was induced by the order of the leader to fire, and
continued with the intention to comply therewith, as the firing stopped as soon as the leader gave the order to that
effect. There was no intent on the part of the appellants either to fire at each and everyone of the victims as separately and
distinctly from each other. It has been held that if the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it
constitutes a single offense (Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code; People v. Acosta, 60 Phil. 158). So also it has been held
that the act of taking two roosters belonging to two different persons in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor
two intentions that characterize two separate crimes (People v. de Leon, 49 Phil. 237, citing decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain of November 2, 1898, October 4, 1905). And in the case of People v. Guillen, 47 O.G. No. 7, 3433, a single
act, that of throwing a highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, resulting in the death of one victim and in
physical injuries on others was considered as a single act, also falling under the first part of Article 48, of the Revised
Penal Code. It may be added that there is absolutely no evidence as to the number of persons killed by each and every one
of the appellants, so even if we were induced to hold each appellant responsible for each and every death caused by him, it
is impossible to carry that desire into effect as it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and
everyone. We are, therefore, forced to find the appellants guilty of only one offense, that of multiple homicide for which the
penalty to be imposed should be in the maximum period.

x x x x x x x x x16

We do not, however, believe that Lawas, which has been described by the Court as constituting an exception rather than as embodying the
general rule, 17 is controlling in the case at bar, given the circumstances discussed above.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 24 February 1986 is hereby MODIFIED by holding
each of the accused Benjamin Bebedor and Rolando Caldito guilty of two (2) crimes of homicide.
There being neither a generic mitigating nor an aggravating circumstance present, each of the accused
shall suffer for each homicide imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from ten (10) years
of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The penalties shall be served successively in accordance with the provisions of Article 70
of the Revised Penal Code. The accused Bebedor and Caldito shall be solidarily liable to the heirs of
Ernesto Bidaure and Rodrigo Carado, Jr. for indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 for each victim, or
a total of P60,000.00. As so modified, the Decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RADEL GALLARDE, accused-appellant. Rtcspped

 DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, finding accused-appellant Radel
Gallarde[1] (hereafter GALLARDE) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. T-1978 and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Editha Talan (hereafter EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual
damages.[2]

On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide in an information whose accusatory
portion reads as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field located at Brgy. Trenchera, [M]unicipality of
Tayug, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with one EDITHA TALAN, a minor-10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with
intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said EDITHA TALAN.[3]

During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. [4] Trial of the case
immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pre-trial conference.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez,
Renato Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez, and Dr. Perfecto Tebangin. The relevant and material facts established by their testimonies are
faithfully summarized in the Appellees Brief as follows: Korte

In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchea, Tayug, Pangasinan,
their neighbors converged. Among them were appellant Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed
Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was
Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer (TSN dated
October 13, 1997, pp. 3-4).

After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, appellant
suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Editha
talking to each other. Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to
his house (Id., pp. 4-6).

Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was
going. Editha answered that she would look for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).

By 10:00 oclock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at
Renatos place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing.
Roger asked the group to help look for her (Id., p. 10).

Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughters disappearance. The latter,
together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the
houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. The searchers used a lighted rubber tire (TSN dated Sept. 24, 1997,
pp. 8-10 and 24).

When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of
appellant. About 7 meters away from appellants house, one of the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Edithas left foot slipper
(TSN dated October 22, 1997, pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez announced: "Tata, Radel is here!" pointing to the
toilet about 6 meters away from appellants house. The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants. His hands
and knees were covered with soil. When confronted by ex-kagawad Hernandez why he was there, appellant answered he
was relieving himself (Id., pp. 11-16).

Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." When told "according to Jimmy,
you were with Editha," appellant responded "I let her go and brought her back to the dike and let her go home." To the next
question, "where did you come from since a while a go you were not yet in this toilet?" appellant answered "I was with
Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that appellants statement was
impossible because Kiko was with him drinking (Id., pp. 16-20). Sclaw
 After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought appellant to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza,
informing the latter that appellant was the last person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the
searchers (Id., pp. 21-22).

Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she reached for her slipper, she saw Edithas right foot
slipper (the other one was earlier found near the house of appellant) (Id., pp. 23-24).

Around 3 meters farther from Edithas right foot slipper; another slipper was found. It was old, 8 to 9 inches in length and
appellant was seen wearing it in the morning of that day (TSN dated Sept. 25, 1997, pp. 25).

The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide hole among the disheveled grass. Ex-
kagawad Fernandez accidentally dropped the lighted rubber tire and as his nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter
exclaimed: "Uncle, look at this loose soil!" Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Edithas
hand pitted out. The Fernandez screamed in terror (Id., pp. 5-6).

Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of
appellants safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they
met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of appellant, saying: "Here is the
suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you" (TSN dated Oct. 21,
1997, pp. 4-5).

The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more
soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. (Id., pp. 9-10).

The cause of Edithas death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed "suffocation of the lungs as a result from
powerful covering of the nose and mouth, associated with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen (Exh. "T", TSN
dated Oct. 23, 1997, pp. 22-23)."[5] Sclex

On the other hand, GALLARDE was the lone witness for the defense. He interposed a denial and the alibi that he was at home with his
mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred. He declared that he is 18 years old, single, a former construction worker. He knew
EDITHA, a neighbor whom he considered as a sister because she used to come to his house. They never had a quarrel or misunderstanding.
He neither raped not killed Editha.[6]

On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court, GALLARDE admitted that he saw Editha on the night of
6 May 1997 in her parents house, particularly in the kitchen. He was there because he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as he was called
by Rudio Fernandez. He drank and had dinner in the kitchen. After dinner he returned to the drinking place and eventually went home
because he was then a little drunk. He knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence he did not see Kgd. Fernandez
anymore. Kgd. Fernandez saw him inside his (Gallardes) toilet on the night of May 6; thereafter Fernandez took him to the barangay captain
and later he was turned over to the PNP at Camp Narciso Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and killing of
Editha Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the Talan residence he was wearing short pants and rubber slippers.
Fernandez asked him at the police headquarters to pull down his shorts and he complied. He was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was
a little loose. He was informed that a cadaver was recovered near his house. When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was
not represented by any lawyer.

GALLARDE further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the court that he considered Editha Talan as a sister and her parents
also treated him in a friendly manner. When he came to know that Edithas parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms
with them. However, he did no go to them to tell them he was innocent because they brandished a bolo in anger.

Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha died. She was still alive when he was drinking at the back of
the Talan house and left for home. From the time he arrived, he never left again that night, and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact. [7]

On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting GALLARDE of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of
rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. It observed: Xlaw

Exh. "T" and Dr. Tebangins testimony thereon show that the late Editha Talan sustained slit wounds inflicted as a means of
suffocating her to death, a laceration of the lower portion of her vagina, and a ruptured hymen. What allegedly oozed from
her vagina was blood, coupled with dirt. Had there been observed the presence of even just a drop of seminal fluid in or
around her vagina, the Court would readily conclude that the laceration and rupture resulted from phallic intrusion.
Without such observation, however, "carnal knowledge" as element of rape would be an open question.

The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a mitigating or aggravating circumstance pursuant to
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code because GALLARDEs alleged inebriation on the night of 6 May 1997, was not satisfactorily proven.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties on 27 October 1997 fixing a liquidated amount
of P70,000 as actual damages, and leaving the matter of moral damages to the discretion of the court. The trial court was not inclined to
award moral damages because the "evidence before it tends to disclose that on the night of 6 May 1997, before she died, Editha was a much-
neglected child."

Accordingly, in its decision[8] of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court hereby convicts the accused
RADEL GALLARDE Y HERMOSA of the crime of MURDER, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. [9]

His motion for reconsideration,[10] having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution[11] of 28 February 1998, GALLARDE seasonably
appealed to us.

We accepted the appeal on 9 September 1998.

In his Appellants Brief filed on 16 March 1999, GALLARDE alleges that the trial court committed the following errors:

1.......In convicting [him] of the crime of murder in an information for rape with homicide. Xsc

2.......In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that [he] was responsible for the death of
Editha Talan.

3.......In not acquitting [him] on the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt. [12]

We sustain GALLARDEs contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information charging him of rape with
homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance.
Although it is true that the term "homicide" as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense,
and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, [13] it is settled in this jurisdiction that where
a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of
the other.[14] In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying
circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
of the offense with which he is charged.[15] It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [16]

In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An
accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried.
It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is
charged in the complaint or information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged. He has a right to be
informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that
charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. [17] Scx

Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of GALLARDE for the death of EDITHA.

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt.[18] The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence
does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability. [19] Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the
basis of circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.[20]

The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following
requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.[21]

The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of
rape, where it is usually only the victim and the rapist who are present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for the complex crime of
rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime. In these cases pieces of the
evidence against the accused are usually circumstantial.[22]

The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other conclusion than that GALLARDE, and no
other else, killed EDITHA and that he is guilty therefor. We quote with approval the lower courts enumeration of the circumstantial evidence
in this case: Scmis

1. Gallarde, 18, and Editha, 10, were neighbors and friends, even as she used to frequent his place.

2. Both were at the Talan residence on the night of May 6, 1997 while neighbors indulged themselves in beer.

3. Among said neighbors Cabinta saw them hand in hand by the toilet situated five (5) meters east of the Talan kitchen.

4. After Cabinta whistled he saw Gallarde run home towards north after letting go of Edithas hands. Neighbor Clemente
also noticed that Gallarde disappeared, and that Editha returned to the kitchen.

5. Cabinta followed Editha back to the kitchen, and saw her holding a kerosene lamp. She told him that she was going to
look for "Dalpac," and off she went in the same direction Gallarde took.

6. Gallarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking place. Subsequently he was seen wearing shorts in his own
toilet.

7. At past 10:00 in the evening during an intensive search for the then missing Editha, her lifeless body was found in a
shallow grave situated some distance behind Gallardes residence.

8. Before Edithas body was discovered, a searcher found a girls slipper (Exh. "B"), 5-6 inches long, among thickets seven
meters away from Gallardes house.

9. Another searcher saw a second slipper (Exh. "B-1"), of the same color and size as the first one. Both slippers were
Edithas, the searchers recalled.

10. A third rubber slipper (Exh. "C") was thereafter found in the field, near Exh. "B-1." It was an old slipper, 8-9 inches
long and with a hole at the rear end.

11. Soil stuck to each one of the three slippers. Missc

12. Gallarde was not at home when searchers went to look for him there, after Cabinta told them that Editha was last seen
with Gallarde.

13. When Gallarde was discovered squatting in the dark toilet behind his house and beside the thickets, his shorts were up
and on. His hands and knees were soiled.

14....... At the toilet he was asked the innocent question of where Editha was and he answered revealingly, thus: "I did not
do anything to her" and "I let her go and brought her back to the dike and let her go home."

15. When asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen empty, Gallarde said he was with Kiko and he slept at the
latters house, which answer Mario Bado promptly refuted saying, "Vulva of your mother Kiko was with me drinking."
Bado and Kiko were not at the place of the Talans that night.

16. Yanked out of the dark toilet near his own house, Gallarde joined Kgd. Mario Fernandez sans protest.

17. Dr. Tebangin found on Edithas cheeks two slit wounds, each being an inch away from her nostrils. Both wounds were
fresh and reddish.

......From the lower portion of Edithas vagina blood oozed, accompanied by dirt.

......Her hymen was ruptured and was still bleeding.

 ......The medico-legal concluded that there must have been a forceful covering of Edithas nose and mouth because of the
presence of the slit wounds on both sides of her face, and that in 30 seconds unconsciousness and weakening resulted, with
the vaginal injuries contributing to her death.[23] Misspped

As to the crime of rape, there is much to be desired with respect to the prosecutions evidence therefor, but not for the reason adduced by the
trial court, namely, the absence of spermatozoa in EDITHAs private part and thereabout. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in
or around the vagina does not negate the commission of rape. [24] Our doubt on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is at all
no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were caused in the course of coitus or by a
male organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony of Dr. Tebangin disclosed that he was never asked if the laceration and the rupture
could have been caused by the penis of a human being. Needless to state, these could have been caused by any object other than the penis of
a person.

We cannot sustain the contention of GALLARDE that he was not positively identified as the assailant since there was no eyewitness to the
actual commission of the crime. It does not follow that although nobody saw GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA, nobody can be said
to have positively identified him. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness
to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identity a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence.
There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still
be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the
persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all
others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others,
then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and
unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission
of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. [25] If resort to circumstantial evidence
would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would
be denied proper protection. Spped

As discussed above, the circumstantial evidence as established by the prosecution in this case and enumerated by the trial court positively
established the identity of GALLARDE, and no one else, as the person who killed EDITHA.

We cannot agree with the trial courts rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the
incident on the ground that "the same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of
an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination[26] proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required.[27] The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act.[28] Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy;[29] and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance
taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; [30] to
expel morphine from his mouth;[31] to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; [32] and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.[33]

There is also no merit in GALLARDEs argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the place and time of
the commission of the crime is fatal and will justify his acquittal. Jospped

The place, time and date of the commission of the offense are not essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide. The gravamen of the
offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman and that on the occasion of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed.
Conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed
prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information, within the period of the statute of limitation, and within the jurisdiction of the
court.[34]

The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the
offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court.[35] The rule
merely requires that the information shows that the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court may even
take judicial notice that said place is within its jurisdiction.[36]
As to the time of the commission of the crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the information does not require the prosecution "to
prove any precise date or time," but may prove any date or time which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant." [37]

Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate time of the commission of the crime, which was
sometime between 9:00 p.m., when GALLARDE left the house of Talan followed by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of EDITHA
was found. This was further corroborated by the examining physician who testified, on the basis of the degree of rigor mortis, that EDITHA
died more or less, at 10:00 p.m. of 6 May 1997. [38]

Likewise, GALLARDEs alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present witnesses who could confirm his presence in his
house. No member of his family corroborated him on this matter. The defenses of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[39] Sppedjo

Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDEs claim is true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical presence at the locus
criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body of EDITHA was found buried was a few meters from his house, the place
pointed to in the alibi and can be reached in a short while. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be
strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. [40]

Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution that might prompt them to incriminate the accused or
falsely testify against him. It is settled that when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and
credit.[41] Testimonies of witnesses who have no motive or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be given credence

.[42]

With respect to GALLARDEs claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.[43] The records show no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and
trial.[44] GALLARDEs assertion that he was denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active
participation in the trial thereafter.[45] It is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court
of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. [46] It is much
too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the accused arraigned and trial
commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against him. [47] Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the
validity of the conviction of the accused.[48] Nexold

Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is
punished with reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
ten (10) years of the medium period of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period
of reclusion temporal as maximum.

As to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages. This should be construed as actual damages.
However, as indemnity for death, the additional sum of P50,000, per current case law, should be awarded.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. T-1978 finding
accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE guilty of the crime of murder is hereby modified. As modified, RADEL GALLARDE is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period of of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Editha
Talan, the sum of P70,000 as liquidated actual damages and P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Editha Talan.

Costs against accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE in both instances.

SO ORDERED. DAVIDE, JR.J

THIRD DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 117488. September 5, 1996]
SANTIAGO IBASCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
His motion to reconsider the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals of 11 August 1994 in CA-G.R. CR No. 13300 affirming in toto the decision[2] of 20 November 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G having been denied,[3] the
petitioner filed this petition for review. The trial court found him guilty of the offense punished in B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 2755-G dated 31 March 1987 reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of April 1984, at Barangay Camohaguin, Municipality of Gumaca, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out
Check No. DAT 41911, in the amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND NINETY PESOS and TEN CENTAVOS (P18,090.10), Philippine
currency, drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank, Daet Branch, and payable to Manuel Trivinio in payment for feeds purchased
from the latter; that the accused knew fully well at the time of the issuance of said check that he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment; that upon presentation of said check to the bank for payment, the
same was dishonored and refused payment for the reason that there was no sufficient funds to cover said check; and that despite notice to the
accused by said Manuel Trivinio that said check was dishonored for lack of funds, said accused failed to deposit the necessary amount to
cover said check, to the damage and prejudice of Manuel Trivinio, now represented by his heirs, in the aforesaid sum.

Contrary to law.[4]
The informations in Criminal Case No. 2757-G and Criminal Case No. 2-757-G are similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 2755-G
except as to the date of the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the number of the checks, and the amounts thereof. In Criminal Case No. 2756-G, the
violation was committed on 23 March 1984 and involved Check No. DAT 41910 in the amount of P17,900.00. [5] In Criminal Case No. 2757-
G, the violation was committed on 24 February 1984 and involved Check No. 41909 in the amount of P15,576.30. [6]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

The facts are as follow [sic]: The complaining witness Maria Negro Trivinio and her late husband Manuel Trivinio operate an animal feed
mill in Gumaca, Quezon while accused-appellant Santiago lbasco and his wife operate a piggery in Daet, Camarines Norte. On or
about October 26, 1983, accused-appellant Santiago lbasco and his wife, came to the residence of the Trivinios at Sitio Seawall, Bgy.
Camohaguin, Gumaca, Quezon and requested credit accommodation for the supply of ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds (TSN,
March 15, 1988, p. 7). In accordance with the agreed credit arrangement, the Trivinios made three deliveries of darak with a total value of
P51,566.49 (Id., p. 9) and in payment, accused-appellant issued three (3) postdated checks, to wit: (1) Check No. 41909, postdated February
24, 1984, for P15,576.30 (Exh. A- Criminal Case No. 2757-G; Id., p. 9); (2) Check No. 41910, postdated March 23, 1984 for P17,900.00
(Exh. A-2756-G; Id., p. 5) and (3) Check No. 41911, postdated April 18, 1984 for P18,090.10 (Exh. A-Criminal Case No. 2755-G; Id.,
p. 10). All checks were drawn against United Coconut Planters Bank, Daet Branch. Upon presentment to the Bank for payment of their due
dates, the checks bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds (Exhs. B-2755-G, B-2756-G and B-2757-G). The Trivinio spouses
notified accused-appellant of the dishonor (TSN, March 13, 1988, p. 11). Accused-appellant replied by telegram offering his real property in
Daet as security. Accused-appellant invited the Trivinios to come to Daet and inspect the property (Exh. C; Folder of Minutes and Exhibits,
p. 13). When the Trivinios arrived in Daet, the accused told them that the property is across the sea, and, not wanting to cross the sea, the
couple did not anymore inspect the property (TSN, March 15, 1988, p. 14). For failure of the accused to settle his account with the Trivinios,
the instant case was filed.[7]
The original records of the aforementioned criminal cases show that after the presentation of the evidence for both parties had been
concluded, the trial court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, before submitting his memorandum, the
petitioner's new counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since, it is claimed, the checks were "prepared, issued
and delivered to the payee ... at the office of the accused in Daet, Camarines Norte." [8]
In its order[9] of 14 November 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss considering that the informations alleged that the
violations were committed in Barangay Camohaguin, Gumaca, Quezon, and that pieces of evidence, viz., the affidavits[10] of Maria Negro, the
surviving spouse of Manuel Trivinio who was presented by the defense as a hostile witness, established that the checks were issued in the said
place.
On 17 December 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision [11] dated 20 November 1991 convicting the petitioner. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court firmly believes and so holds that the prosecution had equitably proved its case by the evidences [sic] presented,
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G and 2757-G, and imposes the penalty in each
criminal cases [sic]:

In Criminal Case No. 2755-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P36,180.20.

In Criminal Case No 2756-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P35,800.00.

In Criminal Case No. 2757-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P31,152.60. [12]
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the evidence offered by the prosecution and, disregarding the theory of the defense, it opined
and ruled as follows:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the proliferation of worthless checks in the mainstream of daily business and to
avert not only the undermining the Banking System of the country, but also the infliction of damage and injury upon trade and commerce
occasioned by the indiscriminate issuance of such checks. By its very nature, the offenses defined BP 22 are against public interest while the
crime of Estafa is against property.

Since the act and commission specified in BP Blg. 22 are not necessarily evil or wrongful from their nature and neither are they inherently
illicit and immoral and considering that the law which penalize [sic] such act or commission is a special statutory law, the offenses are
considered mala prohibita and considering the rule in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated
(People vs. KIBLER, 106, NY, 321, cited in U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132) criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited
for reasons of public policy (People vs. Conosa, C.A. 45, O.G. 3953). The defense of good faith and absence of criminal intent would not
prosper in prosecution for violation (Res. No. 447, S.1980, Tomayo vs. Desederio, Dec. 8, 1980 & Res. No. 624, S.1981. ESCOBAR vs. SY,
Sept. 1, 1981).

xxx

It is of no moment that by the evidence presented by the accused that a pre-existing obligation took place and that the products delivered by
the deceased husband of complaining witness was [sic] below par; and that his piggery suffered losses. This situation can be a basis for a
civil action which accused actually filed against complaining witness, but it cannot divest of the glaring fact that the checks he issued
bounced and was [sic] dishonored.[13]
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court held:

. . .The sworn statement of Maria Negro Trivinio which repudiated the allegation of the accused in questioning the jurisdiction of this Court;
between the protestation of the accused that the place of issuance to be at [sic] Daet, Camarines Norte and the positive allegation of witness
Maria Negro Trivinio that the checks were delivered at their residence in Gumaca, Quezon by the accused, this Court gives weight and
credence to the testimony of said witness and accused is bound by his own evidence. [14]
The petitioner seasonably appealed[15] the decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 13300.
In his Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 13300, the petitioner contended that the trial court erred: (a) in not dismissing the cases for lack of
Jurisdiction; (b) in not dismissing the cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; (c) in not
taking into consideration that the liability of the accused should have been civil in nature and not criminal; and (d) in not disregarding the
testimony of Maria Negro vda. de Trivinio since it is not clear and convincing and is incredible.[16]
In its challenged decision[17] of 11 August 1994, the Court of Appeals rejected these claims of the petitioner and affirmed in toto the trial
court's decision. As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals ruled:

We agree with the lower court. The sworn statement, Exhibit 10, of Maria Trivinio who was presented by accused-appellant as his last
witness, in the words of the lower court, "repudiated the allegation of the accused in questioning the jurisdiction of this Court; between the
protestation of the accused that the place of issuance to be at [sic] Daet, Camarines Norte and the positive allegation of witness Maria Negro
Trivinio that the checks were delivered at their residence in Gumaca, Quezon by the accused, this Court gives weight and credence to the
testimony of said witness and accused is bound by his own evidence" (Decision, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 96-98).

At any rate, as held in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154, a violation of BP 22 is an offense that appears to be continuing in
nature. The knowledge on the part of maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the
offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. Said the Supreme Court:

In respect of the Bouncing checks case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very
fact of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not
only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II,
No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R.
Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it
is likewise true that, knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential
ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another (People
vs.Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegation in the Information, which are controlling
(Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed
herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Femando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court
below. (at page 164)

This ruling was reiterated in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487, where it was held:

Besides, it was held in People v. Hon. Manzanilla, supra, that as "violation of the bad checks act is committed when one 'makes or draws and
issues any checks [sic] to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds' or having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of
the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank," "knowledge" is an essential ingredient of the offense charged. As defined by the statute, knowledge, is, by itself, a continuing
eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. This being the case, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City has
jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 2089-R (688).

Moreover, we ruled in the same case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla, reiterated in People vs. Grospe, supra, that jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the information. The allegation in the information under consideration that the offense was committed in
Baguio City is therefore controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. (at pages 492-493).

In the case at bench it appears that the three (3) checks were deposited in Lucena City. [18]
As to the second error wherein the petitioner asserted that the checks were issued "as a guarantee only for the feeds delivered to him" and
that there is no estafa if a check is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the petitioner obviously
failed to distinguish a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 from estafa under Article 315 (2) [d] of the Revised Penal Code. [19] It further stressed that B.P.
Blg. 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for deposit only, for it makes no distinction as to whether
the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation and the history of its
enactment evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing.[20]
As to the contention that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the drawing and issuance of the checks the petitioner had
insufficient funds at the drawee bank to cover the face value of the checks, the Court of Appeals held that the mere issuance of a dishonored
check gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the check without sufficient funds.[21]
The Court of Appeals also saw no reason to disregard the testimony of Maria Negro.
Still unsatisfied with the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review. In addition to reiterating the arguments he raised before the
Court of Appeals, the petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine that the mere issuance of a bad check is a crime
in itself.
The petitioner admits that the checks he issued were dishonored. His main defense as to the dishonored checks is that they were issued
not for value but for accommodation or guarantee and invokes our ruling in Magno vs. Court of Appeals,[22] where we held that there was no
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 where the bounced check was issued to cover a required warranty deposit. He also cites Ministry Circular No. 4 issued
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 15 December 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:

2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of the obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the
drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
It was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 issued on 8 August 1984, which admitted its misinterpretation of B.P. Blg.
22. The pertinent portion of the latter reads:

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its administrative interpretation
of a statute, but that its new interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn. 476; 20 a2d 455
(1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the
check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection will no longer be considered as a
valid defense.
 The petitioner also urges us to apply our ruling in Co vs. Court of Appeals,[23] where we held that dishonored checks issued prior to 8
August 1984 to guarantee or secure payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, are governed by Circular No. 4 of 15 December
1981 of the DOJ and the drawer thereof cannot be liable for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In the resolution of 3l May l995,[24] we denied the petition for failure of the petitioner to show any reversible error committed by the
Court of Appeals. The petitioner sought a reconsideration primarily on the basis of Co vs. Court of Appeals.[25] In our resolution of 7 August
1995,[26] we granted the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the petition and required the respondents to comment on the petition.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General countered that the trial court had jurisdiction over the cases in as much as the questioned
checks were delivered to Manuel Trivinio in Gumaca, Quezon, and cited in support thereof People vs. Yabut.[27] It further argued that all the
elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are present in these cases. The petitioner's knowledge of insufficient funds is legally presumed from the fact of
dishonor; and the defense that the dishonored checks were issued as guarantee to secure a pre-existing obligation is without merit pursuant to
the rule laid down in Que vs. People.[28]
We sustain the petitioner's conviction.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined by the place where the elements of making, issuing,
or drawing of the check and delivery thereof are committed. Thus, as explained in People vs. Yabut,[29] "[t]he theory is that a person indicted
with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any Jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. x x x The place where the bills were
written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the
delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation."
In her testimony, Maria Negro categorically stated that the three checks were delivered by the petitioner to their residence in Gumaca,
Quezon.
It is well-settled in criminal jurisprudence that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court considering it was in a better position to settle such issue. Indeed, the trial court has the advantage of
hearing the witness and observing his conduct during trial, circumstances which carry a great weight in appreciating his credibility.[30] We, see
no oversight on the part of the trial court in giving credence to the testimony of Maria Negro. Besides, we have repeatedly ruled that the
testimony of a lone witness, when credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to convict. [31]
Besides, it is not without convincing reason to believe that delivery of the checks was in fact made at Gumaca, Quezon, it being the place
of business of the late Manuel Trivinio and from where the animal feeds were delivered. Consequently, payment should be considered effected
at Gumaca, Quezon.[32]
The petitioner's defense of accommodation cannot exculpate him from his wrongdoing. The case of Magno is inapplicable to him. The
material operative facts therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. In Magno, the bounced checks were issued
to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was a modus
operandi whereby the supplier of the goods is also able to sell or lease the same goods at the same time privately financing those in desperate
need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus becomes an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-
purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not
to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value. Also, in Magno, the payee in the former was made aware of the insufficiency of
the funds prior to the issuance of the checks.
Equally untenable is the petitioner's argument that since he issued the checks prior to 8 August 1984 as accommodation or security, he is
similarly situated with Co in the Co case. In Co, we held that the rubber checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 as a guarantee or as part of an
arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection was a valid defense in view of Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice. In
the case of the petitioner, although he issued the checks prior to such date, they were issued in payment of his indebtedness, and not for the
accommodation of the Trivinios nor security of their indebtedness.
Accommodation pertains to an arrangement made as a favor to another, not upon a consideration received. On the other hand, guarantee
refers to a promise to answer the debt of another, in case the latter should fail to do so.[33] Neither occurred in this case.
The petitioner's theory of accommodation is debunked by the following circumstances: (1) The checks were issued after all deliveries
were made at such time when the petitioner's obligation was already in existence; (2) The sum of the checks equalled the petitioner's total
obligation in the amount of P51,566.40; (3) The petitioner prepared a statement of account,[34] where the checks issued were applied to his
accounts due to Manuel Trivinio; (4) The act of the petitioner in issuing three checks of different dates is inconsistent to his claim[35] that
Manuel Trivinio requested a post-dated check to show to his creditors; and (5) After the checks bounced, the petitioner offered a property for
its replacement.[36] All these incidents verily indicate that the checks were issued as payment and for value and not for
accommodation. Needless to state, the checks failed to bear any statement "for accommodation" or "for guarantee" to show the petitioner's
intent.
The fact that the object of the contract, the animal feeds, was not of good quality is irrelevant in the prosecution of a case involving B.P.
Blg. 22, for the saidsss law was enacted to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored
upon presentment for payment.[37]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G is hereby AFFIRMED.
 Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J. (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115217. November 21, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY PAREDES and SANTOS PAREDES, JR. alias TITING, accused,
SANTOS PAREDES JR. alias TITING, accused-appellant.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
At five oclock in the afternoon of 12 April 1989, or thereabouts, while Amelito Banug was on his way home together with Evangelio
Asis Jr. at Kauswagan, Cabacungan, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, they saw the brothers Danny Paredes and Santos Paredes Jr. alias Titing
approaching. Danny was carrying a long firearm while Santos Jr. was holding a knife. As they sensed trouble, Evangelio and Amelito ran
away. But before they could go far, they heard a burst of gunfire. As he looked back, Amelito saw Danny shooting Evangelio. Wounded,
Evangelio fell with face downward to the ground. Then Santos Jr. stabbed the fallen Evangelio.
Amelito then rushed to Evangelios parents and informed them what happened, after which, Amelito returned to the crime scene
accompanied by Evangelios father. They saw Evangelio already lifeless with four (4) gunshot and two (2) stab wounds.
On 9 January 1991 the brothers Danny Paredes and Santos Paredes Jr. were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur. Both raised the defense of alibi.
According to Danny, on 8 April 1989 he was shot at the right ear by the father of Evangelio for refusing to give wine on credit to the
latter. As a result, Danny was brought to the Provincial Hospital at Patin-ay, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, where he was confined until 20
April 1989. His younger brother Santos attended to him (Danny) during his entire period of confinement.
The trial court sustained the alibi of Danny as it was substantiated by a medical certificate and the testimony of a certain Legaspi Marayno
who attended to a sick nephew in the same room occupied by Danny. But the trial court brushed aside the explanation of Santos Jr. on the basis
of his positive identification by Amelito and its finding that Santos Jr. had the physical capability and motive to commit the crime.
On 7 February 1994 the trial court acquitted Danny Paredes but adjudged his brother Santos Paredes Jr. guilty as charged and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Evangelio in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. [1]
Santos Paredes Jr. assails his conviction. He claims that there is clear and convincing evidence that he was not at the scene of the crime
when it was perpetrated, and that granting he is guilty there is clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority.
Accused-appellant argues that the testimony of Amelito is not credible because the trial court acquitted his brother on the basis of the
same testimony. But assuming that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt, he was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the
commission of the crime and therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Outright, we find the first argument of appellant without merit. Although Dannys acquittal is now beyond judicial review, we say by way
of obiter, even if briefly, that his positive identification by Amelito as one of the perpetrators of the crime could have remained unshaken had
it not been eclipsed by the undue reliance of the trial court on the medical certificate which after careful scrutiny reveals the ambiguity of the
duration of Dannys examination and confinement at the Agusan del Sur Provincial Hospital. We observe that the attending physician indicated
in his handwriting that Danny was confined/examined at the hospital from 11:20 p.m. of 8 April 1989 to 20 April 1989. However, it appears
that 20 April was originally 10 April and that the number 2 appearing thereon was merely superimposed. We examined carefully the writing
style of the physician regarding the figure 2 and it appears that he wrote the number 2 five (5) other times but they seem to be different from
the number 2 in 20 April. It is very probable that 10 April was altered to make it 20 April to strengthen the alibi of Danny that he could not
have been at the scene of the crime on 12 April. But that is now water under the bridge, and the defense did not even call the physician to
explain the apparent alteration, if not ambiguity, nor did it present the clinical records of Danny regarding his treatment at the hospital if it is
true that he was treated and confined thereat at the time Evangelio was killed. In this regard, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General

Significantly, the lower court, in acquitting Danny, made no mention of any flaw, either in the substance of Amelitos testimony or in his
deportment as a witness, that could possibly justify its decision to uphold Dannys alibi over Amelitos positive identification of both Danny
and appellant as the culprits responsible for Evangelios death. Apparently, the lower court concluded that Danny could not have committed
the crime charged on the strength of the Medical Certificate (Exhibit 1) issued by Dr. Norberto S. Reyes, Dannys attending physician, which
allegedly shows, among others, that from April 8, 1989 to April 20, 1989, Danny was hospitalized at the Patin-ay Provincial Hospital.[2]
 It is urged upon us that Amelitos testimony regarding the culpability of Danny having been apparently overthrown and disregarded, his
(Amelitos) testimony against him (appellant) must also be similarly considered; hence, he must also be acquitted.
We cannot agree. The testimony of Amelito against appellant may still be considered credible. It is perfectly within the discretion of the
trial court to accept portions of the testimony of a witness as it may deem credible and reject those which it believes to be false. The
maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence. For this maxim to
be invoked, the witness must first be shown to have wilfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. But even so when he is found
to have wilfully falsified this does not make his entire testimony totally incredible. The court may still, upon its discretion, admit and credit
those portions worthy of belief depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities as well as improbabilities of the case.[3]
Moreover, the present case hinges on the credibility of witnesses and, as we have invariably held, the opinion of the trial court as to who
of them should be believed is entitled to great respect, this on the oft-repeated rationale born of judicial experience that the trial judge who
heard the witnesses testify and had the occasion to observe their demeanor on the stand was in a vantage position to determine who of the
witnesses deserve credence. We have examined the records with great care but found nothing which might justify our taking a different view.[4]
For alibi to offset the evidence of the prosecution demonstrating his guilt, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.[5] Such physical impossibility on the part of accused-appellant was not availing to him inasmuch as he as well as Danny testified
that Patin-ay could be reached by jeep from Cabacungan in approximately three (3) hours. [6]Besides, alibi is an inherently weak defense and,
unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration pointing to the accused as the
culprit[7] by an eyewitness who had no improper motive to falsely testify. [8]
But we find the second argument of appellant meritorious. Article 13, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code provides that the circumstance
that the offender is under eighteen years of age is mitigating and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Art. 80 of the same Code.
However, Art. 80 has been expressly repealed by Chapter III of P.D. 603 otherwise known as The Child and Youth Welfare Code. Article 189
of P.D. 603 defines youthful offender as a child, minor, or youth, including one who is emancipated in accordance with law, who is over nine
years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Obviously, the trial court erred in considering the age of
accused-appellant at the time of trial because the law is explicit in this regard. The testimony of appellant that he was only fifteen (15) years
old at the time of the commission of the offense is material because under Art. 68, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code, upon a person over
fifteen (15) and under eighteen (18) years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code punishes murder with reclusion temporal maximum to death.[9] In view of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed in its proper period pursuant to Art. 68, par. (2), of the Code,
which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be
imposed upon accused-appellant shall be taken from the medium period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal minimum or
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree, which is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium or four (4) years and two (2) months to ten (10) years.
Consequently, the Court considers fair and just to impose upon accused-appellant an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as minimum, to twelve (12) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding accused-appellant Santos Paredes Jr. alias Titing guilty of murder
is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as minimum, to twelve (12) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 22, Cabagan, Isabela; ELVINO
AGGABAO and VILLA SURATOS, respondents.

Marallag & Marallag for Alma Aggabao.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for private respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:

Assailed in this petition is the order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, dismissing the criminal information for
concubinage filed against private respondents, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The antecedent facts are as follows:

Upon complaint by Alma T. Aggabao, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan, Isabela filed on July 25, 1986 with the Regional Trial
Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, an information against private respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of
concubinage [Annex "A" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.] allegedly committed in September 1983. Upon being arraigned, private respondents
entered a plea of not guilty [Annex "B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 19]. The complainant was represented before the trial court by a private
prosecutor. During the trial, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that
concubinage, under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, well within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the Regional Trial Court. The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion
contending that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the imposable penalty on the
concubine [Art. 334, RPC] has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC]. The trial court sustained private
respondent's position and granted the motion to dismiss.

Private prosecutor, together with the assistant provincial prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, filed on June 16, 1989 the instant petition assailing the
order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the criminal information against private respondents. In a resolution dated July 17,
1989, this Court denied the petition due to late payment of docket and legal research fees and for lack of merit. The Solicitor General filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of the Court denying the petition. Subsequently, the private prosecutor filed a separate motion for
reconsideration. In these motions, the Solicitor General and the private prosecutor submitted additional arguments to support their position
that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage.

At the outset, it must be stated that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by the private
prosecutor and the assistant provincial prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, with the offended party, Alma T. Aggabao, being named co-petitioner of
the People of the Philippines. The Court has already ruled that while it is the fiscal who represents the People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before the trial courts, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, it is
the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines, not the fiscal [City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina, G.R. No. 83996,
October 21, 1988, 166 SCRA 614] nor the private prosecutor, even with the conformity of the assistant provincial prosecutor [People v.
Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989]. Nevertheless, considering that the Solicitor General has intervened in this case by filing a
motion for reconsideration of the Court resolution dated July 17, 1989 denying the petition, the Court has decided to forego technicalities and
to resolve the issues raised. Moreover, since it is now apparent that the only petitioner in this case is the People of the Philippines as
represented by the Solicitor General, payment of the legal fees is not necessary in accordance with Rule 141, Sec. 16 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

Petitioner first contends that private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after the prosecution has rested its case
and the defense has started to present its evidence. Furthermore, petitioner complains that "it took two (2) years and six (6) months before
anyone to take (sic) notice of the jurisdictional infirmity [Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12]. Hence, according to petitioner, private respondents are
barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, estoppel having already set in.

The contention is without merit. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings [Rule 117,
Sec. 8, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure; U.S. v. Castanares, 18 Phil. 210 (1911)]. It is true that in Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-31218,
February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711 and in People v. Munar, G.R. No. L-37642, October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA 278, cases cited by the Solicitor
General and private prosecutor in their pleadings, the Court held that jurisdiction cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. However,
these cases can readily be distinguished from the case at bar by the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal. In the instant
case, the private respondents made the jurisdictional challenge pending the trial and before the trial court has rendered any judgment on the
merits.

Moreover, the ruling in Vera v. People and People v. Munar that jurisdiction may not be raised for the first time on appeal, is the exception
rather than the general rule.

The doctrine in those cases was first enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36, where the
Court stated that:

. . . a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject- matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for
reasons of public policy.
 Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
meats, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court ... And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo.
58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 399 [See also Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, October 27, 1986,
145 SCRA 211], the Court held that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional
case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction
of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has
been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is
to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by
estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed
almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being
barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.

The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in
this case. And as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to
dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Court holds that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, Vera v.
People and People v. Munar does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, must apply. Private respondents are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Having disposed of the procedural issue, the Court will now proceed with the main issue of whether or not the Regional Trial Court has
original jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage.

The crime of concubinage is penalized by Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:

Art. 334. Concubinage. — Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place
shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (Emphasis supplied.)

According to Sec. 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (hereinafter referred to as the inferior courts) shall exercise "[e]xclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof . . ." On the other hand, the "Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or
body. . ." [Sec. 20. B.P. Blg. 129].

The penalty imposable on the husband who commits concubinage is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges
from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Hence, as regards the husband, there is no question that
concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts. The problem concerns the concubine upon whom the
imposable penalty is destierro.

The Solicitor General and the private prosecutor point out that the duration of destierro, which is between six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC], is beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to impose. Thus, they conclude that either (1) the Regional Trial
Courts and the inferior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage [Solicitor General's Motion for Reconsideration, p.
11; Rollo, p. 521; or (2) the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have "split jurisdiction," the latter having jurisdiction over the crime
as regards the husband and the former as regards the concubine [Private Prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3; Rollo, p. 58].

These propositions are both untenable. It has already been held by the Court in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617 (1950) and People v.
Santos, 87 Phil. 687 (1950) that a crime punishable with the penalty of destierro is within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. This is so
because in the scale of penalties outlined in Art. 71, destierro comes after arresto mayor. * And since under the Judiciary Act of 1948
[Republic Act No. 296], crimes punishable with arresto mayor are within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, it follows that crimes
punishable with destierro are also within the jurisdiction of such courts. In explaining its conclusion that destierro is lighter than arresto
mayor and therefore cognizable by the inferior courts, the Court, in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, supra at p. 619, stated the following:

Destierro is not a higher penalty than arresto mayor. Arresto mayor means imprisonment or complete deprivation of
liberty, whereas destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within a radius of 25 kilometers from the
actual residence of the accused for a specified length of time. The respective severities of arresto mayor and destierro must
not be judged by the duration of each of these penalties, but by the degree of deprivati•n of liberty involved. Penologists
have always considered destierro lighter than arresto mayor. Such criterion is reflected both in the old Spanish Penal Code
and in our Revised Penal Code. In the graduated scale of article 71 the lawmaker has placed destierro below arresto
mayor. There is, therefore, no basis in fact or in law for holding that destierro is a higher penalty than arresto mayor and
that an offense penalized with destierro falls under the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.

The Court is well-aware of the fact that Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan and People v. Santos were decided under the Judiciary Act of 1948
pursuant to which justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities had original jurisdiction over "all offenses in which
the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six months" [Sec. 87 (b)] while Courts of First Instance had original
jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months" [Sec. 44 (f)]. There being
no mention in said Act of crimes for which the penalty is not imprisonment, these aforecited cases were decided on the premise that "there
exists a gap in the law as to which court shall have original jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro or banishment" [Uy Chin Hua
v. Dinglasan, supra, at p. 620].

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), the inferior courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months [Sec. 32 (2)] while the Regional Trial Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body" [Sec. 20].
Ostensibly, Sec. 20 of B. P. Blg. 129 would grant to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro, such as
concubinage, since destierro is not an offense punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months. However,
the Court, after a careful reading of B.P. Blg. 129, is of the considered opinion that there was no intention to overturn the doctrine laid down
in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan and People v. Santos. It is quite evident that among the important factors considered in the allocation of
jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts are the gravity of both the offense and the imposable penalty. It is not,
therefore unreasonable to state that the legislature granted to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes whose penalties are harsher
than those vested in the inferior courts. And since it is already a settled rule that destierro, by its nature, is a lighter penalty than
imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v. Dingalasan, supra], it follows that even under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over
crimes punishable with destierro is vested not in the Regional Trial Courts but in the inferior courts.

More particularly in this case, the crime of concubinage has two penalties, one for the husband and another for the concubine. The penalty
for the husband, prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, is unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. Considering that Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code states that "[t]he offended party [in the crime of concubinage] cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties," it is clearly in the interest of the orderly administration of justice that the concubine be tried with the erring husband before the
inferior courts. The legislature could not have intended to allow the absurd situation wherein the inferior court has jurisdiction over the crime
of concubinage only as regards the husband while the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the same crime with respect to the
concubine.

In fine, the Court, after a careful consideration of the pertinent laws, as well as the jurisprudence on the matter, holds that the crime of
concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts. The Regional Trial Courts have no original jurisdiction over
the said crime. Hence, the court a quo committed no reversible error in dismissing the criminal information against private respondents. At
any rate, considering that the dismissal of the case by the court a quo on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense [Rule 117, Secs. 6 and 7, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure] and considering further that the crime has not yet
prescribed [See Art. 90, RPC], the offended wife is not precluded from initiating the filing of another criminal information against private
respondents before the proper court.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit. The reimbursement of the legal fees paid by the private
prosecutor for the filing of this petition is hereby ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 168649

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

JOSE ALVIZO AUDINE, December 6, 2006

Accused-Appellant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us for review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00338 which affirmed with modification the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 272, finding accused-appellant Jose Alvizo Audine guilty of two (2)
counts of rape committed against his fourteen-year old daughter, AAA[3] and sentencing him to suffer the capital punishment for each count.
On the basis of the complaint filed by AAA, two informations for Rape[4] against accused-appellant were filed with the RTC of
Marikina City. The accusatory portions thereof read:

Criminal Case No. 2001-4093-MK

That on or about the 24th day of December 1999, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the father of the minor victim, by means of force, coercion and
intimidation, with the use of small knife which is a bladed weapon, and with lewd design or intent to cause or gratify his
sexual desire upon complainant AAA, a minor and fifteen (15) years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with said complainant against her will and consent which debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of said child as a human being. [5]

Criminal Case No. 2001-4094-MK

That on or about the 8th day of January 2000, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, who is the father of the minor victim, by means of force, coercion and intimidation, with
the use of a small knife which is a bladed weapon, and with lewd design or intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire upon
complainant AAA, a minor and fifteen (15) years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with said complainant against her will and consent which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of said child as a human being.[6]
The cases were raffled to Branch 272. Finding probable cause, a warrant of arrest was issued against accused-appellant who was arrested and
detained at the Marikina City Police Station.

When arraigned on 10 June 2002, accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the two counts of
rape.[7] Thereafter, the cases were consolidated and jointly tried.

During the pre-trial, the following stipulation of facts[8] was entered into by the prosecution and the defense:

1. The jurisdiction of this court to try these cases;

2. The identity of the accused as AAA;[9]

3. The existence and due execution of Medico Legal Report No. M-187-01 issued and prepared by Dr. Ruby Grace
D. Sabino dated January 17, 2001;

4. The existence of the medico legal examination issued and prepared by Dr. Ruby Grace D. Sabino addressed to the
PNP Crime Laboratory;

5. The existence and due execution of the initial of the Medico Legal Report No. M-187-01 dated January 16, 2001;
and

6. The existence of the manifestation of consent signed by the victim and the Department of Social Welfare and
Development who is the guardian of the victim.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private complainant AAA, Dr. Ruby Grace D. Sabino, SPO4 Nenita Sadullo

Abanes and Lucila Sulte Arresu.For the defense, only accused-appellant took the stand.
The records bear the following:

It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that AAA, the only daughter of the accused-appellant, was
born on August 4, 1985.

On November 7, 1999, the accused-appellant was supposed to bring AAA to the house of his wifes cousin in
Bulacan. Instead, he brought her to the house of his own cousin, Arminda Arginosa, at XXX, XXX City.

On December 24, 1999, AAA was alone reading magazines in the house of her aunt when the accused-appellant
arrived and ordered her to get his clothes from the masters bedroom. AAA did as told. But the accused-appellant almost at
once followed AAA inside the room and pushed her towards the bed. She fought back but the accused-appellant boxed her
in the abdomen. The accused-appellant then forcibly took off AAAs dress and shorts. AAA continued resisting the accused-
appellant and pleaded with him to stop, but to no avail. The accused-appellant kissed AAAs body, laid on top of her, and
inserted his penis into her vagina, satiating his lust. After the violation, the accused-appellant warned AAA not to tell
anybody about the rape. AAA feared for her life because the accused-appellant pointed a knife at her before and after the
rape incident.

The second violation occurred on January 8, 2000. AAA was sleeping alone in her room when she felt something
pressing on her thigh. It was again the accused-appellant, a knife pointed at her abdomen, who was undressing her. It was
the same knife the accused-appellant used during the December 24, 1999 incident. AAA shouted and fought back, but as in
the first incident, the accused-appellant again boxed her in the stomach. The accused-appellant masturbated first before
inserting his male member into AAAs vagina. At the conclusion of the bestial assault, he threatened to kill AAA and her
siblings if she reported the rape to anybody. After the incident, the accused-appellant left for QuezonProvince.

As a result of her successive violations, AAA got pregnant. On August 19, 2000, she gave birth to a baby boy, who
however died five (5) days later.
 Since she was in virtual isolation, AAA went to see medical social worker Lucila Arresu and revealed to the latter
that the accused-appellant had raped her. Armed with that information, Lucila called up the Marikina City Police. SPO4
Nenita Abanes interviewed AAA and took down her statement.

On January 16, 2001, Dr. Ruby Grace Sabino conducted a physical examination on AAA. She found the condition
of AAAs genitalia exhibiting signs of penetration.According to her, AAAs hymen has carunculae myrtiformis or, in laymans
term, there is already a rose bead appearance on it, which is an indication that AAA has already given birth.

Interposing disavowal or alibi, the accused-appellant simply denied the charges against him. He claimed that
on December 24, 1999 and January 8, 2000, he was in Sariaya, Quezon working in his tailoring shop.

He further testified that in September 1999, AAA was missing for three (3) days. His family searched for her and
learnt that she had eloped with her sweetheart BBB.

He claimed that it was not his idea to take AAA anywhere, since she was still studying in Quezon Province. It was
AAAs mother who prevailed upon him to bring their daughter to XXX City to prevent AAA from seeing her friends, who
had badly influenced her, as well as her boyfriend, with whom she later eloped.[10]

On 5 December 2002, the trial court, convicting accused-appellant of two counts of rape and imposing on him the death penalty for
each count, disposed of the cases as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the accused, JOSE ALVIZO AUDINE, is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape (RA 8353) filed against him and is sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of
DEATH in each case. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complaint in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP100,000.00) and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP50,000.00) as moral damages so as to serve
as deterrent to this disturbing trend, plus the costs of the suit. [11]

Ignoring accused-appellants defenses, the trial court ratiocinated:

The accused interposed a number of defenses. First, that of alibi. Jose Audine stated that the December 24, 1999 and January
8, 2000 alleged rape incidents could not be true as he was already in Sariaya, Quezon then, having returned to the province
right after taking AAA to her cousin Arminda Arganosas house in XXX. Second, the accused denied having raped her
daughter and stressed that her daughter had ran away with her boyfriend, BBB, in Sariaya, Quezon on September of 1999
giving an implication that the pregnancy could be attributed to that. He only wanted to stop AAA from seeing her womanizer-
cum-addict boyfriend, BBB. He corroborated AAAs testimony that he filed a rape case in Sariaya, Quezon against BBB.

However, realizing the futility of his defense, the accused shifted his defense in the middle of the trial. According to the
accused, his cousin Arminda Arganosa was arrested for illegal possession of a big amount of shabu
in Dalampasigan Beach in Dalahican, Sariaya, Quezon, and Arminda suspected that he was behind her arrest. He also
accused Arminda of acting as a pimp to her daughter as she vowed to get even with Jose Audine, an allegation too incredible
to believe considering AAAs pregnancy was very noticeable then. In People vs. Balgos, 323 SCRA 372, it was held that an
accuseds shift of theory, upon realizing the futility of his earlier defense, rather than help his cause, only further damaged
his credibility.[12]

Considering that the penalty it imposed was the death penalty, the trial court forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. [13] However, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo,[14] the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.

On 18 February 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant, together with the imposition
of the death penalty for each count of rape, but modified the awards of civil indemnity and damages. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the appealed Decision dated December 5, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2001-4093-MK and 2001-4094-MK, finding the
accused-appellant JOSE ALVIZO AUDINE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him in
each case to suffer the penalty of death is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that for each count of rape, the accused-
 appellant is also CONDEMNED to pay the private complainant, AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Should no motion for reconsideration be filed in this case by the accused-appellant within the allowable reglementary period,
or after the lapse thereof, let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for appropriate
action hereon.[15]

On 15 March 2005, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration[16] of the decision but same was denied by the Court of Appeals on 28
June 2005.[17] In accordance with Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124, the entire records of the case were elevated to the Supreme Court for
review. Thereupon, the parties were required to submit supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice. [18] Accused-appellant opted
not to file a supplemental brief on the ground he had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in his appellants brief. On the part of the Office
of the Solicitor General, despite notice, no response was received therefrom.

Accused-appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [19]

In trying to discredit private complainant AAA, accused-appellant cites several circumstances that tend to create doubt as to his guilt, to wit:
(1) It is quite unimaginable how the accused-appellant could still manage to undress AAA while he was holding her hands and at the same
time pointing a knife at her who was then putting up a fight; (2) It is unbelievable that accused-appellant could have penetrated her considering
that she was kicking him while he was inserting his penis into her vagina; (3) The failure of AAA to exercise any precaution in securing herself,
like locking her room or arming herself with a weapon, to prevent accused-appellants sexual advances considering her alleged horrible
experience with accused-appellant; (4) The delay in reporting the incidents notwithstanding the absence of the accused-appellant who was in
the province all the time, renders doubtful her charges of rape; (5) The charges of rape were filed by AAA as revenge against accused-appellant
whom she considered as the person who separated her from her lover; (6) AAAs admission that she executed a sworn statement charging BBB
with rape which she later recanted, indicates that she can concoct untruthful stories under oath.

In the review of rape cases, we are almost invariably guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.[20]

Accused-appellants contention that he could not have committed the rapes the way private complainant described them deserves scant
consideration. We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:

AAA never testified that the accused-appellant undressed her, while he was holding her hands and pointing a knife
at her, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest. A plain reading of AAAs testimony during her direct examination shows
that such acts of the accused-appellant were done at different points in time.

We also fail to see anything extraordinary or unbelievable in AAAs testimony that despite her act of kicking the
accused-appellant he still succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. While it may be admitted that AAAs act of kicking
made penetration somewhat difficult, it certainly did not render the satyrs maniacal attack irresistible, nor his penetration
into the citadel of his daughters purity anything impossible. [21]
 Private complainant is being faulted for not taking the necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of her horrible experience with
accused-appellant last 24 December 1999. Her failure to perform what accused-appellant claims she ought to have done cannot be taken against
her. A fourteen-year old girl cannot be reasonably expected to exercise or put into place any measure that would avert the repetition of the
ordeal with her father. How the victim comported herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the elements of the
crime of rape.[22] Not all victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of
behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently
to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful experience.[23] The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. [24] This Court,
in People v. Luzorata,[25] held:

This Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been
abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her
credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt x x x.

Private complainant narrated in a clear and straightforward manner her harrowing experience. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
gave credence to her testimony. She recounted her ordeal as follows:

PROS. REMOLETE

Q. Instead of bringing you to Bulacan, your father brought you here in XXX?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In that same day and time, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?

A. He brought me to the house of his cousin and let me lived there, sir.

Q. On December 24, 1999 in the afternoon, do you remember of anything unusual incident that happened to you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you then?

A. Inside the house of my aunt, sir.

Q. Her house at XXX?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was your companion?

A. None, sir.

Q. While alone in that house and you said an unusual incident happened to you, what was that unusual incident that happened
to you?

A. I was raped by my father, sir.

Q. Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court how that incident happened?

A. I was alone in the house then my father raped me, sir.

Q. Do you know where your father came from?

PROS. RAMOLETE:
May I make it of record that the victim is crying Your Honor.

A. He went out, I thought I was alone in the sala but he suddenly entered, sir.

Q. When your father suddenly entered, what happened next?

A. He touched my body and told me not to report it to anybody and he brought me inside the room, sir.

Q. What particular part of your body did he touch?

A. On my thigh, sir.

Q. What were you doing in the sala when your father arrived and touched you?

A. I was reading magazines, sir. He told me to go inside the room and he told me to get his clothes in the masters bedroom,
sir.

Q. Did you in fact get his shirt inside the master bedroom?

A. He followed me inside the room and pushed me to the bed, sir.

Q. What did you do when your father followed you and pushed you in the bed?

A. I fought back but he boxed me on the abdomen puson, sir.

Q. What else did your father do to you if any?

A. He undressed me, sir.

Q. How did he undress you?

A. He pulled my dress and took off my shorts sir.

Q. Were you able to get out of the masters bedroom?

A. No, sir because the door was locked and he was already holding me and I could not free myself.

Q. Who locked the door?

A. My father, sir.

Q. What did you do when your father undressed you?

A. I was fighting and pleading with him not to do it, sir.

Q. Were you able to fight him back?

A. No, sir because he was holding my hand, sir.

Q. Did he listen to your plea?

A. No, sir.

Q. So what happened next?

A. After raping me he left me inside and locked the door, sir.

Q. How did he rape you?

A. He undressed me and kissed the parts of my body and laid on top of me, sir.

Q. What do you mean when you said he placed himself on top of you?

A. He made sexual intercourse, sir.

Q. Go directly to the point.

A. He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q. Did you feel his penis inside your vagina?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you feel?

A. It was painful, sir.

Q. What did you do while the accused was inserting his penis into your vagina?

A. I was kicking him, sir.

Q. Why did you kick him?

A. So he might not pursue what he was doing to me, sir.

Q. Did he stop that thing being done to you?

A. No, sir.

Q. After that after he inserted his penis into your vagina, what happened?

A. After raping me he told me not to tell it to anybody.

Q. What did you do when he was telling you that?

A. I was afraid, sir.

Q. Afraid of whom?

A. Afraid of my father, sir.

Q. Why were you afraid?

A. Because he was pointing a knife on me, sir.

Q. How big is that knife?

A. It was a small knife, sir.

Q. What kind of knife was it?

A. Kitchen knife, sir, my aunt used in the kitchen, sir.

Q. At what point in time did he point that knife to you after he inserted his penis or before?

A. Before he raped me and afterwards, sir.

Q. Aside from pointing that knife to you, what else did he do if any?

A. When I cried, he slapped me, sir.

Q. Was this incident repeated again?

ATTY. LARRACAS:

Objection Your Honor.

PROS. RAMOLETE:
I will reform my question.

Q. At noontime of January 8, 2000, where were you Miss Witness?

A. I was at home, sir.

Q. Who were your companions, if any?

A. None, sir.

Q. Do you remember of any incident that happened to you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was that unusual incident?

A. I was raped again by my father, sir.

Q. Will you kindly inform his Honorable Court what happened?

A. I was sleeping at that time, sir.

Q. Where were you sleeping?

A. Inside the room, sir.

Q. Whose room?

A. My aunt and my room, sir.

Q. Were you awakened from your sleep?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why were you awakened from your sleep?

A. I felt something pressing on my thigh, sir.

Q. Upon feeling something pressing your thigh, what did you do?

A. I was able to stand when I saw my father, sir.

Q. What happened next?

A. He pointed his knife to me again and undressed me, sir.

Q. At what part of your body did he point that knife to you?

A. To my abdomen, sir.

Q. Was that the same knife that he used on December 24, 1999?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you feel when he pointed that knife to your abdomen?

A. I was frightened that he might repeat again what he did to me, sir.

Q. What else transpired?

A. He repeated raping me, sir.

Q. What did you do when he pointed that knife in your stomach?

 A. I shouted and fought him but he boxed me in the stomach, sir.

Q. What happened next?

A. I found it difficult to fight him back, sir.

Q. What happened next?

A. He was able to insert his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q. How did he insert his penis into your vagina?

A. At first, he masturbated and then he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q. What was his position when he inserted his penis into your vagina?

A. He was on top of me, sir.

Q. Did you feel his penis inserted into your vagina?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you feel?

A. I was hurt, sir.

Q. What did you do when your father inserted his penis into your vagina?

A. I tried to fight but he was pointing his knife at me, sir.

Q. Were you able to do anything?

A. None, sir.

Q. After that what happened next?

A. He left the house and went home to the province sir.

Q. What did you do after he was through with his act?

A. I was afraid because everytime he finished what he did to me, he threatened me not to report the matter to anybody or else he will
kill me and my siblings, sir.[26]

After a review of the testimony of the private complainant, We find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the
full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate
court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[27] In the case at bar, there being overwhelming evidence showing that on 24 December
1999 and 8 January 2000 appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant by means of force, coercion and intimidation, we have no
reason not to apply the rule and to apply the exception.

Accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected.[28] For the defense of
alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed;
and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. [29]
 In the case at bar, accused-appellant claimed that on 24 December 1999 and 8 January 2000, he was in Sariaya, Quezon working in
his tailoring shop. He, however, did not present any witness to corroborate such claim. Unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, his
alibi is self-serving and deserves no weight in law; thus, same must necessarily fail. An alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, and where such defense is not corroborated, it is fatal to the accused. [30] Uncorroborated alibi must be disregarded.[31]

Accused-appellant further argues that the delay in reporting the incidents renders doubtful private complainants charges of rape.

We are not persuaded. The delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is neither unknown
nor uncommon. Particularly in incestuous rape, this Court has consistently held that delay in reporting the offense is not indicative of a
fabricated charge.[32] It has been repeatedly held that the delay in reporting a rape incident due to death threats cannot be taken against the
victim.[33] The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. In this case, private complainant, who
was fourteen years old when she was ravished, satisfactorily explained why she did not immediately report the matter to anybody. She revealed
that she is afraid of her father and that the latter threatened to kill her and her siblings if she would divulge the sexual attack on her. [34] Accused-
appellant, being her father, exercises moral ascendancy and influence over her. Thus, her reluctance that caused the delay should not be taken
against her. Neither can it be used to diminish her credibility nor undermine the charge of rape.

The fact of delay does not necessarily lead to an acquittal. In several cases we have decided,[35] the delay lasted for two years or more;
nevertheless, the victims were found to be credible. As above-mentioned, we found the delay to be reasonable and sufficiently explained. The
testimony of the victim herself has convinced the Court that her accusation has a ring of truth sufficient to justify the conviction of appellant.

The defense tried to impute ill motive on private complainant claiming that the latter filed the two cases of rape to exact revenge
because he separated private complainant from her lover-boyfriend.

We find this hard to believe. Motives such as feuds, resentment and revenge have never swayed us from giving full credence to the
testimony of a minor complainant.[36] This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve
full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for
the wrong committed against her.[37] It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would
impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. [38] Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth.[39] Full
weight and credit should, indeed, be accorded AAAs testimony. It is very unlikely for her to accuse her father of so heinous a crime if it were
not true. Her credibility was bolstered beyond reproach by her spontaneous emotional breakdown during trial. [40]

So traumatized by her horrific experience with her father, private complainant testified that, in the event her father is found guilty,
she will not regret or repent if he is sentenced to death because she only wants justice for what he did to her. [41] Furthermore, her refusal to
reveal in the Birth Certificate the name of the father of her child indicates that it was accused-appellant who sired her son. She testified:

ATTY. LARRACAS:

Q. You did not indicate the name of your father as the father of your child?

A. No, maam.

Q. Why did you not place the name of your father?

 A. Because his name if I would place the name of my father it will be shameful and embarrassing if they find out that the
father of my child is my father, maam.[42]

A child of tender years will not make these declarations unless the bestial attacks on her were not truly perpetrated by her father.

The contention of the defense that private complainant cannot be considered a credible witness because she has the propensity to
concoct untruthful stories under oath in light of her admission that she executed a sworn statement charging BBB with the crime of rape which
she later recanted, deserves scant consideration.

Private complainant explained to the satisfaction of this Court that she was merely forced by her father to execute a sworn statement
against BBB that the latter raped her.[43] It is very apparent that she was under her fathers moral authority and influence. This ascendancy,
together with the threats from her father, is so great that private complainant failed to resist or overcome it.

The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code relative to the case on hand are Articles 266-A and 266-B, which read:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

xxxx

Art. 266-B. Penalties.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code must be alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. [44] In the instant case, since the special qualifying
circumstances of the victims minority and her relationship with the offender have been properly alleged in the informations and established
during trial, the imposition of the death penalty for each count of rape is justified.

With the effectivity,[45] however, of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines, the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the penalty to be meted on
accused-appellant shall be reclusion perpetua. Said section reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on accused-appellant, he is not eligible for parole following Section 3 of said law which
provides:

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
As regards the award of damages for each count of rape, the same must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as civil
indemnity[46] was properly reduced by the Court of Appeals to P75,000.00 which is the amount awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty. [47] With respect to moral damages, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals must be increased to P75,000.00 without need of pleading or proof of basis thereof. [48] Moreover,
the P25,000.00 awarded by the Court of Appeals as exemplary damages was proper due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship.[49]

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 February 2005 finding accused-appellant
Jose Alvizo Audineguilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each
penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility to parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. He is
also ordered to pay private complainant AAA, for each count of rape, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 117106. June 26, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY ALBERCA, accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF A PERSON UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISSION
OF AN OFFENSE; NOT VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR.- Accused-appellant signed a document, which shows that he was informed
that he had a right to remain silent and not to give any statement; that any statement he gave could be used against him in court; that he
had a right to retain counsel of his choice and that if he could not afford to hire the services of counsel he would be given a competent
and independent one. After being thus informed, he said he was nonetheless willing to give a statement and tell the truth. His claim that
the constitutional rights stated in the document were not read to him because he was merely forced to sign that document is
improbable. This document was signed not only by him but also by his wife. It is noteworthy that accused-appellant failed to call on his
wife to corroborate his allegation of coercion. After all, accused-appellant does not claim that she, too, was made to sign under duress.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; AFFORDED IN CASE AT BAR.- It was unnecessary to tell accused-appellant that he had a right
to have a counsel of his choice who was competent and independent since he was told he could choose his own counsel. What was
necessary was to assure him that if he could not afford to hire the services of counsel he would be provided by the investigator with a
lawyer who was competent and independent, which was what was done in this case. Nor was it necessary to ask him whether he had
counsel or give him an opportunity to look for counsel since he had waived the right to counsel and pointed to Atty. Abrenica as the
counsel he wanted to assist him in making the waiver. There is therefore no basis for the plea of accused-appellant that his extrajudicial
confession should have been excluded from the evidence because it was obtained in violation of his rights under Section 12 of Art. III.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION, VOLUNTARILY GIVEN.- Accused-appellant claims that he signed the extrajudicial
confession because he had been "threatened" with harm if he did not. However, he did not elaborate as would naturally be his wont had
he really been coerced to sign his confession. On the contrary, there are circumstances belying his claim that he had been coerced into
signing the confession. The confession of accused-appellant is replete with details, which makes it improbable that it was not voluntarily
given.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEFENSE OF ALIBI, BELIED.- The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the accused. In this case, positive identification of accused-appellant was made by victim Joey Rodriguez. Furthermore, the claim that
accused-appellant was somewhere else at the time of the crime was contradicted by one of the prosecution witness. For the defense of
alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must establish by clear and convincing evidence not only that he was not present at the scene of the
crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present there at the time of its commission. This accused-appellant
failed to do.
5. ID.; ID.; WITNESS; CREDIBILITY; NOT AFFECTED BY DELAY IN REPORTING THE CRIME.- The reluctance of some people
to be involved in criminal trials is a matter of judicial notice. Failure to volunteer what one knows to law enforcement officials does not
necessarily impair a witness' credibility. In any event the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe this witness' demeanor, found
his testimony to be truthful and we find no reason to disregard its finding on this matter.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; CONSEQUENCE THEREOF.- There was conspiracy in this case as shown by the concerted
manner in which accused-appellant and his companions entered the Saycon compound and later withdrew from it and the way they
attacked the security guard and the houseboy. Regardless of the part of accused-appellant in the stabbing of the guard and the wounding
of the houseboy, he is liable because of the rule in conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN
SUFFICIENT.- What the prosecution lacked by way of an eyewitness was made up by the circumstantial evidence in the record of this
case. As provided in Sec. 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. And accused-appellant's flight is evidence of his guilt. As
noted in People vs. Abitona, facts or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with
his innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR.- Upon the facts
thus established the Court is convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide. While accused-appellant and his
companions failed to rob the Saycons, the fact is that they took the gun of the security guard for the purpose of gain. Since the group in
addition killed the guard, the crime committed is the complex one of robbery with homicide. It is not necessary that the person robbed be
the same person whom the malefactors originally intended to rob. Nor is it necessary to show that the sole purpose was robbery and by
reason thereof homicide was committed. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is robbery with homicide not only
when "by reason of the robbery" homicide is committed but also when "on the occasion" thereof homicide is committed. If robbery and
homicide are committed on the same occasion, the special complex crime is deemed committed.
9. ID.; ID.; DEATH PENALTY; WHERE REQUIRED MAJORITY VOTE NOT OBTAINED.- The votes of the five (5) Justices fall
short of the majority of eight (8) votes needed to affirm the sentence of death of the trial court. Thus, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant in accordance with Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is here on appeal from the judgment dated August 11, 1994[1] of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, finding
accused-appellant Jimmy Alberca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries[2] and
sentencing him to death. Accused-appellant was in addition ordered to indemnify the heirs of Felipe Climaco in the amount of P50,000.00 and
to pay the Triad Security and Allied Services, Inc. the amount of P10,000.00 for the value of one (1) .38 cal. Revolver, which had been taken
from the victim by one of the malefactors, and the costs.
The information against accused-appellant alleged-

"That on or about the 11th day of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping with several others whose true names and real identities have not as yet been ascertained, did then and there, willfully unlawfully and
feloniously entered the compound of Rebecca Saycon located at No. 99 Tandang Sora Avenue, this City, with intent to kill and with the use
of bladed weapons stabbed FELIPE CLIMACO, a security guard on his body several times and JOEY RODRIGUEZ, a house boy thereat on
his chest, respectively, thus inflicting upon FELIPE CLIMACO serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death and injuries to JOEY RODRIGUEZ and thereafter said accused with intent to gain, by means of such violence and intimidation against
persons, did then and there, wilfully, and unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the service firearm of FELIPE CLIMACO,
1.38 caliber revolver with Serial No. 31897 with six (6) rounds of ammunitions of still undetermined value, belonging to Triad Security &
Allied Services, Incorporated, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Felipe Climaco, Joey Rodriguez of the injuries sustained [sic] and
Triad Security & Allied Services, Incorporated.

"Contrary to law."
 The crime took place in the first hour of April 11, 1994, at the compound of Pastor and Rebecca Gaskell-Saycon at No. 99 Tandang Sora
Avenue, Quezon City. At that time, only Rebecca, her two sons and their "yaya" (nursemaid), security guard Felipe "Philip" Climaco and
houseboy Joey Rodriguez were in the house.[3]
According to Joey's testimony,[4] he was sleeping in the servant's quarters when he was awakened around midnight by the footsteps of
Climaco. He asked Climaco what the matter was ("Ano po yon?") but the latter did not answer as he proceeded to the closet to get a gun. Joey
saw Climaco running towards the swimming pool. After a while, he heard a gunshot. He got up and followed Climaco to the swimming pool
where Joey heard shouts. Intending to ask help from neighbors, Joey opened the gate when he was suddenly attacked by a person whom he
identified as accused-appellant.[5] He fought back but he was stabbed. He ran towards the house. Along the way he met another person with a
gun in one hand and a knife in the other, and inside the house he saw Climaco lying on the floor, wounded. Climaco was in pain and asked to
be taken to the hospital. Climaco said his gun[6] had been taken by a person whom he described was "fatter," "taller," and heavier than Joey
and who wore his hair long. Thereafter, several persons, arrived, including Danilo Saycon, Arnold Agustin, and Joey's twin brother Jonathan
Rodriguez, and the police. Found dead in the garden by the police was one of the intruders, who was later identified as Diego Aruta. [7]
Climaco was taken to the Lanting General Hospital but he was dead on arrival. [8] The autopsy report[9] showed that he suffered several
wounds in various parts of the body, to wit:

"Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver, in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the dependent portions of the
body. Conjunctivae, lips and nailbeds were pale.

"EXTERNAL INJURIES: TRUNK AND UPPER EXTREMITIES:

"(1) Stab wound, anterior left upper thorax, 130 cms. from heel, 11 cms. from anterior midline, measuring 7 x 2.5 x 6 cms. depth, directed
upwards, slightly backwards, towards midline, thru the muscle tissue.

"(2) Stab wound, anterior right thorax, 121 cms. from heel, 9.5 cms. from anterior midline, measuring 5 x 1.5 x 13 cms. depth, directed
slightly upwards, backwards, slightly towards lateral, fracturing the 5th right thoracic rib along the midclavicular line, piercing the middle
and lower lobes of the right lung.

"(3) Stab wound, anterior right lumbar region, 107 cms. from the heel, 11 cms. from anterior midline, measuring 4 x 2 x 12 cms. depth,
directed upwards, backwards, towards rnidline, fracturing the 9th right thoracic rib along the midclavicular line, piercing the loops and
mesenteries of small intestines and portal vein.

"(4) Stab wound, right scapular region, 126 cms. from the heel, 12 cms. from posterior midline, measuring 5 x 1.5 x 12 cms. depth, directed
upwards, slightly forwards, towards midline, thru the muscle tissue.

"(5) Incised wound, anterior proximal 3rd left arm, measuring 8 x 2 cms., 4 cms. from anterior midline.

"(6) Linear abrasion, anterior left lumbar region, measuring 6 x 0.1 cm., 11 cms. from anterior midline.

"(7) Abrasion, anterior left lumbar region, measuring 0.6 x 0.3 cm., 15 cms. anterior midline.

"(8) Linear abrasion, anterior left lumbar region, measuring 7 x 0.1 cm., 4 cms. from anterior midline.

"(9) Linear abrasion, anterior proximal 3rd right forearm, measuring 5 x 0.2 cm., 4 cms. from anterior midline.

"(10) Stabwound, posterior middle 3rd right arm, measuring 2.8 x 1.2 cms. x 10 cms. depth, directed upwards, forwards, towards lateral, thru
the muscle tissue.

"(11) Stab wound, posterior proximal 3rd right forearm, 4 cms. from posterior midline, measuring 2.5 x 0.8 x 5 cms. depth, directed slightly
downwards, towards lateral.

"(12) Stab wound, posterior proximal 3rd right forearm, 4 cms. from posterior midline, measuring 3.5 x 1 x 5 cms. depth, directed upwards,
backwards, towards midline, thru the muscle tissue.

"(13) Incised wound, dorsum of the right hand, measuring 1.7 x 0.3 cms., 6 cms. from posterior midline.

"INTERNAL FINDINGS:

"(1) Recovered from the right thorax and abdominal cavity about 1,000 cc and 500 cc of blood and blood clots, respectively.
"(2) Recovered from the stomach 1 glass of partially digested food particles consisting mostly of rice.

"CONCLUSION:

"Cause of death is stab wounds, body."

On the other hand, Joey was taken to the Quezon City General Hospital. The medico-legal certificate of the attending physician stated
that Joey suffered a "stab wound, 4 cm., 5th ICS, Ant. axillary line, chest (R)" which would require medical attendance for seven days under
normal condition.[10] The wound would not have caused his death even if Joey had not been given immediate medical attendance as it did not
penetrate his lungs.[11]
Accused-appellant, a "taho" vendor, was arrested by NBI agents on April 17, 1994 in San Miguel, Bulacan, in the house of his aunt,
Priscilla Dagandang Mabuhay. He was taken to the NBI Headquarters on Taft Avenue in Manila where he gave an extrajudicial confession in
the presence of his wife Noemi and of an assigned counsel, Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica.[12]
In his confession, given on April 19, 1994, accused-appellant said that the plan to rob the Saycons had been conceived by Diego Aruta
and Darius Caenghog and that he had been told of it on the night of Saturday, April 9, 1994. According to accused-appellant, the following
night, April 10, 1994, at around 7:00, Jhonny "Almar" Alcober, Oscar "Lucas" Clariza and Bengie "Benny" Demson arrived in his
house. (Accused-appellant and his family lived in a house which was just outside the Saycon compound in Tandang Sora, Quezon City.) Diego
and Darius arrived at about 10:00 in the evening. The accused-appellant and the group drank two bottles of gin. All the while, they were looking
over the wall which separated accused-appellant's house from the Saycon compound ("Sinisilip nila sa pader ang bahay ni Mr. Saycon"). At
around midnight, the group went into action. Diego climbed over the wall, followed by Darius and accused-appellant and then by the three,
Almar, Lucas and Benny. But they were noticed by the security guard who shot Diego Aruta. Diego charged ("sinugod"), embraced the security
guard and then stabbed him. Diego was Joined by Darius who also stabbed the guard at the front and by accused-appellant who stabbed the
guard at the back. The security guard staggered into the house. Accused-appellant then noticed a little man coming from a small room near the
gate. He followed the man and stabbed him. The man, though stricken, was able to run inside the house. Accused-appellant then escaped by
going over the wall, while Darius, who took the security guard's gun, escaped through the gate. Greatly weakened by his wound, Diego was
left behind, eventually to die from his gunshot wound.
After the incident, the group dispersed. Accused-appellant stayed in his house until 4:00 in the morning and then left for Pasay City. On
April 13, 1994 he proceeded to Barrio Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, where NBI agents eventually found him.
Accused-appellant claimed that he signed the confession (Exhibits "B-1" to "B-3") because he had been "threatened" with harm if he did
not[13] and that Atty. Abrenica, who assisted him in the execution of the confession, was not his counsel of choice but had merely been provided
him by NBI Special Investigator Ramon Yap.[14] Accused-appellant claimed that he could not have committed the crime because at that time
he was in San Miguel, Bulacan, having gone there on April 10, 1994 to visit an aunt.[15]
The trial court dismissed accused-appellant's alibi. It held that even without the extrajudicial confession, the prosecution's other evidence
established beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants guilt. Hence this appeal based on the following assignment of errors:
I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION
EXECUTED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, IMPLAUSIBLE AND
UNPERSUASIVE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE PROFERRED
BY THE DEFENSE.
III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
1. Art. III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution provides in part:

"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
 xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant signed a document, marked Exhibit "B", which consists of two parts. The first part, marked Exhibit "B-4," shows that
accused-appellant was informed that he had a right to remain silent and not to give any statement; that any statement he gave could be used
against him in court; that he had a right to retain counsel of his choice and that if he could not afford to hire the services of counsel he would
be given a competent and independent one. After being thus informed, he said he was nonetheless willing to give a statement and tell the
truth. Thus, written in Filipino, the first part of the document reads:
"0.1 TANONG: Bago and lahat, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo Ginoong JIMMY ALBERCA Y MABUHAY na ikaw ay aming iniimbistigahan
sa kasong Robbery with Homicide na nangyari noong madaling araw ng Abril 11, 1994 sa tahanan ni MR. PASTOR SAYCON sa
#99 Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, naiintindihan mo ba ito?
SAGOT : Opo, sir.
"02. T: Nais ko rin na ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating saligang batas, na ikaw ay may karapatan na manahimik
at huwag magbigay ng anumang pahayag sa pagsisiyasat na ito at anumang pahayag na iyong sasabihin ay maaaring gamitin laban
sa iyo sa harap ng ating husgado, nauunawaan mo ba ito?
S: Opo, sir. Nauunawaan ko po at nais ko pong magbigay ng aking salaysay.
0 3. T: Ibig ko rin ipaalam sa iyo na ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon o kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado na pili mo at kung ikaw
naman ay wala at hindi mo kayang magbayad ng isang abogado upang tumulong sa pagsisiyasat na ito, ikaw ay bibigyan namin ng
isang abogado na may sapat na kakayahan para pangalagaan ang iyong karapatan, ito ba ay naiintindihan mo?
S: Opo, sir. Naiintindihan ko. Naririto po ngayon si Atty. ERLANDO ABRENICA at ang aking asawa na si NOEMI ALBERCA na
siyang aalalay sa akin sa pagbibigay ko ng aking salaysay na ito.
"04. T: Pagkatapos mong malaman ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas, at matapos na ikaw ay paliwanagan ng
iyong abogado na si Atty. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA kaharap ang iyong asawa na si NOEMI ALBERCA Y JATULAN, nais mo
pa rin bang magbigay ng iyong pahayag sa pagsisiyasat na ito at magbigay o magsabi ng katotohanan at pawang katotohanan
lamang?
S: Opo, sir. Pagkatapos kong marinig at maintindihan ang aking mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas, ako po ay kusang loob
na magbibigay ng aking salaysay at magsasabi ng katotohanan at pawang katotohanan lamang sa pagsisiyasat na ito.
"05. T: Kung gayon, ikaw ba ay nakahanda na lumagda sa kasulatang pagpapaubaya sa mga karapatang mong ito?
S: Opo, sir.

"PAGPAPAUBAYA

"Ako ay pinagpayuhan ng aking mga karapatan na manahimik at magkaroon ng sariling abogado. Lubos ko itong naiintindihan at nais kong
ipaubaya ang mga karapatan kong ito kaharap ang aking abogado na si Atty. ERLANDO ABRENICA at ang aking asawa na si NOEMI J.
ALBERCA. Nais kong magbigay ng aking kusang loob na salaysay at alam ko rin na anumang aking sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay
maaaring gamitin laban o pabor sa akin.

"Nauunawaan ko ang aking mga karapatan at nakahanda akong sumagot sa anumang mga katanungan. Hindi ako tinakot, pinilit o
pinangakuan ng anumang bagay o may ginawa laban sa akin na makakagambala sa aking malayang pagpapaubaya.

"(SGD) JIMMY ALBERCA Y MABUHAY

"Nilagdaan sa harap ni:

"(SGD) NOEMI ALBERCA Y JATULAN

"CERTIFICATION

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Affiant JIMMY ALBERCA Y MABUHAY voluntarily waived all his right under the law after the same were
satisfactory explained to him including whatever consequences his statements may do.

(SGD) Atty. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA

#5 Goldhill Tower, Annapolis St.,

Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila"

 Accused-appellant claims that, contrary to what is recited in the document, the rights were not read to him and that Atty. Erlando A.
Abrenica, who assisted him in waiving the constitutional rights, was not his counsel of choice. But his part of Exhibit "B" was signed and
thumbmarked by accused-appellant, apart from the second part, which is his confession. He did so in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Erlando
A. Abrenica, and of his wife Noemi Jatulan Alberca.
Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was not presented by the prosecution. He is joined in this
regard by a dissenting member of the Court who contends that Atty. Abrenica should have been presented in order to testify on the extent of
services he had rendered to accused-appellant. But beyond seeing to it that the suspect in custodial investigations had been informed of his
constitutional rights and that he understood these rights before he waived them-and thus insure that the waiver was knowing, voluntary and
intelligent - the assigned counsel does hot have anything more to do.
In this case accused-appellant does not claim he did not understand what the document states. What he claims is that the constitutional
rights stated in the document were not read to him because he was merely forced to sign that document. This is improbable, given the fact that
as already stated, this document was signed not only by him but also by his wife. Additionally, accused-appellant affirmed the document before
the Assistant City Prosecutor.
In People v. Llenaresas,[16] it was also alleged by the defense that accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession should have been excluded
from evidence because the counsel, who assisted him in executing his confession, did not testify in court. Rejecting this contention, we held:

"It is true that the prosecution did not present Atty. Meliton Angeles as a witness to confirm his presence during the custodial investigation of
Jabil and Llenaresas. Such failure is not, however, fatal to the case of the Prosecution since the testimonies of the police officers and of
Prosecutor Pedro S. Nantes, in conjunction with the statements found in the extrajudicial confession itself, were quite adequate to sustain the
conclusion reached by the trial court."
Indeed, what is noteworthy is not the prosecution's failure to present Atty. Abrenica but accused-appellant's failure to call on his wife to
corroborate his allegation of coercion, After all, accused-appellant does not claim that she, too, was made to sign under duress.
Another member of the Court also dissents, arguing that in any event it does not appear from the document signed by accused-appellant
that he was informed that it was his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his own, that he had been asked whether he had one,
and that he had been given time to look for one.
Question No. 3 (quoted above) shows that accused-appellant was told that it was his right to have counsel chosen by him and that if he
could not afford to hire one, he would be given a competent counsel in order to protect his rights. ("[I]kaw ay may karapatang magkaroon o
kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado na pili mo at kung ikaw naman ay wala at hindi mo kayang magbayad ng isang abogado upang tumulong
sa pagsisiyasat na ito, ikaw ay bibigyan namin ng isang abogado na may sapat na kakayahan para pangalagaan ang iyong karapatan.")
It was unnecessary to tell accused-appellant that he had a right to have a counsel of his choice who was competent and independent since
he was told he could choose his own counsel. What was necessary was to assure him that if he could not afford to hire the services of counsel
he would be provided by the investigator with a lawyer who was competent and independent, which was what was done in this case. Nor was
it necessary to ask him whether he had counsel or give him an opportunity to look for counsel since he had waived the right to counsel and
pointed to Atty. Abrenica as the counsel he wanted to assist him in making the waiver.
There is therefore no basis for the plea of accused-appellant that his extrajudicial confession should have been excluded from the evidence
because it was obtained in violation of his rights under Section 12 of Art. III.
Accused-appellant also claims that he signed the extrajudicial confession because he had been "threatened" with harm if he did not. He
made this claim twice in his testimony in the trial court, once during his direct examination [17] and again in his cross-examination.[18] If true,
this would render his confession inadmissible under paragraphs (2) and (3) of Section 12. However, apart from saying that he was "threatened,"
he did not elaborate as would naturally be his wont had he really been coerced to sign his confession. He did not say he was beaten up or
subjected to third degree methods. He did not even say what he was told would be done to him if he refused to sign the confession. Neither did
he say who allegedly made the threat.
On the contrary, the following circumstances belie his claim that he had been coerced into signing the confession:
(a) Accused-appellant signed the confession (Exhibits "B-1" to "B-3") in the presence of his wife Noemi Jatulan Alberca and
counsel, Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica, who signed the confession as witnesses thereto. The confession comprises the second part
of the document marked Exhibit "B". Like the first part, which is the waiver of constitutional rights, the second part was also
signed by him, with his wife by his side. The presence of Noemi could only have worked to prevent accused-appellant's will
from being overborne by pressure, let alone intimidation. However, Noemi was never presented to corroborate accused-
appellant's claim that he had been threatened into signing the confession.
(b) As already noted, before answering the questions of the investigator, accused-appellant was informed in Filipino of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his choice and warned that any statement
he gave could be used against him. Nonetheless he willingly gave a statement in order, according to him, to tell the truth.
(c) The NBI investigator Ramon Yap testified on the due execution of the extrajudicial confession and on the fact that accused-
appellant was informed of his constitutional rights but he waived his rights and decided to proceed with the investigation, which
lasted morning and afternoon of April 19, 1994.[19] He denied that the confession had been prepared beforehand and that accused-
appellant was simply made to sign it.
 (d) On April 22, 1994, accused-appellant was taken to the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City, before whom accused-appellant
affirmed his confession. Although accused-appellant claims that he told the prosecutor that the content of the extrajudicial
confession was not true, he does not claim that he complained of any threat, intimidation or force used against him to make him
sign the confession and waiver of rights.[20]
Indeed to disregard the foregoing circumstances and give credence instead to the accused-appellant's claim that he was forced to sign his
confession would be to suggest that accused-appellant's wife, Noemi, the assigned counsel, Atty. Abrenica, the investigator Ramon Yap and
the Assistant City Prosecutor conspired to railroad him to conviction.
The confession of accused-appellant in the case at bar is replete with details, which makes it improbable that it was not voluntarily
given. This is evident in the following portion of the confession:
"09. T: Kung gayon, maaari mo bang sabihin sa akin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ang iyong mga nalalaman na may tungkol sa nangyari sa bahay
ni Mr. PASTOR SAYCON doon sa #99 Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, noong ika-11 ng Abril 1994?
S: Ang nasabi pong bahay ay aming pinasok, at nilooban at ninakawan, noong mga bandang alas dose ng madaling araw ng Abril 11,
1994, araw po ng Lunes.
"10. T: Maaari mo bang isalaysay ng maigi ang mga pangyayari?
S: Noon pong araw ng Sabado, petsa 9, 1994, bandana alas dose ng tanghali ay nagplano sina DIEGO ARUTA at DARIUS CAENGHOG
sa aking tinitirhan sa 101 Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City na papasukin at pagnanakawan ang bahay ni Mr. SAYCON na nasa
kabila lamang ng pader ng aking tirahan. Sinabi nila ito sa akin bandang alas 7:00 ng gabi noon ding po Sabadong iyon. Kinabukasan
araw ng linggo, petsa Abril 10, 1994, bandang alas 7: 00 ng gabi ay dumating sina JHONNY ALCOBER @ "Almar," OSCAR
CLARIZA @ "Lucas," at BENGIE DEMSON @ "Benny." Sila po ay nagtuloy sa aking tinitirhan at doon pa po sila
naghapunan. Bandang alas 10:00 ng gabi ay dumating na rin sina DIEGO at DARIUS sa aking bahay. Kami po tatlo nila DIEGO at
DARIUS ay uminom ng dalawang boteng Ginebra habang sina ALMAR, LUCAS at BENNY ay nagpapahinga sa itaas ng bahay
ko. Habang kami ay nag-iinuman ay panay ang labas nila DIEGO at DARIUS at sinisilip nila sa pader ang bahay ni Mr. Saycon. Ang
plano ni DIEGO ay pasukin namin ang bahay ni Mr. Saycon ng bandang ala-una petsa Abril 11, 1994 pero nainip po sina DARIUS
at ALMAR at sinabi nila na pasukin namin ang nasabing bahay ng bandang alas dose."
Accused-appellant claims that this portion of his confession was supplied by Ramon Yap, the NBI investigator. Yap would not know who the
members of the group were if accused-appellant did not give their names. Accused-appellant does not deny that he knows these persons. In
fact it would seem that Alcober, Clariza and Demson were accused-appellant's townmates because it was to Barogo, Leyte, where according
to the confession, the three fled after the crime. On the other hand, Caenghog was from Carigara, also in Leyte, according to the confession.
2. Accused-appellant's defense is alibi. He claims that at the time of the commission of the crime on April 11, 1994 he was in San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that he went to San Miguel, Bulacan in the morning of April 10 and stayed there until he was picked up by NBI agents on
April 17.[21] Accused-appellant would have called on his relatives Priscilla Dagandang Mabuhay and Antonio Dagandang, as well as Isa Joson,
a neighbor in Bulacan, to testify, except that the prosecution agreed that if presented their testimonies would corroborate accused-appellant's
alibi.[22]
Now the rule is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused.[23] In this case, positive
identification of accused-appellant was made by Joey Rodriguez. Joey was a houseboy of the Saycons. He engaged accused-appellant in a fight
and was stabbed by the latter.[24] He did not know accused-appellant personally but neither was the latter a "total stranger" to him. For the fact
was that accused-appellant's house was just outside the Saycon compound.[25] The premises were sufficiently illuminated by light coming from
the terrace of the house and from the MERALCO street light which made identification of the accused-appellant possible.[26] Joey could not,
therefore, have been mistaken as to the identity of accused-appellant.
Furthermore, the claim that accused-appellant was in San Miguel, Bulacan at the time of the crime was contradicted by prosecution
witness Joselito Aborque.[27] Aborque was also a "taho" vendor. He was a neighbor of accused-appellant. Aborque testified that he saw
accused-appellant in the latter's house with three male visitors at around 7:00 p.m. of April 10, 1994 [28] as he (Aborque) and his wife went out
for a stroll. The defense tried to discredit him by imputing to him a desire to eliminate a competitor since they were both "taho" vendors and
by pointing out that Aborque had given his statement to the NBI five days after the crime. [29] Aborque denied he and accused-appellant were
business rivals.[30] Even if they were, this would not be enough for him to testify falsely against accused-appellant. As for the contention that
it was only on April 16, 1994 that he gave his statement to the NBI, it is sufficient to say that the reluctance of some people to be involved in
criminal trials is a matter of judicial notice. Failure to volunteer what one knows to law enforcement officials does not necessarily impair a
witness' credibility.[31] In any event the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe this witness' demeanor, found his testimony to be
truthful and we find no reason to disregard its finding on this matter.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must establish by clear and convincing evidence not only that he was not present at
the scene of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present there at the time of its commission. [32] This
accused-appellant failed to do. According to him, the distance between San Miguel, Bulacan and Tandang Sora, Quezon City, where the Saycon
compound is, can be negotiated in two and a half hours, and even an hour less if traffic is not heavy. [33] Hence, even assuming that accused-
appellant really went to Bulacan in the morning of April 10, 1994, he could have easily returned to Tandang Sora later the same day.
It is true that none of the witnesses for the prosecution testified having seen accused-appellant stab Felipe Climaco, a point on which the
defense harps.[34] There was conspiracy in this case, however, as shown by the concerted manner in which accused-appellant and his
companions entered the Saycon compound and later withdrew from it and the way they attacked the security guard and the
houseboy. Regardless of the part of accused-appellant in the stabbing of the guard and the wounding of the houseboy, he is liable because of
the rule in conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all. [35]
Moreover, what the prosecution lacked by way of an eyewitness was made up by the circumstantial evidence in the record of this
case.[36] As provided in Sec. 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case it is established that (1) accused-appellant was present at the scene of
the crime; (2) he had a bladed weapon in his possession and displayed a readiness to use the same when he stabbed Joey Rodriguez; (3) Climaco
died due to multiple stab wounds; (4) bloodstains were found on the wall separating the Saycon compound from the house of accused-
appellant;[37] and (5) accused-appellant fled to Bulacan thereafter. His flight is evidence of his guilt.[38] It is logical to infer from all these
circumstances that accused-appellant was among those who inflicted fatal wounds on Climaco. As noted in People v. Abitona,[39] facts or
circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence which,
in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
3. Upon the facts thus established the Court is convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide. While accused-
appellant and his companions failed to rob the Saycons, the fact is that they took the gun of the security guard for the purpose of gain. Since
the group in addition killed the guard, the crime committed is the complex one of robbery with homicide. It is not necessary that the person
robbed be the same person whom the malefactors originally intended to rob. In People v. Ga,[40] the accused planned to rob a house at Forbes
Park in Makati. They killed the house owner, Don Julio Gonzaga, and his wife and houseboy and seriously wounded his daughter and, as help
was coming, they fled without being able to take anything from the house. Instead they took a wristwatch and transistor radio belonging to a
houseboy. It was held that the crime was robbery with homicide.
In People v. Balanag,[41] the accused entered the house of Dr. Guillermo Lopez, Sr. and then killed him for having filed a case against
one of the accused. They fled after taking with them a shoulder bag of Dr. Lopez's daughter, Genoveva. This was also held to be robbery with
homicide.
Nor is it necessary to show that the sole purpose was robbery and by reason thereof homicide was committed. Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that there is robbery with homicide not only when "by reason of the robbery" homicide is committed but also when "on
the occasion" thereof homicide is committed. If robbery and homicide are committed on the same occasion, the special complex crime is
deemed committed.
Thus, in People v. Pamintuan,[42] the accused, who were detention prisoners, escaped from jail, killing jail guards and taking firearms
from the armory. They were found guilty of robbery with homicide.
In People v. Tolentino,[43] three individuals were creating trouble in a store. When a policeman across the street was summoned for help
by the storeowner, the three turned to him and ganged up on him. The accused took the service revolver of the policeman and shot him and
then fled with the gun. It was contended that the taking of the gun was a mere afterthought and that to prove robbery with homicide the
prosecution must show that the robbery preceded the killing. In rejecting this contention, we held:

"The contentions of the accused-appellant are untenable. The testimony of Lourdes Santos clearly shows that there was an intent to rob the
victim of his gun. The gun was first taken from the victim before he was killed. The gun was then taken away and hidden. Nevertheless,
whether or not the taking was before or after the death of the victim is of no moment in this case. It is immaterial that homicide preceded the
robbery where robbery was the real motive of the culprits. (People v. Gapasin 145 SCRA 178). In the case at bar, the accused intended both
to take the gun and kill the victim."
In another case, People v. Hasiron,[44] three individuals, one of whom was the accused, went to the house of the victim and, when told
that he was asleep, left with the advice that they would return. An hour later they returned. They talked with the victim outside his house and
after awhile one of the trio shot the victim, another one went inside his house and took his M-16 Armalite, while the accused took the victim's
service pistol which was tucked in his waist. It was contended that robbery was not the primary motive because if this had been their intention,
they would have robbed the victim of his guns the first time they came. Indeed, the trial court said that the groups' purpose in looking for the
victim was to "confront [him] about something." But the contention was dismissed. Finding the accused guilty of robbery with homicide, this
Court said:

"[T]here is no reasonable doubt that a principal (though not necessarily the only) objective of the malefactors was to take away the firearms
in the possession of the deceased policeman. They evidently knew that Abdulmonim had a firearm in his house, apart from the handgun
tucked in his waist; Jerry Hayudini promptly and unerringly went inside the Aspi house and secured the M-16 armalite, while appellant
pulled out the handgun from Abdulmonim's waist."
4. Now as to the penalty. Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect December 31, 1993, amended Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
as follows:

"Sec. 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

'Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
'1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."'
It provides in Section 23:

"SEC. 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

'Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency.- Mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity
with the following rules:

'1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in
defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

'1(a). When the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.

'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.

'An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. x x x"'
On the basis of these provisions, the trial court imposed on accused-appellant the death penalty.
We hold that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant and his companions constituted a syndicated or an organized crime
group within the meaning of Article 62, as amended. While it is true they confederated and mutually helped one another for the purpose of
gain, there is no proof that they were a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a
syndicated or organized crime group.
The following exchange between Senator Tolentino and Senator Guingona during the deliberation on what is now Art. 62, paragraph 1(a)
of the Revised Penal Code is enlightening:[45]
"Senator Guingona. May we know the difference between the offense committed by a syndicated crime group and one which is committed
by conspiracy of two or more persons.
"Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, the syndicated crime is something like an offense by a group actually for gain purposes. In case of
conspiracy, that is not necessarily so.
"Senator Guingona. So that, that is the only difference.
"Senator Tolentino. The difference, of course, is that in the case of syndicated crime, the group is an organized group, while such
organization is not required in the case of mere conspiracy. Two or more persons just agree to commit a crime, we have a
conspiracy, while in the case of a syndicate there is a group that is actually organized for crime purposes.
"Senator Guingona. How about the difference between the syndicated group and a band in case of specific crimes against persons and
property?
"Senator Tolentino. Well, in the case of a band that means all of them participate in the commission of the offense. All the members, I
think, four or more participate in the commission of the offense. But in the case of a syndicated crime, maybe one member of the
group alone commits a crime, while in the organized group one or two members may commit the crime.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Senator Guingona. Yes, but as can be gleaned from the answer of the distinguished Sponsor, only those who actually commit the offense
would be the one liable for this aggravating circumstance. Those who know but do not participate are not principals, and even if
they are members of the syndicate, they will not be held liable.
"My question is: Would the same situation not arise if we say that conspiracy would qualify the offense instead of having a syndicated
crime here where the member of the syndicated group, who does not participate, is not liable?
"Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I think the concept of syndicate here is different from conspiracy. Two or more persons may conspire
to commit robbery. All right. That is a particular offense. But in the case of a syndicate, the concept here is a group that is organized
for commission of crimes, not only a particular crime, but of crimes. So, there is a big difference between the conspiracy and the
syndicate.
"Now, if the idea of the distinguished President Pro Tempore is to make the mere fact of conspiracy an aggravating circumstance, well,
that is another matter. We can have that as a proposal later on. But mere conspiracy does not constitute a syndicate as conceived in
this provision that we are presenting.
 "Senator Guingona. So that if two or more persons get together and decide to commit one crime only, that is not a syndicate.
"Senator Tolentino. That is not a syndicate. That is a conspiracy.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Senator Guingona. That is why under the circumstances, if there is a conspiracy to sell prohibited drugs, under the principle of
conspiracy, the liability of the seller would be equally applied to the liability of the financier or to the importer.
"Senator Tolentino. But if they are not syndicate, there is no aggravating circumstance. They are all liable equally, but there is no
aggravating circumstance.
"Senator Guingona. Precisely. Can we not change or instead of amending the conspiracy concept, apply that and say that conspiracy will
now be considered as the qualifying aggravating circumstance? In that way, all will have the same liability, and it is up to the
individual person to put up the defense and say: 'I did not know. I was a part of the syndicate, but I was only doing something that
I thought was confined to this.'
"Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, if what the distinguished Gentleman means that instead of 'who belongs to an organized or syndicated
crime group, we just have to say 'who is a part of conspiracy, that will not carry the intent of this provision. Because that means,
whenever there is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a particular crime at one time, we already increase the
penalty. That is not the idea of this. The idea of this proposal is that this group actually engages in the commission of crimes, not
just a particular crime.

"As in the case already mentioned by the distinguished Gentleman, there is a syndicate, but one group commits the crime of selling; another
group commits the crime of importing; another group commits the crime of planting drugs. There are different crimes committed by a single
group that is organized for that purpose.

"But when we talk of conspiracy, we mean an agreement between two or more persons to commit a particular crime. I do not think the
Gentleman can raise that to a level of making it an aggravating circumstance because there is no reason for it. The reason in the syndicated
crime is that it is practically a profession that is being adopted by a group.
"Senator Guingona. Must there be more than one offense planned?
"Senator Tolentino. Maybe, several in the future, not in a particular instance.

"Here is a syndicate that may commit one crime now; another crime tomorrow; another crime two days afterwards. It is really a crime
group."
What emerges from this discussion is the idea of a group of persons, at least two in number, which is organized for the purpose of
committing crimes for gain. In the case at bar, while the evidence shows that accused-appellant and his companions planned to rob the Saycons,
there is no evidence that they were organized for the purpose of committing crimes for gain. There was a conspiracy to commit robbery but
not a syndicated or organized crime group.
The foregoing is the opinion of nine (9) members of the Court, five (5) of whom believe that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime
should have been appreciated by the trial court. To them it is clear that accused-appellant and his companions waited until it was midnight of
April 10, 1994 before carrying out their plan, the better to ensure its success. As earlier noted, three of accused-appellant's companions
(Alcober, Clariza and Demson) arrived at 7:00 o'clock in the evening of April 10, 1994 in the house of accused-appellant. But the group did
not then go into action. At 10:00 o'clock the other two (Aruta and Caenghog) arrived to join the group. Still the group did not strike. They
waited until midnight before they did. All the time, the group was looking over the wall, Evidently accused-appellant and his group were
waiting until the occupants of the house had retired for the night. Even viewed objectively, it can be said that nighttime greatly facilitated the
commission of the crime because with people asleep, the possibility of resistance from the occupants of the house and help from the neighbors
was considerably diminished. As held in People v. Alcala:[46]

"While it does not positively appear that the accused sought the nighttime for the perpetration of the crime, the fact is that they at least took
advantage of it, for they approached the house at an early time, and yet they did not commit the crime until late in the night. This is sufficient
in order that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity may be held to exist. (U.S. vs. Billedo, 32 Phil., 574.)"
Since there is no mitigating circumstance to offset the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, in the opinion of the five (5) Justices the
greater penalty (i.e., death) must be imposed on accused-appellant, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2, no. 1 which provides that when
only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of an offense, the penalty for which is composed of two indivisible penalties,
the greater penalty should be imposed.
Since the votes of the five (5) Justices fall short of the majority of eight (8) votes needed to affirm the sentence of death of the trial court,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant in accordance with Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659.
 On the other hand, four (4) of the Justices, while holding that accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide, do not agree that
nighttime was sought in this case in order to facilitate the commission of the crime and therefore they vote to impose on accused-appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The remaining six (6) other Justices believe that accused-appellant is guilty only of the separate crimes of homicide and physical
injuries. Of these six, four (4) believe that nighttime should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, while two (2) do not think it
should. Two (2) of the six (6) Justices, with whom the other four (4) concurred (so far as the two find the crimes committed to be ho micide
and physical injuries), expressed different reasons for their dissents. One said:
[1] "In People vs. Galit (135 SCRA 465 [1985]), it was held that to satisfy the constitutional guarantees accorded a person under
custodial investigation, 'there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words.' The warning
given to the accused-appellant in the form of two paragraphs falls short of this requirement. He was not informed by the
investigator of his right to a competent and independent counsel of his choice. Neither was he asked whether he has a counsel
of his choice, nor was he given an opportunity to look for one."
[2] "My reading of the PAGPAUBAYA suggests that he waived not just the right to remain silent but also the right to
counsel. However, as can be gleaned from his certification, Atty. Abrenica did nothing as a procured lawyer; he remained as a
mere stolid witness to an act of a lowly taho vendor, which could seal the latter's destiny with death. [The Constitution] requires
of the counsel a meaningful presence consisting of a sincere effort to explain further to the subject the significance, import, and
consequences of the waiver."
[3] "Even assuming that the extrajudicial confession spoke the truth and was not extracted by means of violence or intimidation, the
denial of the accused-appellant's right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective legal assistance when
he waived his constitutional rights rendered the confession inadmissible pursuant to Section 12(3), Article II of the 1987
Constitution."
The other said:
[1] "The NBI ought to have given him reasonable opportunity to get a lawyer of his confidence thru his family or friends before
extracting his confession. The police practice of calling any lawyer on-sight to assist a suspect under custodial investigation
should be discontinued. x x x For generally, these on-sight lawyers give their services free and understandably lack the
enthusiasm to defend the rights of an accused. Atty. Abrenica appears to belong to this variety. x x x The records do not show
how well he advised appellant of his rights.Indeed, he did not even appear during the trial to enlighten the court of the extent of
his legal services to the appellant. When the crime is heinous and punishable by death, it behooves this Court to be strict in
safeguarding the right to counsel of the accused. It can spell the difference between life and death."
[2] "Even assuming that the appellant was not denied the right to counsel, x x x he should only be convicted for the separate crimes
of homicide and physical injuries. x x x They failed to consummate their conspiracy because of the intervention of security guard
Felipe "Philip" Climaco and houseboy Joey Rodriguez. On the occasion of said attempted robbery, accused-appellant and his
companions stabbed Climaco and Rodriguez. Climaco died while Rodriguez sustained serious physical injuries. x x x

"The taking of Climaco's gun cannot be complexed with the stabbing of Climaco and Rodriguez to constitute robbery with homicide. Before
they entered the premises, the group had no intention of robbing Climaco of his gun. It was only Darius, one of the companions of accused-
appellant, who seized Climaco's gun after they had killed him. His act was merely an afterthought. x x x

"The facts in People vs. Tolentino and People vs. Hasiron are different from the case at bar. In those cases, the intent to rob the victims is
clear and the killing was only incidental to the robbery. x x x

"The taking [by another malefactor] of Climaco's gun constitutes theft. Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for theft
because that is not the object of the conspiracy. The evidence shows that the group only conspired to rob the Saycon residence. The rule is
that conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. x x x"
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, so far as it finds the accused-appellant guilty of
robbery with homicide is, AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed on him for lack of necessary
votes to affirm the death sentence.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 123186 July 9, 1998

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

Eric Mendoza and Angelito Balagtas, accused, Eric Mendoza, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

On May 18, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, found 1 the two accused Eric Mendoza
and Angelito Balagtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with rape in Criminal Case No. 1941-
M-91. They were meted out a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to indemnify the victim, Andrelita Sto. Domingo, the
amount of P12,000 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs. From this decision, 2 only Eric Mendoza
appealed. 3 Mendoza was indicted under the following Information: 4

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Eric Mendoza and Angelito Balagtas of the crime of
robbery with rape, penalized under the provisions of Art. 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1991, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with a knife, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of [sic] gain and by means of violence, threats and intimidation enter the house of one Andrelita Sto.
Domingo and once inside, take, rob and carry away with them the following, to wit:
1. cash amounting to P 2,000.00
2. one (1) necklace 2,000.00
3. one (1) set of earning 2,000.00
4. one (1) ring 1,500.00
5. one (1) wrist watch 5,000.00

with the total value of P12,500.00, belonging to the said Andrelita Sto. Domingo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the total amount of P12,500.00 and that simultaneously or during the commission of robbery, the above
named accused Angelito Balagtas by means of violence, threats and intimidation have carnal knowledge of the said
Andrelita Sto. Domingo against her will and by means of force.

That in the commission of this crime the aggravating circumstances were present, to wit: (1) nocturnity, (2) superior
strength and (3) with a [sic] use of a knife.

Contrary to law.

At the trial, the prosecution presented private complainant Andrelita Sto. Domingo as its principal witness. She testified as follows:

In the evening of August 22, 1991, private complainant's husband went to San Jose del Monte, Bulacan to haul chicken. She retired
to their bedroom. She as joined by her three (3)children, while their maid went down to the basement to sleep. 5 The bedroom is on
the elevated portion of their bungalow-type house Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, while another room is located in the
basement. 6 The toilet and bath in the bedroom had a grill-less window with glass jalousies that open to the roof of the terrace. 7 The
lights in the bedroom and the bathroom were on 8 at the time that she and her children fell asleep that evening.

Private complainant woke up when she felt her thighs being rubbed. Thereupon, she saw two (2) men in black jackets with their
faces covered with handkerchiefs. 9 She described one of them as medium built and the other as a small man. The medium-built man
poked a 6-inch knife at her neck and ordered her to open the vault inside the room. 10 The two men took the cash in the vault
amounting to P2,000.00 and jewelry worth P12,000.00. 11

Upon orders of the medium-built man, the small man untied the curtain band and handed the same to him. While undoing the
curtain, the handkerchief loosened, revealing the small man's face to be that of Eric Mendoza. 12 Private complainant recognized him
because he used to work in her uncle's steel factory in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 13 After the medium-built man had tied her
hands with the curtain band and gagged her with a torn t-shirt, the small man helped him carry private complainant to the
bathroom. It was then that she noticed the missing jalousie blades on the window. 14
The medium-built man sent the small man out of the bathroom, through the window, to stand guard on the terrace roof. 15 Alone
with private complainant inside the bathroom, the medium-built man removed the handkerchief covering his face, raised her t-shirt
and began sucking her breast. While keeping the knife pointed at her neck, he forcibly removed her jogging pants and underwear,
laid her on the bathroom floor, and sexually abused her for about two minutes. 16 In the meantime, private complainant could see the
small man peeping through the window and watching her being raped. 17

After satisfying his lust, the medium-built man threatened to kill her and her family if she would tell anyone about what had
happened. He went out through the bathroom window and joined the small man on the terrace roof. 18

In the early morning of August 23, 1991, private complainant's husband arrived and learned of the incident from her. At about
10:00 o'clock that morning, they reported the crime to Mr. Rico Jude Sto. Domingo, the Barangay Chairman of Tumana, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. 19 On August 25, 1991, they also informed the Sta. Maria Police of the incident, but they deliberately left out the
details regarding the rape to avoid public embarrassment. 20

They reconsidered later their decision to keep the rape a secret. On August 27, 1991, they went to the office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) where private complainant was examined by Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., a medico-legal officer. 21 On August 31,
1991, they returned to the Sta. Maria Police Station and reported the rape. 22

Other prosecution witnesses included Dr. Arisala, Jr., the NBI medico-legal officer; Mr. Rico Jude Sto. Domingo, the Barangay
Chairman; and Mr. Rolando de Jesus, an uncle and neighbor of private complainant.

On the witness stand, Dr. Arisala, Jr. confirmed his signature on Living Case Report No. MG-91-863. He stated that there was no
injury on private complainant's genital area. He made no conclusion, however, as to whether or not she was raped, since in cases like
hers where the hymen has been thinned by several completed pregnancies, sexual intercourse no longer causes any injury or
laceration to the hymen. 23

Mr. Rico Jude Sto. Domingo has known Mendoza for six (6) years. He testified that on August 23, 1991, private complainant and her
husband went to his house to report the robbery and rape incident. He made the corresponding entry in the Barangay Blotter. 24 On
August 25, 1991, Mendoza's father presented his son to Mr. Sto. Domingo, who, thereupon, brought them to private complainant's
house. There, a confrontation ensued. Mendoza eventually admitted to having pointed the private complainant's house to Balagtas as
a possible object of robbery. 25 He said that Balagtas was his uncle and identified him as the rapist. 26 After the confession, Mr. Sto.
Domingo turned Mendoza over to the Sta. Maria police before whom he revealed that Balagtas was from San Miguel, Bulacan. The
Sta. Maria police coordinated with the San Miguel police to arrest Balagtas.

Mr. Rolando de Jesus testified that the house of private complainant, who happens to be his niece, is only one hundred (100) meters
away from their house. Their houses are on the side of a private road. While negotiating this road on his car in the evening of August
20, 1991, at about 8:00 o'clock, Mr. de Jesus noticed two persons lingering at the back of private complainant's house. He recognized
one of them to be Mendoza who was seemingly showing to his companion the location of the windows on the second floor of the
house. Mendoza was specifically pointing at the window without iron grills above the terrace roof. 27

There were no other witnesses for the defense except the accused themselves both of whom put up similar claims of alibi.

Mendoza testified that he was in their house in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan with his grandparents and cousins, Totoy, Rodel,
Buboy and Ana in the early morning of August 23, 1991. He denied any confrontation with private complainant at her house where
he allegedly confessed his complicity in the robbery incident. He claimed to have been brought by Mr. Sto. Domingo, the Barangay
Chairman, to the municipal building in August, 1991 where he was detained in a cell, investigated and forced to admit his guilt after
having been mauled for about fifteen (15) minutes.

Balagtas testified that in the early morning of August 23, 1991, he was in their house in Pinambaran, San Miguel, Bulacan. 28 Less
than a year after, he was brought to the municipal building of Sta. Maria where he was, like Mendoza, mauled and forced to make a
confession. 29 He also denied that Mendoza was his nephew. 30

The trial court paid no heed to the defenses of Mendoza and Balagtas. It gave full credence to the evidence of the prosecution which
it found to have established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court ruled, viz:

In view of the foregoing evidence, the Court is morally convinced that the prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Although Eric Mendoza did not participate in sexually abusing the
victim, he and Angelito conspired and helped one another commit the crime of Robbery with Rape.

The crime having been committed before the enactment of R.A. 7659 restoring death penalty, the court can only
impose the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Eric Mendoza and Angelito Balagtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Rape. The Court imposes upon the accused the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

To pay the offended party P12,000.00 actual damage and P100,000.00 moral damage with costs.

SO ORDERED.

The records show that only Mendoza filed a notice of appeal. As to Balagtas, therefore, the trial court judgment has become final
and executory.

Mendoza assigns the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ERIC
MENDOZA HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ERIC MENDOZA. 31

This Court affirms the conviction of Mendoza for the crime of robbery with rape.

First. We are in accord with the trial court's evidentiary findings, largely based on private complainant's testimony, that Mendoza
participated as a principal in robbing her of the cash and jewelries in their house vault. She was a veracious witness whose testimony
was forthright, consistent and credible. In a long line of cases, we have held that if the testimony of the rape victim is accurate and
credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim's testimony because no decent and sensible woman will
publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim. 32 In the instant case,
private complainant's credibility can not be doubted, not only because her testimony is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses,
but also because she had absolutely no motive to falsely implicate the accused. 33 A married woman with a husband and three
daughters would not publicly admit that she had been criminally abused unless that was the truth.

Significantly, too, the private complainant made her statements to the Barangay Chairman and the Sta. Maria Police immediately
after the commission of the crime when she hardly had time or opportunity to fabricate a falsehood.

Nonetheless, Mendoza assails the testimonies of Rico Jude Sto. Domingo and Rolando de Jesus as biased because they are relatives of
private complainant. But mere relationship to the victim is not a ground to exclude a witness or reject his testimony, absent a
showing of evil motive on his part to testify falsely against the accused. 34 The defense, in this case, made no such showing, hence, the
testimonies of Sto. Domingo and de Jesus are worthy of full faith and credit. 35 In fact, as relatives of the victim, they are naturally
interested in implicating only the real culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 36 While revenge is a normal
reaction in a person who has lost loved ones because of a crime, it does not follow that the revenge would be directed aimlessly so as
to include innocent persons. 37

Second. We do not believe Mendoza's alibi. He insists that he was at home in the early morning of August 23, 1991 with his
grandparents and four (4) cousins. The defense, however, failed to put them on the witness stand. Neither did they execute any
statement under oath to substantiate Mendoza's alibi. At any rate, we have consistently ruled that where an accused's alibi can only
be confirmed by his relatives, his denial of culpability deserves scant consideration, especially in the face of affirmative testimonies of
credible prosecution witnesses as to his presence in the crime scene. 38 For his alibi to be considered favorably, Mendoza must prove
not only that he was somewhere else when the crime took place but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed. 39By his own admission, Mendoza lives in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, or in the same
area as the victim's residence. It was easy for Mendoza to negotiate the distance between his house and the victim's house. Mendoza's
alibi cannot exculpate him.

Third. Mendoza claims that he was mauled into confessing culpability for the robbery. In the first place, there is no proof at all of the
mauling incident to support his charge. More importantly, independent of that confession, there is evidence beyond reasonable
doubt of his participation as co-conspirator in committing the robbery. To repeat, the victim positively and unequivocally identified
him and her testimony has been corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses.

Fourth. Mendoza underscores that the stolen items were not recovered from him by the police. It has never been the rule in this
jurisdiction, however, that such a fact can diminish the guilt of a robber whose complicity in the crime has been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption that a person in whose custody are found stolen items, is prima facie the robber or the
thief, 40 does nor translate into a converse presumption that a person indicted for robbery or theft should be acquitted when the
authorities do not recover the stolen items from him. The production in court of the stolen property is not an indispensable requisite
to sustain conviction as long as there is clear proof of the commission of the crime charged. 41

Fifth. Mendoza claims that he has been charged and convicted of a crime he did not commit, considering that he did not rape
Andrelita Sto. Domingo. If at all he were guilty of a crime, it was only of robbery, not robbery with rape.

We disagree.

Robbery with rape is a special complex crime punished under the second paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons —Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 1 or article 263 shall have been inflicted: Provided, however, That when the
robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

. . . . (emphasis ours)

When two or more persons are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of robbery with rape, the conspiracy to rob is all
that is needed to be proven to punish them all as principals in the crime of robbery with rape. The rape may have been
perpetrated by only one of them, but they will all be convicted of robbery with rape, because the rule in this jurisdiction is
that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are
liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them actually took part in the rape. 42 It is enough
that robbery shall have been accompanied by rape to be punishable under the The Revised Penal Code which does not
differentiate whether the rape was committed before, during or after the robbery. 43 Thus, we have held in one case that
where one of the accused acted as guard while rape was being committed on the occasion of the robbery, he is guilty as co-
principal of the crime of robbery with rape. 44 As we explained in the 1918 case of United States v. Tiongco:

. . . [T]he robbers seizing the money and the other effects they found in said house, two of them sullied the honor of
the two women living therein, and the companions of the two men who committed the rape made no opposition nor
prevented these latter from consummating this other crime, apparently unconnected with and unrelated to that of
robbery, but which, as well as sanguinary crimes, is often committed on such occasions, and it is for this reason that
the penal law, in odium of such offenses against property and chastity, has considered them complex and punished
them by one single penalty.

. . . The defendants Rufu Tiongco and Pedro Huerva, who took no part in the rape of the women Juaneza and
Eusula, cannot be excepted from this penalty for the reason that the penal law does not require the condition that
the rape be committed prior to, or simultaneously with the robbery, it being sufficient that this crime be
perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. So the law says, in the definition of the crime, that when the robbery is
accompanied by rape or mutilation caused purposely, all the robbers who took part in the perpetration of the
complex crime are liable for all the offenses falling within the limitation of certain circumstances specified by the
law, committed by the members of the band.

xxx xxx xxx

Therefore, the defendants Tiongco and Huerva, for the very reason that they are liable for the said crime of robbery
in a band, are likewise liable for all the other acts performed on the occasion of the robbery, although they may not
actually and materially have taken any part in the rape committed upon those two women by the other two
defendants, their companions Ledesma and Castano.
 If any of the defendants had wounded or killed an inmate of the house that they robbed, all the defendants would,
under the law, have been punished for the complex crime of robbery with the infliction of wounds of the
commission of homicide; and, in the present case, because two of the robbers raped two women, all the malefactors
are liable for the complex crime in question. 45

In other words, for Mendoza to be convicted only of the crime of robbery, he must prove not only that he himself did not
abuse the victim but that he tried to prevent the rape. We have previously ruled that once conspiracy is established between
the two accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by
one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from
committing rape. 46

Mendoza cannot seek sanctuary in our jurisprudence that where there is no evidence that the accused was aware of his co-accused's
lustful intent and his consummation thereof so that he could have attempted to prevent the same, the former should be held only for
the robbery and not for the rape. 47 In the case at bar, the evidence shows that during the commission of the rape, Mendoza climbed
up and out of the bathroom through the window and stayed at the roof of the terrace. The window, located above the roof of the
terrace, was about 3-1/2 meters away from where the victim and Balagtas were. Mendoza knew of the rape because the private
complainant saw him peep through the window and watch what was being done to her by Balagtas. Nonetheless, Mendoza did
nothing to prevent the rape.

Lastly, Mendoza submits that the trial court erred in not appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in his
favor, considering that he was allegedly born on June 30, 1975 and was thus only 16 years, 1 month, and 23 days old on August 23,
1991, the day the crime was committed.

The burden of proof that Mendoza was a minor at the time of the commission of the offense is on him. 48 He presented, however,
conflicting evidence of his date of birth. On the one hand, when Mendoza filed in the trial court a Motion for Release of the Accused
Under Recognizance 49 on August 21, 1992, he attached a photocopy 50 of his birth certificate indicating his birthday to be June 30,
1981. On the other hand, when he testified in open court on September 8, 1992, he declared that he was born on June 30,
1975. 51 And then just two days after that declaration, he filed in the trial court a Manifestation 52 with an original copy of his birth
certificate, complete with documentary stamps and the seal of the Local Civil Registrar of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, indicating his date of
birth to be June 30, 1974. 53

After going through the said evidence, we find that Mendoza was born on June 30, 1974 and was thus 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. The special mitigating circumstance of minority under Paragraph 2, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code
should, therefore, be appreciated in Mendoza's favor. Said provision reads:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. . . .

1. . . .

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed but always in the proper period.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of robbery with rape is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 61 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in degree is reclusion temporal. We agree with the trial court that the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. Even the defense did not make
any issue of this. When one or more aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime, with no ordinary
mitigating circumstances to offset them, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. 54 The imposable penalty prescribed by
law, therefore, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. We further apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law authorizing the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. 55 In
view of all these, this Court imposes upon Mendoza the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its
maximum period to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal in its maximum period.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 14,
Malolos, dated May 18, 1995, finding ERIC MENDOZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape and
liable for P12,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages, with costs, is HEREBY AFFIRMED with the
modification that this Court imposes upon ERIC MENDOZA an indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its
maximum period to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal in its maximum period. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

MICHAEL PADUA, G.R. No. 168546

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
July 23, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for certiorari and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004[3] and July 28, 2004[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of
violating Section 5,[5] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,[6] otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for selling
dangerous drugs.[7] The Information reads:

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a.
Allan and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. Mike, with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in
relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:

On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar
Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to
sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1
Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops, which was found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.[8]

When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.[9]

During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Paduas counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea
of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 70[10] of Rep. Act No. 9165. The
prosecutor interposed no objection.[11] Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order[12] stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was
considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.Hence, in a Decision[13] dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of
the crime charged:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of
R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art.
39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation[15] dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who
desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 [16] (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as The Probation Law of
1976 and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under
the said laws.

The RTC in an Order[17] dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation
and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment
on the said petition within five days from receipt of the order.

On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC
recommending that Paduabe placed on probation.[18]

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation
on the ground that under Section 24[19] of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by
the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:

Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared
by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation
Office, Josefina J. Pasana.

In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed
on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare
Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore,
do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua
y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.

On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for Treatment and
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of
either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.

More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or
Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that
minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of
probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:

Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended. (underlining supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it
is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[20]
 Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises the
following issues:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR
PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
[02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN
VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER
PURPOSES.[22]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment [23] as its Memorandum. In its
Comment, the OSG countered that

I.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE
II OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.

II.
SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH
THE LAW HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.[24]

Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts order
denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344,[25] the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
violated? and (3) Does Section 32[26] of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law have
application in this case?

As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[27]

Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [28]

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas petition for
probation.

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear
under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:

SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for
drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what it says.[29] If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index
animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.[30] Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.[31]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to
provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous
hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11[32] and 15[33] of the Act. The law considers the users and
possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua,
are categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to
mend their ways.[34] The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of
Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.[35]

The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested
for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first
offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep.
Act No. 9165.

As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006 was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law has application in this case. Section 68[36]of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of
sentence and not probation.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38[37] of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners
benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40[38] of
Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child,
order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child[39] for purposes of applying
Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152044. July 3, 2003]

DOMINGO LAGROSA and OSIAS BAGUIN, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67308,[1] which affirmed the Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, denying petitioners Application for Probation, and its Order denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[2]
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On October 29, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, rendered a decision in Criminal Case No. 8243, [3] finding
petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for
having in their possession forest products without the requisite permits.The trial court sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor,
as maximum. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the decision[4] was denied by the trial court on November 21, 1996. [5]
Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20632.[6] On March 14, 2000,
the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modification as to the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.[7] The decision became final and executory on April 12, 2000.
On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court, [8] which, as mentioned at the outset, was
denied. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67308.[9] On January 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
affirming the questioned resolutions of the trial court.
Hence this petition, raising the following arguments:
1) That Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended by PD No. 1990, is very absurd and illogical considering that
petitioners were not given the opportunity to apply for probation when they were convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
Branch 2, because the penalty imposed by said court is more than six (6) years and therefore non-probationable.
That the first opportunity for herein petitioners to apply for probation was when the Court of Appeals modified the sentence
imposed by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, to six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days as maximum which is clearly probationable.
2) That the ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Pablo Francisco versus Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108747,
is not applicable to the instant case because in the said Francisco case the accused therein can apply for probation because the
penalty imposed by the lower court was already probationable but the accused instead appealed the decision but in the case of
herein petitioners they cannot apply for probation when they were convicted because the penalty imposed by the lower court
was more than six (6) years and therefore non-probationable.
3) That the decision of the Court of Appeals herein sought to be reviewed is clearly contrary to the purpose of the Probation Law.[10]
The law that is at the heart of this controversy is Presidential Decree No. 968, also known as the Probation Law, as amended by P.D.
1990, the pertinent provision of which reads:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place
the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. (underscoring ours)
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

Under Section 9 (a) of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years
are disqualified from seeking probation.
It should be noted that before P.D. 968 was amended by P.D. 1990, the accused was allowed to apply for probation even after he had
already filed an appeal, as long as he had not yet begun to serve his sentence. [11]
Petitioners contend that they should be allowed to apply for probation even if they had already appealed the decision of the trial
court. They argue that their case should be considered an exception to the general rule which excludes an accused who has appealed his
conviction from the benefits of probation. In the case at bar, the trial court sentenced petitioners to a maximum term of eight years, which was
beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation after the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the
trial court and reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed on them to one year, eight months and twenty-one days.[12] They submit that
the ruling in the case of Francisco v. CA[13] is not applicable because in that case, the accused appealed their conviction notwithstanding the
fact that the maximum term of the prison sentence imposed on them by the trial court was less than six years. [14]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the express provision of P.D. 968 prohibiting the grant of probation to those
who have appealed their convictions.[15] It argues that, even if the petitioners have appealed for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty,
this fact does not serve to remove them from the prohibition in Section 4 of P.D. 968 for the law makes no such distinction. [16]
There is no question that petitioners appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioners
Application for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of
Appeals had affirmed their conviction, petitioners were clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. [17]
However, petitioners now ask us not to apply the letter of the law, claiming that their situation should be considered an exception to the
rule. Their petition is without merit.
Petitioners repeatedly assert that their application for probation was made at the first opportunity, undoubtedly invoking the fourth
whereas clause of P.D. 1990, which reads:

WHEREAS, probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but
should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated; x x x.
To bolster this assertion, petitioners claim that what prompted them to appeal the decision of the trial court was the erroneous penalty
imposed by the trial court.[18]
Petitioners are not being very candid. In their appellants brief filed in CA-G.R. CR No. 20632, they raised the following assignment of
errors:
I

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BECAUSE THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM LACKS MORAL CERTAINTY.
II.

IF EVER ACCUSED ARE GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PROPER PENALTY AS PROVIDED BY
LAW.
The fact that petitioners put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that their appeal was prompted by what
was admittedly an incorrect penalty.Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence,
and do not simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for the
purpose of correcting a wrong penalty to reduce it to within probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting
their innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso factorelinquished
the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of
an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. [19]
Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the
penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, [20] we are not yet prepared to accept this proposition, specially given the factual
circumstances of this case. Had the petitioners appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon
them as the sole issue, perhaps this Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led to
their own undoing.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 2002 in CA-
G.R. No. 67308, which affirmed the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, denying petitioners Application for
Probation, and its Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., I reiterate my separate (dissenting) opinion in Francisco vs. CA (243 SCRA 384, 399).

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpusfiled by Anastacio
Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance
should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience
to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the
President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme
power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights
inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called
period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented
from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht
ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary
of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the
inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the
basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the
case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the
existence of a government de factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been
based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy
territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be
construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that
in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete
after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of
the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them,
such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with
the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that
just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his
own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the
allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso
factoacquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the
protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of
the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in
his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the
territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of
the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of
government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or
not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and
espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order,
such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear
relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become
inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra);
and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against
the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter
was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code,
was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the
occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless,
all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the
exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the
country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs.Director of
Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated
within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the
legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such
laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or
suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their
legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection
of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government
or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through
force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and
weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without
the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation
against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their
own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign
country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal
Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of
the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made,
upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established
 by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution
of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine
Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government
or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding
officials under this constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain
limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only
by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the
Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice
regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of
complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed.,
691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive
departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.

Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was
one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away
or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own
sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during
the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of
those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government
and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby
denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion
therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate
opinion.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason
may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has
started.

As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an
emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm
attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should be allowed to be
sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly
be the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.

Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that,
since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article
114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended.

Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to his government or his sovereign in
return for the protection which he receives.

"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or
subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.
"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under
whose protection he is." United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.

Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on him who enjoys the protection of the
Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection,
arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.

By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives,
or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a
qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at
least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and
an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence. Carlisle vs.United
States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.

"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King, in return for that protection
which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the
former being perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King's dominions
immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual,
and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an implied
contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects
have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their
own misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they
remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which
would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be
subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing
allegiance to the government of a state, for they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in
allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)

Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject; the duty which is due from
every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and
fealty to the federal government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government or to the
sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he receives;
that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.

Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance — that which arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired
allegiance — that arising through some circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local
allegiance-- that arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance — that arising
from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every one upon
attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)

Allegiance. — the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his
sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).

"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state — the obligation of obedience
and support which he owes to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of
persons owing this allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who operate this machinery
constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed
as legally supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1
American Journal of International Law, p. 915.).

The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character. This principle had been aptly stated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:

Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty protection on
the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)

Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which the government affords him.
The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the protection received.

It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or
unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
 xxx xxx xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the
former to his government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a
temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426.
(1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).

The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution
of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article
II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides somewhere else, on
symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the people and only the
people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been
exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the
famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an
entity different and in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern
democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our
people.

To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may be some plausibility in the proposition
that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because
our government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential
attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy
occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation
between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of
"suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be
what they are.

The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.

There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and
insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the
benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their
home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may
the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?

Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already decided in
Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The
advent of independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the United States of her power to
exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty,
following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United States of
America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the
American people, accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in
the Filipino people.

The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part
of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945,
the same Filipino people took part — outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United
Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future democratic federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those who
adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired by all who want to be spared the sufferings,
misery and disaster of another war.

Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief
Executive, such as the power granted by the Election Code to the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong
reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power
to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended
any valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the Commonwealth which, by his theory
of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the Japanese occupation.

Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the
mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By
petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended.
Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative
in time of war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the
sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for the moment the
absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same
should be suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or civil service may claim
exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.

Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the Commonwealth Government having been
incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition
is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has to
disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that
organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to
the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty
and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should
continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal protection.

After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the
Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions
in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases
where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept petitioner's theory.

If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized
society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation
and the only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens.

Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical
and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's
proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based on
feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or
some of the feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only
provokes repelling and repulsive feelings — hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural
incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies between our people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any
feeling of attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the
morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the
most inoffensive of our citizens.

Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further slapped, may appear to be divinely
charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with
human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology remains as it is,
the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on hatred?

The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of international law, could not have established in
our country any government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that
banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people.

One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do anything not
forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by
whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the
smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium of the invaders.

Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the day when
Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national security
"committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive departments have jointly declared
that during the period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security,
including article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should be enforced.

That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate
and the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed by
petitioner, could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court
may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not
suspended and that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending
treason cases at any cost.

Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted principles of international law, although
this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak
nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by
petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally accepted principles of international law. As the latter
forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to
accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in
nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own
children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent.

Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?

There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even since the Pacific war started on
December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be
remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by
Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall
continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in force laws
and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations
as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order
to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall
be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as
scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not
have available the necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.

Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice to those
who, although innocent, are now under indictment for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will
be dismissed without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which
appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other accused who were really traitors to their country. Our
conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma
of having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of law that they are
free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of test.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was
nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the
Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to the United States was not suspended, as well
as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them
forth:

I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.

(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had
evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their
respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which preceded
that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be
capable. Up to that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that
account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us now
to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.

But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for entirely different reasons and from
entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not
only to involve the contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death and
destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral
ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous
Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the United States
in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President Truman of June 7, 1945:

International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international legislature.
Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a change
circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled principles to new
situations.

xxx xxx xxx

After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of
international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or
the institution of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to those who
engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and
criminal.

The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg
Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and practically all the nations of the world,
renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and
condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.

Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and comes close to being an act of deception.
In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, "war
between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal throughout
practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the
duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete many legal
precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.

This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the
common sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime.

Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared that "a war of aggression
constitutes .. an International crime. . . .

The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member-
nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American
Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that "war of aggression
constitutes an international crime against the human species."

xxx xxx xxx

We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern international law has abolished the defense
that those who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of
peace. ("U.S.A. — An American Review," published by the United States Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis
supplied.).

When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law" and "the re-establishment of
the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a
distinction between the just and the unjust war — the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph
of the same report.

In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught in
the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one
of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the view-point that all war is legal
and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as
other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring that a war
of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression
constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of
aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive
catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and later, in rapid succession, against other allied
nations, was a war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its
attack against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.

Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended
allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by
Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.

Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific area into a
seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 of the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war
as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means. Thus
she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter. With
the modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the
outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed
and renounced. This is only one way of saving that the rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military
occupation were automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the
pact.

If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a war is an international crime against the
human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or
positive law, acquire or posses any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally
invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense
— and only this sense should we speak here — with respect to this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a
man's house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either to the person of the owner or to his
property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on
the part of the burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the
crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war
criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be
forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes trials. Neither
should we lose sight of the further fact that this government has a representative in the international commission currently trying the
Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United Nations
in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war
already renounced war as an instrument of national policy (Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of
the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain
areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of international law which might be applicable to a military occupation
occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own
government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes
against humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such
circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and
government?

(b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere hypothesis — that when Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain other
areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance
of the allegiance owed to a notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to the occupant
the power to interfere with.

. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus forbidden to take certain measures which he
may be able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the
individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family
honor and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection with or residence in the occupied territory.

The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . .
(III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.)

. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the authority of the occupant is not
sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)

The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the
continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful
sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the
passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other
hand, he may compel them to take an oath — sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' — . . . willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.'
Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the
right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the
inhabitants an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance,
it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.

(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the one's country is unable to afford him in its
protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such
distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent and lasting,
ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring. The outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or
thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and
promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and
promptings of the spirit of the people should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to
the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous
invader and, in consequence was disabled from affording them protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and
loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only
tend to aggravate their crime.

II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."
The Filipino people are the self-same people before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the
Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with
them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be
known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and
the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines." Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical
government thereafter — only the name of that government was to be changed.

Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in all
criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in
prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in article 114 of
said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of
the Constitution which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution"
— of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII).
Under both governments sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from
that people — they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change in its respect.

If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the
same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused owed
allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Article XVI,
section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most
that can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence — that they became, politically, fully
of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age,
why should the responsibility for the crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically independent
be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the same — only his status has changed.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with the
generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation.
Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are
considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124),
and that the rule "that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75,
Phil., 875, 881.)

The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will naturally suspends all laws of a political
nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command, such action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States
Rules of Land Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114
of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as
interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other
construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention, which,
moreover, have entirely different factual bases.

Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to
the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has
completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the district occupied by the
Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative
organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders
provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the
explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and
excepting the application of "laws and regulations which are not proper act under the present situation of the Japanese Military
Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes."

The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the
principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling to note that
the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated by the
desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over progressive needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of international
law, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the
belligerent occupant "takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . .
the occupant is likely to regard to himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with
his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are
permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p.
1879.)

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power, whose interest and
requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and
enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for
the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of
such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country" (Hague
Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the
government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant
`is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety
of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions."
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International
Law, Vol. II. Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)

He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied territory were required to obey two
antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage:

To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws,
regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright
illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually
hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions — on the one hand bound to
continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only
temporary, to Japan.

The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political complexion and taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new
offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant
(Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), — must be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination.
And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by
the de jure government or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military
occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the
fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that
the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we
were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with
illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain
or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not
compete with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the
enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial sovereign,
through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant has ordained obedience to such command
within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from the prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III,
Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)

As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war
crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupant, against which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to
understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal
Code, but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.

In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended
during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the
meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298):

No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to
the rights of the accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military
occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the
Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words
employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition,
page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated
completely.

In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the Japanese military occupation against the
United States or the Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal
provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because of
the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a
retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension was
good only as to the military occupant?

The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As analyzed and described in United
States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States — the court of highest human
authority on that subject — and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the
war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and while no department of this Government was inclined to
magnify the rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in
favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case
grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken
the port of Castine, in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the
United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place
by treaty restored to the United States, and after that was done Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so
introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would have been
liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British
forces in hostility to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of the United States
(the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was
dispelled by the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the
court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are
liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties
cannot be sustained. . . . The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States
could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the
surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during
this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to
such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into the Unites States.' The court
then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and
the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American duties could
be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion:
'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from
authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerents occupation, is to be governed by
him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the
United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering the
opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be
obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign
territory, and that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory of
its former sovereign, the United States."

But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the
exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague
Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to
our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot
nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully
enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the
majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of
the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial
sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have
become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the military occupant to suspend
all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare,
1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory
of another State does not operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer
receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the
victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)

The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of treason was obligatory
on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an
absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom.
The comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he
is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of political nature of his own
government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants
of an occupied territory can expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States the right to
exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that States should
provide system of law and of courts, and in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This
does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges
which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are
granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)

When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country or, in
the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been
contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part,
of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised
Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be "delivered."

The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the military occupant to legally recruit the
inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the
suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds of
services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of taking part military operations against their own country."
Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if
compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law should be corrected
by such world agency as the United Nations organizations.

It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed
or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey
the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the
entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas — after the formal surrender of our and the American
regular fighting forces, — they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering that the latter's military strength at the
time and the long period during which they were left military unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the
atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction.

If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the Philippines, it was because the feigned
cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it
was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the
people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this
line of thought is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the
outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military force
exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants
from taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions
and cause to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate
success in its major conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions, proceed to
utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised
Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a little more
than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the
Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with,
regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)

Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of
the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial
decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is
cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were
undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people as a whole, passively
opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way
of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-
Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and
informers subjected themselves to the perils of military operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas
and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the returning sovereign; those who
committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group
even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to person or
property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the
majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more
by personal motives than by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers
found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the
guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions
imposed by them upon the real traitors.

It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos
were effected while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the Philippines, when their mere physical presence implied
force and pressure — and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government — that we will come to realize
that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense
indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did not in any
wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however,
everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival
of himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.

Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and
restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now
existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control."
Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme
Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President of the United States, and later embodied in the
Hague Conventions of 1907."

The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to take oath to the hostile power," was
inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be
bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the point clear,
by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all the laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to
take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American
Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it,
and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the
application of force by the occupant, from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by
the population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and
allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better position to
know what will save them during the military occupation than any exile government.
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against the use of judicial process for non judicial
ends, and attacked cynics who "see no reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot
Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a man
in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have
got his just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are
enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty men
escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These
passages were taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.

If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the Japanese military occupation, they were at
most — borrowing the famous and significant words of President Roxas — errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said
"feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos,
contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to their country.

Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military occupation, the present Republic of the
Philippines has no right to prosecute treason committed against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government
which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the
provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43
Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that
"sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said
declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was subervient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution under which, in addition to its many provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear
that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had to make said
declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not
have announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their posterity the "blessings of
independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent country under the Commonwealth
Government.

The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status
nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.

The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been seen that the exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as
delegated by a State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can
be easily appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and executed by governmental agencies
of its own creation and which are not subject to the control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or
of State life which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental agencies of another State.
Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental
agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State
whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of
the State by which they were originally created.

By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State
possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted.
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so
slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is
recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the
mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only
administrative autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the so-called
Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the central Government the exercise of almost all of their
powers of Government and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its
sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as
to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of
any considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local self-government be granted to
particular districts. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75.).

The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the American Union which, it is alleged,
preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the
Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express
will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign
status of the individual States is no longer contested.

It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such autonomous powers as they now
possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme
 Court of the United States has held that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or electing the President, or
ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government.
(Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)

This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is
no longer contested. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)

Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the
deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree.
While the Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States and
did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic
of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the
United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is
therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make
the Constitution applicable to the Republic.

Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippines Islands shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the
effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these
constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious.
The latter article can remain operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that
said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to
the United States or the government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former,
whereas under the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the
United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted,
and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law.

In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National
Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be
taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S., 308), rendered in May, 1937,
wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier
case only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United States.

No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the United States in practice regards
the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood," since said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of, the Philippine
Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States had to
issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it was
General MacArthur, and not President Osmeña who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United
States Congress, and not the Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice-President of the
Philippines.

The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may
have been committed against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is
immaterial because, as we have already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different
sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.

Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.

TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine,
and the costs.

The information charged:

That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in
the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and
the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere
to the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war, giving the
said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:

That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial
forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations against the United States and the Philippines, the herein
accused bore arm and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements
against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo
and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945.
Contrary to Law.

The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of defendant's having joined the Makapili
organization. What the People's Court found is that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of
personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded
them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the
accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military
uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period,
the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in
Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to
the mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the Americans."

Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution
witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused
took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on
different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that
the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one
witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a
routine military chore, or just walking or eating.

We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the
purposes for which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations
assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to
eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in
the Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses.
Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the
circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)

At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the
punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason
was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though an
opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological
comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his
cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused
and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from that of enlisting in the invader's
army.

But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case
meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform
bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from American sources on its meaning and
scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have
commented on it. We cull from American materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:

In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the same overt act, was held to mean that there
might be one witness to an overt act and another witness to another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has
been intimated that the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: "The
opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is
wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional
provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule
in England.

More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:

Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the
overt act.

Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to produce two
direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of
two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence,ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918),
decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually
gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported
by the testimony of two witnesses."

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the possible objection that the reasoning
by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which
our treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so exacting and so
uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is
believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the
culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences,
however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a
substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.

The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two
witnesses but said that the founders of the American government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but
because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional Convention
"as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p.
272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in
the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the
farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a
quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too
fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It
must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced
in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not
merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because
one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'"

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who introduced that
provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and
rigidity as the American forefathers meant.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

HILADO, J., dissenting:

Being unable to bring myself agree with the majority upon the application of the two-witness rule herein, I am constrained to dissent.
As I see it, being a member of the Makapili during the Japanese occupation of those areas of the Philippines referred to in the information,
was one single, continuous, and indivisible overt act of the present accused whereby he gave aid and comfort to the Japanese invaders. That
membership was one and the same from the moment he entered the organization till he was captured. The fact that he was seen on a certain
day by one of the state witnesses being a member of the Makapili, and was seen by another state witness but on a different day being a
member of the same organization, does not mean that his membership on the first day was different or independent from his membership on
the other day — it was the selfsame membership all the way through. A contrary construction would entail the consequence that the instant
defendant, if we are to believe the allegations and proofs of the prosecution, became or was a member of the Makapili as many times as there
were days from the first to the last.

T.E. Holland defined "acts" in jurisprudence as follows:

Jurisprudence is concerned only with outward acts. An "act" may therefore be defined . . . as "a determination of will, producing an
effect in the sensible world". The effect may be negative, in which case the act is properly described as a "forbearance". The
essential elements of such an act are there, viz., an exercise of the will, an accompanying state of consciousness, a manifestation of
the will. (Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., unabridged, p. 25.)

There can, therefore, be no question that being a member of the Makapili was an overt act of the accused. And the fact that no two witnesses
saw him being such a member on any single day or on the selfsame occasion does not, in my humble opinion, work against the singleness of
the act, nor does the fact that no two witnesses have testified to that same overt act being done on the same day or occasion argue against
holding the two-witness rule having been complied with.

My view is that, the act being single, continuous and indivisible, at least two witnesses have testified thereto notwithstanding the fact that one
saw it on one day and the other on another day.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and
JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other
similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with
2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing
off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas,
was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38
caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered
three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the
PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The
crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the
assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9,
1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to
arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where
it remained at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where
another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer,
after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the
crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or
until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven
by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-
on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of
April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to
the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After
three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the
mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was
filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532),
committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and
armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC
TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes
were unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March
1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi
Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they
were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each
worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they
had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied
having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were
paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was
neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is
the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the
"Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He
was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including
shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's
letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel
"Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the
amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with
Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was
assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong
was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase.
Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong
was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before
departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list.
Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration
falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with
"M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain
Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the
latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor
prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan
and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the
company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same
procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by
the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for
the transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong
was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel
was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in
under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also
checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter
arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of
piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as
accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death.
However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all
the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T
Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to
said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6%
per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby
ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said
cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value
of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused
Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
 All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of
Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings
taken during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right
to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of
the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after
Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial investigation, they were
subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were
denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they
committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not
guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in
declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his
cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3)
the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction
to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the
same and which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his part in the commission of the
crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing
the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer
represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and
(5) can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by
him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco,
and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer.
Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the
full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they
voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February
11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on
the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law."
(Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel."
By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of
accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will
show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fidelawyer,
Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People
vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the
effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the
very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-
called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United
States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of
accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be
regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral
certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice
Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less,
who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at
about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the
officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of
Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to
the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
 xxx xxx xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their
cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of
the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately
after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto
Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said
Accused as some of the pirates.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded
the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to
be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare
testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain
denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the seashore at
Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said
accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families,
without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such
evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon,
Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar
place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10,
1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more
so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and
difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was
physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that
he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an
untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which
may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned
to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew
and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated.
Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task
in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of
Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his
brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close.
Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas.
Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been
accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco
(aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in
Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which
amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential
Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word
"any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only
apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to
offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any
person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the
whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of
its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:

d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided
(Italics supplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by
any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the
pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel
in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states
from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended,
and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was
committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T
Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine
waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in
criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the
penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No.
532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v.
Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio
Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably
one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which provides:

SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who
knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or
in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway
robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of
an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the
commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr.,
125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does
any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken
by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from
"M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services
personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port
Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-
134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by
accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port
Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the
illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen
cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated
goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the
Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port
authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of
Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening),
that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and
transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a.
Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred
to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the
"Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the
amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March
29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded
1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The
second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his
end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of
the source of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same
from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the cargo
transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even
a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and
documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor
did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a
marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of
money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It
should also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the
exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been
aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation — only
to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-
appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.

Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in
performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's
superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on
board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and
immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented
himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have
realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to
conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the
consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment
of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.